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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 e30d833624 fix(llama-embed): raise the memory limit to match its own context and batch
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
#739 raised the context from 2048 to 4096 and the micro-batch from an effective
512 to 1024, both to match how Paperless chunks documents. It left memory at
2Gi/4Gi, which was sized for the smaller values.

The pod ran fine interactively and was OOMKilled (exit 137) partway through the
first sustained run, around 300 documents into an embedding pass. Nothing in the
server log marked it — the process was killed outright, so the last line is a
half-finished task and the reason is only visible in the container's
lastState.terminated.

This would have surfaced when Paperless first indexed the archive, i.e. on the
first real use rather than under test.

The weights are only ~600 MiB. What sets the footprint is four slots at 4096
context with a 1024-token micro-batch, plus Vulkan allocating the iGPU working
set from system RAM where it counts against this cgroup — the same effect that
put llama-server at 32Gi for 19 GiB of weights.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 08:14:19 +02:00
276 changed files with 2804 additions and 13255 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: fetch-alerts
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ steps:
bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: alert-triage-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+12 -157
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@
# the admin account could (#330).
#
# The token is still OWNED by gitea_admin, because Gitea scopes packages to
# a user or org namespace and most of these images live under `gitea_admin/*`.
# The rebuild-critical ones additionally publish to `konairius/` — an org
# created for the ghcr mirror path, with gitea_admin as a member so this same
# token can push there. The full gitea_admin/* -> org migration is a
# 38-reference change tracked separately in #330 rather than bundled here.
# Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that motivated the
# other cutovers does not apply to it.
# a user or org namespace and these images live under `gitea_admin/*` — a
# different account cannot publish there. Moving them to a dedicated org is
# the remaining cleanup; it is a 38-reference migration across pipelines and
# Flux-deployed CronJobs, so it is tracked separately in #330 rather than
# bundled here. Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that
# motivated the other cutovers does not apply to it.
when:
- event: push
path:
@@ -88,30 +87,6 @@ steps:
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
- name: build-vmtest
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/vmtest
depends_on: []
when:
- event: deployment
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/vmtest/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:latest
- name: build-tofu
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/tofu
@@ -172,28 +147,6 @@ steps:
# not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
# container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
# the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
#
# Published THREE times, and the third one is not a typo. Its consumers — the
# zigbee2mqtt seed-data init container and the trmnl renderer — start while
# the cluster is still being rebuilt, and at that moment gitea.renner.uno does
# not exist, because Gitea runs inside the cluster being built. A cold-rebuild
# rehearsal caught both in ImagePullBackOff.
#
# So there is a copy on ghcr.io. But the manifests must NOT point at it:
# normal operation pulls from the local registry, and an external reference
# would make every steady-state pull leave the network. The recovery source
# and the everyday source are different things, exactly as they are for Flux's
# git source.
#
# Talos resolves that with machine.registries.mirrors, which takes an ordered
# endpoint list — gitea first, ghcr second (bootstrap.sh). Containerd keeps
# the repository path when it falls through, so the two registries have to
# agree on it: `gitea_admin/alpine-jq` cannot be served by ghcr, where the
# namespace is fixed to the account name. Hence the second Gitea destination
# under konairius/, which the manifests reference and which matches the ghcr
# path exactly.
#
# The gitea_admin/ copy stays until nothing references it any more.
- name: build-alpine-jq
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
@@ -206,47 +159,23 @@ steps:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
GHCR_USER: konairius
GHCR_TOKEN:
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:latest \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:latest
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
# baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
# node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
# critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
# where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
#
# This one ALSO publishes to ghcr.io. A cold-rebuild rehearsal proved why: the
# DaemonSet could not pull from gitea.renner.uno, because Gitea runs inside the
# very cluster being rebuilt. Without the plugins there is no macvlan, so
# Multus cannot attach ceph-san, so Rook's network canary never starts, so the
# CephCluster sits at "Configuring Ceph Mons" — and OpenBao waits forever for a
# PVC that will never bind. Moving the download here fixed the integrity gap
# but quietly swapped github.com on the critical path for something strictly
# worse: a registry that by definition does not exist during a recovery. The
# GHCR copy is public, so a bare node can pull it with no credential and no
# Gitea.
#
# The test that proved this also proved the rule is not specific to this
# image. alpine-jq and alpine-openssl mirror for the same reason — see the
# note on build-alpine-jq. Anything an app needs while the cluster is still
# being built cannot live only in that cluster's own registry.
- name: build-cni-plugins
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
@@ -259,36 +188,23 @@ steps:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
GHCR_USER: konairius
GHCR_TOKEN:
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:latest \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:latest
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
# needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
# fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
# every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
# base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
#
# Mirrored to ghcr.io for the reason given on build-alpine-jq: it is an init
# container, so paperless does not start without it, and during a rebuild
# gitea.renner.uno is not there to serve it. A cold-rebuild rehearsal left
# paperless in Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
- name: build-alpine-openssl
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
@@ -301,25 +217,17 @@ steps:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
GHCR_USER: konairius
GHCR_TOKEN:
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
# Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
# run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an
@@ -349,56 +257,3 @@ steps:
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
# netbird-service-sync: the controller that reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy
# services (public Ingress hosts -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP).
# Runtime artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
- name: build-netbird-service-sync
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/netbird-service-sync
depends_on: []
when:
- event: deployment
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/netbird-service-sync/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:latest
# bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0 (#576). Runtime
# artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
- name: build-bird
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/bird
depends_on: []
when:
- event: deployment
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/bird/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:latest
+21 -17
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
# and ci-claude:latest. The Containerfile makes this layer
# byte-reproducible, so rebuilding an unchanged version dedups
# in the registry instead of orphaning a fresh ~260 MB copy.
# 3. bump-pr — (only when any pin is off the latest version) rewrite every
# consumer pin to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
# 3. bump-pr — (only when the version actually changed) rewrite the 5
# consumer pins to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
# reviews and merges it; nothing auto-merges.
#
# TAG SCHEME — deliberately version tags (ci-claude:<claude-version>), NOT the dated
@@ -107,22 +107,31 @@ steps:
[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*) : ;;
*) echo "npm returned an implausible version '$$NEW' — aborting."; exit 1 ;;
esac
# Distinct tags the consumers currently reference. Divergent pins are
# normal (a pipeline bumped on its own); the bump rewrites all of them.
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ' | sed 's/ $$//')
[ -n "$$CUR" ] || { echo "No ci-claude pin found in the consumers — aborting."; exit 1; }
echo "latest=$$NEW current=[$$CUR] event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
# The tag every consumer currently references. They are kept identical,
# so this must resolve to EXACTLY ONE non-empty tag; anything else
# (no match, or a partial/disagreeing set) aborts rather than risk a
# corrupting sed later. Counting with `grep -c .` (non-empty lines)
# instead of `wc -l` is deliberate: an empty result yields 0 here but
# 1 under wc -l, which would slip past the guard.
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9A-Za-z._-]+' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u)
NTAGS=$$(printf '%s' "$$CUR" | grep -c . || true)
if [ -z "$$CUR" ] || [ "$$NTAGS" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "Expected exactly one ci-claude tag across the consumers, got [$$CUR]."
echo "Refusing to guess — fix the pins by hand."; exit 1
fi
echo "latest=$$NEW current=$$CUR event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
printf '%s' "$$NEW" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version"
printf '%s' "$$CUR" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current"
# Build when any pin is off latest, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump when any pin is off latest.
# Build when the version changed, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump the pins only when the
# version the consumers reference is not the latest.
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ] || [ "$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT" = "push" ]; then
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-build"; echo "will build $$NEW"
else
echo "already on $$NEW — nothing to build"
fi
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ]; then
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR [$$CUR] -> $$NEW"
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR $$CUR -> $$NEW"
else
echo "consumers already pin $$NEW — no PR"
fi
@@ -166,9 +175,6 @@ steps:
- |
[ -f "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump" ] || { echo "no version change — no PR"; exit 0; }
set -eu
# Secret values can carry a trailing newline; it breaks the push URL and the auth header.
PUSH_TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$PUSH_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
[ -n "$$PUSH_TOKEN" ] || { echo "PUSH_TOKEN is empty — aborting"; exit 1; }
NEW=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version")
CUR=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current")
# Both were validated non-empty by the decide step; re-assert before a
@@ -184,11 +190,9 @@ steps:
# is not a maintained list.
CONSUMERS=$$(grep -rlE 'ci-claude:[0-9]' .woodpecker)
[ -n "$$CONSUMERS" ] || { echo "No ci-claude consumers found — refusing to continue."; exit 1; }
# NEW goes into a sed replacement: allow only a plain x.y.z version.
printf '%s' "$$NEW" | grep -qE '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$$' || { echo "refusing non-x.y.z version '$$NEW'"; exit 1; }
# Every version-pinned tag becomes NEW, whatever it was; consumers only.
# Exact-string swap of the current tag for the new one, consumers only.
for f in $$CONSUMERS; do
sed -i "s#ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
sed -i "s#ci-claude:$$CUR#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
done
# Author is claude-bot (the PAT's account); the commit subject makes
# the automated-bump nature clear.
+3 -3
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ steps:
# run that never touched them. Tracked in #461.
- name: kustomize-build
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
commands:
- |
set -eu
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ steps:
# whenever it trails the deployed server. If you bump the server, bump here.
- name: woodpecker-lint
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.18.0-alpine
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.17.0-alpine
commands:
- |
set -eu
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ steps:
# this step fails permanently on its own documentation.
- name: no-digest-pins
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
commands:
- |
set -eu
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ when:
steps:
- name: model-selection-tests
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
-14
View File
@@ -7,21 +7,7 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
#
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
+3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ when:
branch: master
path:
- "ansible/roles/netbird-server/**"
# install-netbird-server.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-server.yml"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-server.yml"
- event: deployment
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: e2e
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
+2 -2
View File
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ steps:
# fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
# ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
# test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
- name: e2e-test
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
+2 -2
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ steps:
# (the issue-pick logic needs jq, which only the ci-claude image has);
# minting a 1h read-only token per run is cheap. Degrades to
# snapshot-only if the ci-diagnostics ServiceAccount isn't reconciled.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ steps:
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: issue-fix-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: pr-review-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
# this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
when:
- branch: master
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: update-audit-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
-198
View File
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
# Nightly wiki maintenance for the Notes vault (k.renner/notes), replacing the
# workstation's wiki-maintenance and wiki-consolidate timers: distill the raw/
# backlog into wiki/ (wiki-distill agent), audit wiki/ with the vault's own
# script (structural checks, no model), then consolidate (wiki-consolidate
# agent: verifies a cohort of notes against sources, repos and the live
# cluster and edits them). The pipeline commits and pushes as Claude Bot; the
# push webhook then refreshes the wiki service.
#
# The agents address the vault as ~/Notes and the repos as ~/source/<repo>, so
# each agent step links those into the workspace instead of rewriting them.
when:
- event: cron
cron: wiki-maintenance
# Hand-started runs: `woodpecker pipeline create k.renner/homelab --branch master`.
# The typesafe_api_key secret is scoped to cron and manual, not deployment.
- event: manual
steps:
- name: checkout-notes
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
pull: true
environment:
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
commands:
- |
set -eu
# Token only on the wire, never in .git/config. Secrets set from files carry
# a trailing newline (run 10220: "could not read Username"); strip CR/LF.
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
clone --depth 50 --branch main https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/notes.git notes
echo "raw backlog: $$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l) file(s)"
# Full history for the consolidate agent's `git log` checks; the
# workspace clone is shallow and tree-filtered.
mkdir -p sources
git clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab.git sources/homelab
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homeassistant.git sources/homeassistant
- name: fetch-diag
# Read-only live-cluster access for the consolidate agent, same mechanism
# as issue-fix.yml: ./.ci-diag/kubectl plus a 1h ci-diagnostics token.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID:
from_secret: hetzner_s3_access_key
S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:
from_secret: hetzner_s3_secret_key
commands:
- bash scripts/ci/fetch-kubeconfig.sh
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: distill
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
pull: true
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
commands:
- |
set -eu
# An empty queue must not start the agent: its startup context alone
# costs more than the whole audit.
BACKLOG=$$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l)
if [ "$$BACKLOG" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "distill: raw/ is empty, skipping the agent"
exit 0
fi
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
"$$HOME/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py" --probe-index
MODEL=$$(sh scripts/ci/pick-model.sh "distill raw source notes into atomic wiki notes: read sources, check the wiki for existing coverage, write or merge notes; careful writing, moderate reasoning")
if [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then echo "distill: selected model $$MODEL"; else echo "distill: using the CLI default model"; fi
cd notes
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/distill.md | claude $${MODEL:+--model $$MODEL} \
--agent wiki-distill \
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)" \
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/settings.json \
-p
- name: audit
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
pull: true
commands:
# Findings are report lines in output/, not a pipeline failure.
- python3 -B notes/bin/wiki_audit.py --vault "$$PWD/notes"
- name: consolidate
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
pull: true
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
commands:
- |
set -eu
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
ln -sfn "$$PWD/sources" "$$HOME/source"
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
if [ -f .ci-diag/kubeconfig ]; then
ln -sf "$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubectl" /usr/local/bin/kubectl
export KUBECONFIG="$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubeconfig"
else
echo "consolidate: no ci-diag kubeconfig, live cluster checks unavailable"
fi
cd notes
# JSON output: the agent's report and the run's cost come out of one
# record at the end instead of a 45-minute silent log.
# One source for the Bash allowlist: the settings file (run 10608: the
# agent writes ~/Notes, the rules carried only /root/Notes).
BASH_RULES=$$(jq -r '[.permissions.allow[] | select(startswith("Bash("))] | join(",")' ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json)
rc=0
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate.md | claude \
--agent wiki-consolidate \
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Agent,$$BASH_RULES" \
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json \
--output-format json \
-p > /tmp/consolidate.json || rc=$$?
# A killed or crashed claude leaves no valid JSON; report rc, not a jq error.
if [ -s /tmp/consolidate.json ] && jq -e . /tmp/consolidate.json > /dev/null; then
jq -r '.result // empty' /tmp/consolidate.json
jq -c '{duration_ms, num_turns, total_cost_usd, is_error}' /tmp/consolidate.json
else
echo "consolidate: no result record (exit $$rc)"; head -c 2000 /tmp/consolidate.json || true
fi
echo "consolidate: git log --oneline of the run:"
git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD
exit $$rc
- name: push-notes
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
pull: true
environment:
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
commands:
- |
set -eu
cd notes
git config user.email "claude-bot@renner.uno"
git config user.name "Claude Bot"
# Only the vault content is committed; anything an agent leaves elsewhere
# in the checkout (run 10362: scratch scripts in the root) stays behind.
# The consolidate agent commits its own snapshots, so HEAD may already be
# ahead of origin/main with a clean tree.
git add -A -- wiki raw output .wiki-consolidation-state.json
git diff --cached --quiet || git commit -q -m "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F): distill + audit + consolidate (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)"
if [ "$$(git rev-list --count origin/main..HEAD)" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "wiki-maintenance: no changes"
exit 0
fi
# The workstation pushes main on its own (notes-push.path), so main moves
# while the agents run (run 10241: non-fast-forward). The run's work goes
# to a branch and a PR that this step merges through Gitea; a conflict
# leaves the PR open for a human and fails the run.
BRANCH="wiki-maintenance/$$(date -u +%F)-$$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER"
git checkout -q -b "$$BRANCH"
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" push origin "HEAD:$$BRANCH"
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1/repos/k.renner/notes"
jq -n --arg title "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F) (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)" \
--arg body "Nightly distill + audit + consolidate. Merged by the pipeline; open only if the merge failed." \
--arg head "$$BRANCH" '{title: $$title, body: $$body, head: $$head, base: "main"}' > /tmp/pr.json
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @/tmp/pr.json "$$API/pulls")
echo "POST pull -> HTTP $$code"
[ "$$code" -ge 200 ] && [ "$$code" -lt 300 ] || { cat /tmp/pr-resp.json; exit 1; }
NUM=$$(jq -r '.number' /tmp/pr-resp.json)
# Merge without delete_branch_after_merge: run 10254 got HTTP 500 from that
# call although the merge itself had landed. Verify the PR state instead of
# trusting the status code, then drop the branch as a separate, best-effort step.
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/merge-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"Do":"merge"}' "$$API/pulls/$$NUM/merge")
echo "POST merge #$$NUM -> HTTP $$code"
MERGED=$$(curl -s -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" "$$API/pulls/$$NUM" | jq -r '.merged')
echo "PR #$$NUM merged: $$MERGED"
[ "$$MERGED" = "true" ] || { cat /tmp/merge-resp.json; echo "PR #$$NUM left open"; exit 1; }
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/del-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" \
"$$API/branches/$$(printf '%s' "$$BRANCH" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')")
echo "DELETE branch $$BRANCH -> HTTP $$code (best effort)"
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
#
# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
#
# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733
+7 -10
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
# Deploy the NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster members (the public edge).
# Deploy a NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (a second proxy host).
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml
#
# Prerequisites:
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
# listed under [netbird_proxy] in inventory/pve_hosts.yml. Docker is
# installed by the (Arch-aware) docker-install role.
# - DNS A/AAAA for the host's own name (e.g. proxy-1.renner.uno) -> its IP.
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared by every member) — no
# new token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the
# cluster.
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's A/AAAA to proxy.renner.uno so
# traffic round-robins across the cluster.
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared with VPS-1) — no new
# token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the cluster.
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's IP to the proxy domain so traffic
