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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 fb3724f603 fix(wordpress): route the outpost OAuth path so the gate is a gate, not a dead end
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Verified against the deployed cluster: GET /wp-admin/ correctly 302s to
https://www.renner.uno/outpost.goauthentik.io/start?rd=... — and that URL
returned WordPress's 404 page, because /outpost.goauthentik.io fell through to
the public '/' prefix router.

The effect was that /wp-admin was unreachable rather than protected. An
attacker gains nothing, but neither does the editor the gate exists for.

paperless needs the same route and solves it with a separate Ingress on
auth.renner.uno (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml). Here the whole
flow stays on www.renner.uno, so the path belongs in this rule set.

These endpoints are the login flow itself and are served by the outpost, so
routing them to it is not an authentication hole.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:22:25 +02:00
k.renner 8d1c4eb7ca Merge pull request 'fix(wordpress): remove add_filter from wp-config, route xmlrpc through the gate' (#493) from fix-wordpress-config-extra into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#493
2026-08-16 20:13:31 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 faf79549ac fix(wordpress): remove add_filter from wp-config, route xmlrpc through the gate
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The first deploy returned 500 on every request:

  PHP Fatal error: Uncaught Error: Call to undefined function add_filter()
  in /var/www/html/wp-config.php(128) : eval()'d code

WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA is eval'd inside wp-config.php, which runs long before
wp-settings.php loads the plugin API. add_filter() does not exist yet at that
point, so the call was fatal on every request.

Removing it exposed the second, worse half: the comment justified the filter by
claiming xmlrpc.php was 'blocked at the ingress'. It was not. The public router
matches '/' as a prefix, so xmlrpc.php was served like any other path — the
claim was written without being checked.

An Ingress has no deny verb, so xmlrpc.php now routes to the Authentik gate
alongside /wp-admin and /wp-login.php: anonymous callers meet Authentik instead
of the XML-RPC endpoint. Nothing on this site uses it — no Jetpack, no mobile
app, no pingbacks worth keeping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:11:25 +02:00
k.renner 5336d9b849 Merge pull request 'feat(wordpress): migrate renner.uno off the Hetzner VM into the cluster' (#492) from wordpress-renner-uno into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#492
2026-08-16 20:07:03 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 aa37fb0a0a fix(wordpress): correct the network-policy claim and make the Velero selector safe
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Addresses the automated review on #492.

Blocking: two comments claimed the public/admin split was kept honest by
kubernetes/apps/wordpress/network-policy.yaml. That file does not exist — the
comment was written against the paperless template and never updated once the
namespace policy proved sufficient. The deeper point in the review is the real
one: a paperless-style workload-scoped policy would be a no-op here, because
traefik must reach the pod directly for every public page. The split is
enforced by the Ingress path rules and Authentik, not at the network layer,
and the comment now says so — an auditor looking for a network control would
otherwise have gone hunting for a file that was never there.

Velero: the schedule excluded the database PVC by app.kubernetes.io/instance,
a label the mariadb-operator was only assumed to set. A wrong assumption there
fails silently and sweeps the live database volume into the snapshot. Inverted
to select the content PVC by labels this repo sets on it, the same direction
openbao-daily already uses.

The Service-name assumption flagged as a suggestion is kept: the CRD's separate
primaryService/secondaryService fields indicate the base Service carries the
resource name, and a mismatch fails loudly at pod startup. Written down as a
first-deploy check rather than left implicit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 22:01:01 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b784ce3d38 feat(wordpress): host www.renner.uno in the cluster behind an Authentik gate
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Migrates the Hetzner VM 'wordpress-hochzeit' into the cluster. The site is not
the frozen wedding archive it looks like: it carries an unpublished, fully
composed birth announcement from 2026-05-14, so wp-admin has to keep working
for a human author rather than being replaced by a Git workflow.

Split routing on one host: '/' goes straight to WordPress so the blog stays
publicly readable, while /wp-admin and /wp-login.php route through a dedicated
wordpress-gate outpost. The inverse -- gate the host and skip_path_regex the
public paths, as paperless-gate does -- would need a negative lookahead, and
the outpost's RE2 has none.

Gating all of /wp-admin is only safe because the dead wpgiftregistry plugin is
dropped in the migration: it was the sole emitter of ajaxurl on this site, and
of 121 admin-ajax hits in the current log window not one returned 200.

Core lives in the pinned image, not on the volume, so upgrading is a tag bump
in Git. Only wp-content is persisted.

Backups are split the same way CNPG/Barman and Velero are elsewhere: the
operator takes a logical dump to Hetzner Object Storage at 02:45, Velero takes
the wp-content PVC at 08:45 and skips the database volume -- a crash-consistent
snapshot of a running database is not a backup.

Group membership for the gate is owned by Git, as with the Home Assistant,
Shelly and zone-configurator gates. s.renner is the Authentik account for the
site's WordPress Editor, whose login there is still the pre-2019 s.birzer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 21:48:49 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b976a67be8 feat(mariadb): add mariadb-operator and the wordpress backup bucket
WordPress speaks MySQL natively. The PostgreSQL route would mean pg4wp, an
SQL-rewriting shim whose README lists WordPress 6.5.3 as its newest tested
version while renner.uno runs 7.0.4 — every core update would become a
compatibility gamble.

Charts are OCI artifacts, so this follows the OCIRepository pattern from
spegel rather than the HelmRepository pattern used for CNPG. CRDs ship as a
separate chart that upstream requires first, hence the dependsOn. The version
range is capped at the year boundary: the project uses calendar versioning and
ships an upgrade guide with each minor.

renner-uno-k8s-mariadb carries the same 30d noncurrent-version expiry as the
CNPG and Velero buckets, matched to the Backup resource's maxRetention.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014giKN9N6e5J2DF8QZmVh98
2026-08-16 21:48:36 +02:00
k.renner 352f0b5cff Merge pull request 'fix(authentik): one passkey touch per login, password fallback when none enrolled' (#491) from fix-authentik-double-passkey-touch into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#491
2026-08-16 08:22:10 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 803cdb3db8 feat(authentik): fall back to password when no passkey is enrolled
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The passkey apps were reachable only with a WebAuthn credential:
passkey-passwordless-authentication denies at its validation stage, and
passkey-stepup-authorization demands a passkey on every authorize. An
account with no passkey had no way in.

Branch both flows on enrollment with an expression policy,
passkey-user-has-webauthn. Enrolled accounts keep the mandatory passkey
at login and at every authorize. Accounts without one skip the WebAuthn
stage and get default-authentication-password followed by
default-authentication-mfa-validation — the same pair, in the same
order, that default-authentication-flow already runs, so the fallback is
not a weaker way in than auth.renner.uno's own login.

The policy runs against pending_user, so the branch follows the
identified account's enrollment and is not selectable by the requester.
Bindings keep evaluate_on_plan false and re_evaluate_policies true;
on-plan evaluation would run before a user is resolved.

The negated bindings carry failure_result: true. UserLoginStage defaults
a missing authentication backend to BACKEND_INBUILT rather than
refusing, so a flow that dropped both branches would log the user in on
a username alone. A PolicyException resolves to failure_result before
negate is applied, so a broken expression degrades to password + MFA
instead of to no factor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:45:24 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 9e0ffae358 fix(authentik): share one WebAuthn stage across login and step-up
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Every fresh login to a passkey app costs two touches: one in
passkey-passwordless-authentication, a second immediately after in
passkey-stepup-authorization.

last_auth_threshold is enforced with a single browser cookie
(authentik_mfa) whose JWT is signed with, and carries, the validation
stage's PK. A stage only honours a cookie it wrote itself, and both
stages write to the same cookie name — so two stage objects each demand
their own touch and clobber each other's window.

Collapse them into one passkey-webauthn-validation stage bound into both
flows. not_configured_action is deny, since the authentication flow
reaches the stage with the user only identified and no password stage in
front of it. Passkey-less users enroll from user settings after a
password login; default-authenticator-webauthn-setup has a
configure_flow, so that path is live.

The 8h cookie now also covers the login flow, so a re-login in the same
browser inside the window is satisfied by the cookie alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 09:25:52 +02:00
security-bot 82573754b1 chore(image-automation): bump rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 20:36:17 +00:00
security-bot ba6ca6d0af chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 17:39:04 +00:00
security-bot 9e8c1fa6fe chore(image-automation): bump gotenberg/gotenberg:8.36.0
Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-14 17:36:16 +00:00
k.renner 7a80df3cfc Merge pull request 'fix(ical-proxy): pin the image so a new build actually rolls' (#490) from pin-ical-proxy-image into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#490
2026-08-13 19:40:58 +00:00
claude-bot a2de5b5f56 fix(ical-proxy): pin the image so a new build actually rolls
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:latest never rolls. The tag moves when a build publishes, but nothing
tells the Deployment: the pod template is unchanged, so Kubernetes has
no reason to replace anything.

Nothing else covers it either. This image is deliberately not enrolled in
Flux image automation — kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md
lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest, and
main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so no ImagePolicy watches it.
The two pods have been running a 21-day-old image while :latest moved
underneath them, and the only way to pick up a new build was a manual
restart, which leaves no record anywhere.

Pinning makes the rollout a git change. Flux applies the new pod
template, Kubernetes rolls it, and what is RUNNING becomes recoverable
from this repo instead of "whatever :latest meant the last time a pod
happened to restart".

main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds the
summary_match and summary_replace parameters. The waste calendar needs
them to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach" from every
collection — the feed repeats the whole calendar's name on each event,
and no consumer can shorten it after the fact.

Bumping this tag is now a manual, reviewed edit. Format is
main-<short-sha>, from docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
as prefix.
2026-08-13 21:38:29 +02:00
k.renner 8573cdf220 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): let Reloader restart the renderer on config and secret changes' (#489) from fix-trmnl-renderer-reloader into master
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2026-08-12 20:23:03 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 507e86cb83 fix(trmnl): let Reloader restart the renderer on config and secret changes
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The renderer's init container writes /data/schedules.json ONCE, at pod
start, and nothing re-reads either source afterwards. So a ConfigMap or
Secret change lands in git, updates the object, and the running
renderer keeps the old values indefinitely.

The app re-reads schedules.json every 60 seconds, which makes it look
self-updating. It is not — it re-reads the FILE, and only the init
container writes the file.

This was hit three times in practice, each needing `kubectl delete pod`
by hand:

  * switching the theme to Graphite E-ink Light — the pod kept
    rendering with a theme name that no longer existed
  * setting the schedule's lang field to "de"
  * every re-mint of the BYOS tokens, which is the Secret half

The theme case is the instructive one: nothing errored. HA silently
served the default theme for a name that did not resolve, so the panel
just looked wrong, and I was about to debug the design.

Annotates both sources. Named per-resource rather than the blanket
reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching terminus.yaml and
mosquitto-deployment.yaml.

Terminus got this annotation earlier; the renderer did not, despite
having the same init-container pattern and hitting the same failure in
the same session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:22:04 +02:00
k.renner b2ed2beae4 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): render the panel in German via the schedule's lang field' (#488) from fix-trmnl-render-lang into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#488
2026-08-12 20:18:58 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 f8c968c5a7 fix(trmnl): render the panel in German via the schedule's lang field
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lang was null, so the screenshot session rendered in English — and the
dashboard grew a German weekday array, a German month array and a
fifteen-entry weather-condition dict to translate around it by hand.

The field is documented as "UI language code (HA mode only)" and calls
Home Assistant's own _selectLanguage() on the page before capture;
upstream's tests use lang: 'de'. So localisation is HA's job and the
field was sitting in the schedule template, already written out, set to
null because I copied the shape without asking what it did.

Pairs with homeassistant#220, which deletes both hand-written mappings:
the weather badge points at weather.garten directly and the date is a
device_class: timestamp the frontend formats.

The instance stays language "en". This affects only the render session,
so the panel is German without changing anyone's UI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:16:43 +02:00
k.renner 595e5eb7a3 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): disable Terminus session expiry, the other half of the token fix' (#487) from fix-trmnl-session-expiry into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#487
2026-08-12 20:02:38 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 7e293d3de7 fix(trmnl): disable Terminus session expiry, the other half of the token fix
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The renderer stopped pushing and the panel preview froze. Every webhook:

  HTTP 401: Unauthorized - This session has expired, please login again

Terminus has TWO independent expiries and the earlier fix only addressed
one. API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD governs the JWT's own lifetime and is now
10 years. SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED / SESSION_INACTIVITY_LIMIT govern
the SESSION BEHIND that token and were left at their defaults, so a
valid, decade-long token stopped being accepted after about half an
hour of session inactivity.

Worth being precise, because the two look alike and are not: the first
failure was 400 "expired JWT access token", the token itself. This is
401 "This session has expired", the session. Different mechanism,
different error, same symptom — a panel that silently stops updating.

I noticed both expiries when diagnosing the first one, wrote that
Terminus "has two independent expiries", and then fixed one and moved
on. That is the actual mistake here, not the missing variable.

Disabling session expiry is the state the renderer's own code already
assumes ("stock Terminus disables session expiration"), which is false
by default and has to be made true here — the same shape as the token
period. And it is the deciding constraint for an unattended appliance:
a session that expires needs a human with a password to restore it, and
a hallway panel has neither.

Reloader will roll the pod; the ConfigMap annotation added earlier
covers this. Existing tokens must be re-minted afterwards — the current
session is already dead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 22:01:34 +02:00
k.renner 9423381102 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): point the renderer at Graphite E-ink Light' (#486) from fix-trmnl-graphite-theme into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#486
2026-08-12 19:36:24 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 ae12ce760c fix(trmnl): point the renderer at Graphite E-ink Light
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The renderer's own docs recommend Graphite by name — "Use e-ink theme
(Graphite recommended)", with theme=Graphite in the example — and the
Home Assistant community converges on it independently. The dashboard
now ships graphite-eink-light.yaml (homeassistant repo) in place of the
theme I hand-wrote from a spec sheet.

Pairs with homeassistant#216. The theme name must match the key inside
the vendored file exactly ("Graphite E-ink Light"); a name that does not
resolve fails silently — HA serves the default theme and the panel just
looks wrong rather than erroring.

Note upstream's example also passes `dark`. Not used here: the e-ink
LIGHT variant is the one that gives black-on-white, which is what an
e-paper panel wants. `dark: false` stays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 21:34:55 +02:00
k.renner 641e8bce84 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): make Terminus issue long-lived API tokens' (#485) from fix-trmnl-token-lifetime into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#485
2026-08-12 17:34:47 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 463e493ec0 docs(trmnl): cite the source for API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD
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The setting was treated as an unverified assumption in review, and I
repeated that framing. It was not one.

