fix(llama-embed): raise the memory limit to match its own context and batch

#739 raised the context from 2048 to 4096 and the micro-batch from an effective 512 to 1024, both to match how Paperless chunks documents. It left memory at 2Gi/4Gi, which was sized for the smaller values. The pod ran fine interactively and was OOMKilled (exit 137) partway through the first sustained run, around 300 documents into an embedding pass. Nothing in the server log marked it — the process was killed outright, so the last line is a half-finished task and the reason is only visible in the container's lastState.terminated. This would have surfaced when Paperless first indexed the archive, i.e. on the first real use rather than under test. The weights are only ~600 MiB. What sets the footprint is four slots at 4096 context with a 1024-token micro-batch, plus Vulkan allocating the iGPU working set from system RAM where it counts against this cgroup — the same effect that put llama-server at 32Gi for 19 GiB of weights. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 08:14:19 +02:00
113 changed files with 345 additions and 6057 deletions
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@
 # the admin account could (#330).
 #
 # The token is still OWNED by gitea_admin, because Gitea scopes packages to
-# a user or org namespace and most of these images live under `gitea_admin/*`.
-# The rebuild-critical ones additionally publish to `konairius/` — an org
-# created for the ghcr mirror path, with gitea_admin as a member so this same
-# token can push there. The full gitea_admin/* -> org migration is a
-# 38-reference change tracked separately in #330 rather than bundled here.
-# Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that motivated the
-# other cutovers does not apply to it.
+# a user or org namespace and these images live under `gitea_admin/*` — a
+# different account cannot publish there. Moving them to a dedicated org is
+# the remaining cleanup; it is a 38-reference migration across pipelines and
+# Flux-deployed CronJobs, so it is tracked separately in #330 rather than
+# bundled here. Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that
+# motivated the other cutovers does not apply to it.
 when:
  - event: push
    path:
@@ -88,30 +87,6 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest

-  - name: build-vmtest
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
-    directory: ci/images/vmtest
-    depends_on: []
-    when:
-      - event: deployment
-      - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/vmtest/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
-    environment:
-      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
-      GITEA_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ci_images_token
-    commands:
-      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
-      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
-      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-      - |
-        /kaniko/executor \
-          --context . \
-          --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:latest
-
  - name: build-tofu
    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
    directory: ci/images/tofu
@@ -172,28 +147,6 @@ steps:
  # not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
  # container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
  # the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
-  #
-  # Published THREE times, and the third one is not a typo. Its consumers — the
-  # zigbee2mqtt seed-data init container and the trmnl renderer — start while
-  # the cluster is still being rebuilt, and at that moment gitea.renner.uno does
-  # not exist, because Gitea runs inside the cluster being built. A cold-rebuild
-  # rehearsal caught both in ImagePullBackOff.
-  #
-  # So there is a copy on ghcr.io. But the manifests must NOT point at it:
-  # normal operation pulls from the local registry, and an external reference
-  # would make every steady-state pull leave the network. The recovery source
-  # and the everyday source are different things, exactly as they are for Flux's
-  # git source.
-  #
-  # Talos resolves that with machine.registries.mirrors, which takes an ordered
-  # endpoint list — gitea first, ghcr second (bootstrap.sh). Containerd keeps
-  # the repository path when it falls through, so the two registries have to
-  # agree on it: `gitea_admin/alpine-jq` cannot be served by ghcr, where the
-  # namespace is fixed to the account name. Hence the second Gitea destination
-  # under konairius/, which the manifests reference and which matches the ghcr
-  # path exactly.
-  #
-  # The gitea_admin/ copy stays until nothing references it any more.
  - name: build-alpine-jq
    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
    directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
@@ -206,47 +159,23 @@ steps:
      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
      GITEA_TOKEN:
        from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
    commands:
      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
      - |
        /kaniko/executor \
          --context . \
          --dockerfile Containerfile \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest

  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
  # baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
  # node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
  # critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
  # where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
-  #
-  # This one ALSO publishes to ghcr.io. A cold-rebuild rehearsal proved why: the
-  # DaemonSet could not pull from gitea.renner.uno, because Gitea runs inside the
-  # very cluster being rebuilt. Without the plugins there is no macvlan, so
-  # Multus cannot attach ceph-san, so Rook's network canary never starts, so the
-  # CephCluster sits at "Configuring Ceph Mons" — and OpenBao waits forever for a
-  # PVC that will never bind. Moving the download here fixed the integrity gap
-  # but quietly swapped github.com on the critical path for something strictly
-  # worse: a registry that by definition does not exist during a recovery. The
-  # GHCR copy is public, so a bare node can pull it with no credential and no
-  # Gitea.
-  #
-  # The test that proved this also proved the rule is not specific to this
-  # image. alpine-jq and alpine-openssl mirror for the same reason — see the
-  # note on build-alpine-jq. Anything an app needs while the cluster is still
-  # being built cannot live only in that cluster's own registry.
  - name: build-cni-plugins
    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
    directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
@@ -259,36 +188,23 @@ steps:
      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
      GITEA_TOKEN:
        from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
    commands:
      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
      - |
        /kaniko/executor \
          --context . \
          --dockerfile Containerfile \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest

  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
  # needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
  # fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
  # every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
  # base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
-  #
-  # Mirrored to ghcr.io for the reason given on build-alpine-jq: it is an init
-  # container, so paperless does not start without it, and during a rebuild
-  # gitea.renner.uno is not there to serve it. A cold-rebuild rehearsal left
-  # paperless in Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
  - name: build-alpine-openssl
    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
    directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
@@ -301,25 +217,17 @@ steps:
      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
      GITEA_TOKEN:
        from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
    commands:
      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
      - |
        /kaniko/executor \
          --context . \
          --dockerfile Containerfile \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest

  # Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
  # run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an
@@ -349,30 +257,3 @@ steps:
          --dockerfile Containerfile \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
-
-  # netbird-proxy-services: the controller that reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy
-  # services (public Ingress hosts -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP).
-  # Runtime artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
-  - name: build-netbird-proxy-services
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
-    directory: ci/images/netbird-proxy-services
-    depends_on: []
-    when:
-      - event: deployment
-      - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/netbird-proxy-services/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
-    environment:
-      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
-      GITEA_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ci_images_token
-    commands:
-      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
-      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
-      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-      - |
-        /kaniko/executor \
-          --context . \
-          --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:latest
@@ -7,21 +7,7 @@ when:
      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
      # so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
      - "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
-      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
-      - "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
      - "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
-      # The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
-      # Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
-      # and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
-      # LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
-      # while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
-      #
-      # pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
-      # file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
-      # any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
-      # group membership needs a manual deployment run.
-      - "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
-      - "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
      - ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
  - event: deployment
    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
-# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
-#
-# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
-# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
-# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
-# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
-# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
-#
-# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
-# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
-# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
-# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
-# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
-# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
-vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
-          $ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
-          32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
-          3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
-          36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
-          6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
-          39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
-          6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733
@@ -26,7 +26,3 @@
    - docker-install
    - netbird-proxy
    - netbird-proxy-watchdog
-    # Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
-    # enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
-    # nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
-    - crowdsec-edge-bouncer
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
---
-# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
-#
-# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
-# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
-# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
-# cluster.
-#
-# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
-# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
-# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
-# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
-
-# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
-# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
-crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
-crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
-
-# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
-# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
-# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
-# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
-# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
-#
-# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
-# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
-# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
-crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
-crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
-
-# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
-# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
-# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
-#
-# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
-# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
-# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
-# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
-#
-# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
-# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
-# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
-# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
-# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
-# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
-# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
-crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
-
-crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
-crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
-
-# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
-# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
-# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
-crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
-crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
-# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
-# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
-# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
-# retry_initial_connect matters.
- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    state: restarted
-    daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
---
-# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
-#
-# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
-# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
-# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
-# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
-# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
-# package downloads.
-
- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
-  ansible.builtin.package:
-    name: nftables
-    state: present
-
- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
-#
-# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
-# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
-# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
-# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
-# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
-# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
-# it manipulates host netfilter.
-#
-# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
-# there, before anything is copied to a host.
- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
-  ansible.builtin.get_url:
-    url: >-
-      https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
-      crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
-    dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
-    mode: "0644"
-  delegate_to: localhost
-  become: false
-  run_once: true
-
-# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
-# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
-# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
-# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
-# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
-# host.
- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    mode: "0644"
-
-# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
-# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
-# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
-  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
-    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    dest: /opt
-    remote_src: true
-    include:
-      - crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-
- name: Install the bouncer binary
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    remote_src: true
-    mode: "0755"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
-# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
-    dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
-    dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
- name: Enable and start the bouncer
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-    daemon_reload: true
-
- name: Report how to read it
-  ansible.builtin.debug:
-    msg: |
-      crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
-
-      What it would block:  journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
-      What it does block:   nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
-      Metrics:              curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
-
-      Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
-      both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
-      removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
-#
-# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
-# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
-# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
-# that has to resolve before the first connect.
-[Unit]
-Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
-After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-Type=notify
-# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
-# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
-ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
-ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=10
-LimitNOFILE=65536
-KillMode=mixed
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
-mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
-update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
-
-# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
-# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
-# hosts without journald.
-log_mode: stdout
-log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
-
-api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
-api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
-
-# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
-# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
-# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
-# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
-# absent from the shipped example config.
-retry_initial_connect: true
-
-disable_ipv4: false
-disable_ipv6: false
-deny_action: DROP
-
-supported_decisions_types:
-  - ban
-
-# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
-# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
-# at the default filter priority.
-nftables:
-  ipv4:
-    enabled: true
-    set-only: false
-    table: crowdsec
-    chain: crowdsec-chain
-    priority: -10
-  ipv6:
-    enabled: true
-    set-only: false
-    table: crowdsec6
-    chain: crowdsec6-chain
-    priority: -10
-
-# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
-# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
-# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
-nftables_hooks:
-  - input
-  - forward
-
-prometheus:
-  enabled: true
-  listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
-  listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}
@@ -32,13 +32,8 @@ netbird_watchdog_fail_threshold: 3

 # Minimum seconds between watchdog-issued restarts, so a genuinely broken
 # backend can't put the proxy into a restart loop. Shared by both the URL-probe
-# watchdog and the flood watchdog below. One minute: the route-manager wedge
-# recurs on every routing-peer loss, and rolling node reboots lose one peer
-# every few minutes; a suppressed restart there leaves the wedge standing
-# until the URL probe's three rounds fire (3.5 min of 000 on every domain,
-# measured 2026-09-07). A minute still caps a loop at one restart per
-# probe interval.
-netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 60
+# watchdog and the flood watchdog below.
+netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 600

 # Log fingerprint of the reverse-proxy route-manager wedge, matched as a plain
 # substring in the proxy's docker logs by the flood watchdog. On this build the
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# netbird-proxy-services: reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services (public
-# domains -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP) from Ingresses carrying the
-# public label. Standard library only, so the image is the interpreter plus one
-# file; runs unprivileged as its own user.
-FROM python:3.13-slim
-
-RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin controller
-COPY controller.py /opt/controller.py
-
-ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
-USER controller
-ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/opt/controller.py"]
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""netbird-proxy-services: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
-
-Source of truth: every Ingress carrying the public label (dns.renner.uno/public).
-For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
-service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
-subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
-Traefik untouched, the proxy terminates nothing, and no domain resource is
-involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers.
-
-Ownership is derived from NetBird itself, not from local state: a service is
-managed iff its mode is "tls" and its target is this controller's subnet
-resource. Services that do not match (the hand-made HTTP/domain ones) are never
-touched; a desired host held by such a service is reported and skipped until
-that service is removed by hand.
-
-Credentials: the NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
-Kubernetes auth role, exactly like the setup-key rotator; it never lands in a
-Kubernetes Secret or in a log line.
-"""
-
-import json
-import logging
-import os
-import sys
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-
-LOG = logging.getLogger("netbird-proxy-services")
-
-NB = os.environ.get("NB_MANAGEMENT_URL", "https://netbird.renner.uno").rstrip("/")
-BAO_ADDR = os.environ.get("BAO_ADDR", "http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200").rstrip("/")
-BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "netbird-proxy-services")
-BAO_PAT_PATH = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_PATH", "homelab/data/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird")
-BAO_PAT_KEY = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_KEY", "pat")
-SERVICE_CIDR = os.environ.get("SERVICE_CIDR", "10.96.0.0/12")
-NETWORK_NAME = os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME", "k8s public ingress")
-ROUTER_GROUP = os.environ.get("ROUTER_GROUP_NAME", "k8s-ingress-router")
-SOURCE_GROUP = os.environ.get("SOURCE_GROUP_NAME", "All")
-TRAEFIK_NS, TRAEFIK_SVC = os.environ.get("TRAEFIK_SERVICE", "ingress/traefik").split("/", 1)
-PUBLIC_LABEL = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABEL", "dns.renner.uno/public")
-LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "443"))
-INTERVAL = int(os.environ.get("INTERVAL_SECONDS", "60"))
-HTTP_TIMEOUT = 20
-
-K8S_API = "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
-K8S_TOKEN_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
-K8S_CA_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
-
-
-class ApiError(Exception):
-    pass
-
-
-def http(method, url, body=None, headers=None, cafile=None):
-    data = None if body is None else json.dumps(body).encode()
-    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
-    req.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
-    if data is not None:
-        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-    for k, v in (headers or {}).items():
-        req.add_header(k, v)
-    ctx = None
-    if cafile:
-        import ssl
-        ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile)
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT, context=ctx) as resp:
-            raw = resp.read()
-            return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
-        detail = e.read().decode(errors="replace")[:300]
-        raise ApiError(f"{method} {url} -> {e.code}: {detail}") from None
-
-
-# --- Kubernetes -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-def k8s(path):
-    with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
-        token = f.read().strip()
-    return http("GET", K8S_API + path, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}, cafile=K8S_CA_FILE)
-
-
-def desired_hosts():
-    sel = urllib.parse.quote(f"{PUBLIC_LABEL}=true")
-    ingresses = k8s(f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses?labelSelector={sel}")
-    hosts = {}
-    for ing in ingresses.get("items", []):
-        ref = f'{ing["metadata"]["namespace"]}/{ing["metadata"]["name"]}'
-        for rule in ing.get("spec", {}).get("rules", []):
-            host = rule.get("host")
-            if not host or host.startswith("*"):
-                continue
-            hosts.setdefault(host, ref)
-    return hosts
-
-
-def traefik_cluster_ip():
-    svc = k8s(f"/api/v1/namespaces/{TRAEFIK_NS}/services/{TRAEFIK_SVC}")
-    for ip in svc["spec"].get("clusterIPs", []):
-        if ":" not in ip:
-            return ip
-    raise ApiError(f"{TRAEFIK_NS}/{TRAEFIK_SVC} has no IPv4 ClusterIP")
-
-
-# --- OpenBao ----------------------------------------------------------------
-
-def netbird_pat():
-    with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
-        jwt = f.read().strip()
-    login = http("POST", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/auth/kubernetes/login", {"role": BAO_ROLE, "jwt": jwt})
-    bao_token = login["auth"]["client_token"]
-    kv = http("GET", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/{BAO_PAT_PATH}", headers={"X-Vault-Token": bao_token})
-    pat = kv["data"]["data"].get(BAO_PAT_KEY)
-    if not pat:
-        raise ApiError(f"OpenBao {BAO_PAT_PATH} has no key {BAO_PAT_KEY}")
-    return pat
-
-
-# --- NetBird management -----------------------------------------------------
-
-class NetBird:
-    def __init__(self, pat):
-        self.h = {"Authorization": f"Token {pat}"}
-
-    def get(self, path):
-        return http("GET", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
-
-    def list(self, path):
-        # An empty collection comes back as an empty body / null, not [].
