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claude-bot 57acf5d8f2 fix(ceph): set mon_data_avail_warn to 20%, matching the shared /var
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Addresses #434.

Ceph's 30% default assumes the mon owns its filesystem, where 30% free is
a real reserve. Our mons sit on dataDirHostPath /var/lib/rook — the node's
/var, shared with ~29 GB of containerd storage — and the mon DB is ~106 MB.
The default therefore measures container churn rather than Ceph state, and
k8s-2 trips MON_DISK_LOW whenever its image cache fills.

Tuning image GC does not help: measured on k8s-2, dropping the GC high
threshold to 60 deleted 28 images and moved free space by 0.02 percentage
points, because most of /var/lib/containerd is overlayfs snapshots held by
running containers, which image GC cannot reclaim.

20% of a 60 GB /var still leaves ~12 GB behind a 106 MB database.
mon_data_avail_crit is untouched at 5%, and CephMonDiskLow watches /var
directly for the real risk — the node filling, not the mon growing.

Set through cephConfig so it is reconciled from git rather than applied as
a live `ceph config set`.

The comment records that this override should be revisited, and dropped,
when mons get their own volume at bare-metal migration. That is not
possible on the current cluster: every StorageClass is Ceph-backed, so a
mon PVC would be circular, and Rook applies mon.volumeClaimTemplate only
to newly created mons.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-18 21:41:02 +02:00
k.renner 2337aa16e7 Merge pull request 'feat(ceph): add the toolbox, move image GC off Ceph's warn line, alert on health' (#500) from fix-ceph-toolbox-and-gc-thresholds into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#500
2026-08-18 19:27:30 +00:00
claude-bot 16360aacf9 feat(ceph): add the toolbox, move image GC off Ceph's warn line, alert
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Addresses #434.

Gap 2 — no admin path. There is still no rook-ceph-tools deployment, so
ceph status, ceph health detail, ceph osd df tree, ceph osd perf and ceph
device ls are all unreachable during an incident: mons, OSDs and mgr
mount no admin keyring and the operator's /etc/ceph is empty. Adds the
upstream toolbox from rook v1.20.4 (matching the running operator image)
with the image pinned to the cluster's own quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.5 and
carrying the same imagepolicy marker as cephcluster.yaml, so the client
cannot drift ahead of the mons. Prerequisites verified present: the
rook-ceph-default ServiceAccount, the rook-ceph-mon-endpoints ConfigMap,
and ceph-secret/ceph-username in the rook-ceph-mon secret.

Image GC. The thresholds were already lowered once from the kubelet
defaults, to 70/60, explicitly to stay under Ceph's mon_data_avail_warn.
But that line is <=30% free and a high of 70 fires at exactly 30% free —
on the threshold, not below it. So the cache fills to precisely the point
where the mon warns, and MON_DISK_LOW trips before kubelet reclaims
anything. Observed on k8s-2: 29.81% free and HEALTH_WARN MON_DISK_LOW,
clearing to 31.64% once GC ran. 60/50 fires at 40% free and reclaims to
50%, leaving 10 points of margin.

There is plenty to reclaim, so the lower threshold will bite: containerd
holds ~29 GB of k8s-2's 60 GB /var and caches 179 images against 60 in
use, some dating to May. (The ~309 GB talosctl attributes to
/var/lib/kubelet is mounted Ceph PVCs counted through mount points, not
local disk.)

Alerting, the follow-up #434 parked until ceph_* series existed — they do
now, via #432. CephHealthWarn deliberately waits 6h: Ceph warns for
self-clearing conditions and paging on those teaches people to ignore it,
so what is worth waking for is a warning that does not clear.
CephHealthError fires at 5m. CephMonDiskLow watches /var free directly
rather than going through Ceph, because this fires for a full image cache
rather than for Ceph growth, and naming that keeps the next person from
debugging the wrong subsystem.

NOTE: cluster.yaml is a bootstrap patch. Merging changes nothing on
running nodes — the live kubelet value needs talosctl patch machineconfig.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-18 21:06:43 +02:00
k.renner bb136e30b3 Merge pull request 'chore(dns): drop the stale UDM records pointing at the retired Hetzner VM' (#497) from drop-stale-hetzner-dns into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#497
2026-08-16 21:15:06 +00:00
k.renner 9a1f6cce0c Merge pull request 'fix(cilium): stop the endpoint policy map filling — trim ICMP set, limit identity labels, size + alert' (#495) from fix-cilium-policy-map-exhaustion into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#495
2026-08-16 21:14:08 +00:00
claude-bot 25c8c806b4 fix(cilium): cut policy map demand at the source, not just the ceiling
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The earlier commits in this branch raised policyMapMax and added an alert.
Neither addresses why the map fills. This does.

Measured on k8s-1 with cilium-dbg: 8 endpoint policy maps sit at exactly
16384 entries — full — and the rest cluster at ~8,500. The split tracks
policy direction, so one direction costs ~8,500 entries. Dumping velero's
endpoint 2328 (8,499 entries, ingress only) shows 217 identities x 39
port/proto values, of which 38 are ICMP types. The map is ~99% ICMP, and
3,744 of its entries (44%) belong to woodpecker-ci-step identities.

Two multiplying causes, both fixed here.

The ICMP rule in every default-deny-ingress allowed 39 enumerated types
from `namespace: Exists` — every identity in the cluster. Cilium expands
that to one entry per (identity, type), per endpoint, per direction, in
19 namespaces. The rule's own comment records it was widened "from the
error class to the full standard type set"; that widening is the cost.
Trimmed to 16: the error types that motivated the rule (v4 3/11/12, v6
1/2/3/4 — PMTUD is the documented need), echo, and the IPv6 ND/RA/MLDv2
types observed in flight via Hubble (133, 135, 143). Dropped types are
deprecated (v4 4 Source Quench, RFC 6633), router-only (v4 5, v6 137),
obsolete (v4 13-18, 30), superseded (v6 130-132 by 143), or never
deployed (v6 138, 141/142, 148/149, 151-153). openbao-ns.yaml already
runs an error-only set of 7 in production, so 16 is the conservative side
of existing practice.

Cilium had no `labels` filter, so identity came from all pod labels.
Woodpecker stamps each step pod with woodpecker-ci.org/task-uuid and
step=<name>, making every build step its own security identity — 96 of
them minted in the last hour, against zero pods in the namespace. The GC
is healthy and simply outpaced. Excluding those two label patterns
collapses 78 current identities to one. No CiliumNetworkPolicy selects on
them, so they bought churn and nothing else.

Together these take a direction from ~8,500 entries to roughly 140
identities x 17 values ~= 2,400 — about 4,800 for both directions, well
inside even the old 16384 ceiling. policyMapMax stays raised as headroom,
not as the fix.

Per Cilium's docs, existing identities are not recomputed by a `labels`
change; new ones use the filter and the old ones age out through normal
GC, so the map drains over roughly an hour rather than instantly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-16 23:08:26 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 0211269b91 chore(dns): drop the stale UDM records pointing at the retired Hetzner VM
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renner.uno and www.renner.uno were pinned to 159.69.42.237, the VM that hosted
WordPress before it moved into the cluster. Neither record is live on the UDM
any more (verified: a LAN query for www.renner.uno returns the public answer,
proxy.renner.uno), so the file was drift waiting to be re-applied — a tofu
apply would have pointed the house at a host that is being decommissioned,
while the rest of the world already reaches the cluster.

Their absence is the correct end state, not an omission: www.renner.uno
carries dns.renner.uno/public, so external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record by
design and LAN clients take the public path and hairpin back in. The apex
stays with Cloudflare, which now redirects renner.uno/* to www.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:43:42 +02:00
claude-bot 9371f188b6 docs(cilium): state the alert's map scope and complete the lockstep refs
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Two optional points from the second review on #495.

The PrometheusRule alerts on cilium_bpf_map_pressure without filtering on
map_name, so it covers conntrack, NAT and LB maps as well as the policy
map. That is intended — running out of any of them degrades the datapath
— but the PR is framed around the policy map, so a reader could take the
narrow reading. Say so in the file.

The cross-references between the three copies of bpf-policy-map-max were
one-directional: helmrelease.yaml and patches/cilium-cni.yaml each named
only one other site, while talos/cilium.yaml named both. Each now names
the other two.

Not taken: the suggestion to quote policyMapMax as "65536". The chart
declares it `type: [null, integer]` in its values schema
(helm show values cilium --version 1.20.0), so an integer is correct and
a quoted string would be the schema violation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-16 22:41:42 +02:00
claude-bot 621e4e25bf fix(cilium): carry policyMapMax into the bootstrap inline manifest
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Addresses the blocking review finding on #495.

Raising bpf.policyMapMax only in the HelmRelease left the bootstrap path
on the old value. kubernetes/bootstrap.sh:126 passes
kubernetes/talos/patches/cilium-cni.yaml to talosctl apply-config for
every node, and that manifest hardcoded bpf-policy-map-max: "16384" — so
a cold rebuild would install Cilium with the map size this PR exists to
fix, and stay there until Flux reconciled the HelmRelease.

The sibling bpf-lb-map-max is "65536" in both files, matching the live
agent config, so keeping these in sync is the repo's existing practice.

kubernetes/talos/cilium.yaml carries the same key and is updated too.
Nothing in the repo references that file — only patches/cilium-cni.yaml
is used by bootstrap.sh — so it looks like an orphaned rendered snapshot.
Syncing it rather than deleting it: whether it should exist at all is a
separate question from this fix.

Each of the three sites now names the others, so the next change to this
value has the lockstep written down where someone will hit it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-16 22:36:35 +02:00
k.renner fe75b912f5 Merge pull request 'chore(ci): bump all ci-k8s pipeline pins to 2026-08-10' (#496) from bump-ci-k8s-pins into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#496
2026-08-16 20:34:16 +00:00
claude-bot 8f45e2901b fix(cilium): size the endpoint policy map and alert before it fills
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Closes #451. Closes #454.

Both issues are the same fault: a pod's dedicated cilium_policy_v3_<id>
BPF map ran out of space, endpoint regeneration failed with "no space
left on device", the CNI ADD call never returned, and the pod sat in
sandbox creation. For paperless — replicas: 1 with strategy Recreate —
that was a 41-minute outage on 2026-07-30.

It is not over. Prometheus (metrics landed via #452) puts
cilium_bpf_map_pressure{map_name="cilium_policy_v3_*"} at 0.867 on all
three nodes right now, and max_over_time(...[30d]) at 1.03 — the map has
been driven past capacity. Loki has the overflow recurring as recently
as 2026-08-12 17:46Z, hitting authentik and esphome endpoints.

Three changes:

- bpf.policyMapMax 16384 (chart default) -> 65536, matching the cluster's
  existing bpf-lb-map-max. Takes steady-state pressure from ~87% to ~22%.
  The map is sized at creation, so this only takes effect as agents
  restart.
- The chart range ">=1.19.0" is what let Flux take 1.19.6 -> 1.20.0
  unattended 45 minutes before the first outage. Narrowed to
  ">=1.20.0 <1.21.0" so a CNI minor is a reviewed diff, not a surprise.
- A PrometheusRule on cilium_bpf_map_pressure: warning over 80% for 15m,
  critical at 100%. The metric was already scraped but nothing alerted on
  it, so the first signal was a downstream replica mismatch.