Upstream's doc/configuration.adoc documents the variable and its
1800-second default in as many words, and this instance corroborated it
empirically: a token minted here was rejected roughly thirty minutes
later, which is the documented default behaving exactly as written.
Documentation plus matching observed behaviour is not an assumption.

The reviewer's uncertainty was reasonable — Terminus's source is not
vendored in this repo, so from the checkout alone the claim is
unsupported. The failing was mine for citing nothing at the point of
use, which is the same gap as the /health probe earlier: the evidence
existed and was not written where a reader could find it. Quotes the
documentation inline so the question is answerable from the manifest.

Note this does not make the post-merge check redundant. Whether Terminus
honours the variable is settled here; whether this ConfigMap edit
actually reached the running process via Reloader is a separate
question, and that is what decoding the new token's exp claim answers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:30:03 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 8031a0ad7a docs(openbao): record the trmnl renderer tokens as deliberately unrotated
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Review's remaining point: with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD at 10 years,
nothing will ever expire the renderer's BYOS token or prompt anyone to
rotate it. Left undocumented, "never rotated" is indistinguishable from
"forgotten".

Records it where it is discoverable — the rotation directory itself,
whose purpose is that unrotated credentials are a visible choice rather
than an omission. Notes why there is no rotator: minting a Terminus JWT
requires the account password, which is precisely the secret this design
declined to hold in-cluster, so a rotator would have to store the thing
the long-lived token exists to avoid. Rotation is therefore manual, tied
to the Terminus account password changing.

Also flags that HA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the same OpenBao path is a different
case: secret-rotator already has an `ha-token` mode (home-assistant.yaml
uses it), so enrolling that one is a real follow-up rather than a
limitation, and doing so would leave only the BYOS pair unrotated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:25:32 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 18c8b74baa fix(trmnl): let Reloader roll terminus on ConfigMap changes
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Review caught that this PR, as it stood, would not have fixed the
outage it describes.

terminus-config is consumed via envFrom, and env vars are read once at
container start — Kubernetes does not hot-reload them. The ConfigMap is
a plain resource rather than a configMapGenerator, so editing it does
not change the pod template hash and Flux will not roll the pods
either. Stakater Reloader is deployed but acts only on annotated
workloads, and this Deployment carried no annotation.

Net effect would have been a silent no-op: git and the ConfigMap object
would show a 10-year token period while the running app kept issuing
30-minute tokens, and the re-mint step in the PR plan would have
produced another short-lived token that looked correct and expired
anyway. The manifest and reality would disagree with nothing to
indicate it.

Annotates for terminus-config specifically rather than the blanket
reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching the reasoning already
recorded on mosquitto-deployment.yaml — enrolling anything further
stays a visible, reviewable edit to that line.

Verified Reloader is actually running (kube-system/reloader-reloader).

This also removes a manual step rather than documenting one, which is
the point: a fix that needs a human to remember `kubectl rollout
restart` is not deployed, it is a runbook entry waiting to be missed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:20:29 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 e84ea02100 fix(trmnl): make Terminus issue long-lived API tokens
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The renderer renders correctly and pushes nothing. Every webhook is
rejected:

  [webhook] Webhook failed: 400 {"error":"expired JWT access token"}
  [webhook] BYOS auth: refresh failed (400) {"error":"expired JWT ..."}

Terminus issues API JWTs with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD, default 1800s.
Minting a replacement via POST /api/jwt requires a still-VALID access
token in the Authorization header, so an expired token cannot refresh
itself — the second line above is the refresh attempt being rejected by
the very expiry it was trying to repair. There is no recovery path once
the window closes.

That makes "mint once, store in OpenBao" unworkable for an unattended
appliance, which is what this stack is. The renderer's own code assumes
"stock Terminus disables session expiration and issues effectively
permanent tokens"; that is not true of this deployment. Rather than work
around the assumption in the client, this makes it true: sets
API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD to 10 years.

The trade is deliberate. A long-lived JWT with full Terminus API rights
now sits in OpenBao. The alternative was putting the Terminus account
PASSWORD into the cluster so an init container could mint a short-lived
token on every pod start — a strictly worse secret to hold, for a
LAN-only service whose token is revocable by rotating the account.

Also corrects the obtained_at comment on the renderer, which justified
stamping "now" by repeating that same false permanence assumption.
Stamping now is safe ONLY because of this setting; against the 30-minute
default it is actively harmful, because the app would believe a stale
token had a fresh window, skip its proactive refresh, and strand itself.
The comment now says so, and says what to do if this setting is reverted.

The period is fixed at mint time, so this does not revive the existing
tokens — they must be re-minted after it deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:15:43 +02:00
k.renner fc53334b31 Merge pull request 'fix(trmnl): give Chromium a writable HOME and stamp obtained_at' (#484) from fix-trmnl-renderer-runtime into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#484
2026-08-12 17:02:10 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 2dd3e8f0b2 fix(trmnl): bound the renderer's /tmp with a sized emptyDir
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
Follow-up to the HOME=/tmp fix in this PR, from review.

Pointing HOME at /tmp was correct but left it on the container's
writable layer, which was harmless while Chromium crashed on launch and
wrote nothing. With the browser actually starting once a minute for the
life of the pod, crashpad state and profile data now accumulate there
with nothing to bound them — resources.limits sets memory only, so
there is no ephemeral-storage ceiling to catch it either.

Backs it with an emptyDir at a 512Mi sizeLimit, matching the /tmp mount
convention already used in pve-exporter-deployment.yaml. The point of
the limit is the failure mode, not the size: unbounded it degrades into
node disk pressure, which surfaces far from this pod and hurts whatever
else lands on that node; bounded it is an eviction of the renderer,
attributable on sight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 18:53:55 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 d824263759 fix(trmnl): give Chromium a writable HOME and stamp obtained_at
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
Two runtime faults from the first deploy. Neither is visible statically
— both needed the pod running to find.

1. The browser never launched. Every render died with

     chrome_crashpad_handler: --database is required

   Chromium cannot start without a writable HOME: crashpad builds its
   database path from it. Diagnosed on the pod rather than guessed —
   HOME=/, uid=1000, / is root-owned 0755 and not writable, /tmp is.
   The cause is OUR securityContext, not the image: forcing
   runAsUser 1000 with no matching passwd entry makes HOME fall back
   to "/". Sets HOME=/tmp; crash dumps are throwaway, so they do not
   belong on the PVC.

   Worth being precise about, because review had flagged the dropped
   capabilities as the likely Chromium risk and the comment I added
   said they were fine. The capabilities were fine. Something adjacent
   to that securityContext broke it anyway, and the comment now says
   to check HOME before loosening the capability block.

2. Even once the browser works, nothing would have been pushed. The
   scheduler logged

     BYOS tokens ... expired beyond the refresh window

   and skipped the webhook entirely. It derives token age from
   obtained_at, and the template shipped a literal 0, so
   freshly-minted tokens read as dating from 1970. The init container
   now stamps it with jq's `now * 1000 | floor` at write time.
   Verified the filter produces a 13-digit epoch-ms value. Stock
   Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively permanent
   tokens, so a write-time stamp is honest enough.

Failure mode of the pair was quiet in the way this stack keeps being
quiet: pod Running and Ready, /health passing, schedule firing once a
minute, zero screens reaching Terminus.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 18:48:38 +02:00
k.renner b0f0f9242b Merge pull request 'feat(trmnl): deploy the headless dashboard renderer' (#483) from feat-trmnl-renderer into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#483
2026-08-12 16:43:16 +00:00
k.renner 0581bc334a Merge pull request 'chore(ansible): retire the monitoring plays for decommissioned hosts' (#479) from retire-dead-monitoring into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/issue-fix Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#479
2026-08-12 16:30:30 +00:00
security-bot 3f4846bbbc chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13
ci/woodpecker/cron/issue-fix Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-12 14:35:43 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 8e5b91e6d6 chore(ansible): retire the monitoring plays for decommissioned hosts
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
Prometheus and Loki run in Kubernetes -- statefulsets
prometheus-kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus and the Loki release, both up 93
days. The standalone VMs these plays targeted are gone: neither
prometheus.srv.renner.uno nor loki.srv.renner.uno resolves at all, and the
proxmox_logging group install-log-aggregation.yml targets is not in the
inventory.

So these rendered scrape configs, exporter installs and log shippers for
hosts that do not exist. Removed:

  plays/install-prometheus.yml          -> prometheus.srv.renner.uno (gone)
  plays/install-blackbox-exporter.yml   -> prometheus.srv.renner.uno (gone)
  plays/install-loki.yml                -> loki.srv.renner.uno (gone)
  plays/install-log-aggregation.yml     -> proxmox_logging (no such group)
  roles/prometheus-server, snmp-exporter, pve-exporter, unifi-poller,
  roles/blackbox-exporter, loki-server, promtail

Each role was consumed only by the plays above; promtail was referenced by
nothing at all. Verified no dangling references remain.

plays/update.yml imported install-log-aggregation.yml, so deleting it alone
would have broken the fleet update play. That import is removed and
update.yml re-syntax-checked.

This also retires #473, which changed IPv4 literals to FQDNs in
prometheus.yml.j2 and nodes.yml.j2. That was a change to a template nothing
renders. Its PR body described the instance-label consequences for
dashboards and alert rules, which was fiction -- no dashboard reads those
labels. When it would not apply I reported it as blocked on Proxmox API
credentials; the actual reason was that the target host had not existed for
months, and `--list-hosts` returning 0 was the evidence I misread.