-        return self.get(path) or []
-
-    def post(self, path, body):
-        return http("POST", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
-
-    def put(self, path, body):
-        return http("PUT", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
-
-    def delete(self, path):
-        return http("DELETE", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
-
-
-def group_id(nb, name):
-    for g in nb.list("groups"):
-        if g["name"] == name:
-            return g["id"]
-    raise ApiError(f"NetBird group {name!r} not found")
-
-
-def ensure_network(nb):
-    for n in nb.list("networks"):
-        if n["name"] == NETWORK_NAME:
-            return n["id"]
-    n = nb.post("networks", {"name": NETWORK_NAME,
-                             "description": "managed by netbird-proxy-services; public ingress via TLS passthrough"})
-    LOG.info("created network %s (%s)", NETWORK_NAME, n["id"])
-    return n["id"]
-
-
-def ensure_resource(nb, net):
-    for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/resources"):
-        if r.get("address") == SERVICE_CIDR:
-            return r["id"]
-    r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/resources", {"name": "cluster service CIDR", "address": SERVICE_CIDR,
-                                              "description": "managed by netbird-proxy-services",
-                                              "enabled": True, "groups": []})
-    LOG.info("created subnet resource %s (%s)", SERVICE_CIDR, r["id"])
-    return r["id"]
-
-
-def ensure_router(nb, net, router_group):
-    for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/routers"):
-        if router_group in (r.get("peer_groups") or []):
-            return r["id"]
-    r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/routers", {"peer_groups": [router_group], "metric": 9999,
-                                            "masquerade": True, "enabled": True})
-    LOG.info("created router on group %s (%s)", ROUTER_GROUP, r["id"])
-    return r["id"]
-
-
-def ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group):
-    name = f"{NETWORK_NAME} access"
-    for p in nb.list("policies"):
-        if p["name"] == name:
-            return p["id"]
-    p = nb.post("policies", {"name": name, "enabled": True, "rules": [{
-        "name": name, "enabled": True, "action": "accept", "protocol": "tcp",
-        "ports": [str(LISTEN_PORT)], "bidirectional": False, "sources": [source_group],
-        "destinationResource": {"id": resource, "type": "subnet"}}]})
-    LOG.info("created policy %s (%s)", name, p["id"])
-    return p["id"]
-
-
-def service_body(host, resource, target_ip):
-    return {"name": host, "domain": host, "mode": "tls", "listen_port": LISTEN_PORT, "enabled": True,
-            "targets": [{"target_type": "subnet", "target_id": resource, "protocol": "tcp",
-                         "host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True}]}
-
-
-def is_managed(svc, resource):
-    return svc.get("mode") == "tls" and any(t.get("target_id") == resource for t in svc.get("targets") or [])
-
-
-def target_matches(svc, target_ip):
-    if svc.get("listen_port") != LISTEN_PORT or not svc.get("enabled"):
-        return False
-    ts = svc.get("targets") or []
-    return len(ts) == 1 and ts[0].get("host") == target_ip and ts[0].get("port") == 443 \
-        and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled")
-
-
-def reconcile():
-    hosts = desired_hosts()
-    target_ip = traefik_cluster_ip()
-    nb = NetBird(netbird_pat())
-
-    router_group = group_id(nb, ROUTER_GROUP)
-    source_group = group_id(nb, SOURCE_GROUP)
-    net = ensure_network(nb)
-    resource = ensure_resource(nb, net)
-    ensure_router(nb, net, router_group)
-    ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group)
-
-    by_domain = {s["domain"]: s for s in nb.list("reverse-proxies/services")}
-    created = updated = deleted = held = 0
-
-    for host, ref in sorted(hosts.items()):
-        svc = by_domain.get(host)
-        if svc is None:
-            nb.post("reverse-proxies/services", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
-            LOG.info("created %s (from %s) -> %s:443", host, ref, target_ip)
-            created += 1
-        elif not is_managed(svc, resource):
-            LOG.warning("%s is held by unmanaged service %s (mode %s); remove it to migrate",
-                        host, svc["id"], svc.get("mode"))
-            held += 1
-        elif not target_matches(svc, target_ip):
-            nb.put(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
-            LOG.info("updated %s -> %s:443", host, target_ip)
-            updated += 1
-
-    for domain, svc in by_domain.items():
-        if is_managed(svc, resource) and domain not in hosts:
-            nb.delete(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}")
-            LOG.info("deleted %s (no public Ingress carries it any more)", domain)
-            deleted += 1
-
-    LOG.info("reconciled: %d hosts desired, %d created, %d updated, %d deleted, %d held by unmanaged services",
-             len(hosts), created, updated, deleted, held)
-
-
-def main():
-    logging.basicConfig(level=os.environ.get("LOG_LEVEL", "INFO"), stream=sys.stdout,
-                        format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
-    if os.environ.get("ONCE") == "1":
-        reconcile()
-        return
-    while True:
-        try:
-            reconcile()
-        except Exception as e:  # keep running; the next pass retries
-            LOG.error("reconcile failed: %s", e)
-        time.sleep(INTERVAL)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
-
-# Everything `bootstrap.sh vmtest` needs, so the rebuild test can run as a Job in
-# the cluster instead of on a workstation. The workstation has 31G and the test
-# wants ~14.5G for four VMs — a single run left under 1G headroom, and two
-# overlapping runs OOM-killed the session. The nodes have ~94G with 70G free.
-#
-# Separate from ci-k8s rather than built on it: that image pins talosctl v1.12.6,
-# and this test creates a cluster at the version talos/patches/cluster.yaml
-# installs. A talosctl older than the Talos it provisions is exactly the kind of
-# skew the test exists to catch, so it must not be baked in here.
-#
-# KEEP TALOS_VERSION IN STEP with the installer image tag in
-# kubernetes/talos/patches/cluster.yaml. The phase reads the version from that
-# file at run time and passes it to the provisioner; this pin only decides which
-# client talks to it.
-ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.9
-ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
-ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
-ARG KOPIA_VERSION=0.23.1
-
-# qemu-system-x86_64 and qemu-img are the provisioner's actual backend, and ovmf
-# supplies the UEFI firmware those VMs boot from — without it the provisioner
-# stops with "the required flash image was not found in any of the expected
-# paths", having already downloaded the ISO and generated the PKI. Note the
-# firmware comes from ovmf specifically: qemu-system-x86_64 ships an edk2 CODE
-# image but no VARS, which is the half the provisioner needs.
-#
-# iptables is shelled out to by the CNI plugins that build the VM network; the
-# provisioner fails with "error accessing iptables" without it. The rest is
-# what the phase shells out to: helm for the Cilium install, yq to read the
-# HelmRelease and the installer image, jq for OpenBao's seal status.
-#
-# Versions come from the digest-pinned base rather than being pinned one by one,
-# the same way ci-ansible does it.
-RUN apk add --no-cache \
-      bash \
-      ca-certificates \
-      curl \
-      git \
-      helm \
-      iptables \
-      jq \
-      openssl \
-      ovmf \
-      qemu-img \
-      qemu-system-x86_64 \
-      yq
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
-      "https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
- && echo "7e1d4b7d5846964bdcf63a794e3c8161bb6ef2983d5ace58ea5322f3bf32a27e  /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
-      "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl" \
- && curl -sfL -o /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
-      "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha256" \
- && echo "$(cat /tmp/kubectl.sha256)  /usr/local/bin/kubectl" | sha256sum -c - \
- && rm -f /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kubectl
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/flux.tar.gz \
-      "https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/releases/download/v${FLUX_VERSION}/flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" \
- && echo "4092b367fd060097976fb7261601f79420ecf7266328417dfd8dfee27de0e6a3  /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
- && tar -xzf /tmp/flux.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin flux \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flux \
- && rm -f /tmp/flux.tar.gz
-
-# kopia reads the Velero backup repository directly, which is what the OpenBao
-# restore does when there is no Velero yet to do it: the credentials Velero
-# needs live in OpenBao, so OpenBao cannot be restored by Velero. Its absence
-# was found by a rebuild rehearsal reaching the restore for the first time and
-# stopping at "kopia not found".
-#
-# Same checksum-verified download as the tools above; the tarball unpacks into
-# a versioned directory, so the binary is pulled out by name.
-RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/kopia.tar.gz \
-      "https://github.com/kopia/kopia/releases/download/v${KOPIA_VERSION}/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
- && echo "416d0f84a3dbb321a8b2d8f0997b1a0a6e915babe79ee76fa6e4d2bd1e1c5178  /tmp/kopia.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
- && tar -xzf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz -C /tmp \
- && mv "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64/kopia" /usr/local/bin/kopia \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kopia \
- && rm -rf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64"
@@ -2,12 +2,7 @@

 Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
 metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
-after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
-
-All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
-reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
-k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
-rebuild, not as outstanding work.
+after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.

 Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
 actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were
@@ -120,14 +120,7 @@ spec:
    server:
      resources:
        requests:
-          # 500m, not 200m: the HPA below targets 70% of *this* request, so at
-          # 200m the scale-up threshold sat at 140m — below the pod's own
-          # ordinary peak. Measured over 7d, a warm server pod p99s at ~108m
-          # and peaks at ~190m, and a freshly-started one burns ~300m booting
-          # Django. That made the HPA oscillate 2<->3<->4 all day and pin at
-          # maxReplicas (KubeHpaMaxedOut, issue #761). At 500m the threshold
-          # is 350m/pod, above the boot burst, so only real load scales out.
-          cpu: 500m
+          cpu: 200m
          memory: 1Gi
        limits:
          memory: 2Gi
@@ -161,11 +154,7 @@ spec:
    worker:
      resources:
        requests:
-          # Same reasoning as server above, and the worker is burstier still:
-          # over 7d its per-pod p99 reaches ~336m and peaks hit ~630m while
-          # running blueprint applies and scheduled tasks. 200m understated
-          # that badly enough that routine task batches read as saturation.
-          cpu: 500m
+          cpu: 200m
          memory: 1Gi
        limits:
          memory: 2Gi
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ resources:
  - prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
  - wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
  - llama-gate-egress.yaml
+  - outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-cnp.yaml
@@ -111,23 +111,9 @@ statistics             max_id=13323904    max_start_ts=1787162400.0
 statistics_short_term  max_id=159205762   max_start_ts=1787166000.0
 ```

-## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
+## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)

-Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
-
-| table | rows | span |
-|---|---|---|
-| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
-| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
-| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
-
-The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
-pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
-across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
-document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
-at Postgres.
-
-The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
+Do not start until phase 1 is verified.

 **Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
 HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.
@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ spec:
        # Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
        # effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
        #
-        # Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
-        # repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
-        # without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
+        # INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
+        # `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
+        # homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
+        # when a referenced secret is missing.
        - name: render-db-url
          image: busybox:1.36
          command:
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
              memory: 32Mi
      containers:
        - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
 # That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
 # what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
 #
-# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
-# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
-# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
-# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
-# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
-# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
+# STAGING
+# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
+# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
+# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
+# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
+# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
 apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
 kind: Cluster
 metadata:
@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ resources:
  - zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
  - zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
  # Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
-  # Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
-  # long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
+  # PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
+  # on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
+  # tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
  - ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
  - ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
  - ha-pg-cluster.yaml
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ spec:
      # Two processes rather than one: socat carries a single address pair per
      # invocation, and the families need different receive and send addresses.
      # They are independent — one crashing does not blind the other — and each
-      # carries its own supervisor loop.
+      # is restarted by the kubelet on its own.
      containers:
        # -u is load-bearing on both: unidirectional, left to right. Without it
        # socat would also carry HA's replies back out, and this must stay a
@@ -77,29 +77,17 @@ spec:
        # UDP4-SENDTO takes its A record and UDP6-SENDTO its AAAA. See
        # mdns-relay-service.yaml for why that indirection is required and why
        # the Service is dual-stack.
-        #
-        # Supervisor loop: socat exits 1 on the first datagram it cannot
-        # deliver, and the ClusterIP has no backend while HA restarts. The
-        # trap forwards SIGTERM so the pod still terminates promptly.