# round-robins across the cluster. Repoint proxy.renner.uno away from its
# CNAME to netbird.renner.uno (management host) to A/AAAA records listing
# BOTH proxy IPs (VPS-1 + this host).
- name: Deploy NetBird reverse-proxy cluster member
hosts: netbird_proxy
@@ -25,7 +26,3 @@
- docker-install
- netbird-proxy
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
# Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
# enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
# nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
- crowdsec-edge-bouncer
+1
View File
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@
- common
- docker-install
- netbird-server
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
+4 -4
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@
#
# WHAT IS NOT, and must not be added:
#
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on the
# proxies, an Ansible template — but the
# management server does not validate it from
# any file. It is registered
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on both
# the server and the proxies, all Ansible
# templates — but the management server does not
# validate it from any of them. It is registered
# in the management DATABASE. Rotating it changes
# only what the proxies present, so every proxy
# is locked out: "proxy auth failed: too many
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
---
# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
#
# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
# cluster.
#
# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
#
# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
#
# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
#
# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
# retry_initial_connect matters.
- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
state: restarted
daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
---
# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
#
# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
# package downloads.
- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
ansible.builtin.package:
name: nftables
state: present
- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
ansible.builtin.file:
path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
state: directory
mode: "0755"
# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
#
# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
# it manipulates host netfilter.
#
# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
# there, before anything is copied to a host.
- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
ansible.builtin.get_url:
url: >-
https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
mode: "0644"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
run_once: true
# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
# host.
- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
mode: "0644"
# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.unarchive:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
dest: /opt
remote_src: true
include:
- crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
- name: Install the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
remote_src: true
mode: "0755"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
mode: "0600"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Enable and start the bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
enabled: true
state: started
daemon_reload: true
- name: Report how to read it
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
What it would block: journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
What it does block: nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
Metrics: curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
#
# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
# that has to resolve before the first connect.
[Unit]
Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=notify
# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
LimitNOFILE=65536
KillMode=mixed
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
# hosts without journald.
log_mode: stdout
log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
# absent from the shipped example config.
retry_initial_connect: true
disable_ipv4: false
disable_ipv6: false
deny_action: DROP
supported_decisions_types:
- ban
# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
# at the default filter priority.
nftables:
ipv4:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec
chain: crowdsec-chain
priority: -10
ipv6:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec6
chain: crowdsec6-chain
priority: -10
# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
nftables_hooks:
- input
- forward
prometheus:
enabled: true
listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}
+1 -12
View File
@@ -26,16 +26,8 @@ edge_open3e_poll_seconds: 30
# entries when added), so the multi-frame read is cheap at a 30 s poll.
# Records faults/info events only (NormalOperation, LagDeviceDtcReported,
# LegionellaProtectionTemperatureReached) — NOT setpoint or program changes.
# onebase.*: the 29 paired ZigBee slots on the One Base gateway (ECU 0x6c3) --
# 8 radiator valves, 9 climate sensors, 9 underfloor actuators, 3 floor
# thermostats. Per-device room temperature, active setpoint, humidity, valve
# opening/demand, battery and RSSI; the local replacement for the ViCare cloud
# room sensors. Needs the onebase overlay (files/open3e-onebase.py) -- the stock
# codec declares 57 bytes and a paired slot answers with 68.
# Only CurrentValues are polled. The room and device registries (1884.., 2084..)
# are static configuration and are read on demand, not every 30 s.
edge_open3e_datapoints: >-
vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791,onebase.2086,onebase.2089,onebase.2092,onebase.2095,onebase.2098,onebase.2101,onebase.2104,onebase.2107,onebase.2110,onebase.2113,onebase.2116,onebase.2119,onebase.2122,onebase.2125,onebase.2128,onebase.2131,onebase.2134,onebase.2137,onebase.2140,onebase.2143,onebase.2262,onebase.2265,onebase.2268,onebase.2271,onebase.2274,onebase.2277,onebase.2280,onebase.2283,onebase.2286
vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791
# ECU addresses; -dev selects codec set, tx selects the UDS address.
# vcmu (refrigerant-circuit controller) has no dedicated codec set —
# omitting dpList makes open3e fall back to the generic datapoint list,
@@ -46,9 +38,6 @@ edge_open3e_devices:
# files/open3e-vx3plus.py) — die Stock-vx3-Liste filtert sie sonst weg.
vx3: { tx: "0x6a1", dpList: "/config/vx3plus.py" }
vcmu: { tx: "0x68c" }
# One Base ZigBee gateway. Overlay re-declares the paired ZigBee slots at
# their real 68-byte length (see files/open3e-onebase.py).
onebase: { tx: "0x6c3", dpList: "/config/onebase.py" }
edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds: 10
edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the One Base
# ZigBee gateway on ECU 0x6c3 (BACKENDGATEWAY).
#
# Upstream declares ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues as 57 bytes. A PAIRED device
# slot on this gateway answers with 68: the 57 known bytes plus the parent
# device serial and three trailing bytes. udsoncan reads only the declared
# length and then treats the next two bytes -- the first half of that serial --
# as a foreign data identifier, so every paired slot fails to decode with
# "Server returned values for data identifier 0x.... that was not requested".
# The bogus identifier differs per device because the serial does.
#
# This overlay re-declares the 29 paired slots at 68 bytes, reusing upstream's
# sub-type list so the per-device-type O3ESwitch (climate sensor / TRV / floor
# thermostat / actuator, incl. DeviceTemperatureSetpoint) is inherited rather
# than copied.
#
# EMPTY slots answer with 57 and decode against the stock codec, so they are
# left alone and are not polled. A slot that is later unpaired therefore starts
# reporting a decode error on its topic instead of a value.
#
# Verified on ECU 0x6c3, 2026-09-17: 29 paired slots, all 68 bytes.
from open3e.Open3Ecodecs import O3EComplexType, RawCodec
from open3e.Open3Edatapoints import dataIdentifiers as _master
# ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues of the paired slots: devices 1-20 run 2086..2143
# in steps of 3, devices 21-29 continue at 2262..2286.
_PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES = [2086 + 3 * n for n in range(20)] + [
2262 + 3 * n for n in range(9)
]
def _with_parent_serial(did):
stock = _master["dids"][did]
return O3EComplexType(
68,
stock.id,
list(stock.subTypes)
+ [
RawCodec(8, "ParentDeviceSerialnumber"),
RawCodec(2, "Unknown_65_66"),
RawCodec(1, "Unknown_67"),
],
desc=stock.desc,
info=stock.info,
acc=stock.acc,
)
dataIdentifiers = {
"dids": {
**_master["dids"],
**{did: _with_parent_serial(did) for did in _PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES},
}
}
-7
View File
@@ -129,13 +129,6 @@
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart heating-can
- name: Deploy open3e One Base datapoint overlay (68-byte ZigBee slots)
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: open3e-onebase.py
dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/onebase.py"
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart heating-can
# --- Compose project ---------------------------------------------------------
- name: Deploy the broker credential env file
ansible.builtin.template:
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ services:
volumes:
- ./devices.json:/config/devices.json:ro
- ./vx3plus.py:/config/vx3plus.py:ro
- ./onebase.py:/config/onebase.py:ro
env_file:
# Broker credential, 0600 -- see heating-can.env.j2.
- heating-can.env
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy on the proxy hosts.
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy (VPS-1 and proxy-1).
#
# Why it exists: the proxy's embedded NetBird client pins each proxied
# domain's route to a specific routing-peer identity. The netbird-ingress
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ netbird_watchdog_probe_hosts:
- home.renner.uno
- immich.renner.uno
# Address the probe connects to. The proxy binds :443 on the host directly.
# Address the probe connects to. 127.0.0.1 reaches the local proxy on both
# members: VPS-1 routes it via Traefik's HostSNI(*) TCP passthrough, proxy-1
# binds :443 directly.
netbird_watchdog_probe_address: 127.0.0.1
netbird_watchdog_container: netbird-proxy
@@ -30,13 +32,8 @@ netbird_watchdog_fail_threshold: 3
# Minimum seconds between watchdog-issued restarts, so a genuinely broken
# backend can't put the proxy into a restart loop. Shared by both the URL-probe
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below. One minute: the route-manager wedge
# recurs on every routing-peer loss, and rolling node reboots lose one peer
# every few minutes; a suppressed restart there leaves the wedge standing
# until the URL probe's three rounds fire (3.5 min of 000 on every domain,
# measured 2026-09-07). A minute still caps a loop at one restart per
# probe interval.
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 60
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below.
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 600
# Log fingerprint of the reverse-proxy route-manager wedge, matched as a plain
# substring in the proxy's docker logs by the flood watchdog. On this build the
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
# Deploys the reverse-proxy watchdog (see defaults/main.yml for why).
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency)
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency; proxy-1 is Arch, VPS-1 Debian)
ansible.builtin.package:
name: curl
state: present
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
# NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (proxy-only host, e.g. proxy-1).
# Every member uses the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN + token. NetBird load-balances/
# fails the cluster over via DNS round-robin on the proxy domain (see
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
# Joins the same proxy cluster as the VPS-1 proxy: identical NB_PROXY_DOMAIN
# + the same token. NetBird load-balances/fails the cluster over via DNS
# round-robin on the proxy domain (see plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
# MUST match the netbird-server role's netbird_version — the reverse-proxy
# release line has to track the management server it enrolls against.
@@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ netbird_version: "0.73.2"
# Management server this proxy enrolls against (public API, TLS).
netbird_server_host: netbird.renner.uno
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member, and must NOT
# be a subdomain of the management domain (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird
# docs (TLS/routing conflicts).
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member.
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
# A shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a
# valid HA cluster, so one token serves every member.
# Reuse VPS-1's proxy token — a shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the
# same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a valid HA cluster, so no separate token is needed.
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
# Relay auth secret — MUST be identical across every relay instance and the
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
# NetBird reverse-proxy — HA cluster member on a proxy-only host.
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik: the
# proxy owns the port and terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME
# challenges directly.
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik:
# unlike VPS-1 (where the proxy shares :443 with management/signal/relay via
# SNI routing), this host runs nothing else, so the proxy owns the port and
# terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME challenges directly.
services:
proxy:
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
@@ -23,3 +23,9 @@ netbird_datastore_key: "{{ vault_netbird_datastore_key }}"
# Relay secret for WebSocket relay authentication
netbird_relay_secret: "{{ vault_netbird_relay_secret }}"
# Reverse proxy configuration
# IMPORTANT: Proxy domain must NOT be a subdomain of the management domain
# (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird docs - causes TLS/routing conflicts
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
@@ -16,3 +16,7 @@
- name: Restart netbird coturn
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate coturn
- name: Restart netbird proxy
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate proxy
+9 -68
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- /opt/netbird/management
- /opt/netbird/signal
- /opt/netbird/letsencrypt
- /opt/netbird/proxy/certs
- name: Deploy docker-compose.yml
ansible.builtin.template:
@@ -58,83 +59,23 @@
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart netbird coturn
# The public edge is the proxy hosts (plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml); this
# host runs no reverse proxy. The tasks below remove the one it used to run,
# its watchdogs first so they cannot restart it mid-removal, and can go once
# the role has run against every host that ever carried it.
- name: Check for reverse-proxy watchdog units
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}"
loop:
- netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
- netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
register: _proxy_watchdog_units
- name: Stop and disable reverse-proxy watchdogs
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: "{{ item.item }}"
state: stopped
enabled: false
loop: "{{ _proxy_watchdog_units.results }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
when: item.stat.exists
- name: Remove reverse-proxy watchdog units and scripts
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.service
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-watchdog
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog
- /run/netbird-proxy-watchdog
register: _proxy_watchdog_files
- name: Reload systemd after removing the watchdog units
ansible.builtin.systemd:
daemon_reload: true
when: _proxy_watchdog_files.changed
- name: Deploy proxy.env
ansible.builtin.template:
src: proxy.env.j2
dest: /opt/netbird/proxy.env
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart netbird proxy
- name: Pull NetBird container images
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose pull
changed_when: false
# --remove-orphans removes containers of services no longer in the compose
# file (the reverse proxy).
- name: Start NetBird containers
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d
register: docker_compose_result
changed_when: >-
'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stderr
- name: Remove reverse-proxy volumes
ansible.builtin.shell: |
set -eu
for v in netbird_netbird_proxy_certs netbird_netbird_proxy_data netbird_netbird_proxy_state; do
if [ -n "$(docker volume ls -q --filter "name=^${v}$")" ]; then
docker volume rm "$v"
echo "removed $v"
fi
done
register: _proxy_volumes
changed_when: "'removed' in _proxy_volumes.stdout"
- name: Remove reverse-proxy config and state
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /opt/netbird/proxy.env
- /opt/netbird/proxy
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state
changed_when: "'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or 'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout"
# The management store has no cluster-side backup. Pulling one put a root
# key on this host that the cluster held, and this server's own state is
@@ -187,9 +187,10 @@ services:
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-management.service=netbird-management"
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.port=33073"
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.scheme=h2c"
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — the proxy hosts (proxy-1, proxy-2)
# connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443 and get
# a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — remote reverse-proxy instances (e.g.
# proxy-1) connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443.
# The local proxy uses management:33073 directly, so it never needed
# this route; remote ones get a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.rule=Host(`{{ netbird_server_host }}`) && PathPrefix(`/management.ProxyService/`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.tls=true"
@@ -220,6 +221,37 @@ services:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Reverse Proxy Service (per docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/migration/enable-reverse-proxy)
proxy:
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
container_name: netbird-proxy
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- netbird
depends_on:
- management
env_file:
- ./proxy.env
volumes:
- netbird_proxy_certs:/certs
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state:/var/lib/netbird
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.rule=HostSNI(`*`)"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.tls.passthrough=true"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.service=proxy-tls"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.priority=1"
- "traefik.tcp.services.proxy-tls.loadbalancer.server.port=8443"
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
networks:
netbird:
driver: bridge
volumes:
netbird_proxy_certs:
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
NB_PROXY_DOMAIN={{ netbird_proxy_domain }}
NB_PROXY_TOKEN={{ netbird_proxy_token }}
NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=http://management:33073
NB_PROXY_ALLOW_INSECURE=true
NB_PROXY_ADDRESS=:8443
NB_PROXY_ACME_CERTIFICATES=true
NB_PROXY_ACME_CHALLENGE_TYPE=tls-alpn-01
NB_PROXY_CERTIFICATE_DIRECTORY=/certs
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
{
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-consolidate agent in CI: read the vault and the",
"//2": "source repos cloned under /root/source, read the live cluster through the",
"//3": "ci-diagnostics kubeconfig, edit wiki/, output/ and the rotation state only.",
"//4": "Deny rules win; git and kubectl are read-only subcommands, no network tools.",
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
"Read(//root/source/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/.wiki-consolidation-state.json)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes ls-files:*)",
"Bash(kubectl get:*)",
"Bash(kubectl describe:*)",
"Bash(kubectl version:*)",
"Bash(kubectl api-resources:*)",
"Bash(kubectl explain:*)",
"Bash(git log:*)",
"Bash(git show:*)",
"Bash(git status:*)",
"Bash(git diff:*)",
"Bash(git rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(date:*)",
"Bash(wc:*)",
"Bash(stat:*)",
"Bash(head:*)",
"Bash(tail:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Read(//proc/**)",
"Read(//etc/**)",
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
"Read(//root/.kube/**)",
"Read(//woodpecker/**/.ci-diag/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/source/*/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/source/**)",
"Bash(kubectl apply:*)",
"Bash(kubectl delete:*)",
"Bash(kubectl patch:*)",
"Bash(kubectl edit:*)",
"Bash(kubectl scale:*)",
"Bash(kubectl rollout:*)",
"Bash(kubectl exec:*)",
"Bash(kubectl cp:*)",
"Bash(kubectl drain:*)",
"Bash(kubectl cordon:*)",
"Bash(kubectl label:*)",
"Bash(kubectl annotate:*)",
"Bash(git push:*)",
"Bash(git reset:*)",
"Bash(git checkout:*)",
"Bash(git clean:*)",
"Bash(git rebase:*)",
"Bash(git config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant config:*)",
"Bash(rm:*)",
"Bash(rm -rf:*)",
"Bash(curl:*)",
"Bash(wget:*)",
"Bash(ssh:*)",
"Bash(tea:*)",
"Bash(woodpecker:*)"
]
}
}
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes); the homelab and homeassistant repositories are checked out under ~/source/. `kubectl` reads the live cluster with a read-only identity.
Run the wiki-consolidate agent now for today's scheduled consolidation pass. Follow its instructions exactly: snapshot the vault to git first, abort if that fails, select today's rotating cohort of 20 from the state file, verify claims against both their sources and the live systems, act on the verdicts, write the dated report to ~/Notes/output/, update the state file, and snapshot again at the end. Do not push; the pipeline pushes the run's commits.
Report the counts and the coverage progress when you are done.
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes). Do exactly this, nothing else:
Glob ~/Notes/raw/*.md (top level only, never ~/Notes/raw/_processed/). Distill every file you find into ~/Notes/wiki/ following your process, including the ranker check for every concept. Move each fully processed source to ~/Notes/raw/_processed/. If raw/ has no top-level files besides _index.md, say so and stop.
Do not commit or push; the pipeline does that after you finish. Do not touch anything outside ~/Notes/wiki/ and ~/Notes/raw/.
End with one line per file: which wiki notes it produced or merged into, or "nothing distillable".
-41
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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
{
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-maintenance agent (wiki-distill) in CI.",
"//2": "The step's environment holds a Gitea push token, a TypeSafe key and the wiki-index",
"//3": "client credential, so the Read tool is kept away from /proc (env dumps), /root outside",
"//4": "the vault symlink target, /etc and the checkout's .git/. The vault itself is the work.",
"//5": "Mirrors ci/agents/issue-fix/settings.json; absolute globs because the vault is reached",
"//6": "through the ~/Notes symlink the pipeline creates.",
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*)",
"Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*)",
"Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(date:*)",
"Bash(wc:*)",
"Bash(head:*)",
"Bash(tail:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Read(//proc/**)",
"Read(//etc/**)",
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Bash(rm:*)",
"Bash(git:*)",
"Bash(curl:*)",
"Bash(wget:*)"
]
}
}
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
FROM alpine:3.22@sha256:14358309a308569c32bdc37e2e0e9694be33a9d99e68afb0f5ff33cc1f695dce
# bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0. Distro package, no build
# step — the image is the binary plus its runtime.
#
# 3.22 rather than the 3.21 the other images here pin: bird2 first appears in
# 3.22/community.
#
# Config is read from /etc/bird/bird.conf, not the package default
# /etc/bird.conf, so the mount cannot shadow what the package ships.
#
# kubectl renders the init container's per-node config: go-template-file for
# the templating, a field selector for excluding the node itself, in-cluster
# config for the auth. From the distro, so there is no version literal to drift
# and no download to trust. It is only ever used to read core/v1 Nodes.
RUN apk add --no-cache bird2 kubectl
# Fails the build rather than the first pod if a binary or its path is wrong.
RUN /usr/sbin/bird --version \
&& kubectl version --client > /dev/null
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/sbin/bird", "-f", "-c", "/etc/bird/bird.conf"]
+1 -3
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
git \
jq \
openssh-client \
openssl \
python3 \
py3-yaml
openssl
# Install Claude Code, then make the resulting layer byte-stable so that a
# rebuild of the SAME version DEDUPS in the Gitea registry instead of orphaning
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.12.6
ARG VELERO_VERSION=v1.16.0
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.3
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.5
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
RUN apk add --no-cache \
aws-cli \
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
"https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
&& echo "28e9ccd9aebd690fa03d8cf2582221d87ea38b2a1704f411d75a03589c58f2aa /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& echo "4c41a3b10b075292e64b182283d558e9d8e935f43239de1ed4e4b14359593efb /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/flux.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/releases/download/v${FLUX_VERSION}/flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" \
&& echo "b853df82adfd7736f580692f9f734473d571606307139f8fd20c2a80dd1ff473 /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& echo "4092b367fd060097976fb7261601f79420ecf7266328417dfd8dfee27de0e6a3 /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/flux.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin flux \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flux \
&& rm -f /tmp/flux.tar.gz
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# netbird-service-sync: reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services (public
# domains -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP) from Ingresses carrying the
# public label. Standard library only, so the image is the interpreter plus one
# file; runs unprivileged as its own user.
FROM python:3.13-slim
RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin controller
COPY controller.py /opt/controller.py
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
USER controller
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/opt/controller.py"]
@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""netbird-service-sync: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
Source of truth: every Ingress carrying the public label (dns.renner.uno/public).
