fix(wordpress): route the outpost OAuth path so the gate is a gate, not a dead end

Verified against the deployed cluster: GET /wp-admin/ correctly 302s to https://www.renner.uno/outpost.goauthentik.io/start?rd=... — and that URL returned WordPress's 404 page, because /outpost.goauthentik.io fell through to the public '/' prefix router. The effect was that /wp-admin was unreachable rather than protected. An attacker gains nothing, but neither does the editor the gate exists for. paperless needs the same route and solves it with a separate Ingress on auth.renner.uno (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml). Here the whole flow stays on www.renner.uno, so the path belongs in this rule set. These endpoints are the login flow itself and are served by the outpost, so routing them to it is not an authentication hole. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
Merge pull request 'fix(wordpress): remove add_filter from wp-config, route xmlrpc through the gate' (#493 ) from fix-wordpress-config-extra into master
2026-08-16 22:22:25 +02:00 · 2026-08-16 20:13:31 +00:00 · 2026-08-16 22:11:25 +02:00 · 2026-08-16 20:07:03 +00:00 · 2026-08-16 22:01:01 +02:00 · 2026-08-16 21:48:49 +02:00
28 changed files with 1248 additions and 75 deletions
@@ -1326,7 +1326,121 @@ data:
          name: Caddy docs.renner.uno
        state: absent

-  # Passkey-only (WebAuthn) login for selected apps, in two parts:
+      # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+      # wordpress-gate — www.renner.uno
+      #
+      # Unlike every other gate here, this one does NOT front a whole
+      # host. www.renner.uno is a public family blog; only /wp-admin and
+      # /wp-login.php are routed to this outpost (see
+      # kubernetes/apps/wordpress/ingress.yaml). The front end never
+      # touches it.
+      #
+      # The reverse carve-out — gate everything, skip_path_regex the
+      # public parts, as paperless-gate does for /static/ — is not
+      # possible here: the public set is every post URL, so the pattern
+      # would need a negative lookahead and the outpost's RE2 has none.
+      - id: wordpress-authors-group
+        model: authentik_core.group
+        identifiers:
+          name: WordPress Authors
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          is_superuser: false
+          # Git owns membership, as with the other gates: this group is the
+          # explicit allowlist for who may publish on www.renner.uno.
+          # Add/remove members HERE, not in the UI — blueprint apply is
+          # authoritative for this M2M and reverts UI edits.
+          #
+          # s.renner is the Authentik account for the site's WordPress
+          # Editor, which still carries the pre-2019 login `s.birzer` — the
+          # two names do not match, and that is expected.
+          users:
+            - !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
+            - !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, s.renner]]
+
+      - id: wordpress-gate-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
+        identifiers:
+          name: wordpress-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          mode: proxy
+          internal_host: http://wordpress.wordpress.svc.cluster.local
+          internal_host_ssl_validation: false
+          external_host: https://www.renner.uno
+          cookie_domain: renner.uno
+          access_token_validity: hours=24
+          refresh_token_validity: days=30
+          intercept_header_auth: true
+          # No skip_path_regex: wp-admin's assets are only ever fetched by an
+          # already-authenticated session, and wp-admin has no manifest or
+          # service worker — the credentials:'omit' PWA problem that forced
+          # carve-outs on vscode-gate and retired music-assistant-gate does
+          # not arise here.
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: wordpress-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: WordPress (Gate)
+          slug: wordpress-gate
+          provider: !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://www.renner.uno/wp-admin/
+          meta_description: "Forward-auth gate in front of wp-admin on www.renner.uno"
+
+      # Only WordPress Authors pass the gate — see the group above for the
+      # membership list. Both accounts that exist on the migrated site are
+      # covered, so the gate cannot lock out the editor the site is
+      # currently being kept alive for.
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, wordpress-gate]]
+          group: !KeyOf wordpress-authors-group
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false
+
+      - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
+        identifiers:
+          name: wordpress-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          type: proxy
+          service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
+          providers:
+            - !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
+          config:
+            log_level: info
+            authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
+            authentik_host_insecure: false
+            authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
+            refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
+            container_image: null
+            object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
+            kubernetes_namespace: authentik
+            kubernetes_replicas: 1
+            kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
+            kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
+            kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
+            kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
+            kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
+            kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
+            kubernetes_json_patches: null
+
+  # Passkey login for selected apps. Passkey is mandatory for accounts
+  # that hold one and unavailable to accounts that do not, so both flows
+  # branch on enrollment (policy passkey-user-has-webauthn): enrolled →
+  # WebAuthn, not enrolled → password + MFA. Enrollment status is a
+  # property of the identified account, so the weaker branch is never
+  # something a requester can select.
+  #
+  # Two parts:
  #
  # 1. A passwordless AUTHENTICATION flow (username → passkey, no
  #    password prompt) bound per-provider, so fresh logins to these
@@ -1335,7 +1449,13 @@ data:
  # 2. A step-up AUTHORIZATION flow — unlike the authentication flow,
  #    this runs on EVERY interactive authorize, so an existing
  #    password-only SSO session from another app cannot slip into
-  #    these apps without presenting a passkey.
+  #    these apps without presenting a passkey. Two things narrow that:
+  #    the stage is skipped outright for accounts with no passkey (they
+  #    have no way to satisfy it), and last_auth_threshold reduces it to
+  #    "without presenting a passkey in this browser within the window"
+  #    — one touch then covers every app, including a later
+  #    password-only session for the same user. The cookie is keyed to
+  #    that user's device, so it never carries across users.
  passkey-stepup.yaml: |
    version: 1
    metadata:
@@ -1356,43 +1476,99 @@ data:
          # flow this replaces.
          authentication: require_authenticated

-      - id: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
+      # ONE stage object, shared by the step-up authorization flow and
+      # the passwordless authentication flow below.
