docs(trmnl): note the expected Google drops from the renderer's Chromium

About 43k POLICY_DENIED a day from trmnl-renderer to Google update and account hosts. Source (OCI label): usetrmnl/trmnl-home-assistant dd556e6; the Chromium flags are a fixed list in screenshot.ts:78 with no env or option override, and --disable-background-networking is not among them. Nothing on our side can switch it off; the denies are correct. S28-4 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge pull request 'fix(mdns-relay): turn off RA on net1 so the IPv6 forward uses eth0' (#1598 ) from fix/mdns-relay-no-ra into main
2026-11-07 21:00:44 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 19:43:47 +00:00 · 2026-11-07 20:41:46 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 19:29:05 +00:00 · 2026-11-07 20:28:18 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 20:25:25 +01:00
117 changed files with 3678 additions and 1307 deletions
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ when:
      - "ci/images/**"
      - "secret-rotator/**"
      - "review-bot/**"
+      - "wlan-setup/**"
      - ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"
  - event: deployment
    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-ci-images"'
@@ -197,6 +198,31 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:$TAG \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:latest

+  # wlan-setup: the Go service behind wlan.renner.uno (802.1X/Passpoint setup page with per-device
+  # authentik app passwords). Runs after Gitea is up, so no ghcr mirror.
+  - name: build-wlan-setup
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.20-debug@sha256:28af5a3bd9c51fedb353ad91de735eda53592b5c06a34e7f5a9550334725d7f7
+    directory: wlan-setup
+    when:
+      - event: deployment
+      - event: push
+        path: ["wlan-setup/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d-%H%M)
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Containerfile \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:latest
+
  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: a general-purpose alpine + jq base for
  # workloads that need to read JSON from a shell script. Named for what it IS,
  # not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
@@ -35,25 +35,25 @@ when:
 steps:
  - name: model-selection-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

  - name: pr-review-mistral-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-pr-review-mistral.sh

  - name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh

  - name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ steps:
    # fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
    # ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
    # test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
    # this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
    when:
      - branch: main
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: update-audit-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.316
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.318
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Tests for the wlan-setup Go service (wlan-setup/). Offline: the tests run against a fake
+# authentik server, so the step needs no secret and no network beyond the module cache.
+when:
+  - event: pull_request
+    path: ["wlan-setup/**", ".woodpecker/wlan-setup-test.yml"]
+
+steps:
+  - name: go-test
+    image: golang:1.27.3-bookworm@sha256:d9b6a1beb9474adc2a1ce842573639b44b2a0dd49b6669f51d3821baf9ec37c9
+    commands:
+      - test -z "$(gofmt -l wlan-setup)"
+      - go -C wlan-setup vet ./...
+      - go -C wlan-setup test -race ./...
@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 # edge-host — bare-metal Arch thin client (replaces the k8s-edge Talos VM)

 Runs the hardware-bound services that used to be pinned to the `k8s-edge`
-Talos node (opentofu `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`), plus the new CAN bridge:
+Talos node (opentofu `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`):

 | Service | How it runs | Hardware | Talks to |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | zwave-js-ui | docker compose | ZWA-2 Z-Wave USB radio | HA `zwave_js` via ws://:3000, UI :8091 |
 | sml2mqtt | docker compose | FTDI FT230X meter reader | Mosquitto (`sml2mqtt` user) |
-| open3e | venv + systemd | Innomaker USB2CAN (gs_usb) | Mosquitto (`open3e` user) |
+
+The Viessmann E3 CAN bus is not read by an edge host: the ESP32 gateway
+`vitocal-can` (open3e-esp32) at the Vitocal publishes `open3e/#` directly to
+the cluster broker. `plays/install-edge-host.yml` removes the former
+heating-can stack and the can0 configuration from edge hosts.

 Everything else that once lived on k8s-edge (HA core, matter-server, OTBR,
 music-assistant) already moved to the general node pool and stays in the
@@ -19,17 +23,13 @@ The deployed unit is a **Dell Wyse 3040** (Atom x5-Z8350, 2 GB RAM) on a
 flash-wear handling that hardware implies. The installer also supports an
 N100/NVMe box; it autodetects the target disk, so either works.

-Rationale for leaving Kubernetes for the CAN part: the stock Talos kernel
-ships with `CONFIG_CAN` unset (siderolabs/talos#7686), so SocketCAN cannot
-work in any pod without a custom kernel image per Talos release.
-
 ## Base install (once, from the edge-host installer ISO)

 Build and boot the dedicated installer image — see
 `images/edge-host-iso/README.md`. Short version:

 1. `sudo pacman -S archiso && sudo images/edge-host-iso/build.sh`
-2. Write ISO to a USB stick, boot the target box from it, run `edge-install`
+2. Write ISO to a USB stick, boot the target box from it, run `edge-install <hostname>`
   (partitions the internal disk — NVMe if present, else the eMMC; the
   installer autodetects — installs the ansible-ready base system with SSH
   keys, DHCP, docker — asks for confirmation before wiping).
@@ -58,24 +58,18 @@ inventory change.

 | device | group | playbook |
 |---|---|---|
-| Innomaker USB2CAN (Vitocal/VX3 + E380) | `heating_can` | `plays/install-heating-can.yml` |
 | Nabu Casa ZWA-2 Z-Wave radio | `zwave_gateway` | `plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` |

-Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. They depend on
-the base play having run: all three need the local MQTT bridge, and two of
-them need docker.
+Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. It depends on
+the base play having run: it needs docker.

-A host with nothing attached is simply absent from all three groups and needs
+A host with nothing attached is simply absent from these groups and needs
 none of these commands.

 ## Secrets (before first play run)

 Create `inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml` with ansible-vault. The
-cluster broker has no `open3e` user: edge-1 logs in only as the register
-account `edge-1` (see "MQTT bridge" below), so
-`vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` reaches only the loopback broker, which
-allows anonymous clients; any random value works (`openssl rand -hex 24`).
-The zwave-js value comes out of the cluster:
+zwave-js value comes out of the cluster:

 ```
 # zwave-js session secret
@@ -84,7 +78,6 @@ kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.sessio