For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
Traefik untouched, the proxy terminates nothing, and no domain resource is
involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers. The target sends a
PROXY protocol v2 header so Traefik (and CrowdSec behind its access log) sees
the WAN client address instead of the routing peer's pod IP.
Ownership is derived from NetBird itself, not from local state: a service is
managed iff its mode is "tls" and its target is this controller's subnet
resource. Services that do not match (the hand-made HTTP/domain ones) are never
touched; a desired host held by such a service is reported and skipped until
that service is removed by hand.
Credentials: the NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
Kubernetes auth role, exactly like the setup-key rotator; it never lands in a
Kubernetes Secret or in a log line.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
LOG = logging.getLogger("netbird-service-sync")
NB = os.environ.get("NB_MANAGEMENT_URL", "https://netbird.renner.uno").rstrip("/")
BAO_ADDR = os.environ.get("BAO_ADDR", "http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200").rstrip("/")
BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "netbird-service-sync")
BAO_PAT_PATH = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_PATH", "homelab/data/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird")
BAO_PAT_KEY = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_KEY", "pat")
SERVICE_CIDR = os.environ.get("SERVICE_CIDR", "10.96.0.0/12")
NETWORK_NAME = os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME", "k8s public ingress")
ROUTER_GROUP = os.environ.get("ROUTER_GROUP_NAME", "k8s-ingress-router")
SOURCE_GROUP = os.environ.get("SOURCE_GROUP_NAME", "All")
TRAEFIK_NS, TRAEFIK_SVC = os.environ.get("TRAEFIK_SERVICE", "ingress/traefik").split("/", 1)
PUBLIC_LABEL = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABEL", "dns.renner.uno/public")
LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "443"))
INTERVAL = int(os.environ.get("INTERVAL_SECONDS", "60"))
HTTP_TIMEOUT = 20
K8S_API = "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
K8S_TOKEN_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
K8S_CA_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
class ApiError(Exception):
pass
def http(method, url, body=None, headers=None, cafile=None):
data = None if body is None else json.dumps(body).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
req.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
if data is not None:
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
for k, v in (headers or {}).items():
req.add_header(k, v)
ctx = None
if cafile:
import ssl
ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT, context=ctx) as resp:
raw = resp.read()
return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
detail = e.read().decode(errors="replace")[:300]
raise ApiError(f"{method} {url} -> {e.code}: {detail}") from None
# --- Kubernetes -------------------------------------------------------------
def k8s(path):
with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
token = f.read().strip()
return http("GET", K8S_API + path, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}, cafile=K8S_CA_FILE)
def desired_hosts():
sel = urllib.parse.quote(f"{PUBLIC_LABEL}=true")
ingresses = k8s(f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses?labelSelector={sel}")
hosts = {}
for ing in ingresses.get("items", []):
ref = f'{ing["metadata"]["namespace"]}/{ing["metadata"]["name"]}'
for rule in ing.get("spec", {}).get("rules", []):
host = rule.get("host")
if not host or host.startswith("*"):
continue
hosts.setdefault(host, ref)
return hosts
def traefik_cluster_ip():
svc = k8s(f"/api/v1/namespaces/{TRAEFIK_NS}/services/{TRAEFIK_SVC}")
for ip in svc["spec"].get("clusterIPs", []):
if ":" not in ip:
return ip
raise ApiError(f"{TRAEFIK_NS}/{TRAEFIK_SVC} has no IPv4 ClusterIP")
# --- OpenBao ----------------------------------------------------------------
def netbird_pat():
with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
jwt = f.read().strip()
login = http("POST", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/auth/kubernetes/login", {"role": BAO_ROLE, "jwt": jwt})
bao_token = login["auth"]["client_token"]
kv = http("GET", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/{BAO_PAT_PATH}", headers={"X-Vault-Token": bao_token})
pat = kv["data"]["data"].get(BAO_PAT_KEY)
if not pat:
raise ApiError(f"OpenBao {BAO_PAT_PATH} has no key {BAO_PAT_KEY}")
return pat
# --- NetBird management -----------------------------------------------------
class NetBird:
def __init__(self, pat):
self.h = {"Authorization": f"Token {pat}"}
def get(self, path):
return http("GET", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
def list(self, path):
# An empty collection comes back as an empty body / null, not [].
return self.get(path) or []
def post(self, path, body):
return http("POST", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
def put(self, path, body):
return http("PUT", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
def delete(self, path):
return http("DELETE", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
def group_id(nb, name):
for g in nb.list("groups"):
if g["name"] == name:
return g["id"]
raise ApiError(f"NetBird group {name!r} not found")
def ensure_network(nb):
for n in nb.list("networks"):
if n["name"] == NETWORK_NAME:
return n["id"]
n = nb.post("networks", {"name": NETWORK_NAME,
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync; public ingress via TLS passthrough"})
LOG.info("created network %s (%s)", NETWORK_NAME, n["id"])
return n["id"]
def ensure_resource(nb, net):
for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/resources"):
if r.get("address") == SERVICE_CIDR:
return r["id"]
r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/resources", {"name": "cluster service CIDR", "address": SERVICE_CIDR,
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync",
"enabled": True, "groups": []})
LOG.info("created subnet resource %s (%s)", SERVICE_CIDR, r["id"])
return r["id"]
def ensure_router(nb, net, router_group):
for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/routers"):
if router_group in (r.get("peer_groups") or []):
return r["id"]
r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/routers", {"peer_groups": [router_group], "metric": 9999,
"masquerade": True, "enabled": True})
LOG.info("created router on group %s (%s)", ROUTER_GROUP, r["id"])
return r["id"]
def ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group):
name = f"{NETWORK_NAME} access"
for p in nb.list("policies"):
if p["name"] == name:
return p["id"]
p = nb.post("policies", {"name": name, "enabled": True, "rules": [{
"name": name, "enabled": True, "action": "accept", "protocol": "tcp",
"ports": [str(LISTEN_PORT)], "bidirectional": False, "sources": [source_group],
"destinationResource": {"id": resource, "type": "subnet"}}]})
LOG.info("created policy %s (%s)", name, p["id"])
return p["id"]
def service_body(host, resource, target_ip):
# proxy_protocol: PROXY v2 header carries the WAN client address to
# Traefik (proxyProtocol.trustedIPs on websecure); TCP/TLS modes only.
return {"name": host, "domain": host, "mode": "tls", "listen_port": LISTEN_PORT, "enabled": True,
"targets": [{"target_type": "subnet", "target_id": resource, "protocol": "tcp",
"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True,
"options": {"proxy_protocol": True}}]}
def is_managed(svc, resource):
return svc.get("mode") == "tls" and any(t.get("target_id") == resource for t in svc.get("targets") or [])
def target_matches(svc, target_ip):
if svc.get("listen_port") != LISTEN_PORT or not svc.get("enabled"):
return False
ts = svc.get("targets") or []
return len(ts) == 1 and ts[0].get("host") == target_ip and ts[0].get("port") == 443 \
and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled") \
and (ts[0].get("options") or {}).get("proxy_protocol") is True
def reconcile():
hosts = desired_hosts()
target_ip = traefik_cluster_ip()
nb = NetBird(netbird_pat())
router_group = group_id(nb, ROUTER_GROUP)
source_group = group_id(nb, SOURCE_GROUP)
net = ensure_network(nb)
resource = ensure_resource(nb, net)
ensure_router(nb, net, router_group)
ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group)
by_domain = {s["domain"]: s for s in nb.list("reverse-proxies/services")}
created = updated = deleted = held = 0
for host, ref in sorted(hosts.items()):
svc = by_domain.get(host)
if svc is None:
nb.post("reverse-proxies/services", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
LOG.info("created %s (from %s) -> %s:443", host, ref, target_ip)
created += 1
elif not is_managed(svc, resource):
LOG.warning("%s is held by unmanaged service %s (mode %s); remove it to migrate",
host, svc["id"], svc.get("mode"))
held += 1
elif not target_matches(svc, target_ip):
nb.put(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
LOG.info("updated %s -> %s:443", host, target_ip)
updated += 1
for domain, svc in by_domain.items():
if is_managed(svc, resource) and domain not in hosts:
nb.delete(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}")
LOG.info("deleted %s (no public Ingress carries it any more)", domain)
deleted += 1
LOG.info("reconciled: %d hosts desired, %d created, %d updated, %d deleted, %d held by unmanaged services",
len(hosts), created, updated, deleted, held)
def main():
logging.basicConfig(level=os.environ.get("LOG_LEVEL", "INFO"), stream=sys.stdout,
format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
if os.environ.get("ONCE") == "1":
reconcile()
return
while True:
try:
reconcile()
except Exception as e: # keep running; the next pass retries
LOG.error("reconcile failed: %s", e)
time.sleep(INTERVAL)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
-84
View File
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
# Everything `bootstrap.sh vmtest` needs, so the rebuild test can run as a Job in
# the cluster instead of on a workstation. The workstation has 31G and the test
# wants ~14.5G for four VMs — a single run left under 1G headroom, and two
# overlapping runs OOM-killed the session. The nodes have ~94G with 70G free.
#
# Separate from ci-k8s rather than built on it: that image pins talosctl v1.12.6,
# and this test creates a cluster at the version talos/patches/cluster.yaml
# installs. A talosctl older than the Talos it provisions is exactly the kind of
# skew the test exists to catch, so it must not be baked in here.
#
# KEEP TALOS_VERSION IN STEP with the installer image tag in
# kubernetes/talos/patches/cluster.yaml. The phase reads the version from that
# file at run time and passes it to the provisioner; this pin only decides which
# client talks to it.
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
ARG KOPIA_VERSION=0.23.1
# qemu-system-x86_64 and qemu-img are the provisioner's actual backend, and ovmf
# supplies the UEFI firmware those VMs boot from — without it the provisioner
# stops with "the required flash image was not found in any of the expected
# paths", having already downloaded the ISO and generated the PKI. Note the
# firmware comes from ovmf specifically: qemu-system-x86_64 ships an edk2 CODE
# image but no VARS, which is the half the provisioner needs.
#
# iptables is shelled out to by the CNI plugins that build the VM network; the
# provisioner fails with "error accessing iptables" without it. The rest is
# what the phase shells out to: helm for the Cilium install, yq to read the
# HelmRelease and the installer image, jq for OpenBao's seal status.
#
# Versions come from the digest-pinned base rather than being pinned one by one,
# the same way ci-ansible does it.
RUN apk add --no-cache \
bash \
ca-certificates \
curl \
git \
helm \
iptables \
jq \
openssl \
ovmf \
qemu-img \
qemu-system-x86_64 \
yq
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
"https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
&& echo "28e9ccd9aebd690fa03d8cf2582221d87ea38b2a1704f411d75a03589c58f2aa /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
"https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl" \
&& curl -sfL -o /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
"https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha256" \
&& echo "$(cat /tmp/kubectl.sha256) /usr/local/bin/kubectl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& rm -f /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kubectl
RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/flux.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/releases/download/v${FLUX_VERSION}/flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" \
&& echo "4092b367fd060097976fb7261601f79420ecf7266328417dfd8dfee27de0e6a3 /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/flux.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin flux \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flux \
&& rm -f /tmp/flux.tar.gz
# kopia reads the Velero backup repository directly, which is what the OpenBao
# restore does when there is no Velero yet to do it: the credentials Velero
# needs live in OpenBao, so OpenBao cannot be restored by Velero. Its absence
# was found by a rebuild rehearsal reaching the restore for the first time and
# stopping at "kopia not found".
#
# Same checksum-verified download as the tools above; the tarball unpacks into
# a versioned directory, so the binary is pulled out by name.
RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/kopia.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/kopia/kopia/releases/download/v${KOPIA_VERSION}/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
&& echo "416d0f84a3dbb321a8b2d8f0997b1a0a6e915babe79ee76fa6e4d2bd1e1c5178 /tmp/kopia.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz -C /tmp \
&& mv "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64/kopia" /usr/local/bin/kopia \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kopia \
&& rm -rf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64"
@@ -1,976 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Deploy Paperclip (server-local agent runs, option B) into the homelab cluster behind an Authentik gate, with CNPG Postgres and OpenBao-sourced secrets.
**Architecture:** One Flux `Kustomization` (`paperclip`) applies `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/`: a single-replica Deployment on a ceph-block PVC, CNPG `pclp-pg` (PG17) with barman backups to Hetzner, and a Traefik Ingress that backends only the `paperclip-gate` Authentik outpost. Namespace, baseline CNP, ClusterSecretStore allowlist and image automation live in the existing `infrastructure` tree.
**Tech Stack:** Flux v2 (kustomize-controller, image-reflector v1.2.5), CNPG + barman-cloud plugin, External Secrets → OpenBao, Cilium CNP, Traefik, Authentik blueprints.
**Spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-paperclip-design.md`
## Global Constraints
- Worktree: `/home/krenner/source/homelab-worktrees/paperclip`, branch `feat/paperclip`. Never edit the main checkout.
- Commits as claude-bot: `git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit …`, message ends with `Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>`.
- Push: `git -c credential.helper='store --file=/home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/creds' push …`. PR via `tea pr create --login claude-bot`. Never self-merge.
- One Bash command per call: no `&&`, `;`, `|` chaining, no `2>/dev/null`, no `python -c`.
- Namespace `paperclip`; hostname `paperclip.renner.uno`; LAN-only (no `dns.renner.uno/public` label).
- Image `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip`, tag `nightly`, digest-pinned, `digestReflectionPolicy: Always`.
- Postgres: CNPG `pclp-pg`, `ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17`, 2 instances, `ceph-block`.
- PVC `paperclip-data`, `ceph-block`, 20Gi, mounted at `/paperclip`.
- OpenBao key `apps/paperclip` with fields `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`, `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`, `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` (64-char hex), `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
- Env: `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`, `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE=private`, `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL=https://paperclip.renner.uno`, `HOST=0.0.0.0`, `PORT=3100`.
- Manifest comments: one terse factual line; rationale goes in commit messages/PR.
- No `kubectl apply`/`exec`/`rollout restart` against the live cluster; Flux applies after merge. Server-side `--dry-run=server` is allowed.
## Review Focus
1. **Pod replaced mid agent run** (image bump, secret rotation via Reloader, node drain) — `Recreate` kills in-flight runs; expected: Paperclip marks them failed/recoverable on restart, not wedged. Covered in Task 9 Step 6.
2. **Shared OAuth token expired or missing** — expected: agent runs fail with a visible auth error in Paperclip, server stays healthy. Covered in Task 9 Step 7.
3. **Direct access bypassing the gate** from another namespace pod — expected: connection refused/dropped by CNP. Covered in Task 9 Step 4.
4. **Unauthenticated LAN request** to `paperclip.renner.uno` — expected: redirect to Authentik, never Paperclip's UI. Covered in Task 9 Step 3.
5. **Nightly image with a breaking DB migration** — expected: a base backup exists before the first bump lands. Covered in Task 9 Step 5.
---
### Task 1: Upstream facts that decide two manifest values
No repo changes; produces two decisions consumed by Task 6.
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `SIGNUP_DISABLED` (`"true"` or `"false"`), `CONFIG_PARTIAL_OK` (yes/no), `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT` (yes/no).
- [ ] **Step 1: Sign-up vs instance claim.** Read upstream `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts`, `server/src/routes/auth.ts`, and the claim flow for `authenticated`+`private` (search `claim` under `server/src`):
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/routes/auth.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Decide: if the first-admin claim creates the account through a path that ignores `disableSignUp` (e.g. invite/claim token handler calling the adapter directly), `SIGNUP_DISABLED="true"`. Otherwise `SIGNUP_DISABLED="false"` — the Authentik gate is the access control, and a follow-up PR flips it to `"true"` after the admin is claimed.
- [ ] **Step 2: Partial config.json.** Read `server/src/config.ts` and the config-file loader it calls (search `PAPERCLIP_CONFIG` / `readConfigFile`).
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/config.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Decide `CONFIG_PARTIAL_OK=yes` if a file containing only `{"telemetry":{"enabled":false}}` parses (every other section optional/defaulted). If not, stop and report to the user — do not invent config fields.
- [ ] **Step 3: Entrypoint privilege.**
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/docker-entrypoint.sh -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
`ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT=yes` if it calls `usermod`/`groupmod`/`chown`/`gosu`. Record the result for Task 6.
- [ ] **Step 4: Anonymous health response.**
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/routes/health.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Confirm `GET /api/health` returns HTTP 200 to an anonymous caller when healthy (probes use it). If it returns 401 anonymously, use a `tcpSocket` probe on 3100 in Task 6 instead.
---
### Task 2: Namespace, baseline CNP, ClusterSecretStore allowlist
**Files:**
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml` (append)
- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperclip-ns.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml` (sorted list)
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: namespace `paperclip`; ESO may reference `openbao` from it.