Not addressed: why the busiest endpoint needs ~14k entries. Only 178
CiliumIdentities exist and no CiliumNetworkPolicy declares more than 9
ports, so the entry count is not obviously explained by policy shape.
Establishing that needs `cilium-dbg bpf policy get` on an agent.

MERGING THIS ROLLS THE CNI. The DaemonSet uses
updateStrategy.rollingUpdate.maxUnavailable: 2, so two of three agents
restart at once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-16 22:28:20 +02:00
k.renner d9b4c47cf2 Merge pull request 'fix(wordpress): route the outpost OAuth path so the gate is a gate, not a dead end' (#494) from fix-outpost-callback-path into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#494
2026-08-16 20:24:09 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 fb3724f603 fix(wordpress): route the outpost OAuth path so the gate is a gate, not a dead end
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Verified against the deployed cluster: GET /wp-admin/ correctly 302s to
https://www.renner.uno/outpost.goauthentik.io/start?rd=... — and that URL
returned WordPress's 404 page, because /outpost.goauthentik.io fell through to
the public '/' prefix router.

The effect was that /wp-admin was unreachable rather than protected. An
attacker gains nothing, but neither does the editor the gate exists for.

paperless needs the same route and solves it with a separate Ingress on
auth.renner.uno (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml). Here the whole
flow stays on www.renner.uno, so the path belongs in this rule set.

These endpoints are the login flow itself and are served by the outpost, so
routing them to it is not an authentication hole.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:22:25 +02:00
claude-bot 632e092363 chore(ci): bump all ci-k8s pipeline pins to 2026-08-10
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Closes #461.

Five pipeline steps pinned ci-k8s at two stale tags: e2e-test.yml,
e2e.yml, alert-monitor.yml and issue-fix.yml at 2026-05-01, and
ci-manifests-test.yml at 2026-07-30. 2026-08-10 is the newest dated tag
in gitea_admin/ci-k8s and shares a digest with :latest
(sha256:0019f264...), so all five now run the same image the build
pipeline last produced.

A stale pin eventually points at a garbage-collected tag, and the split
had no deliberate reason behind it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
2026-08-16 22:21:57 +02:00
k.renner 8d1c4eb7ca Merge pull request 'fix(wordpress): remove add_filter from wp-config, route xmlrpc through the gate' (#493) from fix-wordpress-config-extra into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#493
2026-08-16 20:13:31 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 faf79549ac fix(wordpress): remove add_filter from wp-config, route xmlrpc through the gate
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The first deploy returned 500 on every request:

  PHP Fatal error: Uncaught Error: Call to undefined function add_filter()
  in /var/www/html/wp-config.php(128) : eval()'d code

WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA is eval'd inside wp-config.php, which runs long before
wp-settings.php loads the plugin API. add_filter() does not exist yet at that
point, so the call was fatal on every request.

Removing it exposed the second, worse half: the comment justified the filter by
claiming xmlrpc.php was 'blocked at the ingress'. It was not. The public router
matches '/' as a prefix, so xmlrpc.php was served like any other path — the
claim was written without being checked.

An Ingress has no deny verb, so xmlrpc.php now routes to the Authentik gate
alongside /wp-admin and /wp-login.php: anonymous callers meet Authentik instead
of the XML-RPC endpoint. Nothing on this site uses it — no Jetpack, no mobile
app, no pingbacks worth keeping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:11:25 +02:00
k.renner 5336d9b849 Merge pull request 'feat(wordpress): migrate renner.uno off the Hetzner VM into the cluster' (#492) from wordpress-renner-uno into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#492
2026-08-16 20:07:03 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 aa37fb0a0a fix(wordpress): correct the network-policy claim and make the Velero selector safe
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Addresses the automated review on #492.

Blocking: two comments claimed the public/admin split was kept honest by
kubernetes/apps/wordpress/network-policy.yaml. That file does not exist — the
comment was written against the paperless template and never updated once the
namespace policy proved sufficient. The deeper point in the review is the real
one: a paperless-style workload-scoped policy would be a no-op here, because
traefik must reach the pod directly for every public page. The split is
enforced by the Ingress path rules and Authentik, not at the network layer,
and the comment now says so — an auditor looking for a network control would
otherwise have gone hunting for a file that was never there.

Velero: the schedule excluded the database PVC by app.kubernetes.io/instance,
a label the mariadb-operator was only assumed to set. A wrong assumption there
fails silently and sweeps the live database volume into the snapshot. Inverted
to select the content PVC by labels this repo sets on it, the same direction
openbao-daily already uses.

The Service-name assumption flagged as a suggestion is kept: the CRD's separate
primaryService/secondaryService fields indicate the base Service carries the
resource name, and a mismatch fails loudly at pod startup. Written down as a
first-deploy check rather than left implicit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:01:01 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b784ce3d38 feat(wordpress): host www.renner.uno in the cluster behind an Authentik gate
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Migrates the Hetzner VM 'wordpress-hochzeit' into the cluster. The site is not
the frozen wedding archive it looks like: it carries an unpublished, fully
composed birth announcement from 2026-05-14, so wp-admin has to keep working
for a human author rather than being replaced by a Git workflow.

Split routing on one host: '/' goes straight to WordPress so the blog stays
publicly readable, while /wp-admin and /wp-login.php route through a dedicated
wordpress-gate outpost. The inverse -- gate the host and skip_path_regex the
public paths, as paperless-gate does -- would need a negative lookahead, and
the outpost's RE2 has none.

Gating all of /wp-admin is only safe because the dead wpgiftregistry plugin is
dropped in the migration: it was the sole emitter of ajaxurl on this site, and
of 121 admin-ajax hits in the current log window not one returned 200.

Core lives in the pinned image, not on the volume, so upgrading is a tag bump
in Git. Only wp-content is persisted.

Backups are split the same way CNPG/Barman and Velero are elsewhere: the
operator takes a logical dump to Hetzner Object Storage at 02:45, Velero takes
the wp-content PVC at 08:45 and skips the database volume -- a crash-consistent
snapshot of a running database is not a backup.

Group membership for the gate is owned by Git, as with the Home Assistant,
Shelly and zone-configurator gates. s.renner is the Authentik account for the
site's WordPress Editor, whose login there is still the pre-2019 s.birzer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 21:48:49 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b976a67be8 feat(mariadb): add mariadb-operator and the wordpress backup bucket
WordPress speaks MySQL natively. The PostgreSQL route would mean pg4wp, an
SQL-rewriting shim whose README lists WordPress 6.5.3 as its newest tested
version while renner.uno runs 7.0.4 — every core update would become a
compatibility gamble.

Charts are OCI artifacts, so this follows the OCIRepository pattern from
spegel rather than the HelmRepository pattern used for CNPG. CRDs ship as a
separate chart that upstream requires first, hence the dependsOn. The version
range is capped at the year boundary: the project uses calendar versioning and
ships an upgrade guide with each minor.

renner-uno-k8s-mariadb carries the same 30d noncurrent-version expiry as the
CNPG and Velero buckets, matched to the Backup resource's maxRetention.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 21:48:36 +02:00
k.renner 352f0b5cff Merge pull request 'fix(authentik): one passkey touch per login, password fallback when none enrolled' (#491) from fix-authentik-double-passkey-touch into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#491
2026-08-16 08:22:10 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 803cdb3db8 feat(authentik): fall back to password when no passkey is enrolled
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The passkey apps were reachable only with a WebAuthn credential:
passkey-passwordless-authentication denies at its validation stage, and
passkey-stepup-authorization demands a passkey on every authorize. An
account with no passkey had no way in.

Branch both flows on enrollment with an expression policy,
passkey-user-has-webauthn. Enrolled accounts keep the mandatory passkey
at login and at every authorize. Accounts without one skip the WebAuthn
stage and get default-authentication-password followed by
default-authentication-mfa-validation — the same pair, in the same
order, that default-authentication-flow already runs, so the fallback is
not a weaker way in than auth.renner.uno's own login.

The policy runs against pending_user, so the branch follows the
identified account's enrollment and is not selectable by the requester.
Bindings keep evaluate_on_plan false and re_evaluate_policies true;
on-plan evaluation would run before a user is resolved.

The negated bindings carry failure_result: true. UserLoginStage defaults
a missing authentication backend to BACKEND_INBUILT rather than
refusing, so a flow that dropped both branches would log the user in on
a username alone. A PolicyException resolves to failure_result before
negate is applied, so a broken expression degrades to password + MFA
instead of to no factor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:45:24 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 9e0ffae358 fix(authentik): share one WebAuthn stage across login and step-up
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Every fresh login to a passkey app costs two touches: one in
passkey-passwordless-authentication, a second immediately after in
passkey-stepup-authorization.

last_auth_threshold is enforced with a single browser cookie
(authentik_mfa) whose JWT is signed with, and carries, the validation
stage's PK. A stage only honours a cookie it wrote itself, and both
stages write to the same cookie name — so two stage objects each demand
their own touch and clobber each other's window.

Collapse them into one passkey-webauthn-validation stage bound into both
flows. not_configured_action is deny, since the authentication flow
reaches the stage with the user only identified and no password stage in
front of it. Passkey-less users enroll from user settings after a
password login; default-authenticator-webauthn-setup has a
configure_flow, so that path is live.

The 8h cookie now also covers the login flow, so a re-login in the same
browser inside the window is satisfied by the cookie alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:25:52 +02:00
security-bot 82573754b1 chore(image-automation): bump rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 20:36:17 +00:00
security-bot ba6ca6d0af chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 17:39:04 +00:00
security-bot 9e8c1fa6fe chore(image-automation): bump gotenberg/gotenberg:8.36.0
Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 17:36:16 +00:00
k.renner 7a80df3cfc Merge pull request 'fix(ical-proxy): pin the image so a new build actually rolls' (#490) from pin-ical-proxy-image into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#490
2026-08-13 19:40:58 +00:00
claude-bot a2de5b5f56 fix(ical-proxy): pin the image so a new build actually rolls
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:latest never rolls. The tag moves when a build publishes, but nothing
tells the Deployment: the pod template is unchanged, so Kubernetes has
no reason to replace anything.

Nothing else covers it either. This image is deliberately not enrolled in
Flux image automation — kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md
lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest, and
main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so no ImagePolicy watches it.
The two pods have been running a 21-day-old image while :latest moved
underneath them, and the only way to pick up a new build was a manual
restart, which leaves no record anywhere.

Pinning makes the rollout a git change. Flux applies the new pod
template, Kubernetes rolls it, and what is RUNNING becomes recoverable
from this repo instead of "whatever :latest meant the last time a pod
happened to restart".

main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds the
summary_match and summary_replace parameters. The waste calendar needs
them to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach" from every
collection — the feed repeats the whole calendar's name on each event,
and no consumer can shorten it after the fact.

Bumping this tag is now a manual, reviewed edit. Format is
main-<short-sha>, from docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
as prefix.
2026-08-13 21:38:29 +02:00
k.renner 8573cdf220 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): let Reloader restart the renderer on config and secret changes' (#489) from fix-trmnl-renderer-reloader into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#489
2026-08-12 20:23:03 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 507e86cb83 fix(trmnl): let Reloader restart the renderer on config and secret changes
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The renderer's init container writes /data/schedules.json ONCE, at pod
start, and nothing re-reads either source afterwards. So a ConfigMap or
Secret change lands in git, updates the object, and the running
renderer keeps the old values indefinitely.