        - name: socat-ipv4
          image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
-          command:
-            - /bin/sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              trap 'kill "$pid"; exit 0' TERM INT
-              while :; do
-                socat -u \
-                  "UDP4-RECV:5353,ip-add-membership=224.0.0.251:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,reuseaddr" \
-                  "UDP4-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353" &
-                pid=$!
-                wait "$pid"
-                echo "mdns-relay: socat-ipv4 exited ($?); restarting in 2s" >&2
-                sleep 2
-              done
-          # No probes. The supervisor loop is the liveness story; a probe here
-          # could only re-assert that PID 1 is running.
+          args:
+            - -u
+            - "UDP4-RECV:5353,ip-add-membership=224.0.0.251:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,reuseaddr"
+            - "UDP4-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
+          # No probes. socat is a single process with no health surface: if it
+          # exits, the container exits and the kubelet restarts it, which is the
+          # entire liveness story. A probe here could only re-assert that PID 1
+          # is running.
          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 10m
@@ -126,20 +114,10 @@ spec:
        - name: socat-ipv6
          image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
-          command:
-            - /bin/sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              trap 'kill "$pid"; exit 0' TERM INT
-              while :; do
-                socat -u \
-                  "UDP6-RECV:5353,ipv6-join-group=[ff02::fb]:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,ipv6-v6only=1,reuseaddr" \
-                  "UDP6-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353" &
-                pid=$!
-                wait "$pid"
-                echo "mdns-relay: socat-ipv6 exited ($?); restarting in 2s" >&2
-                sleep 2
-              done
+          args:
+            - -u
+            - "UDP6-RECV:5353,ipv6-join-group=[ff02::fb]:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,ipv6-v6only=1,reuseaddr"
+            - "UDP6-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 10m
@@ -57,14 +57,7 @@ spec:
          # and leaves this one untouched (tags are not deleted), so this keeps
          # resolving — but the image then came from the branch build rather than
          # master. Re-point it at a master-built tag when convenient.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/: this init container runs during a cold
-          # rebuild, when Gitea does not exist because it runs inside the
-          # cluster being rebuilt. The node then falls back to a ghcr.io copy
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
-          # keeps the repository path when it falls through — so the path has to
-          # exist on both registries. Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
    # Kept permanently as a standing guard.
    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
 spec:
-  # A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
-  # vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
-  # long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
-  # format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
-  instances: 2
-  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
-  # (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
-  # terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
-  # on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
+  # Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
+  # pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
+  # paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
+  # vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
+  instances: 1
+  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
+  # the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
+  # down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
+  # even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
  smartShutdownTimeout: 10
  stopDelay: 60
  imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,10 +36,8 @@ spec:
      database: immich
      owner: immich
  postgresql:
-    # vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
-    # extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
-    # in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
    shared_preload_libraries:
+      - vectors.so
      - vchord.so
    parameters:
      shared_buffers: "512MB"
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
 spec:
  replicas: 1
-  # The startupProbe below sanctions a 40 min cold download, but the default
-  # progressDeadlineSeconds is 600. Left implicit the Deployment declares
-  # ProgressDeadlineExceeded at 10 minutes while the probe is still legitimately
-  # waiting, and KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck fires 15 min after that on a rollout
-  # that is fine. Kept above the startup budget, with room for the image pull
-  # and scheduling that happen before the first probe.
-  progressDeadlineSeconds: 3000
  # A rolling update would load a second copy of the weights onto the same
  # iGPU and into the same node's RAM before releasing the first.
  strategy:
@@ -82,62 +75,11 @@ spec:
            # many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
            - --threads
            - "4"
-            # 16k is room to spare, not a safety limit. The limit that matters
-            # is not set here at all.
-            #
-            # Isolated by bisection on a scratch pod: this stack breaks on
-            # PROMPT length, and the value of --ctx-size makes no difference to
-            # it. Measured at --ctx-size 65536 with a single slot, so with four
-            # times the headroom:
-            #
-            #     13588 prompt tokens   coherent answer
-            #     15086                 one token, immediate EOS, empty content
-            #     16088                 CJK characters and digit runs
-            #
-            # A single request past that boundary then poisons the slot: the
-            # same 13588-token prompt that answered cleanly a minute earlier
-            # returns one empty token afterwards, and stays broken until the
-            # pod restarts. That is why it looked intermittent, and why a
-            # 650-token classification once came back as 1025 tokens of "!" —
-            # it followed Home Assistant's ~19k prompts through the same slot.
-            #
-            # Nothing reports any of it: finish_reason "stop", a well-formed
-            # OpenAI response, HTTP 200, /health green.
-            #
-            # So the operating rule is about callers, not this flag. Paperless
-            # sits near 5k and is safe; Home Assistant's Assist prompt measured
-            # 18910 and never had a chance. An earlier version of this comment
-            # blamed --ctx-size 32768, which the bisection disproves — 32768
-            # and 65536 both answer correctly as long as the prompt stays under
-            # the boundary.
-            #
-            # The same stack also fails hard at --ubatch-size 2048, which is
-            # the loud version of a limit this one keeps quiet about.
-            #
+            # 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
+            # and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
+            # layers use full attention.
            - --ctx-size
            - "16384"
-            # One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
-            #
-            # Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
-            # also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
-            # of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
-            # 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
-            # "Context size has been exceeded".
-            #
-            # They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
-            # generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
-            # shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
-            # to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
-            # here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
-            # Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
-            #
-            # No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
-            # its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
-            # would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
-            # asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
-            # kill healthy pods during a long document.
-            - --parallel
-            - "1"
            # A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
            # with ErrorDeviceLost.
            - --ubatch-size
@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
 spec:
  replicas: 1
-  # Same reasoning as llama-server: the startupProbe budget (600s) must stay
-  # below progressDeadlineSeconds, whose default is also 600 — exactly equal, so
-  # any cold download that uses most of its budget trips
-  # KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck on a rollout that is still progressing normally.
-  progressDeadlineSeconds: 900
  strategy:
    type: Recreate
  selector:
@@ -46,7 +41,7 @@ spec:
          image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
          args:
            - --hf-repo
-            - gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
+            - Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
            # Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
            - --embeddings
            # A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
@@ -55,41 +50,28 @@ spec:
            # One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
            # reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
            - --alias
-            - bge-m3
-            # bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
-            # Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
-            # llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
-            # outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
-            # trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
-            # rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
-            # pooling types were needed.
+            - qwen3-embedding-0.6b
+            # Qwen3-Embedding is trained for last-token pooling. Left
+            # unspecified llama-server takes the GGUF's default, which is not
+            # visible from outside and would silently produce vectors the model
+            # was not trained to emit. Set before anything is indexed: changing
+            # pooling later invalidates every stored embedding.
            - --pooling
-            - cls
+            - last
            - --n-gpu-layers
            - "99"
            - --threads
            - "2"
-            # Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
-            # tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
-            # Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
-            # llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
-            # at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
-            # "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
-            #
-            # The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
-            # a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
-            # broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
-            # --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
-            # run them mismatched, so both are set.
-            #
-            # 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
-            # ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
-            # 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
-            # this does not need to find out.
+            # Paperless chunks documents at 1024 tokens. The defaults are
+            # batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with --embeddings llama-server
+            # clamps both down to 512 rather than run them mismatched — below
+            # the chunk size. Matching both to 1024 fits a whole chunk in one
+            # pass; 2048 is deliberately avoided, since that is where this
+            # Vulkan stack fails with ErrorDeviceLost.
            - --batch-size
-            - "1536"
+            - "1024"
            - --ubatch-size
-            - "1536"
+            - "1024"
            # Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
            - --ctx-size
            - "4096"
@@ -109,22 +91,24 @@ spec:
            capabilities:
              drop:
                - ALL
-          # Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
-          # 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
-          # well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
-          # at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
-          # weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
-          # same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
-          # candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
-          # their model size.
+          # The weights are only ~600 MiB, but that is not what sets the
+          # footprint: four slots at 4096 context with a 1024-token micro-batch,
+          # and Vulkan allocating the iGPU's working set from system RAM where
+          # it counts against this cgroup.
+          #
+          # 4Gi was sized for the earlier 2048 context and 512 micro-batch. Both
+          # were raised to match Paperless's chunking without raising this, and
+          # the pod then survived interactive use and was OOMKilled (137) partway
+          # through the first sustained run — roughly 300 documents in. Indexing
+          # the archive would have hit it on day one.
          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 250m
-              memory: 2Gi
+              memory: 4Gi
              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
            limits:
              cpu: "2"
-              memory: 8Gi
+              memory: 10Gi
              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
          # ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
          # model needs, but still sized for a cold download.
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
 ---
-# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
-# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
-# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
+# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by the Deployment's initContainer.
+# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away several
+# GiB of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
 #
-# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
-# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
-# inference time.
-#
-# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
-# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
-# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
-# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
-# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
-#
-# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
-# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
+# ReadWriteMany so a second replica or a one-off benchmark Job can mount the
+# same weights; the models are read-only at inference time.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
@@ -28,4 +18,4 @@ spec:
  storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
  resources:
    requests:
-      storage: 120Gi
+      storage: 40Gi
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Cilium's agent ServiceMonitor, declared here rather than by the chart.
-#
-# Reproduces what cilium 1.20.1 renders with prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled,
-# taken field for field off the live object so scraping is unchanged: same name,
-# same namespace, same selector, same 10s interval and node relabeling.
-#
-# It lives here because the chart's template is gated on monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-# existing at install time, and on an empty cluster it does not — those CRDs
-# arrive with kube-prometheus-stack, which reconciles after infrastructure.
-# Cilium is one of infrastructure's healthChecks, so the chart aborting on the
-# missing CRD held the whole cluster: CNI waiting on monitoring waiting on CNI.
-#
-# velero/helmrelease.yaml already does exactly this for its own SM/PM and says
-# why; this is the same move for the component where it mattered most.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: cilium-agent
-  namespace: kube-system
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: cilium
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - kube-system
-  # The chart's Service keeps rendering (prometheus.enabled), so the target and
-  # its `metrics` port are there regardless of who declares the ServiceMonitor.
-  targetLabels:
-    - k8s-app
-  endpoints:
-    - port: metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      relabelings:
-        # Agent metrics are per-node; without this every series lands without a
-        # node label and BPF map pressure cannot be attributed to a machine.
-        - action: replace
-          sourceLabels:
-            - __meta_kubernetes_pod_node_name
-          targetLabel: node
-          replacement: ${1}
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Scrapes CrowdSec. Until this landed, nothing did: `up{namespace="crowdsec"}`
-# returned zero series and Prometheus held no cs_* metric at all, so the
-# detection side of the ingress path was invisible — including whether the
-# agents were reading logs and whether any bouncer was pulling decisions.
-#
-# One monitor for both services. They carry the same shape (a `metrics` port on
-# 6060) and differ only in `app`, so a matchExpressions selector keeps this to
-# a single object rather than two near-identical ones:
-#
-#   crowdsec-service        the LAPI      — decisions, bouncer + machine requests
-#   crowdsec-agent-service  the agents    — acquisition, parsers, scenarios
-#
-# The crowdsec-ns CiliumNetworkPolicy already admits the monitoring namespace
-# without a port restriction, so no policy change is needed.
-#
-# `release: kube-prometheus-stack` is what the chart's Prometheus selects on.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec
-  namespace: crowdsec
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: crowdsec
-    release: kube-prometheus-stack
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchExpressions:
-      - key: app
-        operator: In
-        values:
-          - crowdsec-service
-          - crowdsec-agent-service
-  endpoints:
-    - port: metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 30s
@@ -22,19 +22,7 @@ resources:
  # endpoint, which proves reachability, not that anything was written.
  - prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
  - alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
-  - cilium-servicemonitor.yaml
  - cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
-  - crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
-  # Velero's own monitors: monitoring.coreos.com CRDs arrive with
-  # kube-prometheus-stack, which reconciles after infrastructure, so these
-  # cannot live beside the Velero HelmRelease.
-  - velero-podmonitor.yaml
-  - velero-servicemonitor.yaml
-  - authentik-outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
-  # Rook's exporter/mgr monitors: the operator aborts its node-daemon reconcile
-  # when it cannot create these, which held the CephCluster in Progressing and
-  # deadlocked the whole apps layer. See the file for the cycle.
-  - rook-servicemonitors.yaml
  - home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
  - immich-servicemonitor.yaml
  - loki-servicemonitor.yaml
@@ -58,30 +58,10 @@ spec:
          # VeleroBackupFailed alert fires on the first failure regardless — so
          # nothing is hidden, only the escalation to critical is deferred
          # until a second cycle confirms it.
-          #
-          # The `and on(schedule) velero_backup_last_status` gate exists because
-          # velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp is an in-process gauge that
-          # velero does NOT retract when a Schedule is deleted: the series just
-          # stops being updated, ages past 60h and pages critical forever, for a
-          # schedule that no longer exists. That is what decommissioning
-          # netbird-backup-daily did on 2026-09-01.
-          #
-          # velero_backup_last_status is the same shape but IS retracted on
-          # Schedule deletion, so it works as a liveness set for "this schedule
-          # still exists". It hides nothing: velero repopulates it for every
-          # existing Schedule on its first scrape after a restart (verified
-          # across the three pods of the 2026-08-27 rollout), and it is written
-          # on failed runs too (0) as well as successful ones (1) — so a
-          # schedule that exists and is failing, or that exists and has stopped
-          # firing, still carries the series and still alerts.
          expr: |
-            (
-              time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 60 * 3600
-              and
-              velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 0
-            )
-            and on(schedule)
-            velero_backup_last_status
+            time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 60 * 3600
+            and
+            velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 0
          for: 10m
          labels:
            severity: critical
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# Rook's two ServiceMonitors, declared here rather than by the operator.