- [ ] **Step 1: Append the namespace** to the end of `namespaces.yaml`:
```yaml
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperclip
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Create `paperclip-ns.yaml`** (copy of `paperless-ns.yaml`'s `default-deny-ingress`, ns renamed, paperless-only CNPs dropped):
```yaml
# Traefik is not admitted: the only entry is the paperclip-gate outpost (apps/paperclip/network-policy.yaml).
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- world
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Register it** — in `network-policies/kustomization.yaml` add ` - paperclip-ns.yaml` directly after ` - paperless-ns.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Allowlist the namespace** — in `openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml` insert ` - paperclip` between ` - monitoring` and ` - paperless` (list is sorted).
- [ ] **Step 5: Render check.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies`
Expected: output contains `namespace: paperclip`, exit 0.
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml`
Expected: `clustersecretstore.external-secrets.io/openbao configured (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(paperclip): namespace, baseline CNP and OpenBao allowlist`.
---
### Task 3: OpenBao secret `apps/paperclip`
Out-of-repo; must exist before merge or the ExternalSecret never becomes Ready.
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: OpenBao KV `apps/paperclip` with the four fields in Global Constraints.
- [ ] **Step 1:** Ask wiki-synth for the claude-bot OpenBao write procedure (note `claude-bot-openbao-write-only-identity`): login method, KV mount, exact `bao kv put`/`patch` syntax for an `apps/<name>` key. Use exactly what it returns.
- [ ] **Step 2: Write the generated fields** as claude-bot (write-only identity — never read values back). Values generated inline by the command:
`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` = `openssl rand -hex 32`, `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET` = `openssl rand -hex 32`, `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` = `openssl rand -hex 32` (64 hex chars = 32 bytes, accepted format).
Generate each with a separate `openssl rand -hex 32` call and pass it directly into the `bao kv put` from Step 1; do not echo or log them.
- [ ] **Step 3: Ask the user** to add the shared token themselves (never handle it): "Run `claude setup-token`, then `bao kv patch <mount>/apps/paperclip CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<token>`." Wait for confirmation.
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify field names only** (no values): `bao kv metadata get <mount>/apps/paperclip` shows a current version ≥2. If claude-bot cannot read metadata, ask the user to confirm the four keys exist.
---
### Task 4: Image automation + initial digest
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: ImagePolicy `flux-system:paperclip`; `INITIAL_DIGEST` (`sha256:…`) for Task 6.
- [ ] **Step 1: Create `paperclip.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: ImageRepository
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip
interval: 1h
---
# Upstream publishes no semver tags; track the nightly tag by digest.
apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: ImagePolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
imageRepositoryRef:
name: paperclip
digestReflectionPolicy: Always
filterTags:
pattern: '^nightly$'
policy:
alphabetical:
order: asc
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Register** — add ` - paperclip.yaml` after ` - paperless-ngx.yaml` in `image-automation/kustomization.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Server dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`
Expected: both objects `created (server dry run)`; no `unknown field "digestReflectionPolicy"` error.
- [ ] **Step 4: Resolve the current nightly digest.**
The workstation has `docker` only (no skopeo/crane/buildx, checked 2026-09-25); `docker manifest inspect` lists per-platform digests but not the index digest, so pull once:
Run: `docker pull ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
Run: `docker image inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
Expected: `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip@sha256:<64 hex>`. Record the `sha256:…` part as `INITIAL_DIGEST`.
Run: `docker image rm ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** `feat(paperclip): Flux image automation tracks the nightly digest`.
---
### Task 5: Postgres (CNPG) and secrets in the app directory
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/cluster.yaml`, `objectstore.yaml`, `scheduled-backup.yaml`, `hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml`, `externalsecret.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: Secret `pclp-pg-app` (CNPG, key `uri`), Service `pclp-pg-rw`, Secret `paperclip-secrets`.
- [ ] **Step 1: `cluster.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: pclp-pg
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # data guard
spec:
instances: 2
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
# PG17: upstream's external Postgres target (docker/docker-compose.yml).
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
size: 10Gi
plugins:
- name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
isWALArchiver: true
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pclp-pg-store
bootstrap:
initdb:
database: paperclip
owner: paperclip
postgresql:
parameters:
shared_buffers: "256MB"
max_connections: "200"
checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
max_wal_size: "2GB"
wal_compression: "zstd"
archive_timeout: "30min"
synchronous:
method: any
number: 1
dataDurability: preferred
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `objectstore.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ObjectStore
metadata:
name: pclp-pg-store
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # backup target
spec:
configuration:
destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pclp-pg
endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKey:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
region:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: REGION
wal:
compression: gzip
data:
compression: gzip
retentionPolicy: "30d"
```
- [ ] **Step 3: `scheduled-backup.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ScheduledBackup
metadata:
name: pclp-pg-daily
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # backup schedule
spec:
schedule: "0 45 2 * * *"
immediate: true
backupOwnerReference: self
cluster:
name: pclp-pg
method: plugin
pluginConfiguration:
name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
```
- [ ] **Step 4: `hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # barman S3 creds
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
```
- [ ] **Step 5: `externalsecret.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: paperclip-secrets
namespace: paperclip
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: paperclip-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/paperclip
```
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(paperclip): CNPG pclp-pg with barman backups and OpenBao secrets`. (Rendered together with Task 6's kustomization.)
---
### Task 6: Server workload, storage, ingress, network policy
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/pvc.yaml`, `paperclip.yaml`, `gate-service.yaml`, `ingress.yaml`, `network-policy.yaml`, `kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `pclp-pg-app` (`uri`), `paperclip-secrets`, ImagePolicy `flux-system:paperclip`, `INITIAL_DIGEST` (Task 4), `SIGNUP_DISABLED` / `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT` / probe choice (Task 1).
- Produces: pods labelled `app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip` listening on 3100; Service `paperclip:3100`; ExternalName `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate:9000`.
- [ ] **Step 1: `pvc.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperclip-data
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # data guard
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: ceph-block
resources:
requests:
storage: 20Gi
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `paperclip.yaml`** — replace `<INITIAL_DIGEST>` with the Task 4 value and `<SIGNUP_DISABLED>` with the Task 1 value. If Task 1 found `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT=no`, replace the container `securityContext` with `runAsNonRoot: true`, `runAsUser: 1000`, `runAsGroup: 1000`, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`, `capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}`. If Task 1 chose `tcpSocket`, replace each `httpGet` block with `tcpSocket: {port: http}`.
```yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
annotations:
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperclip-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
spec:
enableServiceLinks: false
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# Telemetry is only configurable in config.json.
- name: disable-telemetry
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@<INITIAL_DIGEST> # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
f=/paperclip/instances/default/config.json
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$f")"
if [ -s "$f" ]; then
jq '.telemetry.enabled = false' "$f" > "$f.tmp"
else
printf '%s\n' '{"telemetry":{"enabled":false}}' > "$f.tmp"
fi
mv "$f.tmp" "$f"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /paperclip
containers:
- name: paperclip
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@<INITIAL_DIGEST> # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3100
env:
- name: DATABASE_URL
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pclp-pg-app
key: uri
- name: HOST
value: "0.0.0.0"
- name: PORT
value: "3100"
- name: PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE
value: authenticated
- name: PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE
value: private
- name: PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL
value: https://paperclip.renner.uno
- name: PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP
value: "<SIGNUP_DISABLED>"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: paperclip-secrets
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /paperclip
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 60
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 4Gi
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperclip-data
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
ports:
- name: http
port: 3100
targetPort: http
```
- [ ] **Step 3: `gate-service.yaml`:**
```yaml
# ExternalName mirror so the Ingress can backend the paperclip-gate outpost in the authentik namespace.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate
namespace: paperclip
spec:
type: ExternalName
externalName: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
ports:
- port: 9000
targetPort: 9000
```
- [ ] **Step 4: `ingress.yaml`:**
```yaml
# LAN-only (no dns.renner.uno/public label); backends the gate outpost, never the Service.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
tls:
- hosts:
- paperclip.renner.uno
secretName: paperclip-tls
rules:
- host: paperclip.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate
port:
number: 9000
```
- [ ] **Step 5: `network-policy.yaml`** (Traefik pod-side port is 8443, verified via `kubectl get pods -n ingress -l app.kubernetes.io/name=traefik`):
```yaml
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-ingress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
---
# Covers the server and every agent it spawns (same pod).
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-egress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
cnpg.io/cluster: pclp-pg
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "5432"
protocol: TCP
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- port: "53"
protocol: TCP
# Gitea, Woodpecker, HA, Loki via their *.renner.uno names.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8443"
protocol: TCP
- toEntities:
- kube-apiserver
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "6443"
protocol: TCP
- toEntities:
- world
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "443"
protocol: TCP
```
- [ ] **Step 6: `kustomization.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- externalsecret.yaml
- hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
- cluster.yaml
- objectstore.yaml
- scheduled-backup.yaml
- pvc.yaml
- paperclip.yaml
- gate-service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
- network-policy.yaml
```
- [ ] **Step 7: Render check.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/paperclip`
Expected: exit 0; output contains `kind: Cluster`, `kind: Deployment`, `claimName: paperclip-data`, and no literal `<INITIAL_DIGEST>` or `<SIGNUP_DISABLED>`.
Run: `grep -rn "<INITIAL_DIGEST>\|<SIGNUP_DISABLED>" kubernetes/apps/paperclip`
Expected: no output, exit 1.
- [ ] **Step 8: Commit** `feat(paperclip): server Deployment, PVC, gated Ingress and CNPs`.
---
### Task 7: Authentik gate
**Files:**
- Modify: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml` (insert before the line ` # navidrome-gate: the Navidrome web UI.`)
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: outpost pods labelled `goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate`, Service `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate.authentik:9000`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Insert blueprint entries** (same indentation as the neighbouring `wiki-gate` block):
```yaml
# paperclip-gate: Paperclip UI; the CNP admits only this outpost. Paperclip keeps its own login behind it.
- id: paperclip-users-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Paperclip Users
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: paperclip-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://paperclip.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Paperclip
slug: paperclip-gate
provider: !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://paperclip.renner.uno
meta_description: "Paperclip agent orchestration"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, paperclip-gate]]
group: !KeyOf paperclip-users-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`:**
```yaml
# Lets the paperclip-gate outpost reach the Paperclip server; scoped to this outpost's pods.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Register** — add ` - paperclip-gate-egress.yaml` after ` - paperless-gate-egress.yaml` in `apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Render + dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/authentik`
Expected: exit 0 (valid YAML incl. the blueprint ConfigMap).
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`
Expected: `ciliumnetworkpolicy.cilium.io/paperclip-gate-egress created (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** `feat(authentik): paperclip-gate outpost and Paperclip Users group`.
---
### Task 8: Flux Kustomization
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`
- [ ] **Step 1:**
```yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 1m
timeout: 20m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperclip
prune: true
wait: true
dependsOn:
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
- name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Server dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`
Expected: `kustomization.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/paperclip created (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit** `feat(paperclip): Flux Kustomization`.
---
### Task 9: PR, merge by user, live verification
- [ ] **Step 1: Push and open the PR** (Task 3 must be complete).
Run: `git -c credential.helper='store --file=/home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/creds' push -u origin feat/paperclip`
Run: `tea pr create --login claude-bot --base master --head feat/paperclip --title "feat(paperclip): deploy Paperclip (server-local runs, trial)" --description "<summary of spec decisions + link to spec + bootstrap steps>\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)"`
Then wait for the user to merge. Do not merge.
- [ ] **Step 2: Reconciliation.** After merge:
Run: `flux get kustomizations paperclip`
Expected: `Ready True`. If False, read `kubectl describe kustomization paperclip -n flux-system` and the failing object's events; diagnose, don't poke.
Run: `kubectl get cluster -n paperclip pclp-pg`
Expected: `Cluster in healthy state`, 2 ready instances.
Run: `kubectl get pods -n paperclip -l app.kubernetes.io/name=paperclip`
Expected: `1/1 Running`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Gate enforced (Review Focus 4).**
Run: `curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' https://paperclip.renner.uno/`
Expected: `302` redirecting to `https://paperclip.renner.uno/outpost.goauthentik.io/…` or `auth.renner.uno`, never `200`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Gate not bypassable (Review Focus 3).**
`default` has no CNPs (verified 2026-09-25), so its egress is open and only paperclip's ingress policy can block the probe.
Run: `kubectl get ciliumnetworkpolicies -n default`
Expected: `No resources found` (else pick another CNP-free namespace).
Run: `kubectl run cnp-probe -n default --rm -i --restart=Never --image=curlimages/curl:8.10.1 -- curl -sS -m 5 http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100/api/health`
Expected: timeout (exit 28), no HTTP response.
- [ ] **Step 5: First backup (Review Focus 5).**
Run: `kubectl get backup -n paperclip`
Expected: one `pclp-pg-daily-…` with phase `completed`.
- [ ] **Step 6: Image policy.**
Run: `kubectl get imagepolicy -n flux-system paperclip -o jsonpath='{.status.latestRef}'`
Expected: `nightly` tag with a `sha256:` digest.
- [ ] **Step 7: Hand-over to the user (browser steps, theirs):**
1. Open `https://paperclip.renner.uno`, pass Authentik, claim the instance as admin.
2. Create a test agent with the `claude-local` adapter and a trivial task ("reply with OK"); it must complete with the shared token (Review Focus 2: if it fails, report the run's error text — an expired token must show as an auth error, not a hang).
3. If `SIGNUP_DISABLED` was `"false"`, open the follow-up PR flipping `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` to `"true"` once the admin is claimed.
4. Review Focus 1 is observed on the first nightly bump: check the interrupted-run status in the UI.
- [ ] **Step 8: Wiki.** Route the verified Paperclip facts (execution topology, env vars, image tags, digest-reflection usage) through wiki-ingest → wiki-distill once the deployment has proven out.
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip in the homelab cluster — design
Date: 2026-09-25
Status: draft, awaiting review
## Goal
Run [Paperclip](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip) (MIT, agent-orchestration
server + UI) in the homelab cluster for real use: its agents do actual work against
homelab systems. This spec covers the **platform** only. Bot identities and their
credentials are out of scope (see "Deferred").
## Decisions
| Topic | Decision |
|---|---|
| Execution model | **B — server-local runs** (upstream default): agent CLIs are child processes of the server, in the server container. Trial only. |
| Upgrade path | If Paperclip is kept: **C** — `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes` sandbox provider + kubernetes-sigs agent-sandbox controller (`agents.x-k8s.io`), per-run Pods and Secrets. Separate spec. |
| Claude auth | **One shared Claude subscription AI connection**, created once via Paperclip's local sign-in (`claude auth login` into `ai-local-logins/<id>`); Paperclip stores and refreshes it. Server-env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is not used: `stripAiAuthBindings` blanks it for managed runs, and upstream accepts no pasted setup-token (the device-code flow needs a Daytona sandbox). |
| Bot credentials | Out of scope. Future "AIR-Manager" Paperclip role handles permission requests. |
| Exposure | LAN-only, behind an Authentik forward-auth gate, then Paperclip's own login. |
### Known trade-off of B (accepted for the trial)
Upstream `runChildProcess()` spawns every local adapter with
`{...sanitizeInheritedPaperclipEnv(process.env), ...opts.env}`; the sanitizer strips only
`PAPERCLIP_*` keys. Every agent therefore sees `DATABASE_URL`, `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`,
the shared filesystem (including every other agent's workspace and the
`ai-local-logins` credentials) and every agent-scoped secret it can read from disk. Under B, no bot may hold
a credential we would not tolerate any other bot using. Per-bot isolation is C's job.
## Architecture
```
LAN client ─▶ Traefik ─▶ ExternalName svc ─▶ ak-outpost-paperclip-gate (authentik ns)
│ forward-auth OK
▼
paperclip Deployment (ns paperclip, 1 replica)
├─ server :3100 (+ agent CLIs as child processes)
├─ PVC /paperclip (ceph-block)
└─▶ pclp-pg-rw (CNPG, PG17, 2 instances) ─▶ barman ▶ Hetzner S3
```
## Components
All modeled on `kubernetes/apps/paperless/` unless stated.
### Namespace and baseline policy
- `Namespace paperclip` in `kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml`.
- Baseline default-deny CNP `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperclip-ns.yaml`
(copy of `paperless-ns.yaml`, renamed).
- Add `paperclip` to the `openbao` ClusterSecretStore namespace allowlist.
### Flux
- `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`: Flux `Kustomization`,
`path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperclip`, `prune: true`, `wait: true`, same `dependsOn` and
CNPG `healthCheckExprs` as `paperless.yaml`.
- `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/kustomization.yaml`: plain resource list.
### Server Deployment (`paperclip.yaml`)
- Image `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@sha256:<digest>` with the Flux
image-automation marker for digest updates.
- `replicas: 1`, `strategy: Recreate` (single writer on an RWO PVC).
- Starts as root: upstream `docker-entrypoint.sh` remaps the `node` user, chowns
`/paperclip`, then drops to uid 1000 via `gosu`. Caps limited to CHOWN,
DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, SETGID, SETUID; `fsGroup: 1000`.
- `automountServiceAccountToken: false` (all agents share the pod filesystem).
- Port 3100; `Service paperclip` ClusterIP :3100.
- Probes: startup and readiness on `GET /api/health` with `Host: localhost` (the
private-hostname guard rejects the pod IP); liveness is a TCP check, since
`/api/health` runs `SELECT 1` and a DB outage must not restart the server.
- Env:
- `DATABASE_URL` assembled from CNPG `pclp-pg-app` Secret (`uri` key).
- `HOST=0.0.0.0`, `PORT=3100`
- `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`
- `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE=private`
- `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL=https://paperclip.renner.uno`
- `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP=false` until the first admin is claimed: the
claim (`/bootstrap/claim`) requires an already signed-in Better Auth account.
A follow-up flips it to `true`.
- `PAPERCLIP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1` (read by `resolveTelemetryConfig`).
- `PAPERCLIP_API_URL=http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100` plus
`PAPERCLIP_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES=paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local`: upstream
otherwise hands agents the public URL, and the gate (`intercept_header_auth`)
rejects their bearer tokens. The Service name also works for sandbox pods under
option C; agent JWTs still authenticate each call.
- `envFrom: secretRef paperclip-secrets`
- Reloader: `secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperclip-secrets`.
### Storage
- `PVC paperclip-data`, `ceph-block`, 20Gi, mounted at `/paperclip` (`PAPERCLIP_HOME`
and `HOME`): instance config, workspaces, repo checkouts, per-agent `claude-runtime`
dirs.
### Postgres
- CNPG `Cluster pclp-pg`: 2 instances, `imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17`,
`ceph-block` 10Gi, `bootstrap.initdb {database: paperclip, owner: paperclip}`,
barman-cloud plugin as WAL archiver.
- `ObjectStore pclp-pg-store` → `s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pclp-pg`, creds via the
existing `hetzner-s3-creds` ExternalSecret pattern.
- `ScheduledBackup` nightly, `method: plugin`, `backupOwnerReference: self`.
- `kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled` on Cluster, ObjectStore, ScheduledBackup.
- PG17 deviates from the cluster-wide PG16 convention because upstream's external
Postgres target is `postgres:17` (`docker/docker-compose.yml`) and its embedded default
is PG18.
### Secrets
One ExternalSecret `paperclip-secrets` ← OpenBao `apps/paperclip` (whole-object
extract):
- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
- `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`
- `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` (64-char hex). Held in OpenBao, not on the PVC, so
encrypted agent secrets in Postgres survive PVC loss.
### Ingress and SSO
- Hostname `paperclip.renner.uno`, Traefik `Ingress`, `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer:
letsencrypt-cluster`, **no** `dns.renner.uno/public` label (LAN-only).
- Authentik gate, per the paperless pattern:
- blueprint entries in `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml`:
proxy provider `paperclip-gate` (`internal_host:
http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100`, `external_host:
https://paperclip.renner.uno`), application, group "Paperclip Users", policy binding;
- outpost `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate`;
- `kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml` (no `auth.renner.uno`
outpost Ingress: like wiki/shelly gates, the outpost serves its own callback on
`paperclip.renner.uno`);
- `ExternalName` Service in `paperclip` ns pointing at the outpost; the app Ingress
targets it on :9000.
- Paperclip's own email/password login stays on (no header/OIDC login upstream).
### Network policy (`kubernetes/apps/paperclip/network-policy.yaml`)
Covers the server **and every agent** (same pod under B).
- Ingress to the app pod: only from the `paperclip-gate` outpost (by label) on 3100.
- Egress from the app pod:
- `pclp-pg` pods :5432
- kube-dns :53
- `ingress` namespace (Traefik) :8443 (pod-side websecure port) — reaches Gitea, Woodpecker, HA, Loki by their
`*.renner.uno` names
- `kube-apiserver` entity :6443
- `world` TCP :443 (Anthropic API, GitHub, npm)
- No SSH egress; git over HTTPS only. The namespace baseline
(`paperclip-ns.yaml`) also restricts `world` to TCP 443 — Cilium unions allows
across CNPs, so an unrestricted baseline would override this list.
- Known gap (house baseline): pods in `monitoring`/`database` and other pods in
`paperclip` can reach :3100 without the gate; Paperclip's own login still applies.
### Image automation
`kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`: `ImageRepository`
(`ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip`) + `ImagePolicy` filtering tag `^nightly$` with
`digestReflectionPolicy: Always` (image-reflector-controller v1.2.5 in cluster; field
available since v0.35.0). First use of digest reflection in this repo.
## Guardrails
- No bot receives cluster-admin or any binding in `flux-system`, `authentik`, `openbao`.
- Git work goes through PRs; bots get no merge rights on protected branches.
- Nothing is granted under B that we would not tolerate any agent misusing.
## Bootstrap (one-time)
1. Place `apps/paperclip` values in OpenBao (the three generated secrets).
2. Merge; Flux deploys with sign-up enabled.
3. Sign up through the gate and claim the instance as admin; then set
`PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP=true`.
4. In onboarding "Connect a model", choose Claude subscription and run the shown login
**as the node user** (the entrypoint makes exec sessions root, and root-owned 0600
credentials are unreadable to the server):
`kubectl exec -it -n paperclip deploy/paperclip -- gosu node sh -c 'export CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=<shown path> && mkdir -p "$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR" && claude auth login'`
Repeat after loss of the PVC or database.
## Verification
- Flux Kustomization `paperclip` Ready; CNPG `pclp-pg` healthy; first ScheduledBackup
completes.
- `curl https://paperclip.renner.uno/api/health` through the gate returns healthy after
Authentik login; unauthenticated request redirects to `auth.renner.uno`.
- Direct pod access from another namespace is denied (CNP).
- A test agent (claude-local) completes a trivial task using the shared Claude connection.
- Flux ImagePolicy reports a `nightly@sha256:` digest.
## Deferred
- **Option C** (sandboxed runs) — required before any per-bot credential isolation.
- **AIR-Manager** role and all bot identities/credentials.
- Public exposure.
+16 -22
View File
@@ -50,18 +50,15 @@ pass insert homelab/openbao/root-token
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste key
```
**Unseal is automatic since 2026-09-08** (static seal, PR #825, issue #805):
the seal key lives in the `openbao-seal-key` Secret (created by `bootstrap.sh`
from `pass show homelab/openbao/seal-key`) and every restarted replica unseals
itself. The shamir key above became the **recovery key** in the migration; it
is kept in `pass` under its old name, `homelab/openbao/unseal-key`. The server
runs three raft peers (see `infrastructure/openbao/helmrelease.yaml`); a sealed
one is neither a voter nor a standby, so a replica that stays sealed after a
restart — wrong or missing seal-key Secret — costs redundancy, two cost
quorum. The trade-off taken with the static seal: the key that unlocks the
store sits in the same etcd as the Secrets ESO already syncs there in
plaintext. Symptom of sealed: ESO stores go NotReady, synced Secrets keep
their last value (they are real k8s Secrets — pods keep running).
**Manual unseal is required after every pod restart** (node drain, upgrade,
crash), **per replica** — the server runs three raft peers (see
`infrastructure/openbao/helmrelease.yaml`), and a sealed one is neither a
voter nor a standby, so it stays out of the cluster until unsealed:
`kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-<N> -- bao operator unseal`, same key for
all three. Three peers mean one sealed replica is survivable; two are not.
Accepted for now; auto-unseal needs a second trust root (transit/KMS) and is
explicitly out of scope. Symptom of sealed: ESO stores go NotReady, synced
Secrets keep their last value (they are real k8s Secrets — pods keep running).
## Phase 2 — configure + ClusterSecretStore (follow-up PR)
@@ -237,19 +234,16 @@ one full reconcile + one OpenBao pod restart/unseal cycle:
- **Backups:** ✅ nightly raft-snapshot CronJob (03:00, keeps 7 on a
dedicated PVC; see infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml) + velero
`openbao-daily` Schedule (06:15) ships that PVC offsite, 30 d retention.
A raft snapshot restore needs the matching seal key — which lives in
A raft snapshot restore needs the matching unseal key — which lives in
`pass`, outside the cluster (GPG key backed up externally 2026-07-14).
A failed snapshot Job is the sealed-after-restart alarm. Still owed:
one tested restore before phase 4.
- **Cluster rebuild order:** seal-key Secret from `pass` → Flux brings up
openbao (empty) → init → restore raft snapshot → replicas unseal themselves
→ ClusterSecretStore Ready → ESO materializes Secrets → apps start
(`bootstrap.sh flux` does all of it; RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md Step 4 by
hand). Until then, secret-consuming apps simply stay Pending on missing
Secrets — same as any missing dependency.
- **Break-glass:** `pass` holds seal key, recovery key + root token (GPG,
offline-capable). With those, everything is recoverable from a raft
snapshot alone.
- **Cluster rebuild order:** Flux brings up openbao (sealed, empty) → restore
raft snapshot → unseal (key from `pass`) → ClusterSecretStore Ready → ESO
materializes Secrets → apps start. Until unseal, secret-consuming apps
simply stay Pending on missing Secrets — same as any missing dependency.
- **Break-glass:** `pass` holds unseal key + root token (GPG, offline-capable).
With those two, everything is recoverable from a raft snapshot alone.
- **Ansible Vault password:** `ansible/vault-password.sh` reads
`ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD` from the environment with no offline backup as of
2026-07-14. It gates decryption of several Ansible-Vault files (PBS
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# Traffic classes on the k8s nodes
Issue #576. Five classes, each on its own VLAN.
## Where each class runs
| class | link | mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Ceph replication | `ceph-san`, VLAN 49 | the whole link is handed to the OSD pod (Multus `host-device`) |
| pod↔pod | `pod0`, VLAN 48 | pod-sourced traffic is routed from table 47; bird puts the peers' pod CIDRs there via `pod0` |
| world↔pod | `ingress0`, VLAN 47 | BGP session sourced there (next hop of every LoadBalancer VIP); pod egress takes table 47's default |
| node↔node | `node0`, VLAN 46 | the node InternalIP and etcd live there; so do apiserver↔kubelet, cilium-health and host→remote-pod traffic |
| world↔node | `mgmt0`, VLAN 40 | API VIP for kubectl, talosctl from outside, node egress (DNS, NTP, image pulls) |
Hard constraint, set by the owner: inter-node and pod traffic never traverses
the UDM. Everything but world↔node stays on the 10G switch. VLAN 46 and 48 are
statically addressed, without a gateway; VLAN 46 is isolated in UniFi.
## Pod traffic: one table
Two rules, one per family, send every packet with a pod source to table 47
(`talos/patches/site-homelab.yaml`, priorities 1000/1001, below main). The
table decides by longest prefix; no rule carves out exceptions.
bird (`kubernetes/infrastructure/bird/`) owns table 47 and fills it with:
- the node's attached networks — `mgmt0`, `ingress0`, `pod0`, `node0` —
taken from the interfaces;
- the peers' pod CIDRs, learned over an iBGP mesh on `pod0`, next hop the
peer's `pod0` address;
- the node's own pod CIDR via `cilium_host`, originated rather than read back
from the kernel (reading it back made BIRD depend on the shape of Cilium's
route, and KRT rejects the IPv4 one);
- the egress default via the UDM on `ingress0`, from the node annotations
`net.renner.uno/egress-gw-v4/v6`.
`node0` has to be in the table: a pod reaching a node address — the
`kubernetes` ClusterIP, which socket LB rewrites to the apiserver's advertise
address, or a hostNetwork pod — would otherwise take the default to the UDM.
The routing decision runs before Cilium's masquerade hook, so the rule sees the
pod address and the masquerade then rewrites it to the egress link's.
Node-originated traffic does not match the rules and uses main, where Cilium
routes each peer's pod CIDR via the peer's InternalIP — on `node0`.
No address is written into this repo twice. Each node publishes its `pod0`
addresses as `nodeAnnotations` beside the `VLANConfig` that assigns them; the
pod CIDRs come from the Node objects. bird's init container renders both from
the API and ends with `bird -p`, so BIRD's own parser gates startup.
## Node↔node
`kubelet.nodeIP.validSubnets` and `cluster.etcd.advertisedSubnets` point at
VLAN 46. Talos picks one InternalIP per family, IPv4 first — the service CIDR
is IPv4, and the apiserver's advertise address must match it.
The API VIP stays on `mgmt0` for kubectl. No in-cluster client uses it:
kubelet, scheduler, controller-manager and Cilium go through KubePrism
(`localhost:7445`), which balances over every address of every control-plane
member; pods use the ClusterIP.
Talos never updates an existing etcd member's peer URLs
(siderolabs/talos#12720). Changing `advertisedSubnets` means, per member:
stage the config, `talosctl etcd forfeit-leadership`, `talosctl etcd leave`,
reboot. `leave` removes only `/var/lib/etcd`; the node rejoins as a learner
and is promoted. EPHEMERAL does not need a wipe.
## Moving node IPs: the mixed state
While some nodes have their InternalIP on the new network and some on the old,
host→remote-pod traffic leaves with a node address that is not an InternalIP:
the kernel picks the source from the route to the peer's InternalIP. Cilium
classifies that as `world`, and every ingress policy that admits only
`host`/`remote-node` (rook-ceph, monitoring, …) drops it. Kernel Ceph clients
lose the OSDs on the other side; RBD mounts hang.
Bridge it for the duration with a temporary `CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy`
admitting the node subnets of both networks, both families, with
`enableDefaultDeny: false` so it restricts nothing else, and delete it once
every node has moved. Keep all OSD nodes schedulable while one is drained:
draining two takes Ceph below its data availability.
## Failure behaviour
If bird stops, table 47 empties, the rules find nothing and fall through to
main: pod traffic returns to the node networks, unseparated rather than
misrouted. The same holds during a cold rebuild until Gitea serves bird's
image. The default route lives in table 47, not in the Talos config, so a
default cannot outlive the specific routes and send pod traffic to the UDM.
## Sources
Cilium v1.20 `pkg/datapath/linux/node.go`; BIRD 2.17 user manual (kernel
protocol, `strict bind`, `direct`); Talos v1.13 `RoutingRuleConfig`,
`machine.nodeAnnotations`, configuration patching (lists are appended,
`$patch: delete`), etcd `LeaveCluster`; KubePrism docs;
siderolabs/talos#12720. PRs #831, #833, #835, #836, #837, #842, #852, #854,
#855, #857, #858, #918, #919, #922; closed unmerged: #830, #838, #839.
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
# Proposal — separate the four traffic classes onto their own VLANs
Status: draft. The question this started with is **answered** — from the Cilium
source and flag reference, not from a test — and the answer changes the shape
of the proposal rather than confirming it.
Supersedes the framing in issue #576, which described this as "give node
management its own NIC, and Ceph public its own VLAN". That was two of four
classes and one of them turned out already solved.
## The four classes
| class | what it is | where it goes today |
|---|---|---|
| **Ceph replication** | OSD-to-OSD heartbeat, replication, recovery | VLAN 49, its own X710 port — **separated** |
| **cluster-internal** | pod-to-pod east-west, including Ceph client I/O | pod network, VXLAN over `mgmt0` |
| **cluster-external** | ingress to LoadBalancer VIPs, egress to LAN and internet | `mgmt0` |
| **management** | Talos API, etcd, kube-apiserver, kubelet | `mgmt0` |
Three of four share one interface. That is not a design decision — until the
bare-metal conversion there was one NIC to work with.
Ceph client I/O living on the pod network is correct rather than a leftover:
that traffic *is* cluster-internal. Ceph is done.
## Principle
**Each class gets its own VLAN. Which physical interface a VLAN lands on is a
separate, changeable decision.**
Defining classes by VLAN means the separation survives recabling, port failures
and capacity changes, and it does not require one port per class. Defining them
by interface would freeze a capacity decision into the architecture.
## The finding that shapes everything else
The original open question was whether `nodePort.directRoutingDevice` moves the
next-hop of Cilium's direct routes, or only selects an interface. It is
answerable from the source, and the answer is: **only the interface.**
`installDirectRoute` takes the next-hop as a parameter:
```go
func installDirectRoute(log *slog.Logger, prefix netip.Prefix, nodeIP net.IP,
skipUnreachable bool) (routeSpec *netlink.Route, err error)
```
and `nodeUpdate` supplies it as `newNode.GetNodeIP(false)`. `GetNodeIP` returns,
in priority order, `NodeInternalIP` → `NodeExternalIP` → anything else. The
same `newIP4` is what tunnel mode uses as the VXLAN endpoint.
`NodeInternalIP` comes from the Kubernetes Node object. `--ipv4-node` looks like
an override but is not one: `initFromConfig()` calls `SetNodeInternalIP` and
`initFromK8s()` runs **after** it and overwrites the value. In a Kubernetes
cluster there is no path by which Cilium's node IP differs from the kubelet's
`InternalIP`.
`--direct-routing-device` is documented as "Device name used to connect nodes in
direct routing mode" — a device, not an address.
**So cluster-internal traffic is welded to the node IP, and the node IP is the
kubelet InternalIP.** Two consequences:
- The class cannot be moved off whatever VLAN the node IP lives on.
- **Routing mode is irrelevant to this problem.** Tunnel mode sources the VXLAN
from the node IP; native mode uses it as the direct-route next-hop. Native
routing buys nothing here, so the disruptive, non-rolling step this proposal
previously contained is simply gone.
## Consequence: draw the line the other way
If cluster-internal cannot leave the node IP, then separation has to come from
moving *management services* off it — and each one has to be checked
individually, because they do not share a mechanism.
| management service | can it leave the node IP? | lever |
|---|---|---|
| etcd | **yes** | `cluster.etcd.advertisedSubnets` (+ `listenSubnets`, which defaults to it) |
| kube-apiserver endpoint | **yes** | already a VIP — `Layer2VIPConfig` with a `link:` field |
| Talos API | **n/a** | `apid` answers on every node address (measured); a client and firewall choice, not a bind setting |
| kubelet | **no** | it *is* the node IP, by definition |
So four VLANs are reachable, but the boundary does not fall where the class
names suggest: **kubelet stays with cluster-internal.** That is the honest
result, and it is worth stating plainly rather than filing kubelet under
management and hoping.
The remaining classes keep the levers established earlier:
- **cluster-external ingress** — `CiliumBGPNodeConfigOverride.spec.bgpInstances[].peers[].localAddress`.
For eBGP the session source is the next-hop, so pinning the session pins
where return traffic arrives. The session to the UDM has been running for
months.
- **cluster-external egress** — eBPF masquerading follows the output device, so
this is a default-route decision plus `enable-masquerade-to-route-source`
(today `false`).
- **Ceph replication** — Multus macvlan on VLAN 49, done.
## The general escape hatch
Ceph is separated because its OSDs got a second interface and stopped using the
pod network for replication. That is the *only* mechanism that fully detaches a
workload from the node IP, and it generalises: anything that must not ride the
node IP gets its own `NetworkAttachmentDefinition`.
It is also expensive per workload — an attachment, an IPAM pool, a pod spec
change. Worth it for Ceph replication. Not worth it for east-west traffic in
general.
## Recommended mapping
Two ways to arrange this, and they differ only in which VLAN gets relabelled:
**A — move the node IP to a new cluster VLAN.** VLAN 40 keeps etcd, the API VIP
and Talos API. Cleanest match to the class names, but it changes every node's
identity, which is the one address the whole cluster is administered through.
**B (recommended) — leave the node IP on VLAN 40 and move management off it.**
VLAN 40 becomes the cluster VLAN; a new VLAN carries etcd and the API VIP.
Identical end state, and no node ever changes its InternalIP.
Under B:
| VLAN | carries |
|---|---|
| 49 | Ceph replication |
| 40 (relabelled *cluster*) | pod east-west, kubelet |
| new *management* | etcd, kube-apiserver VIP, Talos API by convention |
| new *external* | LoadBalancer ingress, egress default route |
The property the user asked for — management carries only management traffic —
holds under B. The label moves; the property is what matters.
## Migration shape
Every step is rolling and reversible. The routing-mode change is gone.
1. **New VLANs** on the switch, trunked to the X710. Nothing uses them.
2. **Addresses** on the new VLANs via Talos, one node at a time, `--mode=try`.
Still unused; this only proves the L2 works.
3. **etcd** to the management VLAN via `advertisedSubnets`. One node at a time,
waiting for a healthy quorum between each.
4. **API VIP** to the management VLAN via `Layer2VIPConfig.link`. DNS for
`k8s.renner.uno` follows.
5. **cluster-external**: BGP `localAddress`, default route, masquerade flag.
Reversible by reverting the override; failure is visible immediately in
`cilium-dbg shell -- bgp/peers`.
6. Verify VLAN 40 by what is *absent* from it, not by what still works.
Step 3 is the one that deserves care — etcd is the only step where a mistake
costs quorum rather than connectivity.
## What this does not buy
Management currently shares a 10 Gb link and is not contended. Nothing observed
today is slow because of this. The case for the split is that traffic classes
with different failure modes and security postures should not be
indistinguishable — not that something is broken.
## Sources and measurements
Source, Cilium v1.20.1 (the running version):
- `pkg/datapath/linux/node.go` — `installDirectRoute(…, nodeIP net.IP, …)`,
fed from `newIP4 = newNode.GetNodeIP(false)`; `createDirectRouteSpec` rejects
a next-hop that is not directly reachable.
- `pkg/node/types/node.go` — `GetNodeIP` prefers `NodeInternalIP`.
- `pkg/node/sync/local_node_sync.go` — `initFromConfig()` applies
`--ipv4-node`, `initFromK8s()` runs afterwards and overwrites it from the
Kubernetes Node.
- `cilium-agent` flag reference — `--direct-routing-device`: "Device name used
to connect nodes in direct routing mode".
Talos:
- Multihoming guide — `cluster.etcd.advertisedSubnets`; `listenSubnets`
defaults to it. kube-apiserver and Talos API listen addresses are not
covered there.
- `kubernetes/talos/patches/k8s-{1,2,3}.yaml` — `Layer2VIPConfig` for
`10.2.40.60` with `link: mgmt0`.
Measured on the cluster:
- `apid` answered on a node address that is not the InternalIP, so the Talos
API is not bound to one address.
- k8s-1 currently holds one routable v4 address plus the VIP on `mgmt0`; its
InternalIP had changed since the last session, which is why nothing here
names an address as fixed.
- Cilium runs `routing-mode: tunnel` with `enable-masquerade-to-route-source`
unset and no direct-routing device configured.
Not verified: whether the kube-apiserver's `--advertise-address` follows the
node IP independently of the VIP. It does not affect the recommendation, since
clients reach the API through the VIP either way.
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@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
# Wiki: local web interface and agent API, as a modular .NET solution
## Goal
A web interface for the Notes wiki that runs entirely in the cluster, and an
HTTP API through which agents ask the wiki typed questions and deposit facts.
Built as one C# solution with a MudBlazor front end, and built so that every
external dependency is replaceable: where the notes live, which model embeds
them, what judges a typed question, what runs an agent, how the vector index
is stored. The first adapters are what the homelab uses today. The point of
the design is that the next one is a project and a config line, not a
rewrite.
## Where we are
- `wiki-index` (Python, ns `ai`) syncs `wiki/` from `k.renner/notes` by blob
SHA, embeds through `wiki-embed` (bge-m3 on llama-server), answers
`POST /rank`. It keeps slug, title and vector, not the text. LAN-only behind
Traefik BasicAuth; the Gitea webhook hits the ClusterIP.
- `~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py` and `wiki_ask.py` rank through the index, build a
document context from a local vault checkout, send it with typed questions
to TypeSafe, gate on `covered`. The wiki-synth agent composes answers from
those judgements.
- New knowledge enters as a file in `raw/` (facts with provenance, never
hypotheses), distilled nightly in CI.
- The house C# project, shelly-manager, sets the conventions: net10.0, an
`.slnx` with `src/` and `test/`, xUnit, MudBlazor 9, Blazor Web App with
interactive server rendering, minimal APIs, an Authentik proxy-header
authentication handler for humans and an API-key handler for machines, a
multi-stage Dockerfile, `dotnet test` on every push and a kaniko release
pipeline to the Gitea registry. Human-facing apps sit behind an Authentik
outpost (`<app>-gate`) with a CNP that admits only that outpost.
## Architecture: ports in the core, adapters around it
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Host (ASP.NET Core + Blazor/Mud) │ composition root,
│ /api/v1, /rank, /webhook, UI pages │ config, auth
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
│ uses
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Application (use cases) │ Sync, Rank, Ask,
│ │ DepositFact, Queue-
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘ Question, Evaluate
│ depends only on
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Core (domain + ports) │ Note, RawSource,
│ no package references │ Report, LinkGraph,
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘ the interfaces
implemented by ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
Adapters.Gitea Adapters.LlamaCpp Adapters.TypeSafe Adapters.FileIndex Adapters.Anthropic
(later: Database, Ollama/Onnx, local Jev, pgvector/Qdrant, OpenAI-compatible answer models)
```
Rules that keep it modular, enforced by project references and a test:
- `Wiki.Core` references nothing. It holds the domain types and the port
interfaces. Adapters reference Core only; they never reference each other
or the host. `Wiki.Host` is the only project that knows which adapters
exist.
- Every port has a **contract test suite** in `test/Wiki.Contracts` that
runs against every adapter of that port. A new adapter is done when the
suite is green. That is what makes "swap the storage" a safe operation.
- Adapters are selected by configuration and registered by name (keyed
services), so several can be active at once. The UI's lab page and the
evaluator use that to compare, the API uses the one marked active.
- Nothing in Core or Application knows about HTTP, Gitea, TypeSafe, files or
Kubernetes.
### Ports
| port | what it abstracts | first adapter | examples of the next ones |
|---|---|---|---|
| `INoteStore` | read notes, raw sources and reports at a head; create a new document (a fact becomes a raw note in the application layer, the store only moves text) | Gitea repository API (`k.renner/notes`, blob SHA) | git checkout on a volume; a database (CNPG Postgres) with the vault imported; an Obsidian sync folder |
| `IEmbeddingModel` | text → vector, with a model id and dimension | llama-server `/v1/embeddings` (bge-m3 via wiki-embed, the model that won the German-document comparison on accuracy per cost) | the qwen3 embedding variants from that comparison; ONNX in-process; any OpenAI-compatible endpoint |
| `IVectorIndex` | store vectors per (model id, document), query top-k | in-memory cosine with a file snapshot per model, as today | pgvector in the database; Qdrant |
| `IChunker` | split a document into addressable units for typed questions | paragraph splitter (headings, fences), as in `wiki_ask.py` | sentence windows; semantic chunks |
| `IJudge` | typed questions over a state: Choice, Noul, Score, with probabilities | TypeSafe System One (`jev-latest`, cloud; the wiki records no locally hosted Jev today) | a locally hosted Jev with the same request shape, should TypeSafe offer one; a constrained-output local LLM adapter, flagged as uncalibrated |
| `IAnswerModel` | prose from a question plus evidence: the selected paragraphs with their notes and the judgements; must cite by slug; streaming | Anthropic Messages API (Claude, model from config, Sonnet by default) | any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, including the local llama-server; a different Claude model per question |
| `IEvaluator` | measure a retrieval or judge configuration against the labelled set (questions and cited sources in `output/`) | recall@k, hit rate, MRR, as `wiki_rank_eval.py` | judge accuracy against hand-labelled paragraphs |
| `IIdentity` | who is calling, for attribution of facts and saved answers | Authentik proxy headers (humans), API key (machines), as in shelly-manager | OIDC bearer tokens |
Two ports deserve a sentence of scope each. The judge returns judgements
with probabilities, never prose, and the UI never presents its output as an
answer, only as ranked, quoted evidence. The answer model turns that
evidence into words and is allowed nothing else: it sees the selected
paragraphs and the judgements, not the whole context, and its output is
shown next to the evidence it was given. Both are single model calls inside
the request. The service runs no agent: no tool loop, no vault edits. The
wiki-synth agent in a Claude session remains the path for artifacts and for
multi-question synthesis, and it can call `/questions` itself.
### Solution layout
```
Wiki.slnx
src/
Wiki.Core/ domain types, ports, frontmatter and link parsing
Wiki.Application/ use cases; depends on Core only
Wiki.Adapters.Gitea/ INoteStore (read at a head, create)
Wiki.Adapters.LlamaCpp/ IEmbeddingModel (OpenAI-compatible embeddings)
Wiki.Adapters.TypeSafe/ IJudge (System One client)
Wiki.Adapters.FileIndex/ IVectorIndex (memory + snapshot per model)
Wiki.Adapters.Anthropic/ IAnswerModel (Messages API, streaming)
Wiki.Host/ ASP.NET Core: API, webhook, MudBlazor UI, auth,
composition root, appsettings
test/
Wiki.Core.Tests/ parsing, link graph, chunker
Wiki.Contracts/ one suite per port, parameterised over adapters
Wiki.Application.Tests/ use cases with fake ports
Wiki.Host.Tests/ API surface, auth handlers
```
Own repository `k.renner/wiki`, same shape as shelly-manager: `Dockerfile`,
`.woodpecker/test.yml` on pull requests, `.woodpecker/release.yml` building
the image with kaniko into the Gitea registry on push to `main`, tagged
`build.<unix-ts>` plus the commit SHA so Flux image automation can follow
it. The homelab repo holds only the manifests. `claude-bot` needs write
access to the new repository.
Two things the shelly-manager history settles in advance: the TypeSafe
client is written from the documented field contract (endpoint, bearer key,
`jev-latest`, Noul/Choice/Score, 255-option cap, 32k-token state budget),
there is no prior C# client to copy; and the UI needs no login page, because
identity comes from the outpost's headers, which avoids the Blazor-circuit
sign-in constraint shelly-manager ran into.
### Configuration
Adapters are declared in `appsettings` and selected by name; secrets come
through environment variables, filled by ExternalSecret, never from the file.
```json
"Wiki": {
"NoteStore": { "Active": "gitea", "gitea": { "Repository": "k.renner/notes", "Branch": "main" } },
"Embeddings": {
"Active": "bge-m3",
"Models": {
"bge-m3": { "Adapter": "LlamaCpp", "Url": "http://wiki-embed.ai.svc:8080", "Model": "bge-m3" },
"e5-large": { "Adapter": "Ollama", "Url": "http://ollama.ai.svc:11434", "Model": "multilingual-e5-large" }
}
},
"Judges": {
"Active": "typesafe",
"Models": {
"typesafe": { "Adapter": "TypeSafe", "Url": "https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone", "Model": "jev-latest" },
"jev-local": { "Adapter": "TypeSafe", "Url": "http://jev.ai.svc:8080/v1/systemone", "Model": "jev" } // illustration: same adapter, other endpoint
}
},
"Index": { "Active": "file", "file": { "Path": "/data/index" } },
"AnswerModels": {
"Active": "claude-sonnet",
"Models": {
"claude-sonnet": { "Adapter": "Anthropic", "Model": "claude-sonnet-5" },
"qwen-local": { "Adapter": "OpenAI", "Url": "http://llama-server.ai.svc:8080/v1", "Model": "qwen3.6-35b-a3b" }
}
}
}
```
Every embedding model gets its own index namespace. Switching the active
model is a config change after the new index has been built in the
background; until then both exist and can be compared. Nothing is
re-embedded in place.
## The web interface (MudBlazor)
Blazor Web App, interactive server rendering, hosted in `Wiki.Host`. Static
assets vendored into the image, no CDN. Pages:
1. **Search**: a query box, results ranked by the active index with score and
tags; for a phrased question, optionally the paragraph-level hits from the
judge with their probabilities, shown as quoted evidence.
2. **Note**: frontmatter, rendered body with `[[wikilinks]]` resolved,
backlinks, sources linking to their raw file.
3. **Browse**: by tag, by `updated`, recently changed, orphans.
4. **Answers**: a question box. The answer streams in within seconds: rank,
judge, compose, all in the request. Below it the evidence: the paragraphs
the judge selected with their notes and probabilities, and the `covered`
gate; a low gate is shown as "the wiki does not cover this" instead of an
answer. A save button writes the answer to `output/` with the wiki-synth
frontmatter (`question`, `sources`, `confidence`), so it joins the
labelled set. Underneath, the saved answers, newest first, including the
ones the wiki-synth agent wrote from a session.
5. **Maintenance**: the raw queue with ages, the last consolidation and audit
reports, index and sync status.
6. **Lab**: pick any registered embedding model and judge, run the same query
through them side by side, and run the evaluator on the labelled set to
get recall@k per configuration. This is the page for "play around with
different models".
7. **Settings**: read-only view of the active adapters and their health.
No editing of notes in the browser. The vault stays a git repository edited
by the consolidate agent and by hand.
## API v1
Reads are authenticated by the hostname's gate (humans) or API key
(machines); writes always need an API key so a fact carries its author.
| method and path | purpose |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/v1/status` | index commit and age, counts, active adapters |
| `GET /api/v1/notes?q=&tag=&limit=` | list; `q` ranks through the active index |
| `GET /api/v1/notes/{slug}` | frontmatter, body, links, backlinks, sources |
| `GET /api/v1/tags` | tags with counts |
| `POST /api/v1/rank` | `{question, k, model?}` → ranked slugs; also served at `/rank` for the existing scripts |
| `POST /api/v1/ask` | `{queries, questions, k, judge?, model?}` → context, typed judgements with the answering paragraphs verbatim, `covered`. For agents and code. |
| `POST /api/v1/questions` | `{question, k?, judge?, model?, answerModel?, save?}` → the answer text with `[[slug]]` citations, the evidence (paragraphs, probabilities), `covered`, model and token usage; streamed as server-sent events when requested; with `save`, the `output/` path and commit |
| `POST /api/v1/facts` | deposit a raw source: title, source, `kind: fact`, observed_at, content, tags → path and commit |
| `GET /api/v1/raw` | the distill queue with ages |
| `GET /api/v1/reports` | `output/` documents by type, newest first |
| `POST /api/v1/lab/eval` | run the evaluator for a (model, judge) pair |
| `POST /webhook` | Gitea push, HMAC as today |
`POST /api/v1/facts` is rejected without `source`, with a `kind` other than
`fact`, or with content under a minimum length. The raw rule is enforced by
shape: there is no field for a hypothesis. The file gets the vault's
provenance frontmatter with `captured_by` set from the API key's identity.
`POST /api/v1/ask` is `wiki_ask.py` moved server-side, so the scripts become
thin clients and agents no longer need a vault checkout. Its result is
judgements and quotations, never prose.
`POST /api/v1/questions` is `/ask` plus one answer-model call, in process:
rank the question, build the context, run the default typed questions
(answered, where, covered), hand the selected paragraphs and judgements to
the answer model, stream the prose back. Below the `covered` threshold it
returns the gap instead of an answer. Time is the sum of the parts, about
0.2 s rank, 1 to 4 s judge, a few seconds of generation. Cost is one model
call over a few thousand tokens, a few cents on Sonnet, against a quarter
dollar for a full agent run.
## Auth and network
- Humans: `wiki.renner.uno`, LAN-only (no `dns.renner.uno/public` label),
Ingress backend `ak-outpost-wiki-gate:9000`, a `wiki-gate-egress` CNP in
`authentik`, the proxy-header handler trusts `X-Authentik-*` only from that
outpost.
- Machines: `wiki-index.renner.uno` with the API-key handler; the workstation
key stays where it is. CI reaches the ClusterIP.
- Secrets (Gitea token, webhook secret, API keys, TypeSafe key, Anthropic
key) reach the
pod as environment variables from Kubernetes Secrets filled by
ExternalSecret from the `openbao` ClusterSecretStore. The pod itself has
no OpenBao access. The Python service fetched its secrets from OpenBao
directly through its own Kubernetes-auth role; that role, its policy and
the `ai` → `openbao` CNP entry are retired with it.
- Egress from the pod: Gitea, wiki-embed, `api.typesafe.ai:443`,
`api.anthropic.com:443`. Every
further adapter that talks to a new endpoint gets its own CNP line, which
is the one place adding an adapter touches the cluster.
## Health endpoints
Three endpoints with three different meanings, wired to the .NET health
checks with tags so that the probes and the humans see the right thing:
| endpoint | meaning | probe |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /health` | the process serves HTTP. Always 200 once Kestrel listens; no dependency checks. | liveness |
| `GET /ready` | the active note store has synced at least once and the active index is loaded; 503 while the first sync or index build runs. A failed later sync keeps the last good state and stays ready. | readiness, plus a startup probe with enough budget for the first sync (the Python service was killed mid-build when its `/health` returned 503 during the initial sync) |
| `GET /api/v1/status` | the full picture for humans and the Settings page: index commit and age, counts, queue lengths, and one entry per registered adapter with its last check result and latency. | none |
Adapter checks (Gitea reachable, embeddings endpoint answering, judge
endpoint answering, answer model answering) are reported in `/status` and
on the Settings page and are never part of `/ready`: a judge outage must not
take the reader down. Their failures show up as red entries, not as
restarts.
## Phases
One PR each, verified before the next. The Python `wiki-index` keeps running
until phase 3 proves parity.
0. **Skeleton.** Repository, solution, `Wiki.Core` with the ports and domain
types, `Wiki.Contracts` with the suites, `Wiki.Host` serving `/health`,
`/ready` and `/api/v1/status`. CI: test and release pipelines. Verify:
image in the registry, pipeline green, the Deployment's three probes
wired and the pod Ready.
1. **Parity with the Python service.** Gitea, LlamaCpp and FileIndex
adapters, the sync use case, `/rank` and `/webhook`. Verify: the 40-query
recall eval gives the same numbers as the Python service on the same
commit; `wiki_rank.py --probe-index` against the new service passes.
2. **Read API and UI.** Notes, tags, raw, reports; Search, Note, Browse,
Maintenance pages; `wiki-gate`. Verify: a note renders with resolved
links; an unauthenticated request is redirected to Authentik.
3. **Ask.** Chunker, TypeSafe adapter, `/api/v1/ask`, scripts as clients.
Verify: `test_wiki_ask.py` passes against the API; a wiki-synth run with
the definition unchanged. Then the Python service is retired and the
`wiki-index` hostname points at the new one.
4. **Facts.** API keys as an ExternalSecret, the deposit-fact use case, `/api/v1/facts`. Verify:
a fact posted from the workstation shows as a `claude-bot` commit and in
the next distill.
5. **Questions.** Anthropic adapter, `/api/v1/questions` with streaming,
the Answers page with save. Verify: a question answered in under ten
seconds with citations that resolve to the shown evidence; a question the
wiki does not cover returns the gap; a saved answer appears in `output/`
with the wiki-synth frontmatter and is picked up by the evaluator.
6. **Lab.** Evaluator, a second embedding model and a second answer model
registered, the Lab page. Verify: two models compared on the labelled set
from the UI.
## Not in scope
- Editing notes in the browser.
- Replacing Obsidian; the vault stays a git repository and `notes-push.path`
keeps pushing.
- Public exposure; LAN and VPN only.
- Running or triggering agents. The service makes single model calls inside
a request; it never runs a tool loop or edits the vault. Distill,
consolidate and multi-question synthesis stay Claude processes in CI or in
a session; the service shows their inputs and outputs and serves their API
calls.
+3 -8
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,7 @@
Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
rebuild, not as outstanding work.
after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were
@@ -432,8 +427,8 @@ is why it belongs here.
among its devices but not `ens19`, because `ens19` is deliberately
address-less. Cilium therefore owns `mgmt0` and sees VLAN 40 frames already
untagged by the 8021q layer, while VLAN 30 frames only ever meet the filter
on the shared parent `uplink`, still tagged. Any future address-less VLAN
carrying pod traffic will need the same treatment.
on the shared parent `enp2s0f0np0`, still tagged. Any future address-less
VLAN carrying pod traffic will need the same treatment.
The symptom does not look like a VLAN problem. A tc-layer drop reaches an
AF_PACKET sender as ENOBUFS, so the CNI dhcp plugin reports `no buffer space
+35 -61
View File
@@ -67,12 +67,10 @@ These must exist outside the cluster or the rebuild cannot complete:
`flux` phase creates the `sops-age` Secret, and any not-yet-migrated sops
files decrypt with it. (Post-OpenBao-phase-4 this may be retired — see
`MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.)
- [ ] **OpenBao seal key, recovery key + root token** — in the GPG `pass`
store (`homelab/openbao/seal-key`, `homelab/openbao/unseal-key` — the
former shamir key, now the recovery key — and `homelab/openbao/root-token`),
and the GPG private key backed up off-machine. The seal key is the one
the snapshots are encrypted under: without it, no OpenBao snapshot can be
restored and no secret-consuming app can start.
- [ ] **OpenBao unseal key + root token** — in the GPG `pass` store
(`homelab/openbao/unseal-key`, `homelab/openbao/root-token`), and the GPG
private key backed up off-machine. Without the unseal key, no OpenBao
snapshot can be restored and no secret-consuming app can start.
- [ ] **OpenBao raft snapshot** reachable — nightly PVC snapshots
(`infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml`) plus the Velero
`openbao-daily` offsite copy. In a total-loss rebuild the offsite Velero
@@ -107,7 +105,7 @@ config, and the nodes are addressed by name.
## Step 1b — boot all three machines from install media
```
https://factory.talos.dev/image/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9/v1.13.10/metal-amd64.iso
https://factory.talos.dev/image/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9/v1.13.9/metal-amd64.iso
```
Write it to a USB stick and boot each MS-01 from it. Each comes up in
@@ -296,65 +294,42 @@ output** — a green step over a still-forming Ceph is a known trap.
> Steady-state (non-rebuild) bootstrap is just `kubernetes/bootstrap.sh flux`
> with `GITEA_TOKEN` set; `FLUX_SOURCE` defaults to `gitea`.
## Step 4 — openbao: restore the snapshot
## Step 4 — openbao: restore the snapshot + unseal
`bootstrap.sh flux` does this step itself (`restore_openbao`): it creates the
`openbao-seal-key` Secret from `pass` before Flux brings OpenBao up, initialises
the empty server, restores the newest raft snapshot straight out of the Velero
kopia repository, and waits until every replica has unsealed itself from the
static seal. What follows is the same procedure by hand, for when the script
is not an option.
OpenBao unseals itself from the static seal (`openbao-seal-key` Secret, key
`key`, the 32-byte base64 key from `pass show homelab/openbao/seal-key`). The
snapshots are encrypted under that key, so it must be the same key the backed
up cluster used — a different one restores nothing. Until the snapshot is
restored, the `ClusterSecretStore` stays NotReady, ESO cannot materialize
Secrets, and every secret-consuming app stays Pending.
After Step 3, OpenBao comes up **sealed and empty**. Until it is restored and
unsealed, the `ClusterSecretStore` stays NotReady, ESO cannot materialize
Secrets, and every secret-consuming app stays Pending. This step is **manual**
(the unseal key lives in `pass`, off-cluster by design).
```sh
# 1. The seal key, before the pods start (a pod without it never starts).
kubectl create namespace openbao --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
kubectl -n openbao create secret generic openbao-seal-key \
--from-literal=key="$(pass show homelab/openbao/seal-key)"
# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pods to exist (all three sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
kubectl -n openbao get pods
# 2. Wait for openbao-0 (uninitialised: 0/1 Ready is expected), then
# initialise it. With an auto-seal, init hands out recovery keys and the
# server unseals itself. These keys are throwaway: the restore replaces them.
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator init \
-recovery-shares=1 -recovery-threshold=1
# 3. Restore the most recent raft snapshot. Source it from the snapshot PVC
# 2. Restore the most recent raft snapshot. Source it from the snapshot PVC
# (infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml) or, in a total-loss rebuild,
# from the Velero `openbao-daily` offsite copy. Root token from the init
# output. No -force: OpenBao checks the snapshot was written under this
# server's seal key and refuses otherwise ("different autoseal key") — that
# refusal is the signal the Secret is wrong. -force would skip the check and
# leave a server that can never unseal.
# from the Velero `openbao-daily` offsite copy. Copy it into the pod, then:
kubectl -n openbao cp <snapshot>.snap openbao-0:/tmp/restore.snap
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- \
env BAO_TOKEN=<init root token> bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/restore.snap
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/restore.snap
# 4. The server seals against the snapshot's keyring and unseals itself from
# the static seal; openbao-1 and openbao-2 follow (OrderedReady). Nothing
# to type. Afterwards the tokens and recovery key from pass apply again.
kubectl -n openbao get pods -w
# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1) — EVERY replica, same key.
# A sealed server is neither a raft voter nor a standby, so unsealing only
# openbao-0 leaves the three-peer cluster one node short of quorum.
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste homelab/openbao/unseal-key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-1 -- bao operator unseal # same key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-2 -- bao operator unseal # same key
```
Verify the store recovers before moving on:
```sh
kubectl -n openbao exec openbao-0 -- bao status # want: Seal Type static, Sealed false
kubectl get clustersecretstore openbao # want: Valid / Ready
kubectl -n <ns> get externalsecret # want: SecretSynced
kubectl get clustersecretstore openbao # want: Valid / Ready
kubectl -n <ns> get externalsecret # want: SecretSynced
```
> A replica that stays **sealed** after a restart could not use the static
> seal — the Secret is missing or does not match the key the data was
> written under. Fix the Secret and restart the pod; `bao operator unseal`
> with the recovery key (`pass show homelab/openbao/unseal-key`) does not
> unseal an auto-sealed server and is only for recovery-mode operations.
> Details + rationale: `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
> **Manual unseal is required after every OpenBao pod restart**, not just
> during rebuilds, and for *each* replica that restarts — a rolling node
> drain seals all three in turn. Details + rationale:
> `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
## Step 5 — apps: let the rest reconcile
@@ -418,15 +393,14 @@ it: repo → **Settings → Repository → Mirror Settings** in Gitea, or
- **`bootstrap.sh talos` is dead** — it cannot generate a config (#581), and
Step 2 no longer uses it. Its `flux` and `wait-apps` phases are still used in
Steps 3, 5 and 6 and work; do not read this as the whole script being gone.
Its `flux` phase carries the OpenBao restore (Step 4); the seal key and the
other secrets are read from `pass` or streamed in at run time and never live
in CI.
- **OpenBao unseals itself, but only under the seal key the snapshot was
written with.** Three raft replicas mean the service survives losing one; a
sealed server is neither a voter nor a standby. A pod that stays sealed after
a restart has the wrong `openbao-seal-key` Secret — Step 4 covers this; it is
repeated here because it is the step most likely to be half-done under
pressure.
It has also never had an `openbao` phase — Step 4 is manual because the
unseal key must not live in CI; see issue #187 on whether to wire a
semi-automated OpenBao restore.
- **OpenBao seals on every restart and each replica must be unsealed
individually.** Three raft replicas mean the service survives losing one, but
a sealed server is neither a voter nor a standby — unsealing only one leaves
the cluster short of quorum. Step 4 covers this; it is repeated here because
it is the step most likely to be half-done under pressure.
- Ceph's cluster network is a Multus attachment on VLAN 49 with whereabouts
IPAM, not host networking. Nothing in the rebuild needs special handling for
it — the nodes hold no address on that segment — but a rebuilt cluster will
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ metadata:
namespace: audiobookshelf
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audiobookshelf
annotations:
# envFrom does not restart the pod when the ConfigMap changes; Reloader does.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: audiobookshelf-config
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /ca
containers:
- name: audiobookshelf
image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.36.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 80
@@ -122,7 +119,7 @@ spec:
claimName: audiobookshelf-metadata
- name: books
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
claimName: audiobookshelf-books
- name: le-ca
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
+2 -2
View File
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ spec:
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
name: audiobookshelf-books
namespace: audiobookshelf
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-bulk
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
@@ -976,280 +976,6 @@ data:
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# wiki-gate: the wiki service (ns ai) behind the same passkey flows as
# llama-gate. The service trusts X-Authentik-Username only from pod
# addresses, and its CNP admits only this outpost, so the gate is the
# whole access control for wiki.renner.uno.
- id: wiki-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://wiki.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://wiki.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Wiki
slug: wiki-gate
provider: !KeyOf wiki-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://wiki.renner.uno
meta_description: "Notes wiki: search, notes, answers, maintenance"
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf wiki-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# paperclip-gate: Paperclip UI; the CNP admits only this outpost. Paperclip keeps its own login behind it.
- id: paperclip-users-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Paperclip Users
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: paperclip-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://paperclip.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Paperclip
slug: paperclip-gate
provider: !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://paperclip.renner.uno
meta_description: "Paperclip agent orchestration"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, paperclip-gate]]
group: !KeyOf paperclip-users-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# navidrome-gate: the Navidrome web UI. Navidrome auto-creates the
# X-Authentik-Username user on first login; the first user is admin.
# /rest and /share bypass the gate at the Traefik router.
- id: navidrome-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://navidrome.navidrome.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://navidrome.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Navidrome
slug: navidrome-gate
provider: !KeyOf navidrome-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://navidrome.renner.uno
meta_description: "Music streaming (Subsonic)"
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf navidrome-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# lidarr-gate: Lidarr runs with AuthenticationMethod=External, so the gate
# is its only access control.
- id: music-librarians-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Music Librarians
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
# Membership is owned here; blueprint apply reverts UI edits.
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: lidarr-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://lidarr.navidrome.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://lidarr.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Lidarr
slug: lidarr-gate
provider: !KeyOf lidarr-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://lidarr.renner.uno
meta_description: "Music library gaps: discographies, Spotify artists"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, lidarr-gate]]
group: !KeyOf music-librarians-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf lidarr-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: authentik Embedded Outpost
+2 -13
View File
@@ -120,14 +120,7 @@ spec:
server:
resources:
requests:
# 500m, not 200m: the HPA below targets 70% of *this* request, so at
# 200m the scale-up threshold sat at 140m — below the pod's own
# ordinary peak. Measured over 7d, a warm server pod p99s at ~108m
# and peaks at ~190m, and a freshly-started one burns ~300m booting
# Django. That made the HPA oscillate 2<->3<->4 all day and pin at
# maxReplicas (KubeHpaMaxedOut, issue #761). At 500m the threshold
# is 350m/pod, above the boot burst, so only real load scales out.
cpu: 500m
cpu: 200m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
@@ -161,11 +154,7 @@ spec:
worker:
resources:
requests:
# Same reasoning as server above, and the worker is burstier still:
# over 7d its per-pod p99 reaches ~336m and peaks hit ~630m while
# running blueprint applies and scheduled tasks. 200m understated
# that badly enough that routine task batches read as saturation.
cpu: 500m
cpu: 200m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
+1 -4
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ resources:
- helmrelease.yaml
- paperless-gate-ingress.yaml
- paperless-gate-egress.yaml
- paperclip-gate-egress.yaml
- vscode-gate-egress.yaml
- shelly-manager-gate-egress.yaml
- esphome-gate-egress.yaml
@@ -17,9 +16,7 @@ resources:
- prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
- wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
- llama-gate-egress.yaml
- wiki-gate-egress.yaml
- navidrome-gate-egress.yaml
- lidarr-gate-egress.yaml
- outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
- ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cnp.yaml
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ metadata:
# so this Service produces no public record — LDAP stays
# LAN-internal, which matches the threat model of the cleartext
# bind on 389.
external-dns.kubernetes.io/hostname: ldap.renner.uno
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: ldap.renner.uno
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Lets the lidarr-gate outpost reach Lidarr; the matching ingress rule is in
# network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: lidarr-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: lidarr-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": navidrome
app.kubernetes.io/name: lidarr
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8686"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Lets the navidrome-gate outpost reach Navidrome; the matching ingress rule
# is in network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: navidrome-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: navidrome-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": navidrome
app.kubernetes.io/name: navidrome
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "4533"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Lets the paperclip-gate outpost reach the Paperclip server; scoped to this outpost's pods.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Lets the wiki-gate outpost reach the wiki service. The authentik namespace
# baseline CNP otherwise stops any authentik pod from entering ai. Scoped to
# this outpost's pod label; the matching ingress rule is in ai-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: wiki-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wiki-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
@@ -3,4 +3,3 @@ kind: Kustomization
resources:
- externalsecret.yaml
- helmrelease.yaml
- networkpolicy.yaml
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# The apps namespace is default-deny-ingress, so the ServiceMonitor added in
# monitoring-rules/external-dns-servicemonitor.yaml scraped into a timeout.
# The selector matches both releases — the Cloudflare one deployed here and
# external-dns-unifi from infrastructure/ — since they share the chart's
# app.kubernetes.io/name and land in the same namespace.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: external-dns-allow-metrics-scrape
namespace: apps
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: external-dns
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: monitoring
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "7979"
protocol: TCP
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: gatus
image: twinproduction/gatus:v5.37.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gatus"}
image: twinproduction/gatus:v5.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gatus"}
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
annotations:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRouteTCP
metadata:
name: gitea-ssh
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ kind: Kustomization
# and verified. See MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md.
resources:
- statefulset.yaml
- pdb.yaml
- service.yaml
- ingressroute-ssh.yaml
- ingress.yaml
+26 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,28 @@
# Prometheus scrape and Traefik are admitted by the namespace baseline in
# infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-ns.yaml.
#
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-metrics-scrape
namespace: apps
spec:
# Prometheus (monitoring ns) scrapes gitea's /metrics on :3000. The apps
# default-deny-ingress only allows same-ns / home-assistant / host, so the
# scrape is dropped (context deadline exceeded). This became necessary only
# after the LXC->in-cluster cutover — the old static target was external, so
# no in-cluster policy applied. Scoped to the gitea pod + :3000.
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3000"
protocol: TCP
---
# Secret rotation: the flux-git rotator (openbao ns) reaches gitea to mint a new
# flux PAT. It uses the in-cluster Service (gitea.gitea.svc:3000) — the public
# flux PAT. It uses the in-cluster Service (gitea.apps.svc:3000) — the public
# gitea.renner.uno name hairpins off the ingress LB from a pod (same failure as
# pve.renner.uno). Scoped to the gitea pod :3000 and the rotator label; the
# egress half is rotator-gitea-flux-egress in network-policies/openbao-ns.yaml.
@@ -10,7 +30,7 @@ apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-flux-rotator
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
@@ -34,7 +54,7 @@ apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-review-bot-rotator
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
---
# Eviction protection for the single-replica Gitea StatefulSet.
#
# Gitea runs on SQLite (single writer) and its repos + DB live on a single
# ReadWriteOnce PVC, so it is deliberately replicas:1 and cannot fail over.
# With no PDB, a node drain / maintenance evicts the pod abruptly, mid-write,
# with zero coordination. minAvailable:1 on a 1-replica workload makes the
# eviction API refuse *voluntary* evictions: `kubectl drain` blocks and
# surfaces this pod, forcing a conscious decision (drain with
# --disable-eviction, or scale down first) instead of yanking the live DB.
# It does NOT block involuntary disruptions (node crash, OOM).
apiVersion: policy/v1
kind: PodDisruptionBudget
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
minAvailable: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ spec:
# NOTE: volumeClaimTemplates is immutable on an existing StatefulSet,
# so bumping this value cannot be `kubectl apply`-ed in place — Flux
# will reject the whole object. Landing this size change requires a
# one-time `kubectl delete statefulset gitea -n gitea --cascade=orphan`
# one-time `kubectl delete statefulset gitea -n apps --cascade=orphan`
# (pod + PVC keep running) so Flux re-creates the STS from this
# template and re-adopts them. After the cleanup_packages GC reclaims
# the ~10G of orphaned blobs, real usage is ~9G, so 40Gi is headroom.
+1 -3
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ metadata:
name: gf-pg
namespace: monitoring
spec:
instances: 2
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
@@ -111,23 +111,9 @@ statistics max_id=13323904 max_start_ts=1787162400.0
statistics_short_term max_id=159205762 max_start_ts=1787166000.0
```
## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
| table | rows | span |
|---|---|---|
| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
at Postgres.
The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
**Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ metadata:
lb-pool: bgp
annotations:
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "10.2.99.87,fd99::87"
external-dns.kubernetes.io/hostname: ha.renner.uno
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: ha.renner.uno
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ spec:
# Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
# effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
#
# Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
# repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
# without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
# INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
# `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
# homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
# when a referenced secret is missing.
- name: render-db-url
image: busybox:1.36
command:
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -18,21 +18,19 @@
# That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
# what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
#
# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
# STAGING
# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: ha-pg
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
instances: 2
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
@@ -126,7 +124,8 @@ spec:
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volumes are lost outright.
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Fewer checkpoints => fewer full-page writes, since a page is only
# fully-logged on its first modification after a checkpoint.
@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@ resources:
# health broker credential: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (first of the
# eight users to migrate off mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml).
- mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
# open3e-int broker credential: open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal
# CAN; OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated.
- mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
- mosquitto-config.yaml
- mosquitto-certificate.yaml
- mosquitto-service.yaml
@@ -63,8 +60,9 @@ resources:
- zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
- zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
# Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
# Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
# long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
# PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
# on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
# tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
- ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
- ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
- ha-pg-cluster.yaml
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ spec:
# Two processes rather than one: socat carries a single address pair per
# invocation, and the families need different receive and send addresses.
# They are independent — one crashing does not blind the other — and each
# carries its own supervisor loop.
# is restarted by the kubelet on its own.
containers:
# -u is load-bearing on both: unidirectional, left to right. Without it
# socat would also carry HA's replies back out, and this must stay a
@@ -77,29 +77,17 @@ spec:
# UDP4-SENDTO takes its A record and UDP6-SENDTO its AAAA. See
# mdns-relay-service.yaml for why that indirection is required and why
# the Service is dual-stack.
#
# Supervisor loop: socat exits 1 on the first datagram it cannot
# deliver, and the ClusterIP has no backend while HA restarts. The
# trap forwards SIGTERM so the pod still terminates promptly.
- name: socat-ipv4
image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
trap 'kill "$pid"; exit 0' TERM INT
while :; do
socat -u \
"UDP4-RECV:5353,ip-add-membership=224.0.0.251:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,reuseaddr" \
"UDP4-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353" &
pid=$!
wait "$pid"
echo "mdns-relay: socat-ipv4 exited ($?); restarting in 2s" >&2
sleep 2
done
# No probes. The supervisor loop is the liveness story; a probe here
# could only re-assert that PID 1 is running.
args:
- -u
- "UDP4-RECV:5353,ip-add-membership=224.0.0.251:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,reuseaddr"
- "UDP4-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
# No probes. socat is a single process with no health surface: if it
# exits, the container exits and the kubelet restarts it, which is the
# entire liveness story. A probe here could only re-assert that PID 1
# is running.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
@@ -126,20 +114,10 @@ spec:
- name: socat-ipv6
image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
trap 'kill "$pid"; exit 0' TERM INT
while :; do
socat -u \
"UDP6-RECV:5353,ipv6-join-group=[ff02::fb]:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,ipv6-v6only=1,reuseaddr" \
"UDP6-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353" &
pid=$!
wait "$pid"
echo "mdns-relay: socat-ipv6 exited ($?); restarting in 2s" >&2
sleep 2
done
args:
- -u
- "UDP6-RECV:5353,ipv6-join-group=[ff02::fb]:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,ipv6-v6only=1,reuseaddr"
- "UDP6-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ metadata:
#
# Listed per-Secret rather than with the blanket auto annotation, so that
# enrolling another broker user is a visible edit to this line.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials,mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ spec:
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd sml2mqtt "$SML2MQTT_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e "$OPEN3E_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e-int "$OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd evcc "$EVCC_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd health "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd zigbee2mqtt "$ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD"
@@ -125,12 +124,6 @@ spec:
user open3e
topic readwrite open3e/#
# open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal CAN: own subtree
# under open3e/ so edge-1's listener on open3e/cmnd never sees
# its commands.
user open3e-int
topic readwrite open3e/int/#
user evcc
topic read open3e/#
topic readwrite evcc/#
@@ -194,13 +187,6 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
key: password
# open3e-int: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (see
# mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml).
- name: OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
key: password
- name: EVCC_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ metadata:
# LAN can connect with `mqtt.renner.uno` (matches the broker cert
# SAN) instead of the bare IP. No Cloudflare label — kept off the
# public DNS; UniFi serves a split-DNS answer for LAN clients.
external-dns.kubernetes.io/hostname: mqtt.renner.uno
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: mqtt.renner.uno
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Projects the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker credential (open3e-esp32 gateway
# on the Vitocal internal CAN) from OpenBao into the Secret the broker
# consumes. Rotator: kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml.
#
# creationPolicy is implicitly Owner: deleting this ExternalSecret deletes the
# live Secret. Set creationPolicy: Orphan first to detach without destroying.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
@@ -57,14 +57,7 @@ spec:
# and leaves this one untouched (tags are not deleted), so this keeps
# resolving — but the image then came from the branch build rather than
# master. Re-point it at a master-built tag when convenient.
#
# konairius/, not gitea_admin/: this init container runs during a cold
# rebuild, when Gitea does not exist because it runs inside the
# cluster being rebuilt. The node then falls back to a ghcr.io copy
# (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
# keeps the repository path when it falls through — so the path has to
# exist on both registries. Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-09-04
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
command:
- sh
- -c
+12 -13
View File
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
# Kept permanently as a standing guard.
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
# A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
# vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
# long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
# format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
instances: 2
# See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
# (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
# terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
# on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
# Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
# pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
# paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
# vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
instances: 1
# See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
# the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
# down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
# even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,10 +36,8 @@ spec:
database: immich
owner: immich
postgresql:
# vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
# extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
# in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
shared_preload_libraries:
- vectors.so
- vchord.so
parameters:
shared_buffers: "512MB"
@@ -59,7 +57,8 @@ spec:
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volumes are lost outright.
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Write-reduction tuning. These databases are largely idle, and the
# Postgres defaults favour throughput over storage that wears out.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: immich-machine-learning
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.1.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3003
-32
View File
@@ -28,38 +28,6 @@ spec:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
---
# Media root on the EC 2+1 bulk pool; thumbs mount separately below.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: immich-library-bulk
namespace: immich
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-bulk
resources:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
---
# Thumbnails stay replicated: read affinity serves them from the local OSD.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: immich-thumbs
namespace: immich
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 30Gi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
+2 -10
View File
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ metadata:
namespace: immich
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: immich-server
annotations:
# envFrom does not restart the pod when the ConfigMap changes; Reloader does.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: immich-config
spec:
# Scaled to 0 alongside immich-machine-learning during single-node
# maintenance; see the note there. The CNPG Postgres cluster stays running,
@@ -87,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /ca
containers:
- name: immich-server
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.1.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3001
@@ -110,8 +107,6 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- name: library
mountPath: /data
- name: thumbs
mountPath: /data/thumbs
- name: immich-config-file
mountPath: /config
readOnly: true
@@ -147,10 +142,7 @@ spec:
volumes:
- name: library
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: immich-library-bulk
- name: thumbs
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: immich-thumbs
claimName: immich-library
- name: immich-config-file
secret:
secretName: immich-secrets
@@ -61,9 +61,6 @@ spec:
enabled: true
storageClass: ceph-block
size: 50Gi
# A minAvailable:1 PDB on a single replica blocks every node drain.
pdb:
create: false
# Bootstrap admin/org/bucket on the fresh PVC. Admin password + token come
# from the influxdb-bootstrap Secret (OpenBao via ESO), deterministic across
# rebuilds so the bootstrap token is the live admin token. `influx setup`
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ kind: Kustomization
resources:
- gatus/
- external-dns/
- gitea/
- ical-proxy/
# gitea/ has its own `gitea` Kustomization (clusters/homelab/gitea.yaml, #878).
# woodpecker/ moved to its own dedicated `woodpecker` Kustomization
# (clusters/homelab/woodpecker.yaml) so its wp-pg CNPG cluster's barman
# dependency + Cluster health-gating don't contaminate this shared apps KS.
+6 -32
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# the entrypoint exit after one pass instead of looping internally —
# the CronJob handles scheduling.
#
# Books land in /audiobooks (the audiobookshelf-books-bulk PVC, shared
# Books land in /audiobooks (the audiobookshelf-books PVC, shared
# with the audiobookshelf Deployment). Config + DB live on
# libation-config (RWO ceph-block, seeded once from
# libation-bootstrap secret).
@@ -42,11 +42,9 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# Seed the libation-config PVC from the bootstrap secret on
# first run only — sentinel file gates re-runs so DB updates
# from subsequent liberate passes are preserved. Refreshed
# Audible tokens are preserved by the container args, not by
# this sentinel: the entrypoint copies AccountsSettings.json
# into ephemeral /config-internal rather than symlinking it.
# first run only — sentinel file gates re-runs so token
# refreshes in AccountsSettings.json and DB updates from
# subsequent liberate passes are preserved.
- name: seed-config
image: busybox:1.37.0
command: ["/bin/sh", "-eu", "-c"]
@@ -68,11 +66,6 @@ spec:
install -m 660 /bootstrap/AccountsSettings.json /libation-state/AccountsSettings.json
install -m 660 /bootstrap/Settings.json /libation-state/Settings.json
install -m 660 /bootstrap/LibationContext.db /libation-state/LibationContext.db
# Without this key the seeded tokens cannot be decrypted:
# TokenStorageMethod is Encrypted and the container has no
# OS secret store, so a missing key file makes the
# entrypoint mint a throwaway one on every run.
install -m 660 /bootstrap/libation-master.key /libation-state/libation-master.key
touch /libation-state/.bootstrapped
ls -la /libation-state
volumeMounts:
@@ -92,26 +85,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: libation
# Pinned by digest: Spegel caches mutable tag resolutions, so
# :latest stayed on 13.7.11 despite imagePullPolicy Always.
image: docker.io/rmcrackan/libation:14.2.1@sha256:6f9d8ba19dc3803dd6ba295ab5a7abfb6ff3bc06286eebf4ecd8ccbe43245888
# The entrypoint stages config into ephemeral /config-internal
# by copy (only the DB is symlinked to the PVC), so Audible
# tokens refreshed during a run are lost at container exit.
# Passing args makes the entrypoint set up the environment and
# then exec this instead of its own loop; the trap copies the
# refreshed file back to the PVC on every exit path.
args:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
trap 'cp /config-internal/AccountsSettings.json /libation-state/AccountsSettings.json' EXIT
set -e
# Strip the Audible intro/outro; re-liberated books replace their file instead of gaining a " (1)" copy.
jq '.StripAudibleBrandAudio = true | .OverwriteExisting = true' /config-internal/Settings.json > /config-internal/Settings.json.tmp
mv /config-internal/Settings.json.tmp /config-internal/Settings.json
/libation/LibationCli scan
/libation/LibationCli liberate
image: docker.io/rmcrackan/libation:latest
env:
- name: LIBATION_CONFIG_DIR
value: /libation-state
@@ -138,7 +112,7 @@ spec:
claimName: libation-config
- name: books
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
claimName: audiobookshelf-books
- name: bootstrap
secret:
secretName: libation-bootstrap
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# SOPS-encrypted Secret on first boot (sentinel file gate); after that
# Libation reads and writes it directly so token rotation persists.
#
# Books are written to the audiobookshelf-books-bulk PVC (already provisioned
# Books are written to the audiobookshelf-books PVC (already provisioned
# by the audiobookshelf seed Kustomization, RWX ceph-filesystem). We
# share the same namespace so the PVC reference is direct — k8s PVCs
# are namespace-scoped.
+3 -61
View File
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
spec:
replicas: 1
# The startupProbe below sanctions a 40 min cold download, but the default
# progressDeadlineSeconds is 600. Left implicit the Deployment declares
# ProgressDeadlineExceeded at 10 minutes while the probe is still legitimately
# waiting, and KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck fires 15 min after that on a rollout
# that is fine. Kept above the startup budget, with room for the image pull
# and scheduling that happen before the first probe.
progressDeadlineSeconds: 3000
# A rolling update would load a second copy of the weights onto the same
# iGPU and into the same node's RAM before releasing the first.
strategy:
@@ -82,62 +75,11 @@ spec:
# many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
- --threads
- "4"
# 16k is room to spare, not a safety limit. The limit that matters
# is not set here at all.
#
# Isolated by bisection on a scratch pod: this stack breaks on
# PROMPT length, and the value of --ctx-size makes no difference to
# it. Measured at --ctx-size 65536 with a single slot, so with four
# times the headroom:
#
# 13588 prompt tokens coherent answer
# 15086 one token, immediate EOS, empty content
# 16088 CJK characters and digit runs
#
# A single request past that boundary then poisons the slot: the
# same 13588-token prompt that answered cleanly a minute earlier
# returns one empty token afterwards, and stays broken until the
# pod restarts. That is why it looked intermittent, and why a
# 650-token classification once came back as 1025 tokens of "!" —
# it followed Home Assistant's ~19k prompts through the same slot.
#
# Nothing reports any of it: finish_reason "stop", a well-formed
# OpenAI response, HTTP 200, /health green.
#
# So the operating rule is about callers, not this flag. Paperless
# sits near 5k and is safe; Home Assistant's Assist prompt measured
# 18910 and never had a chance. An earlier version of this comment
# blamed --ctx-size 32768, which the bisection disproves — 32768
# and 65536 both answer correctly as long as the prompt stays under
# the boundary.
#
# The same stack also fails hard at --ubatch-size 2048, which is
# the loud version of a limit this one keeps quiet about.
#
# 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
# and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
# layers use full attention.
- --ctx-size
- "16384"
# One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
#
# Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
# also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
# of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
# 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
# "Context size has been exceeded".
#
# They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
# generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
# shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
# to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
# here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
# Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
#
# No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
# its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
# would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
# asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
# kill healthy pods during a long document.
- --parallel
- "1"
# A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
# with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --ubatch-size
+28 -44
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
spec:
replicas: 1
# Same reasoning as llama-server: the startupProbe budget (600s) must stay
# below progressDeadlineSeconds, whose default is also 600 — exactly equal, so
# any cold download that uses most of its budget trips
# KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck on a rollout that is still progressing normally.
progressDeadlineSeconds: 900
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
@@ -46,7 +41,7 @@ spec:
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args:
- --hf-repo
- gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
- Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
# Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
- --embeddings
# A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
@@ -55,41 +50,28 @@ spec:
# One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
# reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
- --alias
- bge-m3
# bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
# Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
# llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
# outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
# trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
# rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
# pooling types were needed.
- qwen3-embedding-0.6b
# Qwen3-Embedding is trained for last-token pooling. Left
# unspecified llama-server takes the GGUF's default, which is not
# visible from outside and would silently produce vectors the model
# was not trained to emit. Set before anything is indexed: changing
# pooling later invalidates every stored embedding.
- --pooling
- cls
- last
- --n-gpu-layers
- "99"
- --threads
- "2"
# Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
# tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
# Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
# llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
# at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
# "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
#
# The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
# a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
# broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
# --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
# run them mismatched, so both are set.
#
# 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
# ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
# 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
# this does not need to find out.
# Paperless chunks documents at 1024 tokens. The defaults are
# batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with --embeddings llama-server
# clamps both down to 512 rather than run them mismatched — below
# the chunk size. Matching both to 1024 fits a whole chunk in one
# pass; 2048 is deliberately avoided, since that is where this
# Vulkan stack fails with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --batch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
- --ubatch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
# Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
- --ctx-size
- "4096"
@@ -109,22 +91,24 @@ spec:
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
# Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
# 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
# well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
# at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
# weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
# same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
# candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
# their model size.
# The weights are only ~600 MiB, but that is not what sets the
# footprint: four slots at 4096 context with a 1024-token micro-batch,
# and Vulkan allocating the iGPU's working set from system RAM where
# it counts against this cgroup.
#
# 4Gi was sized for the earlier 2048 context and 512 micro-batch. Both
# were raised to match Paperless's chunking without raising this, and
# the pod then survived interactive use and was OOMKilled (137) partway
# through the first sustained run — roughly 300 documents in. Indexing
# the archive would have hit it on day one.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 2Gi
memory: 4Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
limits:
cpu: "2"
memory: 8Gi
memory: 10Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
# ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
# model needs, but still sized for a cold download.
@@ -6,5 +6,3 @@ resources:
- embed.yaml
- gate-service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
- wiki-embed.yaml
- wiki-embed-ingress.yaml
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
---
# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by the Deployment's initContainer.
# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away several
# GiB of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
#
# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
# inference time.
#
# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
#
# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
# ReadWriteMany so a second replica or a one-off benchmark Job can mount the
# same weights; the models are read-only at inference time.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
@@ -28,4 +18,4 @@ spec:
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 120Gi
storage: 40Gi
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
---
# wiki-embed.renner.uno — LAN-only (no dns.renner.uno/public label), consumed by
# bin/wiki_rank.py on the workstation and the nightly wiki jobs. Machine client,
# so Traefik BasicAuth instead of the browser-only Authentik gate; same pattern
# as kubernetes/apps/monitoring/loki-ingress.yaml.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: wiki-embed-basic-auth
namespace: ai
spec:
basicAuth:
secret: wiki-embed-basic-auth
realm: wiki-embed
---
# OpenBao key apps/ai/wiki-embed-basic-auth, field `users` = htpasswd line.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: wiki-embed-basic-auth
namespace: ai
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: wiki-embed-basic-auth
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/ai/wiki-embed-basic-auth
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: wiki-embed
namespace: ai
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: ai-wiki-embed-basic-auth@kubernetescrd
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
tls:
- hosts:
- wiki-embed.renner.uno
secretName: wiki-embed-tls
rules:
- host: wiki-embed.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: wiki-embed
port:
number: 8080
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
---
# Embedding endpoint for the ~/Notes wiki ranker (bin/wiki_rank.py). Own
# Deployment so wiki traffic never queues behind Paperless on llama-embed.
# Same model and PVC as llama-embed, so no second download.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: wiki-embed
namespace: ai
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki-embed
spec:
replicas: 1
# Above the 600s startupProbe budget; see embed.yaml.
progressDeadlineSeconds: 900
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki-embed
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki-embed
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: wiki-embed
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args:
- --hf-repo
- gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
- --embeddings
- --alias
- bge-m3
# bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling; the GGUF default is not.
- --pooling
- cls
- --n-gpu-layers
- "99"
- --threads
- "2"
# wiki_rank.py caps each note at 1500 chars and sends 2 per request.
- --batch-size
- "1536"
- --ubatch-size
- "1536"
- --ctx-size
- "4096"
- --no-webui
env:
- name: LLAMA_CACHE
value: /models
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8080
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
# Same sizing as llama-embed: 1.6 GiB measured peak, headroom for slots.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 2Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
limits:
cpu: "2"
memory: 8Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 60
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: http
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 6
volumeMounts:
- name: models
mountPath: /models
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llama-server-models
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: wiki-embed
namespace: ai
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki-embed
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki-embed
ports:
- name: http
port: 8080
targetPort: http

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