The app re-reads schedules.json every 60 seconds, which makes it look
self-updating. It is not — it re-reads the FILE, and only the init
container writes the file.

This was hit three times in practice, each needing `kubectl delete pod`
by hand:

  * switching the theme to Graphite E-ink Light — the pod kept
    rendering with a theme name that no longer existed
  * setting the schedule's lang field to "de"
  * every re-mint of the BYOS tokens, which is the Secret half

The theme case is the instructive one: nothing errored. HA silently
served the default theme for a name that did not resolve, so the panel
just looked wrong, and I was about to debug the design.

Annotates both sources. Named per-resource rather than the blanket
reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching terminus.yaml and
mosquitto-deployment.yaml.

Terminus got this annotation earlier; the renderer did not, despite
having the same init-container pattern and hitting the same failure in
the same session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:22:04 +02:00
k.renner b2ed2beae4 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): render the panel in German via the schedule's lang field' (#488) from fix-trmnl-render-lang into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#488
2026-08-12 20:18:58 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 f8c968c5a7 fix(trmnl): render the panel in German via the schedule's lang field
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lang was null, so the screenshot session rendered in English — and the
dashboard grew a German weekday array, a German month array and a
fifteen-entry weather-condition dict to translate around it by hand.

The field is documented as "UI language code (HA mode only)" and calls
Home Assistant's own _selectLanguage() on the page before capture;
upstream's tests use lang: 'de'. So localisation is HA's job and the
field was sitting in the schedule template, already written out, set to
null because I copied the shape without asking what it did.

Pairs with homeassistant#220, which deletes both hand-written mappings:
the weather badge points at weather.garten directly and the date is a
device_class: timestamp the frontend formats.

The instance stays language "en". This affects only the render session,
so the panel is German without changing anyone's UI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:16:43 +02:00
k.renner 595e5eb7a3 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): disable Terminus session expiry, the other half of the token fix' (#487) from fix-trmnl-session-expiry into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#487
2026-08-12 20:02:38 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 7e293d3de7 fix(trmnl): disable Terminus session expiry, the other half of the token fix
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The renderer stopped pushing and the panel preview froze. Every webhook:

  HTTP 401: Unauthorized - This session has expired, please login again

Terminus has TWO independent expiries and the earlier fix only addressed
one. API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD governs the JWT's own lifetime and is now
10 years. SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED / SESSION_INACTIVITY_LIMIT govern
the SESSION BEHIND that token and were left at their defaults, so a
valid, decade-long token stopped being accepted after about half an
hour of session inactivity.

Worth being precise, because the two look alike and are not: the first
failure was 400 "expired JWT access token", the token itself. This is
401 "This session has expired", the session. Different mechanism,
different error, same symptom — a panel that silently stops updating.

I noticed both expiries when diagnosing the first one, wrote that
Terminus "has two independent expiries", and then fixed one and moved
on. That is the actual mistake here, not the missing variable.

Disabling session expiry is the state the renderer's own code already
assumes ("stock Terminus disables session expiration"), which is false
by default and has to be made true here — the same shape as the token
period. And it is the deciding constraint for an unattended appliance:
a session that expires needs a human with a password to restore it, and
a hallway panel has neither.

Reloader will roll the pod; the ConfigMap annotation added earlier
covers this. Existing tokens must be re-minted afterwards — the current
session is already dead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:01:34 +02:00
k.renner 9423381102 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): point the renderer at Graphite E-ink Light' (#486) from fix-trmnl-graphite-theme into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#486
2026-08-12 19:36:24 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 ae12ce760c fix(trmnl): point the renderer at Graphite E-ink Light
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The renderer's own docs recommend Graphite by name — "Use e-ink theme
(Graphite recommended)", with theme=Graphite in the example — and the
Home Assistant community converges on it independently. The dashboard
now ships graphite-eink-light.yaml (homeassistant repo) in place of the
theme I hand-wrote from a spec sheet.

Pairs with homeassistant#216. The theme name must match the key inside
the vendored file exactly ("Graphite E-ink Light"); a name that does not
resolve fails silently — HA serves the default theme and the panel just
looks wrong rather than erroring.

Note upstream's example also passes `dark`. Not used here: the e-ink
LIGHT variant is the one that gives black-on-white, which is what an
e-paper panel wants. `dark: false` stays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 21:34:55 +02:00
k.renner 641e8bce84 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): make Terminus issue long-lived API tokens' (#485) from fix-trmnl-token-lifetime into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#485
2026-08-12 17:34:47 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 463e493ec0 docs(trmnl): cite the source for API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD
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The setting was treated as an unverified assumption in review, and I
repeated that framing. It was not one.

Upstream's doc/configuration.adoc documents the variable and its
1800-second default in as many words, and this instance corroborated it
empirically: a token minted here was rejected roughly thirty minutes
later, which is the documented default behaving exactly as written.
Documentation plus matching observed behaviour is not an assumption.

The reviewer's uncertainty was reasonable — Terminus's source is not
vendored in this repo, so from the checkout alone the claim is
unsupported. The failing was mine for citing nothing at the point of
use, which is the same gap as the /health probe earlier: the evidence
existed and was not written where a reader could find it. Quotes the
documentation inline so the question is answerable from the manifest.

Note this does not make the post-merge check redundant. Whether Terminus
honours the variable is settled here; whether this ConfigMap edit
actually reached the running process via Reloader is a separate
question, and that is what decoding the new token's exp claim answers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:30:03 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 8031a0ad7a docs(openbao): record the trmnl renderer tokens as deliberately unrotated
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Review's remaining point: with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD at 10 years,
nothing will ever expire the renderer's BYOS token or prompt anyone to
rotate it. Left undocumented, "never rotated" is indistinguishable from
"forgotten".

Records it where it is discoverable — the rotation directory itself,
whose purpose is that unrotated credentials are a visible choice rather
than an omission. Notes why there is no rotator: minting a Terminus JWT
requires the account password, which is precisely the secret this design
declined to hold in-cluster, so a rotator would have to store the thing
the long-lived token exists to avoid. Rotation is therefore manual, tied
to the Terminus account password changing.

Also flags that HA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the same OpenBao path is a different
case: secret-rotator already has an `ha-token` mode (home-assistant.yaml
uses it), so enrolling that one is a real follow-up rather than a
limitation, and doing so would leave only the BYOS pair unrotated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:25:32 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 18c8b74baa fix(trmnl): let Reloader roll terminus on ConfigMap changes
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Review caught that this PR, as it stood, would not have fixed the
outage it describes.

terminus-config is consumed via envFrom, and env vars are read once at
container start — Kubernetes does not hot-reload them. The ConfigMap is
a plain resource rather than a configMapGenerator, so editing it does
not change the pod template hash and Flux will not roll the pods
either. Stakater Reloader is deployed but acts only on annotated
workloads, and this Deployment carried no annotation.

Net effect would have been a silent no-op: git and the ConfigMap object
would show a 10-year token period while the running app kept issuing
30-minute tokens, and the re-mint step in the PR plan would have
produced another short-lived token that looked correct and expired
anyway. The manifest and reality would disagree with nothing to
indicate it.

Annotates for terminus-config specifically rather than the blanket
reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching the reasoning already
recorded on mosquitto-deployment.yaml — enrolling anything further
stays a visible, reviewable edit to that line.

Verified Reloader is actually running (kube-system/reloader-reloader).

This also removes a manual step rather than documenting one, which is
the point: a fix that needs a human to remember `kubectl rollout
restart` is not deployed, it is a runbook entry waiting to be missed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:20:29 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 e84ea02100 fix(trmnl): make Terminus issue long-lived API tokens
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The renderer renders correctly and pushes nothing. Every webhook is
rejected:

  [webhook] Webhook failed: 400 {"error":"expired JWT access token"}
  [webhook] BYOS auth: refresh failed (400) {"error":"expired JWT ..."}

Terminus issues API JWTs with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD, default 1800s.
Minting a replacement via POST /api/jwt requires a still-VALID access
token in the Authorization header, so an expired token cannot refresh
itself — the second line above is the refresh attempt being rejected by
the very expiry it was trying to repair. There is no recovery path once
the window closes.

That makes "mint once, store in OpenBao" unworkable for an unattended
appliance, which is what this stack is. The renderer's own code assumes
"stock Terminus disables session expiration and issues effectively
permanent tokens"; that is not true of this deployment. Rather than work
around the assumption in the client, this makes it true: sets
API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD to 10 years.

The trade is deliberate. A long-lived JWT with full Terminus API rights
now sits in OpenBao. The alternative was putting the Terminus account
PASSWORD into the cluster so an init container could mint a short-lived
token on every pod start — a strictly worse secret to hold, for a
LAN-only service whose token is revocable by rotating the account.

Also corrects the obtained_at comment on the renderer, which justified
stamping "now" by repeating that same false permanence assumption.
Stamping now is safe ONLY because of this setting; against the 30-minute
default it is actively harmful, because the app would believe a stale
token had a fresh window, skip its proactive refresh, and strand itself.
The comment now says so, and says what to do if this setting is reverted.