-#
-# Reproduced field for field off the live objects in the production cluster, so
-# scraping is unchanged: same names, same namespace, same selectors, same 10s
-# interval and `cluster` relabeling. The only thing dropped is the CephCluster
-# ownerReference, which Rook set and Flux cannot.
-#
-# They live here because CephCluster.spec.monitoring.enabled is now false, and
-# that is not a monitoring decision — it breaks a deadlock. Rook's node-daemon
-# reconcile creates this ServiceMonitor and, unlike the exporter DaemonSet next
-# to it, treats a failure as fatal (pkg/operator/ceph/cluster/nodedaemon/
-# reconcile.go, v1.20.7):
-#
-#     if !cephCluster.Spec.Monitoring.MetricsDisabled {
-#         // exporter reconciled; its errors are logged and reconcile continues
-#         if cephCluster.Spec.Monitoring.Enabled {
-#             if err := EnableCephExporterServiceMonitor(...); err != nil {
-#                 return errors.Wrap(err, "failed to enable service monitor")
-#             }
-#         }
-#     }
-#
-# On an empty cluster monitoring.coreos.com/v1 does not exist yet, so that call
-# fails with "the server could not find the requested resource (post
-# servicemonitors.monitoring.coreos.com)", the whole node-daemon reconcile
-# aborts, and the CephCluster never leaves status.phase Progressing. That is
-# what infrastructure-ceph-cluster's healthCheckExpr waits on — and the chain
-# closes on itself:
-#
-#     infrastructure-ceph-cluster → CephCluster phase Ready
-#                                 → Rook reconcile settles
-#                                 → monitoring.coreos.com CRDs exist
-#                                 → kube-prometheus-stack (monitoring)
-#                                 → grafana-db
-#                                 → infrastructure-ceph-cluster
-#
-# Nothing outside that loop can break it, so a cold rebuild stopped here with
-# every one of the twenty app Kustomizations behind it.
-#
-# Same treatment velero/helmrelease.yaml and cilium/helmrelease.yaml already
-# get, and for the same reason: the metrics stay where they are, only the
-# scrape wiring moves to the layer where its CRDs exist.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: rook-ceph-exporter
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-  labels:
-    team: rook
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: rook-ceph-exporter
-      rook_cluster: rook-ceph
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - rook-ceph
-  endpoints:
-    - port: ceph-exporter-http-metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      # Rook stamps the cluster name so series from several Ceph clusters stay
-      # separable. One cluster here, but dropping it would rename every series.
-      relabelings:
-        - action: replace
-          replacement: rook-ceph
-          targetLabel: cluster
---
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: rook-ceph-mgr
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-  labels:
-    team: rook
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: rook-ceph-mgr
-      rook_cluster: rook-ceph
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - rook-ceph
-  endpoints:
-    - port: http-metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      relabelings:
-        - action: replace
-          replacement: rook-ceph
-          targetLabel: cluster
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "annotations": {"list": []},
-  "description": "CrowdSec: Erkennung im Cluster, Durchsetzung am NetBird-Edge",
-  "editable": true,
-  "fiscalYearStartMonth": 0,
-  "graphTooltip": 1,
-  "id": null,
-  "links": [],
-  "panels": [
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Aktive Ban-Entscheidungen in der LAPI, ganz überwiegend aus den CAPI-Community-Blocklisten. Das ist die Menge, die ein scharfgeschalteter Bouncer durchsetzt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 0, "y": 0},
-      "id": 1,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(cs_active_decisions)", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Aktive Decisions",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Bouncer, die in den letzten 10 Minuten Decisions abgeholt haben. Fällt das unter die erwartete Zahl, holt ein Bouncer nichts mehr — und setzt damit einen veralteten Stand durch, ohne dass irgendetwas ausfällt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 6, "y": 0},
-      "id": 2,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[10m])) > 0)", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Bouncer, die abholen",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Vom Agent gelesene Logzeilen pro Sekunde. Steht das auf 0, detektiert CrowdSec nichts mehr — der häufigste stille Ausfall, weil alles andere weiterläuft.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 0.01}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 12, "y": 0},
-      "id": 3,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[5m]))", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Gelesene Logzeilen/s",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Szenario-Overflows der letzten 24 h — also lokal erkannte Angriffe, im Gegensatz zu den von CAPI übernommenen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 18, "y": 0},
-      "id": 4,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[24h]))", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Lokale Overflows (24 h)",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Abholrate je Bouncer. Der Firewall-Bouncer auf den Proxies fragt alle 10 s. Die LAPI legt bei jeder neuen beobachteten Client-Adresse einen Eintrag `<name>@<ip>` an, und beobachtet wird die Pod-IP des netbird-ingress-Peers — deshalb erscheint ein logischer Bouncer hier mehrfach und nach Pod-Rollen unter neuen Namen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 4},
-      "id": 5,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{bouncer}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Bouncer-Abholrate",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund. `http:scan` dominiert und stammt aus den CAPI-Blocklisten.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 20, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 4},
-      "id": 6,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (cs_active_decisions)", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Welche Szenarien lokal auslösen. Das ist das, was CrowdSec selbst aus den Traefik-Logs erkennt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "bars", "fillOpacity": 70, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 12},
-      "id": 7,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["sum"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (name) (increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[1h]))", "legendFormat": "{{name}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Szenario-Overflows (je Stunde)",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Geparste gegen nicht geparste Zeilen. Ein Anstieg bei `ko` heißt meist, dass sich ein Logformat geändert hat und der Parser nicht mehr greift — CrowdSec liest dann weiter, erkennt aber nichts mehr.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 12},
-      "id": 8,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [
-        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "geparst", "refId": "A"},
-        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ko_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "nicht geparst", "refId": "B"}
-      ],
-      "title": "Parser",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Whitelist-Treffer nach Grund. Nützlich beim Scharfschalten: was hier zählt, wäre sonst ein Kandidat für einen Ban gewesen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 20},
-      "id": 9,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (rate(cs_node_wl_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Whitelist-Treffer",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 20},
-      "id": 10,
-      "options": {
-        "code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
-        "content": "## Was dieses Dashboard NICHT zeigt\n\nAlle Panels stammen aus der LAPI und den Agents im Cluster. Die **Bouncer auf proxy-1 und proxy-2 exportieren eigene Metriken**, die hier fehlen:\n\n- `fw_bouncer_active_decisions` — was tatsächlich in den nftables-Sets steht\n- `fw_bouncer_dropped_packets` / `_bytes` — was wirklich verworfen wurde\n- `lapi_requests_total` / `_failures_total` — aus Sicht des Bouncers\n\nSie liegen auf `127.0.0.1:60601` der Proxy-Hosts. Die Hosts sind öffentlich und haben bisher keinerlei Metrik-Pfad; den Port ins Internet zu öffnen, nur um ein Scrape-Ziel zu bekommen, wäre der falsche Tausch.\n\n**Konsequenz:** „Bouncer-Abholrate\" oben zeigt, dass ein Bouncer *fragt* — nicht, dass er die Antwort auch angewandt hat. Solange der Modus `dry-run` ist, wendet er ohnehin nichts an.\n\nEin Scrape-Pfad für die Hosts ist eigene Arbeit und Voraussetzung dafür, dass „was wird wirklich geblockt\" beantwortbar wird."
-      },
-      "title": "Blinder Fleck",
-      "type": "text"
-    }
-  ],
-  "refresh": "30s",
-  "schemaVersion": 38,
-  "style": "dark",
-  "tags": ["homelab", "crowdsec", "security"],
-  "templating": {"list": []},
-  "time": {"from": "now-6h", "to": "now"},
-  "timepicker": {},
-  "timezone": "",
-  "title": "CrowdSec Overview",
-  "uid": "crowdsec-overview",
-  "version": 1,
-  "weekStart": ""
-}
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
  - name: dashboard-blackbox-overview
    files:
      - blackbox-overview.json
-  - name: dashboard-crowdsec-overview
-    files:
-      - crowdsec-overview.json
  - name: dashboard-disk-health
    files:
      - disk-health.json
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ spec:
        # stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
        # policy) — no extra dependency.
        - name: reconcile-publish-ip
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
          volumeMounts:
            - name: data
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
      containers:
        - name: music-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: LOG_LEVEL
              value: info
@@ -82,10 +82,7 @@ data:
  # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
-  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
-  # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
-  # index has to be rebuilt.
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "qwen3-embedding-0.6b"
  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1
@@ -143,20 +140,7 @@ spec:
          # on every paperless pod start: tools belong in the image, not
          # installed at runtime. Dated tag so a change is a reviewable diff
          # here, matching the ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/, and that is not cosmetic. This is an
-          # INIT container, so paperless does not start without it — and during
-          # a cold rebuild gitea.renner.uno does not exist, because Gitea runs
-          # inside the cluster being rebuilt. A rehearsal left this pod in
-          # Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
-          #
-          # The node falls back to a ghcr.io copy in that window
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh). Containerd
-          # keeps the repository path when it falls through, so the path has to
-          # exist on both registries — hence konairius/, which matches the ghcr
-          # namespace. Steady state still pulls from Gitea and never leaves the
-          # network.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-07-30
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -183,7 +167,7 @@ spec:
              drop: ["ALL"]
      containers:
        - name: paperless
-          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
+          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 8000
@@ -338,6 +322,7 @@ spec:
    - port: 80
      targetPort: http
 ---
+---
 # ExternalName mirror so the paperless-namespace Ingress can backend to
 # the gate outpost in the authentik namespace (cross-namespace Service
 # refs aren't supported in standard Ingress).
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# trmnl
-
-Terminus (self-hosted TRMNL BYOS server) plus the headless renderer that
-screenshots the Home Assistant entrance dashboard and pushes it in. One
-device: a TRMNL X at the entrance, 1872x1404, 16 greys.
-
-## Device firmware
-
-Terminus mirrors one model-agnostic binary and it is the **ESP32-C3** (OG)
-build. This panel is a TRMNL X, i.e. ESP32-S3, so that file is not the
-artefact for a manual flash here. Use
-`https://trmnl-fw.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/trmnl_x/flash/FW<version>.bin`
-— a merged image at offset `0x0` — and run `esptool image-info` on
-anything before writing it.
-
-The panel runs 1.8.16, flashed over USB on 2026-09-05. It shipped on
-1.8.6, where turning on `firmware_update` froze the screen for as long as
-an update was offered (fixed upstream in 1.8.7, commit `9b7a0f7`).
-
-## Image automation
-
-Both images are enrolled (`infrastructure/image-automation/terminus.yaml`,
-`trmnl-renderer.yaml`) and track the latest `0.x`. A bad bump on either
-surfaces as a **blank or corrupted panel**, not as a failed rollout — no
-readiness probe can tell that a rendered screen became unreadable. Look at
-the panel after a bump lands; revert the tag if it is wrong.
-
-## Device endpoint
-
-`trmnl-device.renner.uno` is the device-facing name, TLS via Traefik
-(`device-ingress.yaml`). `API_URI` must carry the same scheme the device
-polls with, because Terminus bakes it into the absolute `image_url` it
-returns. The LoadBalancer in `device-service.yaml` keeps `10.2.99.89`
-without a hostname as a cleartext fallback that depends on neither
-Traefik nor certificate renewal — the captive portal accepts a bare
-address.
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-# Device-facing endpoint, over TLS.
-#
-# This replaces the reason the cleartext LoadBalancer in device-service.yaml
-# was given a hostname at all. That file claimed the firmware "would reject
-# the internal CA" — but nothing here is signed by an internal CA:
-# letsencrypt-cluster solves DNS-01 against the renner.uno Cloudflare zone,
-# so trmnl.renner.uno already serves a public Let's Encrypt certificate
-# (issuer CN=YR2) that any client with a normal CA bundle trusts. A
-# LAN-only name gets the same treatment — DNS-01 never needs the host to be
-# publicly reachable — so the device can speak HTTPS like everything else.
-#
-# The hostname moves here from the Service's external-dns annotation rather
-# than being duplicated: two sources claiming trmnl-device.renner.uno would
-# have external-dns flapping the record between the Traefik VIP and the
-# device LB. The LoadBalancer keeps its address and stays reachable at
-# http://10.2.99.89 as a nameless fallback if TLS ever turns out to be the
-# thing that breaks.
-#
-# CONSEQUENCE, and the reason API_URI in terminus.yaml changes with this:
-# Traefik's `web` entrypoint carries a global http -> websecure redirect
-# (helmrelease.yaml: `to: websecure, scheme: https, permanent: true`), so
-# once this name points at Traefik, http://trmnl-device.renner.uno answers
-# 308 rather than serving. Whether the firmware follows that is not
-# documented, so the device is provisioned with the https URL and Terminus
-# hands back https image_urls to match. No mixed-scheme fetch.
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Ingress
-metadata:
-  name: terminus-device
-  namespace: trmnl
-  # No external-dns hostname annotation: external-dns-unifi runs with
-  # --source=ingress, so it registers the hosts in spec.rules on its own.
-  # Same as the terminus Ingress next door.
-  annotations:
-    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
-spec:
-  ingressClassName: traefik
-  tls:
-    - hosts:
-        - trmnl-device.renner.uno
-      secretName: trmnl-device-tls
-  rules:
-    - host: trmnl-device.renner.uno
-      http:
-        paths:
-          - path: /
-            pathType: Prefix
-            backend:
-              service:
-                name: terminus
-                port:
-                  number: 80
@@ -1,24 +1,15 @@
-# Cleartext fallback for the device, reachable by address only.
+# Device-facing endpoint. Cleartext HTTP, deliberately.
 #
-# This used to be THE device endpoint, on the premise that the firmware
-# "cannot be handed the internal CA". The premise was wrong: nothing here
-# hands out an internal CA for these names — letsencrypt-cluster solves
-# DNS-01 against the renner.uno Cloudflare zone and issues publicly-trusted
-# certificates for LAN-only hosts, which is why trmnl.renner.uno has always
-# served an issuer CN=YR2 certificate. The device speaks HTTPS via
-# device-ingress.yaml, which now owns the trmnl-device.renner.uno name.
