fix(llama-embed): raise the memory limit to match its own context and batch

#739 raised the context from 2048 to 4096 and the micro-batch from an effective
512 to 1024, both to match how Paperless chunks documents. It left memory at
2Gi/4Gi, which was sized for the smaller values.

The pod ran fine interactively and was OOMKilled (exit 137) partway through the
first sustained run, around 300 documents into an embedding pass. Nothing in the
server log marked it — the process was killed outright, so the last line is a
half-finished task and the reason is only visible in the container's
lastState.terminated.

This would have surfaced when Paperless first indexed the archive, i.e. on the
first real use rather than under test.

The weights are only ~600 MiB. What sets the footprint is four slots at 4096
context with a 1024-token micro-batch, plus Vulkan allocating the iGPU working
set from system RAM where it counts against this cgroup — the same effect that
put llama-server at 32Gi for 19 GiB of weights.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -7,21 +7,7 @@ when:
       # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
       # so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
       - "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
-      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
-      - "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
       - "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
-      # The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
-      # Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
-      # and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
-      # LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
-      # while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
-      #
-      # pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
-      # file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
-      # any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
-      # group membership needs a manual deployment run.
-      - "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
-      - "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
       - ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
   - event: deployment
     evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'

ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
----
-# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
-#
-# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
-# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
-# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
-# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
-# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
-#
-# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
-# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
-# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
-# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
-# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
-# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
-vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
-          $ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
-          32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
-          3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
-          36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
-          6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
-          39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
-          6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733

ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,3 @@
     - docker-install
     - netbird-proxy
     - netbird-proxy-watchdog
-    # Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
-    # enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
-    # nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
-    - crowdsec-edge-bouncer

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/defaults/main.yml

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
----
-# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
-#
-# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
-# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
-# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
-# cluster.
-#
-# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
-# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
-# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
-# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
-
-# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
-# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
-crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
-crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
-
-# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
-# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
-# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
-# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
-# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
-#
-# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
-# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
-# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
-crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
-crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
-
-# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
-# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
-# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
-#
-# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
-# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
-# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
-# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
-#
-# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
-# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
-# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
-# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
-# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
-# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
-# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
-crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
-
-crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
-crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
-
-# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
-# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
-# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
-crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
-crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/handlers/main.yml

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
----
-# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
-# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
-# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
-# retry_initial_connect matters.
-- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    state: restarted
-    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/tasks/main.yml

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
----
-# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
-#
-# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
-# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
-# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
-# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
-# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
-# package downloads.
-
-- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
-  ansible.builtin.package:
-    name: nftables
-    state: present
-
-- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
-#
-# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
-# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
-# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
-# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
-# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
-# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
-# it manipulates host netfilter.
-#
-# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
-# there, before anything is copied to a host.
-- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
-  ansible.builtin.get_url:
-    url: >-
-      https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
-      crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
-    dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
-    mode: "0644"
-  delegate_to: localhost
-  become: false
-  run_once: true
-
-# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
-# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
-# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
-# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
-# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
-# host.
-- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    mode: "0644"
-
-# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
-# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
-# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
-- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
-  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
-    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
-    dest: /opt
-    remote_src: true
-    include:
-      - crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-
-- name: Install the bouncer binary
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-    remote_src: true
-    mode: "0755"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
-# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
-- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
-    dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
-- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
-    dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
-
-- name: Enable and start the bouncer
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-    daemon_reload: true
-
-- name: Report how to read it
-  ansible.builtin.debug:
-    msg: |
-      crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
-
-      What it would block:  journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
-      What it does block:   nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
-      Metrics:              curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
-
-      Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
-      both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
-      removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
-#
-# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
-# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
-# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
-# that has to resolve before the first connect.
-[Unit]
-Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
-After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-Type=notify
-# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
-# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
-ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
-ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=10
-LimitNOFILE=65536
-KillMode=mixed
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
-mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
-update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
-
-# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
-# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
-# hosts without journald.
-log_mode: stdout
-log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
-
-api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
-api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
-
-# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
-# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
-# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
-# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
-# absent from the shipped example config.
-retry_initial_connect: true
-
-disable_ipv4: false
-disable_ipv6: false
-deny_action: DROP
-
-supported_decisions_types:
-  - ban
-
-# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
-# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
-# at the default filter priority.
-nftables:
-  ipv4:
-    enabled: true
-    set-only: false
-    table: crowdsec
-    chain: crowdsec-chain
-    priority: -10
-  ipv6:
-    enabled: true
-    set-only: false
-    table: crowdsec6
-    chain: crowdsec6-chain
-    priority: -10
-
-# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
-# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
-# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
-nftables_hooks:
-  - input
-  - forward
-
-prometheus:
-  enabled: true
-  listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
-  listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}

kubernetes/RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md

@@ -2,12 +2,7 @@
 
 Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
 metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
-after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
-
-All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
-reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
-k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
-rebuild, not as outstanding work.
+after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
 
 Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
 actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md

@@ -111,23 +111,9 @@ statistics             max_id=13323904    max_start_ts=1787162400.0
 statistics_short_term  max_id=159205762   max_start_ts=1787166000.0
 ```
 
-## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
+## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
 
-Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
-
-| table | rows | span |
-|---|---|---|
-| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
-| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
-| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
-
-The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
-pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
-across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
-document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
-at Postgres.
-
-The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
+Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
 
 **Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
 HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ spec:
         # Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
         # effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
         #
-        # Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
-        # repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
-        # without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
+        # INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
+        # `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
+        # homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
+        # when a referenced secret is missing.
         - name: render-db-url
           image: busybox:1.36
           command:
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
               memory: 32Mi
       containers:
         - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: TZ
               value: Europe/Berlin

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/ha-pg-cluster.yaml

@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
 # That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
 # what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
 #
-# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
-# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
-# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
-# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
-# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
-# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
+# STAGING
+# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
+# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
+# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
+# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
+# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
 apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
 kind: Cluster
 metadata:

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/kustomization.yaml

@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ resources:
   - zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
   - zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
   # Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
-  # Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
-  # long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
+  # PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
+  # on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
+  # tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
   - ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
   - ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
   - ha-pg-cluster.yaml

kubernetes/apps/immich/cluster.yaml

@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
     # Kept permanently as a standing guard.
     kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
 spec:
-  # A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
-  # vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
-  # long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
-  # format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
-  instances: 2
-  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
-  # (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
-  # terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
-  # on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
+  # Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
+  # pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
+  # paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
+  # vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
+  instances: 1
+  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
+  # the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
+  # down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
+  # even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
   smartShutdownTimeout: 10
   stopDelay: 60
   imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,10 +36,8 @@ spec:
       database: immich
       owner: immich
   postgresql:
-    # vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
-    # extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
-    # in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
     shared_preload_libraries:
+      - vectors.so
       - vchord.so
     parameters:
       shared_buffers: "512MB"

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml

@@ -75,44 +75,11 @@ spec:
             # many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
             - --threads
             - "4"
-            # 16k, and going above it corrupts inference rather than failing.
-            # At 32768 per slot this server answered a 650-token classification
-            # prompt with 1025 tokens of "!" — the KV cache producing numbers
-            # rather than language. It does not crash, it does not warn, and
-            # the OpenAI response looks well-formed, so the damage only shows
-            # in what callers get back: Paperless ran past its 300 s timeout,
-            # and Home Assistant got an empty completion and a hallucinated
-            # device list.
-            #
-            # The same Vulkan/Mesa stack already fails hard at --ubatch-size
-            # 2048; this is the quiet version of that limit. Raise this only
-            # against a generation that is read, not against a server that
-            # merely starts.
-            #
+            # 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
+            # and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
+            # layers use full attention.
             - --ctx-size
             - "16384"
-            # One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
-            #
-            # Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
-            # also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
-            # of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
-            # 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
-            # "Context size has been exceeded".
-            #
-            # They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
-            # generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
-            # shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
-            # to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
-            # here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
-            # Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
-            #
-            # No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
-            # its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