The period is fixed at mint time, so this does not revive the existing
tokens — they must be re-minted after it deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:15:43 +02:00
k.renner fc53334b31 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): give Chromium a writable HOME and stamp obtained_at' (#484) from fix-trmnl-renderer-runtime into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#484
2026-08-12 17:02:10 +00:00
60 changed files with 1581 additions and 632 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: fetch-alerts
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-05-01
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ steps:
# run that never touched them. Tracked in #461.
- name: kustomize-build
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-07-30
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
commands:
- |
set -eu
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ steps:
# this step fails permanently on its own documentation.
- name: no-digest-pins
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-07-30
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
commands:
- |
set -eu
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: e2e
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-05-01
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ steps:
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
- name: e2e-test
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-05-01
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ steps:
# (the issue-pick logic needs jq, which only the ci-claude image has);
# minting a 1h read-only token per run is cheap. Degrades to
# snapshot-only if the ci-diagnostics ServiceAccount isn't reconciled.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-05-01
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
@@ -1326,7 +1326,121 @@ data:
name: Caddy docs.renner.uno
state: absent
# Passkey-only (WebAuthn) login for selected apps, in two parts:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# wordpress-gate — www.renner.uno
#
# Unlike every other gate here, this one does NOT front a whole
# host. www.renner.uno is a public family blog; only /wp-admin and
# /wp-login.php are routed to this outpost (see
# kubernetes/apps/wordpress/ingress.yaml). The front end never
# touches it.
#
# The reverse carve-out — gate everything, skip_path_regex the
# public parts, as paperless-gate does for /static/ — is not
# possible here: the public set is every post URL, so the pattern
# would need a negative lookahead and the outpost's RE2 has none.
- id: wordpress-authors-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: WordPress Authors
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
# Git owns membership, as with the other gates: this group is the
# explicit allowlist for who may publish on www.renner.uno.
# Add/remove members HERE, not in the UI — blueprint apply is
# authoritative for this M2M and reverts UI edits.
#
# s.renner is the Authentik account for the site's WordPress
# Editor, which still carries the pre-2019 login `s.birzer` — the
# two names do not match, and that is expected.
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, s.renner]]
- id: wordpress-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://wordpress.wordpress.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://www.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
# No skip_path_regex: wp-admin's assets are only ever fetched by an
# already-authenticated session, and wp-admin has no manifest or
# service worker — the credentials:'omit' PWA problem that forced
# carve-outs on vscode-gate and retired music-assistant-gate does
# not arise here.
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: WordPress (Gate)
slug: wordpress-gate
provider: !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://www.renner.uno/wp-admin/
meta_description: "Forward-auth gate in front of wp-admin on www.renner.uno"
# Only WordPress Authors pass the gate — see the group above for the
# membership list. Both accounts that exist on the migrated site are
# covered, so the gate cannot lock out the editor the site is
# currently being kept alive for.
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, wordpress-gate]]
group: !KeyOf wordpress-authors-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# Passkey login for selected apps. Passkey is mandatory for accounts
# that hold one and unavailable to accounts that do not, so both flows
# branch on enrollment (policy passkey-user-has-webauthn): enrolled →
# WebAuthn, not enrolled → password + MFA. Enrollment status is a
# property of the identified account, so the weaker branch is never
# something a requester can select.
#
# Two parts:
#
# 1. A passwordless AUTHENTICATION flow (username → passkey, no
# password prompt) bound per-provider, so fresh logins to these
@@ -1335,7 +1449,13 @@ data:
# 2. A step-up AUTHORIZATION flow — unlike the authentication flow,
# this runs on EVERY interactive authorize, so an existing
# password-only SSO session from another app cannot slip into
# these apps without presenting a passkey.
# these apps without presenting a passkey. Two things narrow that:
# the stage is skipped outright for accounts with no passkey (they
# have no way to satisfy it), and last_auth_threshold reduces it to
# "without presenting a passkey in this browser within the window"
# — one touch then covers every app, including a later
# password-only session for the same user. The cookie is keyed to
# that user's device, so it never carries across users.
passkey-stepup.yaml: |
version: 1
metadata:
@@ -1356,43 +1476,99 @@ data:
# flow this replaces.
authentication: require_authenticated
- id: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
# ONE stage object, shared by the step-up authorization flow and
# the passwordless authentication flow below.
#
# `last_auth_threshold` is enforced with a single browser cookie
# (`authentik_mfa`) whose JWT is both signed with and carries the
# stage's PK, so a validation stage only ever honours a cookie it
# wrote itself. Two separate stage objects therefore each demand
# their own touch, and — sharing the one cookie name — overwrite
# each other, so neither window survives. Sharing this object is
# what lets the login touch satisfy the per-app step-up.
#
# Declared here, ahead of every !KeyOf reference to it: the
# blueprint importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
- id: passkey-webauthn-validation
model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
name: passkey-webauthn-validation
state: present
attrs:
device_classes:
- webauthn
# `configure`, not `deny`: g.renner has Home Assistant access
# but no enrolled WebAuthn device (live check 2026-07-07), so
# a hard deny would lock her out with no self-service path.
# `configure` injects the default WebAuthn enrollment stage
# inline — first login without a passkey becomes "enroll one
# now, then validate it". Still passkey-only: there is no way
# through this stage without a WebAuthn credential.
not_configured_action: configure
configuration_stages:
- !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_webauthn.authenticatorwebauthnstage, [name, default-authenticator-webauthn-setup]]
# Skip re-validation if a passkey was already presented within
# the window. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) no double-touch
# when the login itself used a passkey seconds earlier;
# (2) NetBird's dashboard silently re-authorizes via
# /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry — a flow that
# always demands interaction would fail those and force a
# visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
# `deny`, not `configure`: the authentication flow reaches this
# stage with the user merely *identified* (a typed username)
# and no password stage in front of it, so inline enrollment
# would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
# their own passkey and take over that account. The policy
# binding means only accounts that already hold a passkey reach
# this stage at all, so `deny` is defence in depth rather than
# a path anyone walks — accounts without one branch to password
# + MFA instead.
not_configured_action: deny
# Window within which an already-presented passkey satisfies a
# later run of this stage. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) the
# per-app step-up must not demand a second touch seconds after
# the login touch; (2) NetBird's dashboard silently
# re-authorizes via /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry —
# a stage that always demands interaction fails those and
# forces a visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
#
# The cookie is browser-scoped, so inside the window a re-login
# in that same browser is satisfied by the cookie alone and the
# username is all that gets typed. Accepted for a single touch
# per app.
last_auth_threshold: hours=8
webauthn_user_verification: preferred
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
# Gate on "this account has a passkey", so enrollment status picks
# the branch. Enrolled accounts must use WebAuthn — at login and at
# every authorize — while accounts with no passkey fall back to
# password + MFA. An attacker cannot pick the weaker branch: the
# user is already identified when this runs, so the branch follows
# the victim's enrollment, not the requester's choice.
#
# request.user is the flow's pending_user, not the (anonymous)
# requester: ReevaluateMarker builds the engine with
# plan.context[PLAN_CONTEXT_PENDING_USER] (flows/markers.py). That
# requires the bindings below to keep evaluate_on_plan false and
# re_evaluate_policies true — on-plan evaluation happens before the
# identification stage has resolved a user.
- id: policy-has-passkey
model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
identifiers:
name: passkey-user-has-webauthn
state: present
attrs:
expression: |
return ak_user_has_authenticator(request.user, "webauthn")
- id: binding-stepup-webauthn
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
stage: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
order: 10
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-stepup-webauthn
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
# Passwordless authentication flow: identification (username or
# email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login.
# email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login, with a
# password + MFA branch for accounts that have no passkey.
- id: passkey-passwordless-flow
model: authentik_flows.flow
identifiers:
@@ -1403,37 +1579,6 @@ data:
title: "Sign in with your passkey"
designation: authentication
# SEPARATE stage from the step-up one, and deliberately `deny`:
# at this point in an authentication flow the user has only been
# *identified* (typed a username), not authenticated — `configure`
# here would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
# their own passkey and take over that account. Inline enrollment
# for passkey-less users happens exclusively in the authorization
# step-up stage above, where require_authenticated guarantees a
# fully authenticated session. A passkey-less user therefore
# bootstraps via password login on auth.renner.uno, then gets the
# enrollment prompt on first app access.
#
# Declared BEFORE the identification stage because the latter
# references it via !KeyOf (webauthn_stage), and the blueprint
# importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
- id: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
state: present
attrs:
device_classes:
- webauthn
not_configured_action: deny
# Small non-zero window so a passkey presented via the
# identification stage's autofill (webauthn_stage below) is
# not challenged a second time by this stage at order 20 in
# the same flow run. The skip is session-scoped, so a fresh
# (attacker) session never inherits it.
last_auth_threshold: minutes=5
webauthn_user_verification: preferred
# webauthn_stage enables passkey autofill (conditional WebAuthn,
# authentik >= 2025.12): the browser offers enrolled passkeys in
# the username field's autofill — one tap, no username typed.
@@ -1449,7 +1594,7 @@ data:
user_fields:
- username
- email
webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
@@ -1458,12 +1603,87 @@ data:
order: 10
state: present
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
# Order 20 and 21/22 are the two mutually exclusive branches.
- id: binding-passwordless-webauthn
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
order: 20
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-webauthn
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
# The negated branch. failure_result: true is the safety net — the
# UserLoginStage defaults a missing authentication backend to
# BACKEND_INBUILT instead of refusing (user_login/stage.py), so a
# flow that drops BOTH branches would log the user in on a typed
# username alone. A PolicyException is resolved to failure_result
# before negate is applied (policies/process.py), so a broken
# expression pulls the password stage IN and degrades everyone to
# password + MFA rather than to no factor at all.
- id: binding-passwordless-password
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_password.passwordstage, [name, default-authentication-password]]
order: 21
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-password
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: true
failure_result: true
# Same MFA validation the default authentication flow runs at its
# order 30, so the fallback is not a weaker way into these apps
# than auth.renner.uno's own login already is. It carries
# not_configured_action: configure, which is safe here and nowhere
# else in this flow: the password stage above has established a
# first factor by the time it runs, so it doubles as the enrollment
# path for accounts holding no authenticator at all.
- id: binding-passwordless-mfa
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage, [name, default-authentication-mfa-validation]]
order: 22
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-mfa
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: true
failure_result: true
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
@@ -1577,3 +1797,19 @@ data:
redirect_uris:
- url: https://dash.renner.uno/login/generic_oauth
matching_mode: strict
# Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
# Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the
# identification stage's webauthn_stage FK is SET_NULL and is
# re-pointed above, so no dangling reference survives. Declared
# last: the importer applies entries top-to-bottom inside one
# transaction, so the replacements exist before these go.
- model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