-#
-# Kept, without a hostname, because it is the one path to Terminus that
-# depends on neither Traefik nor certificate renewal: http://10.2.99.89
-# still serves /api/setup and /api/display. If TLS is ever what breaks the
-# panel, the recovery is to type that address into the captive portal.
-#
-# Scope of the exposure is unchanged: LAN-only (no public DNS label, no
-# Cloudflare record), no admin session — the device authenticates with its
-# MAC in the `ID` header plus a per-device api_key.
+# The TRMNL firmware initiates every request and cannot be handed the
+# internal CA, so terminating TLS here would simply break polling. Scope of
+# the exposure: this Service is LAN-only (no public DNS label, no Cloudflare
+# record), it carries no admin session — the device authenticates with its
+# MAC in the `ID` header plus a per-device api_key — and the Terminus admin
+# UI stays on the TLS route at trmnl.renner.uno.
 #
 # Same shape as home-assistant-bgp: a dedicated address on the Cilium BGP
-# pool.
+# pool rather than a TLS-less Ingress, which would be a new pattern for this
+# repo. The device is provisioned with the HOSTNAME, not the address.
 #
 # The address is requested explicitly, matching every other LB service here.
 # Left to allocate freely, Cilium IPAM handed out the first free address in
@@ -39,10 +30,8 @@ metadata:
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
    lb-pool: bgp
-  # No external-dns hostname: device-ingress.yaml claims that name. Two
-  # sources claiming trmnl-device.renner.uno would flap the record between
-  # the Traefik VIP and this address (external-dns runs --policy=sync).
  annotations:
+    external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: trmnl-device.renner.uno
    lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "10.2.99.89,fd99::89"
 spec:
  type: LoadBalancer
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ resources:
  - valkey.yaml
  - terminus.yaml
  - ingress.yaml
-  # TLS device endpoint (owns trmnl-device.renner.uno) plus the nameless
-  # cleartext LoadBalancer it falls back to.
-  - device-ingress.yaml
  - device-service.yaml
  # Headless HA screenshotter. Lives in this namespace because Terminus
  # FETCHES rendered screens back from it (uri delivery mode), so the
@@ -177,14 +177,7 @@ spec:
        # webhook start failing with "expired JWT access token" about
        # thirty minutes after seeding.
        - name: render-schedule
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/: this container starts during a cold
-          # rebuild, when Gitea does not exist because it runs inside the
-          # cluster being rebuilt — a rehearsal left it in Init:ImagePullBackOff.
-          # The node falls back to a ghcr.io copy then
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
-          # keeps the repository path, so it has to exist on both registries.
-          # Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -234,12 +227,16 @@ spec:
            capabilities:
              drop: ["ALL"]
      containers:
-        # Enrolled in image automation (flux-system:trmnl-renderer). A bad
-        # bump shows up as a corrupted screen, not a failed rollout — check
-        # the panel after one lands. ARCH-SUFFIXED image: upstream publishes
-        # no multi-arch manifest.
+        # Pinned, not enrolled in image automation — same reasoning as
+        # Terminus itself. This drives a wall-mounted panel and upstream
+        # is pre-1.0; an unattended bump that changes the dithering
+        # pipeline or the webhook payload shows up as a corrupted
+        # screen, not as a failed rollout.
+        #
+        # Note the image is ARCH-SUFFIXED: upstream publishes no
+        # multi-arch manifest, only trmnl-ha-amd64 and trmnl-ha-aarch64.
        - name: renderer
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/trmnl-ha-amd64:0.10.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:trmnl-renderer"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/trmnl-ha-amd64:0.9.5
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 10000
@@ -7,17 +7,11 @@ data:
  TZ: "Europe/Berlin"
  HANAMI_PORT: "2345"
  # What the device is told to fetch from. Terminus bakes this into the
-  # absolute `image_url` it hands back on /api/display, so it has to be a
-  # name the DEVICE can resolve and fetch — and it has to carry the same
-  # scheme the device polls with, or every screen fetch is a second,
-  # cleartext connection. No trailing slash: the same string is typed into
-  # the captive portal at provisioning time.
-  #
-  # https since device-ingress.yaml took over trmnl-device.renner.uno. The
-  # earlier value was http on the theory that the firmware would reject an
-  # internal CA; there is no internal CA here — letsencrypt-cluster issues
-  # publicly-trusted certs for LAN-only names via DNS-01.
-  API_URI: "https://trmnl-device.renner.uno"
+  # absolute `image_url` it hands back on /api/display, so it MUST be the
+  # cleartext LAN name, not trmnl.renner.uno — the firmware speaks plain
+  # HTTP and would reject the internal CA. No trailing slash: the same
+  # string is typed into the captive portal at provisioning time.
+  API_URI: "http://trmnl-device.renner.uno"
  KEYVALUE_URL: "redis://terminus-valkey:6379"
  # Rack::Attack rate-limit bypass. Beyond upstream's RFC1918 defaults this
  # adds fc00::/7, which covers the pod CIDR (fd10:244::/48), the Cilium LB
@@ -134,7 +128,7 @@ spec:
        # is a device-bricking class of risk. Bumps are a reviewed, manual
        # act — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md.
        - name: terminus
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.72.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.68.0
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 2345
@@ -197,7 +191,7 @@ spec:
            capabilities:
              drop: ["ALL"]
        - name: sidekiq
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.72.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.68.0
          command: ["bundle", "exec", "sidekiq", "-r", "./config/sidekiq.rb"]
          envFrom:
            - configMapRef:
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+# Dedicated namespace where the kubernetes backend spawns pipeline step pods,
+# isolated from the apps namespace.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: woodpecker-ci
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: woodpecker
+    # Image-build steps run a privileged docker/buildx plugin pod (see the
+    # server's WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED). Talos enforces Pod Security;
+    # without this the privileged step pods are rejected at admission. The
+    # namespace is dedicated to ephemeral CI step pods, so scoping the
+    # exemption here keeps it off apps/.
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
+---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ServiceAccount
 metadata:
@@ -28,19 +28,6 @@ spec:
    - name: infrastructure
    - name: infrastructure-crds
    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
-    # ha-pg-objectstore.yaml declares an ObjectStore, whose CRD comes from the
-    # CNPG Barman plugin in infrastructure-cnpg-barman. Without this edge the
-    # kind is unknown when this path is first applied, and a server-side
-    # dry-run rejects the ENTIRE set over the one object it cannot recognise:
-    #
-    #   ObjectStore/home-assistant/ha-pg-store dry-run failed:
-    #   no matches for kind "ObjectStore" in version ...
-    #
-    # Every other ObjectStore user — authentik, immich, paperless, trmnl,
-    # woodpecker — already declares it. This was the only one that did not, and
-    # it took speech-to-phrase, zone-configurator and matter-server down with
-    # it, since all three wait on home-assistant.
-    - name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
 ---
 apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: Kustomization
@@ -122,20 +122,8 @@ spec:
  path: ./kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster
  prune: true
  wait: true
-  # Deliberately NOT dependsOn: infrastructure. That edge closed a cycle no
-  # existing cluster could ever hit and no new one could ever escape:
-  # infrastructure is Ready only once its openbao healthCheck passes, openbao-0
-  # only runs once its PVC binds, and that PVC wants the ceph-block StorageClass
-  # defined in this very Kustomization. A cold rebuild stopped here for good,
-  # with openbao-0 Pending on "unbound immediate PersistentVolumeClaims".
-  #
-  # The edge was never needed. infrastructure runs wait: false, so it applies
-  # the rook-ceph namespace and the operator immediately and only its readiness
-  # waits on the healthChecks — everything this path needs exists long before
-  # infrastructure reports Ready. On an empty API server this Kustomization
-  # retries on retryInterval until the operator installs its CRDs, the same
-  # self-healing shape post-crds already relies on; on a live cluster the CRDs
-  # are always present and nothing changes.
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
  # kstatus doesn't know how to read Rook CR readiness, so without these
  # this Kustomization reports Ready as soon as the manifests apply — long
  # before OSDs/mons/MDS are actually serving I/O. Apps depending on this
@@ -70,23 +70,9 @@ spec:
      # map only shows up as "no space left on device" in the log while pod
      # sandbox creation fails (#452). cilium_bpf_map_pressure makes it
      # alertable beforehand.
-      #
-      # That reasoning is about the metrics, which this line provides. The
-      # ServiceMonitor is only the scrape wiring and is declared standalone in
-      # apps/monitoring-rules instead — the same treatment velero/helmrelease
-      # already gives its own, and for the same reason: the chart's template is
-      # gated on monitoring.coreos.com/v1 existing at install time.
-      #
-      # Here it is worse than for velero. Cilium's chart does not skip the
-      # template, it aborts rendering — "Service Monitor requires
-      # monitoring.coreos.com/v1 CRDs" — and cilium is one of the seven
-      # healthChecks the infrastructure Kustomization waits on. So on an empty
-      # cluster the CNI blocked infrastructure, which blocked grafana-db, which
-      # blocked monitoring, which is where those CRDs come from. The lowest
-      # layer in the cluster was waiting on the highest.
      enabled: true
      serviceMonitor:
-        enabled: false
+        enabled: true
    bpf:
      # Per-endpoint policy map size: one entry per (identity, direction,
      # protocol, port) allowed. When it fills, endpoint regeneration fails
@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ subjects:
 # with no marker. Re-apply this block, or the skew silently returns.
 apiVersion: v1
 stringData:
-  SIDECAR_IMAGE: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/plugin-barman-cloud-sidecar:v0.15.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cnpg-barman-plugin-sidecar"}
+  SIDECAR_IMAGE: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/plugin-barman-cloud-sidecar:v0.14.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cnpg-barman-plugin-sidecar"}
 kind: Secret
 metadata:
  name: plugin-barman-cloud-kg5c2795f7
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ spec:
            secretKeyRef:
              key: SIDECAR_IMAGE
              name: plugin-barman-cloud-kg5c2795f7
-        image: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/plugin-barman-cloud:v0.15.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cnpg-barman-plugin"}
+        image: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/plugin-barman-cloud:v0.14.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cnpg-barman-plugin"}
        name: barman-cloud
        ports:
        - containerPort: 9090
@@ -36,51 +36,6 @@ spec:
  values:
    container_runtime: containerd

-    # Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
-    #
-    # This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
-    # allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
-    # without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
-    # so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
-    # is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
-    # deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
-    # thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
-    #
-    # Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
-    # here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
-    # resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
-    #
-    # The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
-    # clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
-    # proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
-    # the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
-    # Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
-    config:
-      capi_whitelists.yaml: |
-        cidrs:
-          # The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
-          # netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
-          # keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
-          # proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
-          - 45.157.177.26/32
-          - 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
-          - 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
-          # netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
-          #
-          # Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
-          # hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
-          # no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
-          # this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
-          # outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
-          # inbound attack involved at all.
-          #
-          # Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
-          # current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
-          # these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
-          # community blocklists.
-          - 162.55.50.97/32
-          - 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
-
    # mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
    # the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
    # wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -99,7 +54,7 @@ spec:
    # required.
    #
    # NOTE: enabling this makes the LAPI serve HTTPS-only. The Traefik ingress
-    # bouncer is currently INERT (detached, see post-crds/traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml)
+    # bouncer is currently INERT (detached, see traefik/crowdsec-middleware.yaml)
    # so there is no live impact, but re-enabling it will require pointing the
    # plugin at https + trusting this CA (or giving it a bouncer-ou client cert).
    tls:
@@ -123,24 +78,6 @@ spec:

    lapi:
      replicas: 1
-      service:
-        # Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
-        #
-        # These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
-        # Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
-        # annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
-        # is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
-        # answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
-        # 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
-        # scheme mismatch.
-        #
-        # With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
-        # plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
-        # choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
-        # certificate is self-signed.
-        annotations:
-          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
-          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
      # Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
      # workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
      # cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -149,18 +86,10 @@ spec:
        requests:
          cpu: 50m
      podAnnotations:
-        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
-        # consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
-        # start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
-        # the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
-        # the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
-        #
-        # crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
+        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
+        # env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
        # kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
-        # crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
-        # ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
-        # here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
      persistentVolume:
        data:
          # Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -189,17 +118,6 @@ spec:
            secretKeyRef:
              name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
              key: key
-        # The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
-        # endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
-        # `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
-        # names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
-        # registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
-        # is the source of truth, not the database.
-        - name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
-          valueFrom:
-            secretKeyRef:
-              name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-              key: key

    agent:
      # Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a
@@ -217,32 +135,6 @@ spec:
        - namespace: ingress
          podName: traefik-*
          program: traefik
-          # Read by polling, not inotify. Every path under
-          # /var/log/containers is a symlink into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
-          # rotates the target once it reaches containerLogMaxSize (10Mi,
-          # roughly every eight hours for Traefik here). An inotify tailer
-          # does not survive that rotation: it reopens the path, waits for a
-          # file that is in fact already present, and never reads another
-          # line. Nothing about that state looks broken from outside — the
-          # pod stays Running and Ready, the LAPI keeps answering, and the
-          # cumulative counters keep displaying whatever they reached, so the
-          # only symptom is that no scenario ever fires again.
-          #
-          # CrowdSec detects the hazard itself and logs it at startup, with
-          # this exact remedy in the message: "is a symlink, but inotify
-          # polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
-          # Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true". Upstream carries
-          # the same case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik), and the chart
-          # gained this field in helm-charts#109 specifically to fix it.
-          #
-          # Orthogonal to the force_inotify: true that the chart hardcodes
-          # into acquis.yaml and offers no way to unset. That one governs the
-          # fsnotify watch on the directory, i.e. discovering the log of a
-          # replacement Traefik pod; this one governs how an already
-          # discovered file is read. Both true is the supported combination.