-            # would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
-            # asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
-            # kill healthy pods during a long document.
-            - --parallel
-            - "1"
             # A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
             # with ErrorDeviceLost.
             - --ubatch-size

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ spec:
           image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
           args:
             - --hf-repo
-            - gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
+            - Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
             # Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
             - --embeddings
             # A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
@@ -50,41 +50,28 @@ spec:
             # One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
             # reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
             - --alias
-            - bge-m3
-            # bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
-            # Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
-            # llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
-            # outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
-            # trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
-            # rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
-            # pooling types were needed.
+            - qwen3-embedding-0.6b
+            # Qwen3-Embedding is trained for last-token pooling. Left
+            # unspecified llama-server takes the GGUF's default, which is not
+            # visible from outside and would silently produce vectors the model
+            # was not trained to emit. Set before anything is indexed: changing
+            # pooling later invalidates every stored embedding.
             - --pooling
-            - cls
+            - last
             - --n-gpu-layers
             - "99"
             - --threads
             - "2"
-            # Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
-            # tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
-            # Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
-            # llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
-            # at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
-            # "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
-            #
-            # The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
-            # a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
-            # broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
-            # --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
-            # run them mismatched, so both are set.
-            #
-            # 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
-            # ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
-            # 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
-            # this does not need to find out.
+            # Paperless chunks documents at 1024 tokens. The defaults are
+            # batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with --embeddings llama-server
+            # clamps both down to 512 rather than run them mismatched — below
+            # the chunk size. Matching both to 1024 fits a whole chunk in one
+            # pass; 2048 is deliberately avoided, since that is where this
+            # Vulkan stack fails with ErrorDeviceLost.
             - --batch-size
-            - "1536"
+            - "1024"
             - --ubatch-size
-            - "1536"
+            - "1024"
             # Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
             - --ctx-size
             - "4096"
@@ -104,22 +91,24 @@ spec:
             capabilities:
               drop:
                 - ALL
-          # Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
-          # 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
-          # well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
-          # at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
-          # weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
-          # same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
-          # candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
-          # their model size.
+          # The weights are only ~600 MiB, but that is not what sets the
+          # footprint: four slots at 4096 context with a 1024-token micro-batch,
+          # and Vulkan allocating the iGPU's working set from system RAM where
+          # it counts against this cgroup.
+          #
+          # 4Gi was sized for the earlier 2048 context and 512 micro-batch. Both
+          # were raised to match Paperless's chunking without raising this, and
+          # the pod then survived interactive use and was OOMKilled (137) partway
+          # through the first sustained run — roughly 300 documents in. Indexing
+          # the archive would have hit it on day one.
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 250m
-              memory: 2Gi
+              memory: 4Gi
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
             limits:
               cpu: "2"
-              memory: 8Gi
+              memory: 10Gi
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
           # ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
           # model needs, but still sized for a cold download.

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/pvc.yaml

@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
 ---
-# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
-# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
-# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
+# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by the Deployment's initContainer.
+# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away several
+# GiB of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
 #
-# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
-# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
-# inference time.
-#
-# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
-# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
-# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
-# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
-# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
-#
-# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
-# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
+# ReadWriteMany so a second replica or a one-off benchmark Job can mount the
+# same weights; the models are read-only at inference time.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
@@ -28,4 +18,4 @@ spec:
   storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
   resources:
     requests:
-      storage: 120Gi
+      storage: 40Gi

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Scrapes CrowdSec. Until this landed, nothing did: `up{namespace="crowdsec"}`
-# returned zero series and Prometheus held no cs_* metric at all, so the
-# detection side of the ingress path was invisible — including whether the
-# agents were reading logs and whether any bouncer was pulling decisions.
-#
-# One monitor for both services. They carry the same shape (a `metrics` port on
-# 6060) and differ only in `app`, so a matchExpressions selector keeps this to
-# a single object rather than two near-identical ones:
-#
-#   crowdsec-service        the LAPI      — decisions, bouncer + machine requests
-#   crowdsec-agent-service  the agents    — acquisition, parsers, scenarios
-#
-# The crowdsec-ns CiliumNetworkPolicy already admits the monitoring namespace