state: absent
- model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
state: absent
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ resources:
- zone-configurator-gate-egress.yaml
- alertmanager-gate-egress.yaml
- prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
- wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
- outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
- ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
---
# Allow the dedicated wordpress-gate outpost to egress into the wordpress
# namespace and reach WordPress (:80). Without this, the authentik-namespace
# baseline CNP has no egress rule to wordpress, so the gate outpost's
# forwarded requests are dropped. Scoped to the gate outpost's pod label so no
# other authentik component can reach it. Mirrors esphome-gate-egress.yaml.
#
# Note this gate only ever sees /wp-admin and /wp-login.php — the public site
# is routed straight to the same Service by a separate Ingress, so this rule
# is not the only path into the wordpress namespace, unlike the paperless case.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: wordpress-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "80"
protocol: TCP
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
# gets the heavy HA pod (8Gi) off the soon-to-be-tiny edge box.
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
+27 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,33 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: ical-proxy
image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:latest
# Pinned to a commit build rather than :latest.
#
# :latest never rolls. The tag moves when a build publishes, but
# nothing tells the Deployment about it: the pod template is
# unchanged, so Kubernetes has no reason to replace anything, and
# this image is deliberately NOT enrolled in Flux image automation
# — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md, which
# lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest,
# and main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so there is no
# ImagePolicy watching it. The pods therefore sat on a 21-day-old
# image while :latest moved underneath them, and the only way to
# pick up a new build was a manual restart.
#
# A pinned tag makes the rollout a git change: Flux applies the new
# pod template and Kubernetes rolls it, which is also what makes
# what is RUNNING recoverable from this repo rather than "whatever
# :latest meant the last time a pod happened to restart".
#
# main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds
# the summary_match/summary_replace parameters this deployment
# needs to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach"
# from every waste collection.
#
# Bumping this is a manual, reviewed edit. The tag format is
# main-<short-sha> (docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
# as prefix).
image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:main-99a912b
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
name: http
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ kind: Kustomization
# come from the kube-prometheus-stack chart. Flux applies this Kustomization
# only after `monitoring` is Ready (chart installed → CRDs present).
resources:
- prometheusrule-ceph.yaml
- prometheusrule-cilium.yaml
- prometheusrule-hetzner-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-loki.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: ceph
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: ceph.rules
rules:
- alert: CephHealthWarn
# ceph_health_status: 0 = HEALTH_OK, 1 = HEALTH_WARN, 2 = HEALTH_ERR.
# 6h is deliberately long. Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions —
# a slow BlueStore op during the Sunday restore sweep, a mon briefly
# below its disk threshold — and paging on those trains people to
# ignore the alert. What matters is a warning that does not clear.
expr: ceph_health_status == 1
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph has been HEALTH_WARN for 6h"
description: "The Ceph cluster has held HEALTH_WARN for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Get the detail with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
- alert: CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
expr: ceph_health_status == 2
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Ceph is HEALTH_ERR"
description: "The Ceph cluster is in HEALTH_ERR — availability or redundancy is at risk. Inspect immediately with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail` and `ceph osd df tree`."
- alert: CephMonDiskLow
# Named explicitly rather than left to CephHealthWarn, because the
# mons sit on the node's /var alongside containerd's image cache:
# this fires for a full image cache, not for Ceph growth. Cleared by
# kubelet image GC (imageGCHighThresholdPercent in
# kubernetes/talos/patches/cluster.yaml), which must stay below
# Ceph's mon_data_avail_warn of 30% free.
expr: |
100 * node_filesystem_avail_bytes{mountpoint="/var"}
/ node_filesystem_size_bytes{mountpoint="/var"} < 30
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} /var below 30% free — Ceph mon will warn"
description: "/var on {{ $labels.instance }} is under 30% free, which is Ceph's mon_data_avail_warn threshold, and the mon on this node reports MON_DISK_LOW below it. Usually containerd's image cache; check whether kubelet image GC is reclaiming with `talosctl -n <node> usage /var/lib --depth 1`."
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: cilium
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: cilium.rules
# Both alerts are map-agnostic on purpose. cilium_bpf_map_pressure is
# emitted per map type — policy, conntrack, NAT, LB — distinguished by
# the map_name label, and running out of any of them degrades the
# datapath. The policy map is merely the one that has bitten us.
# Cilium only exports the metric for maps above
# policyMapPressureMetricsThreshold (chart default 0.1), so quiet maps
# produce no series rather than a flood of near-zero ones.
rules:
- alert: CiliumBPFMapPressureHigh
# cilium_bpf_map_pressure is used/capacity for the fullest map of
# that name on the agent. A full map is not a slow path — it is a
# hard failure: the agent cannot program the datapath, so endpoint
# regeneration fails and every new pod on the node hangs in sandbox
# creation until something frees space.
expr: cilium_bpf_map_pressure > 0.8
for: 15m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Cilium BPF map {{ $labels.map_name }} is {{ $value | humanizePercentage }} full on {{ $labels.node }}"
description: "The BPF map {{ $labels.map_name }} on node {{ $labels.node }} has been over 80% full for 15 minutes. At 100% the Cilium agent can no longer program the datapath and new pods on this node fail sandbox creation. Raise the corresponding size in kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (values.bpf) — the map is sized at creation, so the change needs an agent restart."
- alert: CiliumBPFMapFull
# Pressure reaches (and can exceed) 1.0 when the agent wants more
# entries than the map holds. Pods are already failing to start.
expr: cilium_bpf_map_pressure >= 1
for: 0m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Cilium BPF map {{ $labels.map_name }} is full on {{ $labels.node }}"
description: "The BPF map {{ $labels.map_name }} on node {{ $labels.node }} is at or over capacity. Endpoint regeneration is failing with 'no space left on device' and pods scheduled to this node will hang in ContainerCreating. Check `{namespace=\"kube-system\",pod=~\"cilium-.+\"} |= \"no space left on device\"` in Loki for the affected endpoints."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: gotenberg
image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.35.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
args:
- "gotenberg"
- "--chromium-disable-javascript=true"
+52 -11
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@ data:
# The app re-reads schedules.json every 60 s, so edits here take
# effect without a restart once the init container has rewritten it.
#
# lang is "de", not null. It calls Home Assistant's own
# _selectLanguage() for the screenshot session, so the rendered page
# is localised by HA rather than by hand. With it left null the
# dashboard grew a German weekday array, a German month array and a
# fifteen-entry weather-condition dict — reimplementing translations
# HA already ships. The instance itself stays language "en"; this
# only affects the render session.
#
# model_id is 1 — TRMNL X (name "v2", 1872x1404, 16 colours) — and it
# is an INTEGER, not a name. Confirmed against the running server:
# GET /api/screens returns model_id as a number, and upstream's
@@ -60,8 +68,8 @@ data:
"rotate": null,
"zoom": 1,
"wait": null,
"theme": "trmnl-eink",
"lang": null,
"theme": "Graphite E-ink Light",
"lang": "de",
"dark": false,
"invert": false,
"timestamp": false,
@@ -107,6 +115,27 @@ metadata:
namespace: trmnl
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: trmnl-renderer
annotations:
# BOTH sources need this, and for the same reason: the init
# container writes /data/schedules.json ONCE, at pod start. Nothing
# re-reads either source afterwards.
#
# The app re-reads schedules.json every 60s, which makes it look
# self-updating — but only the FILE, and the file is only rewritten
# by the init container. So a ConfigMap or Secret change lands in
# git, updates the object, and the running renderer keeps the old
# values indefinitely.
#
# Both halves were hit repeatedly in practice and each time needed
# `kubectl delete pod` by hand: the theme name, the schedule's lang
# field, and every re-mint of the BYOS tokens. A fix that depends on
# someone remembering to restart a pod is not deployed.
#
# Named per-resource rather than the blanket
# reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching terminus.yaml and
# mosquitto-deployment.yaml.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-schedule
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
# RWO PVC, and two renderers would push conflicting screens for the
@@ -142,9 +171,16 @@ spec:
# proxy that exchanges a Terminus username+password for these
# tokens, but that would mean shipping the Terminus PASSWORD
# into the cluster and doing a network call at every pod start.
# Stock Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively
# permanent tokens, so they are minted once out of band and kept
# in OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
# Tokens are therefore minted once out of band and kept in
# OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
#
# That only works because Terminus is configured with
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see terminus.yaml). It is
# NOT, as an earlier version of this comment claimed, because
# stock Terminus issues permanent tokens — the stock default is
# 1800s, and this deployment demonstrated it by having the
# webhook start failing with "expired JWT access token" about
# thirty minutes after seeding.
- name: render-schedule
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
command:
@@ -154,13 +190,18 @@ spec:
set -eu
# obtained_at is stamped at write time, in MILLISECONDS.
# It is not cosmetic: the scheduler derives token age from
# it, and a literal 0 in the template made the app treat
# freshly-minted tokens as ancient and refuse to push —
# it, and a literal 0 made the app treat freshly-minted
# tokens as ancient and skip the webhook entirely —
# "BYOS tokens ... expired beyond the refresh window"
# — with no render attempt and no error, just a warning at
# startup. Stamping it here is honest enough: stock
# Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively
# permanent tokens, so age is not load-bearing.
#
# Stamping it "now" is only safe because Terminus is
# configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see
# terminus.yaml). Against the 30-minute default it would be
# actively harmful: the app would believe a stale token had
# 30 fresh minutes left, skip its proactive refresh, and
# then be unable to recover, because refreshing requires a
# still-valid token. If that setting is ever reverted, this
# must become a real mint time carried alongside the tokens.
jq --arg at "$BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
--arg rt "$BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN" \
'(.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.access_token) = $at
+72
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,64 @@ data:
# pool (fd99::/120) and the LAN ULA — without it every IPv6 client,
# including the device and Traefik, is rate-limited as if it were remote.
RACK_ATTACK_ALLOWED_SUBNETS: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.1,::1,fc00::/7"
# 10 years, against a default of 1800s (30 minutes).
#
# Documented upstream in doc/configuration.adoc:
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD — "The amount of time, in seconds, the JWT
# access token remains valid before needing to refresh your access
# token." Default: 1,800 seconds (30 minutes).
# Corroborated on this instance: a token minted here was rejected about
# thirty minutes later, i.e. the documented default behaving as written.
#
# This exists for the renderer, which pushes screens to /api/screens with
# a JWT held in OpenBao. At the default period that arrangement cannot
# work unattended, and it fails in a way that has no recovery: minting a
# replacement token via POST /api/jwt requires a still-VALID access token
# in the Authorization header, so once one expires it cannot be refreshed
# from itself. Observed exactly that on first deploy —
# [webhook] Webhook failed: 400 {"error":"expired JWT access token"}
# [webhook] BYOS auth: refresh failed (400) {"error":"expired JWT ..."}
# — the refresh attempt being rejected by the very expiry it was trying
# to repair.
#
# The renderer's own code assumes "stock Terminus disables session
# expiration and issues effectively permanent tokens". That is simply not
# true of this deployment, so the assumption is made true here rather
# than worked around in the client.
#
# The trade is deliberate: a long-lived JWT with full Terminus API rights
# now sits in OpenBao. Accepted because the alternative was putting the
# Terminus account PASSWORD into the cluster so an init container could
# mint a short-lived token on every pod start, which is a strictly worse
# secret to hold. The token is revocable by rotating the account's
# credentials; it grants access only to this LAN-only instance.
#
# NOTE: the period is fixed at mint time. Changing this does not extend
# tokens that already exist — they must be re-minted afterwards.
API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD: "315360000"