Worth checking separately, not assumed here: whether anything scrapes the
PVE node_exporter and chrony_exporter today. install-node-exporter-pve.yml
still installs them on pve_cluster, but the config that pointed a Prometheus
at them was in the templates just deleted. If that was the only reference,
those metrics have been dark since the VM went away -- and the FQDN change
in #473 would have masked the question rather than raising it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Bot <claude-bot@renner.uno>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 22:10:50 +02:00
71 changed files with 1296 additions and 2128 deletions
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
---
# Deploy Blackbox Exporter to Prometheus server for endpoint probing
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-blackbox-exporter.yml
- name: Install Blackbox Exporter
hosts: prometheus.srv.renner.uno
become: yes
roles:
- blackbox-exporter
post_tasks:
- name: Verify blackbox_exporter is running
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:9115/metrics"
status_code: 200
register: exporter_health
retries: 3
delay: 5
until: exporter_health.status == 200
-86
View File
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
---
# Setup Log Aggregation Infrastructure
# This playbook configures the complete logging stack:
# 1. Loki server for log storage and querying
# 2. Alloy agents on all VMs/CTs for log collection
# 3. Syslog receiver for remote devices (Synology NAS, network devices)
#
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/setup-log-aggregation.yml
#
# To limit to specific hosts:
# --limit loki.srv.renner.uno # Only configure Loki server
# --limit proxmox_all_running # Only configure log agents
- name: Setup Loki Log Aggregation Server
hosts: proxmox_logging
become: yes
gather_facts: yes
roles:
- common
- loki-server
post_tasks:
- name: Verify Loki is running
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:3100/ready"
status_code: 200
register: loki_health
retries: 5
delay: 10
until: loki_health.status == 200
- name: Display Loki status
debug:
msg: "Loki is running and healthy at http://{{ inventory_hostname }}:3100"
- name: Deploy Monitoring Agent to Loki Server (with syslog receiver)
hosts: proxmox_logging
become: yes
gather_facts: yes
vars:
loki_endpoint: "http://loki.srv.renner.uno:3100"
prometheus_remote_write_endpoint: "http://prometheus.srv.renner.uno:9090/api/v1/write"
# Syslog receiver settings are defined in host_vars/loki.srv.renner.uno/vars.yml:
# - alloy_syslog_receiver_enabled: true
# - alloy_syslog_receiver_port: 1514
# - alloy_syslog_receiver_protocol: "udp"
# - alloy_syslog_receiver_format: "raw"
# - alloy_stability_level: "experimental"
roles:
- monitoring-agent
post_tasks:
- name: Display syslog receiver info
debug:
msg: |
Syslog receiver is listening on UDP port {{ alloy_syslog_receiver_port | default(1514) }}
Configure remote devices to send syslog to: {{ inventory_hostname }}:{{ alloy_syslog_receiver_port | default(1514) }}
when: alloy_syslog_receiver_enabled | default(false)
- name: Deploy Monitoring Agent to All Running VMs/CTs
hosts: proxmox_all_running:!proxmox_logging:!proxmox_noansible
become: yes
gather_facts: yes
serial: 10 # Deploy to 10 hosts at a time to avoid overwhelming the network
vars:
loki_endpoint: "http://loki.srv.renner.uno:3100"
prometheus_remote_write_endpoint: "http://prometheus.srv.renner.uno:9090/api/v1/write"
roles:
- monitoring-agent
post_tasks:
- name: Verify Alloy is running
systemd:
name: alloy
state: started
register: alloy_service
- name: Display agent status
debug:
msg: "Monitoring agent deployed successfully on {{ inventory_hostname }}"
when: alloy_service is defined
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
---
# Install Loki Log Aggregation Server
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-loki.yml
- name: Install Loki Log Aggregation Server
hosts: loki.srv.renner.uno
become: yes
gather_facts: yes
roles:
- common
- loki-server
post_tasks:
- name: Verify Loki is running
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:3100/ready"
status_code: 200
register: loki_health
retries: 5
delay: 10
until: loki_health.status == 200
- name: Display Loki status
debug:
msg: "Loki is running and healthy at http://{{ inventory_hostname }}:3100"
-43
View File
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
---
# Install Prometheus Metrics Server
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-prometheus.yml
- name: Install Prometheus Metrics Server
hosts: prometheus.srv.renner.uno
become: yes
gather_facts: yes
vars:
# Synology NAS SNMP targets
snmp_synology_targets:
- name: nas-1
target: "10.2.40.50"
- name: nas-2
target: "10.3.40.57"
# SNMPv3 credentials from vault
snmp_use_v3: true
snmp_v3_username: "{{ vault_snmp_v3_username }}"
snmp_v3_auth_password: "{{ vault_snmp_v3_auth_password }}"
snmp_v3_priv_password: "{{ vault_snmp_v3_priv_password }}"
roles:
- common
- prometheus-server
- snmp-exporter
- pve-exporter
- unifi-poller
post_tasks:
- name: Verify Prometheus is running
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:9090/-/ready"
status_code: 200
register: prometheus_health
retries: 5
delay: 10
until: prometheus_health.status == 200
- name: Display Prometheus status
debug:
msg: "Prometheus is running and healthy at http://{{ inventory_hostname }}:9090"
-1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
- import_playbook: install-grist.yml
- import_playbook: install-music-assistant.yml
- import_playbook: update-docker.yml
- import_playbook: install-log-aggregation.yml
- import_playbook: update-pve-rolling.yml
- name: Update Summary
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
---
blackbox_exporter_version: "0.25.0"
blackbox_exporter_port: 9115
blackbox_exporter_user: "blackbox_exporter"
blackbox_exporter_group: "blackbox_exporter"
# Endpoints to probe
blackbox_http_targets:
- name: "gitea"
url: "https://gitea.renner.uno"
- name: "immich"
url: "https://immich.renner.uno"
- name: "authentik"
url: "https://auth.renner.uno"
- name: "home-assistant"
url: "https://ha.renner.uno"
- name: "grafana"
url: "https://grafana.renner.uno"
- name: "prometheus"
url: "https://prometheus.renner.uno"
blackbox_dns_targets: []
blackbox_tcp_targets:
- name: "postgres-ha"
target: "10.2.40.135:5432"
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart blackbox_exporter
systemd:
name: blackbox_exporter
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Create blackbox_exporter group
group:
name: "{{ blackbox_exporter_group }}"
system: yes
state: present
- name: Create blackbox_exporter user
user:
name: "{{ blackbox_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ blackbox_exporter_group }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
createhome: no
state: present
- name: Create blackbox_exporter directories
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ blackbox_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ blackbox_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0755'
loop:
- /etc/blackbox_exporter
- /var/lib/blackbox_exporter
- name: Download blackbox_exporter
get_url:
url: "https://github.com/prometheus/blackbox_exporter/releases/download/v{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64.tar.gz"
dest: "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.tar.gz"
mode: '0644'
- name: Extract blackbox_exporter
unarchive:
src: "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.tar.gz"
dest: /tmp
remote_src: yes
creates: "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64"
- name: Install blackbox_exporter binary
copy:
src: "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64/blackbox_exporter"
dest: /usr/local/bin/blackbox_exporter
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0755'
remote_src: yes
notify: Restart blackbox_exporter
- name: Deploy blackbox_exporter configuration
template:
src: blackbox.yml.j2
dest: /etc/blackbox_exporter/blackbox.yml
owner: "{{ blackbox_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ blackbox_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart blackbox_exporter
- name: Deploy blackbox_exporter systemd service
template:
src: blackbox_exporter.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/blackbox_exporter.service
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart blackbox_exporter
- name: Enable and start blackbox_exporter
systemd:
name: blackbox_exporter
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.tar.gz"
- "/tmp/blackbox_exporter-{{ blackbox_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64"
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
modules:
http_2xx:
prober: http
timeout: 5s
http:
valid_http_versions: ["HTTP/1.1", "HTTP/2.0"]
valid_status_codes: [] # Defaults to 2xx
method: GET
follow_redirects: true
fail_if_ssl: false
fail_if_not_ssl: false
tls_config:
insecure_skip_verify: false
http_post_2xx:
prober: http
timeout: 5s
http:
method: POST
valid_status_codes: []
tcp_connect:
prober: tcp
timeout: 5s
# DNS module for external domain resolution (tests upstream/cache)
dns_external:
prober: dns
timeout: 5s
dns:
query_name: "google.com"
query_type: "A"
valid_rcodes:
- NOERROR
# DNS module for internal domain resolution (tests local resolution)
dns_internal:
prober: dns
timeout: 5s
dns:
query_name: "k8s-1.srv.renner.uno"
query_type: "A"
valid_rcodes:
- NOERROR
# DNS module for common cached domain
dns_cached:
prober: dns
timeout: 5s
dns:
query_name: "cloudflare.com"
query_type: "A"
valid_rcodes:
- NOERROR
icmp:
prober: icmp
timeout: 5s
icmp:
preferred_ip_protocol: "ip4"
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Prometheus Blackbox Exporter
Documentation=https://github.com/prometheus/blackbox_exporter
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ blackbox_exporter_user }}
Group={{ blackbox_exporter_group }}
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/blackbox_exporter \
--config.file=/etc/blackbox_exporter/blackbox.yml \
--web.listen-address=:{{ blackbox_exporter_port }}
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
# Allow ICMP probing (requires CAP_NET_RAW)
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_RAW
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_RAW
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
---
# Loki Server Configuration
# Version and download
loki_version: "3.4.2"
loki_arch: "linux-amd64"
loki_download_url: "https://github.com/grafana/loki/releases/download/v{{ loki_version }}/loki-{{ loki_arch }}.zip"
loki_bin_path: "/usr/local/bin/loki"
# Directories
loki_data_dir: "/var/lib/loki"
loki_config_dir: "/etc/loki"
loki_config_file: "{{ loki_config_dir }}/loki-config.yaml"
# Server configuration
loki_http_listen_port: 3100
loki_grpc_listen_port: 9096
loki_http_listen_address: "0.0.0.0"
# Retention settings (90 days)
loki_retention_period: "2160h" # 90 days
loki_retention_delete_delay: "2h"
# Storage configuration
loki_storage_type: "filesystem"
loki_chunks_directory: "{{ loki_data_dir }}/chunks"
loki_rules_directory: "{{ loki_data_dir }}/rules"
# Index configuration
loki_index_prefix: "loki_index_"
loki_index_period: "24h"
# Limits
loki_ingestion_rate_mb: 10
loki_ingestion_burst_size_mb: 20
loki_max_streams_per_user: 10000
loki_max_entries_limit_per_query: 5000
# Query settings
loki_max_query_length: "720h" # 30 days max query span
# Systemd service
loki_user: "loki"
loki_group: "loki"
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart loki
systemd:
name: loki
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Reload systemd
systemd:
daemon_reload: yes
-95
View File
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
---
# Loki Server Installation and Configuration
- name: Install dependencies
apt:
name:
- unzip
- curl
state: present
update_cache: yes
- name: Create loki user
user:
name: "{{ loki_user }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
create_home: no
- name: Create directories
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ loki_user }}"
group: "{{ loki_group }}"
mode: '0755'
loop:
- "{{ loki_config_dir }}"
- "{{ loki_data_dir }}"
- "{{ loki_chunks_directory }}"
- "{{ loki_rules_directory }}"
- "{{ loki_data_dir }}/index"
- "{{ loki_data_dir }}/index_cache"
- "{{ loki_data_dir }}/compactor"
- name: Download Loki
get_url:
url: "{{ loki_download_url }}"
dest: "/tmp/loki.zip"
mode: '0644'
- name: Unzip Loki
unarchive:
src: "/tmp/loki.zip"
dest: "/tmp"
remote_src: yes
- name: Install Loki binary
copy:
src: "/tmp/loki-{{ loki_arch }}"
dest: "{{ loki_bin_path }}"
mode: '0755'
remote_src: yes
notify: Restart loki
- name: Create Loki configuration
template:
src: loki-config.yaml.j2
dest: "{{ loki_config_file }}"
owner: "{{ loki_user }}"
group: "{{ loki_group }}"
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart loki
- name: Create Loki systemd service
template:
src: loki.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/loki.service
mode: '0644'
notify:
- Reload systemd
- Restart loki
- name: Enable and start Loki service
systemd:
name: loki
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Wait for Loki to be ready
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:{{ loki_http_listen_port }}/ready"
status_code: 200
register: result
until: result.status == 200
retries: 30
delay: 5
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- "/tmp/loki.zip"
- "/tmp/loki-{{ loki_arch }}"
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
# Loki Configuration
# Generated by Ansible
auth_enabled: false
server:
http_listen_address: {{ loki_http_listen_address }}
http_listen_port: {{ loki_http_listen_port }}
grpc_listen_port: {{ loki_grpc_listen_port }}
log_level: info
common:
instance_addr: 127.0.0.1
path_prefix: {{ loki_data_dir }}
storage:
filesystem:
chunks_directory: {{ loki_chunks_directory }}
rules_directory: {{ loki_rules_directory }}
replication_factor: 1
ring:
kvstore:
store: inmemory
query_range:
results_cache:
cache:
embedded_cache:
enabled: true
max_size_mb: 100
schema_config:
configs:
- from: 2024-01-01
store: tsdb
object_store: filesystem
schema: v13
index:
prefix: {{ loki_index_prefix }}
period: {{ loki_index_period }}
storage_config:
tsdb_shipper:
active_index_directory: {{ loki_data_dir }}/index
cache_location: {{ loki_data_dir }}/index_cache
compactor:
working_directory: {{ loki_data_dir }}/compactor
compaction_interval: 10m
retention_enabled: true
retention_delete_delay: {{ loki_retention_delete_delay }}
retention_delete_worker_count: 150
delete_request_store: filesystem
limits_config:
retention_period: {{ loki_retention_period }}
ingestion_rate_mb: {{ loki_ingestion_rate_mb }}
ingestion_burst_size_mb: {{ loki_ingestion_burst_size_mb }}
max_streams_per_user: {{ loki_max_streams_per_user }}
max_entries_limit_per_query: {{ loki_max_entries_limit_per_query }}
max_query_length: {{ loki_max_query_length }}
reject_old_samples: true
reject_old_samples_max_age: 168h # 7 days
ruler:
alertmanager_url: ""
storage:
type: local
local:
directory: {{ loki_rules_directory }}
analytics:
reporting_enabled: false
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Loki Log Aggregation System
Documentation=https://grafana.com/docs/loki/latest/
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ loki_user }}
Group={{ loki_group }}
ExecStart={{ loki_bin_path }} -config.file={{ loki_config_file }}
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10s
LimitNOFILE=65536
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ReadWritePaths={{ loki_data_dir }}
PrivateTmp=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
---
# Prometheus Server Configuration
# Version and download
prometheus_version: "3.2.1"
prometheus_arch: "linux-amd64"
prometheus_download_url: "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/releases/download/v{{ prometheus_version }}/prometheus-{{ prometheus_version }}.{{ prometheus_arch }}.tar.gz"
prometheus_bin_path: "/usr/local/bin/prometheus"
prometheus_promtool_path: "/usr/local/bin/promtool"
# Directories
prometheus_data_dir: "/var/lib/prometheus"
prometheus_config_dir: "/etc/prometheus"
prometheus_config_file: "{{ prometheus_config_dir }}/prometheus.yml"
prometheus_rules_dir: "{{ prometheus_config_dir }}/rules"
prometheus_targets_dir: "{{ prometheus_config_dir }}/targets"
# Server configuration
prometheus_listen_address: "0.0.0.0"
prometheus_listen_port: 9090
prometheus_web_external_url: ""
# Retention settings (90 days)
prometheus_retention_time: "90d"
prometheus_retention_size: "30GB"
# Scrape settings
prometheus_scrape_interval: "30s"
prometheus_evaluation_interval: "30s"
prometheus_scrape_timeout: "10s"
# Remote write (for Alloy agents)
prometheus_remote_write_enabled: true
# Systemd service
prometheus_user: "prometheus"
prometheus_group: "prometheus"
# Alert notification endpoints
prometheus_alertmanager_url: ""
# Email alerting (via Grafana)
alerting_email_enabled: true
alerting_email_to: ""
# Home Assistant webhook for alerts
alerting_ha_webhook_enabled: true
alerting_ha_webhook_url: ""
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart prometheus
systemd:
name: prometheus
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Reload prometheus
systemd:
name: prometheus
state: reloaded
- name: Reload systemd
systemd:
daemon_reload: yes
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
---
# Prometheus Server Installation and Configuration
- name: Install dependencies
apt:
name:
- curl
state: present
update_cache: yes
- name: Create prometheus user
user:
name: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
create_home: no
- name: Create directories
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
group: "{{ prometheus_group }}"
mode: '0755'
loop:
- "{{ prometheus_config_dir }}"
- "{{ prometheus_data_dir }}"