+      #
+      # `last_auth_threshold` is enforced with a single browser cookie
+      # (`authentik_mfa`) whose JWT is both signed with and carries the
+      # stage's PK, so a validation stage only ever honours a cookie it
+      # wrote itself. Two separate stage objects therefore each demand
+      # their own touch, and — sharing the one cookie name — overwrite
+      # each other, so neither window survives. Sharing this object is
+      # what lets the login touch satisfy the per-app step-up.
+      #
+      # Declared here, ahead of every !KeyOf reference to it: the
+      # blueprint importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
+      - id: passkey-webauthn-validation
        model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
        identifiers:
-          name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
+          name: passkey-webauthn-validation
        state: present
        attrs:
          device_classes:
            - webauthn
-          # `configure`, not `deny`: g.renner has Home Assistant access
-          # but no enrolled WebAuthn device (live check 2026-07-07), so
-          # a hard deny would lock her out with no self-service path.
-          # `configure` injects the default WebAuthn enrollment stage
-          # inline — first login without a passkey becomes "enroll one
-          # now, then validate it". Still passkey-only: there is no way
-          # through this stage without a WebAuthn credential.
-          not_configured_action: configure
-          configuration_stages:
-            - !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_webauthn.authenticatorwebauthnstage, [name, default-authenticator-webauthn-setup]]
-          # Skip re-validation if a passkey was already presented within
-          # the window. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) no double-touch
-          # when the login itself used a passkey seconds earlier;
-          # (2) NetBird's dashboard silently re-authorizes via
-          # /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry — a flow that
-          # always demands interaction would fail those and force a
-          # visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
+          # `deny`, not `configure`: the authentication flow reaches this
+          # stage with the user merely *identified* (a typed username)
+          # and no password stage in front of it, so inline enrollment
+          # would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
+          # their own passkey and take over that account. The policy
+          # binding means only accounts that already hold a passkey reach
+          # this stage at all, so `deny` is defence in depth rather than
+          # a path anyone walks — accounts without one branch to password
+          # + MFA instead.
+          not_configured_action: deny
+          # Window within which an already-presented passkey satisfies a
+          # later run of this stage. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) the
+          # per-app step-up must not demand a second touch seconds after
+          # the login touch; (2) NetBird's dashboard silently
+          # re-authorizes via /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry —
+          # a stage that always demands interaction fails those and
+          # forces a visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
+          #
+          # The cookie is browser-scoped, so inside the window a re-login
+          # in that same browser is satisfied by the cookie alone and the
+          # username is all that gets typed. Accepted for a single touch
+          # per app.
          last_auth_threshold: hours=8
          webauthn_user_verification: preferred

-      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+      # Gate on "this account has a passkey", so enrollment status picks
+      # the branch. Enrolled accounts must use WebAuthn — at login and at
+      # every authorize — while accounts with no passkey fall back to
+      # password + MFA. An attacker cannot pick the weaker branch: the
+      # user is already identified when this runs, so the branch follows
+      # the victim's enrollment, not the requester's choice.
+      #
+      # request.user is the flow's pending_user, not the (anonymous)
+      # requester: ReevaluateMarker builds the engine with
+      # plan.context[PLAN_CONTEXT_PENDING_USER] (flows/markers.py). That
+      # requires the bindings below to keep evaluate_on_plan false and
+      # re_evaluate_policies true — on-plan evaluation happens before the
+      # identification stage has resolved a user.
+      - id: policy-has-passkey
+        model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
+        identifiers:
+          name: passkey-user-has-webauthn
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          expression: |
+            return ak_user_has_authenticator(request.user, "webauthn")
+
+      - id: binding-stepup-webauthn
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
          target: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
-          stage: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
+          stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
          order: 10
        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
+          target: !KeyOf binding-stepup-webauthn
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false

      # Passwordless authentication flow: identification (username or
-      # email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login.
+      # email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login, with a
+      # password + MFA branch for accounts that have no passkey.
      - id: passkey-passwordless-flow
        model: authentik_flows.flow
        identifiers:
@@ -1403,37 +1579,6 @@ data:
          title: "Sign in with your passkey"
          designation: authentication

-      # SEPARATE stage from the step-up one, and deliberately `deny`:
-      # at this point in an authentication flow the user has only been
-      # *identified* (typed a username), not authenticated — `configure`
-      # here would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
-      # their own passkey and take over that account. Inline enrollment
-      # for passkey-less users happens exclusively in the authorization
-      # step-up stage above, where require_authenticated guarantees a
-      # fully authenticated session. A passkey-less user therefore
-      # bootstraps via password login on auth.renner.uno, then gets the
-      # enrollment prompt on first app access.
-      #
-      # Declared BEFORE the identification stage because the latter
-      # references it via !KeyOf (webauthn_stage), and the blueprint
-      # importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
-      - id: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
-        model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
-        identifiers:
-          name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          device_classes:
-            - webauthn
-          not_configured_action: deny
-          # Small non-zero window so a passkey presented via the
-          # identification stage's autofill (webauthn_stage below) is
-          # not challenged a second time by this stage at order 20 in
-          # the same flow run. The skip is session-scoped, so a fresh
-          # (attacker) session never inherits it.