 ```yaml
 # vault.yml
-vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "..."
 vault_edge_loki_password: "..."   # dedicated edge-1 Loki push cred (see "Logging & eMMC")
 ```
@@ -102,9 +95,6 @@ The Z-Wave network keys do NOT need separate handling — they live in

 Preparation:
 - [ ] `vault.yml` populated (above), play runs green against edge-1
- [ ] CAN: Innomaker adapter connected to the VX3 external CAN port,
-      `ip -details link show can0` shows `state ERROR-ACTIVE bitrate 250000`,
-      `candump can0 -n 5` shows frames

 zwave-js (order matters — never two servers on one radio):
 - [ ] Copy the store out of the PVC while the pod still runs:
@@ -122,11 +112,6 @@ sml2mqtt:
      port, Wh stays Wh) → remove sml2mqtt from the home-assistant
      kustomization in the follow-up PR

-open3e:
- [ ] Stop any workstation listener (ONE instance per bus, hard rule)
- [ ] Move the USB2CAN adapter, `systemctl start open3e`
- [ ] Topics under `open3e/#` update on the broker
-
 Afterwards:
 - [ ] Retire VM 153: remove `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`, `talos/patches/k8s-edge.yaml`,
      node from the cluster (`kubectl delete node k8s-edge`, tofu apply)
@@ -134,22 +119,13 @@ Afterwards:

 ## Day-2 notes

- Image bumps: edit `edge_zwavejs_image` / `edge_sml2mqtt_image` in
-  defaults and re-run the play (no flux image-automation out here —
-  deliberate for sml2mqtt, acceptable for zwave-js). If a zwave-js bump
-  changes its Alpine major, also update `edge_zwave_alpine_base` and refresh
-  the preloaded `.so` (see "Logging & eMMC" → zwave-js).
- open3e / E3onCAN updates: both are pinned to commits in
-  `roles/heating-can/defaults/main.yml`, so re-running the play does NOT pick
-  up upstream changes -- that is deliberate, these drive the heat pump. The
-  weekly update-audit reports when either falls behind (see
-  `ci/agents/update-audit/prompt.md`); bump the pin and re-run.
-  Pinning to a tag is not an option for open3e: it publishes none.
- Ad-hoc CAN scans: `systemctl stop open3e` first (single-instance rule),
-  restart afterwards.
- can-utils (`candump`) is AUR-only on Arch — install manually via
-  `pamac build can-utils` if needed for debugging; the role deliberately
-  doesn't manage AUR packages.
+- Image bumps: Renovate opens a PR for `edge_*_image` in
+  `roles/*/defaults/main.yml` (tag + digest, `customManagers` in
+  `renovate.json`). No pipeline deploys to edge-1, so after the merge run
+  `ansible-playbook plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` from `ansible/` on a
+  mesh-connected workstation. The play reads the image's Alpine release
+  itself and rebuilds the preloaded `.so` when it changes (see
+  "Logging & eMMC" → zwave-js).

 ## Logging & eMMC

@@ -162,7 +138,9 @@ role keeps logs off local flash and monitors wear:
 - **Docker logs to journald** (`docker-daemon.json`, `log-driver: journald`)
  instead of unbounded json files under `/var/lib/docker/containers`. Both
  compose services inherit it; `docker logs` still works.
- **Grafana Alloy ships the journal to Loki** (`edge-alloy.service`). Its
+- **Grafana Alloy ships the journal to Loki** (`edge-alloy.service`, which
+  runs the upstream `grafana/alloy` image with `/run/log/journal` mounted
+  read-only; Arch's `grafana-alloy` package has no `loki.source.journal`). Its
  WAL/positions sit on `/run/alloy` (tmpfs), so the agent writes nothing to
  the eMMC either. Net effect: no log writes hit local flash — the trade-off
  is that logs are RAM-only and lost on reboot unless already shipped.
@@ -190,7 +168,7 @@ journal commit).

 - **Fix:** the `zwave-js` container preloads **`libeatmydata`**
  (`LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libeatmydata.so`, mounted read-only from
-  `zwave-js/libeatmydata.so`). This makes `fsync`/`fdatasync` no-ops *for that
+  `zwave-js/libeatmydata-alpine<X.Y>.so`). This makes `fsync`/`fdatasync` no-ops *for that
  one process*, so the kernel batches the writes via normal writeback (~30 s)
  instead of forcing each one. The WS/MQTT value stream to Home Assistant and
  the on-disk cache are **unchanged** — full data resolution, no re-interview
@@ -199,9 +177,9 @@ journal commit).
  batch it); the only mount-level alternative is putting the cache on tmpfs,
  which makes the *whole* store volatile → re-interview on every restart.
 - **The `.so` is musl** (the image is Alpine-based), extracted from
-  `edge_zwave_alpine_base` — keep that var in sync with the image's Alpine
-  version; to refresh after a major bump, `rm zwave-js/libeatmydata.so` and
-  re-run.
+  `alpine:<X.Y>`, where `X.Y` is read from the image's `/etc/alpine-release`
+  on every run. A new Alpine release gives a new file name, so the play
+  extracts it, recreates the container and deletes the old file.
 - **Durability guard:** because `fsync` is neutralized, a hard power-loss
  during the (rare) settings write could truncate `settings.json`, which holds
  the **Z-Wave network keys**. `edge-zwave-settings-backup.timer` keeps a
@@ -211,47 +189,3 @@ journal commit).
 - Verify the drop with the eMMC-write sampling described above; roll back by
  removing the `LD_PRELOAD` env + `.so` mount from the compose file.

-## MQTT bridge (TLS to the cluster broker)
-
-open3e, e3oncan and sml2mqtt do **not** publish to the cluster broker directly.
-They connect to a **local mosquitto on loopback** (`127.0.0.1:1883`,
-`edge_mqtt_host`), which **bridges to the cluster broker over TLS**
-(`mqtt.renner.uno:8883`). Two reasons:
-
- **Security:** open3e and e3oncan have no native MQTTS support (their MQTT
-  code does a plain `connect()`), so they can't use the broker's 8883 TLS
-  listener. Terminating TLS in the local broker keeps their plaintext MQTT on
-  loopback only — off the untrusted IoT VLAN — while the actual network hop is
-  encrypted. The public Let's Encrypt cert is validated against the system CA
-  bundle (`edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile`); no cert distribution needed.
- **Availability:** the local broker buffers telemetry (in RAM) if the cluster
-  broker is briefly unreachable, and flushes on reconnect — edge-1 no longer
-  hard-depends on cluster/network uptime for every publish.
-
-The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary is the
-host; nothing off-host can reach it.
-
-**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** One bridge `connection` logs in as the
-register account `edge-1` (`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`)
-and carries `open3e/#` out and `open3e/cmnd` back. The cluster broker does not
-accept the vault-password bridges in `bridge.d/legacy.conf`, which exists only
-until the first push. Its password is pushed
-by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
-esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
-the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
-its own server key, nothing else. On a push it writes
-`/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/edge-1.conf`, deletes `bridge.d/legacy.conf` and
-restarts the local mosquitto. The controller sets a new password whenever the
-bridge reports "not connected" (also after a reinstall), so no play run is
-needed for a rotation. Diagnosis: `journalctl -u
-edge-mqtt-cred`, and `mosquitto_sub -t '$SYS/broker/connection/edge-1/state'`
-(retained `1` = connected).
-
-**eMMC:** the local broker writes **nothing** to flash — `persistence false`
-(retained/queued messages in RAM) and `log_dest stdout` (to the volatile
-journal → Loki). Do not add persistence or log-file settings to
-`edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2`.
-
-Rollback: point `edge_mqtt_host` back to `mqtt.renner.uno` and re-run (clients
-reconnect directly on 1883). Config: `edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2` →
-`/etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf`.
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 # Secret indirection — real values live in vault.yml (ansible-vault) next
 # to this file; see docs/edge-host.md for how to populate it from
 # the cluster secrets.
-edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "{{ vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret }}"
 # Loki push credential (dedicated 'edge-1' user, Traefik basic-auth on the
 # loki.renner.uno ingress; the matching htpasswd line lives in the cluster
@@ -36,25 +35,8 @@ keepalived_ntp_sysctl:
 # Realtek NIC on the Wyse 3040 has no hardware timestamping.
 chrony_hwtimestamp: false

-# --- Local MQTT contract -------------------------------------------------
-# Shared between the broker and its clients, so it belongs to the inventory
-# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can
-# publishes here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
-# broker AS the open3e user, so it needs that identity too.
-#
-# Keeping these in one role's defaults only worked while a single play loaded
-# every role at once. Splitting the plays by capability exposed it: the bridge
-# could not render without a heating-can default, and the CAN services could
-# not render without an mqtt-bridge default.
-edge_mqtt_host: 127.0.0.1
-edge_mqtt_port: 1883
-edge_open3e_mqtt_user: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_topic: open3e
-
 # Units claude-bot may restart (ssh-ca role); the containers go through docker.
 ssh_ca_claude_sudo_units:
-  - mosquitto
-  - edge-mqtt-cred
  - edge-alloy
  - keepalived
  - chronyd
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@ proxy-1.renner.uno ansible_host=proxy-1.nb.renner.uno ansible_user=root
 proxy-2.renner.uno ansible_host=proxy-2.nb.renner.uno ansible_user=root

 # Every bare-metal edge thin client. Gets the host-generic roles only:
-# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the MQTT bridge, the VLAN
-# sub-interface. Nothing here assumes any peripheral is attached.
+# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the VLAN sub-interface. Nothing here
+# assumes any peripheral is attached.
 [edge_host]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno ansible_user=root
+edge-2.iot.renner.uno ansible_user=root

 # Synology NAS (DSM): nas-1 RS1221+ on site, nas-2 DS1522+ off site.
 [synology_nas]
@@ -36,32 +37,18 @@ nas-2.renner.uno ansible_user=root
 # These are children of [edge_host], declared below: a peripheral is added to an
 # edge client, it does not replace the base. Making that a :children relation
 # rather than a comment means a host added only to a capability group still
-# resolves group_vars/edge_host -- where the local MQTT contract lives -- so it
-# cannot silently come up without edge_mqtt_host and friends.
+# resolves group_vars/edge_host.
 [zwave_gateway]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno

-[heating_can]
-edge-1.iot.renner.uno
-
 [edge_host:children]
 zwave_gateway
-heating_can

-# NTP servers. edge-1 was added here so the role would survive the PVE hosts
-# being retired for bare-metal Talos, which cannot run chrony or keepalived
-# itself. That retirement has now happened, so edge-1 is the ONLY member.
-#
-# THIS IS NO LONGER HIGHLY AVAILABLE. The group was jupiter (MASTER, prio 100),
-# saturn (90), neptune (80) and edge-1 (BACKUP, 70); the first three are gone.
-# A single VRRP member takes the address regardless of its configured state, so
-# the service address is still served, but by one thin client with
-# no failover behind it. install-ntp-ha.yml still carries the four-host
-# ntp_servers priority map, which now describes hosts that do not exist.
-#
-# Restoring redundancy needs a second chrony host that is not a Talos node.
-# See plays/install-ntp-ha.yml for why keepalived is scoped more narrowly than
-# chrony within this group.
+# NTP servers: every edge host (edge-1 BACKUP prio 70, edge-2 BACKUP prio 60;
+# see the ntp_servers map in plays/install-ntp-ha.yml). Talos nodes cannot run
+# chrony or keepalived. The jupiter/saturn/neptune entries in that map
+# describe retired PVE hosts. See plays/install-ntp-ha.yml for why keepalived
+# is scoped more narrowly than chrony within this group.
 [ntp_cluster:children]
 edge_host

@@ -73,6 +60,7 @@ proxy-1.renner.uno
 proxy-2.renner.uno
 netbird.renner.uno
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno
+edge-2.iot.renner.uno
 nas-1.renner.uno
 nas-2.renner.uno

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
---
-# Configure VMs to use host time sync via kvm-clock
-# Disables systemd-timesyncd to prevent NTP conflicts
-#
-# VMs get time from Proxmox host via kvm-clock paravirtualized clock
-# This is more accurate and reliable than network NTP for VMs
-
- name: Configure VM time synchronization from host
-  hosts: all
-  become: yes
-  gather_facts: yes
-
-  tasks:
-    - name: Check if running as VM (not LXC)
-      stat:
-        path: /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
-      register: clocksource_file
-
-    - name: Get current clock source
-      slurp:
-        src: /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
-      register: clocksource
-      when: clocksource_file.stat.exists
-
-    - name: Display clock source
-      debug:
-        msg: "Clock source: {{ (clocksource.content | b64decode | trim) if clocksource_file.stat.exists else 'N/A (LXC)' }}"
-
-    - name: Check if systemd-timesyncd is installed
-      command: systemctl list-unit-files systemd-timesyncd.service
-      register: timesyncd_installed
-      check_mode: false
-      failed_when: false
-      changed_when: false
-
-    - name: Stop and disable systemd-timesyncd on VMs using kvm-clock
-      systemd:
-        name: systemd-timesyncd
-        state: stopped
-        enabled: no
-      when:
-        - clocksource_file.stat.exists
-        - clocksource.content is defined
-        - "'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode)"
-        - "'systemd-timesyncd.service' in timesyncd_installed.stdout"
-
-    - name: Mask systemd-timesyncd to prevent re-enabling
-      systemd:
-        name: systemd-timesyncd
-        masked: yes
-      when:
-        - clocksource_file.stat.exists
-        - clocksource.content is defined
-        - "'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode)"
-        - "'systemd-timesyncd.service' in timesyncd_installed.stdout"
-
-    - name: Verify time sync status
-      command: timedatectl show --property=NTPSynchronized
-      register: timesync_status
-      check_mode: false
-      changed_when: false
-      failed_when: false
-
-    - name: Display final status
-      debug:
-        msg: |
-          Host: {{ inventory_hostname }}
-          Type: {{ 'VM (kvm-clock)' if (clocksource_file.stat.exists and 'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode | default(''))) else 'LXC/Other' }}
-          Time sync: {{ timesync_status.stdout | default('unknown') }}
-          Note: VMs sync time from Proxmox host, LXCs inherit host time automatically
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 # their own inventory groups:
 #
 #   plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml   [zwave_gateway]   ZWA-2 radio
-#   plays/install-heating-can.yml     [heating_can]     Innomaker USB2CAN
 #
 # Splitting the roles without splitting the plays would have kept the coupling:
 # one play applying every role to one group is the monolith again, a layer up.
@@ -31,11 +30,96 @@
  # do not silently depend on the connection user staying privileged.
  become: true

+  # The Viessmann E3 CAN bus is read by vitocal-can (open3e-esp32 at the
+  # Vitocal), which publishes to the cluster broker itself, not by an edge
+  # host. These remove the former heating-can stack, the can0 configuration
+  # and the open3e MQTT bridge (loopback mosquitto + edge-mqtt-cred); each is
+  # a no-op where they are absent.
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: Read the service list
+      ansible.builtin.service_facts:
+
+    - name: Stop and disable the retired MQTT bridge services
+      ansible.builtin.systemd:
+        name: "{{ item }}"
+        state: stopped
+        enabled: false
+      loop:
+        - edge-mqtt-cred
+        - mosquitto
+      when: (item ~ '.service') in ansible_facts.services
+
+    - name: Remove the retired MQTT bridge files
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: "{{ item }}"
+        state: absent
+      loop:
+        - /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service
+        - /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred
+        - /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
+        - /etc/mosquitto
+      register: edge_mqtt_bridge_files
+
+    - name: Reload systemd without the edge-mqtt-cred unit
+      ansible.builtin.systemd:
+        daemon_reload: true
+      when: edge_mqtt_bridge_files.changed
+
+    - name: Uninstall mosquitto
+      ansible.builtin.package:
+        name: mosquitto
+        state: absent
+
+    - name: Check for the retired heating-can compose project
+      ansible.builtin.stat:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/heating-can/docker-compose.yml
+      register: edge_heating_can_compose
+
+    - name: Stop and remove the retired heating-can containers and image
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: docker compose down --remove-orphans --rmi all
+        chdir: /opt/edge-host/heating-can
+      when: edge_heating_can_compose.stat.exists
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Remove the retired heating-can directory
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/heating-can
+        state: absent
+
+    - name: Remove the can0 networkd configuration
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /etc/systemd/network/80-can0.network
+        state: absent
+      register: edge_can0_network
+
+    - name: Reload networkd without the can0 configuration
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: networkctl reload
+      when: edge_can0_network.changed
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Read the can0 link flags
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: ip -o link show can0
+      register: edge_can0_link
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      failed_when: false
+
+    - name: Take can0 down
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: ip link set can0 down
+      when:
+        - edge_can0_link.rc == 0
+        - edge_can0_link.stdout is search('[<,]UP[,>]')
+      changed_when: true
+
  roles:
    - certificates
    - common
+    - pacman-cache
    - edge-flash-wear
    - docker-install
    - edge-log-shipper
-    - mqtt-bridge
    - edge-vlan
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus, for hosts with the Innomaker
-# USB2CAN adapter attached.
-#
-# Targets [heating_can]: membership means the adapter is physically present.
-# Two roles because they are two concerns -- the interface is host network
-# state, the services consume it -- but one group, because both need the same
-# hardware.