# The OTHER half of the same problem, and the reason the first fix
# did not hold. Terminus has TWO independent expiries: the JWT's own
# lifetime (above) and the SESSION behind it. Raising only the token
# period left the session at its defaults, so pushes kept working for
# a while and then failed with
# HTTP 401 {"error":"This session has expired, please login again"}
# which is a different error, from a different mechanism, than the
# "expired JWT access token" the first fix addressed.
#
# Documented in doc/configuration.adoc:
# SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED — "Determines if your browser session
# or JWT API token is expired or not." Default: true.
# SESSION_INACTIVITY_LIMIT 1800s, SESSION_LIFETIME_LIMIT 86400s.
#
# Disabling it is exactly the state the renderer's own code assumes
# ("stock Terminus disables session expiration and issues ~100-year
# tokens") — an assumption that is false by default and has to be
# made true here, same as the token period.
#
# Same trade as above, and it is the deciding one for an unattended
# appliance: a session that expires needs a human with a password to
# restore it, and this panel has neither.
SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED: "false"
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
@@ -26,6 +84,20 @@ metadata:
namespace: trmnl
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
annotations:
# terminus-config is consumed via envFrom, and env vars are read ONCE at
# container start — Kubernetes does not hot-reload them. The ConfigMap is
# a plain resource, not a configMapGenerator, so editing it does not
# change the pod template hash and Flux will not roll the pods either.
# Without this annotation a ConfigMap-only change (such as raising
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD) applies to git and to the ConfigMap object
# while the running app keeps the old value indefinitely — a silent
# no-op, with the manifest and reality disagreeing.
#
# Named per-ConfigMap rather than the blanket `reloader.stakater.com/
# auto: "true"`, matching mosquitto-deployment.yaml: enrolling anything
# further stays a visible, reviewable edit to this line.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: terminus-config
spec:
replicas: 1
# RWO PVC shared by both containers in this pod, and APP_SETUP runs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: whisper
image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.5.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
args:
- --model=base-int8
- --language=de
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
annotations:
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wordpress-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
# RWO volume, single writer — the rolling default would deadlock on the
# new pod waiting for a volume the old pod still holds.
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
spec:
securityContext:
# wp-content must be writable by Apache (www-data, uid/gid 33) for
# media uploads and plugin installs.
fsGroup: 33
containers:
- name: wordpress
image: wordpress:7.0.4-php8.3-apache
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 80
env:
# The operator names the base Service after the MariaDB resource;
# the CRD's separate primaryService/secondaryService fields are the
# suffixed variants for replicated setups, which this is not
# (replicas: 1). Not verified against a running cluster — if it is
# wrong the pod fails loudly on connect at startup rather than
# degrading quietly. Confirm with `kubectl get svc -n wordpress`
# on first deploy.
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_HOST
value: wordpress-mariadb.wordpress.svc.cluster.local:3306
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_NAME
value: wordpress
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_USER
value: wordpress
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
# Generated by the operator from the MariaDB CR — never
# stored in Git or OpenBao.
name: wordpress-mariadb-app
key: password
- name: WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA
value: |
define('WP_HOME', 'https://www.renner.uno');
define('WP_SITEURL', 'https://www.renner.uno');
define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
/* Traefik terminates TLS; without this WordPress sees plain
HTTP and builds http:// URLs into every page and redirect. */
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO'] === 'https') {
$_SERVER['HTTPS'] = 'on';
}
/* Core lives in the image, not on the volume — the updater
would only fail against a read-only docroot. Plugin and
theme installs are unaffected. */
define('WP_AUTO_UPDATE_CORE', false);
/* No add_filter() here. WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA is eval'd inside
wp-config.php, long before wp-settings.php loads the plugin
API, so any add_filter call is a fatal error on every request
— which is exactly what happened on first deploy. xmlrpc is
handled at the ingress instead, by routing /xmlrpc.php
through the Authentik gate. */
envFrom:
# The eight WordPress salts. Rotating them in OpenBao invalidates
# every session — which is the intended lever, not a side effect.
- secretRef:
name: wordpress-secrets
volumeMounts:
- name: content
mountPath: /var/www/html/wp-content
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 60
periodSeconds: 30
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 768Mi
volumes:
- name: content
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: wordpress-content
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
ports:
- name: http
port: 80
targetPort: http
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# The eight WordPress salts (AUTH_KEY, SECURE_AUTH_KEY, LOGGED_IN_KEY,
# NONCE_KEY, AUTH_SALT, SECURE_AUTH_SALT, LOGGED_IN_SALT, NONCE_SALT).
# Expected keys in OpenBao at homelab/apps/wordpress, named exactly as the
# image's env vars: WORDPRESS_AUTH_KEY, WORDPRESS_SECURE_AUTH_KEY, ...
#
# Deliberately NOT carried over from the old wp-config.php: the Hetzner host
# is being decommissioned and its salts have been sitting on a VM whose
# neighbour site was compromised this month. New salts cost one logout.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: wordpress-secrets
namespace: wordpress
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: wordpress-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/wordpress
---
# S3 credentials for the MariaDB Backup.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: wordpress
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
# Reuses the paperless copy of the shared Hetzner S3 credentials (identical
# ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY / REGION) to avoid seeding a new OpenBao
# path for this migration — same approach woodpecker took. FOLLOW-UP: give
# wordpress its own seed/wordpress/hetzner-creds path once OpenBao can be
# written, and repoint this here (the value is the same, so it's a drop-in
# swap).
- extract:
key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
# A plain Ingress cannot point at a Service in another namespace, and the
# Authentik outposts all live in `authentik`. Same workaround as
# zone-configurator and paperless: mirror the outpost Service in as an
# ExternalName.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
namespace: wordpress
spec:
type: ExternalName
externalName: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
ports:
- port: 9000
targetPort: 9000
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# Two routers on one host. The site itself must stay readable by anyone --
# it is a family blog -- while the editing surface sits behind Authentik.
#
# Why not one gated Ingress with skip_path_regex, the way paperless-gate
# carves out /static/: that works when the PUBLIC paths are enumerable. Here
# it is the reverse -- every post URL is public and only two paths are gated
# -- which would need a negative lookahead. The outpost is Go, and RE2 has no
# lookahead. So the split happens at the router instead.
#
# Traefik orders routers by rule length, so PathPrefix(`/wp-admin`) is
# evaluated before PathPrefix(`/`); no explicit priority is needed.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
labels:
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: www.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: wordpress
port:
number: 80
tls:
- secretName: wordpress-tls
hosts:
- www.renner.uno
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: wordpress-admin
namespace: wordpress
labels:
# Same label as the public Ingress on purpose. external-dns-unifi runs
# with --label-filter=dns.renner.uno/public!=true, so an unlabelled
# Ingress on this host would quietly gain a UDM A-record pointing LAN
# clients straight at the Traefik VIP -- a second, unintended path to
# the same host that skips the public route entirely.
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
# No cert-manager annotation and no tls block: the public Ingress above
# already owns the certificate for this host. Declaring it twice would
# create two Certificates racing for the same wordpress-tls Secret.
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: www.renner.uno
http:
paths:
# The outpost's own OAuth leg. Without this the gate is a dead end,
# not a gate: hitting /wp-admin redirects to
# /outpost.goauthentik.io/start on THIS host, which otherwise falls
# through to the public `/` router and lands on WordPress's 404
# page — verified exactly that way on first deploy. paperless needs
# the same route and has it as a separate Ingress on auth.renner.uno
# (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml); here the flow stays
# on www.renner.uno, so it belongs in this rule set.
#
# It is not an authentication hole: these endpoints ARE the login
# flow, and the outpost serves them itself.
- path: /outpost.goauthentik.io
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
# Covers admin-ajax.php too. That is only safe because the gift
# registry plugin -- the sole thing on this site that ever emitted
# an ajaxurl -- is being dropped in the migration. Verified against
# the live site: 121 admin-ajax hits in the current log window, not
# one of them a 200.
- path: /wp-admin
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
- path: /wp-login.php
pathType: Exact
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
# xmlrpc.php would otherwise be served by the public `/` prefix
# router — an earlier version of this file claimed it was "blocked
# at the ingress" while nothing blocked it at all. There is no deny
# verb in an Ingress, so it goes through the gate instead: anonymous
# callers get Authentik, not the XML-RPC endpoint. Nothing on this
# site uses it (no Jetpack, no mobile app, no pingbacks worth
# keeping), so no legitimate caller is affected.
- path: /xmlrpc.php
pathType: Exact
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- externalsecret.yaml
- mariadb.yaml
- pvc.yaml
- deployment.yaml
- gate-service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
# The database for www.renner.uno. Named `wordpress-mariadb`, not `wp-*`:
# `wp-pg` in the woodpecker namespace is Woodpecker's Postgres, and reusing
# the prefix for an unrelated engine invites exactly the wrong guess.
#
# Mirrors the CNPG convention: the operator lives in `database`, the database
# resource lives with its consumer (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: MariaDB
metadata:
name: wordpress-mariadb
namespace: wordpress
annotations:
# Data guard — a Kustomization rebuild must never take the database with it.
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
# generate: true lets the operator create both Secrets on first reconcile.
# Neither password is ever typed by a human or parked in OpenBao, so there
# is nothing to rotate by hand and nothing to leak through Git.
rootPasswordSecretKeyRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb-root
key: password
generate: true
username: wordpress
passwordSecretKeyRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb-app
key: password
generate: true
database: wordpress
port: 3306
replicas: 1
storage:
size: 5Gi
storageClassName: ceph-block
# The source database is 527 KB. 5Gi is not a sizing estimate, it is the
# smallest allocation that leaves room for binlogs and a decade of posts.
myCnf: |
[mariadb]
bind-address=*
default_storage_engine=InnoDB
innodb_buffer_pool_size=256M
# WordPress writes utf8mb4 throughout; the source dump carries
# utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci on every table that survives the migration.
character_set_server=utf8mb4
collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci
max_allowed_packet=64M
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
---
# Logical backup to Hetzner Object Storage. Velero only captures PVC data,
# which for a running database is crash-consistent, not transaction-consistent
# — that is a snapshot, not a backup you would want to restore from.
apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: Backup
metadata:
name: wordpress-mariadb-backup
namespace: wordpress
spec:
mariaDbRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb
schedule:
# 02:45, ahead of the Velero window that starts at 03:15.
cron: "45 2 * * *"
suspend: false
maxRetention: 720h # 30d, matching the CNPG ObjectStore retentionPolicy
compression: gzip
storage:
s3:
bucket: renner-uno-k8s-mariadb
prefix: wordpress
endpoint: fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
region: fsn1
accessKeyIdSecretKeyRef:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKeySecretKeyRef:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
tls:
enabled: true
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Only wp-content is persisted, not the whole docroot. WordPress core comes
# from the pinned image, so upgrading the site means bumping a tag in Git
# rather than clicking "update" in wp-admin — which is the entire point of
# moving off the Hetzner VM, where core was a mutable pile of PHP on disk.
#
# Consequence to be aware of: WordPress's own core updater will fail against
# a read-only core. Plugin and theme installs still work, because those land
# in wp-content.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: wordpress-content
namespace: wordpress
labels:
# The Velero Schedule selects ON this label rather than excluding the
# database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is merely assumed to set. If
# that assumption were wrong the exclusion would fail silently and Velero
# would snapshot the live database volume; selecting a label this repo
# owns cannot fail that way. Same direction as openbao-daily, which picks
# its snapshot PVC by app.kubernetes.io/component.
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/component: content
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
# RWO is sufficient: a single replica with strategy Recreate. ceph-block is
# the cluster default; named explicitly so a default change can't silently
# move the media library onto another class.
storageClassName: ceph-block
resources:
requests:
# The migrated wp-content is 29 MB compressed, 13 MB of it uploads.
storage: 10Gi
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ spec:
kind: HelmRelease
name: cloudnative-pg # DB operator — seed jobs create databases
namespace: database
- apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
name: mariadb-operator # the MySQL half — WordPress can't use CNPG
namespace: database
# decryption block dropped 2026-07-13: no *.sops.yaml left under this
# path — secrets come from OpenBao via ESO (MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md).
---
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: flux-system
spec:
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 2m
timeout: 15m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/wordpress
prune: true
dependsOn:
# infrastructure gates on the mariadb-operator HelmRelease being Ready,
# so the MariaDB CRD exists and has a controller before this applies.
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
# kstatus has no built-in rule for k8s.mariadb.com resources, so without
# this the Kustomization would report Ready the moment the manifests are
# accepted — before the database is actually serving. Same reasoning as
# the CephCluster expressions in infrastructure.yaml.
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: MariaDB
failed: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'False' && c.reason == 'Failed')"
current: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'True')"
@@ -17,7 +17,11 @@ spec:
chart:
spec:
chart: cilium
version: ">=1.19.0"
# Patch-only range: Flux reconciles every 30m and would otherwise take a
# CNI minor or major unattended. Widening this is a deliberate, reviewed
# act — a minor bump changes datapath behaviour and rolls 2 of 3 agents
# at once.
version: ">=1.20.0 <1.21.0"
sourceRef:
kind: HelmRepository
name: cilium
@@ -29,6 +33,16 @@ spec:
remediation:
retries: 3
values:
# Which pod labels feed security-identity computation. Patterns are
# start-anchored regexes; a leading "!" excludes while keeping the default
# set. Woodpecker stamps every step pod with woodpecker-ci.org/task-uuid
# and step=<name>, so without this each build step is its own identity —
# and every identity costs one entry per allowed (direction, proto, port)
# in every endpoint's policy map, cluster-wide. Nothing selects on these
# labels in policy, so they buy identity churn and nothing else.
# Keep in lockstep with kubernetes/talos/patches/cilium-cni.yaml and
# kubernetes/talos/cilium.yaml.
labels: '!woodpecker-ci\.org/.* !step$'
ipv6:
enabled: true
ipam:
@@ -46,6 +60,19 @@ spec:
serviceMonitor:
enabled: true
bpf:
# Size of each endpoint's own cilium_policy_v3_<id> map, holding one
# entry per (identity, direction, protocol, port) the endpoint is
# allowed. When it fills, endpoint regeneration fails with "no space
# left on device", the CNI ADD call never returns, and the pod is stuck
# in sandbox creation — so this must stay comfortably above the busiest
# endpoint's entry count, tracked by cilium_bpf_map_pressure.
# Takes effect on agent restart; the map is sized at creation.
# Bootstrap installs Cilium from the inline manifest in
# kubernetes/talos/patches/cilium-cni.yaml, so bpf-policy-map-max there
# must move with this value or a cold rebuild starts with the old size.
# kubernetes/talos/cilium.yaml carries a third copy of the same key.
# Nothing enforces any of this; grep bpf-policy-map-max before changing it.
policyMapMax: 65536
# Let pods reach the cluster's own LoadBalancer external IPs; Cilium
# redirects the socket directly to the backend pod instead of sending
# traffic out to the VIP and back (which fails with L2 announcements).
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ resources:
- rook-ceph/
- ceph-csi-drivers/
- cloudnative-pg/
- mariadb-operator/
- netbird-ingress/
- netbird-backup/
- coredns-config/
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# MariaDB operator, for the one workload in this cluster that cannot use
# CloudNativePG: WordPress. WordPress speaks MySQL natively — the PostgreSQL
# route would mean pg4wp, an SQL-rewriting shim whose own README lists
# WordPress 6.5.3 as its newest tested version while renner.uno runs 7.0.4.
#
# The charts are OCI artifacts (ghcr.io), so this follows the OCIRepository
# pattern from infrastructure/spegel rather than the HelmRepository pattern
# used for CNPG.
#
# CRDs ship as a SEPARATE chart that must be installed first — upstream is
# explicit about the ordering, hence the dependsOn below rather than a single
# release with crds: CreateReplace.
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: OCIRepository
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 24h
url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator-crds
ref:
# Calendar versioning: the major is the year. Upstream ships an upgrade
# guide with each minor (Helm repo deprecations, registry moves), so the
# range is capped at the year boundary instead of the usual open ">=".
semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
---
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 30m
chartRef:
kind: OCIRepository
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
---
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: OCIRepository
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 24h
url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator
ref:
semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
---
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 30m
dependsOn:
- name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
chartRef:
kind: OCIRepository
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
values:
# The operator watches all namespaces; the MariaDB CR itself lives with
# the app in kubernetes/apps/wordpress/, mirroring how CNPG Clusters sit
# in their consumer's namespace (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
metrics:
enabled: false
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- helmrelease.yaml
@@ -151,3 +151,12 @@ apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: trmnl
---
# WordPress for www.renner.uno, migrated off the Hetzner VM `wordpress-hochzeit`.
# No privileged label needed: the cluster enforces `baseline`, which permits the
# official Apache image's root master process binding :80. It does trip the
# `restricted` audit/warn level — that is expected and not an error.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: wordpress
@@ -31,43 +31,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
@@ -103,40 +80,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -38,43 +38,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
@@ -103,40 +80,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -36,40 +36,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -32,40 +32,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -27,43 +27,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
@@ -102,40 +79,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -28,43 +28,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
@@ -103,40 +80,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -157,44 +157,21 @@ spec:
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 } # Echo Reply
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 } # Destination Unreachable
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 } # Source Quench
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 } # Redirect
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 } # Destination Unreachable — PMTUD
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 } # Echo Request
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 } # Router Advertisement
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 } # Router Solicitation
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 } # Time Exceeded
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 } # Parameter Problem
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 } # Timestamp
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 } # Timestamp Reply
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 } # Information Request
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 } # Information Reply
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 } # Address Mask Request
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 } # Address Mask Reply
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 } # Traceroute
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 } # Destination Unreachable
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 } # Packet Too Big
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 } # Packet Too Big — PMTUD, mandatory
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 } # Time Exceeded
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 } # Parameter Problem
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 } # Echo Request
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 } # Echo Reply
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Listener Query
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Listener Report
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Listener Done
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 } # Router Solicitation
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 } # Router Advertisement
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 } # Neighbor Solicitation
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 } # Neighbor Advertisement
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 } # Redirect
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 } # Router Renumbering
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 } # Inverse ND Solicitation
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 } # Inverse ND Advertisement
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 } # MLDv2 Listener Report
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 } # Certification Path Solicitation
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 } # Certification Path Advertisement
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Router Advertisement
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Router Solicitation
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 } # Multicast Router Termination
egress:
# Cluster-internal callers HA initiates connections to: mosquitto,
# whisper, matter-server, etc.
@@ -253,43 +230,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
---
# Scoped world ingress — replaces the former namespace-wide `fromEntities:
# world` allow (see the note in the default-deny-ingress policy above). IoT-VLAN
@@ -42,40 +42,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -42,40 +42,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ resources:
- external-secrets-ns.yaml
- woodpecker-ci-ns.yaml
- trmnl-ns.yaml
- wordpress-ns.yaml
- allow-cilium-health.yaml
@@ -67,40 +67,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -37,43 +37,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
@@ -109,43 +86,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
---
# Allow FTP access (from scanners on the LAN) to the ftp-scanner pod.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
@@ -41,40 +41,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -26,43 +26,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
# Peer P2P
- toEndpoints:
@@ -92,40 +69,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -42,43 +42,20 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
---
# The TRMNL panel polls /api/display over cleartext HTTP on the
# terminus-device LoadBalancer. The firmware cannot be handed the internal
@@ -28,40 +28,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -45,40 +45,17 @@ spec:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: wordpress
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
# Unlike paperless, traefik IS allowed here. www.renner.uno is a public
# blog: the front end must be reachable without authentication, so the
# public router terminates directly in this namespace.
#
# Be clear about what this does and does not buy: the public/admin split
# is enforced by the two Ingress objects' path rules (`/` straight to the
# Service, /wp-admin and /wp-login.php to the gate outpost) and by
# Authentik — NOT at the network layer. paperless can point a
# workload-scoped CNP at its gate because nothing else may reach it;
# here traefik must reach the pod directly for every public page, so the
# equivalent rule would be a no-op. Anyone auditing this namespace for
# defence in depth should know the network layer is not where the admin
# surface is protected.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
# Scoped to the gate outpost rather than the whole authentik namespace:
# only that pod has business reaching wp-admin.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
# The mariadb-operator reconciles the MariaDB CR from the database
# namespace — same cross-namespace requirement CNPG consumers have.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
# home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
# world covers two things WordPress genuinely needs outbound: the
# wordpress.org update/plugin API, and the Hetzner Object Storage
# endpoint the MariaDB Backup writes to.
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- world
# ICMP — egress mirror.
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
@@ -59,3 +59,22 @@ resources:
- review-bot.yaml
- claude-oauth.yaml
- mosquitto-health.yaml