-          last_auth_threshold: minutes=5
-          webauthn_user_verification: preferred
-
      # webauthn_stage enables passkey autofill (conditional WebAuthn,
      # authentik >= 2025.12): the browser offers enrolled passkeys in
      # the username field's autofill — one tap, no username typed.
@@ -1449,7 +1594,7 @@ data:
          user_fields:
            - username
            - email
-          webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
+          webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation

      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
@@ -1458,12 +1603,87 @@ data:
          order: 10
        state: present

-      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+      # Order 20 and 21/22 are the two mutually exclusive branches.
+      - id: binding-passwordless-webauthn
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
          target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
-          stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
+          stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
          order: 20
        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
+          target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-webauthn
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false
+
+      # The negated branch. failure_result: true is the safety net — the
+      # UserLoginStage defaults a missing authentication backend to
+      # BACKEND_INBUILT instead of refusing (user_login/stage.py), so a
+      # flow that drops BOTH branches would log the user in on a typed
+      # username alone. A PolicyException is resolved to failure_result
+      # before negate is applied (policies/process.py), so a broken
+      # expression pulls the password stage IN and degrades everyone to
+      # password + MFA rather than to no factor at all.
+      - id: binding-passwordless-password
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
+          stage: !Find [authentik_stages_password.passwordstage, [name, default-authentication-password]]
+          order: 21
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
+          target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-password
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: true
+          failure_result: true
+
+      # Same MFA validation the default authentication flow runs at its
+      # order 30, so the fallback is not a weaker way into these apps
+      # than auth.renner.uno's own login already is. It carries
+      # not_configured_action: configure, which is safe here and nowhere
+      # else in this flow: the password stage above has established a
+      # first factor by the time it runs, so it doubles as the enrollment
+      # path for accounts holding no authenticator at all.
+      - id: binding-passwordless-mfa
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
+          stage: !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage, [name, default-authentication-mfa-validation]]
+          order: 22
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
+          target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-mfa
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: true
+          failure_result: true

      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
@@ -1577,3 +1797,19 @@ data:
          redirect_uris:
            - url: https://dash.renner.uno/login/generic_oauth
              matching_mode: strict
+
+      # Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
+      # Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the
+      # identification stage's webauthn_stage FK is SET_NULL and is
+      # re-pointed above, so no dangling reference survives. Declared
+      # last: the importer applies entries top-to-bottom inside one
+      # transaction, so the replacements exist before these go.
+      - model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
+        identifiers:
+          name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
+        state: absent
+
+      - model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
+        identifiers:
+          name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
+        state: absent
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ resources:
  - zone-configurator-gate-egress.yaml
  - alertmanager-gate-egress.yaml
  - prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
+  - wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
  - outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+---
+# Allow the dedicated wordpress-gate outpost to egress into the wordpress
+# namespace and reach WordPress (:80). Without this, the authentik-namespace
+# baseline CNP has no egress rule to wordpress, so the gate outpost's
+# forwarded requests are dropped. Scoped to the gate outpost's pod label so no
+# other authentik component can reach it. Mirrors esphome-gate-egress.yaml.
+#
+# Note this gate only ever sees /wp-admin and /wp-login.php — the public site
+# is routed straight to the same Service by a separate Ingress, so this rule
+# is not the only path into the wordpress namespace, unlike the paperless case.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-gate-egress
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "80"
+              protocol: TCP
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
      # gets the heavy HA pod (8Gi) off the soon-to-be-tiny edge box.
      containers:
        - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -17,7 +17,33 @@ spec:
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: ical-proxy
-          image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:latest
+          # Pinned to a commit build rather than :latest.
+          #
+          # :latest never rolls. The tag moves when a build publishes, but
+          # nothing tells the Deployment about it: the pod template is
+          # unchanged, so Kubernetes has no reason to replace anything, and
+          # this image is deliberately NOT enrolled in Flux image automation
+          # — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md, which
+          # lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest,
+          # and main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so there is no
+          # ImagePolicy watching it. The pods therefore sat on a 21-day-old
+          # image while :latest moved underneath them, and the only way to
+          # pick up a new build was a manual restart.
+          #
+          # A pinned tag makes the rollout a git change: Flux applies the new
+          # pod template and Kubernetes rolls it, which is also what makes
+          # what is RUNNING recoverable from this repo rather than "whatever
+          # :latest meant the last time a pod happened to restart".
+          #
+          # main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds
+          # the summary_match/summary_replace parameters this deployment
+          # needs to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach"
+          # from every waste collection.
+          #
+          # Bumping this is a manual, reviewed edit. The tag format is
+          # main-<short-sha> (docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
+          # as prefix).
+          image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:main-99a912b
          ports:
            - containerPort: 8080
              name: http
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gotenberg
-          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.35.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
+          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
          args:
            - "gotenberg"
            - "--chromium-disable-javascript=true"
@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@ data:
  # The app re-reads schedules.json every 60 s, so edits here take
  # effect without a restart once the init container has rewritten it.
  #
+  # lang is "de", not null. It calls Home Assistant's own
+  # _selectLanguage() for the screenshot session, so the rendered page
+  # is localised by HA rather than by hand. With it left null the
+  # dashboard grew a German weekday array, a German month array and a
+  # fifteen-entry weather-condition dict — reimplementing translations
+  # HA already ships. The instance itself stays language "en"; this
+  # only affects the render session.
+  #
  # model_id is 1 — TRMNL X (name "v2", 1872x1404, 16 colours) — and it
  # is an INTEGER, not a name. Confirmed against the running server:
  # GET /api/screens returns model_id as a number, and upstream's
@@ -60,8 +68,8 @@ data:
        "rotate": null,
        "zoom": 1,
        "wait": null,
-        "theme": "trmnl-eink",
-        "lang": null,
+        "theme": "Graphite E-ink Light",
+        "lang": "de",
        "dark": false,
        "invert": false,
        "timestamp": false,
@@ -107,6 +115,27 @@ metadata:
  namespace: trmnl
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: trmnl-renderer
+  annotations:
+    # BOTH sources need this, and for the same reason: the init
+    # container writes /data/schedules.json ONCE, at pod start. Nothing
+    # re-reads either source afterwards.