-#
-# Requires the base play (plays/install-edge-host.yml) to have run: these
-# services publish to the local MQTT bridge it sets up.
- name: Install heating CAN services
-  hosts: heating_can
-  become: true
-
-  roles:
-    - socketcan
-    - heating-can
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  become: true
  roles:
    - common
+    - timesyncd
    - docker-install
    - netbird-proxy
    - netbird-proxy-watchdog
@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
  become: true
  roles:
    - common
+    - timesyncd
    - docker-install
    - netbird-server
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@
      edge-1.iot.renner.uno:
        priority: 70
        state: "BACKUP"
+      edge-2.iot.renner.uno:
+        priority: 60
+        state: "BACKUP"

  roles:
    - role: chrony-ntp-server
@@ -54,18 +54,9 @@
 # via plays/configure-ssh-ca.yml.

 # -------------------------------------------------------
-# 5. Disable NTP on VMs/LXC (use host time)
+# 5. Time sync
 # -------------------------------------------------------
- name: Stop and disable systemd-timesyncd on VMs/LXC
-  systemd:
-    name: systemd-timesyncd
-    state: stopped
-    enabled: no
-    masked: yes
-  when:
-    - ansible_facts['virtualization_role'] == 'guest'
-    - ansible_facts['virtualization_type'] in ['kvm', 'lxc']
-  ignore_errors: yes
+# Moved to separate roles: timesyncd (internet VPS), chrony-ntp-server (edge).

 # -------------------------------------------------------
 # 6. Certificates
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@

 edge_alloy_config_file: /etc/alloy/edge.alloy
 edge_alloy_http_port: 12345
-edge_alloy_bin: /usr/bin/grafana-alloy   # Arch `grafana-alloy` pkg names the binary this, not `alloy`
+# Upstream image: Arch's grafana-alloy 1.21 is built without
+# loki.source.journal. Renovate-tracked (customManagers in renovate.json).
+edge_alloy_image: grafana/alloy:v1.21.3@sha256:8ab871206bd2d8f89277f53abffee5f452a293980788d52f85fa183a87a505a4
 edge_loki_push_url: "https://loki.renner.uno/loki/api/v1/push"
 edge_loki_username: edge-1
 edge_alloy_labels:
@@ -6,15 +6,18 @@
 # directly, so one journal source covers everything. Alloy s storage/WAL sits
 # on /run (tmpfs) so it does not write to flash either.

- name: Install grafana-alloy
+# Alloy runs from the upstream image (see edge-alloy.service); the Arch package
+# lacks journal support.
+- name: Remove the grafana-alloy package
  ansible.builtin.package:
    name: grafana-alloy
-    state: present
+    state: absent

 - name: Create alloy system group
  ansible.builtin.group:
    name: alloy
    system: true
+  register: edge_alloy_group

 - name: Create alloy system user
  ansible.builtin.user:
@@ -24,6 +27,25 @@
    system: true
    create_home: false
    shell: /usr/bin/nologin
+  register: edge_alloy_user
+
+- name: Look up the systemd-journal group
+  ansible.builtin.getent:
+    database: group
+    key: systemd-journal
+
+- name: Set the container identity
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    edge_alloy_uid: "{{ edge_alloy_user.uid }}"
+    edge_alloy_gid: "{{ edge_alloy_group.gid }}"
+    edge_alloy_journal_gid: "{{ ansible_facts.getent_group['systemd-journal'][1] }}"
+
+- name: Pull the alloy image
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [docker, pull, "{{ edge_alloy_image }}"]
+  register: edge_alloy_pull
+  changed_when: "'Downloaded newer image' in edge_alloy_pull.stdout"
+  notify: Restart alloy

 - name: Create alloy config directory
  ansible.builtin.file:
@@ -1,32 +1,35 @@
 [Unit]
-Description=Grafana Alloy (edge-1 log shipper -> Loki)
+Description=Grafana Alloy (journal -> Loki)
 Documentation=https://grafana.com/docs/alloy/
-After=network-online.target
+After=docker.service network-online.target
+Requires=docker.service
 Wants=network-online.target

 [Service]
 Type=simple
-User=alloy
-Group=alloy
-# Read the (volatile) systemd journal.
-SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal
-# WAL + positions on tmpfs so the agent never writes to the eMMC. %t is the
-# runtime dir root (/run); RuntimeDirectory creates /run/alloy owned by us.
-RuntimeDirectory=alloy
-ExecStart={{ edge_alloy_bin }} run \
+# WAL + positions on tmpfs so the agent never writes to the eMMC.
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/install -d -o alloy -g alloy -m 0750 /run/alloy
+ExecStartPre=-/usr/bin/docker rm -f edge-alloy
+# Attached run with --log-driver none: the container's output reaches the
+# journal once, through this unit.
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker run --rm --name edge-alloy \
+  --log-driver none \
+  --network host \
+  --user {{ edge_alloy_uid }}:{{ edge_alloy_gid }} \
+  --group-add {{ edge_alloy_journal_gid }} \
+  --read-only --tmpfs /tmp \
+  --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+  -v /run/log/journal:/run/log/journal:ro \
+  -v /etc/machine-id:/etc/machine-id:ro \
+  -v {{ edge_alloy_config_file }}:/etc/alloy/config.alloy:ro \
+  -v /run/alloy:/var/lib/alloy \
+  {{ edge_alloy_image }} run \
  --server.http.listen-addr=127.0.0.1:{{ edge_alloy_http_port }} \
-  --storage.path=%t/alloy \
-  {{ edge_alloy_config_file }}
-ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-Restart=on-failure
+  --storage.path=/var/lib/alloy \
+  /etc/alloy/config.alloy
+ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker stop edge-alloy
+Restart=always
 RestartSec=10s
-LimitNOFILE=65536
-
-# Hardening (bare metal, no LXC namespace limits here).
-NoNewPrivileges=yes
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=yes
-PrivateTmp=yes

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus: open3e (heat pump) and
-# e3oncan (E380 energy meter). The can0 interface itself is the socketcan
-# role.
-
-# Service root. Kept per-role so the role is usable on its own.
-edge_base_dir: /opt/edge-host
-
-edge_open3e_mqtt_user: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_topic: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
-edge_open3e_poll_seconds: 30
-# Read-only datapoint set (Phase 1 extended set, established 2026-07-02 on
-# the commissioning workstation; see vican repo CLAUDE.md for the rationale).
-# NO -w / write DIDs here — live heating + battery, writes are Phase 3.
-# vx3.266 = ErrorDtcHistory (O3EList) — the VX3 fault log; polled to catch
-# recurrences of FailureCommunicationEnergyMeter (the E380 energy-meter link
-# the internal PV-surplus EMS depends on). Decodes via the master O3EList
-# codec inherited through the vx3plus overlay.
-# vitocal.543/2350/2543/2560: SmartGrid-/EMS-Status-Beobachtung (2026-07-06)
-# — klärt, ob die Eigenstromoptimierung (EMS) bei PV-Überschuss von selbst
-# den WW-Boost auslöst (2543.2 steht laut Scan bereits auf +10 K), bevor
-# SG-Ready-Verdrahtung oder andere Trigger gebaut werden. Alle vier ro.
-# vitocal.259/260 = InfoDtcList/InfoDtcHistory (O3EList) — the HPMU event log,
-# the Vitocal-side counterpart to vx3.266. Both are capped lists (2 and 9
-# entries when added), so the multi-frame read is cheap at a 30 s poll.
-# Records faults/info events only (NormalOperation, LagDeviceDtcReported,
-# LegionellaProtectionTemperatureReached) — NOT setpoint or program changes.
-# onebase.*: the 29 paired ZigBee slots on the One Base gateway (ECU 0x6c3) --
-# 8 radiator valves, 9 climate sensors, 9 underfloor actuators, 3 floor
-# thermostats. Per-device room temperature, active setpoint, humidity, valve
-# opening/demand, battery and RSSI; the local replacement for the ViCare cloud
-# room sensors. Needs the onebase overlay (files/open3e-onebase.py) -- the stock
-# codec declares 57 bytes and a paired slot answers with 68.
-# Only CurrentValues are polled. The room and device registries (1884.., 2084..)
-# are static configuration and are read on demand, not every 30 s.
-edge_open3e_datapoints: >-
-  vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791,onebase.2086,onebase.2089,onebase.2092,onebase.2095,onebase.2098,onebase.2101,onebase.2104,onebase.2107,onebase.2110,onebase.2113,onebase.2116,onebase.2119,onebase.2122,onebase.2125,onebase.2128,onebase.2131,onebase.2134,onebase.2137,onebase.2140,onebase.2143,onebase.2262,onebase.2265,onebase.2268,onebase.2271,onebase.2274,onebase.2277,onebase.2280,onebase.2283,onebase.2286
-# ECU addresses; -dev selects codec set, tx selects the UDS address.
-# vcmu (refrigerant-circuit controller) has no dedicated codec set —
-# omitting dpList makes open3e fall back to the generic datapoint list,
-# which decodes all polled VCMU DIDs.
-edge_open3e_devices:
-  vitocal: { tx: "0x680", dpList: "vcal" }
-  # dpList als Pfad: Overlay-Datei mit den Batteriemodul-DIDs (siehe
-  # files/open3e-vx3plus.py) — die Stock-vx3-Liste filtert sie sonst weg.
-  vx3: { tx: "0x6a1", dpList: "/config/vx3plus.py" }
-  vcmu: { tx: "0x68c" }
-  # One Base ZigBee gateway. Overlay re-declares the paired ZigBee slots at
-  # their real 68-byte length (see files/open3e-onebase.py).
-  onebase: { tx: "0x6c3", dpList: "/config/onebase.py" }
-
-edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds: 10
-edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
-
-# Secrets come from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
-#   edge_open3e_mqtt_password
-
-# The image carrying both readers, built and pinned in CI
-# (ci/images/heating-can/Containerfile). The source pins live in the
-# Containerfile, in the artifact -- not here -- so what is deployed is a tag,
-# and `docker compose up -d` on an unchanged tag is a genuine no-op.
-#
-# Tracked by the weekly update-audit as an ordinary image, which is why this is
-# simpler to keep current than the two git refs it replaced: one publishes no
-# tags at all, the other was pinned to an untagged commit between releases.
-heating_can_image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
-
-# Compose project directory. Separate from the old native layout under
-# {{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e, which this role removes.
-heating_can_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/heating-can"
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the One Base
-# ZigBee gateway on ECU 0x6c3 (BACKENDGATEWAY).
-#
-# Upstream declares ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues as 57 bytes. A PAIRED device
-# slot on this gateway answers with 68: the 57 known bytes plus the parent
-# device serial and three trailing bytes. udsoncan reads only the declared
-# length and then treats the next two bytes -- the first half of that serial --
-# as a foreign data identifier, so every paired slot fails to decode with
-# "Server returned values for data identifier 0x.... that was not requested".
-# The bogus identifier differs per device because the serial does.
-#
-# This overlay re-declares the 29 paired slots at 68 bytes, reusing upstream's
-# sub-type list so the per-device-type O3ESwitch (climate sensor / TRV / floor
-# thermostat / actuator, incl. DeviceTemperatureSetpoint) is inherited rather
-# than copied.
-#
-# EMPTY slots answer with 57 and decode against the stock codec, so they are
-# left alone and are not polled. A slot that is later unpaired therefore starts
-# reporting a decode error on its topic instead of a value.
-#
-# Verified on ECU 0x6c3, 2026-09-17: 29 paired slots, all 68 bytes.
-from open3e.Open3Ecodecs import O3EComplexType, RawCodec
-from open3e.Open3Edatapoints import dataIdentifiers as _master
-
-# ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues of the paired slots: devices 1-20 run 2086..2143
-# in steps of 3, devices 21-29 continue at 2262..2286.
-_PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES = [2086 + 3 * n for n in range(20)] + [
-    2262 + 3 * n for n in range(9)
-]
-
-
-def _with_parent_serial(did):
-    stock = _master["dids"][did]
-    return O3EComplexType(
-        68,
-        stock.id,
-        list(stock.subTypes)
-        + [
-            RawCodec(8, "ParentDeviceSerialnumber"),
-            RawCodec(2, "Unknown_65_66"),
-            RawCodec(1, "Unknown_67"),
-        ],
-        desc=stock.desc,
-        info=stock.info,
-        acc=stock.acc,
-    )
-
-
-dataIdentifiers = {
-    "dids": {
-        **_master["dids"],
-        **{did: _with_parent_serial(did) for did in _PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES},
-    }
-}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the VX3:
-# the stock vx3 list acts as a FILTER (DIDs missing from it are popped
-# from the master table, Open3Eclass.py), so the per-battery-module DIDs
-# were never pollable with dpList "vx3". This overlay re-adds them with
-# codec None (= keep the master/general codec, RawCodec hex strings).
-#
-# Module DIDs (verified answering on ECU 0x6a1, 2026-07-03):
-#   1577-1582  ElectricalEnergyStorageModule{One..Six}OperatingData
-#              (139 B: 8x temperature 0.1 °C + 15x cell voltage mV)
-#   3085-3090  ElectricalEnergyStorageModule{One..Six}Information
-#              (18 B: module voltage 0.01 V, SoH?, counters)
-from open3e.Open3EdatapointsVx3 import dataIdentifiers as _vx3
-
-dataIdentifiers = {
-    "dids": {
-        **_vx3["dids"],
-        1577: None, 1578: None, 1579: None, 1580: None, 1581: None, 1582: None,
-        3085: None, 3086: None, 3087: None, 3088: None, 3089: None, 3090: None,
-    }
-}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Reload systemd
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    daemon_reload: true
-
- name: Restart heating-can
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d --force-recreate
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: true
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus.
-#
-# Two readers of the same heating installation, supervised inside one container
-# from one image (ci/images/heating-can):
-#   open3e    UDS request/response to the Vitocal heat pump and Vitocharge VX3
-#   e3oncan   passive CANopen listener for the E380 grid energy meter, which
-#             feeds the heat pump's own energy management
-#
-# They coexist because e3oncan issues no bus writes.
-#
-# Nothing is installed here. The image is built in CI with both sources pinned,
-# published to the registry, and this host only pulls and runs it. That is what
-# removes the churn: these were pip-installed into venvs on the node, and pip
-# re-cloned and rebuilt a VCS requirement on every converge -- restarting the
-# heating bridge each time -- which pinning the SHA did not fix.
-#
-# network_mode: host is required, not incidental: SocketCAN interfaces live in
-# the host network namespace, so can0 is only reachable that way. It is also how
-# the local MQTT broker on 127.0.0.1 is reached. CAN_RAW needs no capabilities,
-# so both run unprivileged.
-#
-# The can0 interface itself belongs to the socketcan role; this role consumes it.
-
- name: Create heating-can directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# --- Migration off the native install ---------------------------------------
-# Must happen before the containers start. Two open3e instances issuing UDS
-# requests on one CAN bus is the failure mode to avoid, so the old units are
-# stopped and masked rather than merely disabled -- masked so a stray
-# `systemctl start` or a leftover dependency cannot bring them back alongside
-# the containers.
- name: Find which native CAN units still exist
-  ansible.builtin.stat:
-    path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}.service"
-  loop:
-    - open3e
-    - e3oncan
-  register: heating_can_native_units
-
-# Stop and disable BEFORE anything else, and do NOT swallow the result.
-#
-# The first version did stop + disable + mask in one call with
-# failed_when: false, then deleted the unit files. Masking a unit whose file
-# still exists conflicts, so the call failed, failed_when hid it, nothing was
-# stopped -- and the next task deleted the unit files out from under two
-# running processes. systemctl is-enabled then reported "not-found" and looked
-# clean while is-active still said "active".
-#
-# The result on 2026-08-10 was two open3e instances issuing UDS requests on the
-# same CAN bus for nine minutes, fighting over the open3e-edge client ID and
-# kicking each other off the broker.
-#
-# Only units that actually exist are touched, so a fresh host does not need an
-# error swallowed to get through this.
- name: Stop and disable the native CAN services
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: "{{ item.item }}"
-    state: stopped
-    enabled: false
-  loop: "{{ heating_can_native_units.results }}"
-  loop_control:
-    label: "{{ item.item }}"
-  when: item.stat.exists
-
-# Masking is deliberately NOT used. It writes a symlink at the same path the
-# next task removes, so the two cancel out -- which is half of how the original
-# failed. With the unit files gone there is nothing left to start.
- name: Remove the native unit files
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}.service"
-    state: absent
-  loop:
-    - open3e
-    - e3oncan
-  notify: Reload systemd
-
-# The invariant that actually matters is "no native process is on the CAN bus",
-# and systemd reporting success is not the same claim. Two open3e instances
-# polling one bus is the failure this whole block exists to prevent, so it is
-# asserted directly rather than inferred from the calls above.
- name: Check for surviving native CAN processes
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    argv: [pgrep, -af, "edge-host/(open3e|e3oncan)"]
-  register: heating_can_survivors
-  check_mode: false
-  changed_when: false
-  failed_when: false
-
- name: Assert no native CAN process survived
-  ansible.builtin.assert:
-    that:
-      - heating_can_survivors.stdout | default('') | length == 0
-    fail_msg: >-
-      A native open3e/e3oncan process is still running after the units were
-      stopped and removed:
-      {{ heating_can_survivors.stdout_lines | default([]) | join('; ') }}.
-      Starting the container now would put two readers on the same CAN bus --
-      two open3e instances issue competing UDS requests and take over each
-      other's MQTT session. Kill the survivors, then re-run.
-    success_msg: No native CAN processes remain; safe to start the container.
-
- name: Remove the native venvs
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ item }}"
-    state: absent
-  loop:
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e/venv"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan/venv"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan/src"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan"
-
-# --- Configuration (bind-mounted into the containers) ------------------------
- name: Deploy open3e devices.json
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    content: "{{ edge_open3e_devices | to_nice_json }}\n"
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/devices.json"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy open3e vx3 datapoint overlay (battery-module DIDs)