- "{{ prometheus_rules_dir }}"
- "{{ prometheus_targets_dir }}"
- name: Download Prometheus
get_url:
url: "{{ prometheus_download_url }}"
dest: "/tmp/prometheus.tar.gz"
mode: '0644'
- name: Extract Prometheus
unarchive:
src: "/tmp/prometheus.tar.gz"
dest: "/tmp"
remote_src: yes
- name: Install Prometheus binaries
copy:
src: "/tmp/prometheus-{{ prometheus_version }}.{{ prometheus_arch }}/{{ item.src }}"
dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
mode: '0755'
remote_src: yes
loop:
- { src: "prometheus", dest: "{{ prometheus_bin_path }}" }
- { src: "promtool", dest: "{{ prometheus_promtool_path }}" }
notify: Restart prometheus
- name: Check for console templates
stat:
path: "/tmp/prometheus-{{ prometheus_version }}.{{ prometheus_arch }}/consoles"
register: consoles_dir
- name: Copy console templates
copy:
src: "/tmp/prometheus-{{ prometheus_version }}.{{ prometheus_arch }}/{{ item }}/"
dest: "{{ prometheus_config_dir }}/{{ item }}/"
remote_src: yes
owner: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
group: "{{ prometheus_group }}"
loop:
- consoles
- console_libraries
when: consoles_dir.stat.exists
- name: Create Prometheus configuration
template:
src: prometheus.yml.j2
dest: "{{ prometheus_config_file }}"
owner: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
group: "{{ prometheus_group }}"
mode: '0644'
validate: "{{ prometheus_promtool_path }} check config %s"
notify: Restart prometheus
- name: Create alert rules
template:
src: alert-rules.yml.j2
dest: "{{ prometheus_rules_dir }}/alert-rules.yml"
owner: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
group: "{{ prometheus_group }}"
mode: '0644'
notify: Reload prometheus
- name: Create node exporter targets file
template:
src: nodes.yml.j2
dest: "{{ prometheus_targets_dir }}/nodes.yml"
owner: "{{ prometheus_user }}"
group: "{{ prometheus_group }}"
mode: '0644'
- name: Create Prometheus systemd service
template:
src: prometheus.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/prometheus.service
mode: '0644'
notify:
- Reload systemd
- Restart prometheus
- name: Enable and start Prometheus service
systemd:
name: prometheus
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Wait for Prometheus to be ready
uri:
url: "http://127.0.0.1:{{ prometheus_listen_port }}/-/ready"
status_code: 200
register: result
until: result.status == 200
retries: 30
delay: 5
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- "/tmp/prometheus.tar.gz"
- "/tmp/prometheus-{{ prometheus_version }}.{{ prometheus_arch }}"
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
# Prometheus Alert Rules
# Generated by Ansible
groups:
- name: infrastructure
rules:
# Disk usage alerts
- alert: HighDiskUsage
expr: (node_filesystem_avail_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"} / node_filesystem_size_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"}) * 100 < 15
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High disk usage on {{ '{{' }} $labels.instance {{ '}}' }}"
description: "Disk usage is above 85% on {{ '{{' }} $labels.mountpoint {{ '}}' }} ({{ '{{' }} $value | printf \"%.1f\" {{ '}}' }}% free)"
- alert: CriticalDiskUsage
expr: (node_filesystem_avail_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"} / node_filesystem_size_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay"}) * 100 < 5
for: 2m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Critical disk usage on {{ '{{' }} $labels.instance {{ '}}' }}"
description: "Disk usage is above 95% on {{ '{{' }} $labels.mountpoint {{ '}}' }} ({{ '{{' }} $value | printf \"%.1f\" {{ '}}' }}% free)"
# Memory alerts
- alert: HighMemoryUsage
expr: (1 - (node_memory_MemAvailable_bytes / node_memory_MemTotal_bytes)) * 100 > 90
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High memory usage on {{ '{{' }} $labels.instance {{ '}}' }}"
description: "Memory usage is above 90% ({{ '{{' }} $value | printf \"%.1f\" {{ '}}' }}%)"
# CPU alerts
- alert: HighCPUUsage
expr: 100 - (avg by(instance) (rate(node_cpu_seconds_total{mode="idle"}[5m])) * 100) > 85
for: 10m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High CPU usage on {{ '{{' }} $labels.instance {{ '}}' }}"
description: "CPU usage is above 85% for 10 minutes ({{ '{{' }} $value | printf \"%.1f\" {{ '}}' }}%)"
- name: services
rules:
# Service down alerts
- alert: ServiceDown
expr: up == 0
for: 2m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Service {{ '{{' }} $labels.job {{ '}}' }} down on {{ '{{' }} $labels.instance {{ '}}' }}"
description: "Service has been unreachable for more than 2 minutes"
# DNS VIP health
- alert: DNSVIPDown
expr: absent(up{job="dns-servers"} == 1) or count(up{job="dns-servers"} == 1) < 2
for: 1m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "DNS cluster degraded"
description: "Less than 2 DNS servers are healthy"
- name: security
rules:
# High auth failure rate (placeholder - needs log-based metrics from Loki)
- alert: HighAuthFailureRate
expr: rate(authentik_login_failed_total[5m]) > 5
for: 2m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High authentication failure rate"
description: "More than 5 auth failures per minute detected"
- name: loki
rules:
# Loki health
- alert: LokiDown
expr: up{job="loki"} == 0
for: 2m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Loki log aggregation is down"
description: "Loki has been unreachable for more than 2 minutes"
# Loki ingestion rate
- alert: LokiHighIngestionRate
expr: rate(loki_distributor_bytes_received_total[5m]) > 10485760
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High log ingestion rate in Loki"
description: "Log ingestion rate is above 10MB/s"
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
# Node Exporter targets - auto-generated by Ansible
# Updates require re-running the prometheus playbook
#
# NOTE: Most hosts have Alloy agents that push metrics via remote_write.
# This file only includes hosts that need direct scraping (standalone node_exporter).
# Alloy-managed hosts are excluded to avoid duplicate "down" targets.
# PVE cluster nodes - need direct scraping (no Alloy agent)
- targets:
- 'jupiter.renner.uno:9100'
labels:
job: 'node'
group: 'pve_cluster'
hostname: 'jupiter'
- targets:
- 'neptune.renner.uno:9100'
labels:
job: 'node'
group: 'pve_cluster'
hostname: 'neptune'
- targets:
- 'saturn.renner.uno:9100'
labels:
job: 'node'
group: 'pve_cluster'
hostname: 'saturn'
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Prometheus Monitoring System
Documentation=https://prometheus.io/docs/
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ prometheus_user }}
Group={{ prometheus_group }}
ExecStart={{ prometheus_bin_path }} \
--config.file={{ prometheus_config_file }} \
--storage.tsdb.path={{ prometheus_data_dir }} \
--storage.tsdb.retention.time={{ prometheus_retention_time }} \
--storage.tsdb.retention.size={{ prometheus_retention_size }} \
--web.listen-address={{ prometheus_listen_address }}:{{ prometheus_listen_port }} \
{% if prometheus_remote_write_enabled %}
--web.enable-remote-write-receiver \
{% endif %}
{% if prometheus_web_external_url %}
--web.external-url={{ prometheus_web_external_url }} \
{% endif %}
--web.enable-lifecycle
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10s
LimitNOFILE=65536
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ReadWritePaths={{ prometheus_data_dir }}
PrivateTmp=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
# Prometheus Configuration
# Generated by Ansible
global:
scrape_interval: {{ prometheus_scrape_interval }}
evaluation_interval: {{ prometheus_evaluation_interval }}
scrape_timeout: {{ prometheus_scrape_timeout }}
external_labels:
cluster: homelab
datacenter: renner
rule_files:
- "{{ prometheus_rules_dir }}/*.yml"
{% if prometheus_alertmanager_url %}
alerting:
alertmanagers:
- static_configs:
- targets:
- {{ prometheus_alertmanager_url }}
{% endif %}
scrape_configs:
# Prometheus self-monitoring
- job_name: 'prometheus'
static_configs:
- targets: ['localhost:{{ prometheus_listen_port }}']
# Loki metrics
- job_name: 'loki'
static_configs:
- targets: ['loki.srv.renner.uno:3100']
# File-based service discovery for dynamic targets
- job_name: 'alloy-nodes'
file_sd_configs:
- files:
- '{{ prometheus_targets_dir }}/*.yml'
- '{{ prometheus_targets_dir }}/*.json'
refresh_interval: 30s
{% if prometheus_remote_write_enabled %}
# Remote write receiver for Alloy agents
# Agents push metrics to /api/v1/write
{% endif %}
# Static targets for infrastructure components
# Proxmox VE API metrics (via pve-exporter)
- job_name: 'pve'
scrape_interval: 60s
scrape_timeout: 55s
static_configs:
- targets:
- 'jupiter.renner.uno'
- 'neptune.renner.uno'
- 'saturn.renner.uno'
metrics_path: /pve
params:
module: [default]
cluster: ['1']
node: ['1']
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9221 # pve-exporter address
- target_label: group
replacement: proxmox
- target_label: type
replacement: hypervisor
# RustFS (S3-compatible storage)
# NOTE: RustFS uses OpenTelemetry push-model via --obs-endpoint, not Prometheus pull.
# Unlike MinIO, it doesn't expose /minio/v2/metrics/cluster endpoint.
# Metrics collection would require setting up RUSTFS_OBS_ENDPOINT to push to an OTEL collector.
# For now, node-level metrics are available via Alloy agents on the RustFS hosts.
# Home Assistant metrics
- job_name: 'homeassistant'
metrics_path: /api/prometheus
bearer_token: '{{ homeassistant_prometheus_token }}'
scheme: http
static_configs:
- targets: ['homeassistant.iot.renner.uno:8123']
labels:
group: 'smarthome'
type: 'homeassistant'
# UniFi Poller metrics
- job_name: 'unifi'
static_configs:
- targets: ['localhost:9130']
labels:
group: 'network'
type: 'unifi'
# Caddy reverse proxy metrics (HA cluster)
- job_name: 'caddy'
static_configs:
- targets:
- 'caddy.dmz.renner.uno:2019'
- 'caddy2.dmz.renner.uno:2019'
labels:
group: 'ingress'
type: 'reverse-proxy'
# PostgreSQL metrics (via postgres_exporter)
- job_name: 'postgresql'
static_configs:
- targets: ['localhost:9187']
labels:
group: 'database'
type: 'postgresql'
# Authentik identity provider metrics
- job_name: 'authentik'
static_configs:
- targets:
- 'authentik-app-1.srv.renner.uno:9300'
- 'authentik-app-2.srv.renner.uno:9300'
labels:
group: 'identity'
type: 'authentik'
# Node Exporter - system metrics from all hosts
- job_name: 'node'
file_sd_configs:
- files:
- '{{ prometheus_targets_dir }}/nodes.yml'
refresh_interval: 60s
# Chrony Exporter - NTP metrics from PVE cluster
# One static_config per host so each carries its own hostname label. The
# previous form listed all three targets together and recovered the hostname
# in relabel_configs by regex-matching __address__ against the node's IP --
# which silently coupled the labels to the addressing. Changing a target
# would have left the regex unmatched and the hostname label simply absent,
# with the scrape still succeeding.
- job_name: 'chrony'
static_configs:
- targets: ['jupiter.renner.uno:9123']
labels:
group: 'ntp'
type: 'time-server'
hostname: 'jupiter'
- targets: ['neptune.renner.uno:9123']
labels:
group: 'ntp'
type: 'time-server'
hostname: 'neptune'
- targets: ['saturn.renner.uno:9123']
labels:
group: 'ntp'
type: 'time-server'
hostname: 'saturn'
# Immich photo management metrics
- job_name: 'immich'
static_configs:
- targets: ['immich.srv.renner.uno:8081']
labels:
group: 'media'
type: 'photo-management'
# Blackbox Exporter - HTTP endpoint probing
- job_name: 'blackbox-http'
metrics_path: /probe
params:
module: [http_2xx]
static_configs:
- targets:
- https://gitea.renner.uno
- https://immich.renner.uno
- https://auth.renner.uno
- https://ha.renner.uno
- https://grafana.renner.uno
- https://prometheus.renner.uno
labels:
group: 'probe'
type: 'http'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9115
# Blackbox Exporter - TCP probing
- job_name: 'blackbox-tcp'
metrics_path: /probe
params:
module: [tcp_connect]
static_configs:
- targets:
- 10.2.40.135:5432 # PostgreSQL HA VIP
labels:
group: 'probe'
type: 'tcp'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9115
# Blackbox Exporter - DNS probing (external domains like google.com)
- job_name: 'blackbox-dns-external'
metrics_path: /probe
params:
module: [dns_external]
static_configs:
- targets:
- 10.2.40.53 # Proxmox DNS VIP
- 10.2.40.1 # UDM Gateway DNS
labels:
group: 'probe'
type: 'dns'
query_type: 'external'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9115
# Blackbox Exporter - DNS probing (internal domains like k8s-1.srv.renner.uno)
- job_name: 'blackbox-dns-internal'
metrics_path: /probe
params:
module: [dns_internal]
static_configs:
- targets:
- 10.2.40.53 # Proxmox DNS VIP
- 10.2.40.1 # UDM Gateway DNS
labels:
group: 'probe'
type: 'dns'
query_type: 'internal'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9115
# Blackbox Exporter - DNS probing (cached domains)
- job_name: 'blackbox-dns-cached'
metrics_path: /probe
params:
module: [dns_cached]
static_configs:
- targets:
- 10.2.40.53 # Proxmox DNS VIP
- 10.2.40.1 # UDM Gateway DNS
labels:
group: 'probe'
type: 'dns'
query_type: 'cached'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__param_target]
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9115
{% if snmp_synology_targets is defined and snmp_synology_targets | length > 0 %}
# Synology NAS SNMP metrics
# snmp_exporter v0.27+ requires both synology and ucd_la_table modules
- job_name: 'synology'
scrape_interval: 60s
scrape_timeout: 55s
metrics_path: /snmp
params:
module: [synology, ucd_la_table, ucd_memory, if_mib]
{% if snmp_use_v3 | default(false) %}
auth: [synology_v3]
{% else %}
auth: [synology_v2]
{% endif %}
static_configs:
- targets:
{% for target in snmp_synology_targets %}
- '{{ target.target }}' # {{ target.name }}
{% endfor %}
labels:
group: 'storage'
type: 'nas'
relabel_configs:
- source_labels: [__address__]
target_label: __param_target
- source_labels: [__address__]
regex: '([^:]+)(:\d+)?'
replacement: '${1}'
target_label: instance
- target_label: __address__
replacement: localhost:9116 # snmp_exporter address
{% endif %}
-36
View File
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
---
# Promtail Configuration
# Version and download
promtail_version: "3.4.2"
promtail_arch: "linux-amd64"
promtail_download_url: "https://github.com/grafana/loki/releases/download/v{{ promtail_version }}/promtail-{{ promtail_arch }}.zip"
promtail_bin_path: "/usr/local/bin/promtail"
# Directories
promtail_config_dir: "/etc/promtail"
promtail_config_file: "{{ promtail_config_dir }}/promtail-config.yaml"
promtail_positions_file: "/var/lib/promtail/positions.yaml"
# Server configuration
promtail_http_listen_port: 9080
promtail_http_listen_address: "0.0.0.0"
# Loki server
promtail_loki_url: "http://loki.srv.renner.uno:3100/loki/api/v1/push"
# Log scrape configurations
# Override in playbook or host_vars for specific services
promtail_scrape_configs:
- job_name: system
static_configs:
- targets:
- localhost
labels:
job: syslog
host: "{{ inventory_hostname }}"
__path__: /var/log/syslog
# Systemd service
promtail_user: "promtail"
promtail_group: "promtail"
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart promtail
systemd:
name: promtail
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
-112
View File
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Install dependencies
apt:
name:
- unzip
- curl
state: present
update_cache: yes
- name: Create promtail group
group:
name: "{{ promtail_group }}"
system: yes
state: present
- name: Create promtail user
user:
name: "{{ promtail_user }}"
group: "{{ promtail_group }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
home: /var/lib/promtail
create_home: yes
state: present
- name: Add promtail user to systemd-journal group
user:
name: "{{ promtail_user }}"
groups: systemd-journal
append: yes
- name: Create config directory
file:
path: "{{ promtail_config_dir }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ promtail_user }}"
group: "{{ promtail_group }}"
mode: '0755'
- name: Create positions directory
file:
path: "{{ promtail_positions_file | dirname }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ promtail_user }}"
group: "{{ promtail_group }}"
mode: '0755'
- name: Check if promtail binary exists
stat:
path: "{{ promtail_bin_path }}"
register: promtail_binary
- name: Get installed promtail version
command: "{{ promtail_bin_path }} --version"
register: installed_version
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
when: promtail_binary.stat.exists
- name: Download promtail
get_url:
url: "{{ promtail_download_url }}"
dest: /tmp/promtail.zip
mode: '0644'
when: not promtail_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and promtail_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Extract promtail binary
unarchive:
src: /tmp/promtail.zip
dest: /tmp/
remote_src: yes
when: not promtail_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and promtail_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Install promtail binary
copy:
src: "/tmp/promtail-{{ promtail_arch }}"
dest: "{{ promtail_bin_path }}"
remote_src: yes
mode: '0755'
when: not promtail_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and promtail_version not in installed_version.stdout)
notify: Restart promtail
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /tmp/promtail.zip
- "/tmp/promtail-{{ promtail_arch }}"
- name: Configure promtail
template:
src: promtail-config.yaml.j2
dest: "{{ promtail_config_file }}"
owner: "{{ promtail_user }}"
group: "{{ promtail_group }}"
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart promtail
- name: Create systemd service
template:
src: promtail.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/promtail.service
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart promtail
- name: Enable and start promtail
systemd:
name: promtail
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
server:
http_listen_port: {{ promtail_http_listen_port }}
http_listen_address: {{ promtail_http_listen_address }}
grpc_listen_port: 0
positions:
filename: {{ promtail_positions_file }}
clients:
- url: {{ promtail_loki_url }}
tenant_id: default
scrape_configs:
{% for config in promtail_scrape_configs %}
- job_name: {{ config.job_name }}
{% if config.journal is defined %}
journal:
max_age: {{ config.journal.max_age | default('12h') }}
labels:
job: {{ config.job_name }}
host: {{ inventory_hostname }}
{% if config.journal.matches is defined %}
matches: {{ config.journal.matches }}
{% endif %}
{% if config.relabel_configs is defined %}
relabel_configs:
{% for relabel in config.relabel_configs %}
- source_labels: {{ relabel.source_labels | to_json }}
target_label: {{ relabel.target_label }}
{% if relabel.regex is defined %}
regex: '{{ relabel.regex }}'
{% endif %}
{% if relabel.replacement is defined %}
replacement: '{{ relabel.replacement }}'
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% if config.static_configs is defined %}
static_configs:
{% for static in config.static_configs %}
- targets:
{% for target in static.targets %}
- {{ target }}
{% endfor %}
labels:
{% for key, value in static.labels.items() %}
{{ key }}: {{ value }}
{% endfor %}
{% endfor %}
{% if config.pipeline_stages is defined %}
pipeline_stages:
{% for stage in config.pipeline_stages %}
{% if stage.multiline is defined %}
- multiline:
firstline: '{{ stage.multiline.firstline }}'
{% if stage.multiline.max_wait_time is defined %}
max_wait_time: {{ stage.multiline.max_wait_time }}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% if stage.regex is defined %}
- regex:
expression: '{{ stage.regex.expression }}'
{% endif %}
{% if stage.labels is defined %}
- labels:
{% for label in stage.labels %}
{{ label }}:
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% if stage.timestamp is defined %}
- timestamp:
source: {{ stage.timestamp.source }}
format: '{{ stage.timestamp.format }}'
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Promtail Log Collector
Documentation=https://grafana.com/docs/loki/latest/clients/promtail/
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ promtail_user }}
Group={{ promtail_group }}
ExecStart={{ promtail_bin_path }} -config.file={{ promtail_config_file }}
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
TimeoutStopSec=30
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/promtail
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
---
# PVE Exporter defaults
# Installation
pve_exporter_version: "3.4.5"
pve_exporter_install_dir: /opt/pve-exporter
pve_exporter_config_dir: /etc/pve-exporter
pve_exporter_venv_path: "{{ pve_exporter_install_dir }}/venv"
# Service
pve_exporter_user: pve-exporter
pve_exporter_group: pve-exporter
pve_exporter_port: 9221
# Proxmox connection (override with vault variables)
pve_exporter_pve_user: "{{ pve_user | default('root@pam') }}"
pve_exporter_pve_token_name: "{{ pve_token_id | default('ansible') }}"
pve_exporter_pve_token_value: "{{ pve_token_secret }}"
pve_exporter_pve_verify_ssl: false
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart pve-exporter
systemd:
name: pve-exporter
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
-78
View File
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
---
# PVE Exporter installation and configuration
- name: Install Python dependencies
apt:
name:
- python3
- python3-pip
- python3-venv
state: present
update_cache: yes
- name: Create pve-exporter system user
user:
name: "{{ pve_exporter_user }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
create_home: no
- name: Create installation directory
file:
path: "{{ pve_exporter_install_dir }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ pve_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ pve_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0755'
- name: Create configuration directory
file:
path: "{{ pve_exporter_config_dir }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ pve_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ pve_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0750'
- name: Create Python virtual environment
command: python3 -m venv {{ pve_exporter_venv_path }}
args:
creates: "{{ pve_exporter_venv_path }}/bin/python"
- name: Set venv ownership
file:
path: "{{ pve_exporter_venv_path }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ pve_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ pve_exporter_group }}"
recurse: yes
- name: Install prometheus-pve-exporter
pip:
name: prometheus-pve-exporter
virtualenv: "{{ pve_exporter_venv_path }}"
state: present
- name: Create configuration file
template:
src: pve.yml.j2
dest: "{{ pve_exporter_config_dir }}/pve.yml"
owner: "{{ pve_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ pve_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0640'
notify: Restart pve-exporter
- name: Create systemd service
template:
src: pve-exporter.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/pve-exporter.service
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart pve-exporter
- name: Enable and start pve-exporter service
systemd:
name: pve-exporter
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Prometheus PVE Exporter
Documentation=https://github.com/prometheus-pve/prometheus-pve-exporter
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ pve_exporter_user }}
Group={{ pve_exporter_group }}
ExecStart={{ pve_exporter_venv_path }}/bin/pve_exporter \
--config.file {{ pve_exporter_config_dir }}/pve.yml \
--web.listen-address 0.0.0.0:{{ pve_exporter_port }}
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10s
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# PVE Exporter Configuration
# Generated by Ansible
default:
user: "{{ pve_exporter_pve_user }}"
token_name: "{{ pve_exporter_pve_token_name }}"
token_value: "{{ pve_exporter_pve_token_value }}"
verify_ssl: {{ pve_exporter_pve_verify_ssl | lower }}
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
---
# SNMP Exporter defaults
snmp_exporter_version: "0.30.1"
snmp_exporter_listen_port: 9116
snmp_exporter_user: "snmp_exporter"
snmp_exporter_group: "snmp_exporter"
snmp_exporter_install_dir: "/opt/snmp_exporter"
snmp_exporter_config_dir: "/etc/snmp_exporter"
# Synology NAS SNMP targets
# Configure in host_vars or group_vars
snmp_synology_targets: []
# Example:
# snmp_synology_targets:
# - name: nas-1
# target: 10.2.40.50
# - name: nas-2
# target: 10.2.40.51
# SNMPv3 authentication (recommended for security)
# These should be set in vault
snmp_v3_username: "prometheus"
snmp_v3_auth_protocol: "SHA" # MD5 or SHA
snmp_v3_auth_password: "" # Set in vault
snmp_v3_priv_protocol: "AES" # DES or AES
snmp_v3_priv_password: "" # Set in vault
snmp_v3_security_level: "authPriv" # noAuthNoPriv, authNoPriv, authPriv
# SNMPv2c fallback (less secure, but simpler)
snmp_v2_community: "public"
snmp_use_v3: true
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart snmp_exporter
systemd:
name: snmp_exporter
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
-114
View File
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
---
# SNMP Exporter installation and configuration
- name: Create snmp_exporter group
group:
name: "{{ snmp_exporter_group }}"
system: yes
state: present
- name: Create snmp_exporter user
user:
name: "{{ snmp_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ snmp_exporter_group }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
home: "{{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}"
create_home: no
- name: Create directories
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ snmp_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ snmp_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0755'
loop:
- "{{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}"
- "{{ snmp_exporter_config_dir }}"
- name: Check if snmp_exporter is already installed
stat:
path: "{{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}/snmp_exporter"
register: snmp_exporter_binary
- name: Get installed snmp_exporter version
command: "{{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}/snmp_exporter --version"
register: installed_version
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
when: snmp_exporter_binary.stat.exists
- name: Download snmp_exporter
get_url:
url: "https://github.com/prometheus/snmp_exporter/releases/download/v{{ snmp_exporter_version }}/snmp_exporter-{{ snmp_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64.tar.gz"
dest: "/tmp/snmp_exporter.tar.gz"
mode: '0644'
when: not snmp_exporter_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and snmp_exporter_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Extract snmp_exporter
unarchive:
src: "/tmp/snmp_exporter.tar.gz"
dest: "/tmp/"
remote_src: yes
when: not snmp_exporter_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and snmp_exporter_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Install snmp_exporter binary
copy:
src: "/tmp/snmp_exporter-{{ snmp_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64/snmp_exporter"
dest: "{{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}/snmp_exporter"
remote_src: yes
owner: "{{ snmp_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ snmp_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0755'
when: not snmp_exporter_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and snmp_exporter_version not in installed_version.stdout)
notify: Restart snmp_exporter
- name: Install default snmp.yml from release
copy:
src: "/tmp/snmp_exporter-{{ snmp_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64/snmp.yml"
dest: "{{ snmp_exporter_config_dir }}/snmp.yml"
remote_src: yes
owner: "{{ snmp_exporter_user }}"
group: "{{ snmp_exporter_group }}"
mode: '0644'
when: not snmp_exporter_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and snmp_exporter_version not in installed_version.stdout)
notify: Restart snmp_exporter
- name: Add synology_v3 auth entry
lineinfile:
path: "{{ snmp_exporter_config_dir }}/snmp.yml"
insertafter: "^auths:"
line: " synology_v3: {version: 3, security_level: {{ snmp_v3_security_level }}, username: {{ snmp_v3_username }}, password: {{ snmp_v3_auth_password }}, auth_protocol: {{ snmp_v3_auth_protocol }}, priv_protocol: {{ snmp_v3_priv_protocol }}, priv_password: {{ snmp_v3_priv_password }}}"
notify: Restart snmp_exporter
- name: Add synology_v2 auth entry
lineinfile:
path: "{{ snmp_exporter_config_dir }}/snmp.yml"
insertafter: "^auths:"
line: " synology_v2: {version: 2, community: {{ snmp_v2_community }}}"
notify: Restart snmp_exporter
- name: Create snmp_exporter systemd service
template:
src: snmp_exporter.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/snmp_exporter.service
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart snmp_exporter
- name: Enable and start snmp_exporter service
systemd:
name: snmp_exporter
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- "/tmp/snmp_exporter.tar.gz"
- "/tmp/snmp_exporter-{{ snmp_exporter_version }}.linux-amd64"
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# SNMPv3 Authentication for Synology NAS
# Appended to default snmp.yml by Ansible
auths:
{% if snmp_use_v3 | default(true) %}
synology_v3:
security_level: {{ snmp_v3_security_level }}
username: {{ snmp_v3_username }}
password: {{ snmp_v3_auth_password }}
auth_protocol: {{ snmp_v3_auth_protocol }}
{% if snmp_v3_security_level == 'authPriv' %}
priv_protocol: {{ snmp_v3_priv_protocol }}
priv_password: {{ snmp_v3_priv_password }}
{% endif %}
{% else %}
synology_v2:
community: {{ snmp_v2_community }}
{% endif %}
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Prometheus SNMP Exporter
Documentation=https://github.com/prometheus/snmp_exporter
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ snmp_exporter_user }}
Group={{ snmp_exporter_group }}
ExecStart={{ snmp_exporter_install_dir }}/snmp_exporter \
--config.file={{ snmp_exporter_config_dir }}/snmp.yml \
--web.listen-address=:{{ snmp_exporter_listen_port }}
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ReadOnlyPaths=/
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
---
# UniFi Poller defaults
# Version to install
unifi_poller_version: "2.11.2"
# Installation paths
unifi_poller_bin_path: /usr/local/bin/unpoller
unifi_poller_config_dir: /etc/unpoller
unifi_poller_config_file: "{{ unifi_poller_config_dir }}/up.conf"
# Service user
unifi_poller_user: unpoller
unifi_poller_group: unpoller
# UniFi Controller settings (override in vars/vault)
unifi_controller_url: "https://192.168.1.1"
unifi_controller_user: ""
unifi_controller_pass: ""
unifi_controller_verify_ssl: false
unifi_controller_site: "default"
# Prometheus exporter settings
unifi_poller_prometheus_port: 9130
unifi_poller_prometheus_path: /metrics
# Polling intervals
unifi_poller_interval: 30s
unifi_poller_save_sites: true
unifi_poller_save_ids: false
unifi_poller_save_events: false
unifi_poller_save_alarms: false
unifi_poller_save_anomalies: false
unifi_poller_save_dpi: true
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart unpoller
systemd:
name: unpoller
state: restarted
daemon_reload: yes
-88
View File
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
---
# UniFi Poller installation and configuration
- name: Create unpoller system user
user:
name: "{{ unifi_poller_user }}"
system: yes
shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
create_home: no
- name: Create configuration directory
file:
path: "{{ unifi_poller_config_dir }}"
state: directory
owner: "{{ unifi_poller_user }}"
group: "{{ unifi_poller_group }}"
mode: '0750'
- name: Check if unpoller is already installed
stat:
path: "{{ unifi_poller_bin_path }}"
register: unpoller_binary
- name: Get installed version
command: "{{ unifi_poller_bin_path }} --version"
register: installed_version
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
when: unpoller_binary.stat.exists
- name: Download UniFi Poller
get_url:
url: "https://github.com/unpoller/unpoller/releases/download/v{{ unifi_poller_version }}/unpoller_{{ unifi_poller_version }}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
dest: /tmp/unpoller.tar.gz
mode: '0644'
when: not unpoller_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and unifi_poller_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Extract UniFi Poller
unarchive:
src: /tmp/unpoller.tar.gz
dest: /tmp/
remote_src: yes
when: not unpoller_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and unifi_poller_version not in installed_version.stdout)
- name: Install UniFi Poller binary
copy:
src: /tmp/unpoller
dest: "{{ unifi_poller_bin_path }}"
remote_src: yes
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0755'
when: not unpoller_binary.stat.exists or (installed_version.stdout is defined and unifi_poller_version not in installed_version.stdout)
notify: Restart unpoller
- name: Create configuration file
template:
src: up.conf.j2
dest: "{{ unifi_poller_config_file }}"
owner: "{{ unifi_poller_user }}"
group: "{{ unifi_poller_group }}"
mode: '0640'
notify: Restart unpoller
- name: Create systemd service
template:
src: unpoller.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/unpoller.service
owner: root
group: root
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart unpoller
- name: Enable and start unpoller service
systemd:
name: unpoller
state: started
enabled: yes
daemon_reload: yes
- name: Clean up downloaded files
file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /tmp/unpoller.tar.gz
- /tmp/unpoller
changed_when: false
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=UniFi Poller - Prometheus Exporter for UniFi Network
Documentation=https://github.com/unpoller/unpoller
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User={{ unifi_poller_user }}
Group={{ unifi_poller_group }}
ExecStart={{ unifi_poller_bin_path }} --config {{ unifi_poller_config_file }}
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10s
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ReadOnlyPaths=/
ReadWritePaths={{ unifi_poller_config_dir }}
PrivateTmp=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# UniFi Poller Configuration
# Generated by Ansible
[poller]
# Turns on debug messages
debug = false
# Turns off messages
quiet = false
[prometheus]
# Whether to export metrics
disable = false
# HTTP listen address for /metrics endpoint
http_listen = "0.0.0.0:{{ unifi_poller_prometheus_port }}"
# Path for metrics endpoint
report_errors = false
[unifi]
# UniFi Controller configurations
[[unifi.controller]]
# URL for the UniFi Controller
url = "{{ unifi_controller_url }}"
# Username
user = "{{ unifi_controller_user }}"
# Password
pass = "{{ unifi_controller_pass }}"
# Sites to poll (leave empty for all sites)
sites = ["{{ unifi_controller_site }}"]
# Verify SSL certificates
verify_ssl = {{ unifi_controller_verify_ssl | lower }}
# Save site information
save_sites = {{ unifi_poller_save_sites | lower }}
# Save device IDs
save_ids = {{ unifi_poller_save_ids | lower }}
# Save events
save_events = {{ unifi_poller_save_events | lower }}
# Save alarms
save_alarms = {{ unifi_poller_save_alarms | lower }}
# Save anomalies
save_anomalies = {{ unifi_poller_save_anomalies | lower }}
# Save DPI data
save_dpi = {{ unifi_poller_save_dpi | lower }}
@@ -1326,7 +1326,121 @@ data:
name: Caddy docs.renner.uno
state: absent