# NOT ROTATED, deliberately — recorded here because the whole point of this
# directory is that unrotated credentials should be a visible choice:
#
# homelab/apps/trmnl/renderer → BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN / BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN
# Terminus API JWTs used by the e-ink renderer to push screens. Terminus
# is configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years
# (kubernetes/apps/trmnl/terminus.yaml), so nothing will ever expire
# these or prompt a rotation. That is deliberate: the alternative was
# holding the Terminus account password in-cluster to mint short-lived
# tokens per pod start. There is no rotator because minting requires the
# account password, which is exactly what we declined to store.
# Rotate BY HAND whenever the Terminus account password changes, by
# re-running POST /login and re-seeding both keys.
#
# HA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the same path is a dedicated Home Assistant
# long-lived token. `ha-token` mode in secret-rotator already handles
# this class (see home-assistant.yaml) — enrolling it is a genuine
# follow-up, not a limitation, and would leave only the BYOS pair
# unrotated.
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ spec:
- paperless
- trmnl
- velero
- wordpress
provider:
vault: # ESO's provider name; speaks OpenBao fine
server: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
@@ -312,3 +312,38 @@ spec:
matchExpressions:
- key: cnpg.io/cluster
operator: DoesNotExist
---
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Schedule
metadata:
name: wordpress-daily
namespace: velero
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
spec:
# Daily at 08:45 local (next free stagger slot after trmnl-daily at 08:15).
# Covers the wordpress-content PVC: the media library and any plugins or
# themes installed through wp-admin. WordPress core is not in here — it
# comes from the pinned image, so Git is its backup.
schedule: "45 8 * * *"
useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
template:
includedNamespaces:
- wordpress
includedResources:
- persistentvolumeclaims
storageLocation: default
ttl: 720h0m0s
snapshotMoveData: true
# Selects the content PVC by a label this repo sets, rather than
# excluding the database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is assumed to
# set — an exclusion built on a wrong assumption fails silently and
# sweeps the live database volume in. A crash-consistent snapshot of a
# running database is not a restorable backup; the operator's own Backup
# resource takes a logical dump to Hetzner Object Storage at 02:45, the
# same division of labour as CNPG/Barman elsewhere in this file.
# openbao-daily picks its PVC the same way.
labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/component: content
@@ -24,6 +24,27 @@ spec:
# gives headroom for parallel restores during cluster rebuild too
# (paperless + audiobookshelf + immich + ... all clone at once).
cephConfig:
mon:
# Ceph's 30% default assumes the mon has a filesystem to itself, where
# 30% free is a meaningful reserve. Here the mons live on
# dataDirHostPath /var/lib/rook — the node's /var, shared with ~29 GB
# of containerd image and snapshot storage — and the mon DB itself is
# ~106 MB. So the default measures container churn, not Ceph: k8s-2
# trips MON_DISK_LOW whenever the image cache fills, and image GC does
# not clear it (most of /var/lib/containerd is overlayfs snapshots held
# by running containers, which GC cannot reclaim — see #434).
# 20% of a 60 GB /var still leaves ~12 GB against a 106 MB database.
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
# monitoring-rules watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
# node filling rather than the mon growing.
#
# BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this. Give the mons their own volume and
# the default 30% becomes meaningful again, at which point this override
# should be dropped rather than carried over. It cannot be done on the
# current cluster — every StorageClass is Ceph-backed, so a mon PVC
# would be circular, and Rook only applies mon.volumeClaimTemplate to
# newly created mons, never migrating existing ones.
mon_data_avail_warn: "20"
mgr:
mgr/volumes/max_concurrent_clones: "16"
# QLC tune for the Crucial P2 NVMe per host. Baseline 2026-05-05:
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- cephcluster.yaml
- toolbox.yaml
- storageclass.yaml
- volumesnapshotclass.yaml
- objectstore.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
# Upstream Rook toolbox, taken verbatim from
# https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rook/rook/v1.20.4/deploy/examples/toolbox.yaml
# (matching the operator image docker.io/rook/ceph:v1.20.4), with three
# deliberate changes:
# - the image is pinned to the cluster's own Ceph version and carries the
# same imagepolicy marker as cephcluster.yaml, so the client never drifts
# ahead of the mons it talks to
# - resource requests/limits, since this is a long-lived idle pod
# - no other divergence; keep it that way so upstream diffs stay readable
#
# This is the only admin path to Ceph internals. Without it `ceph status`,
# `ceph health detail`, `ceph osd df tree`, `ceph osd perf` and `ceph device
# ls` are unreachable during an incident: the mons, OSDs and mgr mount no
# admin keyring, and the operator's /etc/ceph is empty.
#
# It mounts the client.admin keyring from the rook-ceph-mon secret, so it is
# a full-privilege credential holder, not a read-only one — Rook offers no
# lesser-privileged toolbox. Ingress to it is gated by the namespace
# default-deny-ingress CNP (network-policies/rook-ceph-ns.yaml).
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: rook-ceph-tools
namespace: rook-ceph
labels:
app: rook-ceph-tools
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: rook-ceph-tools
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: rook-ceph-tools
spec:
dnsPolicy: ClusterFirstWithHostNet
serviceAccountName: rook-ceph-default
containers:
- name: rook-ceph-tools
image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.5 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
command:
- /bin/bash
- -c
- |
# Replicate the script from toolbox.sh inline so the ceph image
# can be run directly, instead of requiring the rook toolbox
CEPH_CONFIG="/etc/ceph/ceph.conf"
MON_CONFIG="/etc/rook/mon-endpoints"
KEYRING_FILE="/etc/ceph/keyring"
CONFIG_OVERRIDE="/etc/rook-config-override/config"
# create a ceph config file in its default location so ceph/rados tools can be used
# without specifying any arguments
write_endpoints() {
endpoints=$(cat ${MON_CONFIG})
# filter out the mon names
# external cluster can have numbers or hyphens in mon names, handling them in regex
# shellcheck disable=SC2001
mon_endpoints=$(echo "${endpoints}"| sed 's/[a-z0-9_-]\+=//g')
DATE=$(date)
echo "$DATE writing mon endpoints to ${CEPH_CONFIG}: ${endpoints}"
cat <<EOF > ${CEPH_CONFIG}
[global]
mon_host = ${mon_endpoints}
[client.admin]
keyring = ${KEYRING_FILE}
EOF
# Merge the config override if it exists and is not empty
if [ -f "${CONFIG_OVERRIDE}" ] && [ -s "${CONFIG_OVERRIDE}" ]; then
echo "$DATE merging config override from ${CONFIG_OVERRIDE}"
echo "" >> ${CEPH_CONFIG}
cat ${CONFIG_OVERRIDE} >> ${CEPH_CONFIG}
echo "" >> ${CEPH_CONFIG}
fi
}
# watch the endpoints config file and update if the mon endpoints ever change
watch_endpoints() {
# get the timestamp for the target of the soft link
real_path=$(realpath ${MON_CONFIG})
initial_time=$(stat -c %Z "${real_path}")
while true; do
real_path=$(realpath ${MON_CONFIG})
latest_time=$(stat -c %Z "${real_path}")
if [[ "${latest_time}" != "${initial_time}" ]]; then
write_endpoints
initial_time=${latest_time}
fi
sleep 10
done
}
# read the secret from an env var (for backward compatibility), or from the secret file
ceph_secret=${ROOK_CEPH_SECRET}
if [[ "$ceph_secret" == "" ]]; then
ceph_secret=$(cat /var/lib/rook-ceph-mon/secret.keyring)
fi
# create the keyring file
cat <<EOF > ${KEYRING_FILE}
[${ROOK_CEPH_USERNAME}]
key = ${ceph_secret}
EOF
# write the initial config file
write_endpoints
# continuously update the mon endpoints if they fail over
watch_endpoints
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
tty: true
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 2016
runAsGroup: 2016
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
env:
- name: ROOK_CEPH_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: rook-ceph-mon
key: ceph-username
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /etc/ceph
name: ceph-config
- name: mon-endpoint-volume
mountPath: /etc/rook
- name: ceph-admin-secret
mountPath: /var/lib/rook-ceph-mon
readOnly: true
- name: rook-config-override
mountPath: /etc/rook-config-override
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: ceph-admin-secret
secret:
secretName: rook-ceph-mon
optional: false
items:
- key: ceph-secret
path: secret.keyring
- name: mon-endpoint-volume
configMap:
name: rook-ceph-mon-endpoints
items:
- key: data
path: mon-endpoints
- name: rook-config-override
configMap:
name: rook-config-override
optional: true
- name: ceph-config
emptyDir: {}
tolerations:
- key: "node.kubernetes.io/unreachable"
operator: "Exists"
effect: "NoExecute"
tolerationSeconds: 5
+8 -2
View File
@@ -249,6 +249,11 @@ data:
identity-heartbeat-timeout: "30m0s"
identity-gc-interval: "15m0s"
# Exclude Woodpecker's per-build labels from identity computation, so CI
# steps share one identity instead of minting one each. Keep in lockstep
# with patches/cilium-cni.yaml and values.labels in
# kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml.
labels: '!woodpecker-ci\.org/.* !step$'
cilium-endpoint-gc-interval: "5m0s"
nodes-gc-interval: "5m0s"
@@ -302,8 +307,9 @@ data:
# sizing of the TCP CT, non-TCP CT, NAT and policy BPF maps.
bpf-map-dynamic-size-ratio: "0.0025"
# bpf-policy-map-max specifies the maximum number of entries in endpoint
# policy map (per endpoint)
bpf-policy-map-max: "16384"
# policy map (per endpoint). Keep in lockstep with patches/cilium-cni.yaml and
# values.bpf.policyMapMax in kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml.
bpf-policy-map-max: "65536"
# bpf-policy-stats-map-max specifies the maximum number of entries in global
# policy stats map
bpf-policy-stats-map-max: "65536"
+11 -2
View File
@@ -267,6 +267,11 @@ cluster:
identity-heartbeat-timeout: "30m0s"
identity-gc-interval: "15m0s"
# Exclude Woodpecker's per-build labels from identity computation, so
# CI steps share one identity instead of minting one each. Keep in
# lockstep with values.labels in
# kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml.
labels: '!woodpecker-ci\.org/.* !step$'
cilium-endpoint-gc-interval: "5m0s"
nodes-gc-interval: "5m0s"
@@ -320,8 +325,12 @@ cluster:
# sizing of the TCP CT, non-TCP CT, NAT and policy BPF maps.
bpf-map-dynamic-size-ratio: "0.0025"
# bpf-policy-map-max specifies the maximum number of entries in endpoint
# policy map (per endpoint)
bpf-policy-map-max: "16384"
# policy map (per endpoint). Keep in lockstep with values.bpf.policyMapMax
# in kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml, and with the third
# copy in kubernetes/talos/cilium.yaml: bootstrap installs Cilium from this
# inline manifest, so a lower value here means a cold rebuild comes up with
# a map that overflows until Flux reconciles.
bpf-policy-map-max: "65536"
# bpf-policy-stats-map-max specifies the maximum number of entries in global
# policy stats map
bpf-policy-stats-map-max: "65536"
+16 -12
View File
@@ -26,19 +26,23 @@ machine:
nodeIP:
validSubnets:
- 10.2.40.0/24
# Lower the image GC thresholds from the kubelet defaults (85/80)
# so containerd's image cache is pruned before /var crosses Ceph's
# mon_data_avail_warn line (mon DB warns when its hostpath has
# <30% free). k8s-2 and k8s-3 sit at 77-79% used because of pod
# density (75 pods on k8s-2 vs 42 on k8s-1) — unused image layers
# accumulate untouched until the 85% high watermark, which the
# node never hits, so GC never fires. 70/60 keeps /var safely
# under 30%-free without raising the VM disk again. Spegel P2P
# pull-through softens the re-pull cost when GC'd images are
# needed back.
# Lower the image GC thresholds from the kubelet defaults (85/80) so
# containerd's image cache is pruned before /var crosses Ceph's
# mon_data_avail_warn line — the mon DB warns when its hostpath has
# <=30% free, and mons live on /var/lib/rook (hostPath, no PVC).
# High must stay strictly below that line, not on it: a high of 70
# means GC first fires at exactly 30% free, which is the warn point
# itself, so every cache fill-up trips MON_DISK_LOW before kubelet
# reclaims anything. 60/50 fires at 40% free and reclaims to 50%,
# keeping 10 points of margin.
# containerd is the dominant local consumer of /var (~29 GB of 60 on
# k8s-2, which carries 75 pods against 42 on k8s-1) and most of it is
# reclaimable — 179 images cached against 60 in use. Spegel P2P
# pull-through softens the re-pull cost when GC'd images are needed
# back.
extraConfig:
imageGCHighThresholdPercent: 70
imageGCLowThresholdPercent: 60
imageGCHighThresholdPercent: 60
imageGCLowThresholdPercent: 50
cluster:
controlPlane:
endpoint: https://k8s.renner.uno:6443
+15 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
locals {
renner_uno_records = {
# A Records
"@" = { type = "A", value = "159.69.42.237" }
"www" = { type = "A", value = "159.69.42.237" }
# No "@" / "www" entries. Both used to pin renner.uno and www.renner.uno
# to 159.69.42.237, the Hetzner VM that hosted the WordPress site until it
# moved into the cluster (kubernetes/apps/wordpress). Neither record is
# actually live on the UDM any more — verified 2026-08-16: a LAN query for
# www.renner.uno returns the public answer (proxy.renner.uno) — so this
# block was drift waiting to be re-applied.
#
# The correct end state is exactly this absence: www.renner.uno is labelled
# dns.renner.uno/public, so external-dns-unifi deliberately writes no UDM
# record and LAN clients follow the public path (wildcard -> proxy) and
# hairpin back in. Re-adding an A record here would point the house at a
# server that is being decommissioned.
#
# The apex stays with Cloudflare, where a redirect rule sends
# renner.uno/* to https://www.renner.uno/*.
# CNAME Records (External Targets)
"nut" = { type = "CNAME", value = "nut.srv.renner.uno" }
+4 -2
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ locals {
"renner-uno-k8s-velero", # Velero PVC backups (Kopia data mover)
"renner-uno-k8s-secrets", # SOPS talosconfig/kubeconfig for cluster bootstrap
"renner-uno-tfstate", # OpenTofu remote state (migrated off the nas-1 Garage S3)
"renner-uno-k8s-mariadb", # mariadb-operator logical dumps (wordpress-mariadb)
]
}
@@ -95,8 +96,9 @@ locals {
# precedent in this repo — left uncapped (keep every version) since
# storage cost there is negligible.
hetzner_buckets_noncurrent_expiry_days = {
"renner-uno-k8s-cnpg" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-velero" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-cnpg" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-velero" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-mariadb" = 30 # Backup maxRetention: 720h (kubernetes/apps/wordpress/mariadb.yaml)
}
}