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: open3e-vx3plus.py
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/vx3plus.py"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy open3e One Base datapoint overlay (68-byte ZigBee slots)
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: open3e-onebase.py
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/onebase.py"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
-# --- Compose project ---------------------------------------------------------
- name: Deploy the broker credential env file
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: heating-can.env.j2
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/heating-can.env"
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy heating-can compose project
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: docker-compose.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Pull the heating-can image
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose pull
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: false
-
-# Unlike the zwave and meter services there is no missing-device tolerance here:
-# can0 is created by the socketcan role from a USB adapter that is part of this
-# host's purpose. If it is absent the heating telemetry is down and the run
-# should say so rather than pass quietly.
- name: Start heating-can services
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  register: heating_can_up
-  changed_when: >-
-    'Started' in heating_can_up.stderr or 'Created' in heating_can_up.stderr
-    or 'Started' in heating_can_up.stdout or 'Creating' in heating_can_up.stdout
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can).
-#
-# One container. Both CAN readers live in the image and are supervised inside
-# it -- this file supplies configuration and nothing else. It does not know
-# open3e's or E3onCAN's command line.
-#
-# network_mode: host is required: SocketCAN interfaces live in the host network
-# namespace, so {{ edge_can_interface }} is only reachable this way, and it is
-# also how the local MQTT broker is reached. CAN_RAW needs no capabilities, so
-# the image runs unprivileged.
-services:
-  heating-can:
-    image: {{ heating_can_image }}
-    container_name: heating-can
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    network_mode: host
-    volumes:
-      - ./devices.json:/config/devices.json:ro
-      - ./vx3plus.py:/config/vx3plus.py:ro
-      - ./onebase.py:/config/onebase.py:ro
-    env_file:
-      # Broker credential, 0600 -- see heating-can.env.j2.
-      - heating-can.env
-    environment:
-      CAN_INTERFACE: "{{ edge_can_interface }}"
-      MQTT_HOST: "{{ edge_mqtt_host }}"
-      MQTT_PORT: "{{ edge_mqtt_port }}"
-      MQTT_TOPIC: "{{ edge_open3e_mqtt_topic }}"
-      MQTT_FORMAT: "{{ edge_open3e_mqtt_format }}"
-      E3ONCAN_MQTT_FORMAT: "{{ edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format }}"
-      OPEN3E_CONFIG: /config/devices.json
-      OPEN3E_CLIENT_ID: open3e-edge
-      OPEN3E_POLL_SECONDS: "{{ edge_open3e_poll_seconds }}"
-      OPEN3E_DATAPOINTS: "{{ edge_open3e_datapoints }}"
-      E3ONCAN_DEVICE: e380
-      E3ONCAN_GAP_SECONDS: "{{ edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds }}"
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). 0600 -- carries the broker credential.
-#
-# Kept out of docker-compose.yml, which is 0644: the sibling roles on this host
-# do the same (power-meter-sml renders its config at 0600 while its compose file
-# stays world-readable), and the native unit this replaced used a 0600 env file
-# for exactly this value.
-MQTT_USER={{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-MQTT_PASSWORD={{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
-# --- MQTT: edge clients (open3e, e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish to a LOCAL
-# mosquitto on loopback, which bridges to the central cluster broker over TLS
-# (open3e/e3oncan have no native MQTTS). This keeps plaintext on loopback only
-# — off the untrusted IoT VLAN — and buffers telemetry in RAM during cluster
-# blips. The local broker writes nothing to the eMMC (persistence off, logs to
-# the volatile journal). See edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2 and README "MQTT bridge".
-# Upstream cluster broker the local bridge connects to (TLS; the public
-# Let's Encrypt cert is validated against the system CA bundle).
-edge_mqtt_cluster_host: mqtt.renner.uno
-edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port: 8883
-edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
-
-# --- Bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) ------------
-# The cluster account the bridge logs in as (register entry in
-# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml). The controller pushes
-# its password to edge-mqtt-cred and rotates it when the bridge reports
-# "not connected"; there is no copy in ansible-vault.
-edge_mqtt_bridge_account: edge-1
-# HTTPS port of edge-mqtt-cred (esp32 device API, mTLS). Only a client
-# certificate from the MQTT CA with this CN is accepted.
-edge_mqtt_cred_port: 8443
-edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn: mqtt-account-controller
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-# Managed by ansible (roles/mqtt-bridge). Receives the cluster bridge password
-# from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) so no plaintext copy lives in
-# ansible-vault and no play run is needed to rotate it.
-#
-# Speaks the controller's esp32 device API over HTTPS:
-#   GET /api/status   -> {"mqtt": {"connected": bool}}
-#   PUT /api/settings <- {"mqtt": {"user": "...", "pass": "..."}}
-# A client certificate from the MQTT CA with CN mqtt-account-controller is
-# required; nothing else may call it. The server key is generated on this
-# host and never leaves it (the controller pins it on first contact).
-#
-# PUT writes the bridge file (template + credentials), removes the legacy
-# vault-password bridges and restarts the local mosquitto. The password is
-# kept only in that 0640 root:mosquitto file.
-import grp
-import json
-import os
-import socket
-import ssl
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import threading
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-
-CONF = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
-WRITE = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def connected():
-    try:
-        out = subprocess.run(
-            ["mosquitto_sub", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", str(CONF["local_port"]),
-             "-t", CONF["state_topic"], "-C", "1", "-W", "3"],
-            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdout
-    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
-        return False
-    return out.strip() == "1"
-
-
-def write_bridge(user, password):
-    with open(CONF["template"]) as f:
-        body = f.read()
-    body += f"remote_username {user}\nremote_password {password}\n"
-    d = os.path.dirname(CONF["bridge_file"])
-    fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=d, prefix=".edge-mqtt-cred.")
-    with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
-        f.write(body)
-    os.chown(tmp, 0, grp.getgrnam("mosquitto").gr_gid)
-    os.chmod(tmp, 0o640)
-    os.replace(tmp, CONF["bridge_file"])
-    for legacy in CONF["legacy_files"]:
-        if os.path.exists(legacy):
-            os.remove(legacy)
-    subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "mosquitto"], check=True, timeout=60)
-
-
-def valid(s):
-    # Controller passwords are random URL-safe tokens; anything with
-    # whitespace or a control character would break the config line.
-    return isinstance(s, str) and 0 < len(s) <= 256 and s.isprintable() and not any(c.isspace() for c in s)
-
-
-class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    def authorized(self):
-        cert = self.connection.getpeercert() or {}
-        cns = [v for rdn in cert.get("subject", ()) for k, v in rdn if k == "commonName"]
-        if cns != [CONF["allowed_cn"]]:
-            self.send_error(403)
-            return False
-        return True
-
-    def reply(self, code, obj=None):
-        data = b"" if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode()
-        self.send_response(code)
-        if data:
-            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(data)
-
-    def do_GET(self):
-        if not self.authorized():
-            return
-        if self.path != "/api/status":
-            return self.send_error(404)
-        self.reply(200, {"mqtt": {"connected": connected()}})
-
-    def do_PUT(self):
-        if not self.authorized():
-            return
-        if self.path != "/api/settings":
-            return self.send_error(404)
-        try:
-            n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-            if not 0 < n <= 4096:
-                raise ValueError("body size")
-            m = json.loads(self.rfile.read(n))["mqtt"]
-            user, password = m["user"], m["pass"]
-        except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
-            return self.send_error(400)
-        if user != CONF["user"] or not valid(password):
-            return self.send_error(400)
-        with WRITE:
-            write_bridge(user, password)
-        self.log_message("bridge credentials for %s replaced, mosquitto restarted", user)
-        self.reply(204)
-
-    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
-        sys.stderr.write("%s %s\n" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args))
-
-
-class Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-    address_family = socket.AF_INET6
-
-    def server_bind(self):
-        self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
-        super().server_bind()
-
-    def get_request(self):
-        # The TLS handshake runs in the request thread, with a timeout, so a
-        # stalled peer cannot block the accept loop.
-        sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
-        sock.settimeout(10)
-        return self.ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False), addr
-
-
-def main():
-    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
-    ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
-    ctx.load_cert_chain(CONF["cert"], CONF["key"])
-    ctx.load_verify_locations(CONF["ca"])
-    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
-    srv = Server(("::", CONF["port"]), Handler)
-    srv.ctx = ctx
-    srv.serve_forever()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIUN8ne4k4Wif9O83GDyKiBP0Ma7EIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
-GTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUmVubmVyIE1RVFQgQ0EwHhcNMjYxMDA2MTUzMDE1WhcNMzYx
-MDAzMTUzMDE1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5SZW5uZXIgTVFUVCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49
-AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOZhZF2JDoyvVg2oIXSbJAuAWDcoG22RxPA4oMKRMA/b
-XzIY566D2k6cVnWqbil9s/q4O2mj+Epo7plBw8NwuOOjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
-AwICpDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcqSDDiLZzhrvqq9f16Y08
-CO7QfzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiBFkxd9pXnqIcjReEcOTvCBZ3HxKu2jNQGL
-/le7gunTGgIgZapWAcu4awa+wmZcR/z2luOjD2GhIT15um14Z+sstJk=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
---
-# The MQTT clients (zwave-js, sml2mqtt, open3e, e3oncan) reconnect on their
-# own once the local broker is back.
- name: Restart mosquitto
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: mosquitto
-    state: restarted
-
- name: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: edge-mqtt-cred
-    state: restarted
-    daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
---
-# Local MQTT bridge broker.
-#
-# Edge clients (open3e, e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish here over loopback; this
-# broker bridges to the cluster broker over TLS, because those clients have no
-# native MQTTS. Persistence is off and logging goes to stdout so it writes
-# nothing to local flash.
-
- name: Install mosquitto
-  ansible.builtin.package:
-    name: mosquitto
-    state: present
-
- name: Create the bridge directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
-    state: directory
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0750"
-
- name: Check for the controller-managed bridge file
-  ansible.builtin.stat:
-    path: "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf"
-  register: edge_mqtt_bridge_managed
-
-# Until mqtt-account-controller has pushed the first password, keep the
-# vault-password bridges so the cluster never loses edge-1's data. Once the
-# managed file exists, never render them again (edge-mqtt-cred removed them).
- name: Deploy legacy vault-password bridges
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2
-    dest: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"   # carries the legacy cluster bridge credentials
-  when: not edge_mqtt_bridge_managed.stat.exists
-  notify: Restart mosquitto
-
- name: Deploy local mosquitto config
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2
-    dest: /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"
-  notify: Restart mosquitto
-
- name: Enable local mosquitto bridge
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: mosquitto
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-
-# --- edge-mqtt-cred (REN-1307): receives the bridge password from
-# mqtt-account-controller. edge-1 holds only the public MQTT CA and its own
-# server key, generated here and never copied off the host.
- name: Create edge-mqtt-cred config directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
-    state: directory
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "0700"
-
- name: Generate edge-mqtt-cred server key and certificate
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: >-
-      openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1
-      -nodes -days 36500 -subj "/CN={{ inventory_hostname }}"
-      -keyout /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key -out /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt
-    creates: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred files
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: "{{ item.src }}"
-    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
-  loop:
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.py, dest: /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred, mode: "0755"}
-    # Public CA of the cluster's MQTT client certificates
-    # (kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/mqtt-ca.yaml), valid until 2036-10-03.
-    - {src: mqtt-ca.crt, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt, mode: "0644"}
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred config and bridge template
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: "{{ item.src }}"
-    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
-  loop:
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json, mode: "0600"}
-    # Read only on the controller's next push: a change here reaches the
-    # running bridge when the password is next set.
-    - {src: edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in, mode: "0600"}
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service, mode: "0644"}
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Enable edge-mqtt-cred
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: edge-mqtt-cred
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-    daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). edge-mqtt-cred appends
-# remote_username/remote_password to this and writes the result to
-# /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf. One bridge for
-# open3e, as the register account `{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}`
-# (ACL readwrite open3e/#). sml2mqtt is retired (SML reader, 2026-09-19).
-connection {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-# The bridge state goes to the LOCAL broker only (retained 1/0); edge-mqtt-cred
-# reads it to answer the controller's "connected?".
-notifications true
-notifications_local_only true
-notification_topic $SYS/broker/connection/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}/state
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Legacy vault-password bridges, rendered only
-# while /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf does not
-# exist; edge-mqtt-cred deletes this file on the controller's first push
-# (REN-1307). Remove with the vault keys once edge-1 is on the register account.
-# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
-# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
-# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
-connection edge1-open3e
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Local mosquitto that the edge clients (open3e,
-# e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish to over loopback; it bridges to the central
-# cluster broker over TLS. open3e/e3oncan have no native MQTTS, so this is how
-# edge-1's MQTT gets off plaintext on the untrusted IoT VLAN, and it buffers
-# telemetry in RAM if the cluster broker is briefly unreachable.
-#
-# eMMC: this host runs on a small internal eMMC, so the local broker writes
-# NOTHING to flash — `persistence false` keeps retained/queued messages in RAM
-# only, and `log_dest stdout` goes to the (volatile, RAM) journal that Alloy
-# ships to Loki. Do not add persistence/log-file settings here.
-persistence false
-log_dest stdout
-log_type error
-log_type warning
-log_type notice
-
-# Loopback only — the trust boundary is the host itself. Any process on edge-1
-# may publish here (same trust as the bridged services); nothing off-host can
-# reach it. Real authentication to the cluster happens on the bridge below.
-# Single v4-loopback listener: all edge clients dial 127.0.0.1 (edge_mqtt_host),
-# and a second same-port listener can make some builds refuse to start.
-listener 1883 127.0.0.1
-allow_anonymous true
-
-# --- Bridges to the cluster broker (REN-1307). bridge.d holds either
-# {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf, written by edge-mqtt-cred with the password
-# mqtt-account-controller pushed, or, until that first push, legacy.conf with
-# the two vault-password bridges. edge-mqtt-cred deletes legacy.conf when it
-# writes the new file.
-include_dir /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{{ {
-  "port": edge_mqtt_cred_port,
-  "allowed_cn": edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn,
-  "user": edge_mqtt_bridge_account,
-  "cert": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt",
-  "key": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key",
-  "ca": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt",
-  "template": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in",