# Passkey-only (WebAuthn) login for selected apps, in two parts:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# wordpress-gate — www.renner.uno
#
# Unlike every other gate here, this one does NOT front a whole
# host. www.renner.uno is a public family blog; only /wp-admin and
# /wp-login.php are routed to this outpost (see
# kubernetes/apps/wordpress/ingress.yaml). The front end never
# touches it.
#
# The reverse carve-out — gate everything, skip_path_regex the
# public parts, as paperless-gate does for /static/ — is not
# possible here: the public set is every post URL, so the pattern
# would need a negative lookahead and the outpost's RE2 has none.
- id: wordpress-authors-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: WordPress Authors
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
# Git owns membership, as with the other gates: this group is the
# explicit allowlist for who may publish on www.renner.uno.
# Add/remove members HERE, not in the UI — blueprint apply is
# authoritative for this M2M and reverts UI edits.
#
# s.renner is the Authentik account for the site's WordPress
# Editor, which still carries the pre-2019 login `s.birzer` — the
# two names do not match, and that is expected.
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, s.renner]]
- id: wordpress-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://wordpress.wordpress.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://www.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
# No skip_path_regex: wp-admin's assets are only ever fetched by an
# already-authenticated session, and wp-admin has no manifest or
# service worker — the credentials:'omit' PWA problem that forced
# carve-outs on vscode-gate and retired music-assistant-gate does
# not arise here.
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: WordPress (Gate)
slug: wordpress-gate
provider: !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://www.renner.uno/wp-admin/
meta_description: "Forward-auth gate in front of wp-admin on www.renner.uno"
# Only WordPress Authors pass the gate — see the group above for the
# membership list. Both accounts that exist on the migrated site are
# covered, so the gate cannot lock out the editor the site is
# currently being kept alive for.
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, wordpress-gate]]
group: !KeyOf wordpress-authors-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: wordpress-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf wordpress-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# Passkey login for selected apps. Passkey is mandatory for accounts
# that hold one and unavailable to accounts that do not, so both flows
# branch on enrollment (policy passkey-user-has-webauthn): enrolled →
# WebAuthn, not enrolled → password + MFA. Enrollment status is a
# property of the identified account, so the weaker branch is never
# something a requester can select.
#
# Two parts:
#
# 1. A passwordless AUTHENTICATION flow (username → passkey, no
# password prompt) bound per-provider, so fresh logins to these
@@ -1335,7 +1449,13 @@ data:
# 2. A step-up AUTHORIZATION flow — unlike the authentication flow,
# this runs on EVERY interactive authorize, so an existing
# password-only SSO session from another app cannot slip into
# these apps without presenting a passkey.
# these apps without presenting a passkey. Two things narrow that:
# the stage is skipped outright for accounts with no passkey (they
# have no way to satisfy it), and last_auth_threshold reduces it to
# "without presenting a passkey in this browser within the window"
# — one touch then covers every app, including a later
# password-only session for the same user. The cookie is keyed to
# that user's device, so it never carries across users.
passkey-stepup.yaml: |
version: 1
metadata:
@@ -1356,43 +1476,99 @@ data:
# flow this replaces.
authentication: require_authenticated
- id: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
# ONE stage object, shared by the step-up authorization flow and
# the passwordless authentication flow below.
#
# `last_auth_threshold` is enforced with a single browser cookie
# (`authentik_mfa`) whose JWT is both signed with and carries the
# stage's PK, so a validation stage only ever honours a cookie it
# wrote itself. Two separate stage objects therefore each demand
# their own touch, and — sharing the one cookie name — overwrite
# each other, so neither window survives. Sharing this object is
# what lets the login touch satisfy the per-app step-up.
#
# Declared here, ahead of every !KeyOf reference to it: the
# blueprint importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
- id: passkey-webauthn-validation
model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
name: passkey-webauthn-validation
state: present
attrs:
device_classes:
- webauthn
# `configure`, not `deny`: g.renner has Home Assistant access
# but no enrolled WebAuthn device (live check 2026-07-07), so
# a hard deny would lock her out with no self-service path.
# `configure` injects the default WebAuthn enrollment stage
# inline — first login without a passkey becomes "enroll one
# now, then validate it". Still passkey-only: there is no way
# through this stage without a WebAuthn credential.
not_configured_action: configure
configuration_stages:
- !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_webauthn.authenticatorwebauthnstage, [name, default-authenticator-webauthn-setup]]
# Skip re-validation if a passkey was already presented within
# the window. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) no double-touch
# when the login itself used a passkey seconds earlier;
# (2) NetBird's dashboard silently re-authorizes via
# /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry — a flow that
# always demands interaction would fail those and force a
# visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
# `deny`, not `configure`: the authentication flow reaches this
# stage with the user merely *identified* (a typed username)
# and no password stage in front of it, so inline enrollment
# would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
# their own passkey and take over that account. The policy
# binding means only accounts that already hold a passkey reach
# this stage at all, so `deny` is defence in depth rather than
# a path anyone walks — accounts without one branch to password
# + MFA instead.
not_configured_action: deny
# Window within which an already-presented passkey satisfies a
# later run of this stage. Non-zero for two reasons: (1) the
# per-app step-up must not demand a second touch seconds after
# the login touch; (2) NetBird's dashboard silently
# re-authorizes via /silent-auth (prompt=none) on token expiry —
# a stage that always demands interaction fails those and
# forces a visible re-login every access-token lifetime.
#
# The cookie is browser-scoped, so inside the window a re-login
# in that same browser is satisfied by the cookie alone and the
# username is all that gets typed. Accepted for a single touch
# per app.
last_auth_threshold: hours=8
webauthn_user_verification: preferred
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
# Gate on "this account has a passkey", so enrollment status picks
# the branch. Enrolled accounts must use WebAuthn — at login and at
# every authorize — while accounts with no passkey fall back to
# password + MFA. An attacker cannot pick the weaker branch: the
# user is already identified when this runs, so the branch follows
# the victim's enrollment, not the requester's choice.
#
# request.user is the flow's pending_user, not the (anonymous)
# requester: ReevaluateMarker builds the engine with
# plan.context[PLAN_CONTEXT_PENDING_USER] (flows/markers.py). That
# requires the bindings below to keep evaluate_on_plan false and
# re_evaluate_policies true — on-plan evaluation happens before the
# identification stage has resolved a user.
- id: policy-has-passkey
model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
identifiers:
name: passkey-user-has-webauthn
state: present
attrs:
expression: |
return ak_user_has_authenticator(request.user, "webauthn")
- id: binding-stepup-webauthn
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
stage: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
order: 10
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-stepup-webauthn
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
# Passwordless authentication flow: identification (username or
# email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login.
# email, NO password stage) → WebAuthn validation → login, with a
# password + MFA branch for accounts that have no passkey.
- id: passkey-passwordless-flow
model: authentik_flows.flow
identifiers:
@@ -1403,37 +1579,6 @@ data:
title: "Sign in with your passkey"
designation: authentication
# SEPARATE stage from the step-up one, and deliberately `deny`:
# at this point in an authentication flow the user has only been
# *identified* (typed a username), not authenticated — `configure`
# here would let anyone who knows a passkey-less username enroll
# their own passkey and take over that account. Inline enrollment
# for passkey-less users happens exclusively in the authorization
# step-up stage above, where require_authenticated guarantees a
# fully authenticated session. A passkey-less user therefore
# bootstraps via password login on auth.renner.uno, then gets the
# enrollment prompt on first app access.
#
# Declared BEFORE the identification stage because the latter
# references it via !KeyOf (webauthn_stage), and the blueprint
# importer resolves entries top-to-bottom.
- id: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
state: present
attrs:
device_classes:
- webauthn
not_configured_action: deny
# Small non-zero window so a passkey presented via the
# identification stage's autofill (webauthn_stage below) is
# not challenged a second time by this stage at order 20 in
# the same flow run. The skip is session-scoped, so a fresh
# (attacker) session never inherits it.
last_auth_threshold: minutes=5
webauthn_user_verification: preferred
# webauthn_stage enables passkey autofill (conditional WebAuthn,
# authentik >= 2025.12): the browser offers enrolled passkeys in
# the username field's autofill — one tap, no username typed.
@@ -1449,7 +1594,7 @@ data:
user_fields:
- username
- email
webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
webauthn_stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
@@ -1458,12 +1603,87 @@ data:
order: 10
state: present
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
# Order 20 and 21/22 are the two mutually exclusive branches.
- id: binding-passwordless-webauthn
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
stage: !KeyOf passkey-webauthn-validation
order: 20
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-webauthn
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
# The negated branch. failure_result: true is the safety net — the
# UserLoginStage defaults a missing authentication backend to
# BACKEND_INBUILT instead of refusing (user_login/stage.py), so a
# flow that drops BOTH branches would log the user in on a typed
# username alone. A PolicyException is resolved to failure_result
# before negate is applied (policies/process.py), so a broken
# expression pulls the password stage IN and degrades everyone to
# password + MFA rather than to no factor at all.
- id: binding-passwordless-password
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_password.passwordstage, [name, default-authentication-password]]
order: 21
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-password
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: true
failure_result: true
# Same MFA validation the default authentication flow runs at its
# order 30, so the fallback is not a weaker way into these apps
# than auth.renner.uno's own login already is. It carries
# not_configured_action: configure, which is safe here and nowhere
# else in this flow: the password stage above has established a
# first factor by the time it runs, so it doubles as the enrollment
# path for accounts holding no authenticator at all.
- id: binding-passwordless-mfa
model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
target: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage, [name, default-authentication-mfa-validation]]
order: 22
state: present
attrs:
evaluate_on_plan: false
re_evaluate_policies: true
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
policy: !KeyOf policy-has-passkey
target: !KeyOf binding-passwordless-mfa
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: true
failure_result: true
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
identifiers:
@@ -1577,3 +1797,19 @@ data:
redirect_uris:
- url: https://dash.renner.uno/login/generic_oauth
matching_mode: strict
# Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
# Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the
# identification stage's webauthn_stage FK is SET_NULL and is
# re-pointed above, so no dangling reference survives. Declared
# last: the importer applies entries top-to-bottom inside one
# transaction, so the replacements exist before these go.
- model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-stepup-webauthn-validation
state: absent
- model: authentik_stages_authenticator_validate.authenticatorvalidatestage
identifiers:
name: passkey-passwordless-webauthn-validation
state: absent
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ resources:
- zone-configurator-gate-egress.yaml
- alertmanager-gate-egress.yaml
- prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
- wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
- outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
- ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
---
# Allow the dedicated wordpress-gate outpost to egress into the wordpress
# namespace and reach WordPress (:80). Without this, the authentik-namespace
# baseline CNP has no egress rule to wordpress, so the gate outpost's
# forwarded requests are dropped. Scoped to the gate outpost's pod label so no
# other authentik component can reach it. Mirrors esphome-gate-egress.yaml.
#
# Note this gate only ever sees /wp-admin and /wp-login.php — the public site
# is routed straight to the same Service by a separate Ingress, so this rule
# is not the only path into the wordpress namespace, unlike the paperless case.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: wordpress-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "80"
protocol: TCP
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
# gets the heavy HA pod (8Gi) off the soon-to-be-tiny edge box.
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
+27 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,33 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: ical-proxy
image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:latest
# Pinned to a commit build rather than :latest.
#
# :latest never rolls. The tag moves when a build publishes, but
# nothing tells the Deployment about it: the pod template is
# unchanged, so Kubernetes has no reason to replace anything, and
# this image is deliberately NOT enrolled in Flux image automation
# — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md, which
# lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest,
# and main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so there is no
# ImagePolicy watching it. The pods therefore sat on a 21-day-old
# image while :latest moved underneath them, and the only way to
# pick up a new build was a manual restart.
#
# A pinned tag makes the rollout a git change: Flux applies the new
# pod template and Kubernetes rolls it, which is also what makes
# what is RUNNING recoverable from this repo rather than "whatever
# :latest meant the last time a pod happened to restart".
#
# main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds
# the summary_match/summary_replace parameters this deployment
# needs to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach"
# from every waste collection.
#
# Bumping this is a manual, reviewed edit. The tag format is
# main-<short-sha> (docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
# as prefix).
image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:main-99a912b
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
name: http
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ spec:
# stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
# policy) — no extra dependency.
- name: reconcile-publish-ip
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.12 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
readOnly: true
containers:
- name: music-assistant
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.12 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
env:
- name: LOG_LEVEL
value: info
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: gotenberg
image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.35.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
args:
- "gotenberg"
- "--chromium-disable-javascript=true"
+98 -6
View File
@@ -29,12 +29,27 @@ data:
# The app re-reads schedules.json every 60 s, so edits here take
# effect without a restart once the init container has rewritten it.
#
# lang is "de", not null. It calls Home Assistant's own
# _selectLanguage() for the screenshot session, so the rendered page
# is localised by HA rather than by hand. With it left null the
# dashboard grew a German weekday array, a German month array and a
# fifteen-entry weather-condition dict — reimplementing translations
# HA already ships. The instance itself stays language "en"; this
# only affects the render session.
#
# model_id is 1 — TRMNL X (name "v2", 1872x1404, 16 colours) — and it
# is an INTEGER, not a name. Confirmed against the running server:
# GET /api/screens returns model_id as a number, and upstream's
# example value "og_1bit" matches no model on this instance (the
# 2-bit OG model here is id 11, name "og_plus"). Getting this wrong
# shows up as Terminus rejecting the pushed screen with a 422.
#
# All three auth fields below are placeholders the init container
# replaces — including obtained_at, which must end up a real epoch-MS
# stamp. The 0 here is inert only because it is always overwritten;
# left as 0 the scheduler reads the tokens as ancient and refuses to
# push at all ("expired beyond the refresh window"), with no render
# attempt and no error beyond one startup warning.
schedules.template.json: |
[
{
@@ -53,8 +68,8 @@ data:
"rotate": null,
"zoom": 1,
"wait": null,
"theme": "trmnl-eink",
"lang": null,
"theme": "Graphite E-ink Light",
"lang": "de",
"dark": false,
"invert": false,
"timestamp": false,
@@ -100,6 +115,27 @@ metadata:
namespace: trmnl
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: trmnl-renderer
annotations:
# BOTH sources need this, and for the same reason: the init
# container writes /data/schedules.json ONCE, at pod start. Nothing
# re-reads either source afterwards.
#
# The app re-reads schedules.json every 60s, which makes it look
# self-updating — but only the FILE, and the file is only rewritten
# by the init container. So a ConfigMap or Secret change lands in
# git, updates the object, and the running renderer keeps the old
# values indefinitely.
#
# Both halves were hit repeatedly in practice and each time needed
# `kubectl delete pod` by hand: the theme name, the schedule's lang
# field, and every re-mint of the BYOS tokens. A fix that depends on
# someone remembering to restart a pod is not deployed.
#
# Named per-resource rather than the blanket
# reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true", matching terminus.yaml and
# mosquitto-deployment.yaml.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-schedule
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: trmnl-renderer-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
# RWO PVC, and two renderers would push conflicting screens for the
@@ -135,9 +171,16 @@ spec:
# proxy that exchanges a Terminus username+password for these
# tokens, but that would mean shipping the Terminus PASSWORD
# into the cluster and doing a network call at every pod start.
# Stock Terminus disables session expiry and issues effectively
# permanent tokens, so they are minted once out of band and kept
# in OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
# Tokens are therefore minted once out of band and kept in
# OpenBao — the password never enters the cluster.
#
# That only works because Terminus is configured with
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see terminus.yaml). It is
# NOT, as an earlier version of this comment claimed, because
# stock Terminus issues permanent tokens — the stock default is
# 1800s, and this deployment demonstrated it by having the
# webhook start failing with "expired JWT access token" about
# thirty minutes after seeding.
- name: render-schedule
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
command:
@@ -145,10 +188,25 @@ spec:
- -c
- |
set -eu
# obtained_at is stamped at write time, in MILLISECONDS.
# It is not cosmetic: the scheduler derives token age from
# it, and a literal 0 made the app treat freshly-minted
# tokens as ancient and skip the webhook entirely —
# "BYOS tokens ... expired beyond the refresh window"
#
# Stamping it "now" is only safe because Terminus is
# configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years (see
# terminus.yaml). Against the 30-minute default it would be
# actively harmful: the app would believe a stale token had
# 30 fresh minutes left, skip its proactive refresh, and
# then be unable to recover, because refreshing requires a
# still-valid token. If that setting is ever reverted, this
# must become a real mint time carried alongside the tokens.
jq --arg at "$BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
--arg rt "$BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN" \
'(.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.access_token) = $at
| (.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.refresh_token) = $rt' \
| (.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.refresh_token) = $rt
| (.[].webhook_format.byosConfig.auth.obtained_at) = (now * 1000 | floor)' \
/template/schedules.template.json > /data/schedules.json
echo "wrote /data/schedules.json ($(wc -c < /data/schedules.json) bytes)"
env:
@@ -208,6 +266,21 @@ spec:
value: "http://home-assistant-bgp.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8123"
- name: TZ
value: "Europe/Berlin"
# Chromium will not start without a writable HOME. Running
# as uid 1000 with no matching passwd entry leaves HOME="/",
# which is root-owned 0755, and the browser dies on launch
# with
# chrome_crashpad_handler: --database is required
# because crashpad cannot create its database directory.
#
# Diagnosed on the running pod, not guessed: HOME=/, uid=1000,
# / not writable, /tmp writable. Crash dumps are throwaway, so
# /tmp is the right home for them rather than the PVC.
#
# This is a consequence of OUR non-root securityContext, not
# of the image — so it must move together with runAsUser.
- name: HOME
value: "/tmp"
# Dedicated long-lived token, NOT the operator's personal
# one, so the renderer's access can be revoked on its own.
# It is injected into the headless browser's localStorage,
@@ -220,6 +293,16 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
# Bounded scratch backing HOME. Chromium writes crashpad
# state and profile data here on every launch, and it now
# launches once a minute for the life of the pod — on the
# container's writable layer that is unbounded growth
# against node disk, with no ephemeral-storage limit to
# catch it. A sizeLimit converts a slow, cluster-wide
# node-disk-pressure problem into a bounded and clearly
# attributable eviction of this pod.
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
# HTTP probes here, unlike terminus.yaml's TCP-only ones, because
# /health is confirmed rather than assumed: the upstream image's
# own Dockerfile declares
@@ -260,6 +343,12 @@ spec:
# mounted either). Those flags are baked into the app's own
# PUPPETEER_ARGS, not something we pass, so this holds as long as
# the pinned tag does — worth re-checking on any bump.
#
# Confirmed on the running pod: the capability drop is genuinely
# not what broke the browser. The first deploy DID crash it, but
# on a writable-HOME problem caused by runAsUser — see the HOME
# env above. Do not "fix" a future Chromium launch failure by
# loosening this block before checking HOME and /tmp.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
@@ -271,6 +360,9 @@ spec:
- name: schedule-template
configMap:
name: trmnl-renderer-schedule
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
sizeLimit: 512Mi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
+72
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,64 @@ data:
# pool (fd99::/120) and the LAN ULA — without it every IPv6 client,
# including the device and Traefik, is rate-limited as if it were remote.
RACK_ATTACK_ALLOWED_SUBNETS: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.1,::1,fc00::/7"
# 10 years, against a default of 1800s (30 minutes).
#
# Documented upstream in doc/configuration.adoc:
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD — "The amount of time, in seconds, the JWT
# access token remains valid before needing to refresh your access
# token." Default: 1,800 seconds (30 minutes).
# Corroborated on this instance: a token minted here was rejected about
# thirty minutes later, i.e. the documented default behaving as written.
#
# This exists for the renderer, which pushes screens to /api/screens with
# a JWT held in OpenBao. At the default period that arrangement cannot
# work unattended, and it fails in a way that has no recovery: minting a
# replacement token via POST /api/jwt requires a still-VALID access token
# in the Authorization header, so once one expires it cannot be refreshed
# from itself. Observed exactly that on first deploy —
# [webhook] Webhook failed: 400 {"error":"expired JWT access token"}
# [webhook] BYOS auth: refresh failed (400) {"error":"expired JWT ..."}
# — the refresh attempt being rejected by the very expiry it was trying
# to repair.
#
# The renderer's own code assumes "stock Terminus disables session
# expiration and issues effectively permanent tokens". That is simply not
# true of this deployment, so the assumption is made true here rather
# than worked around in the client.
#
# The trade is deliberate: a long-lived JWT with full Terminus API rights
# now sits in OpenBao. Accepted because the alternative was putting the
# Terminus account PASSWORD into the cluster so an init container could
# mint a short-lived token on every pod start, which is a strictly worse
# secret to hold. The token is revocable by rotating the account's
# credentials; it grants access only to this LAN-only instance.
#
# NOTE: the period is fixed at mint time. Changing this does not extend
# tokens that already exist — they must be re-minted afterwards.
API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD: "315360000"
# The OTHER half of the same problem, and the reason the first fix
# did not hold. Terminus has TWO independent expiries: the JWT's own
# lifetime (above) and the SESSION behind it. Raising only the token
# period left the session at its defaults, so pushes kept working for
# a while and then failed with
# HTTP 401 {"error":"This session has expired, please login again"}
# which is a different error, from a different mechanism, than the
# "expired JWT access token" the first fix addressed.
#
# Documented in doc/configuration.adoc:
# SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED — "Determines if your browser session
# or JWT API token is expired or not." Default: true.
# SESSION_INACTIVITY_LIMIT 1800s, SESSION_LIFETIME_LIMIT 86400s.
#
# Disabling it is exactly the state the renderer's own code assumes
# ("stock Terminus disables session expiration and issues ~100-year
# tokens") — an assumption that is false by default and has to be
# made true here, same as the token period.
#
# Same trade as above, and it is the deciding one for an unattended
# appliance: a session that expires needs a human with a password to
# restore it, and this panel has neither.
SESSION_EXPIRATION_ENABLED: "false"
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
@@ -26,6 +84,20 @@ metadata:
namespace: trmnl
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
annotations:
# terminus-config is consumed via envFrom, and env vars are read ONCE at
# container start — Kubernetes does not hot-reload them. The ConfigMap is
# a plain resource, not a configMapGenerator, so editing it does not
# change the pod template hash and Flux will not roll the pods either.
# Without this annotation a ConfigMap-only change (such as raising
# API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD) applies to git and to the ConfigMap object
# while the running app keeps the old value indefinitely — a silent
# no-op, with the manifest and reality disagreeing.
#
# Named per-ConfigMap rather than the blanket `reloader.stakater.com/
# auto: "true"`, matching mosquitto-deployment.yaml: enrolling anything
# further stays a visible, reviewable edit to this line.
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: terminus-config
spec:
replicas: 1
# RWO PVC shared by both containers in this pod, and APP_SETUP runs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: whisper
image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.5.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
args:
- --model=base-int8
- --language=de
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
annotations:
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wordpress-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
# RWO volume, single writer — the rolling default would deadlock on the
# new pod waiting for a volume the old pod still holds.
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
spec:
securityContext:
# wp-content must be writable by Apache (www-data, uid/gid 33) for
# media uploads and plugin installs.
fsGroup: 33
containers:
- name: wordpress
image: wordpress:7.0.4-php8.3-apache
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 80
env:
# The operator names the base Service after the MariaDB resource;
# the CRD's separate primaryService/secondaryService fields are the
# suffixed variants for replicated setups, which this is not
# (replicas: 1). Not verified against a running cluster — if it is
# wrong the pod fails loudly on connect at startup rather than
# degrading quietly. Confirm with `kubectl get svc -n wordpress`
# on first deploy.
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_HOST
value: wordpress-mariadb.wordpress.svc.cluster.local:3306
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_NAME
value: wordpress
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_USER
value: wordpress
- name: WORDPRESS_DB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
# Generated by the operator from the MariaDB CR — never
# stored in Git or OpenBao.
name: wordpress-mariadb-app
key: password
- name: WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA
value: |
define('WP_HOME', 'https://www.renner.uno');
define('WP_SITEURL', 'https://www.renner.uno');
define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
/* Traefik terminates TLS; without this WordPress sees plain
HTTP and builds http:// URLs into every page and redirect. */
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO'] === 'https') {
$_SERVER['HTTPS'] = 'on';
}
/* Core lives in the image, not on the volume — the updater
would only fail against a read-only docroot. Plugin and
theme installs are unaffected. */
define('WP_AUTO_UPDATE_CORE', false);
/* No add_filter() here. WORDPRESS_CONFIG_EXTRA is eval'd inside
wp-config.php, long before wp-settings.php loads the plugin
API, so any add_filter call is a fatal error on every request
— which is exactly what happened on first deploy. xmlrpc is
handled at the ingress instead, by routing /xmlrpc.php
through the Authentik gate. */
envFrom:
# The eight WordPress salts. Rotating them in OpenBao invalidates
# every session — which is the intended lever, not a side effect.
- secretRef:
name: wordpress-secrets
volumeMounts:
- name: content
mountPath: /var/www/html/wp-content
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 60
periodSeconds: 30
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 768Mi
volumes:
- name: content
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: wordpress-content
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
ports:
- name: http
port: 80
targetPort: http
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# The eight WordPress salts (AUTH_KEY, SECURE_AUTH_KEY, LOGGED_IN_KEY,
# NONCE_KEY, AUTH_SALT, SECURE_AUTH_SALT, LOGGED_IN_SALT, NONCE_SALT).
# Expected keys in OpenBao at homelab/apps/wordpress, named exactly as the
# image's env vars: WORDPRESS_AUTH_KEY, WORDPRESS_SECURE_AUTH_KEY, ...
#
# Deliberately NOT carried over from the old wp-config.php: the Hetzner host
# is being decommissioned and its salts have been sitting on a VM whose
# neighbour site was compromised this month. New salts cost one logout.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: wordpress-secrets
namespace: wordpress
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: wordpress-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/wordpress
---
# S3 credentials for the MariaDB Backup.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: wordpress
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
# Reuses the paperless copy of the shared Hetzner S3 credentials (identical
# ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY / REGION) to avoid seeding a new OpenBao
# path for this migration — same approach woodpecker took. FOLLOW-UP: give
# wordpress its own seed/wordpress/hetzner-creds path once OpenBao can be
# written, and repoint this here (the value is the same, so it's a drop-in
# swap).
- extract:
key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
# A plain Ingress cannot point at a Service in another namespace, and the
# Authentik outposts all live in `authentik`. Same workaround as
# zone-configurator and paperless: mirror the outpost Service in as an
# ExternalName.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
namespace: wordpress
spec:
type: ExternalName
externalName: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
ports:
- port: 9000
targetPort: 9000
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# Two routers on one host. The site itself must stay readable by anyone --
# it is a family blog -- while the editing surface sits behind Authentik.
#
# Why not one gated Ingress with skip_path_regex, the way paperless-gate
# carves out /static/: that works when the PUBLIC paths are enumerable. Here
# it is the reverse -- every post URL is public and only two paths are gated
# -- which would need a negative lookahead. The outpost is Go, and RE2 has no
# lookahead. So the split happens at the router instead.
#
# Traefik orders routers by rule length, so PathPrefix(`/wp-admin`) is
# evaluated before PathPrefix(`/`); no explicit priority is needed.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: wordpress
labels:
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: www.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: wordpress
port:
number: 80
tls:
- secretName: wordpress-tls
hosts:
- www.renner.uno
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: wordpress-admin
namespace: wordpress
labels:
# Same label as the public Ingress on purpose. external-dns-unifi runs
# with --label-filter=dns.renner.uno/public!=true, so an unlabelled
# Ingress on this host would quietly gain a UDM A-record pointing LAN
# clients straight at the Traefik VIP -- a second, unintended path to
# the same host that skips the public route entirely.
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
# No cert-manager annotation and no tls block: the public Ingress above
# already owns the certificate for this host. Declaring it twice would
# create two Certificates racing for the same wordpress-tls Secret.
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: www.renner.uno
http:
paths:
# The outpost's own OAuth leg. Without this the gate is a dead end,
# not a gate: hitting /wp-admin redirects to
# /outpost.goauthentik.io/start on THIS host, which otherwise falls
# through to the public `/` router and lands on WordPress's 404
# page — verified exactly that way on first deploy. paperless needs
# the same route and has it as a separate Ingress on auth.renner.uno
# (apps/authentik/paperless-gate-ingress.yaml); here the flow stays
# on www.renner.uno, so it belongs in this rule set.
#
# It is not an authentication hole: these endpoints ARE the login
# flow, and the outpost serves them itself.
- path: /outpost.goauthentik.io
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
# Covers admin-ajax.php too. That is only safe because the gift
# registry plugin -- the sole thing on this site that ever emitted
# an ajaxurl -- is being dropped in the migration. Verified against
# the live site: 121 admin-ajax hits in the current log window, not
# one of them a 200.
- path: /wp-admin
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
- path: /wp-login.php
pathType: Exact
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
# xmlrpc.php would otherwise be served by the public `/` prefix
# router — an earlier version of this file claimed it was "blocked
# at the ingress" while nothing blocked it at all. There is no deny
# verb in an Ingress, so it goes through the gate instead: anonymous
# callers get Authentik, not the XML-RPC endpoint. Nothing on this
# site uses it (no Jetpack, no mobile app, no pingbacks worth
# keeping), so no legitimate caller is affected.
- path: /xmlrpc.php
pathType: Exact
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-wordpress-gate
port:
number: 9000
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- externalsecret.yaml
- mariadb.yaml
- pvc.yaml
- deployment.yaml
- gate-service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
# The database for www.renner.uno. Named `wordpress-mariadb`, not `wp-*`:
# `wp-pg` in the woodpecker namespace is Woodpecker's Postgres, and reusing
# the prefix for an unrelated engine invites exactly the wrong guess.
#
# Mirrors the CNPG convention: the operator lives in `database`, the database
# resource lives with its consumer (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: MariaDB
metadata:
name: wordpress-mariadb
namespace: wordpress
annotations:
# Data guard — a Kustomization rebuild must never take the database with it.
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
# generate: true lets the operator create both Secrets on first reconcile.
# Neither password is ever typed by a human or parked in OpenBao, so there
# is nothing to rotate by hand and nothing to leak through Git.
rootPasswordSecretKeyRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb-root
key: password
generate: true
username: wordpress
passwordSecretKeyRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb-app
key: password
generate: true
database: wordpress
port: 3306
replicas: 1
storage:
size: 5Gi
storageClassName: ceph-block
# The source database is 527 KB. 5Gi is not a sizing estimate, it is the
# smallest allocation that leaves room for binlogs and a decade of posts.
myCnf: |
[mariadb]
bind-address=*
default_storage_engine=InnoDB
innodb_buffer_pool_size=256M
# WordPress writes utf8mb4 throughout; the source dump carries
# utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci on every table that survives the migration.
character_set_server=utf8mb4
collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_520_ci
max_allowed_packet=64M
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
---
# Logical backup to Hetzner Object Storage. Velero only captures PVC data,
# which for a running database is crash-consistent, not transaction-consistent
# — that is a snapshot, not a backup you would want to restore from.
apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: Backup
metadata:
name: wordpress-mariadb-backup
namespace: wordpress
spec:
mariaDbRef:
name: wordpress-mariadb
schedule:
# 02:45, ahead of the Velero window that starts at 03:15.
cron: "45 2 * * *"
suspend: false
maxRetention: 720h # 30d, matching the CNPG ObjectStore retentionPolicy
compression: gzip
storage:
s3:
bucket: renner-uno-k8s-mariadb
prefix: wordpress
endpoint: fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
region: fsn1
accessKeyIdSecretKeyRef:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKeySecretKeyRef:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
tls:
enabled: true
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Only wp-content is persisted, not the whole docroot. WordPress core comes
# from the pinned image, so upgrading the site means bumping a tag in Git
# rather than clicking "update" in wp-admin — which is the entire point of
# moving off the Hetzner VM, where core was a mutable pile of PHP on disk.
#
# Consequence to be aware of: WordPress's own core updater will fail against
# a read-only core. Plugin and theme installs still work, because those land
# in wp-content.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: wordpress-content
namespace: wordpress
labels:
# The Velero Schedule selects ON this label rather than excluding the
# database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is merely assumed to set. If
# that assumption were wrong the exclusion would fail silently and Velero
# would snapshot the live database volume; selecting a label this repo
# owns cannot fail that way. Same direction as openbao-daily, which picks
# its snapshot PVC by app.kubernetes.io/component.
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/component: content
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
# RWO is sufficient: a single replica with strategy Recreate. ceph-block is
# the cluster default; named explicitly so a default change can't silently
# move the media library onto another class.
storageClassName: ceph-block
resources:
requests:
# The migrated wp-content is 29 MB compressed, 13 MB of it uploads.
storage: 10Gi
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ spec:
kind: HelmRelease
name: cloudnative-pg # DB operator — seed jobs create databases
namespace: database
- apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
name: mariadb-operator # the MySQL half — WordPress can't use CNPG
namespace: database
# decryption block dropped 2026-07-13: no *.sops.yaml left under this
# path — secrets come from OpenBao via ESO (MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md).
---
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: wordpress
namespace: flux-system
spec:
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 2m
timeout: 15m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/wordpress
prune: true
dependsOn:
# infrastructure gates on the mariadb-operator HelmRelease being Ready,
# so the MariaDB CRD exists and has a controller before this applies.
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
# kstatus has no built-in rule for k8s.mariadb.com resources, so without
# this the Kustomization would report Ready the moment the manifests are
# accepted — before the database is actually serving. Same reasoning as
# the CephCluster expressions in infrastructure.yaml.
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: k8s.mariadb.com/v1alpha1
kind: MariaDB
failed: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'False' && c.reason == 'Failed')"
current: "has(status.conditions) && status.conditions.exists(c, c.type == 'Ready' && c.status == 'True')"
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ resources:
- rook-ceph/
- ceph-csi-drivers/
- cloudnative-pg/
- mariadb-operator/
- netbird-ingress/
- netbird-backup/
- coredns-config/
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# MariaDB operator, for the one workload in this cluster that cannot use
# CloudNativePG: WordPress. WordPress speaks MySQL natively — the PostgreSQL
# route would mean pg4wp, an SQL-rewriting shim whose own README lists
# WordPress 6.5.3 as its newest tested version while renner.uno runs 7.0.4.
#
# The charts are OCI artifacts (ghcr.io), so this follows the OCIRepository
# pattern from infrastructure/spegel rather than the HelmRepository pattern
# used for CNPG.
#
# CRDs ship as a SEPARATE chart that must be installed first — upstream is
# explicit about the ordering, hence the dependsOn below rather than a single
# release with crds: CreateReplace.
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: OCIRepository
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 24h
url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator-crds
ref:
# Calendar versioning: the major is the year. Upstream ships an upgrade
# guide with each minor (Helm repo deprecations, registry moves), so the
# range is capped at the year boundary instead of the usual open ">=".
semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
---
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 30m
chartRef:
kind: OCIRepository
name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
---
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: OCIRepository
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 24h
url: oci://ghcr.io/mariadb-operator/charts/mariadb-operator
ref:
semver: ">=26.6.0 <27.0.0"
---
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
spec:
interval: 30m
dependsOn:
- name: mariadb-operator-crds
namespace: database
chartRef:
kind: OCIRepository
name: mariadb-operator
namespace: database
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
values:
# The operator watches all namespaces; the MariaDB CR itself lives with
# the app in kubernetes/apps/wordpress/, mirroring how CNPG Clusters sit
# in their consumer's namespace (ak-pg in authentik, im-pg in immich).
metrics:
enabled: false
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- helmrelease.yaml
@@ -151,3 +151,12 @@ apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: trmnl
---
# WordPress for www.renner.uno, migrated off the Hetzner VM `wordpress-hochzeit`.
# No privileged label needed: the cluster enforces `baseline`, which permits the
# official Apache image's root master process binding :80. It does trip the
# `restricted` audit/warn level — that is expected and not an error.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: wordpress
@@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ resources:
- external-secrets-ns.yaml
- woodpecker-ci-ns.yaml
- trmnl-ns.yaml
- wordpress-ns.yaml
- allow-cilium-health.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: wordpress
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
# Unlike paperless, traefik IS allowed here. www.renner.uno is a public
# blog: the front end must be reachable without authentication, so the
# public router terminates directly in this namespace.
#
# Be clear about what this does and does not buy: the public/admin split
# is enforced by the two Ingress objects' path rules (`/` straight to the
# Service, /wp-admin and /wp-login.php to the gate outpost) and by
# Authentik — NOT at the network layer. paperless can point a
# workload-scoped CNP at its gate because nothing else may reach it;
# here traefik must reach the pod directly for every public page, so the
# equivalent rule would be a no-op. Anyone auditing this namespace for
# defence in depth should know the network layer is not where the admin
# surface is protected.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
# Scoped to the gate outpost rather than the whole authentik namespace:
# only that pod has business reaching wp-admin.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wordpress-gate
# The mariadb-operator reconciles the MariaDB CR from the database
# namespace — same cross-namespace requirement CNPG consumers have.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
# home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": wordpress
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
# world covers two things WordPress genuinely needs outbound: the
# wordpress.org update/plugin API, and the Hetzner Object Storage
# endpoint the MariaDB Backup writes to.
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- world
# ICMP — egress mirror.
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 5, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 9, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 10, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 13, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 14, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 15, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 16, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 17, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 18, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 30, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 130, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 131, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 132, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 137, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 138, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 141, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 142, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 148, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 149, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 151, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 152, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 153, family: IPv6 }
@@ -59,3 +59,22 @@ resources:
- review-bot.yaml
- claude-oauth.yaml
- mosquitto-health.yaml
# NOT ROTATED, deliberately — recorded here because the whole point of this
# directory is that unrotated credentials should be a visible choice:
#
# homelab/apps/trmnl/renderer → BYOS_ACCESS_TOKEN / BYOS_REFRESH_TOKEN
# Terminus API JWTs used by the e-ink renderer to push screens. Terminus
# is configured with API_ACCESS_TOKEN_PERIOD = 10 years
# (kubernetes/apps/trmnl/terminus.yaml), so nothing will ever expire
# these or prompt a rotation. That is deliberate: the alternative was
# holding the Terminus account password in-cluster to mint short-lived
# tokens per pod start. There is no rotator because minting requires the
# account password, which is exactly what we declined to store.
# Rotate BY HAND whenever the Terminus account password changes, by
# re-running POST /login and re-seeding both keys.
#
# HA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the same path is a dedicated Home Assistant
# long-lived token. `ha-token` mode in secret-rotator already handles
# this class (see home-assistant.yaml) — enrolling it is a genuine
# follow-up, not a limitation, and would leave only the BYOS pair
# unrotated.
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ spec:
- paperless
- trmnl
- velero
- wordpress
provider:
vault: # ESO's provider name; speaks OpenBao fine
server: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
@@ -312,3 +312,38 @@ spec:
matchExpressions:
- key: cnpg.io/cluster
operator: DoesNotExist
---
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Schedule
metadata:
name: wordpress-daily
namespace: velero
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
spec:
# Daily at 08:45 local (next free stagger slot after trmnl-daily at 08:15).
# Covers the wordpress-content PVC: the media library and any plugins or
# themes installed through wp-admin. WordPress core is not in here — it
# comes from the pinned image, so Git is its backup.
schedule: "45 8 * * *"
useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
template:
includedNamespaces:
- wordpress
includedResources:
- persistentvolumeclaims
storageLocation: default
ttl: 720h0m0s
snapshotMoveData: true
# Selects the content PVC by a label this repo sets, rather than
# excluding the database PVC by one the mariadb-operator is assumed to
# set — an exclusion built on a wrong assumption fails silently and
# sweeps the live database volume in. A crash-consistent snapshot of a
# running database is not a restorable backup; the operator's own Backup
# resource takes a logical dump to Hetzner Object Storage at 02:45, the
# same division of labour as CNPG/Barman elsewhere in this file.
# openbao-daily picks its PVC the same way.
labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wordpress
app.kubernetes.io/component: content
+4 -2
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ locals {
"renner-uno-k8s-velero", # Velero PVC backups (Kopia data mover)
"renner-uno-k8s-secrets", # SOPS talosconfig/kubeconfig for cluster bootstrap
"renner-uno-tfstate", # OpenTofu remote state (migrated off the nas-1 Garage S3)
"renner-uno-k8s-mariadb", # mariadb-operator logical dumps (wordpress-mariadb)
]
}
@@ -95,8 +96,9 @@ locals {
# precedent in this repo — left uncapped (keep every version) since
# storage cost there is negligible.
hetzner_buckets_noncurrent_expiry_days = {
"renner-uno-k8s-cnpg" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-velero" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-cnpg" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-velero" = 30
"renner-uno-k8s-mariadb" = 30 # Backup maxRetention: 720h (kubernetes/apps/wordpress/mariadb.yaml)
}
}