-# without a port restriction, so no policy change is needed.
-#
-# `release: kube-prometheus-stack` is what the chart's Prometheus selects on.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec
-  namespace: crowdsec
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: crowdsec
-    release: kube-prometheus-stack
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchExpressions:
-      - key: app
-        operator: In
-        values:
-          - crowdsec-service
-          - crowdsec-agent-service
-  endpoints:
-    - port: metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 30s

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ resources:
   - prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
   - alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
   - cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
-  - crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
-  - prometheusrule-crowdsec.yaml
   - home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
   - immich-servicemonitor.yaml
   - loki-servicemonitor.yaml

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-crowdsec.yaml

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: PrometheusRule
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec
-  namespace: monitoring
-  labels:
-    # kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus selects on this label.
-    release: kube-prometheus-stack
-spec:
-  groups:
-    - name: crowdsec.rules
-      rules:
-        - alert: CrowdsecNotReadingLogs
-          # The failure that hides. Everything stays green — pods Running,
-          # LAPI answering, bouncers pulling, decisions being enforced — while
-          # the agents read nothing and therefore detect nothing. The counters
-          # are cumulative, so `cscli metrics` keeps showing a large number and
-          # looks healthy; only the rate tells the truth.
-          #
-          # This alert was written after finding exactly that state: both
-          # agents frozen at their line counts for hours while Traefik kept
-          # logging, and zero events poured into any scenario. It had been that
-          # way since 2026-08-27, and the only outward sign was an absence of
-          # alerts, which reads like quiet rather than blindness.
-          #
-          # Known cause per the wiki: the tailer does not reattach after the
-          # container log rotates.
-          expr: |
-            sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[30m])) == 0
-          for: 30m
-          labels:
-            severity: critical
-          annotations:
-            summary: "CrowdSec liest seit 30min keine Logzeilen"
-            description: >-
-              Die Agents lesen nichts mehr, obwohl Traefik weiter loggt — es
-              wird also nichts erkannt. Prüfen: `cscli metrics` im Agent-Pod,
-              und ob die getailte Datei unter /var/log/containers noch dem
-              laufenden Traefik-Pod entspricht. Ein Neustart der Agents nimmt
-              die aktuelle Datei wieder auf.
-
-        - alert: CrowdsecEdgeBouncerNotPulling
-          # Both proxies must be fetching decisions. A bouncer that stops
-          # pulling keeps enforcing whatever it last held, and a bouncer whose
-          # process died enforces nothing at all — a clean shutdown deletes its
-          # nftables tables. Neither shows up anywhere else.
-          #
-          # Counted rather than named on purpose. The LAPI registers a new
-          # bouncer entry per observed client address, and what it observes is
-          # the netbird-ingress pod IP, so names like `edge@10.244.0.113` come
-          # and go as those pods roll. The count is stable; the names are not.
-          #
-          # `or vector(0)` matters: without it, all bouncers going silent makes
-          # the inner filter empty, count() returns no series, and the alert
-          # never fires — the total-failure case would be the one it misses.
-          expr: |
-            (count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[15m])) > 0) or vector(0)) < 2
-          for: 15m
-          labels:
-            severity: critical
-          annotations:
-            summary: "Weniger als zwei CrowdSec-Bouncer holen Decisions ab"
-            description: >-
-              Erwartet werden proxy-1 und proxy-2. Holt einer nichts mehr ab,
-              setzt er einen veralteten Stand durch; ist sein Dienst beendet,
-              setzt er gar nichts mehr durch, weil ein sauberer Stop die
-              nftables-Tabellen löscht. Prüfen: `systemctl status
-              crowdsec-firewall-bouncer` auf beiden Hosts.
-
-        - alert: CrowdsecTargetDown
-          expr: |
-            up{namespace="crowdsec"} == 0
-          for: 10m
-          labels:
-            severity: warning
-          annotations:
-            summary: "CrowdSec-Scrape-Target {{ $labels.pod }} antwortet nicht"
-            description: >-
-              Ein LAPI- oder Agent-Pod ist nicht erreichbar. Für sich noch kein
-              Ausfall der Durchsetzung — die Bouncer behalten ihren letzten
-              Stand —, aber solange das anhält, kommen keine neuen Decisions an.

kubernetes/apps/monitoring/dashboards/crowdsec-overview.json

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "annotations": {"list": []},
-  "description": "CrowdSec: Erkennung im Cluster, Durchsetzung am NetBird-Edge",
-  "editable": true,
-  "fiscalYearStartMonth": 0,
-  "graphTooltip": 1,
-  "id": null,
-  "links": [],
-  "panels": [
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Aktive Ban-Entscheidungen in der LAPI, ganz überwiegend aus den CAPI-Community-Blocklisten. Das ist die Menge, die ein scharfgeschalteter Bouncer durchsetzt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 0, "y": 0},
-      "id": 1,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(cs_active_decisions)", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Aktive Decisions",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Bouncer, die in den letzten 10 Minuten Decisions abgeholt haben. Fällt das unter die erwartete Zahl, holt ein Bouncer nichts mehr — und setzt damit einen veralteten Stand durch, ohne dass irgendetwas ausfällt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 6, "y": 0},
-      "id": 2,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[10m])) > 0)", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Bouncer, die abholen",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Vom Agent gelesene Logzeilen pro Sekunde. Steht das auf 0, detektiert CrowdSec nichts mehr — der häufigste stille Ausfall, weil alles andere weiterläuft.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 0.01}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 12, "y": 0},
-      "id": 3,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[5m]))", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Gelesene Logzeilen/s",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Szenario-Overflows der letzten 24 h — also lokal erkannte Angriffe, im Gegensatz zu den von CAPI übernommenen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 18, "y": 0},
-      "id": 4,
-      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[24h]))", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Lokale Overflows (24 h)",
-      "type": "stat"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Abholrate je Bouncer. Der Firewall-Bouncer auf den Proxies fragt alle 10 s. Die LAPI legt bei jeder neuen beobachteten Client-Adresse einen Eintrag `<name>@<ip>` an, und beobachtet wird die Pod-IP des netbird-ingress-Peers — deshalb erscheint ein logischer Bouncer hier mehrfach und nach Pod-Rollen unter neuen Namen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 4},