-  "bridge_file": "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ ".conf",
-  "legacy_files": ["/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf"],
-  "local_port": edge_mqtt_port,
-  "state_topic": "$SYS/broker/connection/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ "/state",
-} | to_nice_json }}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). See /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred.
-[Unit]
-Description=Receives the MQTT bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller
-After=network-online.target mosquitto.service
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=5
-# Root only to write the bridge file and restart mosquitto.
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadWritePaths=/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
-ProtectHome=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Managed by ansible (roles/pacman-cache).
+# Downloaded packages are not kept; older versions come from the Arch Linux
+# Archive.
+[Trigger]
+Operation = Install
+Operation = Upgrade
+Operation = Remove
+Type = Package
+Target = *
+
+[Action]
+Description = Removing downloaded packages from the cache...
+When = PostTransaction
+Exec = /usr/bin/find /var/cache/pacman/pkg -mindepth 1 -delete
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+# Keep the pacman package cache empty. pacman keeps every downloaded package;
+# on a 7 GB eMMC root the cache grows to gigabytes. Arch hosts only.
+
+- name: Ensure the pacman hook directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/pacman.d/hooks
+    state: directory
+    mode: "0755"
+
+- name: Empty the package cache after every transaction
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: pacman-cache.hook
+    dest: /etc/pacman.d/hooks/pacman-cache.hook
+    mode: "0644"
+
+- name: Empty the package cache
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [find, /var/cache/pacman/pkg, -mindepth, "1", -delete, -print]
+  register: pacman_cache_clean
+  changed_when: pacman_cache_clean.stdout | length > 0
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
-# SocketCAN interface. Consumed by heating-can.
-# --- CAN / open3e (Viessmann E3 external bus) ---
-edge_can_interface: can0
-edge_can_bitrate: 250000
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
-# reload alone only re-reads config files; existing links keep their old state
-# until reconfigured.
- name: Reload networkd
-  ansible.builtin.shell:
-    cmd: networkctl reload && networkctl reconfigure {{ edge_can_interface }}
-  changed_when: true
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
---
-# SocketCAN interface, owned by systemd-networkd.
-#
-# gs_usb is an in-tree module and autoloads when the adapter enumerates;
-# networkd then matches the interface and applies bitrate + up. Separate from
-# the services that consume the bus (heating-can, e380-can-meter) because the
-# interface is host network state shared by both.
-
- name: Configure can0 via systemd-networkd
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: 80-can0.network.j2
-    dest: /etc/systemd/network/80-can0.network
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Reload networkd
-
- name: Enable systemd-networkd
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: systemd-networkd
-    state: started
-    enabled: true
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/socketcan).
-# Viessmann E3 external CAN bus via Innomaker USB2CAN (gs_usb).
-# The adapter is a stub tap on an already-terminated bus (120R jumper OFF).
-[Match]
-Name={{ edge_can_interface }}
-
-[Link]
-# networkd applies [CAN] settings but does not raise a CAN link on its
-# own (observed on edge-1); force it up, and back up after any down.
-ActivationPolicy=always-up
-
-[CAN]
-BitRate={{ edge_can_bitrate }}
-# NO RestartSec here: gs_usb does not support hardware bus-off restart,
-# and networkd fails the ENTIRE link configuration on the unsupported
-# option ("off (failed)", link never raised — found by reboot test).
-# Bus-off recovery falls to the open3e service restart loop.
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@
    group: root
    mode: "0644"

+- name: Install sudo
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: sudo
+    state: present
+  when: not ssh_ca_synouser.stat.exists
+
 - name: Install the Claude sudo rules
  ansible.builtin.template:
    src: sudoers-claude.j2
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+# Keep the system clock on NTP with systemd-timesyncd, on hosts that run no
+# chrony. A KVM guest's clocksource does not steer wall-clock time; without an
+# NTP client the clock drifts until JWT iat/exp checks fail.
+
+- name: Install systemd-timesyncd
+  ansible.builtin.apt:
+    name: systemd-timesyncd
+    state: present
+  when: ansible_facts['os_family'] == 'Debian'
+
+- name: Run systemd-timesyncd
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    name: systemd-timesyncd
+    masked: false
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+
+- name: Wait for the clock to synchronize
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [timedatectl, show, --property=NTPSynchronized, --value]
+  register: timesyncd_synchronized
+  changed_when: false
+  until: timesyncd_synchronized.stdout == "yes"
+  retries: 12
+  delay: 5
@@ -13,12 +13,8 @@ zwave_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/zwave-js"
 # survives moving the stick between machines.
 edge_zwave_device: /dev/serial/by-id/usb-Nabu_Casa_ZWA-2_80B54EE15720-if00

-edge_zwavejs_image: ghcr.io/zwave-js/zwave-js-ui:11.21.1
-
-# Alpine version the zwave-js-ui image is built on -- the source for the musl
-# libeatmydata.so preloaded into that container. Keep in sync if the image
-# bumps its Alpine major (check: docker exec zwave-js cat /etc/os-release).
-edge_zwave_alpine_base: alpine:3.22
+# Renovate-tracked (customManagers in renovate.json).
+edge_zwavejs_image: ghcr.io/zwave-js/zwave-js-ui:11.25.2@sha256:ac4874a3cbea61c0c60002a8fd8ae05104cc8eb2eae91aa05bd184972aa06853

 # Secret from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
 #   edge_zwavejs_session_secret
@@ -15,17 +15,31 @@
    - "{{ zwave_base_dir }}"
    - "{{ zwave_base_dir }}/store"

+# The preloaded .so is musl and must come from the image's own Alpine release.
+- name: Read the Alpine release of the zwave-js-ui image
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    cmd: docker run --rm --entrypoint cat {{ edge_zwavejs_image }} /etc/alpine-release
+  register: zwave_alpine_release
+  changed_when: false
+  check_mode: false
+
+- name: Name libeatmydata.so after that Alpine release
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    zwave_alpine_minor: "{{ zwave_alpine_release.stdout.split('.')[:2] | join('.') }}"
+    zwave_libeatmydata: "libeatmydata-alpine{{ zwave_alpine_release.stdout.split('.')[:2] | join('.') }}.so"
+
 - name: Extract musl libeatmydata.so (matches the zwave-js-ui Alpine base)
  ansible.builtin.shell:
    cmd: |
      set -euo pipefail
      tmp="$(mktemp)"
      trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
-      docker run --rm --network=host {{ edge_zwave_alpine_base }} \
+      docker run --rm --network=host alpine:{{ zwave_alpine_minor }} \
        sh -c 'apk add --no-cache libeatmydata >/dev/null 2>&1 && cat /usr/lib/libeatmydata.so' > "$tmp"
      test "$(stat -c%s "$tmp")" -ge 8000   # sanity: real .so is ~14 KB, guards against a failed/empty pull
-      install -m 0644 "$tmp" {{ zwave_base_dir }}/libeatmydata.so
-    creates: "{{ zwave_base_dir }}/libeatmydata.so"
+      install -m 0644 "$tmp" {{ zwave_base_dir }}/{{ zwave_libeatmydata }}
+    creates: "{{ zwave_base_dir }}/{{ zwave_libeatmydata }}"
+    executable: /bin/bash
  notify: Restart zwave-js

 # Because fsync is neutralized, a hard power-loss during the (rare) settings
@@ -93,3 +107,18 @@
      zwave-js could not start -- the ZWA-2 radio is not present:
      {{ zwave_compose_up.stderr_lines | select('search', 'device') | list }}
  when: zwave_compose_up.rc != 0
+
+- name: Find libeatmydata.so builds of other Alpine releases
+  ansible.builtin.find:
+    paths: "{{ zwave_base_dir }}"
+    patterns: "libeatmydata*.so"
+    excludes: "{{ zwave_libeatmydata }}"
+  register: zwave_stale_libeatmydata
+
+- name: Remove libeatmydata.so builds of other Alpine releases
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: "{{ item.path }}"
+    state: absent
+  loop: "{{ zwave_stale_libeatmydata.files }}"
+  loop_control:
+    label: "{{ item.path }}"
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ services:
      - "{{ edge_zwave_device }}:/dev/zwave"
    volumes:
      # musl libeatmydata.so extracted from the image's Alpine base (ro)
-      - ./libeatmydata.so:/usr/lib/libeatmydata.so:ro
+      - ./{{ zwave_libeatmydata }}:/usr/lib/libeatmydata.so:ro
      # Persistent store: settings.json, device DB, network keys. Path is
      # unchanged from the previous shared project, so nothing is migrated.
      - ./store:/usr/src/app/store
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-synology-python.yml
 - name: Base system
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/common.yml
- name: VM time sync
-  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-vm-time-sync.yml

 - name: SSH user CA
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-ssh-ca.yml
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-edge-host.yml
 - name: Z-Wave gateway
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml
- name: Heating CAN
-  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-heating-can.yml
 - name: NTP service
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-ntp-ha.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM node:24-alpine@sha256:8a32c8cf649a49915a66e81e7a609223c708d0adabf288ee3f4077d765542f85
+FROM node:26-alpine@sha256:c6ad9e9c1d80f6eb607c26b4b0a132ff7a2344fad1c78ea3baa2a7d4c8de6d94

 # Default to the latest Claude Code. Pinning a fixed version is the wrong
 # default here: old releases eventually stop working against the API, so a
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
-<plist version="1.0">
-<dict>
-	<key>PayloadContent</key>
-	<array>
-		<dict>
-			<key>PayloadType</key>
-			<string>com.apple.wifi.managed</string>
-			<key>PayloadVersion</key>
-			<integer>1</integer>
-			<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
-			<string>uno.renner.wifi.renner-test.network</string>
-			<key>PayloadUUID</key>
-			<string>c7814579-fc2b-4f38-bcc8-77e1123ab710</string>
-			<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
-			<string>Renner Test Wi-Fi</string>
-			<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
-			<string>Renner</string>
-			<key>SSID_STR</key>
-			<string>Renner Test</string>
-			<key>HIDDEN_NETWORK</key>
-			<false/>
-			<key>AutoJoin</key>
-			<true/>
-			<key>EncryptionType</key>
-			<string>Any</string>
-			<key>EAPClientConfiguration</key>
-			<dict>
-				<key>OuterIdentity</key>
-				<string>anonymous</string>
-				<key>AcceptEAPTypes</key>
-				<array>
-					<integer>21</integer>
-				</array>
-				<key>TTLSInnerAuthentication</key>
-				<string>PAP</string>
-				<key>TLSTrustedServerNames</key>
-				<array>
-					<string>radius.renner.uno</string>
-				</array>
-			</dict>
-		</dict>
-	</array>
-	<key>PayloadType</key>
-	<string>Configuration</string>
-	<key>PayloadVersion</key>
-	<integer>1</integer>
-	<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
-	<string>uno.renner.wifi.renner-test</string>
-	<key>PayloadUUID</key>
-	<string>b35513d4-97e5-4804-a77b-5ca1f723a408</string>
-	<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
-	<string>Renner Test Wi-Fi (802.1X)</string>
-	<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
-	<string>Renner</string>
-</dict>
-</plist>
@@ -4,6 +4,54 @@ FreeRADIUS terminates EAP-TTLS and proxies the inner PAP request to the
 authentik RADIUS outpost `802.1X Radius`. authentik checks the password and
 the access policy and returns the VLAN.

+## Routing by outer identity
+
+FreeRADIUS decides on the outer EAP identity (`User-Name`) of each request,
+before any local EAP processing:
+
+| Outer identity | Path |
+|---|---|
+| `anonymous` or `anonymous@<anything>` (any case) | EAP-TTLS terminated in FreeRADIUS, inner PAP to authentik |
+| anything else | whole EAP conversation (all rounds, `State` included) proxied to the UDM RADIUS for UniFi Endpoint accounts |
+
+UniFi Endpoint clients send their real account name as outer identity; their
+names look like ordinary usernames, so the rule cannot match on name patterns.
+The UDM's Access-Accept/Reject/Challenge goes to the NAS unchanged, including
+its Tunnel-* VLAN and MS-MPPE keys. The "Accept without VLAN is rejected" rule
+applies to the authentik path only. Accounting is answered locally on both
+paths.
+
+The anonymous outer identity is mandatory for authentik clients: without it
+the login goes to the UDM and fails.
+
+UDM target: home server `udm`, `10.2.11.1` UDP 1812 (the UDM on VLAN 11,
+UniFi network "(11) RADIUS"), shared secret `UDM_RADIUS_SECRET` from OpenBao
+`apps/radius`. The UDM RADIUS accepts clients from `10.2.11.0/24` only, not
+from the pod CIDR.
+
+### Path to the UDM
+
+Each FreeRADIUS pod has a second interface `net1` on VLAN 11
+(NetworkAttachmentDefinition `freeradius-udm`,
+`kubernetes/apps/authentik/freeradius-network-attachment.yaml`):
+
+- macvlan on the node link `radius0` (VLAN 11 on `uplink`, no host addresses;
+  VLANConfig in `kubernetes/talos/patches/k8s-{1,2,3}.yaml`). VLAN 11 is in
+  Cilium's `bpf.vlanBypass`, otherwise the tagged frames are dropped on
+  `uplink`.
+- IPv4 leased from the UDM DHCP server (cni-dhcp-daemon), requested without
+  the routers option: `net1` holds only the connected `10.2.11.0/24`, no
+  default route. The proxy socket is not bound to an address; the kernel's
+  route lookup for `10.2.11.1` picks `net1` and its leased address as source.
+- IPv6 disabled on `net1` (VLAN 11 sends router advertisements).
+- The NAS listeners are bound to `eth0` (`interface = eth0`); nothing listens
+  on `net1`.
+- Traffic on `net1` bypasses Cilium; there is no CNP for the UDM hop.
+
+`radius0` must exist on every node before FreeRADIUS pods are scheduled
+there: without it the macvlan ADD fails and the pod stays in
+`ContainerCreating`.
+
 ## authentik objects

 Defined in `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml`, key
@@ -77,7 +125,15 @@ Created through the UniFi Network API (site `default`):
 |---|---|---|
 | Firewall policy "Allow APs RADIUS" | `62c21e63-8c15-4720-adf8-b2333c090e2f` | zone Isolated `10.2.10.0/24` → zone External `10.2.99.91`, UDP `1812-1813`, ALLOW, IPv4 |
 | RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" | `3e5fcfed-63dc-4e7d-ad51-17cbc074e4bb` | auth `10.2.99.91:1812`, acct `10.2.99.91:1813`, secret `DOT1X_NAS_SECRET`, VLAN assignment on (`vlan_wlan_mode: optional`) |
-| WLAN "Renner Test" | `3eba27e7-ddc2-41fb-ad3f-82add317847a` | copy of "Renner UniFi" (WPA2/WPA3 Enterprise transition, fast roaming, BSS transition, same AP group and bands), network (90) Guest as fallback, RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" |
+| WLAN "Renner UniFi" | `ef4122f2-4a83-4dca-9ef3-468d29f39a6b` | WPA3 Enterprise (no transition), PMF required, fast roaming, BSS transition, client isolation off, RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X"; Application Hotspot, type Passpoint (set in the UniFi UI: the API format differs from the UI's) |
+
+Passpoint on "Renner UniFi" (UniFi offers Passpoint only with WPA3 Enterprise):
+venue "Renner", Residential / Private Residence, network type Private with
+Guest Access, IPv4 single NATed private, IPv6 available, NAI realm
+`renner.uno` with EAP-TTLS, sub-methods PAP and username/password, domain
+`renner.uno`, operator friendly name "Renner", connection capability ICMP
+allow. The AKMs on air are `FT/802.1X` and `802.1X/SHA-256`; plain `802.1X`
+is not offered.

 ## Live login check

@@ -95,22 +151,54 @@ For IPv6 set `LIVE_SOURCE` to the workstation's `fd02:50::` address and use
 `fd99::91`. `group-id=[3530]` is VLAN `50`, `tunnel-type=[0000000d]` VLAN,
 `medium=[00000006]` IEEE-802.

-## Client setup (SSID "Renner Test")
+## Client setup (SSID "Renner UniFi")
+
+Setup page: `https://wlan.renner.uno` (behind the Authentik gate, any
+authentik user), served by the Go service `wlan-setup/`
+(`kubernetes/apps/authentik/wlan-setup*.yaml`). Android, Apple and Windows get
+Passpoint profiles with their own app password; Linux an `nmcli` command
+(NetworkManager has no Passpoint support) that carries no password.
+
+Passpoint: `/<platform>/install` (`android`, `apple` or `windows`) signs the
+user in through the authentik OAuth2 application `wlan-setup` (scope
+`goauthentik.io/api`). On `/<platform>/callback`, the service exchanges the
+code, creates an app password (`wlan-<platform>-<user>-<timestamp>-<random>`)
+with the user's own access token, and hands out the profile:
+
+- Android: `application/x-wifi-config` in the response to that GET, as its
+  installer requires.
+- Apple: a `.mobileconfig` download.
+- Windows: a CarrierProvisioning XML signed with XML-DSig (enveloped, C14N
+  1.0, rsa-sha1, chain in KeyInfo) by the Let's Encrypt certificate
+  `wlan-setup-signing`; kept for 5 minutes under a single-use token. The
+  browser is sent to `ms-settings:wifi-provisioning?uri=https://wlan.renner.uno/windows/profile/<token>`;
+  Windows Settings fetches it (Ingress `wlan-setup-provisioning`, without the
+  gate) and offers "Add".
+
+The service stores nothing else. Deleting the app password in authentik removes
+that device from the WLAN. The profiles match WLANs that advertise Hotspot 2.0
+with domain and NAI realm `renner.uno` (EAP-TTLS/PAP), i.e. "Renner UniFi".
+Creating the app password needs no admin rights.
+
+App passwords expire when unused. The page creates them with 29 days (the API
+caps new tokens at 30 days unless the group attribute
+`goauthentik.io/user/token-maximum-lifetime` allows more). Every 802.1X login
+with an app password renews it to 60 days: the policy
+`dot1x-app-password-renew` on the `dot1x-login` binding (at most one write per
+day). authentik rejects expired app passwords and deletes them in its
+`clean_expired_models` task. A device that has not connected for 60 days, or a
+profile that was never installed, loses its app password and needs a new
+profile from the page.

 All clients use EAP-TTLS with inner PAP. The server certificate is a public
 Let's Encrypt certificate for `radius.renner.uno`, so no CA needs to be
-installed. Username and password are the authentik credentials. PAP runs
-inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.
+installed. The 802.1X password stage (`dot1x-password`) accepts the authentik
+password and app passwords. PAP runs inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and
+is never sent in clear over the air.

 ### Android

- EAP method: TTLS
- Phase 2 authentication: PAP
- CA certificate: Use system certificates
- Domain: `radius.renner.uno`
- Identity: authentik username
- Anonymous identity: `anonymous`
- Password: authentik password
+Passpoint profile from the setup page ("Auf Android installieren").

 ### Linux (NetworkManager)

@@ -119,14 +207,17 @@ inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.
 - Inner authentication: PAP
 - CA certificate: system bundle (e.g. `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`)
 - Domain: `radius.renner.uno`
+- Anonymous identity: `anonymous` (mandatory)
 - Username / password: authentik credentials

 ### Windows 11

-Settings > Network & Internet > Wi-Fi > Manage known networks > Add network:
+Passpoint profile from the setup page ("Auf Windows installieren"). Manual
+setup without the page: Settings > Network & Internet > Wi-Fi > Manage known
+networks > Add network:

- Network name: `Renner Test`
- Security type: WPA2-Enterprise AES
+- Network name: `Renner UniFi`
+- Security type: WPA3-Enterprise AES
 - EAP method: EAP-TTLS
 - Authentication method: Unencrypted password (PAP)
 - Server validation: where offered ("Verify server identity" / trusted
@@ -141,14 +232,14 @@ wireless network" instead.

 ### Apple (iOS, iPadOS, macOS)

-Apple devices need the configuration profile
-`docs/radius/clients/renner-test.mobileconfig`. Install it via AirDrop, Files
-or Settings (Profile Downloaded). The device asks for username and password on
-the first join. The profile sets security type Any (WPA2/WPA3), outer identity
-`anonymous` and trusted server name `radius.renner.uno`; it contains no
-password and no certificate. Apple
-devices may show a one-time "trust certificate" prompt for `radius.renner.uno`
-on the first join.
+Passpoint configuration profile from the setup page ("Profil laden"),
+installed via Settings (Profile Downloaded) or, on a Mac, System Settings >
+General > Device Management. It sets `IsHotspot` with domain and NAI realm
+`renner.uno` (no SSID), security type Any, outer identity `anonymous`,
+trusted server name `radius.renner.uno`, username and app password; it
+contains no certificate. Its PayloadIdentifier is fixed, so installing it
+replaces an earlier profile. Apple devices may show a one-time "trust
+certificate" prompt for `radius.renner.uno` on the first join.

 ## Measurement: authentication latency per SSID

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The image is the official archiso **releng** profile plus:
 - the extra disk tools the installer needs

 Division of labour: the ISO produces an **ansible-ready base system**;
-all service configuration (zwave-js-ui, sml2mqtt, open3e/CAN) stays in
+all service configuration (zwave-js-ui, sml2mqtt) stays in
 `ansible/docs/edge-host.md` as the single source of truth. Rebuilding the
 box is: boot ISO → `edge-install` → run the play.

@@ -42,10 +42,11 @@ for the CA key; rebuild the ISO after a CA rotation.
 2. Boot the target from it (UEFI, Secure Boot off; one-time F12/setup
   visit if the box doesn't already boot USB first)
 3. Either on the console (auto-login as root) or headless —
-   `ssh root@<dhcp-ip>` with an owner certificate — run `edge-install`. It auto-detects the internal disk
-   (NVMe, else eMMC — covers the Wyse 3040 — else first non-USB disk),
-   shows the target and requires typing the hostname before wiping
-   anything. Override with `edge-install /dev/sdY`.
+   `ssh root@<dhcp-ip>` with an owner certificate — run
+   `edge-install <hostname>` (e.g. `edge-install edge-2`). It auto-detects
+   the internal disk (NVMe, else eMMC — covers the Wyse 3040 — else first
+   non-USB disk), shows the target and requires typing the hostname before
+   wiping anything. Override with `edge-install <hostname> /dev/sdY`.
 4. Reboot. Confirm the box is reachable by name — `ssh root@<host>` — before
   going further; it is identified by name everywhere and its address is
   never recorded. Then add it to `[edge_host]` in
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Installer for edge-1 (bare-metal edge host, replaces the k8s-edge VM).
+# Installer for the bare-metal edge hosts (edge-1, edge-2, ...).
 # Runs from the edge-host ISO live environment. WIPES the target disk.
-# Usage: edge-install [disk]
-# Default: the internal disk — first NVMe, else eMMC (Wyse 3040), else
+# Usage: edge-install <hostname> [disk]
+# Default disk: the internal disk — first NVMe, else eMMC (Wyse 3040), else
 # the first non-USB, non-optical disk. The live USB stick itself is
 # excluded via the ISO9660 label mount.
 set -euo pipefail

-HOST=edge-1
+usage() { echo "usage: edge-install <hostname> [disk]"; exit 1; }
+[ $# -ge 1 ] && [ $# -le 2 ] || usage
+HOST=$1
+# RFC 1123 label: what systemd-networkd sends as the DHCP hostname.
+[[ "$HOST" =~ ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$ ]] \
+  || { echo "invalid hostname: $HOST"; exit 1; }
+shift

 detect_disk() {
  # eMMC needs mmc_block before any /dev/mmcblk* exists (see
@@ -51,7 +57,7 @@ mount --mkdir "$(part 1)" /mnt/boot

 # Everything the edge-host ansible role expects to find; the role itself
 # is applied over SSH after first boot (see ansible/docs/edge-host.md).
-pacstrap -K /mnt base linux linux-firmware intel-ucode openssh python git \
+pacstrap -K /mnt base linux linux-firmware intel-ucode openssh sudo python git \
  docker docker-compose

 genfstab -U /mnt >> /mnt/etc/fstab
@@ -1483,8 +1483,11 @@ data:
          name: dot1x-password
        state: present
        attrs:
+          # App passwords: the WLAN credential that devices store (Android
+          # Passpoint profiles carry it), created by wlan.renner.uno.
          backends:
            - authentik.core.auth.InbuiltBackend
+            - authentik.core.auth.TokenBackend

      - id: dot1x-login
        model: authentik_stages_user_login.userloginstage
@@ -1506,12 +1509,54 @@ data:
          order: 20
        state: present

-      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+      - id: binding-dot1x-login
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
          target: !KeyOf dot1x-flow
          stage: !KeyOf dot1x-login
          order: 100
        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      # Sliding expiry: an app password used for 802.1X expires 60 days
+      # after its last use; authentik rejects and deletes expired app
+      # passwords. auth_method_args.token is set by TokenBackend. Always
+      # passes; failure_result true keeps an error from blocking the login.
+      - id: dot1x-app-password-renew
+        model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
+        identifiers:
+          name: dot1x-app-password-renew
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          expression: |
+            from datetime import timedelta
+            from django.utils.timezone import now
+            from authentik.core.models import Token, TokenIntents
+            ref = (request.context.get("auth_method_args") or {}).get("token")
+            if request.context.get("auth_method") == "token" and isinstance(ref, dict):
+                renewed = now() + timedelta(days=60)
+                count = Token.objects.filter(
+                    pk=ref.get("pk"),
+                    user=request.user,
+                    intent=TokenIntents.INTENT_APP_PASSWORD,
+                    expiring=True,
+                    expires__lt=renewed - timedelta(days=1),
+                ).update(expires=renewed)
+                ak_logger.info("dot1x app password", token=ref.get("name"), renewed=count)
+            return True
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf dot1x-app-password-renew
+          target: !KeyOf binding-dot1x-login
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: true

      - id: dot1x-has-vlan
        model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
@@ -1624,3 +1669,47 @@ data:
            kubernetes_httproute_annotations: {}
            kubernetes_httproute_parent_refs: []
            kubernetes_json_patches: null
+
+      # wlan.renner.uno (wlan-setup.yaml): signs the user in and, with the
+      # user's own access token (scope goauthentik.io/api), creates the WLAN
+      # app password for the Android Passpoint profile. Confidential client;
+      # the secret comes from wlan-setup-oauth (wlan-setup-oauth.yaml). No
+      # policy binding: every authentik user may set up the WLAN.
+      - id: wlan-setup-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
+        identifiers:
+          name: WLAN setup
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          authentication_flow: null
+          authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          client_type: confidential
+          client_id: wlan-setup
+          client_secret: !Env WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+          grant_types:
+            - authorization_code
+          access_token_validity: minutes=5
+          signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, authentik Self-signed Certificate]]
+          property_mappings:
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-authentik_api]]
+          redirect_uris:
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/android/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/apple/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/windows/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: wlan-setup
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: WLAN setup
+          slug: wlan-setup
+          provider: !KeyOf wlan-setup-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://wlan.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "WLAN setup page; creates WLAN app passwords"
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ spec:
      # on an unclean shutdown is not an acceptable trade.
      checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
      max_wal_size: "2GB"
+      # authentik's subclass joins over empty tables get planner costs far above
+      # jit_above_cost; LLVM compilation then takes ~420 ms for a query that
+      # executes in 0.1 ms (every flow start, every RADIUS/LDAP login).
+      jit: "off"
      # zstd, not "on": the boolean spelling resolves to pglz (2016-era, weaker
      # and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
      # full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
-# FreeRADIUS 3.2 config for 802.1X: EAP-TTLS terminated here, inner PAP
-# proxied to the authentik outpost ak-outpost-8021x-radius. Replaces the
-# image's raddb completely. Functional test: tests/radius/run.sh.
+# FreeRADIUS 3.2 config for 802.1X: outer identity anonymous[@...] -> EAP-TTLS
+# terminated here, inner PAP proxied to the authentik outpost
+# ak-outpost-8021x-radius; any other outer identity -> whole EAP conversation
+# proxied to the UDM RADIUS (UniFi Endpoint). Replaces the image's raddb
+# completely. Functional test: tests/radius/run.sh.
 # VLAN contract: docs/radius/dot1x.md.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ConfigMap
@@ -32,9 +34,10 @@ data:

    max_request_time = 30
    cleanup_delay = 5
-    # Greater than response_window (proxy.conf): never forward a NAS
-    # retransmit to the outpost. A TTLS inner request sent twice to the home
-    # server leaves a freed request in the proxy hash; radiusd segfaults.
+    # Greater than every home server's response_window (proxy.conf): never
+    # forward a NAS retransmit to a home server. A TTLS inner request sent
+    # twice to the home server leaves a freed request in the proxy hash;
+    # radiusd segfaults.
    proxy_dedup_window = 10
    max_requests = 16384
    hostname_lookups = no
@@ -152,6 +155,42 @@ data:
      nostrip
    }

+    # UDM RADIUS (FreeRADIUS) for UniFi Endpoint accounts; gets the whole
+    # outer EAP conversation. Address: UDM on VLAN 11 "(11) RADIUS", reached
+    # over net1 (freeradius-network-attachment.yaml); the UDM accepts
+    # RADIUS clients from 10.2.11.0/24 only.
+    home_server udm {
+      type = auth
+      ipaddr = 10.2.11.1
+      port = 1812
+      proto = udp
+      secret = $ENV{UDM_RADIUS_SECRET}
+      # RFC 3579: every reply to an EAP request carries Message-Authenticator.
+      require_message_authenticator = yes
+      # Less than proxy_dedup_window (radiusd.conf).
+      response_window = 5
+      zombie_period = 20
+      # Probe with an Access-Request for a user that cannot exist (no
+      # EAP-Message, so no Endpoint login); the reject counts as an answer.
+      # Sent only while zombie or dead.
+      status_check = request
+      username = "udm-status-probe.invalid"
+      password = "not-a-secret"
+      check_interval = 6
+      check_timeout = 4
+      num_answers_to_alive = 3
+    }
+
+    home_server_pool udm {
+      type = fail-over
+      home_server = udm
+    }
+
+    realm udm {
+      auth_pool = udm
+      nostrip
+    }
+
  mods-enabled_always: |
    always ok {
      rcode = ok
@@ -194,35 +233,50 @@ data:

  sites-enabled_default: |
    server default {
+      # NAS listeners on eth0 only; net1 (VLAN 11) carries the UDM proxy
+      # traffic and nothing else.
      listen {
        type = auth
        ipaddr = *
        port = 1812
+        interface = eth0
      }

      listen {
        type = acct
        ipaddr = *
        port = 1813
+        interface = eth0
      }

      listen {
        type = auth
        ipv6addr = ::
        port = 1812
+        interface = eth0
      }

      listen {
        type = acct
        ipv6addr = ::
        port = 1813
+        interface = eth0
      }

      authorize {
-        # EAP-TTLS only.
+        # EAP only.
        if (!&EAP-Message) {
          reject
        }
+        # Outer identity anonymous[@realm]: authentik clients, EAP-TTLS here.
+        # Any other: UniFi Endpoint account (real name as outer identity);
+        # every round goes to the UDM unprocessed.
+        if (&User-Name && &User-Name !~ /^anonymous(@.*)?$/i) {
+          update control {
+            &Proxy-To-Realm := udm
+          }
+          return
+        }
        eap {
          ok = return
          updated = return
@@ -245,12 +299,23 @@ data:
        ok
      }

+      # UDM replies pass unchanged.
      post-auth {
-        update reply {
-          &Cisco-AVPair !* ANY
+        if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
+          noop
+        }
+        else {
+          update reply {
+            &Cisco-AVPair !* ANY
+          }
        }
        Post-Auth-Type REJECT {
-          eap
+          if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
+            noop
+          }
+          else {
+            eap
+          }
        }
      }

@@ -259,7 +324,12 @@ data:

      # Runs the TTLS callback that hands the outpost reply back into the tunnel.
      post-proxy {
-        eap
+        if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
+          noop
+        }
+        else {
+          eap
+        }
      }
    }

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+# FreeRADIUS net1: macvlan on radius0, VLAN 11 "(11) RADIUS" (VLANConfig in
+# kubernetes/talos/patches/k8s-{1,2,3}.yaml). Carries only the proxy traffic
+# to home server `udm` (freeradius-config.yaml): the UDM RADIUS accepts
+# clients from 10.2.11.0/24, not from the pod CIDR. Bypasses Cilium policy.
+# Address leased from the UDM; nothing references it.
+#
+# net1 holds only its connected /24, so the unbound proxy socket reaches the
+# UDM via net1 with the leased source. No sbr: it moves that route into a
+# source-based table, and the proxy would leave via eth0 from the pod IP.
+# skipDefault + subnet-mask: the lease is requested without routers, so no
+# default route lands on net1 (dnsmasq sends only requested options).
+# IPv6 off on net1: VLAN 11 sends RAs (default route, SLAAC); the UDM
+# RADIUS clients are IPv4 only.
+#
+# Requires cni-dhcp-daemon (infrastructure/multus) and VLAN 11 in Cilium's
+# bpf.vlanBypass (infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml).
+apiVersion: k8s.cni.cncf.io/v1
+kind: NetworkAttachmentDefinition
+metadata:
+  name: freeradius-udm
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  config: |
+    {
+      "cniVersion": "0.3.1",
+      "name": "freeradius-udm",
+      "plugins": [
+        {
+          "type": "macvlan",
+          "master": "radius0",
+          "mode": "bridge",
+          "ipam": {
+            "type": "dhcp",
+            "request": [
+              { "skipDefault": true },
+              { "option": "subnet-mask" }
+            ]
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "type": "tuning",
+          "sysctl": {
+            "net.ipv6.conf.IFNAME.disable_ipv6": "1"
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    }
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ spec:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app.kubernetes.io/name: freeradius
+      annotations:
+        # net1 on VLAN 11: the path to the UDM RADIUS.
+        k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: freeradius-udm
    spec:
      enableServiceLinks: false
      affinity:
@@ -89,6 +92,11 @@ spec:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: radius-secrets
                  key: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
+            - name: UDM_RADIUS_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: radius-secrets
+                  key: UDM_RADIUS_SECRET
          ports:
            - name: radius
              containerPort: 1812
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-11-01-1059 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-11-05-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
          securityContext:
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ spec:
            secretKeyRef:
              name: ak-pg-app
              key: password
+        # Default 0 opens a new Postgres connection per request.
+        - name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__CONN_MAX_AGE
+          value: "60"
+        - name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__CONN_HEALTH_CHECKS
+          value: "true"
        - name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__PASSWORD
          valueFrom:
            secretKeyRef:
@@ -166,10 +171,11 @@ spec:
    worker:
      # Overrides the global key; keep authentik-secrets in the list.
      podAnnotations:
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: authentik-secrets,radius-secrets
-      # Shared secret of the 802.1X Radius provider, set via `!Env` in
-      # dot1x-radius.yaml. Worker only (blueprint applier); optional so a
-      # missing Secret fails only the dot1x blueprint entry.
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: authentik-secrets,radius-secrets,wlan-setup-oauth
+      # Shared secret of the 802.1X Radius provider and client secret of the
+      # WLAN setup provider, set via `!Env` in dot1x-radius.yaml. Worker only
+      # (blueprint applier); optional so a missing Secret fails only the
+      # blueprint entries that use it.
      env:
        - name: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
          valueFrom:
@@ -177,6 +183,12 @@ spec:
              name: radius-secrets
              key: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
              optional: true
+        - name: WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: wlan-setup-oauth
+              key: client_secret
+              optional: true
      resources:
        requests:
          # Same reasoning as server above, and the worker is burstier still:
@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ resources:
  - radius-cert.yaml
  - radius-externalsecret.yaml
  - freeradius-config.yaml
+  - freeradius-network-attachment.yaml
  - freeradius.yaml
  - freeradius-cnp.yaml
+  - wlan-setup-oauth.yaml
+  - wlan-setup-signing-cert.yaml
+  - wlan-setup.yaml
  # ak-pg CNPG Postgres backend (moved here from the retired seed-authentik KS;
  # each carries prune: disabled so ownership transferred without a teardown).
  # authentik has no data PVCs — all state lives in ak-pg. This KS depends on
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Client secret of the "WLAN setup" OAuth2 provider (dot1x-radius blueprint).
+# Generated once; the authentik worker reads it as WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+# for the blueprint, wlan-setup reads it for the code exchange.
+apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Password
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  length: 64
+  digits: 16
+  symbols: 0
+  allowRepeat: true
+  noUpper: false
+  secretKeys:
+    - client_secret
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  refreshPolicy: CreatedOnce
+  target:
+    name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  dataFrom:
+    - sourceRef:
+        generatorRef:
+          apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+          kind: Password
+          name: wlan-setup-oauth
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+# Signs the Windows Wi-Fi provisioning XML of wlan.renner.uno (XML-DSig in the
+# wlan-setup service). Issued via the cluster-wide Cloudflare DNS-01
+# ClusterIssuer.
+apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+kind: Certificate
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-signing
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  secretName: wlan-setup-signing
+  issuerRef:
+    name: letsencrypt-cluster
+    kind: ClusterIssuer
+  dnsNames:
+    - wlan.renner.uno
+  privateKey:
+    algorithm: RSA
+    size: 2048
+    encoding: PKCS8
+    rotationPolicy: Always
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# wlan.renner.uno: setup page for the 802.1X WLAN "Renner UniFi", served by the
+# wlan-setup Go service (wlan-setup/). Android, Apple and Windows get Passpoint
+# profiles with a per-device authentik app password; Linux an nmcli command.
+# Public, so a device can reach it before it is in the WLAN (mobile data,
+# Renner Gast). Any Authentik user passes the gate (no group); the service
+# stores no user credentials beyond the 5-minute single-use Windows profile.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: authentik
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+  annotations:
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wlan-setup-oauth
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65534
+        runAsGroup: 65534
+        # Group of the signing key files (defaultMode 0440).
+        fsGroup: 65534
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: wlan-setup
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:2026-11-05-1517 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wlan-setup"}
+          env:
+            # Client secret of the "WLAN setup" OAuth2 provider.
+            - name: WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+                  key: client_secret
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8080
+              protocol: TCP
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+          volumeMounts:
+            # Key and chain that sign the Windows provisioning XML; read per
+            # request, so cert-manager renewals need no restart.
+            - name: signing
+              mountPath: /etc/wlan-signing
+              readOnly: true
+      volumes:
+        - name: signing
+          secret:
+            secretName: wlan-setup-signing
+            defaultMode: 0440
+            items:
+              - key: tls.key
+                path: tls.key
+              - key: tls.crt
+                path: tls.crt
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: authentik
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+spec:
+  ipFamilyPolicy: PreferDualStack
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 80
+      targetPort: http
+      protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: authentik
+  labels:
+    # Public: Cloudflare CNAME → NetBird proxy → Traefik.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - wlan.renner.uno
+      secretName: wlan-setup-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: wlan.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: wlan-setup
+                port:
+                  number: 80
+---
+# Without the gate: Windows Settings fetches the signed provisioning XML
+# without the browser's session; the single-use token in the path is the only
+# gate. Traefik reaches the pods through the CNP wlan-setup-gate that
+# gate-sync creates for the Ingress above.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-provisioning
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - wlan.renner.uno
+      secretName: wlan-setup-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: wlan.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /windows/profile/
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: wlan-setup
+                port:
+                  number: 80
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-10-29-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-11-05-1401 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
          env:
            - name: CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN
              valueFrom:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gitea-mcp
-          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.12.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
+          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.13.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
          # Image has no ENTRYPOINT (binary is in CMD), so args alone would replace it.
          command:
            - /app/gitea-mcp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ spec:
      annotations:
        # Bump to restart the pod and re-attach net1 (DHCP via multus).
        # 2026-10-06: first attach on containernetworking/plugins v1.9.1.
-        homelab.renner.uno/restarted-for: "2026-10-06 cni-plugins v1.9.1 attach check"
+        homelab.renner.uno/restarted-for: "2026-11-07 net1 without RA (S28-36)"
        k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: mdns-relay-iot
    spec:
      # Runs where the node patch declares the IoT VLAN (ens19).
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ spec:
  # dropped. The relay's forward path to Home Assistant runs over eth0, so
  # that route has to stay intact.
  #
+  # sbr covers IPv4 only. With Router Advertisements net1 gets a global IPv6
+  # address and default route in the main table, and the IPv6 forward to the
+  # Service leaves via net1 with an IoT source, which HA's CNP drops. tuning
+  # turns RA processing off; the link-local address ff02::fb needs stays.
+  #
  # Requires the cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet in infrastructure/multus.
  config: |
    {
@@ -45,6 +50,13 @@ spec:
            "type": "dhcp"
          }
        },
+        {
+          "type": "tuning",
+          "sysctl": {
+            "net.ipv6.conf.IFNAME.accept_ra": "0",
+            "net.ipv6.conf.IFNAME.autoconf": "0"
+          }
+        },
        {
          "type": "sbr"
        }
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: shelly-manager
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/shelly-manager:2026-11-02-1412 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/shelly-manager:2026-11-07-1918 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          ports:
            - name: http
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ spec:
              memory: 32Mi
      containers:
        - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.11.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -49,17 +49,12 @@
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite #"]
-# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan.
-# The controller pushes
-# the password to edge-mqtt-cred on edge-1 (ansible role mqtt-bridge) over
-# HTTPS with its own client certificate, and pins edge-1's self-generated
-# server certificate on first contact (key edge-1.pin in mqtt-account-hashes;
-# delete it after a reinstall of edge-1).
- name: edge-1
+# vitocal-can: open3e-esp32 CAN gateway at the Vitocal 250-A (S28-28).
+# The firmware registers its compiled-in DHCP name `open3e`, not its
+# configured hostname.
+- name: vitocal-can
  auth: password
-  deliver: {esp32: "https://edge-1.iot.renner.uno:8443"}
-  # No sml2mqtt/#: the SML meter reader is retired for good (owner,
-  # 2026-09-19; grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus).
+  deliver: {esp32: "http://open3e.iot.renner.uno"}
  acl: ["readwrite open3e/#"]
 # Shellies (REN-1017): one password account per device, pushed by the
 # controller through shelly-manager's per-device API. Name shelly-<id> =
@@ -106,6 +101,10 @@
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 25}  # Plug S Gen1 1c1a8f
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-41
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 41}  # Plug Gen1 f4cfa26d9cb2
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
 - name: shelly-15
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 15}  # Plug S G3 8cbfea910578
@@ -188,6 +187,34 @@
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 30}  # Plus 2PM b48a0a226c28 (reachable again, REN-1108)
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-7
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 7}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518df3500
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-23
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 23}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518e05b88
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-11
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 11}  # Plus 2PM ccdba7d0b804
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-28
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 28}  # Plus 2PM 0cdc7efa8dc0
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-17
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 17}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daed2054
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-18
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 18}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daecc47c
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-20
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 20}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daecb690
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
 # Sleeping H&Ts (REN-1107): awake only 8-13 s every 1-2 h, so the
 # controller pushes when the device publishes `online` on its wake topic
 # (shelly-manager topic prefix `shellies/<hostname>`), not in the 2-min loop.
@@ -211,3 +238,8 @@
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 38}  # H&T G3 ecda3bc0b6a0
  wake: shellies/shellyhtg3-ecda3bc0b6a0/online
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-40
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 40}  # Flood G4 7c2c67732e08
+  wake: shellies/shellyfloodg4-7c2c67732e08/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ spec:
          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
          # keeps the repository path when it falls through — so the path has to
          # exist on both registries. Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: immich-machine-learning
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.3.5 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.3.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 3003
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /ca
      containers:
        - name: immich-server
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.3.5 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.3.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 3001
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-10-30-1314 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-11-05-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
          env:
            - name: KUMA_URL
              value: https://kuma.renner.uno
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gotenberg
-          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.39.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
+          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.40.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
          args:
            - "gotenberg"
            - "--chromium-disable-javascript=true"
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ spec:
          # exist on both registries — hence konairius/, which matches the ghcr
          # namespace. Steady state still pulls from Gitea and never leaves the
          # network.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-openssl"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-openssl"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: review-bot
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:2026-11-02-1054 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:review-bot"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:2026-11-05-1350 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:review-bot"}
          env:
            - name: GITEA_URL
              value: https://gitea.renner.uno
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ spec:
          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
          # keeps the repository path, so it has to exist on both registries.
          # Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ spec:
        # is a device-bricking class of risk. Bumps are a reviewed, manual
        # act — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md.
        - name: terminus
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.79.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.80.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 2345
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ spec:
            capabilities:
              drop: ["ALL"]
        - name: sidekiq
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.79.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.80.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
          command: ["bundle", "exec", "sidekiq", "-r", "./config/sidekiq.rb"]
          envFrom:
            - configMapRef:
@@ -95,19 +95,20 @@ spec:
      # VLAN-tagged frames, accounted as "VLAN traffic disallowed by VLAN
      # filter" in cilium_drop_count_total.
      #
-      # Only VLAN 30 (v30iot) needs listing. Cilium attaches to devices that
-      # carry an address, so it sees mgmt0's frames already untagged by the
-      # 8021q layer — nothing for a VLAN filter to match. ens19 is deliberately
-      # address-less, so its frames only meet the filter on the shared parent,
-      # still tagged. Adding 40 would change nothing and would touch the
-      # datapath carrying etcd and the API.
+      # Only the address-less macvlan parents need listing: VLAN 30 (ens19,
+      # v30iot) and VLAN 11 (radius0, freeradius-udm). Cilium attaches to
+      # devices that carry an address, so it sees mgmt0's frames already
+      # untagged by the 8021q layer — nothing for a VLAN filter to match.
+      # ens19 and radius0 are deliberately address-less, so their frames only
+      # meet the filter on the shared parent, still tagged. Adding 40 would
+      # change nothing and would touch the datapath carrying etcd and the API.
      #
      # The symptom when this is wrong is not a DHCP timeout: a tc-layer drop
      # reaches an AF_PACKET sender as ENOBUFS, so the CNI dhcp plugin reports
      # "no buffer space available" (#592).
      #
      # Same three-copy problem as policyMapMax above. Takes an agent restart.
-      vlanBypass: [30]
+      vlanBypass: [30, 11]
      # Let pods reach the cluster's own LoadBalancer external IPs; Cilium
      # redirects the socket directly to the backend pod instead of sending
      # traffic out to the VIP and back (which fails with L2 announcements).
@@ -155,13 +156,39 @@ spec:
    k8sServicePort: 7445
    # Hubble itself is on in every agent (chart default); the relay aggregates
    # the three nodes' flow buffers behind one gRPC endpoint so `hubble observe`
-    # works without exec into kube-system (REN-487). Renders no change to
-    # cilium-config or the agent DaemonSet, so the reloader annotation above
-    # does not roll the CNI. The relay has no client auth; who may reach it is
-    # network-policies/kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml.
+    # works without exec into kube-system (REN-487). The relay has no client
+    # auth; who may reach it is network-policies/kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml.
    hubble:
      relay:
        enabled: true
+      # Every policy drop goes to the agent's stdout and from there to Loki
+      # ({namespace="kube-system", container="cilium-agent"} |= "POLICY_DENIED"),
+      # so denied traffic can be reviewed after the fact. Changes cilium-config,
+      # so the reloader rolls the agents.
+      export:
+        static:
+          enabled: true
+          filePath: stdout
+          allowList:
+            - '{"verdict":["DROPPED"],"drop_reason_desc":["POLICY_DENIED"],"event_type":[{"type":1}]}'
+          fieldMask:
+            - time
+            - node_name
+            - verdict
+            - drop_reason_desc
+            - traffic_direction
+            - IP
+            - l4
+            - source.namespace
+            - source.pod_name
+            - source.identity
+            - source.workloads
+            - source_names
+            - destination.namespace
+            - destination.pod_name
+            - destination.identity
+            - destination.workloads
+            - destination_names
    l2announcements:
      enabled: true
    externalIPs:
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ existing `flux-system` GitRepository whose Secret was created by
 | authentik-gate-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | kuma-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | cloudflare-lb-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
+| wlan-setup | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | secret-rotator | `YYYY-MM-DD` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins; staged: only the Home Assistant rotation CronJobs carry the marker so far |
 | gatus | `5.x` | v-prefix filter |
 | velero-plugin-for-aws | `1.13.x` | Tight: must match velero server major.minor |
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ resources:
  - velero-plugin-for-aws.yaml
  - vsftpd.yaml
  - wiki.yaml
+  - wlan-setup.yaml
  - woodpecker.yaml
  - wyoming.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImageRepository
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup
+  interval: 30m
+---
+# build-ci-images.yml tags each build YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM; newest wins.
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImagePolicy
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  imageRepositoryRef:
+    name: wlan-setup
+  filterTags:
+    pattern: '^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{4}$'
+  policy:
+    alphabetical:
+      order: asc
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ spec:
          # No imagePullSecret: the ghcr namespace is private and its credential
          # is in machine.registries too, because a Secret would have to come
          # from OpenBao, which needs Ceph, which needs these binaries.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cni-plugins"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cni-plugins"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ spec:
              value: "netbird-ingress-$(NODE_NAME)"
            - name: NB_LOG_LEVEL
              value: "info"
+            # stdout only; the image default also writes client.log into the
+            # 16Mi state tmpfs.
+            - name: NB_LOG_FILE
+              value: "console"
            # rootless image needs a writable HOME for its state.
            - name: USER
              value: "netbird"
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# Client networks as Cilium CIDR groups, referenced from CNPs via
+# fromCIDRSet.cidrGroupRef. ULA + IPv4 only: the ISP-delegated GUA prefixes
+# change and are not listed.
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-default
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd00::/64
+    - 192.168.8.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-management
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:10::/64
+    - 10.2.10.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-radius
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:11::/64
+    - 10.2.11.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-video
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.20.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-iot
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:30::/64
+    - 10.2.30.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-server
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:40::/64
+    - fd40::/64
+    - 10.2.40.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-node
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:46::/64
+    - 10.2.46.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-ingress
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:47::/64
+    - 10.2.47.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-pod
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:48::/64
+    - 10.2.48.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-privat
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:50::/64
+    - 10.2.50.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-phone
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.60.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-access
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.70.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-vpn
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.80.0/24
+    - 192.168.32.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-guest
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.90.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-multi-transfer
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.122.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-multi-lan
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.123.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-mutti
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.200.0/24
@@ -186,14 +186,21 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "1883"
              protocol: TCP
            - port: "8883"
              protocol: TCP
+    # MQTT clients on the private LAN, TLS only.
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8883"
+              protocol: TCP
 ---
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
@@ -205,8 +212,11 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-server
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8123"
@@ -225,8 +235,8 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8082"
@@ -489,7 +499,7 @@ spec:
            - port: "6638"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
-# mqtt-account-controller: credential delivery to edge-1 (deliver.esp32 in mqtt-accounts.yaml).
+# mqtt-account-controller: credential delivery to deliver.esp32 targets in mqtt-accounts.yaml.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -514,11 +524,12 @@ spec:
          rules:
            dns:
              - matchPattern: "*"
+    # vitocal-can (open3e-esp32), plain HTTP API.
    - toFQDNs:
-        - matchName: "edge-1.iot.renner.uno"
+        - matchName: "open3e.iot.renner.uno"
      toPorts:
        - ports:
-            - port: "8443"
+            - port: "80"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
 # whisper and speech-to-phrase: model downloads over HTTPS.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# CoreDNS is reachable from the LAN through the kube-dns-lb LoadBalancer
+# (ETP=Local, client address reaches the pod). Selecting the pods makes
+# them default-deny for ingress, so the whole cluster (pods, nodes, kubelet
+# probes, Prometheus) is allowed on every port; LAN clients only on 53.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: coredns-ingress
+  namespace: kube-system
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      k8s-app: kube-dns
+  ingress:
+    - fromEntities:
+        - cluster
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-default
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-management
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-radius
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-video
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-server
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-node
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-ingress
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-pod
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-phone
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-access
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-guest
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-multi-transfer
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-multi-lan
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-mutti
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: TCP
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - cidr-groups.yaml
  - default-deny.yaml
  - allow-ingress.yaml
  - ingress-isolation.yaml
@@ -40,3 +41,4 @@ resources:
  - allow-cilium-health.yaml
  - cnpg-barman-s3.yaml
  - kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml
+  - kube-system-coredns.yaml
@@ -1,13 +1,6 @@
-# Targeted carve-out: alloy-syslog needs world ingress on the syslog
-# ports specifically. The Service is ETP=Cluster, so external syslog
-# senders (Proxmox, LXC hosts, network gear) hit the LB IP, get DNAT'd
-# to an alloy pod, and get SNAT'd to the receiving node's cilium_host
-# address. Cilium then sees the source as `world-ipv4` identity (the
-# cilium_host IP isn't a known endpoint), NOT `host` — so the broad
-# monitoring CNP's `fromEntities: host` rule doesn't catch it.
-#
-# Scoped via endpointSelector so this only widens ingress on the
-# alloy-syslog pod, not the whole namespace.
+# Syslog senders reaching the alloy-syslog LB (ETP=Local, client address
+# reaches the pod): network gear on Management, the SLZB coordinators on
+# IoT, and the UDM itself, which sources from its k8s-ingress address.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -19,8 +12,10 @@ spec:
      app.kubernetes.io/instance: alloy-syslog
      app.kubernetes.io/name: alloy
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-management
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-ingress
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "514"
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ spec:
            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
 ---
-# Allow FTP access (from scanners on the LAN) to the ftp-scanner pod.
+# FTP from the scanners (IoT and Privat) to the ftp-scanner pod.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -123,8 +123,24 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: ftp-scanner
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "21"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21100"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21101"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21102"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21103"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21104"
+              protocol: TCP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -142,7 +158,7 @@ spec:
            - port: "21104"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
-# Allow Syncthing peer-to-peer sync from the LAN/world.
+# Allow Syncthing peer-to-peer sync from Privat and VPN.
 # - 22000 TCP+QUIC: actual sync traffic between peers.
 # - 21027 UDP: local-discovery broadcast packets from peers on the LAN.
 # UI (8384) is intentionally NOT listed — authentik-gate-sync generates the
@@ -157,8 +173,18 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: syncthing
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "22000"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "22000"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "21027"
+              protocol: UDP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -62,9 +62,10 @@ spec:
 # CA, so this bypasses Traefik entirely and the namespace default-deny has
 # to be opened for it — same shape as paperless's allow-ftp-scanner.
 #
-# Scoped to the terminus pods and port 2345 only. Requests still have to
-# carry a known device MAC in the `ID` header plus its api_key; this rule
-# opens the port, not the application.
+# Scoped to the terminus pods, port 2345 and the IoT network (the panel's
+# network; the LB is ETP=Local, so the client address reaches the pod).
+# Requests still have to carry a known device MAC in the `ID` header plus
+# its api_key; this rule opens the port, not the application.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -75,8 +76,13 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "2345"
+              protocol: TCP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -154,6 +160,12 @@ spec:
 ---
 # In-cluster + DNS for every pod except terminus (terminus-egress is its
 # allowlist; selecting it here would widen it to all of `cluster`).
+#
+# trmnl-renderer's Chromium calls clients2.google.com:80,
+# update.googleapis.com:443 and accounts.google.com:443; these drops are
+# expected and harmless. The launch flags are fixed in upstream
+# trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/screenshot.ts (PUPPETEER_ARGS, no override) and lack
+# --disable-background-networking.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: backup-verify
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-10-29 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:backup-verify"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:backup-verify"}
              command: ["bash", "/script/backup-verify.sh"]
              env:
                - name: HOME
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ machine:
    # 10.2.30.0/24 route makes node replies bypass the UDM and breaks every
    # DNATed flow.
    net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
+    # radius0 (VLAN 11) is LINK ONLY as well: the macvlan parent for the
+    # FreeRADIUS attachment. VLAN 11 announces RAs; the node must not
+    # autoconfigure from them.
+    net.ipv6.conf.radius0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    # These two sit on the untagged fallback network, where nothing may run.
    # Left enabled they autoconfigure a ULA and an IPv6 default route from its
    # RAs, which ties with mgmt0's and costs the cluster IPv6 egress.
@@ -168,6 +172,17 @@ vlanID: 30
 parent: uplink
 up: true
 ---
+# VLAN 11, UniFi "(11) RADIUS": link only, no addresses, no DHCP. Macvlan
+# parent of the freeradius-udm attachment
+# (kubernetes/apps/authentik/freeradius-network-attachment.yaml), which names
+# it as `master`; renaming this link means editing that too.
+apiVersion: v1alpha1
+kind: VLANConfig
+name: radius0
+vlanID: 11
+parent: uplink
+up: true
+---
 # Pod network, VLAN 48. Node-to-node only: the VXLAN overlay rides it once the
 # kubelet node IP moves here, and nothing on it is routed off the switch.
 #
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ machine:
    # macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments; host addresses on that L2
    # make node replies bypass the UDM and break every UDM-DNATed flow.
    net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
+    # radius0 (VLAN 11): link only — see k8s-1.yaml.
+    net.ipv6.conf.radius0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    # Same for the physical ports on the untagged fallback network: left
    # enabled they take an IPv6 default route from its RAs and cost the
    # cluster IPv6 egress.
@@ -115,6 +117,14 @@ vlanID: 30
 parent: uplink
 up: true
 ---
+# VLAN 11, "(11) RADIUS": link only, no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
+apiVersion: v1alpha1
+kind: VLANConfig
+name: radius0
+vlanID: 11
+parent: uplink
+up: true
+---
 # Pod network, VLAN 48. Node-to-node only, statically addressed, no gateway
 # and no DHCP — see k8s-1.yaml.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ machine:
  sysctls:
    # v30iot NIC carries no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
    net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
+    # radius0 (VLAN 11): link only — see k8s-1.yaml.
+    net.ipv6.conf.radius0.disable_ipv6: "1"
    # Same for the physical ports on the untagged fallback network — see
    # k8s-1.yaml.
    net.ipv6.conf.uplink.disable_ipv6: "1"
@@ -102,6 +104,14 @@ vlanID: 30
 parent: uplink
 up: true
 ---
+# VLAN 11, "(11) RADIUS": link only, no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
+apiVersion: v1alpha1
+kind: VLANConfig
+name: radius0
+vlanID: 11
+parent: uplink
+up: true
+---
 # Pod network, VLAN 48. Node-to-node only, statically addressed, no gateway
 # and no DHCP — see k8s-1.yaml.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
@@ -68,13 +68,14 @@ locals {
  # idx is a static per-network slot for rule_index derivation — never
  # reuse a freed idx for a new network.
  #
-  # Deliberately absent: (40) Server idx=4, (42) Ingress idx=5, and
-  # (49) k8s Ceph idx=6. The cluster nodes have interfaces on those VLANs,
-  # so a DNATed flow's reply would go directly over the shared L2 and
-  # bypass the UDM's conntrack (asymmetric, connection drops) — and
-  # clients there are the nodes themselves, whose DNS chain (CoreDNS ->
-  # k8s_gateway) already resolves the public names in-cluster. Their idx
-  # slots stay reserved.
+  # Deliberately absent: (40) Server idx=4, (49) k8s Ceph idx=6,
+  # (46) k8s Node, (47) k8s Ingress and (48) k8s Pod. The cluster nodes
+  # have interfaces on those VLANs (mgmt0, node0, ingress0, pod0), so a
+  # DNATed flow's reply would go directly over the shared L2 and bypass
+  # the UDM's conntrack (asymmetric, connection drops) — and clients there
+  # are the nodes themselves, whose DNS chain (CoreDNS -> k8s_gateway)
+  # already resolves the public names in-cluster. idx=5 stays reserved
+  # (its network, (42) Ingress, no longer exists).
  hairpin_networks = {
    "Default"              = { id = "5d4fba77ce63ee614841d53d", idx = 0 }
    "(10) Management"      = { id = "600334abf9ee0c059da6be8f", idx = 1 }
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
    "flux",
    "kubernetes",
    "woodpecker",
-    "dockerfile"
+    "dockerfile",
+    "custom.regex"
  ],
  "ignorePaths": [
    "kubernetes/clusters/homelab/flux-system/**",
@@ -23,6 +24,20 @@
      "/^kubernetes/.+\\.ya?ml$/"
    ]
  },
+  "customManagers": [
+    {
+      "customType": "regex",
+      "description": "Container images of the Ansible roles: `edge_<name>_image: <image>:<tag>@<digest>` in ansible/roles/*/defaults/main.yml. No other manager reads these files.",
+      "managerFilePatterns": [
+        "/^ansible/roles/[^/]+/defaults/main\\.ya?ml$/"
+      ],
+      "matchStrings": [
+        "(?:^|\\n)edge_[a-z0-9_]+_image:[ \\t]*[\"']?(?<depName>[^\\s:@\"']+):(?<currentValue>[^\\s@\"']+)(?:@(?<currentDigest>sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}))?"
+      ],
+      "datasourceTemplate": "docker",
+      "versioningTemplate": "docker"
+    }
+  ],
  "packageRules": [
    {
      "description": "Flux image automation (kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation) already bumps these images. Renovate must not open a second, competing update. Keep this list equal to the ImageRepository images there.",
@@ -134,6 +149,20 @@
      "groupName": "CI non-major",
      "groupSlug": "ci-minor-patch"
    },
+    {
+      "description": "Edge-host images (ansible/): no pipeline deploys them, the play runs from a workstation after the merge. One PR of its own, so the merge and the play run go together.",
+      "matchFileNames": [
+        "ansible/**"
+      ],
+      "matchUpdateTypes": [
+        "patch",
+        "minor",
+        "digest",
+        "pin"
+      ],
+      "groupName": "edge hosts (ansible)",
+      "groupSlug": "edge-hosts-ansible"
+    },
    {
      "description": "Stateful apps and the CNI: one PR each, never in a group (REN-315). A git revert does not undo a DB migration or a CNI change, so each needs its own review and, where it can disrupt the cluster, a window.",
      "matchUpdateTypes": [
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More