-          #
-          # Costs CPU per open file per upstream docs — two files per node.
-          poll_without_inotify: true
      env:
        - name: COLLECTIONS
          value: "crowdsecurity/traefik crowdsecurity/http-cve crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules"
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
-  - lapi-ingress.yaml
+  - bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
  - helmrelease.yaml
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
-#
-# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
-# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
-# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
-# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
-# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
-# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
-# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
-# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
-# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
-#
-# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
-#
-# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
-# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
-# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
-# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
-# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
-# kind of request every round:
-#
-#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
-#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
-#
-# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
-# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
-# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
-# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
-#
-# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
-# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
-# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
-# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
-#
-# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
-# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
-# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
-# backend; the ServersTransport carrying it is a traefik.io CRD consumer and
-# lives in post-crds/crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml.
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Ingress
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-lapi
-  namespace: crowdsec
-  labels:
-    # Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
-    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
-  annotations:
-    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
-    # NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
-    # not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
-    #
-    # The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
-    # Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
-    # are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
-    # Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
-    # chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
-spec:
-  ingressClassName: traefik
-  rules:
-    - host: crowdsec.renner.uno
-      http:
-        paths:
-          - path: /
-            pathType: Prefix
-            backend:
-              service:
-                name: crowdsec-service
-                port:
-                  number: 8080
-  tls:
-    - secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
-      hosts:
-        - crowdsec.renner.uno
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
  - helmrelease.yaml
@@ -96,13 +96,28 @@ The security-scan agent will continue to surface vuln findings on
 these as "Skipped / Flux image-automation owns this" even without
 a policy.

-Only a tag-format problem belongs on that list. The policy is to run the
-latest version and let image-automation hold us there wherever the tags
-allow it, so an image with a usable semver stream gets enrolled even when
-a bump carries risk. Where a bad bump is hard to detect, the answer is a
-note about what to check afterwards — see `apps/trmnl/README.md` for the
-panel, whose failure mode is a blank screen rather than a failed rollout
-— not an exclusion.
+- `ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus` — publishes a usable `0.x.0` tag stream, so
+  unlike the three above this is **not** a tag-format problem. It is left
+  unenrolled because the blast radius is hardware: Terminus is pre-1.0,
+  cuts no GitHub Releases and ships no changelog, and it serves the
+  firmware and `/api/display` contract that the TRMNL X panel polls. An
+  unattended bump that changes either can leave a wall-mounted device
+  dark, with no rollback path that doesn't involve the captive portal.
+  Bumps are a reviewed, manual act: read the commit range, then edit the
+  tag in `kubernetes/apps/trmnl/terminus.yaml` (both containers).
+
+  The Valkey sidecar alongside it *is* enrolled (`valkey.yaml`) — it holds
+  only the Sidekiq queue and touches no device-facing contract.
+
+- `ghcr.io/usetrmnl/trmnl-ha-amd64` — the TRMNL screenshot renderer, for
+  the same reason and one more. It owns the dithering pipeline and the
+  webhook payload shape, so a bad bump surfaces as a *corrupted or blank
+  panel*, not as a failed rollout — there is no readiness signal that
+  catches "the image is now unreadable". Separately, upstream publishes
+  **no multi-arch manifest**: only the arch-suffixed `trmnl-ha-amd64` and
+  `trmnl-ha-aarch64` repositories exist, so an ImagePolicy here would also
+  be pinning us to one architecture in a way the tag does not make
+  obvious. Bump manually in `kubernetes/apps/trmnl/renderer.yaml`.

 ## Re-import hazard: cnpg-barman-plugin

@@ -9,26 +9,9 @@ spec:
 ---
 # v-prefix tags (v19.2.3). Upstream also publishes date-suffixed builds
 # (v19.2.3-20250717) and moving major/minor tags (v19, v19.2); the
-# filter pins us to the bare three-component release.
-#
-# The range was 19.x, to keep the 19 -> 20 (Tentacle) cutover a deliberate
-# upgrade tied to the Rook operator version. That coupling had already come
-# apart without anyone noticing: Rook's floating constraint pulled v1.20 in
-# June, and with it a ceph-csi image whose client libraries are Ceph 20.2.1.
-# The cluster stayed on 19.2.6, so every CSI pod has since been talking to
-# the mons with a client a whole major ahead of them.
-#
-# That is not academic. The 19.2.6 mons mint auth keys as aes256k, and the
-# 20.2.1 client cannot decode them — "auth: failed to decode key 'AgB...'".
-# Nothing broke only because the four CSI users predate the cipher change and
-# still carry legacy aes keys, which Ceph itself flags as insecure. The moment
-# one is recreated — ceph auth rotate, a deleted Secret, Rook resyncing — the
-# provisioner stops and no PVC binds. A rebuild rehearsal hits it immediately,
-# because a fresh cluster has no legacy keys at all.
-#
-# So the cutover happens now, with the version the client already is. Rook
-# v1.20 supports Tentacle from v20.2.1; v20.2.0 is excluded deliberately —
-# upstream reports data corruption there when read affinity is enabled.
+# filter pins us to the bare three-component release. Range stays at
+# 19.x — the 19 → 20 (Tentacle) cutover should be a deliberate
+# upgrade tied to the Rook operator version.
 apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: ImagePolicy
 metadata:
@@ -42,4 +25,4 @@ spec:
    extract: '$ver'
  policy:
    semver:
-      range: ">=20.2.1 <21.0.0"
+      range: "19.x"
@@ -18,9 +18,7 @@ resources:
  - mosquitto.yaml
  - redis.yaml
  - shelly-manager.yaml
-  - terminus.yaml
  - tika.yaml
-  - trmnl-renderer.yaml
  - valkey.yaml
  - velero-plugin-for-aws.yaml
  - vsftpd.yaml
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: ImageRepository
-metadata:
-  name: terminus
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus
-  interval: 1h
---
-# Pre-1.0, so the range is 0.x rather than a major pin: upstream's minors are
-# its release stream, and holding at a single minor is how this drifted four
-# releases behind while it was excluded from automation.
-#
-# A bad bump here surfaces as a blank or corrupted panel rather than a failed
-# rollout — no readiness probe can tell that a rendered screen became
-# unreadable. Check the panel after one lands; revert the tag if it is wrong.
-apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: ImagePolicy
-metadata:
-  name: terminus
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  imageRepositoryRef:
-    name: terminus
-  filterTags:
-    pattern: '^(?P<ver>\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$'
-    extract: '$ver'
-  policy:
-    semver:
-      range: "0.x"
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: ImageRepository
-metadata:
-  name: trmnl-renderer
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/trmnl-ha-amd64
-  interval: 1h
---
-# Upstream ships no multi-arch manifest, only the arch-suffixed repositories.
-# That does not obstruct a policy: the image reference already names the
-# architecture, so this pins nothing the tag did not.
-#
-# The floating `0.9` / `0.10` series tags are filtered out; only fully
-# qualified patch versions are candidates. Same panel caveat as terminus.yaml.
-apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: ImagePolicy
-metadata:
-  name: trmnl-renderer
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  imageRepositoryRef:
-    name: trmnl-renderer
-  filterTags:
-    pattern: '^(?P<ver>\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$'
-    extract: '$ver'
-  policy:
-    semver:
-      range: "0.x"
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ resources:
  - cloudnative-pg/
  - mariadb-operator/
  - netbird-ingress/
-  - netbird-proxy-services/
  - coredns-config/
  - k8s-gateway/
  - external-dns-unifi/
@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ spec:
      labels:
        app: cni-plugins-installer
    spec:
-      # Same reasoning as multus-daemonset.yaml. This one installs the macvlan
-      # binary the ceph-san attachment is made of, so a node that cannot
-      # schedule it has no plugin to delegate to — the failure the init
-      # container comment below already describes, reached by a different road.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
      hostNetwork: true
      tolerations:
        - operator: Exists
@@ -49,32 +44,7 @@ spec:
          # at all and put github.com on the critical path of every node rebuild.
          # Dated tag so a version change is a reviewable diff here, matching the
          # ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/, and the difference is what makes a
-          # rebuild possible. Gitea runs inside this cluster, so during a rebuild
-          # it does not exist: a rehearsal sat here in ImagePullBackOff with "no
-          # route to host", and because the plugins never installed there was no
-          # macvlan, so Multus could not attach ceph-san, so Rook's network
-          # canary never started, so the CephCluster hung at "Configuring Ceph
-          # Mons" and OpenBao waited forever on a PVC that could not bind. The
-          # failure surfaced four layers from its cause.
-          #
-          # This used to point straight at ghcr.io, which fixed the rebuild and
-          # broke the normal case: every steady-state pull then left the network
-          # for an image the local registry already holds. The fallback belongs
-          # to the node, not to the manifest — machine.registries.mirrors names
-          # Gitea first and ghcr.io second (bootstrap.sh), so nothing here has to
-          # know about the recovery path.
-          #
-          # Containerd keeps the repository path when it falls through, so the
-          # path must resolve on both registries; the build pushes one digest to
-          # konairius/ on each, verified equal. Bumping the tag means building
-          # first — an unpublished tag is unpullable on both.
-          #
-          # No imagePullSecret: the ghcr namespace is private and its credential
-          # is in machine.registries too, because a Secret would have to come
-          # from OpenBao, which needs Ceph, which needs these binaries.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-07-30
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -154,40 +154,6 @@ spec:
        app: multus
        name: multus
    spec:
-      # Upstream ships this DaemonSet with no priority class, so it runs at 0
-      # and can preempt nothing. Any event that makes the pod need a fresh
-      # scheduling decision — a rollout, a node restart, an eviction — then has
-      # to fit it onto a node that may since have filled up, and if it does not
-      # fit it simply stays Pending. The node has no multus after that, and
-      # nothing reports it: pods still start, they just never get their
-      # secondary attachment, and the annotation everything waits on never
-      # appears.
-      #
-      # Seen on a cold rebuild: two of four nodes sat at 99% memory requests
-      # when the DaemonSet rolled, both multus pods went Pending, and Rook's
-      # network canary hung in Init:0/1 waiting for a network-status annotation
-      # that could never come. The CephCluster stayed in Progressing, which is
-      # what infrastructure-ceph-cluster gates on, so the whole apps layer
-      # stopped behind a scheduling decision three layers away.
-      #
-      # node-critical, the same class cilium and cni-dhcp-daemon carry, because
-      # that is what this is: without multus a node cannot attach a secondary
-      # network, and only that node is affected. Nothing cluster-wide fails.
-      #
-      # This does outrank kube-apiserver, which Talos runs as a static pod at
-      # system-cluster-critical (2000000000, against 2000001000 here), and on a
-      # control plane that has run out of memory the kubelet will pick the API
-      # server as the pod to evict. That was observed twice, at 6GiB and at
-      # 8GiB.
-      #
-      # It is not a reason to demote this DaemonSet. Kubernetes puts the CNI
-      # above the control plane deliberately — a node without its CNI cannot run
-      # anything at all — and a class name is a statement about what the pod is,
-      # not a dial for picking a number. The eviction says the control plane is
-      # starved, and that is where it has to be fixed: enough allocatable
-      # memory, or kubeReserved/systemReserved so the static pods keep what they
-      # need. Demoting this to cluster-critical would only move the victim.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
      hostNetwork: true
      hostPID: true
      tolerations:
@@ -146,11 +146,6 @@ spec:
        app: whereabouts
        name: whereabouts
    spec:
-      # Same reasoning as multus-daemonset.yaml: this is the IPAM half of the
-      # secondary-network path, so a node without it cannot hand out an address
-      # on ceph-san and the attachment fails just as completely as if multus
-      # itself were missing. Upstream leaves the priority class unset.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
      hostNetwork: true
      serviceAccountName: whereabouts
      # Every node here is a control plane node, so the NoSchedule toleration
@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
  name: paperless
 ---
-# A disposable copy of paperless's database, for measuring how the local LLM
-# classifies documents without experimenting on the live archive.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
@@ -190,31 +188,3 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
  name: ai
---
-# Where the Woodpecker kubernetes backend spawns pipeline step pods, isolated
-# from `apps`. Distinct from `woodpecker`, which holds the service itself.
-#
-# Here rather than in apps/woodpecker for the reason spelled out above that
-# namespace: post-crds ships this namespace's CiliumNetworkPolicies via
-# ../network-policies/, and infrastructure-crds runs before every app KS. With
-# the namespace declared in the workload KS the order inverted, and a rebuild
-# stopped with
-#
-#   CiliumNetworkPolicy/woodpecker-ci/default-deny-ingress not found:
-#   namespaces "woodpecker-ci" not found
-#
-# which held infrastructure-crds, and with it all twenty app Kustomizations
-# that depend on it. The same reasoning was already written down for
-# `woodpecker` and simply not carried across to its sibling.
-#
-# Image-build steps run a privileged docker/buildx plugin pod (see the server's
-# WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED). Talos enforces Pod Security; without the
-# label the privileged step pods are rejected at admission. The namespace holds
-# nothing but ephemeral CI step pods, so the exemption stays off apps/.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Namespace
-metadata:
-  name: woodpecker-ci
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: woodpecker
-    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
  - daemonset.yaml
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-# Reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses that carry
-# dns.renner.uno/public: one TLS-passthrough service per host on :443,
-# targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a subnet resource over the service
-# CIDR (ci/images/netbird-proxy-services/controller.py).
-#
-# openbao namespace, like the rotators: its default-deny already allows egress
-# to OpenBao, DNS, the apiserver and `world` (netbird.renner.uno), and the
-# NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
-# netbird-proxy-services role — policies/netbird-proxy-services.hcl, applied
-# once by hand like the rotator roles. Until that role exists the pod logs an
-# auth error each minute and does nothing.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ServiceAccount
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-proxy-services
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
---
-# Read-only, cluster-wide: public Ingresses live in many namespaces, the
-# Traefik Service in ingress/.
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: ClusterRole
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-proxy-services-read
-rules:
-  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
-    resources: ["ingresses"]
-    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
-  - apiGroups: [""]
-    resources: ["services"]
-    verbs: ["get"]
---
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: ClusterRoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-proxy-services-read
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: ClusterRole
-  name: netbird-proxy-services-read
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: netbird-proxy-services
-    namespace: openbao
---
-apiVersion: apps/v1
-kind: Deployment
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-proxy-services
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
-spec:
-  replicas: 1
-  # One writer against the management API at a time.
-  strategy:
-    type: Recreate
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: netbird-proxy-services
-      securityContext:
-        runAsNonRoot: true
-        # Numeric, or the kubelet refuses the image's named user with
-        # "cannot verify user is non-root". The script needs no home and no
-        # writable path, so nobody/nogroup is enough.
-        runAsUser: 65534
-        runAsGroup: 65534
-        seccompProfile:
-          type: RuntimeDefault
-      containers:
-        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:2026-09-07
-          securityContext:
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
-            capabilities:
-              drop: ["ALL"]
-          env:
-            - name: NB_MANAGEMENT_URL
-              value: https://netbird.renner.uno
-            - name: BAO_ADDR
-              value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
-            - name: BAO_ROLE
-              value: netbird-proxy-services
-            # Must match cluster.network.serviceSubnets in talos/patches/cluster.yaml.
-            - name: SERVICE_CIDR
-              value: "10.96.0.0/12"
-            - name: TRAEFIK_SERVICE
-              value: ingress/traefik
-            - name: INTERVAL_SECONDS
-              value: "60"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
-kind: Kustomization
-resources:
-  - deployment.yaml
@@ -34,17 +34,6 @@ spec:
        - ports:
            - port: "8080"
              protocol: TCP
-    # Home Assistant's llama.cpp conversation agent calls the chat model only —
-    # it has no use for the embedding endpoint, so unlike paperless above this
-    # grant does not extend to llama-embed.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": home-assistant
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "8080"
-              protocol: TCP
    - fromEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
@@ -167,18 +167,6 @@ spec:
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
-    # The cluster's own chat model, for the llama.cpp conversation agent that
-    # backs Assist. Scoped to the one pod and port rather than the ai namespace
-    # as a whole, so this grant cannot widen if something else is placed there —
-    # the embedding endpoint next to it is deliberately not included.
-    - toEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "8080"
-              protocol: TCP
    # traefik for east-west OIDC roundtrips that go through the
    # public hostname via k8s_gateway.
    - toEndpoints:
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# OpenBao policy: netbird-proxy-services
-#
-# The reverse-proxy-services controller (Deployment netbird-proxy-services in
-# the openbao namespace) reads the NetBird PAT on every reconcile pass and
-# calls the management API with it. Read-only on that one path; it shares the
-# bootstrap credential with rotator-netbird but not that role's PATCH rights.
-#
-# NOT applied by Flux. Apply ONCE with an admin token:
-#
-#   bao policy write netbird-proxy-services kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/netbird-proxy-services.hcl
-#   bao write auth/kubernetes/role/netbird-proxy-services \
-#     bound_service_account_names=netbird-proxy-services \
-#     bound_service_account_namespaces=openbao \
-#     policies=netbird-proxy-services ttl=15m
-#
-# The PAT itself is the one rotator-netbird already uses
-# (homelab/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird, key `pat`).
-#
-# Do NOT set token_no_default_policy=true (kv-v2 preflight needs the default policy).
-
-path "homelab/data/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
@@ -10,8 +10,33 @@
 # name hairpins off the ingress LB from a pod. Needs BOTH netpol halves
 # (gitea-allow-flux-rotator + rotator-gitea-flux-egress).
 #
-# The ExternalSecret that publishes the rotated token to Flux lives in
-# ../../post-crds/flux-git-externalsecret.yaml (needs ESO's CRDs).
+# The ExternalSecret MERGES into Flux's existing flux-system secret (does not
+# own it) so a sync failure leaves the last-good value in place; Flux's
+# source-controller reads it fresh each fetch, no restart. OpenBao policy/role
+# rotator-gitea-flux + the gitea-flux bootstrap (flux account password) are
+# provisioned by hand (see policies/rotator-gitea-flux.hcl).
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: flux-system-git-auth
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: flux-system
+    creationPolicy: Merge
+  data:
+    - secretKey: username
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/flux-git
+        property: username
+    - secretKey: password
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/flux-git
+        property: token
 ---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ServiceAccount
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
-#
-# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
-# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
-# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
-# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
-# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
-# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
-# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
-# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
-#
-# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-  namespace: crowdsec
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# traefik.io CRD consumer for the public LAPI endpoint (crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml
-# holds the Ingress). The CA it names is the chart's self-signed LAPI CA.
-apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
-kind: ServersTransport
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-lapi
-  namespace: crowdsec
-spec:
-  serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
-  rootCAs:
-    - secret: crowdsec-root-secret
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-# Keeps Flux's flux-system secret supplied with the rotated Gitea credential
-# WITHOUT owning it, so a sync failure leaves the last-good value in place;
-# Flux's source-controller reads it fresh each fetch, no restart. OpenBao
-# policy/role rotator-gitea-flux + the gitea-flux bootstrap (flux account
-# password) are provisioned by hand (see ../openbao/policies/rotator-gitea-flux.hcl).
-#
-# See creationPolicy below for why that is Orphan and not Merge — the
-# distinction is what makes a recovery from the break-glass source possible.
-#
-# Split out of ../openbao/rotation/flux-git.yaml, which still holds the
-# rotation CronJob: external-secrets.io CRDs are installed by the ESO
-# HelmRelease in the infrastructure Kustomization, so this manifest cannot
-# pass server-side dry-run there on a fresh cluster.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: flux-system-git-auth
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: flux-system
-    # Orphan, not Merge: create the Secret if it is absent, but never own it.
-    #
-    # Merge cannot create — it only writes into a Secret that already exists,
-    # on the assumption that `flux bootstrap` made one. That assumption breaks
-    # in exactly the situation this cluster is rebuilt from. The break-glass
-    # bootstrap pulls from the GitHub mirror and keeps its token in
-    # flux-system-breakglass (bootstrap.sh), so `flux-system` is never created,
-    # so this ExternalSecret has nothing to merge into — and reports Ready while
-    # producing no Secret at all. The operator then performs the documented
-    # handover back to Gitea and finds the GitRepository pointing at a Secret
-    # that does not exist.
-    #
-    # Owner would create it but attach an ownerReference, so deleting this
-    # object would take Flux's credential with it. Orphan creates and updates
-    # without ownership, which is what the paragraph at the top of this file
-    # actually wanted: a sync failure, or the loss of this object, leaves the
-    # last-good value in place.
-    #
-    # Safe on a live cluster: the Secret holds exactly the two keys written
-    # below (verified against production), so writing it whole is the same
-    # result as merging into it.
-    creationPolicy: Orphan
-    # Explicit rather than relying on the default, because it is the half that
-    # matters here: if the OpenBao entry ever disappears, keep serving the
-    # credential Flux already has rather than leaving it with none.
-    deletionPolicy: Retain
-  data:
-    - secretKey: username
-      remoteRef:
-        key: infrastructure/flux-git
-        property: username
-    - secretKey: password
-      remoteRef:
-        key: infrastructure/flux-git
-        property: token
@@ -10,26 +10,4 @@ resources:
  # configured (2026-07-13): a store that can't turn Ready would block this
  # KS's wait gate and freeze the dependsOn chain.
  - openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml
-  # ExternalSecrets. external-secrets.io CRDs come from the ESO HelmRelease in
-  # the infrastructure Kustomization, so these cannot pass its server-side
-  # dry-run on a fresh cluster — Flux rejects the whole apply set, including
-  # the ESO HelmRelease that would have installed the CRDs. They sat next to
-  # their consumers until a cold-rebuild test hit that deadlock (2026-09-01);
-  # nothing had ever applied this layer against an empty API server before.
-  - crowdsec-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
-  - crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
-  - external-dns-unifi-externalsecret.yaml
-  - flux-git-externalsecret.yaml
-  - netbird-ingress-externalsecret.yaml
-  - velero-externalsecret.yaml
-  - velero-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
-  # traefik.io CRDs, same reasoning — installed by the Traefik HelmRelease in
-  # infrastructure. Traefik is deliberately absent from that Kustomization's
-  # healthChecks, so this KS may dry-run before the chart lands; it retries on
-  # retryInterval rather than deadlocking, because nothing here installs the
-  # CRDs it is waiting for.
-  - traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml
-  - traefik-rate-limit-middleware.yaml
-  - traefik-security-headers-middleware.yaml
-  - crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml
  - ../network-policies/
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: rook-ceph
 spec:
  cephVersion:
-    image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
+    image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
    allowUnsupported: false
  dataDirHostPath: /var/lib/rook
  # Defaults to false. With three OSDs and size 3 there is no spare copy, so
@@ -78,35 +78,16 @@ spec:
    enabled: true
    ssl: false
  monitoring:
-    # false, and this is not a decision about metrics. `metricsDisabled` is the
-    # switch that turns metrics off; this one only decides whether Rook creates
-    # the ServiceMonitors — and creating them is fatal to the reconcile when it
-    # fails. On an empty cluster monitoring.coreos.com/v1 does not exist, so
-    # Rook's node-daemon reconcile aborted, the CephCluster never left
-    # status.phase Progressing, and infrastructure-ceph-cluster's healthCheckExpr
-    # waits on exactly that — with grafana-db → monitoring → those same CRDs
-    # behind it, closing the loop.
-    #
-    # The ceph-exporter DaemonSet and the mgr metrics endpoint are untouched;
-    # only the scrape wiring moved, to apps/monitoring-rules/
-    # rook-servicemonitors.yaml, where the CRDs exist by the time it applies.
-    # Both objects are reproduced there field for field off the live cluster.
-    enabled: false
+    enabled: true
  # Dedicated Ceph cluster network on VLAN 49, attached to the OSDs through
  # Multus. The attachment is san-network-attachment.yaml.
  #
-  # Only `cluster` is selected. Do not add `public`: under provider: host
-  # that puts every daemon including the mons on host networking. A mon's
-  # address then becomes the node's DHCP lease, and when a lease moves the mon
-  # crash-loops on "Cannot assign requested address" with no node free to
-  # fail over to, because all three already hold the mon host ports.
-  #
-  # addressRanges.cluster is stated, not discovered. Without it Rook runs a
-  # canary pod on an OSD node to read the CIDR off the attachment on EVERY
-  # reconcile; the attachment is host-device, so the OSD on that node already
-  # holds the NIC and the canary can never attach — the reconcile blocks for
-  # 15 minutes, fails, and repeats. The value must equal the whereabouts range
-  # in san-network-attachment.yaml.
+  # Only `cluster` is selected. Do not add `public`, and do not reach for
+  # `addressRanges` — that is honoured only under provider: host, which puts
+  # every daemon including the mons on host networking. A mon's address then
+  # becomes the node's DHCP lease, and when a lease moves the mon crash-loops
+  # on "Cannot assign requested address" with no node free to fail over to,
+  # because all three already hold the mon host ports.
  #
  # With `public` unset, client traffic stays on the pod network and VLAN 49
  # carries Ceph-internal traffic only — which is also why Rook's Multus
@@ -123,9 +104,6 @@ spec:
    provider: multus
    selectors:
      cluster: rook-ceph/ceph-san
-    addressRanges:
-      cluster:
-        - 10.99.0.0/29
  # Nodes listed explicitly, not useAllNodes: under useAllNodes the operator
  # re-provisions an OSD on any node whose device still carries a BlueStore
  # signature, so purging an OSD before pulling its drive is impossible — it
@@ -153,12 +131,10 @@ spec:
    useAllDevices: false
    # Two forms while the production drives are migrated:
    #
-    #   by-partlabel/r-osd-data  the target. Talos names the drive in the
-    #                            machine config (RawVolumeConfig osd-data), so
+    #   by-partlabel/r-ceph-osd  the target. Talos names the drive in the
+    #                            machine config (RawVolumeConfig ceph-osd), so
    #                            this file needs to know nothing about models,
-    #                            serials or hostnames. The label must not
-    #                            contain "ceph": ceph-volume rejects any such
-    #                            partition as a legacy ceph-disk member.
+    #                            serials or hostnames.
    #   by-id/nvme-SAMSUNG…      the three MS-01 drives as they are today:
    #                            bluestore written straight onto the raw disk,
    #                            with no partition table and therefore no
@@ -170,7 +146,7 @@ spec:
    #
    # The second half goes when those three are repartitioned, one node at a
    # time. Until then it is what keeps the running OSDs claimed.
-    devicePathFilter: "^/dev/disk/by-(partlabel/r-osd-data|id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR)"
+    devicePathFilter: "^/dev/disk/by-(partlabel/r-ceph-osd|id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR)"
    config:
      osdsPerDevice: "1"
  # Highest built-in class: kubelet evicts these last and the kernel gives
@@ -3,26 +3,33 @@
 # without every Ceph daemon landing on host networking to get there. The
 # alternative and why it was rejected is in cephcluster.yaml.
 #
-# host-device: the SAN NIC is dedicated to Ceph and has exactly one consumer
-# per node — the OSD pod — so it is handed to that pod whole, not virtualised
-# under it. The device keeps its identity (MAC, MTU) and moves back to the
-# host when the pod goes away.
-#
-# `device` names the role, not hardware: every machine renames its own SAN
-# interface to ceph-san at boot (udev rule in its Talos patch). No kernel
-# interface name appears in this file.
-#
 # ISOLATION
 #
-# VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else. No gateway and no
-# routes: there is no router on this segment and there must not be one.