-      "id": 5,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{bouncer}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Bouncer-Abholrate",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund. `http:scan` dominiert und stammt aus den CAPI-Blocklisten.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 20, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 4},
-      "id": 6,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (cs_active_decisions)", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Welche Szenarien lokal auslösen. Das ist das, was CrowdSec selbst aus den Traefik-Logs erkennt.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "bars", "fillOpacity": 70, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 12},
-      "id": 7,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["sum"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (name) (increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[1h]))", "legendFormat": "{{name}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Szenario-Overflows (je Stunde)",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Geparste gegen nicht geparste Zeilen. Ein Anstieg bei `ko` heißt meist, dass sich ein Logformat geändert hat und der Parser nicht mehr greift — CrowdSec liest dann weiter, erkennt aber nichts mehr.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 12},
-      "id": 8,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [
-        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "geparst", "refId": "A"},
-        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ko_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "nicht geparst", "refId": "B"}
-      ],
-      "title": "Parser",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "description": "Whitelist-Treffer nach Grund. Nützlich beim Scharfschalten: was hier zählt, wäre sonst ein Kandidat für einen Ban gewesen.",
-      "fieldConfig": {
-        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
-        "overrides": []
-      },
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 20},
-      "id": 9,
-      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
-      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (rate(cs_node_wl_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
-      "title": "Whitelist-Treffer",
-      "type": "timeseries"
-    },
-    {
-      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
-      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 20},
-      "id": 10,
-      "options": {
-        "code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
-        "content": "## Was dieses Dashboard NICHT zeigt\n\nAlle Panels stammen aus der LAPI und den Agents im Cluster. Die **Bouncer auf proxy-1 und proxy-2 exportieren eigene Metriken**, die hier fehlen:\n\n- `fw_bouncer_active_decisions` — was tatsächlich in den nftables-Sets steht\n- `fw_bouncer_dropped_packets` / `_bytes` — was wirklich verworfen wurde\n- `lapi_requests_total` / `_failures_total` — aus Sicht des Bouncers\n\nSie liegen auf `127.0.0.1:60601` der Proxy-Hosts. Die Hosts sind öffentlich und haben bisher keinerlei Metrik-Pfad; den Port ins Internet zu öffnen, nur um ein Scrape-Ziel zu bekommen, wäre der falsche Tausch.\n\n**Konsequenz:** „Bouncer-Abholrate\" oben zeigt, dass ein Bouncer *fragt* — nicht, dass er die Antwort auch angewandt hat. Solange der Modus `dry-run` ist, wendet er ohnehin nichts an.\n\nEin Scrape-Pfad für die Hosts ist eigene Arbeit und Voraussetzung dafür, dass „was wird wirklich geblockt\" beantwortbar wird."
-      },
-      "title": "Blinder Fleck",
-      "type": "text"
-    }
-  ],
-  "refresh": "30s",
-  "schemaVersion": 38,
-  "style": "dark",
-  "tags": ["homelab", "crowdsec", "security"],
-  "templating": {"list": []},
-  "time": {"from": "now-6h", "to": "now"},
-  "timepicker": {},
-  "timezone": "",
-  "title": "CrowdSec Overview",
-  "uid": "crowdsec-overview",
-  "version": 1,
-  "weekStart": ""
-}

kubernetes/apps/monitoring/dashboards/kustomization.yaml

@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
   - name: dashboard-blackbox-overview
     files:
       - blackbox-overview.json
-  - name: dashboard-crowdsec-overview
-    files:
-      - crowdsec-overview.json
   - name: dashboard-disk-health
     files:
       - disk-health.json

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -82,10 +82,7 @@ data:
   # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
-  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
-  # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
-  # index has to be rebuilt.
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "qwen3-embedding-0.6b"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
-#
-# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
-# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
-# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
-# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
-# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
-# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
-# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
-# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
-#
-# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-  namespace: crowdsec
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -36,51 +36,6 @@ spec:
   values:
     container_runtime: containerd
 
-    # Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
-    #
-    # This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
-    # allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
-    # without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
-    # so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
-    # is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
-    # deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
-    # thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
-    #
-    # Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
-    # here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
-    # resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
-    #
-    # The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
-    # clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
-    # proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
-    # the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
-    # Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
-    config:
-      capi_whitelists.yaml: |
-        cidrs:
-          # The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
-          # netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
-          # keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
-          # proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
-          - 45.157.177.26/32
-          - 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
-          - 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
-          # netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
-          #
-          # Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
-          # hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
-          # no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
-          # this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
-          # outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
-          # inbound attack involved at all.
-          #
-          # Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
-          # current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
-          # these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
-          # community blocklists.
-          - 162.55.50.97/32
-          - 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