+    #
+    # The app re-reads schedules.json every 60s, which makes it look
+    # self-updating — but only the FILE, and the file is only rewritten
+    # by the init container. So a ConfigMap or Secret change lands in
+    # git, updates the object, and the running renderer keeps the old
+    # values indefinitely.
+    #
+    # Both halves were hit repeatedly in practice and each time needed
+    # `kubectl delete pod` by hand: the theme name, the schedule's lang
+    # field, and every re-mint of the BYOS tokens. A fix that depends on
+    # someone remembering to restart a pod is not deployed.
+    #
+    # Named per-resource rather than the blanket
+    # reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching terminus.yaml and
+    # mosquitto-deployment.yaml.
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-schedule
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-secrets
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  # RWO PVC, and two renderers would push conflicting screens for the
@@ -142,9 +171,16 @@ spec:
        # proxy that exchanges a Terminus username+password for these
        # tokens, but that would mean shipping the Terminus PASSWORD
        # into the cluster and doing a network call at every pod start.
-        # Stock Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively
-        # permanent tokens, so they are minted once out of band and kept
-        # in OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
+        # Tokens are therefore minted once out of band and kept in
+        # OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
+        #
+        # That only works because Terminus is configured with
+        # API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see terminus.yaml). It is
+        # NOT, as an earlier version of this comment claimed, because
+        # stock Terminus issues permanent tokens — the stock default is
+        # 1800s, and this deployment demonstrated it by having the
+        # webhook start failing with "expired JWT access token" about
+        # thirty minutes after seeding.
        - name: render-schedule
          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
          command:
@@ -154,13 +190,18 @@ spec:
              set -eu
              # obtained_at is stamped at write time, in MILLISECONDS.
              # It is not cosmetic: the scheduler derives token age from
-              # it, and a literal 0 in the template made the app treat
-              # freshly-minted tokens as ancient and refuse to push —
+              # it, and a literal 0 made the app treat freshly-minted
+              # tokens as ancient and skip the webhook entirely —
              #   "BYOS tokens ... expired beyond the refresh window"
-              # — with no render attempt and no error, just a warning at
-              # startup. Stamping it here is honest enough: stock
-              # Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively
-              # permanent tokens, so age is not load-bearing.
+              #
+              # Stamping it "now" is only safe because Terminus is
+              # configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see
+              # terminus.yaml). Against the 30-minute default it would be
+              # actively harmful: the app would believe a stale token had
+              # 30 fresh minutes left, skip its proactive refresh, and
+              # then be unable to recover, because refreshing requires a
+              # still-valid token. If that setting is ever reverted, this
+              # must become a real mint time carried alongside the tokens.
              jq --arg at "$BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
                 --arg rt "$BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN" \
                 '(.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.access_token) = $at
@@ -18,6 +18,64 @@ data:
  # pool (fd99::/120) and the LAN ULA — without it every IPv6 client,
  # including the device and Traefik, is rate-limited as if it were remote.
  RACK_ATTACK_ALLOWED_SUBNETS: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.1,::1,fc00::/7"
+  # 10 years, against a default of 1800s (30 minutes).
+  #
+  # Documented upstream in doc/configuration.adoc:
+  #   API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD — "The amount of time, in seconds, the JWT
+  #   access token remains valid before needing to refresh your access
+  #   token." Default: 1,800 seconds (30 minutes).
+  # Corroborated on this instance: a token minted here was rejected about
+  # thirty minutes later, i.e. the documented default behaving as written.
+  #
+  # This exists for the renderer, which pushes screens to /api/screens with
+  # a JWT held in OpenBao. At the default period that arrangement cannot
+  # work unattended, and it fails in a way that has no recovery: minting a
+  # replacement token via POST /api/jwt requires a still-VALID access token
+  # in the Authorization header, so once one expires it cannot be refreshed
+  # from itself. Observed exactly that on first deploy —
+  #   [webhook] Webhook failed: 400 {"error":"expired JWT access token"}
+  #   [webhook] BYOS auth: refresh failed (400) {"error":"expired JWT ..."}
+  # — the refresh attempt being rejected by the very expiry it was trying
+  # to repair.
+  #
+  # The renderer's own code assumes "stock Terminus disables session
+  # expiration and issues effectively permanent tokens". That is simply not
+  # true of this deployment, so the assumption is made true here rather
+  # than worked around in the client.
+  #
+  # The trade is deliberate: a long-lived JWT with full Terminus API rights
+  # now sits in OpenBao. Accepted because the alternative was putting the
+  # Terminus account PASSWORD into the cluster so an init container could
+  # mint a short-lived token on every pod start, which is a strictly worse
+  # secret to hold. The token is revocable by rotating the account's
+  # credentials; it grants access only to this LAN-only instance.
+  #
+  # NOTE: the period is fixed at mint time. Changing this does not extend
+  # tokens that already exist — they must be re-minted afterwards.
+  API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD: "315360000"
+  # The OTHER half of the same problem, and the reason the first fix
+  # did not hold. Terminus has TWO independent expiries: the JWT's own
+  # lifetime (above) and the SESSION behind it. Raising only the token
+  # period left the session at its defaults, so pushes kept working for
+  # a while and then failed with
+  #   HTTP 401 {"error":"This session has expired, please login again"}
+  # which is a different error, from a different mechanism, than the
+  # "expired JWT access token" the first fix addressed.
+  #
+  # Documented in doc/configuration.adoc:
+  #   SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED — "Determines if your browser session
+  #   or JWT API token is expired or not." Default: true.
+  #   SESSION_INACTIVITY_LIMIT 1800s, SESSION_LIFETIME_LIMIT 86400s.
+  #
+  # Disabling it is exactly the state the renderer's own code assumes
+  # ("stock Terminus disables session expiration and issues ~100-year
+  # tokens") — an assumption that is false by default and has to be
+  # made true here, same as the token period.
+  #
+  # Same trade as above, and it is the deciding one for an unattended
+  # appliance: a session that expires needs a human with a password to
+  # restore it, and this panel has neither.
+  SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED: "false"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -26,6 +84,20 @@ metadata:
  namespace: trmnl
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
+  annotations:
+    # terminus-config is consumed via envFrom, and env vars are read ONCE at
+    # container start — Kubernetes does not hot-reload them. The ConfigMap is
+    # a plain resource, not a configMapGenerator, so editing it does not
+    # change the pod template hash and Flux will not roll the pods either.
+    # Without this annotation a ConfigMap-only change (such as raising
+    # API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD) applies to git and to the ConfigMap object
+    # while the running app keeps the old value indefinitely — a silent
+    # no-op, with the manifest and reality disagreeing.
+    #
+    # Named per-ConfigMap rather than the blanket `reloader.stakater.com/
+    # auto: "true"`, matching mosquitto-deployment.yaml: enrolling anything
+    # further stays a visible, reviewable edit to this line.
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: terminus-config
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  # RWO PVC shared by both containers in this pod, and APP_SETUP runs
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ spec:
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: whisper
-          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.5.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
+          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
          args:
            - --model=base-int8
            - --language=de
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress
+  namespace: wordpress
+  annotations:
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wordpress-secrets
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    # RWO volume, single writer — the rolling default would deadlock on the
+    # new pod waiting for a volume the old pod still holds.
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        # wp-content must be writable by Apache (www-data, uid/gid 33) for
+        # media uploads and plugin installs.
+        fsGroup: 33
+      containers:
+        - name: wordpress
+          image: wordpress:7.0.4-php8.3-apache
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 80
+          env:
+            # The operator names the base Service after the MariaDB resource;
+            # the CRD's separate primaryService/secondaryService fields are the
+            # suffixed variants for replicated setups, which this is not
+            # (replicas: 1). Not verified against a running cluster — if it is
+            # wrong the pod fails loudly on connect at startup rather than
+            # degrading quietly. Confirm with `kubectl get svc -n wordpress`
+            # on first deploy.
+            - name: WORDPRESS_DB_HOST
+              value: wordpress-mariadb.wordpress.svc.cluster.local:3306
+            - name: WORDPRESS_DB_NAME
+              value: wordpress
+            - name: WORDPRESS_DB_USER
+              value: wordpress
+            - name: WORDPRESS_DB_PASSWORD
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  # Generated by the operator from the MariaDB CR — never
+                  # stored in Git or OpenBao.
+                  name: wordpress-mariadb-app
+                  key: password
+            - name: WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA
+              value: |
+                define('WP_HOME', 'https://www.renner.uno');
+                define('WP_SITEURL', 'https://www.renner.uno');
+                define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
+                /* Traefik terminates TLS; without this WordPress sees plain
+                   HTTP and builds http:// URLs into every page and redirect. */
+                if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO'] === 'https') {
+                    $_SERVER['HTTPS'] = 'on';
+                }
+                /* Core lives in the image, not on the volume — the updater
+                   would only fail against a read-only docroot. Plugin and
+                   theme installs are unaffected. */
+                define('WP_AUTO_UPDATE_CORE', false);
+                /* No add_filter() here. WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA is eval'd inside
+                   wp-config.php, long before wp-settings.php loads the plugin
+                   API, so any add_filter call is a fatal error on every request
+                   — which is exactly what happened on first deploy. xmlrpc is
+                   handled at the ingress instead, by routing /xmlrpc.php
+                   through the Authentik gate. */
+          envFrom:
+            # The eight WordPress salts. Rotating them in OpenBao invalidates
+            # every session — which is the intended lever, not a side effect.
+            - secretRef:
+                name: wordpress-secrets
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: content
+              mountPath: /var/www/html/wp-content
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 10
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 60
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 50m
+              memory: 256Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 768Mi
+      volumes:
+        - name: content
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: wordpress-content
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 80
+      targetPort: http
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# The eight WordPress salts (AUTH_KEY, SECURE_AUTH_KEY, LOGGED_IN_KEY,
+# NONCE_KEY, AUTH_SALT, SECURE_AUTH_SALT, LOGGED_IN_SALT, NONCE_SALT).
+# Expected keys in OpenBao at homelab/apps/wordpress, named exactly as the
+# image's env vars: WORDPRESS_AUTH_KEY, WORDPRESS_SECURE_AUTH_KEY, ...
+#
+# Deliberately NOT carried over from the old wp-config.php: the Hetzner host
+# is being decommissioned and its salts have been sitting on a VM whose
+# neighbour site was compromised this month. New salts cost one logout.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-secrets
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: wordpress-secrets
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: apps/wordpress
+---
+# S3 credentials for the MariaDB Backup.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  dataFrom:
+    # Reuses the paperless copy of the shared Hetzner S3 credentials (identical
+    # ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY / REGION) to avoid seeding a new OpenBao
+    # path for this migration — same approach woodpecker took. FOLLOW-UP: give
+    # wordpress its own seed/wordpress/hetzner-creds path once OpenBao can be
+    # written, and repoint this here (the value is the same, so it's a drop-in
+    # swap).
+    - extract:
+        key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# A plain Ingress cannot point at a Service in another namespace, and the
+# Authentik outposts all live in `authentik`. Same workaround as
+# zone-configurator and paperless: mirror the outpost Service in as an
+# ExternalName.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  type: ExternalName
+  externalName: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
+  ports:
+    - port: 9000
+      targetPort: 9000
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# Two routers on one host. The site itself must stay readable by anyone --
+# it is a family blog -- while the editing surface sits behind Authentik.
+#
+# Why not one gated Ingress with skip_path_regex, the way paperless-gate
+# carves out /static/: that works when the PUBLIC paths are enumerable. Here
+# it is the reverse -- every post URL is public and only two paths are gated
+# -- which would need a negative lookahead. The outpost is Go, and RE2 has no
+# lookahead. So the split happens at the router instead.
+#
+# Traefik orders routers by rule length, so PathPrefix(`/wp-admin`) is
+# evaluated before PathPrefix(`/`); no explicit priority is needed.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress
+  namespace: wordpress
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: www.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: wordpress
+                port:
+                  number: 80
+  tls:
+    - secretName: wordpress-tls
+      hosts:
+        - www.renner.uno
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-admin
+  namespace: wordpress
+  labels:
+    # Same label as the public Ingress on purpose. external-dns-unifi runs
+    # with --label-filter=dns.renner.uno/public!=true, so an unlabelled
+    # Ingress on this host would quietly gain a UDM A-record pointing LAN
+    # clients straight at the Traefik VIP -- a second, unintended path to
+    # the same host that skips the public route entirely.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  # No cert-manager annotation and no tls block: the public Ingress above
+  # already owns the certificate for this host. Declaring it twice would
+  # create two Certificates racing for the same wordpress-tls Secret.
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: www.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          # The outpost's own OAuth leg. Without this the gate is a dead end,
+          # not a gate: hitting /wp-admin redirects to
+          # /outpost.goauthentik.io/start on THIS host, which otherwise falls
+          # through to the public `/` router and lands on WordPress's 404
+          # page — verified exactly that way on first deploy. paperless needs
+          # the same route and has it as a separate Ingress on auth.renner.uno
+          # (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml); here the flow stays
+          # on www.renner.uno, so it belongs in this rule set.
+          #
+          # It is not an authentication hole: these endpoints ARE the login
+          # flow, and the outpost serves them itself.
+          - path: /outpost.goauthentik.io
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
+                port:
+                  number: 9000
+          # Covers admin-ajax.php too. That is only safe because the gift
+          # registry plugin -- the sole thing on this site that ever emitted
+          # an ajaxurl -- is being dropped in the migration. Verified against
+          # the live site: 121 admin-ajax hits in the current log window, not
+          # one of them a 200.
+          - path: /wp-admin
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
+                port:
+                  number: 9000
+          - path: /wp-login.php
+            pathType: Exact
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
+                port:
+                  number: 9000
+          # xmlrpc.php would otherwise be served by the public `/` prefix
+          # router — an earlier version of this file claimed it was "blocked
+          # at the ingress" while nothing blocked it at all. There is no deny
+          # verb in an Ingress, so it goes through the gate instead: anonymous
+          # callers get Authentik, not the XML-RPC endpoint. Nothing on this
+          # site uses it (no Jetpack, no mobile app, no pingbacks worth
+          # keeping), so no legitimate caller is affected.
+          - path: /xmlrpc.php
+            pathType: Exact
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
+                port:
+                  number: 9000
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
+  - mariadb.yaml
+  - pvc.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - gate-service.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# The database for www.renner.uno. Named `wordpress-mariadb`, not `wp-*`:
+# `wp-pg` in the woodpecker namespace is Woodpecker's Postgres, and reusing
+# the prefix for an unrelated engine invites exactly the wrong guess.
+#
+# Mirrors the CNPG convention: the operator lives in `database`, the database
+# resource lives with its consumer (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
+apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
+kind: MariaDB
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-mariadb
+  namespace: wordpress
+  annotations:
+    # Data guard — a Kustomization rebuild must never take the database with it.
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
+spec:
+  # generate: true lets the operator create both Secrets on first reconcile.
+  # Neither password is ever typed by a human or parked in OpenBao, so there
+  # is nothing to rotate by hand and nothing to leak through Git.
+  rootPasswordSecretKeyRef:
+    name: wordpress-mariadb-root
+    key: password
+    generate: true
+  username: wordpress
+  passwordSecretKeyRef:
+    name: wordpress-mariadb-app
+    key: password
+    generate: true
+  database: wordpress
+  port: 3306
+  replicas: 1
+
+  storage:
+    size: 5Gi
+    storageClassName: ceph-block
+  # The source database is 527 KB. 5Gi is not a sizing estimate, it is the
+  # smallest allocation that leaves room for binlogs and a decade of posts.
+
+  myCnf: |
+    [mariadb]
+    bind-address=*
+    default_storage_engine=InnoDB
+    innodb_buffer_pool_size=256M
+    # WordPress writes utf8mb4 throughout; the source dump carries
+    # utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci on every table that survives the migration.
+    character_set_server=utf8mb4
+    collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci
+    max_allowed_packet=64M
+
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      cpu: 100m
+      memory: 512Mi
+    limits:
+      memory: 1Gi
+---
+# Logical backup to Hetzner Object Storage. Velero only captures PVC data,
+# which for a running database is crash-consistent, not transaction-consistent
+# — that is a snapshot, not a backup you would want to restore from.
+apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
+kind: Backup
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-mariadb-backup
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  mariaDbRef:
+    name: wordpress-mariadb
+  schedule:
+    # 02:45, ahead of the Velero window that starts at 03:15.
+    cron: "45 2 * * *"
+    suspend: false
+  maxRetention: 720h # 30d, matching the CNPG ObjectStore retentionPolicy
+  compression: gzip
+  storage:
+    s3:
+      bucket: renner-uno-k8s-mariadb
+      prefix: wordpress
+      endpoint: fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
+      region: fsn1
+      accessKeyIdSecretKeyRef:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
+      secretAccessKeySecretKeyRef:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
+      tls:
+        enabled: true
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Only wp-content is persisted, not the whole docroot. WordPress core comes
+# from the pinned image, so upgrading the site means bumping a tag in Git
+# rather than clicking "update" in wp-admin — which is the entire point of
+# moving off the Hetzner VM, where core was a mutable pile of PHP on disk.
+#
+# Consequence to be aware of: WordPress's own core updater will fail against
+# a read-only core. Plugin and theme installs still work, because those land
+# in wp-content.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-content
+  namespace: wordpress
+  labels:
+    # The Velero Schedule selects ON this label rather than excluding the
+    # database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is merely assumed to set. If
+    # that assumption were wrong the exclusion would fail silently and Velero
+    # would snapshot the live database volume; selecting a label this repo
+    # owns cannot fail that way. Same direction as openbao-daily, which picks
+    # its snapshot PVC by app.kubernetes.io/component.
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+    app.kubernetes.io/component: content
+  annotations:
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  # RWO is sufficient: a single replica with strategy Recreate. ceph-block is
+  # the cluster default; named explicitly so a default change can't silently
+  # move the media library onto another class.
+  storageClassName: ceph-block
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      # The migrated wp-content is 29 MB compressed, 13 MB of it uploads.
+      storage: 10Gi
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ spec:
      kind: HelmRelease
      name: cloudnative-pg # DB operator — seed jobs create databases
      namespace: database
+    - apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
+      kind: HelmRelease
+      name: mariadb-operator # the MySQL half — WordPress can't use CNPG
+      namespace: database
  # decryption block dropped 2026-07-13: no *.sops.yaml left under this
  # path — secrets come from OpenBao via ESO (MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md).
 ---
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  timeout: 15m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/wordpress
+  prune: true
+  dependsOn:
+    # infrastructure gates on the mariadb-operator HelmRelease being Ready,
+    # so the MariaDB CRD exists and has a controller before this applies.
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds
+    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
+  # kstatus has no built-in rule for k8s.mariadb.com resources, so without
+  # this the Kustomization would report Ready the moment the manifests are
+  # accepted — before the database is actually serving. Same reasoning as
+  # the CephCluster expressions in infrastructure.yaml.
+  healthCheckExprs:
+    - apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
+      kind: MariaDB
+      failed: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'False' && c.reason == 'Failed')"
+      current: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'True')"
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ resources:
  - rook-ceph/
  - ceph-csi-drivers/
  - cloudnative-pg/
+  - mariadb-operator/
  - netbird-ingress/
  - netbird-backup/
  - coredns-config/
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# MariaDB operator, for the one workload in this cluster that cannot use
+# CloudNativePG: WordPress. WordPress speaks MySQL natively — the PostgreSQL
+# route would mean pg4wp, an SQL-rewriting shim whose own README lists
+# WordPress 6.5.3 as its newest tested version while renner.uno runs 7.0.4.
+#
+# The charts are OCI artifacts (ghcr.io), so this follows the OCIRepository
+# pattern from infrastructure/spegel rather than the HelmRepository pattern
+# used for CNPG.
+#
+# CRDs ship as a SEPARATE chart that must be installed first — upstream is
+# explicit about the ordering, hence the dependsOn below rather than a single
+# release with crds: CreateReplace.
+apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: OCIRepository
+metadata:
+  name: mariadb-operator-crds
+  namespace: database
+spec:
+  interval: 24h
+  url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator-crds
+  ref:
+    # Calendar versioning: the major is the year. Upstream ships an upgrade
+    # guide with each minor (Helm repo deprecations, registry moves), so the
+    # range is capped at the year boundary instead of the usual open ">=".
+    semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
+---
+apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
+kind: HelmRelease
+metadata:
+  name: mariadb-operator-crds
+  namespace: database
+spec:
+  interval: 30m
+  chartRef:
+    kind: OCIRepository
+    name: mariadb-operator-crds
+    namespace: database
+  install:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+  upgrade:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+---
+apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: OCIRepository
+metadata:
+  name: mariadb-operator
+  namespace: database
+spec:
+  interval: 24h
+  url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator
+  ref:
+    semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
+---
+apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
+kind: HelmRelease
+metadata:
+  name: mariadb-operator
+  namespace: database
+spec:
+  interval: 30m
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: mariadb-operator-crds
+      namespace: database
+  chartRef:
+    kind: OCIRepository
+    name: mariadb-operator
+    namespace: database
+  install:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+  upgrade:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+  values:
+    # The operator watches all namespaces; the MariaDB CR itself lives with
+    # the app in kubernetes/apps/wordpress/, mirroring how CNPG Clusters sit
+    # in their consumer's namespace (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
+    metrics:
+      enabled: false
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - helmrelease.yaml
@@ -151,3 +151,12 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
  name: trmnl
+---
+# WordPress for www.renner.uno, migrated off the Hetzner VM `wordpress-hochzeit`.
+# No privileged label needed: the cluster enforces `baseline`, which permits the
+# official Apache image's root master process binding :80. It does trip the
+# `restricted` audit/warn level — that is expected and not an error.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress
@@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ resources:
  - external-secrets-ns.yaml
  - woodpecker-ci-ns.yaml
  - trmnl-ns.yaml
+  - wordpress-ns.yaml
  - allow-cilium-health.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny-ingress
+  namespace: wordpress
+spec:
+  endpointSelector: {}
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
+    # Unlike paperless, traefik IS allowed here. www.renner.uno is a public
+    # blog: the front end must be reachable without authentication, so the
+    # public router terminates directly in this namespace.
+    #
+    # Be clear about what this does and does not buy: the public/admin split
+    # is enforced by the two Ingress objects' path rules (`/` straight to the
+    # Service, /wp-admin and /wp-login.php to the gate outpost) and by
+    # Authentik — NOT at the network layer. paperless can point a
+    # workload-scoped CNP at its gate because nothing else may reach it;
+    # here traefik must reach the pod directly for every public page, so the
+    # equivalent rule would be a no-op. Anyone auditing this namespace for
+    # defence in depth should know the network layer is not where the admin
+    # surface is protected.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+    # Scoped to the gate outpost rather than the whole authentik namespace:
+    # only that pod has business reaching wp-admin.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
+            goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
+    # The mariadb-operator reconciles the MariaDB CR from the database
+    # namespace — same cross-namespace requirement CNPG consumers have.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
+    - fromEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    # ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
+    # home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 5,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 9,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 10,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 13,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 14,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 15,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 16,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 17,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 18,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 30,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+    # world covers two things WordPress genuinely needs outbound: the
+    # wordpress.org update/plugin API, and the Hetzner Object Storage
+    # endpoint the MariaDB Backup writes to.
+    - toEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+        - world
+    # ICMP — egress mirror.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 5,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 9,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 10,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 13,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 14,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 15,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 16,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 17,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 18,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 30,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -59,3 +59,22 @@ resources:
  - review-bot.yaml
  - claude-oauth.yaml
  - mosquitto-health.yaml
+# NOT ROTATED, deliberately — recorded here because the whole point of this
+# directory is that unrotated credentials should be a visible choice:
+#
+#   homelab/apps/trmnl/renderer → BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN / BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN
+#     Terminus API JWTs used by the e-ink renderer to push screens. Terminus
+#     is configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years
+#     (kubernetes/apps/trmnl/terminus.yaml), so nothing will ever expire
+#     these or prompt a rotation. That is deliberate: the alternative was
+#     holding the Terminus account password in-cluster to mint short-lived
+#     tokens per pod start. There is no rotator because minting requires the
+#     account password, which is exactly what we declined to store.
+#     Rotate BY HAND whenever the Terminus account password changes, by
+#     re-running POST /login and re-seeding both keys.
+#
+#     HA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the same path is a dedicated Home Assistant
+#     long-lived token. `ha-token` mode in secret-rotator already handles
+#     this class (see home-assistant.yaml) — enrolling it is a genuine
+#     follow-up, not a limitation, and would leave only the BYOS pair
+#     unrotated.
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ spec:
        - paperless
        - trmnl
        - velero
+        - wordpress
  provider:
    vault: # ESO's provider name; speaks OpenBao fine
      server: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
@@ -312,3 +312,38 @@ spec:
      matchExpressions:
        - key: cnpg.io/cluster
          operator: DoesNotExist
+---
+apiVersion: velero.io/v1
+kind: Schedule
+metadata:
+  name: wordpress-daily
+  namespace: velero
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
+spec:
+  # Daily at 08:45 local (next free stagger slot after trmnl-daily at 08:15).
+  # Covers the wordpress-content PVC: the media library and any plugins or
+  # themes installed through wp-admin. WordPress core is not in here — it
+  # comes from the pinned image, so Git is its backup.
+  schedule: "45 8 * * *"
+  useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
+  template:
+    includedNamespaces:
+      - wordpress
+    includedResources:
+      - persistentvolumeclaims
+    storageLocation: default
+    ttl: 720h0m0s
+    snapshotMoveData: true
+    # Selects the content PVC by a label this repo sets, rather than
+    # excluding the database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is assumed to
+    # set — an exclusion built on a wrong assumption fails silently and
+    # sweeps the live database volume in. A crash-consistent snapshot of a
+    # running database is not a restorable backup; the operator's own Backup
+    # resource takes a logical dump to Hetzner Object Storage at 02:45, the
+    # same division of labour as CNPG/Barman elsewhere in this file.
+    # openbao-daily picks its PVC the same way.
+    labelSelector:
+      matchLabels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
+        app.kubernetes.io/component: content
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ locals {
    "renner-uno-k8s-velero",  # Velero PVC backups (Kopia data mover)
    "renner-uno-k8s-secrets", # SOPS talosconfig/kubeconfig for cluster bootstrap
    "renner-uno-tfstate",     # OpenTofu remote state (migrated off the nas-1 Garage S3)
+    "renner-uno-k8s-mariadb", # mariadb-operator logical dumps (wordpress-mariadb)
  ]
 }

@@ -95,8 +96,9 @@ locals {
  # precedent in this repo — left uncapped (keep every version) since
  # storage cost there is negligible.
  hetzner_buckets_noncurrent_expiry_days = {
-    "renner-uno-k8s-cnpg"   = 30
-    "renner-uno-k8s-velero" = 30
+    "renner-uno-k8s-cnpg"    = 30
+    "renner-uno-k8s-velero"  = 30
+    "renner-uno-k8s-mariadb" = 30 # Backup maxRetention: 720h (kubernetes/apps/wordpress/mariadb.yaml)
  }
 }