-# whereabouts adds neither unless asked, so nothing here can leak onto or off
-# the SAN.
+# VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else. Two consequences
+# are deliberate:
 #
-# The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6 — headroom for a leaked
-# allocation to sit until the reconciler collects it. One address per node is
-# in use; a second OSD on a node would need a second SAN interface, which is a
-# hardware change, not a config one.
+#   No gateway and no routes. There is no router on this segment and there
+#   must not be one. whereabouts adds neither unless asked, so nothing here
+#   can leak onto or off the SAN. This also means no `sbr` chaining is
+#   needed — unlike the v30iot attachments, there is no DHCP-supplied default
+#   route to confine, because there is no DHCP and no default route.
+#
+#   The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6. It was .4-.6 while the
+#   migration ran, because the nodes still held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph
+#   needed host networking to reach this link — three addresses for three
+#   OSDs, no spare. The nodes have since given those up (the link is only a
+#   macvlan parent now and needs no address of its own), so the reservation
+#   has nothing left to avoid.
+#
+#   Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it elsewhere on the
+#   segment is not cosmetic. There is no router here, so an address outside
+#   the /29 would be unreachable from anything still using one inside it —
+#   which is exactly what would break a future rolling change, where migrated
+#   and un-migrated OSDs have to keep talking to each other.
+#
+#   Six addresses for three OSDs is the headroom the migration could not
+#   afford: room for a leaked allocation to sit until the reconciler collects
+#   it, and room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.
 #
 # IPAM
 #
@@ -30,18 +37,29 @@
 # a server that must not exist here, and host-local keeps its state per node
 # with no cluster-wide coordination, so two nodes would hand out the same
 # address on shared L2. See infrastructure/multus/whereabouts-daemonset.yaml.
+#
+# MTU 9000 matches the link. macvlan children inherit the master's MTU, but
+# it is stated so that a change to the parent does not silently halve
+# replication throughput without anything in the tree recording the
+# expectation.
 apiVersion: k8s.cni.cncf.io/v1
 kind: NetworkAttachmentDefinition
 metadata:
  name: ceph-san
  namespace: rook-ceph
 spec:
+  # `master` is an interface name. enp2s0f1np1 is the second X710 SFP+ port,
+  # a busPath-derived predictable name (net.ifnames=1 via the Image Factory
+  # schematic) that is identical on k8s-1/2/3 and cannot shuffle across
+  # reboots.
  config: |
    {
      "cniVersion": "0.3.1",
      "name": "ceph-san",
-      "type": "host-device",
-      "device": "ceph-san",
+      "type": "macvlan",
+      "master": "enp2s0f1np1",
+      "mode": "bridge",
+      "mtu": 9000,
      "ipam": {
        "type": "whereabouts",
        "range": "10.99.0.0/29",
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
      serviceAccountName: rook-ceph-default
      containers:
        - name: rook-ceph-tools
-          image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
+          image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
          command:
            - /bin/bash
            - -c
@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
  - helmrelease.yaml
+  - crowdsec-middleware.yaml
+  - security-headers-middleware.yaml
+  - rate-limit-middleware.yaml
@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
+  - hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
  - snapshot-readonly-storageclass.yaml
  - node-agent-config.yaml
  - helmrelease.yaml
+  - servicemonitor.yaml
+  - podmonitor.yaml
  - restore-test-rbac.yaml
  - restore-test-cronjob.yaml
 # Velero Schedule CRs live in kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-# First machine of the throwaway cluster on Hetzner.
-#
-# enp1s0 is the public NIC; the private networks are enp7s0 and enp8s0, in the
-# order bootstrap.sh attaches them.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-1
-  nodeLabels:
-    # Holds a Ceph OSD device; the CephCluster selects OSD nodes by this label.
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN NIC to the role name at boot. Matched by PCI bus path
-    # rather than MAC: the address follows from the order bootstrap.sh attaches
-    # the networks, while the MAC is assigned by Hetzner at attach time and is
-    # not known when this file is written.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
---
-# In the generated schema rather than machine.network.hostname: naming the host
-# in both is rejected at apply time. `auto: off` switches off the generated
-# `auto: stable`, which is mutually exclusive with a static name.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-1
---
-# Every interface is stated, the public one included. Talos stops running its
-# default DHCP operators for the whole machine as soon as one new-style network
-# document exists, so an omitted interface gets no address.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
---
-# Ceph cluster network, renamed to the role name by the udev rule in the
-# machine section. The node holds no address here; the link exists for the OSD
-# pod. No mtu: a Hetzner network carries 1450, not production's 9000.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    # Two disks: the system disk and the attached volume. Matching on transport
-    # as the qemu patches do selects nothing here — a Hetzner volume arrives
-    # over virtio-scsi, and a selector matching zero disks is skipped silently.
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  # bootstrap.sh reads this size and creates the volume to match.
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# Second machine. See hcloud-1.yaml.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-2
-  nodeLabels:
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # See hcloud-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-2
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
---
-# See hcloud-1.yaml.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# Third machine. See hcloud-1.yaml.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-3
-  nodeLabels:
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # See hcloud-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-3
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
---
-# See hcloud-1.yaml.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true
@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ machine:
    # Disabling v6 on a VLAN parent does not affect the VLAN child.
    net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
-    # That network also carries the mgmt VLAN's ARP. Answer ARP only on the
-    # link that owns the address, or the UDM learns the node IP against
-    # enp87s0's MAC and delivers IPv4 to a NIC Cilium is not attached to (#793).
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: "2"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_announce: "2"
  install:
    # Select disks by serial only. A broad selector such as
    # `disk.transport == 'nvme'` matches every drive in the machine, and the
@@ -35,13 +28,6 @@ machine:
    # this label instead of listing hostnames, so which boxes carry storage is
    # stated once, here, by the machine that knows.
    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN port (X710 port 1, matched by its burned-in MAC) to the
-    # role name at boot, before the network stack opens links — a rule applied
-    # to a RUNNING node cannot rename (Resource busy) and takes effect at the
-    # next reboot.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", ATTR{address}=="58:47:ca:74:70:28", NAME="ceph-san"
 cluster:
  allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
 ---
@@ -138,15 +124,14 @@ parent: enp2s0f0np0
 up: true
 ---
 # Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49, untagged on the
-# wire. OSD-to-OSD replication and nothing else. The udev rule in the machine
-# section above renames the port to ceph-san at boot, so shared manifests name
-# the role and only this file knows the hardware.
+# wire. OSD-to-OSD replication and nothing else.
 #
-# The node holds NO address here on purpose: the link is handed whole to the
-# OSD pod (host-device attachment). Giving the node an address would put it on
-# a segment reserved for Ceph-internal traffic.
+# The node holds NO address here on purpose. Rook attaches the link to the OSD
+# pods through a Multus macvlan, and a macvlan parent only needs to be up.
+# Giving the node an address would put it on a segment reserved for
+# Ceph-internal traffic.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
+name: enp2s0f1np1
 up: true
 mtu: 9000
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@ machine:
    # cluster IPv6 egress.
    net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
-    # Answer ARP only on the link that owns the address — see k8s-1.yaml (#793).
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: "2"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_announce: "2"
  install:
    # Select the installer target by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive
    # or on EPHEMERAL, whatever order the kernel enumerates them in.
@@ -28,10 +23,6 @@ machine:
    topology.kubernetes.io/zone: saturn
    # Holds a Ceph OSD drive — see k8s-1.yaml.
    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN port to the role name at boot — see k8s-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", ATTR{address}=="58:47:ca:76:6f:74", NAME="ceph-san"
 cluster:
  allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
 ---
@@ -104,12 +95,11 @@ up: true
 ---
 # Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49, untagged on the
 # wire. OSD-to-OSD replication only, not routed off its own segment.
-# Renamed to the role name by the udev rule above — see k8s-1.yaml.
 #
-# The node holds NO address here on purpose: the link is handed whole to the
-# OSD pod (host-device attachment).
+# The node holds NO address here on purpose. Rook attaches the link to the OSD
+# pods through a Multus macvlan, and a macvlan parent only needs to be up.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
+name: enp2s0f1np1
 up: true
 mtu: 9000
@@ -8,11 +8,6 @@ machine:
    # k8s-1.yaml.
    net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
-    # Answer ARP only on the link that owns the address — see k8s-1.yaml (#793).
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore: "1"
-    net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: "2"
-    net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_announce: "2"
  install:
    # Select the installer target by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive
    # or on EPHEMERAL, whatever order the kernel enumerates them in.
@@ -24,10 +19,6 @@ machine:
    topology.kubernetes.io/zone: neptune
    # Holds a Ceph OSD drive — see k8s-1.yaml.
    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN port to the role name at boot — see k8s-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", ATTR{address}=="58:47:ca:74:72:d4", NAME="ceph-san"
 cluster:
  allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
 ---
@@ -87,9 +78,9 @@ parent: enp2s0f0np0
 up: true
 ---
 # Dedicated Ceph cluster network — see k8s-1.yaml. The node holds NO address
-# here on purpose; the link is handed whole to the OSD pod (host-device).
+# here on purpose; the link is only a macvlan parent for the OSD pods.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
+name: enp2s0f1np1
 up: true
 mtu: 9000
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-# Site patch for the throwaway cluster on Hetzner Cloud.
-#
-# This site exists for one thing the other two cannot test: whether a node that
-# genuinely cannot reach gitea.renner.uno still comes up. At home the registry
-# answers, so containerd never reaches the second endpoint in
-# machine.registries.mirrors and the fallback stays unproven.
-#
-# Hetzner Cloud networks are layer 3. A macvlan child carries its own MAC and
-# frames from it do not cross between servers — measured: same-node ARP
-# resolves, cross-node does not. OSD replication therefore does not run here.
-#
-# What belongs in this file is what the cluster is. Interfaces, disks and names
-# are machine properties and live in the node patches.
-machine:
-  kubelet:
-    nodeIP:
-      # The segment bootstrap.sh provisions for node addresses. Unpinned, the
-      # kubelet can pick the public NIC.
-      validSubnets:
-        - 10.90.0.0/16
-cluster:
-  # Three control planes that also carry workloads, which is the production
-  # shape. The qemu site cannot mirror it: that provisioner gives a second disk
-  # to workers only, so a Ceph OSD forces 1 control plane and 3 workers there.
-  allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
@@ -11,12 +11,6 @@ machine:
    # kubelet picks the first non-loopback IP, which could land on the v30iot
    # NIC (ens19, 10.2.30.0/24). Control-plane traffic and hostNetwork pod IPs
    # must stay on mgmt LAN.
-    # fd40::/64 is the mgmt LAN ULA, and it is listed so the Node object carries
-    # an IPv6 InternalIP at all. Without one, Cilium falls back to detecting the
-    # node's IPv6 from mgmt0 and picks the SLAAC address from the dynamic
-    # provider prefix, which it then probes until the agent restarts (#789).
-    # The GUA is not a control-plane address: BGP peers on fd40::/64 too.
    nodeIP:
      validSubnets:
        - 10.2.40.0/24
-        - fd40::/64
@@ -43,15 +43,3 @@ apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: HostnameConfig
 auto: off
 hostname: vm-1
---
-# Ceph cluster network — see vm-2.yaml for why this is a VLAN, and why the
-# DHCPv4Config below is load-bearing.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: VLANConfig
-name: ceph-san
-parent: enp0s2
-vlanID: 30
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp0s2
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ auto: off
 hostname: vm-2
 ---
 # The OSD device, named by the machine that has it. Ceph then consumes
-# /dev/disk/by-partlabel/r-osd-data and needs to know nothing about models,
+# /dev/disk/by-partlabel/r-ceph-osd and needs to know nothing about models,
 # serials or hostnames — the same CephCluster works here and on the MS-01s.
 #
 # The selector is a CEL expression, so each machine says whatever identifies its
@@ -29,33 +29,9 @@ hostname: vm-2
 # real nodes it will name the Samsung.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
+name: ceph-osd
 provisioning:
  diskSelector:
    match: disk.transport == "virtio" && !system_disk
  minSize: 5GiB
  grow: true
---
-# The Ceph cluster network link. Production gives it a second physical port;
-# this machine has one NIC, so the segment is a VLAN on it.
-#
-# A dummy link would be simpler and worthless — no traffic between nodes, so
-# Ceph would replicate over an interface going nowhere and the test would pass
-# having proven nothing. A VLAN rides the provisioner's bridge that every VM is
-# on, so the SAN carries real frames on its own tag.
-#
-# No MTU, unlike production's 9000: the qemu NIC is created with host_mtu=1500.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: VLANConfig
-name: ceph-san
-parent: enp0s2
-vlanID: 30
---
-# Load-bearing. Declaring any network document makes Talos configure this link
-# explicitly, and the implicit DHCP that gives the node its address stops. A
-# first attempt with only the VLANConfig took vm-4 off the network — NotReady,
-# unreachable over the Talos API. Verified on a second throwaway node that this
-# document keeps the parent addressed.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp0s2
@@ -15,21 +15,9 @@ hostname: vm-3
 ---
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
+name: ceph-osd
 provisioning:
  diskSelector:
    match: disk.transport == "virtio" && !system_disk
  minSize: 5GiB
  grow: true
---
-# Ceph cluster network — see vm-2.yaml for why this is a VLAN, and why the
-# DHCPv4Config below is load-bearing.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: VLANConfig
-name: ceph-san
-parent: enp0s2
-vlanID: 30
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp0s2
@@ -19,21 +19,9 @@ hostname: vm-4
 ---
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
+name: ceph-osd
 provisioning:
  diskSelector:
    match: disk.transport == "virtio" && !system_disk
  minSize: 5GiB
  grow: true
---
-# Ceph cluster network — see vm-2.yaml for why this is a VLAN, and why the
-# DHCPv4Config below is load-bearing.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: VLANConfig
-name: ceph-san
-parent: enp0s2
-vlanID: 30
---
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp0s2
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More