-
     # mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
     # the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
     # wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -123,24 +78,6 @@ spec:
 
     lapi:
       replicas: 1
-      service:
-        # Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
-        #
-        # These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
-        # Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
-        # annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
-        # is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
-        # answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
-        # 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
-        # scheme mismatch.
-        #
-        # With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
-        # plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
-        # choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
-        # certificate is self-signed.
-        annotations:
-          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
-          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
       # Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
       # workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
       # cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -149,18 +86,10 @@ spec:
         requests:
           cpu: 50m
       podAnnotations:
-        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
-        # consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
-        # start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
-        # the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
-        # the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
-        #
-        # crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
+        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
+        # env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
         # kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
-        # crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
-        # ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
-        # here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
       persistentVolume:
         data:
           # Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -189,17 +118,6 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
               key: key
-        # The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
-        # endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
-        # `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
-        # names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
-        # registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
-        # is the source of truth, not the database.
-        - name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
-          valueFrom:
-            secretKeyRef:
-              name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
-              key: key
 
     agent:
       # Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/kustomization.yaml

@@ -2,6 +2,4 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
-  - edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
-  - lapi-ingress.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
-#
-# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
-# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
-# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
-# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
-# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
-# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
-# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
-# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
-# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
-#
-# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
-#
-# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
-# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
-# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
-# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
-# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
-# kind of request every round:
-#
-#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
-#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
-#
-# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
-# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
-# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
-# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
-#
-# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
-# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
-# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
-# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
----
-# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
-# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
-# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
-# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
-# what the Service resolves to.
-apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
-kind: ServersTransport
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-lapi
-  namespace: crowdsec
-spec:
-  serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
-  rootCAs:
-    - secret: crowdsec-root-secret
----
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Ingress
-metadata:
-  name: crowdsec-lapi
-  namespace: crowdsec
-  labels:
-    # Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
-    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
-  annotations:
-    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
-    # NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
-    # not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
-    #
-    # The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
-    # Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
-    # are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
-    # Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
-    # chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
-spec:
-  ingressClassName: traefik
-  rules:
-    - host: crowdsec.renner.uno
-      http:
-        paths:
-          - path: /
-            pathType: Prefix
-            backend:
-              service:
-                name: crowdsec-service
-                port:
-                  number: 8080
-  tls:
-    - secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
-      hosts:
-        - crowdsec.renner.uno

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/ai-ns.yaml

@@ -34,17 +34,6 @@ spec:
         - ports:
             - port: "8080"
               protocol: TCP
-    # Home Assistant's llama.cpp conversation agent calls the chat model only —
-    # it has no use for the embedding endpoint, so unlike paperless above this
-    # grant does not extend to llama-embed.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": home-assistant
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "8080"
-              protocol: TCP
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/home-assistant-ns.yaml

@@ -167,18 +167,6 @@ spec:
     - toEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
-    # The cluster's own chat model, for the llama.cpp conversation agent that
-    # backs Assist. Scoped to the one pod and port rather than the ai namespace
-    # as a whole, so this grant cannot widen if something else is placed there —
-    # the embedding endpoint next to it is deliberately not included.
-    - toEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "8080"
-              protocol: TCP
     # traefik for east-west OIDC roundtrips that go through the
     # public hostname via k8s_gateway.
     - toEndpoints: