fix(llama-embed): size the batch for bge-m3's tokenizer, not Paperless's

The LLM index rebuild ran for 79 minutes and then died:

    input (1069 tokens) is too large to process.
    increase the physical batch size (current batch size: 1024)

Setting the batch to Paperless's chunk size looked like an exact match
and was not. Paperless counts its 1024 tokens with llama_index's
tokenizer; this server measures the batch in bge-m3's, which is
XLM-RoBERTa and splits German into more pieces. A chunk Paperless
considered full arrived here 4.4% over the limit, and the request failed
rather than truncating.

1536 absorbs a tokenizer ratio rather than a rounding error. 2048 stays
out of reach: that is where the chat model hit ErrorDeviceLost on this
Vulkan stack, under a 20 GB model's memory pressure that a 600 MB one may
well not reproduce — but there is no reason to go looking.

The index is left partial by the failed run and has to be rebuilt with
`document_llmindex rebuild` once this is live.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml

@@ -87,30 +87,6 @@ steps:
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
 
-  - name: build-vmtest
-    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
-    directory: ci/images/vmtest
-    depends_on: []
-    when:
-      - event: deployment
-      - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/vmtest/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
-    environment:
-      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
-      GITEA_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ci_images_token
-    commands:
-      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
-      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
-      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-      - |
-        /kaniko/executor \
-          --context . \
-          --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:latest
-
   - name: build-tofu
     image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
     directory: ci/images/tofu
@@ -171,28 +147,6 @@ steps:
   # not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
   # container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
   # the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
-  #
-  # Published THREE times, and the third one is not a typo. Its consumers — the
-  # zigbee2mqtt seed-data init container and the trmnl renderer — start while
-  # the cluster is still being rebuilt, and at that moment gitea.renner.uno does
-  # not exist, because Gitea runs inside the cluster being built. A cold-rebuild
-  # rehearsal caught both in ImagePullBackOff.
-  #
-  # So there is a copy on ghcr.io. But the manifests must NOT point at it:
-  # normal operation pulls from the local registry, and an external reference
-  # would make every steady-state pull leave the network. The recovery source
-  # and the everyday source are different things, exactly as they are for Flux's
-  # git source.
-  #
-  # Talos resolves that with machine.registries.mirrors, which takes an ordered
-  # endpoint list — gitea first, ghcr second (bootstrap.sh). Containerd keeps
-  # the repository path when it falls through, so the two registries have to
-  # agree on it: `gitea_admin/alpine-jq` cannot be served by ghcr, where the
-  # namespace is fixed to the account name. Hence the second Gitea destination
-  # under konairius/, which the manifests reference and which matches the ghcr
-  # path exactly.
-  #
-  # The gitea_admin/ copy stays until nothing references it any more.
   - name: build-alpine-jq
     image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
     directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
@@ -205,47 +159,23 @@ steps:
       GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
       GITEA_TOKEN:
         from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
     commands:
       - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
       - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
       - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
       - |
         /kaniko/executor \
           --context . \
           --dockerfile Containerfile \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
 
   # Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
   # baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
   # node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
   # critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
   # where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
-  #
-  # This one ALSO publishes to ghcr.io. A cold-rebuild rehearsal proved why: the
-  # DaemonSet could not pull from gitea.renner.uno, because Gitea runs inside the
-  # very cluster being rebuilt. Without the plugins there is no macvlan, so
-  # Multus cannot attach ceph-san, so Rook's network canary never starts, so the
-  # CephCluster sits at "Configuring Ceph Mons" — and OpenBao waits forever for a
-  # PVC that will never bind. Moving the download here fixed the integrity gap
-  # but quietly swapped github.com on the critical path for something strictly
-  # worse: a registry that by definition does not exist during a recovery. The
-  # GHCR copy is public, so a bare node can pull it with no credential and no
-  # Gitea.
-  #
-  # The test that proved this also proved the rule is not specific to this
-  # image. alpine-jq and alpine-openssl mirror for the same reason — see the
-  # note on build-alpine-jq. Anything an app needs while the cluster is still
-  # being built cannot live only in that cluster's own registry.
   - name: build-cni-plugins
     image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
     directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
@@ -258,36 +188,23 @@ steps:
       GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
       GITEA_TOKEN:
         from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
     commands:
       - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
       - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
       - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
       - |
         /kaniko/executor \
           --context . \
           --dockerfile Containerfile \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
 
   # Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
   # needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
   # fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
   # every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
   # base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
-  #
-  # Mirrored to ghcr.io for the reason given on build-alpine-jq: it is an init
-  # container, so paperless does not start without it, and during a rebuild
-  # gitea.renner.uno is not there to serve it. A cold-rebuild rehearsal left
-  # paperless in Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
   - name: build-alpine-openssl
     image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
     directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
@@ -300,25 +217,17 @@ steps:
       GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
       GITEA_TOKEN:
         from_secret: ci_images_token
-      GHCR_USER: konairius
-      GHCR_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
     commands:
       - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
       - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
       - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
       - |
         /kaniko/executor \
           --context . \
           --dockerfile Containerfile \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
 
   # Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
   # run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an

.woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ when:
       # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
       # so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
       - "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
+      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
+      - "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
       - "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
       - ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
   - event: deployment

ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
+#
+# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
+# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
+# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
+# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
+# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
+#
+# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
+# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
+# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
+# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
+# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
+# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
+vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
+          $ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
+          32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
+          3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
+          36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
+          6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
+          39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
+          6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733

ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -26,3 +26,7 @@
     - docker-install
     - netbird-proxy
     - netbird-proxy-watchdog
+    # Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
+    # enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
+    # nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
+    - crowdsec-edge-bouncer

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/defaults/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
+#
+# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
+# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
+# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
+# cluster.
+#
+# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
+# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
+# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
+# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
+
+# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
+# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
+crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
+crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
+
+# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
+# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
+# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
+# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
+# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
+#
+# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
+# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
+# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
+
+# STARTS INERT, and that is the point.
+#
+# dry-run pulls decisions and logs what it would block without creating a
+# single nftables rule. The first bouncer to arm anywhere enforces ~24k CAPI
+# decisions at once on the only external entry path, so the false-positive
+# window has to come before the enforcement, not after it. Flip to `nftables`
+# one host at a time once the log looks right.
+crowdsec_bouncer_mode: dry-run
+
+crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
+crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
+
+# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
+# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
+# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/handlers/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
+# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
+# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
+# retry_initial_connect matters.
+- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/tasks/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
+#
+# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
+# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
+# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
+# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
+# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
+# package downloads.
+
+- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: nftables
+    state: present
+
+- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
+    state: directory
+    mode: "0755"
+
+# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
+#
+# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
+# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
+# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
+# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
+# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
+# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
+# it manipulates host netfilter.
+#
+# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
+# there, before anything is copied to a host.
+- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
+  ansible.builtin.get_url:
+    url: >-
+      https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
+      crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
+    dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
+    mode: "0644"
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  run_once: true
+
+# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
+# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
+# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
+# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
+# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
+# host.
+- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    mode: "0644"
+
+# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
+# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
+# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
+- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt
+    remote_src: true
+    include:
+      - crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+
+- name: Install the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    remote_src: true
+    mode: "0755"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
+- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
+    dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+    mode: "0600"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
+    dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    mode: "0644"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Enable and start the bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+    daemon_reload: true
+
+- name: Report how to read it
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: |
+      crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
+
+      What it would block:  journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
+      What it does block:   nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
+      Metrics:              curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
+
+      Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
+      both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
+      removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+#
+# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
+# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
+# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
+# that has to resolve before the first connect.
+[Unit]
+Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
+After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
+# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
+ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=10
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+KillMode=mixed
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
+update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
+
+# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
+# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
+# hosts without journald.
+log_mode: stdout
+log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
+
+api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
+api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
+
+# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
+# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
+# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
+# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
+# absent from the shipped example config.
+retry_initial_connect: true
+
+disable_ipv4: false
+disable_ipv6: false
+deny_action: DROP
+
+supported_decisions_types:
+  - ban
+
+# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
+# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
+# at the default filter priority.
+nftables:
+  ipv4:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec
+    chain: crowdsec-chain
+    priority: -10
+  ipv6:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec6
+    chain: crowdsec6-chain
+    priority: -10
+
+# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
+# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
+# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
+nftables_hooks:
+  - input
+  - forward
+
+prometheus:
+  enabled: true
+  listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
+  listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}

ansible/roles/netbird-server/files/netbird-backup-dump

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# Forced-command target for the netbird-backup SSH key (see the
-# "Authorize the cluster backup key" task): takes a CONSISTENT snapshot
-# of the management SQLite store via the online-backup API (safe against
-# a live writer, unlike copying store.db) and streams a gzipped tar to
-# stdout. The key's authorized_keys entry is restricted to exactly this
-# script — the in-cluster puller cannot run anything else.
-#
-# Deliberately store.db ONLY: /opt/netbird/config is fully regenerable
-# from the netbird-server role's templates + vault, and including it
-# would put the plaintext TURN secret (turnserver.conf) into every
-# nightly tarball. Restore = re-run the role (rebuilds config), then
-# untar this dump into /opt/netbird/management/.
-set -eu
-tmp=$(mktemp -d)
-trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
-sqlite3 /opt/netbird/management/store.db ".backup '$tmp/store.db'"
-tar -C "$tmp" -czf - store.db

ansible/roles/netbird-server/tasks/main.yml

@@ -77,29 +77,22 @@
   register: docker_compose_result
   changed_when: "'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or 'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout"
 
-# Off-VPS backup of the management store (SPOF assessment 2026-07-25:
-# this SQLite DB — peers, setup keys, groups, routes — had zero backup
-# coverage; losing the VPS meant re-enrolling the entire mesh). The VPS
-# cannot reach any PBS (both PBS names resolve to the public proxy,
-# ports closed), so the CLUSTER pulls: a CronJob
-# (kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup) ssh's in with a dedicated
-# key that is locked to the dump script below, and lands the tarball on
-# a Ceph PVC that Velero ships offsite. The dump is store.db ONLY —
-# /opt/netbird/config is regenerable from this role's templates + vault
-# and would otherwise leak the TURN secret into every tarball. Restore:
-# re-run this role (rebuilds config), then untar the dump into
-# /opt/netbird/management/.
-- name: Install the backup dump script
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: netbird-backup-dump
-    dest: /usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump
-    mode: "0755"
+# The management store has no cluster-side backup. Pulling one put a root
+# key on this host that the cluster held, and this server's own state is
+# its own business to protect rather than the cluster's. Dropping the two
+# tasks that placed them would only stop ansible managing the key and the
+# script — the pair below revokes them instead, and can go once the role
+# has run against every host that ever carried them.
+- name: Remove the backup dump script
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump
+    state: absent
 
-- name: Authorize the cluster backup key (forced command, no shell)
+- name: Revoke the cluster backup key
   ansible.posix.authorized_key:
     user: root
     key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFeW/L9bHMTSa5/Qb0ClppCf4Z0hL39JwzI6tBmKd2FG netbird-backup@homelab-cluster"
-    key_options: 'restrict,command="/usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump"'
+    state: absent
 
 - name: Wait for management container to be ready
   ansible.builtin.pause:

ci/images/vmtest/Containerfile

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
-
-# Everything `bootstrap.sh vmtest` needs, so the rebuild test can run as a Job in
-# the cluster instead of on a workstation. The workstation has 31G and the test
-# wants ~14.5G for four VMs — a single run left under 1G headroom, and two
-# overlapping runs OOM-killed the session. The nodes have ~94G with 70G free.
-#
-# Separate from ci-k8s rather than built on it: that image pins talosctl v1.12.6,
-# and this test creates a cluster at the version talos/patches/cluster.yaml
-# installs. A talosctl older than the Talos it provisions is exactly the kind of
-# skew the test exists to catch, so it must not be baked in here.
-#
-# KEEP TALOS_VERSION IN STEP with the installer image tag in
-# kubernetes/talos/patches/cluster.yaml. The phase reads the version from that
-# file at run time and passes it to the provisioner; this pin only decides which
-# client talks to it.
-ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.9
-ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
-ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
-ARG KOPIA_VERSION=0.23.1
-
-# qemu-system-x86_64 and qemu-img are the provisioner's actual backend, and ovmf
-# supplies the UEFI firmware those VMs boot from — without it the provisioner
-# stops with "the required flash image was not found in any of the expected
-# paths", having already downloaded the ISO and generated the PKI. Note the
-# firmware comes from ovmf specifically: qemu-system-x86_64 ships an edk2 CODE
-# image but no VARS, which is the half the provisioner needs.
-#
-# iptables is shelled out to by the CNI plugins that build the VM network; the
-# provisioner fails with "error accessing iptables" without it. The rest is
-# what the phase shells out to: helm for the Cilium install, yq to read the
-# HelmRelease and the installer image, jq for OpenBao's seal status.
-#
-# Versions come from the digest-pinned base rather than being pinned one by one,
-# the same way ci-ansible does it.
-RUN apk add --no-cache \
-      bash \
-      ca-certificates \
-      curl \
-      git \
-      helm \
-      iptables \
-      jq \
-      openssl \
-      ovmf \
-      qemu-img \
-      qemu-system-x86_64 \
-      yq
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
-      "https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
- && echo "7e1d4b7d5846964bdcf63a794e3c8161bb6ef2983d5ace58ea5322f3bf32a27e  /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
-      "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl" \
- && curl -sfL -o /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
-      "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KUBECTL_VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha256" \
- && echo "$(cat /tmp/kubectl.sha256)  /usr/local/bin/kubectl" | sha256sum -c - \
- && rm -f /tmp/kubectl.sha256 \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kubectl
-
-RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/flux.tar.gz \
-      "https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/releases/download/v${FLUX_VERSION}/flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" \
- && echo "4092b367fd060097976fb7261601f79420ecf7266328417dfd8dfee27de0e6a3  /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
- && tar -xzf /tmp/flux.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin flux \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flux \
- && rm -f /tmp/flux.tar.gz
-
-# kopia reads the Velero backup repository directly, which is what the OpenBao
-# restore does when there is no Velero yet to do it: the credentials Velero
-# needs live in OpenBao, so OpenBao cannot be restored by Velero. Its absence
-# was found by a rebuild rehearsal reaching the restore for the first time and
-# stopping at "kopia not found".
-#
-# Same checksum-verified download as the tools above; the tarball unpacks into
-# a versioned directory, so the binary is pulled out by name.
-RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/kopia.tar.gz \
-      "https://github.com/kopia/kopia/releases/download/v${KOPIA_VERSION}/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
- && echo "416d0f84a3dbb321a8b2d8f0997b1a0a6e915babe79ee76fa6e4d2bd1e1c5178  /tmp/kopia.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
- && tar -xzf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz -C /tmp \
- && mv "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64/kopia" /usr/local/bin/kopia \
- && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kopia \
- && rm -rf /tmp/kopia.tar.gz "/tmp/kopia-${KOPIA_VERSION}-linux-x64"

kubernetes/RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md

@@ -2,7 +2,12 @@
 
 Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
 metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
-after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
+after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
+
+All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
+reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
+k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
+rebuild, not as outstanding work.
 
 Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
 actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were

kubernetes/RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md

@@ -119,9 +119,11 @@ against do not exist, and the node ends up with no address on any interface.
 Beyond that it carries:
 
 - `siderolabs/intel-ucode` — no hypervisor supplies microcode here
-- `siderolabs/i915` — the Alder Lake-P Iris Xe. Nothing requests `/dev/dri`
-  today; present so wanting hardware transcoding later is a config change
-  rather than another rolling reinstall
+- `siderolabs/i915` — the Alder Lake-P Iris Xe. The Intel GPU device plugin
+  (`infrastructure/intel-gpu-plugin`) turns this into the schedulable resource
+  `gpu.intel.com/i915`, which `apps/llama-server` requests for LLM inference
+  and which any hardware-transcoding workload would use too. Without the
+  extension the plugin finds no `/dev/dri` and advertises nothing
 - `siderolabs/thunderbolt` — inert until `machine.kernel.modules` requests
   `thunderbolt`/`thunderbolt_net`, present for the same reason. Note its udev
   rule auto-authorises any Thunderbolt device attached once those modules load

kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml

@@ -877,6 +877,105 @@ data:
             kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
             kubernetes_json_patches: null
 
+      # llama-server WebUI gate
+      #
+      # llama-server has no authentication of its own — it serves its chat UI
+      # and a full OpenAI-compatible API to anyone who can reach the port. That
+      # is why it was LAN-only until now. This gate is what makes a public
+      # hostname defensible: the outpost terminates every request, enforces the
+      # session, and only then forwards to llama-server.
+      #
+      # Same reasoning as vscode-gate, and the same passkey step-up: what sits
+      # behind the gate is entirely unprotected, so the gate is the whole of the
+      # access control rather than a second factor on top of an app login.
+      #
+      # In-cluster consumers (Home Assistant, Paperless, CI) are unaffected:
+      # they address llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local directly and never pass
+      # through Traefik or this outpost.
+      #
+      # No group and no policy binding: any user who can authenticate gets in,
+      # as with Immich, Audiobookshelf, Home Assistant and Music Assistant. The
+      # gates that pin membership to a named user in git — vscode, esphome,
+      # zigbee2mqtt, shelly-manager, prometheus — are admin interfaces, where
+      # the allowlist is the point. A chat UI is not one of those, and deciding
+      # its membership here would put an access-control choice in a manifest
+      # instead of leaving it where the user directory belongs.
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+      - id: llama-gate-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
+        identifiers:
+          name: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          # Both flows, mirroring the Audiobookshelf provider. Setting only
+          # authorization_flow leaves authentication on Authentik's default
+          # flow, which is what made the first login clumsy — the step-up ran
+          # on top of a password prompt instead of replacing it. With the
+          # passwordless flow named explicitly, signing in is the passkey
+          # itself.
+          #
+          # Referenced by !Find rather than !KeyOf: both flows are defined in
+          # the passkey-stepup document of this ConfigMap, and !KeyOf only
+          # resolves within one document.
+          authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
+          authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          mode: proxy
+          internal_host: http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
+          internal_host_ssl_validation: false
+          external_host: https://llm.renner.uno
+          cookie_domain: renner.uno
+          access_token_validity: hours=24
+          refresh_token_validity: days=30
+          intercept_header_auth: true
+          # The WebUI ships `<link rel="manifest">` and registers a service
+          # worker. Per the W3C spec a manifest is fetched with
+          # `credentials: 'omit'`, so it carries no session cookie and the gate
+          # answers it with a 302 to auth.renner.uno — which turns every page
+          # load into a redirect round-trip. This is the failure that forced
+          # paperless-gate's own carve-out and that retired music-assistant-gate
+          # outright. Both paths serve no authenticated content, so letting them
+          # through anonymously costs nothing.
+          skip_path_regex: ^/(manifest\.webmanifest|sw\.js)$
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: Local LLM (Gate)
+          slug: llama-gate
+          provider: !KeyOf llama-gate-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://llm.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "Forward-auth gate in front of the local llama-server WebUI"
+
+      - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
+        identifiers:
+          name: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          type: proxy
+          service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
+          providers:
+            - !KeyOf llama-gate-provider
+          config:
+            log_level: info
+            authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
+            authentik_host_insecure: false
+            authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
+            refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
+            container_image: null
+            object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
+            kubernetes_namespace: authentik
+            kubernetes_replicas: 1
+            kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
+            kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
+            kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
+            kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
+            kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
+            kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
+            kubernetes_json_patches: null
+
       - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
         identifiers:
           name: authentik Embedded Outpost

kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ resources:
   - alertmanager-gate-egress.yaml
   - prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
   - wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
+  - llama-gate-egress.yaml
+  - outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
   - ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
   - ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
   - ldap-outpost-cnp.yaml

kubernetes/apps/authentik/llama-gate-egress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+# Lets the llama-gate outpost reach llama-server. The cluster baseline CNP
+# (kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/authentik-ns.yaml) otherwise stops
+# any authentik-namespace pod from entering the ai namespace.
+#
+# The outpost is the trust boundary: it forwards to llama-server only after
+# validating the Authentik session, and the matching ingress rule in
+# ai-ns.yaml admits nothing else — so nothing in the cluster can route around
+# the gate to reach the unauthenticated API through the public hostname.
+#
+# Scoped to this outpost's pod label rather than the whole namespace, so the
+# other gates cannot reach llama-server either.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: llama-gate-egress
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      goauthentik.io/outpost-name: llama-gate
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md

@@ -111,9 +111,23 @@ statistics             max_id=13323904    max_start_ts=1787162400.0
 statistics_short_term  max_id=159205762   max_start_ts=1787166000.0
 ```
 
-## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
+## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
 
-Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
+Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
+
+| table | rows | span |
+|---|---|---|
+| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
+| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
+| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
+
+The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
+pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
+across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
+document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
+at Postgres.
+
+The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
 
 **Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
 HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -56,10 +56,9 @@ spec:
         # Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
         # effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
         #
-        # INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
-        # `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
-        # homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
-        # when a referenced secret is missing.
+        # Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
+        # repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
+        # without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
         - name: render-db-url
           image: busybox:1.36
           command:

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/ha-pg-cluster.yaml

@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
 # That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
 # what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
 #
-# STAGING
-# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
-# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
-# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
-# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
-# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
+# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
+# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
+# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
+# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
+# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
+# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
 apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
 kind: Cluster
 metadata:

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/kustomization.yaml

@@ -60,9 +60,8 @@ resources:
   - zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
   - zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
   # Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
-  # PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
-  # on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
-  # tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
+  # Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
+  # long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
   - ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
   - ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
   - ha-pg-cluster.yaml

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/zigbee2mqtt-deployment.yaml

@@ -57,14 +57,7 @@ spec:
           # and leaves this one untouched (tags are not deleted), so this keeps
           # resolving — but the image then came from the branch build rather than
           # master. Re-point it at a master-built tag when convenient.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/: this init container runs during a cold
-          # rebuild, when Gitea does not exist because it runs inside the
-          # cluster being rebuilt. The node then falls back to a ghcr.io copy
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
-          # keeps the repository path when it falls through — so the path has to
-          # exist on both registries. Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c

kubernetes/apps/immich/cluster.yaml

@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
     # Kept permanently as a standing guard.
     kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
 spec:
-  # Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
-  # pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
-  # paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
-  # vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
-  instances: 1
-  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
-  # the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
-  # down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
-  # even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
+  # A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
+  # vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
+  # long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
+  # format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
+  instances: 2
+  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
+  # (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
+  # terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
+  # on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
   smartShutdownTimeout: 10
   stopDelay: 60
   imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ spec:
       database: immich
       owner: immich
   postgresql:
+    # vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
+    # extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
+    # in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
     shared_preload_libraries:
-      - vectors.so
       - vchord.so
     parameters:
       shared_buffers: "512MB"

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+---
+# The chat endpoint, and the only one behind the ingress.
+#
+# Single-model rather than router mode. Router mode served chat and embeddings
+# from one port, but two things made that wrong here:
+#
+#   1. Its /health answers 200 as soon as the router process listens, while the
+#      models are still downloading behind it. Kubernetes marked the pod Ready
+#      within seconds of start, so traffic arrived at a server that could not
+#      answer. In single-model mode /health returns 503 until the model is
+#      resident, which is what the probes below actually need.
+#   2. Every model on the port is selectable in the built-in WebUI, including
+#      the embedding model. Asking an embedding model to chat returns fluent
+#      nonsense ("capital capital capital ...") rather than an error, and
+#      `--embeddings` does not prevent it. There is no flag to hide a model
+#      from the list — `--tags` is informational and `--ui-config` only sets UI
+#      preferences — so the only way to keep it out of the picker is to keep it
+#      off this endpoint. It runs in embed.yaml instead.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: llama-server
+  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  # A rolling update would load a second copy of the weights onto the same
+  # iGPU and into the same node's RAM before releasing the first.
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        # Makes the CephFS volume group-writable so the weights can be cached.
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: llama-server
+          image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
+          args:
+            # The one place this model is named; llama-server resolves the repo
+            # and downloads it itself, so there is nothing to keep in sync.
+            #
+            # A 35B mixture-of-experts with only ~3B parameters active per
+            # token. Decode on this hardware is bound by how many bytes are read
+            # per token rather than by parameter count, and this model reads
+            # ~1.85 GB/token where a dense 27B reads ~16.5 GB — so it is both
+            # far larger and faster than any dense model that would fit.
+            #
+            # Measured here (llama-bench, k8s-1, this image): tg128 11.59 tok/s,
+            # against 10.78 for a dense 8B. Prefill 120.9 t/s at 512 tokens and
+            # 69.8 at 16384 — a sublinear falloff, so the Gated Delta Net
+            # prefill collapse of llama.cpp#27638 does not occur on this stack.
+            - --hf-repo
+            - ggml-org/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-GGUF:Q4_K_M
+            # Every layer on the Intel iGPU. Full offload matches CPU throughput
+            # while leaving the node's 14 cores free for the rest of the
+            # cluster; the iGPU is here for that isolation, not for a speed-up.
+            - --n-gpu-layers
+            - "99"
+            # Decode runs on the GPU, so extra threads buy nothing. At 11.59
+            # tok/s this model moves 21.4 GB/s against the 53.9 GB/s a dense
+            # model sustains here, so it is the iGPU's 96 EUs working through
+            # many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
+            - --threads
+            - "4"
+            # 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
+            # and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
+            # layers use full attention.
+            - --ctx-size
+            - "16384"
+            # A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
+            # with ErrorDeviceLost.
+            - --ubatch-size
+            - "1024"
+            # The server otherwise allows every CORS origin and warns about it
+            # at startup. Without this, any page a LAN browser visits could call
+            # this unauthenticated API from the user's machine. Consumers talk
+            # to it server-side; the WebUI is same-origin and unaffected.
+            - --cors-origins
+            - localhost
+            # Two names for one model. Without this the id is the whole
+            # --hf-repo string, which is unreadable in a model picker and in
+            # logs.
+            #
+            # Exactly one name, because a second one cannot be had usefully:
+            # llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and reports the first as
+            # the model's `id`, so with `chat` alongside this the picker always
+            # showed `chat` — in either flag order, since "chat" sorts first.
+            #
+            # Dropping it costs nothing. A second name would only be worth
+            # having as a stable handle for machine consumers, and there is
+            # nothing to stabilise: a single-model server ignores the request's
+            # `model` field entirely and answers to any string, verified against
+            # this endpoint. So no consumer config can break on a model swap,
+            # with or without an alias. The name exists purely to be advertised
+            # on /v1/models, which is what a client reads to build its picker.
+            - --alias
+            - qwen3.6-35b-a3b
+            # Qwen3.6 enables thinking by default. At ~11.6 tok/s that spends
+            # minutes reasoning before answering, and a request with a modest
+            # max_tokens returns an empty `content` with finish_reason "length"
+            # because the whole budget went to reasoning_content. Off by default
+            # keeps answers usable; a client that wants it can send
+            # chat_template_kwargs per request.
+            - --chat-template-kwargs
+            - '{"enable_thinking": false}'
+          env:
+            # Where --hf-repo caches the weights. Pointing it at the PVC makes
+            # the download a one-time cost, shared with llama-embed, and keeps
+            # the server off a home directory it cannot write as UID 1000.
+            - name: LLAMA_CACHE
+              value: /models
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8080
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          # Vulkan allocates the iGPU's working set from system RAM, and that
+          # counts against the pod's cgroup: a 5.2 GiB model measured 7.54 GiB
+          # RSS. Sized as the 19 GiB of weights plus that overhead, plus the KV
+          # cache — which is unusually cheap here, since only 10 of the 40
+          # layers use full attention.
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 500m
+              memory: 24Gi
+              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
+            limits:
+              cpu: "6"
+              memory: 32Gi
+              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
+          # /health is 503 while the model loads and 200 once it is resident, so
+          # the pod only goes Ready when it can actually answer. On a cold PVC
+          # that includes pulling ~19 GiB from Hugging Face, hence the long
+          # startup budget (40 min); liveness takes over only after that.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 240
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            timeoutSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: models
+              mountPath: /models
+      volumes:
+        - name: models
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: llama-server-models
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: llama-server
+  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8080
+      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+---
+# The embedding endpoint, for RAG and semantic search.
+#
+# Deliberately separate from llama-server and deliberately not behind the
+# ingress: an embedding model has no generative training, and when it shares a
+# port with the chat model the built-in WebUI lists it as a choice. Selecting it
+# returns fluent nonsense rather than an error, because `--embeddings` does not
+# actually refuse chat completions. Keeping it on its own ClusterIP-only Service
+# is what makes it unselectable, since llama.cpp has no way to hide a model from
+# the picker.
+#
+# Reachable in-cluster at http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/embeddings.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: llama-embed
+  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: llama-embed
+          image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
+          args:
+            - --hf-repo
+            - gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
+            # Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
+            - --embeddings
+            # A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
+            # advertised as the whole --hf-repo string, which would end up
+            # verbatim in Paperless's config and break on the next model swap.
+            # One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
+            # reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
+            - --alias
+            - bge-m3
+            # bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
+            # Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
+            # llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
+            # outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
+            # trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
+            # rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
+            # pooling types were needed.
+            - --pooling
+            - cls
+            - --n-gpu-layers
+            - "99"
+            - --threads
+            - "2"
+            # Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
+            # tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
+            # Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
+            # llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
+            # at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
+            # "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
+            #
+            # The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
+            # a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
+            # broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
+            # --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
+            # run them mismatched, so both are set.
+            #
+            # 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
+            # ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
+            # 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
+            # this does not need to find out.
+            - --batch-size
+            - "1536"
+            - --ubatch-size
+            - "1536"
+            # Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
+            - --ctx-size
+            - "4096"
+            # No browser ever talks to this Service, so the WebUI is dead weight
+            # and one more unauthenticated surface.
+            - --no-webui
+          env:
+            # Same cache as llama-server, so the two share one copy of anything
+            # they have in common and neither re-downloads the other's weights.
+            - name: LLAMA_CACHE
+              value: /models
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8080
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          # Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
+          # 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
+          # well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
+          # at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
+          # weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
+          # same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
+          # candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
+          # their model size.
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 250m
+              memory: 2Gi
+              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
+            limits:
+              cpu: "2"
+              memory: 8Gi
+              gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
+          # ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
+          # model needs, but still sized for a cold download.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 60
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            timeoutSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: models
+              mountPath: /models
+      volumes:
+        - name: models
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: llama-server-models
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: llama-embed
+  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8080
+      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/gate-service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# ExternalName mirror so the ai-namespace Ingress can backend to the llama-gate
+# outpost that Authentik deploys into the authentik namespace (cross-namespace
+# Service references are not supported in a standard Ingress).
+#
+# Traffic path:
+#   browser → traefik (llm.renner.uno)
+#           → ak-outpost-llama-gate (ExternalName → authentik ns)
+#           → outpost validates the session + passkey step-up
+#           → http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
+#
+# In-cluster consumers skip all of this and address llama-server directly.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: ak-outpost-llama-gate
+  namespace: ai
+spec:
+  type: ExternalName
+  externalName: ak-outpost-llama-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
+  ports:
+    - port: 9000
+      targetPort: 9000

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+# llm.renner.uno — the chat WebUI, public and behind Authentik.
+#
+# Traefik no longer reaches llama-server directly. This Ingress backends the
+# llama-gate proxy outpost (ExternalName → authentik ns), which enforces a
+# passkey step-up and forwards only after the session validates. The ai
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy is tightened so ONLY that outpost pod may reach
+# llama-server, so nothing in the cluster can route around the gate. Pattern
+# mirrors kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/vscode-ingress.yaml.
+#
+# The gate is the entire access control here: llama-server has no
+# authentication of its own and serves a full OpenAI-compatible API on the same
+# port as the UI. That is what kept this hostname LAN-only until now.
+#
+# In-cluster consumers — Home Assistant, Paperless, CI — address
+# llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080 directly and never pass through
+# Traefik or the outpost, so they need no credentials and are unaffected by the
+# gate.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: llama-server
+  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    # Public: Cloudflare wildcard → tunnel → NetBird proxy → Traefik. The UDM
+    # external-dns instance skips anything carrying this, and LAN clients reach
+    # the same hostname through the hairpin NAT.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - llm.renner.uno
+      secretName: llama-server-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: llm.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ak-outpost-llama-gate
+                port:
+                  number: 9000

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - pvc.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - embed.yaml
+  - gate-service.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/pvc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
+# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
+# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
+#
+# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
+# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
+# inference time.
+#
+# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
+# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
+# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
+# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
+# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
+#
+# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
+# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: llama-server-models
+  namespace: ai
+  annotations:
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteMany
+  storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 120Gi

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/cilium-servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Cilium's agent ServiceMonitor, declared here rather than by the chart.
-#
-# Reproduces what cilium 1.20.1 renders with prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled,
-# taken field for field off the live object so scraping is unchanged: same name,
-# same namespace, same selector, same 10s interval and node relabeling.
-#
-# It lives here because the chart's template is gated on monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-# existing at install time, and on an empty cluster it does not — those CRDs
-# arrive with kube-prometheus-stack, which reconciles after infrastructure.
-# Cilium is one of infrastructure's healthChecks, so the chart aborting on the
-# missing CRD held the whole cluster: CNI waiting on monitoring waiting on CNI.
-#
-# velero/helmrelease.yaml already does exactly this for its own SM/PM and says
-# why; this is the same move for the component where it mattered most.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: cilium-agent
-  namespace: kube-system
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: cilium
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - kube-system
-  # The chart's Service keeps rendering (prometheus.enabled), so the target and
-  # its `metrics` port are there regardless of who declares the ServiceMonitor.
-  targetLabels:
-    - k8s-app
-  endpoints:
-    - port: metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      relabelings:
-        # Agent metrics are per-node; without this every series lands without a
-        # node label and BPF map pressure cannot be attributed to a machine.
-        - action: replace
-          sourceLabels:
-            - __meta_kubernetes_pod_node_name
-          targetLabel: node
-          replacement: ${1}

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ resources:
   - prometheusrule-loki.yaml
   - prometheusrule-mariadb-backup.yaml
   - prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
-  - prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
   - prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
   - prometheusrule-openbao.yaml
   - prometheusrule-velero.yaml
@@ -23,20 +22,9 @@ resources:
   # endpoint, which proves reachability, not that anything was written.
   - prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
   - alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
-  - cilium-servicemonitor.yaml
   - cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
   - home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
   - immich-servicemonitor.yaml
   - loki-servicemonitor.yaml
   - smartctl-exporter-servicemonitor.yaml
   - probes-blackbox.yaml
-  # Velero's own monitors: monitoring.coreos.com CRDs arrive with
-  # kube-prometheus-stack, which reconciles after infrastructure, so these
-  # cannot live beside the Velero HelmRelease.
-  - velero-podmonitor.yaml
-  - velero-servicemonitor.yaml
-  - authentik-outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
-  # Rook's exporter/mgr monitors: the operator aborts its node-daemon reconcile
-  # when it cannot create these, which held the CephCluster in Progressing and
-  # deadlocked the whole apps layer. See the file for the cycle.
-  - rook-servicemonitors.yaml

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: PrometheusRule
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-backup
-  namespace: monitoring
-  labels:
-    # kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus selects on this label.
-    release: kube-prometheus-stack
-spec:
-  groups:
-    - name: netbird-backup.rules
-      rules:
-        - alert: NetbirdVpsBackupStale
-          # The nightly pull of the controller VPS's management store
-          # hasn't succeeded in over 26 h (one missed cycle + slack).
-          # This dump is the only copy of the mesh state (peers, setup
-          # keys, routes) that survives losing the Hetzner VPS — a
-          # silently dead backup is exactly the failure mode the SPOF
-          # assessment flagged.
-          expr: |
-            time() - kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="netbird-backup", cronjob="netbird-vps-backup"} > 26 * 3600
-          for: 30m
-          labels:
-            severity: critical
-          annotations:
-            summary: "NetBird VPS backup has not succeeded in 26h+"
-            description: "The netbird-vps-backup CronJob's last successful run is over 26 hours old. Check the job logs in the netbird-backup namespace (ssh reachability of netbird.renner.uno, the netbird-backup-ssh ExternalSecret, PVC space)."
-
-        - alert: NetbirdVpsBackupNeverRan
-          # The CronJob exists but has never succeeded — most likely the
-          # one-time OpenBao provisioning step
-          # (bao kv put homelab/infrastructure/netbird-backup ssh-key=@…)
-          # hasn't been done, so the ExternalSecret cannot sync and the
-          # job pod fails on the missing secret mount.
-          expr: |
-            kube_cronjob_created{namespace="netbird-backup", cronjob="netbird-vps-backup"}
-            unless
-            kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="netbird-backup", cronjob="netbird-vps-backup"}
-          for: 6h
-          labels:
-            severity: warning
-          annotations:
-            summary: "NetBird VPS backup has never succeeded"
-            description: "The netbird-vps-backup CronJob exists but has no successful run. If this is the initial rollout: the private key must be provisioned once by hand — bao kv put homelab/infrastructure/netbird-backup ssh-key=@<keyfile> — before the ExternalSecret can sync."

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/rook-servicemonitors.yaml

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# Rook's two ServiceMonitors, declared here rather than by the operator.
-#
-# Reproduced field for field off the live objects in the production cluster, so
-# scraping is unchanged: same names, same namespace, same selectors, same 10s
-# interval and `cluster` relabeling. The only thing dropped is the CephCluster
-# ownerReference, which Rook set and Flux cannot.
-#
-# They live here because CephCluster.spec.monitoring.enabled is now false, and
-# that is not a monitoring decision — it breaks a deadlock. Rook's node-daemon
-# reconcile creates this ServiceMonitor and, unlike the exporter DaemonSet next
-# to it, treats a failure as fatal (pkg/operator/ceph/cluster/nodedaemon/
-# reconcile.go, v1.20.7):
-#
-#     if !cephCluster.Spec.Monitoring.MetricsDisabled {
-#         // exporter reconciled; its errors are logged and reconcile continues
-#         if cephCluster.Spec.Monitoring.Enabled {
-#             if err := EnableCephExporterServiceMonitor(...); err != nil {
-#                 return errors.Wrap(err, "failed to enable service monitor")
-#             }
-#         }
-#     }
-#
-# On an empty cluster monitoring.coreos.com/v1 does not exist yet, so that call
-# fails with "the server could not find the requested resource (post
-# servicemonitors.monitoring.coreos.com)", the whole node-daemon reconcile
-# aborts, and the CephCluster never leaves status.phase Progressing. That is
-# what infrastructure-ceph-cluster's healthCheckExpr waits on — and the chain
-# closes on itself:
-#
-#     infrastructure-ceph-cluster → CephCluster phase Ready
-#                                 → Rook reconcile settles
-#                                 → monitoring.coreos.com CRDs exist
-#                                 → kube-prometheus-stack (monitoring)
-#                                 → grafana-db
-#                                 → infrastructure-ceph-cluster
-#
-# Nothing outside that loop can break it, so a cold rebuild stopped here with
-# every one of the twenty app Kustomizations behind it.
-#
-# Same treatment velero/helmrelease.yaml and cilium/helmrelease.yaml already
-# get, and for the same reason: the metrics stay where they are, only the
-# scrape wiring moves to the layer where its CRDs exist.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: rook-ceph-exporter
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-  labels:
-    team: rook
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: rook-ceph-exporter
-      rook_cluster: rook-ceph
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - rook-ceph
-  endpoints:
-    - port: ceph-exporter-http-metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      # Rook stamps the cluster name so series from several Ceph clusters stay
-      # separable. One cluster here, but dropping it would rename every series.
-      relabelings:
-        - action: replace
-          replacement: rook-ceph
-          targetLabel: cluster
----
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: ServiceMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: rook-ceph-mgr
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-  labels:
-    team: rook
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: rook-ceph-mgr
-      rook_cluster: rook-ceph
-  namespaceSelector:
-    matchNames:
-      - rook-ceph
-  endpoints:
-    - port: http-metrics
-      path: /metrics
-      interval: 10s
-      honorLabels: true
-      relabelings:
-        - action: replace
-          replacement: rook-ceph
-          targetLabel: cluster

kubernetes/apps/paperless/MIGRATION-data-to-block.md

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-# paperless-data: CephFS → RBD
-
-## Why
-
-`paperless-data` is `ReadWriteMany` on `ceph-filesystem`, but **only the paperless
-Deployment mounts it**. Verified 2026-08-20:
-
-```
-$ pods mounting paperless-data
-paperless-68cb8b8744-7hjb8      <- one, and only one
-
-paperless-data     ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem
-paperless-media    ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem   <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
-paperless-consume  ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem   <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
-```
-
-Its contents are single-writer state — the 50 MB Whoosh index,
-`classification_model.pickle`, `celerybeat-schedule.db`, `log/`,
-`migration_lock`, `protonmail.pem`. 75 files. Nothing else reads or writes them.
-
-It is on CephFS by default, not by requirement.
-
-## What it costs
-
-Every access goes through the MDS. Measured with **zero CI pipelines running**:
-
-```
-paperless-data client   request_load_avg 22   (all other sessions 0-1)
-MDS over 180s           4,052 client requests  = 22.5/s
-                        2,718 journal events   = 15/s
-                            2 dir commits      <- almost none: not file writes
-```
-
-So it is cap/inode churn from repeated access, not data being written. That is
-most of the constant **7-8 GB/day** written to `cephfs-metadata`, and since that
-pool is `size: 3`, roughly **21-24 GB/day** reaches the drives.
-
-`cephfs-metadata` deliberately stays at size 3. Losing it destroys the entire
-filesystem rather than the objects on one OSD, and the 275 GiB in `cephfs-data0`
-depends on it. Cutting the writes at source is correct; cutting the replication
-is not.
-
-## Sequence
-
-Staged deliberately: the PVC lands first and empty, so merging it changes
-nothing. The copy and the repoint are separate.
-
-### Phase 1 — provision (this PR)
-
-`paperless-data-block` (RWO, `ceph-block`, 10Gi) is created and mounted by
-nothing. Inert.
-
-Verify: `kubectl -n paperless get pvc paperless-data-block` → Bound.
-
-### Phase 2 — copy
-
-The Whoosh index must come across intact. Paperless *can* rebuild it
-(`document_index reindex`), but that reprocesses every document, so copying is
-both faster and less disruptive.
-
-1. Scale paperless to 0. The source must be quiescent — `celerybeat-schedule.db`
-   and the Whoosh index are both live-written, and copying them under an active
-   writer gives a torn read.
-2. Run a one-off pod that mounts BOTH PVCs and copies:
-   ```
-   cp -a /src/. /dst/
-   ```
-   The RWO target pins the pod to one node; the RWX source will follow.
-3. Verify file count and index size match:
-   ```
-   find /src -type f | wc -l   ==   find /dst -type f | wc -l
-   du -sh /src/index           ==   du -sh /dst/index
-   ```
-
-### Phase 3 — repoint
-
-Change the Deployment's `data` volume to `claimName: paperless-data-block`,
-merge, let it roll.
-
-Verify afterwards:
-- paperless starts, search returns results (proves the Whoosh index survived)
-- `ceph tell mds.cephfs-b session ls` no longer shows a busy `paperless-data`
-  client
-- `rate(ceph_pool_wr_bytes{pool_id="3"})` drops from its 7-8 GB/day baseline
-
-**Do not delete `paperless-data` until search has been confirmed working.** It is
-the rollback, and it is `prune: disabled` so Flux will not remove it.
-
-## Expected effect
-
-~7-8 GB/day off `cephfs-metadata`, so ~21-24 GB/day off the drives once
-replication is counted. Against ~432 GB/day cluster-wide that is roughly 5% —
-worth doing, but it is a correctness fix (a single-writer volume does not belong
-on a shared filesystem) more than a large win.
-
-It also removes 22 req/sec of MDS load, which benefits the workloads that
-genuinely need CephFS — Woodpecker CI workspaces share the same MDS.

kubernetes/apps/paperless/network-policy.yaml

@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@ spec:
               protocol: UDP
             - port: "53"
               protocol: TCP
+    # The cluster's own LLM, for AI suggestions and RAG embeddings. Scoped to
+    # the two pods and the one port rather than the ai namespace as a whole, so
+    # this grant cannot widen if something else is ever placed there.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
     # External HTTPS only — Tika model downloads, runtime image
     # fetches, etc. RFC1918 + ULA are excluded from `world` via the
     # CIDR-deny pattern. `world` covers public IPs / DNS-resolvable

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -31,12 +31,14 @@ data:
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_DELETE_DUPLICATES: "true"
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_ENABLE_BARCODES: "true"
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_ENABLE_ASN_BARCODE: "true"
-  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_BARCODE_SCANNER: "ZXING"
+  # No CONSUMER_BARCODE_SCANNER: zxing-cpp is the only backend, so the
+  # setting no longer exists. pyzbar and libzbar are gone from the image.
+  #
   # CephFS does not propagate inotify across nodes — files written
   # via the RWX consume PVC from a pod on a different node than
   # paperless never fire IN_CREATE in paperless's kernel. Polling
   # is the reliable backstop. See wiki: cephfs-inotify-no-cross-node-propagation.
-  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING: "10"
+  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING_INTERVAL: "10"
   PAPERLESS_REDIS: "redis://redis:6379"
   PAPERLESS_DBENGINE: "postgresql"
   PAPERLESS_DBHOST: "pprl-pg-rw"
@@ -44,6 +46,47 @@ data:
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENABLED: "1"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT: "http://tika:9998"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT: "http://gotenberg:3000"
+  # AI suggestions against the cluster's own LLM (kubernetes/apps/llama-server).
+  # Nothing leaves the cluster: both endpoints are ClusterIP Services, so
+  # document text is never sent to a third party and there is no API key to
+  # rotate — llama-server has no authentication, and the ai namespace's network
+  # policy is what restricts who may reach it.
+  #
+  # CAVEAT, and it is a real one: paperless reads these from an
+  # ApplicationConfiguration row in the database and falls back to the
+  # environment only when that row is empty. A value set in the admin UI
+  # therefore overrides this ConfigMap silently. Configure AI in ONE place —
+  # here — and leave those fields untouched in the UI.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml. The
+  # server ignores the field on the wire, but paperless sends it and the value
+  # is what appears in its logs.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
+  # ClusterIP addresses are private, and paperless blocks non-public endpoints
+  # unless this is set. Default is already true; explicit because the whole
+  # integration silently stops working if it ever flips.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
+  # Under llama-server's own 16384, leaving room for the response.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
+  # The 120s default is too tight at ~11 tok/s: a classification is roughly
+  # 2-4k prompt tokens plus a second round trip for localisation.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "300"
+  # Matched against Django's settings.LANGUAGES, so the region is required —
+  # "de" alone does not resolve. Without it the model returns German tags but
+  # English document types, which was reproducible against this endpoint.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_OUTPUT_LANGUAGE: "de-de"
+  # RAG embeddings from llama-embed. Its Qwen3-Embedding covers 100+ languages,
+  # where paperless's default all-MiniLM-L6-v2 is documented as suited to
+  # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
+  # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
+  # index has to be rebuilt.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -56,6 +99,13 @@ metadata:
     # Reloader restarts paperless when paperless-secrets changes (e.g. after a
     # secret-key rotation). See kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/paperless.yaml.
     secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-secrets
+    # And when paperless-config changes. The ConfigMap is consumed with
+    # envFrom, and Kubernetes does not restart a pod when a ConfigMap it reads
+    # that way is updated — the running container keeps the environment it
+    # started with. Without this, a settings change applies cleanly in git and
+    # in the cluster while the application never sees it, which is how the AI
+    # settings landed with no effect at all.
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-config
 spec:
   replicas: 1
   strategy:
@@ -93,20 +143,7 @@ spec:
           # on every paperless pod start: tools belong in the image, not
           # installed at runtime. Dated tag so a change is a reviewable diff
           # here, matching the ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/, and that is not cosmetic. This is an
-          # INIT container, so paperless does not start without it — and during
-          # a cold rebuild gitea.renner.uno does not exist, because Gitea runs
-          # inside the cluster being rebuilt. A rehearsal left this pod in
-          # Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
-          #
-          # The node falls back to a ghcr.io copy in that window
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh). Containerd
-          # keeps the repository path when it falls through, so the path has to
-          # exist on both registries — hence konairius/, which matches the ghcr
-          # namespace. Steady state still pulls from Gitea and never leaves the
-          # network.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c
@@ -133,7 +170,7 @@ spec:
               drop: ["ALL"]
       containers:
         - name: paperless
-          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:2.20.15 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
+          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 8000
@@ -185,6 +222,25 @@ spec:
           # Safe against ALLOWED_HOSTS: the kubelet sends the pod IP as Host,
           # and PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS is "*". Narrowing that value later
           # means giving these probes an explicit Host header.
+
+          # The container does not serve until its init sequence finishes:
+          # s6 makes svc-webserver depend on init-migrations and
+          # init-search-index. On the first 3.x start those are the SHA256
+          # checksum backfill, which opens and reads every original and every
+          # archive file, and a full Tantivy index build, since the Whoosh
+          # index cannot be converted. Both scale with the corpus.
+          #
+          # startupProbe holds liveness and readiness off until the webserver
+          # answers, giving that boot 30 * 20s = 10 minutes. Without it the
+          # 120s liveness delay plus three 30s periods kills the pod 210s in,
+          # part-way through a migration, and the next boot starts over.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /accounts/login/
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 30
           livenessProbe:
             httpGet:
               path: /accounts/login/
@@ -233,22 +289,16 @@ spec:
             seccompProfile:
               type: RuntimeDefault
       volumes:
-        # paperless-data-block (RWO, ceph-block), NOT paperless-data
-        # (RWX, ceph-filesystem). Only this Deployment ever mounted the volume,
-        # and its contents are single-writer state — the Whoosh index,
-        # classification model, celerybeat schedule, logs. Being on CephFS meant
-        # every access went through the MDS: 22 requests/sec sustained with zero
-        # CI running, ~15 journal events/sec against 2 directory commits per
-        # 180s, i.e. cap/inode churn rather than file writes. That was most of
-        # the constant 7-8 GB/day on cephfs-metadata, and that pool is size 3.
+        # `data` is RWO on ceph-block, not RWX on ceph-filesystem. Only this
+        # Deployment mounts it and its contents are single-writer state — the
+        # search index, classification model, celerybeat schedule, logs. On
+        # CephFS every access went through the MDS: 22 requests/sec sustained
+        # with zero CI running, ~15 journal events/sec against 2 directory
+        # commits per 180s, i.e. cap/inode churn rather than file writes. That
+        # was most of the constant 7-8 GB/day on cephfs-metadata, a size 3 pool.
         #
         # `consume` and `media` below STAY on CephFS: the ftp-scanner writes to
         # those from another node, so they genuinely need RWX.
-        #
-        # paperless-data is retained (prune: disabled) as the rollback. Do not
-        # delete it until search has been confirmed working — that is what
-        # proves the Whoosh index survived the copy, not merely that paperless
-        # starts. Migration record: MIGRATION-data-to-block.md.
         - name: data
           persistentVolumeClaim:
             claimName: paperless-data-block

kubernetes/apps/paperless/pvcs.yaml

@@ -3,33 +3,18 @@
 # (e.g. when the seed initContainer or the Garage migration creds are
 # removed once we're done with the migration phase). Velero's
 # bootstrap-restore then owns their contents.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
-metadata:
-  name: paperless-data
-  namespace: paperless
-  annotations:
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
-spec:
-  accessModes:
-    - ReadWriteMany
-  storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      storage: 10Gi
----
-# Replacement for paperless-data, on RBD instead of CephFS.
+
+# paperless's single-writer state, on RBD rather than CephFS.
 #
-# WHY: paperless-data is declared ReadWriteMany on ceph-filesystem, but only ONE
-# pod ever mounts it — the paperless Deployment itself. Its contents are all
-# single-writer state: the 50 MB Whoosh index, classification_model.pickle,
-# celerybeat-schedule.db, logs, migration_lock. Nothing shares it. Only `consume`
-# and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the FTP scanner writes to those from a
-# different node.
+# WHY RWO: only ONE pod mounts it — the paperless Deployment itself. Its
+# contents are all single-writer state: the Tantivy search index,
+# classification_model.pickle, celerybeat-schedule.db, logs, migration_lock.
+# Nothing shares it. Only `consume` and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the
+# FTP scanner writes to those from a different node.
 #
-# COST OF LEAVING IT: every access goes through the MDS. Measured 2026-08-20 with
-# zero CI running, this volume's client was doing 22 MDS requests/sec sustained,
-# and the MDS logged ~15 journal events/sec against only 2 directory commits per
+# WHY NOT CEPHFS: every access goes through the MDS. With zero CI running, this
+# volume's client sustained 22 MDS requests/sec, and the MDS logged ~15 journal
+# events/sec against only 2 directory commits per
 # 180s — i.e. cap and inode churn from repeated access, not file writes. That is
 # most of the constant 7-8 GB/day written to cephfs-metadata, which is a size 3
 # pool, so ~21-24 GB/day actually hits the drives.
@@ -38,10 +23,6 @@ spec:
 # the metadata pool destroys the whole filesystem, not just the objects on one
 # OSD, so the 275 GiB in cephfs-data0 rides on it. Reducing the writes at source
 # is the right fix; reducing the replication is not.
-#
-# MIGRATION: this PVC is created EMPTY and nothing mounts it yet. The data copy
-# and the deployment repoint are a separate, staged step — see
-# MIGRATION-data-to-block.md. Merging this alone is inert.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:

kubernetes/apps/trmnl/renderer.yaml

@@ -177,14 +177,7 @@ spec:
         # webhook start failing with "expired JWT access token" about
         # thirty minutes after seeding.
         - name: render-schedule
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/: this container starts during a cold
-          # rebuild, when Gitea does not exist because it runs inside the
-          # cluster being rebuilt — a rehearsal left it in Init:ImagePullBackOff.
-          # The node falls back to a ghcr.io copy then
-          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
-          # keeps the repository path, so it has to exist on both registries.
-          # Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c

kubernetes/apps/trmnl/valkey.yaml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ spec:
         # Valkey major version tracks upstream's compose.yml (9.x). Sidekiq
         # is the only consumer; a major bump is a separate migration.
         - name: valkey
-          image: valkey/valkey:9.1.1-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:valkey-trmnl"}
+          image: valkey/valkey:9.1.2-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:valkey-trmnl"}
           args:
             - valkey-server
             - --save

kubernetes/apps/whisper/deployment.yaml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ spec:
     spec:
       containers:
         - name: whisper
-          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
+          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.7.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
           args:
             - --model=base-int8
             - --language=de

kubernetes/apps/woodpecker/rbac.yaml

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+# Dedicated namespace where the kubernetes backend spawns pipeline step pods,
+# isolated from the apps namespace.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: woodpecker-ci
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: woodpecker
+    # Image-build steps run a privileged docker/buildx plugin pod (see the
+    # server's WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED). Talos enforces Pod Security;
+    # without this the privileged step pods are rejected at admission. The
+    # namespace is dedicated to ephemeral CI step pods, so scoping the
+    # exemption here keeps it off apps/.
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
+---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ServiceAccount
 metadata:

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/flux-system/gotk-sync.yaml

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ metadata:
 spec:
   interval: 1m0s
   ref:
-    branch: vmtest-flux
+    branch: master
   secretRef:
     name: flux-system
-  url: https://gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/homelab.git
+  url: https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab.git
 ---
 apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: Kustomization

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/home-assistant.yaml

@@ -28,19 +28,6 @@ spec:
     - name: infrastructure
     - name: infrastructure-crds
     - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
-    # ha-pg-objectstore.yaml declares an ObjectStore, whose CRD comes from the
-    # CNPG Barman plugin in infrastructure-cnpg-barman. Without this edge the
-    # kind is unknown when this path is first applied, and a server-side
-    # dry-run rejects the ENTIRE set over the one object it cannot recognise:
-    #
-    #   ObjectStore/home-assistant/ha-pg-store dry-run failed:
-    #   no matches for kind "ObjectStore" in version ...
-    #
-    # Every other ObjectStore user — authentik, immich, paperless, trmnl,
-    # woodpecker — already declares it. This was the only one that did not, and
-    # it took speech-to-phrase, zone-configurator and matter-server down with
-    # it, since all three wait on home-assistant.
-    - name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
 ---
 apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: Kustomization

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/infrastructure.yaml

@@ -122,20 +122,8 @@ spec:
   path: ./kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster
   prune: true
   wait: true
-  # Deliberately NOT dependsOn: infrastructure. That edge closed a cycle no
-  # existing cluster could ever hit and no new one could ever escape:
-  # infrastructure is Ready only once its openbao healthCheck passes, openbao-0
-  # only runs once its PVC binds, and that PVC wants the ceph-block StorageClass
-  # defined in this very Kustomization. A cold rebuild stopped here for good,
-  # with openbao-0 Pending on "unbound immediate PersistentVolumeClaims".
-  #
-  # The edge was never needed. infrastructure runs wait: false, so it applies
-  # the rook-ceph namespace and the operator immediately and only its readiness
-  # waits on the healthChecks — everything this path needs exists long before
-  # infrastructure reports Ready. On an empty API server this Kustomization
-  # retries on retryInterval until the operator installs its CRDs, the same
-  # self-healing shape post-crds already relies on; on a live cluster the CRDs
-  # are always present and nothing changes.
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
   # kstatus doesn't know how to read Rook CR readiness, so without these
   # this Kustomization reports Ready as soon as the manifests apply — long
   # before OSDs/mons/MDS are actually serving I/O. Apps depending on this

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/llama-server.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: llama-server
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 1m
+  # On a cold PVC the chat model pulls ~19 GiB of GGUF weights from Hugging
+  # Face and then loads onto the iGPU before /health goes green, so a first
+  # start is far slower than a normal app's.
+  timeout: 60m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/llama-server
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds
+    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster

kubernetes/e2e-test.sh

@@ -524,6 +524,109 @@ check "alertmanager: no severity=critical alerts active" bash -c '
     test "$body" = "[]"
 '
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Local AI inference. Every check here corresponds to a defect that actually
+# shipped, because none of them are catchable by manifest validation — the
+# manifests were valid in each case and the endpoint still misbehaved.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export LB_IP
+
+# helper_post: POST JSON from inside e2e-helper, for Services with no ingress.
+# kubectl exec passes argv directly, so the JSON needs no shell quoting.
+helper_post() {
+    local url="$1" data="$2" out body code attempt
+    for attempt in 1 2 3; do
+        out=$(kubectl -n monitoring exec e2e-helper -- \
+              curl -sk --max-time 60 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+              -d "$data" -w $'\n__CODE__:%{http_code}' "$url" 2>&1)
+        body=${out%$'\n'__CODE__:*}
+        code=${out##*__CODE__:}
+        printf 'attempt=%s code=%s body=%s\n' "$attempt" "$code" "${body:0:200}"
+        if [[ "$code" =~ ^2[0-9][0-9]$ ]]; then
+            printf '%s' "$body" > /tmp/helper_body
+            return 0
+        fi
+        sleep 5
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+export -f helper_post
+
+# llm_chat: POST a chat completion to llama-server from inside the cluster.
+# It goes to the Service, not the public hostname: llm.renner.uno now answers
+# with an Authentik redirect, and the API is deliberately in-cluster only —
+# which is also how every real consumer reaches it. Result lands in
+# /tmp/helper_body.
+llm_chat() {
+    local prompt="$1" max="${2:-64}"
+    helper_post "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/chat/completions" \
+        "$(jq -nc --arg p "$prompt" --argjson n "$max" \
+            '{model:"qwen3.6-35b-a3b",messages:[{role:"user",content:$p}],max_tokens:$n,temperature:0}')"
+}
+export -f llm_chat
+
+echo "=== Local AI inference ==="
+
+# The gate is the whole of the access control on the public hostname:
+# llama-server has no authentication and serves the API on the same port as the
+# UI. An anonymous request must be bounced to Authentik, never answered. A 200
+# here would mean the ingress is reaching llama-server directly again.
+check "public hostname is gated by authentik" \
+    bash -c 'code=$(curl -sk --resolve "llm.renner.uno:443:$LB_IP" --max-time 15 \
+                 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/models")
+             echo "got=$code"; [[ "$code" =~ ^(302|307|401|403)$ ]]'
+
+# Asserts the id specifically, not merely that the string appears somewhere:
+# every configured name shows up in the `aliases` array regardless of order, so
+# a substring match passes even when the picker is showing the wrong one.
+check "descriptive name is the advertised id" \
+    bash -c 'helper_curl "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/models" &&
+             jq -e ".data[0].id == \"qwen3.6-35b-a3b\"" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+# Only one name is configured. A second would be advertised alongside it and,
+# if it sorted first, would take the id — which is what a picker displays.
+check "no second name competes for the id" \
+    bash -c 'jq -e ".data[0].aliases | length == 1" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+# Regression: the embedding model used to share this port. It appeared in the
+# chat picker, and selecting it returned fluent nonsense ("capital capital
+# capital ...") instead of an error, because --embeddings does not refuse chat
+# completions. It now lives on a separate Service; if it ever reappears here,
+# it is selectable again and this must fail.
+check "embedding model absent from chat endpoint" \
+    bash -c '! grep -qi embed /tmp/helper_body'
+
+# Regression: with thinking enabled by default the model spent its whole token
+# budget on reasoning_content and returned an EMPTY content with
+# finish_reason "length" — a 200 response that answers nothing. Asserting on
+# the status code alone would have passed.
+check "chat completion returns non-empty content" \
+    bash -c 'llm_chat "Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich." 64 &&
+             jq -e ".choices[0].message.content | length > 0" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+check "chat completion stops rather than truncating" \
+    bash -c 'jq -e ".choices[0].finish_reason == \"stop\"" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+# Coherence, not just liveness. This is what catches a model answering from the
+# wrong weights or a numerically broken backend — llama-bench measures
+# throughput and would report excellent numbers while emitting garbage.
+check "chat answer is coherent (knows Paris)" \
+    bash -c 'jq -re ".choices[0].message.content" /tmp/helper_body | grep -qi paris'
+
+# Reached from the monitoring namespace, which ai-ns.yaml admits; there is no
+# ingress for this Service by design.
+check "llama-embed returns an embedding vector" \
+    bash -c 'helper_post "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/embeddings" \
+                 "{\"model\":\"embed\",\"input\":\"Testsatz\"}" &&
+             jq -e ".data[0].embedding | length > 0" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+# Guards the resource request silently disappearing: without it the pod still
+# runs, just on CPU, and only a throughput measurement would notice.
+check "llama-server holds an iGPU allocation" \
+    bash -c 'kubectl -n ai get deploy llama-server -o json |
+             jq -e ".spec.template.spec.containers[0].resources.limits[\"gpu.intel.com/i915\"]" >/dev/null'
+
 echo "=== Authentik OIDC discovery (per-app) ==="
 # A reachable, parseable .well-known proves Authentik has an OIDC provider
 # bound to that application slug. If the app config is missing or Authentik

kubernetes/infrastructure/ceph-csi-drivers/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-# The upstream ceph-csi-drivers chart, which is how Rook expects CSI drivers to
-# be provided since v1.20: "CSI drivers are admin-managed via the
-# ceph-csi-operator. Rook no longer deploys CSI."
-#
-# This replaces a static rendering of the chart's ServiceAccounts and RBAC. That
-# workaround (#babed078) was written during a five-day outage in which both
-# ctrlplugin Deployments sat at 0/2 and PVC attach/detach was blocked
-# cluster-wide, and it justified itself with:
-#
-#   "helm-controller v1.5.4 predates disableTakeOwnership, so Helm would refuse
-#    to adopt the operator-managed Driver and OperatorConfig CRs"
-#
-# That is not so. disableTakeOwnership landed in helm-controller v1.2.0, three
-# minors BEFORE the version running here, and it is an opt-OUT: taking ownership
-# of existing resources is the default. Nothing stood in the way of the chart.
-#
-# What the workaround could not do is create the Driver CRs, and a cold-rebuild
-# rehearsal is where that surfaced. Rook's v1.18 -> v1.20 migration had created
-# them once on this cluster, so they looked permanent; on an empty cluster Rook
-# creates the CephConnection and ClientProfile and stops there, no Driver is
-# ever made, the ceph-csi-operator deploys no provisioner, and every PVC waits
-# forever. OpenBao's among them, which is where the rebuild stopped.
-#
-# cephConnections and clientProfiles stay EMPTY here on purpose. Rook owns both:
-# the CephConnection carries the mon Service IPs Rook keeps current, and the
-# ClientProfile points at Secrets Rook creates. Handing either to Helm would
-# freeze a value that is supposed to move. Verified on a fresh cluster — Rook
-# creates exactly those two and nothing else.
-apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: HelmRepository
-metadata:
-  name: ceph-csi-operator
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-spec:
-  interval: 24h
-  url: https://ceph.github.io/ceph-csi-operator/
----
-apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
-kind: HelmRelease
-metadata:
-  name: ceph-csi-drivers
-  namespace: rook-ceph
-spec:
-  interval: 30m
-  # Wait for the rook-ceph HelmRelease to finish, not just for the CRDs to
-  # appear. The two are not the same thing, and an earlier version of this file
-  # argued the opposite: "nothing here installs those CRDs, so a dependsOn would
-  # only move the wait". True as far as existence goes — but the csi.ceph.io
-  # CRDs come from the ceph-csi-operator subchart inside the rook-ceph release,
-  # which runs with `crds: CreateReplace` and `retries: 3`, so they are not
-  # created once. They are created again on every attempt, and everything living
-  # under them goes with them.
-  #
-  # A cold rebuild landed in exactly that window:
-  #
-  #   19:24:21  ceph-csi-drivers  install succeeded — both Driver CRs created
-  #   19:25:50  csi.ceph.io CRDs  recreated by a later operator attempt
-  #   19:29:33  rook-ceph-operator install finally succeeded
-  #
-  # The Driver objects were gone, but Helm still had them in its stored release
-  # and would not re-render before the 30m interval. No controller reported
-  # anything: the ceph-csi-operator sat idle with nothing to reconcile, no
-  # provisioner Deployment was ever created, and every PVC on ceph-block stayed
-  # Pending on "waiting for a volume to be created by the external provisioner
-  # rook-ceph.rbd.csi.ceph.com". openbao-0 then never got a node, and the run
-  # failed 15 minutes later reporting that OpenBao would not answer.
-  dependsOn:
-    - name: rook-ceph-operator
-  chart:
-    spec:
-      chart: ceph-csi-drivers
-      version: "~1.0.4"
-      sourceRef:
-        kind: HelmRepository
-        name: ceph-csi-operator
-        namespace: rook-ceph
-  install:
-    # Kept as a backstop. dependsOn removes the race this was covering for, but
-    # a CRD replace outside an install of this release would still empty it, and
-    # a retry is cheaper than a 30-minute wait for the next interval.
-    remediation:
-      retries: 5
-  upgrade:
-    remediation:
-      retries: 3
-  values:
-    # Rook's, not ours — see the header.
-    cephConnections: []
-    clientProfiles: []
-    # Names must match what the StorageClasses already name as their
-    # provisioner (rook-ceph.rbd.csi.ceph.com), which is also what Rook's
-    # migration produced on the live cluster. The chart's default drops the
-    # namespace prefix and would leave every StorageClass pointing at a driver
-    # that does not exist.
-    # clusterName is load-bearing and easy to miss: it becomes --clustername on
-    # the plugin, and ceph-csi hands it to rados_create2 as the Ceph cluster
-    # name. The chart defaults it to "", which librados rejects outright — the
-    # provisioner then fails every request with
-    #   failed to get connection: connecting failed: rados: ret=-22
-    # which reads like a credential or network fault and is neither. The
-    # toolbox keeps working throughout, because it falls back to the default
-    # name "ceph", so the cluster looks healthy while nothing can provision.
-    drivers:
-      rbd:
-        name: rook-ceph.rbd.csi.ceph.com
-        clusterName: rook-ceph
-        enabled: true
-      cephfs:
-        name: rook-ceph.cephfs.csi.ceph.com
-        clusterName: rook-ceph
-        enabled: true
-      nfs:
-        enabled: false
-      nvmeof:
-        enabled: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/ceph-csi-drivers/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
-# The ServiceAccounts and RBAC that used to be rendered here by hand now come
-# from the chart that owns them, together with the Driver CRs they exist for.
 resources:
-  - helmrelease.yaml
+  - serviceaccounts.yaml
+  - rbac.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/ceph-csi-drivers/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+# RBAC for the per-driver ServiceAccounts in serviceaccounts.yaml.
+# Rendered from ceph-csi-operator/ceph-csi-drivers chart v1.0.1 templates,
+# with $normalizedDriverName fixed to the operator's hardcoded driver-type
+# names (`rbd`, `cephfs`). Sync with upstream if the chart's RBAC changes.
+# Source: https://github.com/ceph/ceph-csi-operator/tree/v1.0.1/deploy/charts/ceph-csi-drivers/templates
+
+# ---------- rbd-ctrlplugin ----------
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-cr
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [secrets]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, create, delete, patch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumeclaims]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [storageclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [events]
+    verbs: [list, watch, create, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumeattachments]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumeattachments/status]
+    verbs: [patch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [nodes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [csinodes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumeclaims/status]
+    verbs: [patch]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshots]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, patch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [configmaps]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts/token]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [replication.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupreplicationcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [replication.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupreplicationclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [authentication.k8s.io]
+    resources: [tokenreviews]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [authorization.k8s.io]
+    resources: [subjectaccessreviews]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [cbt.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [snapshotmetadataservices]
+    verbs: [get, list]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-crb
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-cr
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: rbd-ctrlplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-r
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [coordination.k8s.io]
+    resources: [leases]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, delete, update, create]
+  - apiGroups: [csiaddons.openshift.io]
+    resources: [csiaddonsnodes]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, create, update, delete]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [replicasets]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [deployments/finalizers, daemonsets/finalizers]
+    verbs: [update]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-rb
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-r
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: rbd-ctrlplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+
+# ---------- rbd-nodeplugin ----------
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-cr
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [secrets]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumes]
+    verbs: [get, list]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumeattachments]
+    verbs: [get, list]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [configmaps]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts/token]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [nodes]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [authentication.k8s.io]
+    resources: [tokenreviews]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [events]
+    verbs: [list, watch, create, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumeclaims]
+    verbs: [get]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-crb
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-cr
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: rbd-nodeplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-r
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [csiaddons.openshift.io]
+    resources: [csiaddonsnodes]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, create, update, delete]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [replicasets]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [deployments/finalizers, daemonsets/finalizers]
+    verbs: [update]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-rb
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-r
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: rbd-nodeplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+
+# ---------- cephfs-ctrlplugin ----------
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-cr
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [secrets]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [configmaps]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [nodes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [csinodes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, create, delete, patch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumeclaims]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, patch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [storageclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [events]
+    verbs: [list, watch, create, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumeattachments]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumeattachments/status]
+    verbs: [patch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumeclaims/status]
+    verbs: [patch]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshots]
+    verbs: [get, list]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, patch, update]
+  - apiGroups: [snapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumesnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotclasses]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [groupsnapshot.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupsnapshotcontents/status]
+    verbs: [update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [replication.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupreplicationcontents]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [replication.storage.openshift.io]
+    resources: [volumegroupreplicationclasses]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts/token]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [authentication.k8s.io]
+    resources: [tokenreviews]
+    verbs: [create]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-crb
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-cr
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-r
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [coordination.k8s.io]
+    resources: [leases]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, delete, update, create]
+  - apiGroups: [csiaddons.openshift.io]
+    resources: [csiaddonsnodes]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, create, update, delete]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [replicasets]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [deployments/finalizers, daemonsets/finalizers]
+    verbs: [update]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-rb
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-r
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+
+# ---------- cephfs-nodeplugin ----------
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-cr
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [nodes]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [secrets]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [configmaps]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [serviceaccounts/token]
+    verbs: [create]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [events]
+    verbs: [list, watch, create, update, patch]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [persistentvolumes, persistentvolumeclaims]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [authentication.k8s.io]
+    resources: [tokenreviews]
+    verbs: [create]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-crb
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-cr
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: cephfs-nodeplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-r
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [csiaddons.openshift.io]
+    resources: [csiaddonsnodes]
+    verbs: [get, watch, list, create, update, delete]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [replicasets]
+    verbs: [get]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [deployments/finalizers, daemonsets/finalizers]
+    verbs: [update]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-rb
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-r
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: cephfs-nodeplugin-sa
+    namespace: rook-ceph

kubernetes/infrastructure/ceph-csi-drivers/serviceaccounts.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Per-driver ServiceAccounts consumed by the workloads that the
+# ceph-csi-controller-manager generates for each `Driver` CR. Rook v1.20
+# extracted CSI driver management into the upstream ceph-csi-operator
+# (subchart of `rook-ceph`); these SAs are normally provisioned by the
+# separate `ceph-csi-drivers` chart, but installing that chart would also
+# create a parallel set of `Driver` / `OperatorConfig` CRs and Helm cannot
+# adopt the operator-managed ones on helm-controller v1.5.4. We render
+# only the SAs + RBAC the existing operator-managed `Driver` CRs need.
+#
+# Names are fixed by the operator (CSI_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_PREFIX="" on
+# ceph-csi-controller-manager): `<driver-type>-{ctrl,node}plugin-sa`,
+# where driver-type is `rbd` or `cephfs`. Do not rename.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-ctrlplugin-sa
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: rbd-nodeplugin-sa
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-ctrlplugin-sa
+  namespace: rook-ceph
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: cephfs-nodeplugin-sa
+  namespace: rook-ceph

kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -70,23 +70,9 @@ spec:
       # map only shows up as "no space left on device" in the log while pod
       # sandbox creation fails (#452). cilium_bpf_map_pressure makes it
       # alertable beforehand.
-      #
-      # That reasoning is about the metrics, which this line provides. The
-      # ServiceMonitor is only the scrape wiring and is declared standalone in
-      # apps/monitoring-rules instead — the same treatment velero/helmrelease
-      # already gives its own, and for the same reason: the chart's template is
-      # gated on monitoring.coreos.com/v1 existing at install time.
-      #
-      # Here it is worse than for velero. Cilium's chart does not skip the
-      # template, it aborts rendering — "Service Monitor requires
-      # monitoring.coreos.com/v1 CRDs" — and cilium is one of the seven
-      # healthChecks the infrastructure Kustomization waits on. So on an empty
-      # cluster the CNI blocked infrastructure, which blocked grafana-db, which
-      # blocked monitoring, which is where those CRDs come from. The lowest
-      # layer in the cluster was waiting on the highest.
       enabled: true
       serviceMonitor:
-        enabled: false
+        enabled: true
     bpf:
       # Per-endpoint policy map size: one entry per (identity, direction,
       # protocol, port) allowed. When it fills, endpoint regeneration fails

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
+# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
+# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
+# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
+# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
+# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
+# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
+# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
+#
+# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -36,6 +36,36 @@ spec:
   values:
     container_runtime: containerd
 
+    # Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
+    #
+    # This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
+    # allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
+    # without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
+    # so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
+    # is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
+    # deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
+    # thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
+    #
+    # Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
+    # here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
+    # resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
+    #
+    # The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
+    # clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
+    # proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
+    # the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
+    # Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
+    config:
+      capi_whitelists.yaml: |
+        cidrs:
+          # The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
+          # netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
+          # keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
+          # proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
+          - 45.157.177.26/32
+          - 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
+          - 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
+
     # mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
     # the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
     # wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -54,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
     # required.
     #
     # NOTE: enabling this makes the LAPI serve HTTPS-only. The Traefik ingress
-    # bouncer is currently INERT (detached, see post-crds/traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml)
+    # bouncer is currently INERT (detached, see traefik/crowdsec-middleware.yaml)
     # so there is no live impact, but re-enabling it will require pointing the
     # plugin at https + trusting this CA (or giving it a bouncer-ou client cert).
     tls:
@@ -86,10 +116,18 @@ spec:
         requests:
           cpu: 50m
       podAnnotations:
-        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
-        # env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
+        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
+        # consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
+        # start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
+        # the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
+        # the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
+        #
+        # crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
         # kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
+        # crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
+        # ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
+        # here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
       persistentVolume:
         data:
           # Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -118,6 +156,17 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
               key: key
+        # The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
+        # endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
+        # `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
+        # names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
+        # registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
+        # is the source of truth, not the database.
+        - name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+              key: key
 
     agent:
       # Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - lapi-ingress.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
+# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
+# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
+# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
+# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
+# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
+# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
+# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
+# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
+#
+# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
+#
+# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
+# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
+# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
+# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
+# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
+# kind of request every round:
+#
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
+#
+# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
+# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
+# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
+# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
+#
+# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
+# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
+# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
+# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
+---
+# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
+# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
+# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
+# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
+# what the Service resolves to.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: ServersTransport
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
+  rootCAsSecrets:
+    - crowdsec-root-secret
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+  labels:
+    # Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
+    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+    # NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
+    # not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: crowdsec.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: crowdsec-service
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+  tls:
+    - secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
+      hosts:
+        - crowdsec.renner.uno

kubernetes/infrastructure/external-dns-unifi/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/ceph.yaml

@@ -9,26 +9,9 @@ spec:
 ---
 # v-prefix tags (v19.2.3). Upstream also publishes date-suffixed builds
 # (v19.2.3-20250717) and moving major/minor tags (v19, v19.2); the
-# filter pins us to the bare three-component release.
-#
-# The range was 19.x, to keep the 19 -> 20 (Tentacle) cutover a deliberate
-# upgrade tied to the Rook operator version. That coupling had already come
-# apart without anyone noticing: Rook's floating constraint pulled v1.20 in
-# June, and with it a ceph-csi image whose client libraries are Ceph 20.2.1.
-# The cluster stayed on 19.2.6, so every CSI pod has since been talking to
-# the mons with a client a whole major ahead of them.
-#
-# That is not academic. The 19.2.6 mons mint auth keys as aes256k, and the
-# 20.2.1 client cannot decode them — "auth: failed to decode key 'AgB...'".
-# Nothing broke only because the four CSI users predate the cipher change and
-# still carry legacy aes keys, which Ceph itself flags as insecure. The moment
-# one is recreated — ceph auth rotate, a deleted Secret, Rook resyncing — the
-# provisioner stops and no PVC binds. A rebuild rehearsal hits it immediately,
-# because a fresh cluster has no legacy keys at all.
-#
-# So the cutover happens now, with the version the client already is. Rook
-# v1.20 supports Tentacle from v20.2.1; v20.2.0 is excluded deliberately —
-# upstream reports data corruption there when read affinity is enabled.
+# filter pins us to the bare three-component release. Range stays at
+# 19.x — the 19 → 20 (Tentacle) cutover should be a deliberate
+# upgrade tied to the Rook operator version.
 apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: ImagePolicy
 metadata:
@@ -42,4 +25,4 @@ spec:
     extract: '$ver'
   policy:
     semver:
-      range: ">=20.2.1 <21.0.0"
+      range: "19.x"

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperless-ngx.yaml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ spec:
   image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx
   interval: 1h
 ---
-# Allow only patch + minor bumps within the 2.x line. A 3.0 release
+# Allow only patch + minor bumps within the 3.x line. A 4.0 release
 # requires manual policy widening — major upgrades typically need a
 # migration plan and shouldn't land via auto-merge.
 apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ spec:
     name: paperless-ngx
   policy:
     semver:
-      range: "2.x"
+      range: "3.x"

kubernetes/infrastructure/intel-gpu-plugin/daemonset.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+# Advertises the on-board Intel iGPU as the schedulable resource
+# `gpu.intel.com/i915`, so pods can request it without a /dev/dri hostPath or
+# any privilege escalation — the plugin hands the render node to the container
+# through the kubelet device-plugin API. The same resource covers both GPU
+# compute (LLM inference) and QuickSync video transcoding; it is not
+# compute-specific.
+#
+# All three nodes are MS-01 with an i9-12900H (Alder Lake-P, PCI 8086:46a6,
+# Iris Xe 96 EU) at 0000:00:02.0. Talos carries the driver in the `i915` system
+# extension, already present in the schematic, so no machineconfig change is
+# needed.
+#
+# Vendored from upstream rather than installed via the
+# `intel-device-plugins-gpu` Helm chart: that chart renders a `GpuDevicePlugin`
+# custom resource, which only works alongside the Intel Device Plugin Operator
+# and its CRDs, cert-manager webhook and controller. With one device type on
+# three identical nodes, the operator manages nothing this DaemonSet does not.
+#
+# Source: intel/intel-device-plugins-for-kubernetes, v0.36.0,
+# deployments/gpu_plugin/base/intel-gpu-plugin.yaml
+# Upgrading means re-syncing this file against that path at the new tag and
+# bumping the image tag below.
+#
+# Namespace is kube-system because the plugin mounts hostPaths (/dev/dri,
+# /sys/class/drm, the kubelet device-plugin socket and the CDI path). The
+# cluster enforces PodSecurity `baseline`, which forbids hostPath volumes, and
+# kube-system is the only namespace in the API server's exemption list.
+#
+# Node Feature Discovery is not deployed, so upstream's `nfd_labeled_nodes`
+# overlay is omitted along with its `intel.feature.node.kubernetes.io/gpu`
+# nodeSelector. Every node carries the same iGPU, leaving nothing to discover;
+# the plugin exits cleanly on a node without /dev/dri.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: DaemonSet
+metadata:
+  name: intel-gpu-plugin
+  namespace: kube-system
+  labels:
+    app: intel-gpu-plugin
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: intel-gpu-plugin
+  updateStrategy:
+    type: RollingUpdate
+    rollingUpdate:
+      maxSurge: 0
+      maxUnavailable: 1
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: intel-gpu-plugin
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: intel-gpu-plugin
+          env:
+            - name: NODE_NAME
+              valueFrom:
+                fieldRef:
+                  fieldPath: spec.nodeName
+            - name: HOST_IP
+              valueFrom:
+                fieldRef:
+                  fieldPath: status.hostIP
+          image: intel/intel-gpu-plugin:0.36.0
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          args:
+            # Slots the single iGPU is handed out as, letting that many
+            # containers share it concurrently. A slot count, not fractional
+            # accounting — nothing partitions the device between sharers, so
+            # they contend for it. Sized for an inference server plus room for
+            # a transcoder and a benchmark pod alongside it.
+            - -shared-dev-num=4
+          securityContext:
+            seLinuxOptions:
+              type: "container_device_plugin_t"
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              memory: "45Mi"
+              cpu: 40m
+            limits:
+              memory: "90Mi"
+              cpu: 100m
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: devfs
+              mountPath: /dev/dri
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: sysfsdrm
+              mountPath: /sys/class/drm
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: kubeletsockets
+              mountPath: /var/lib/kubelet/device-plugins
+            - name: cdipath
+              mountPath: /var/run/cdi
+      volumes:
+        - name: devfs
+          hostPath:
+            path: /dev/dri
+        - name: sysfsdrm
+          hostPath:
+            path: /sys/class/drm
+        - name: kubeletsockets
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/kubelet/device-plugins
+        - name: cdipath
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/run/cdi
+            type: DirectoryOrCreate
+      nodeSelector:
+        kubernetes.io/arch: amd64

kubernetes/infrastructure/intel-gpu-plugin/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - daemonset.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/kustomization.yaml

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ resources:
   - cert-manager/
   - snapshot-controller/
   - metrics-server/
+  - intel-gpu-plugin/
   - crowdsec/
   - traefik/
   - rook-ceph/
@@ -17,7 +18,6 @@ resources:
   - cloudnative-pg/
   - mariadb-operator/
   - netbird-ingress/
-  - netbird-backup/
   - coredns-config/
   - k8s-gateway/
   - external-dns-unifi/

kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/cni-plugins-installer.yaml

@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ spec:
       labels:
         app: cni-plugins-installer
     spec:
-      # Same reasoning as multus-daemonset.yaml. This one installs the macvlan
-      # binary the ceph-san attachment is made of, so a node that cannot
-      # schedule it has no plugin to delegate to — the failure the init
-      # container comment below already describes, reached by a different road.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
       hostNetwork: true
       tolerations:
         - operator: Exists
@@ -49,32 +44,7 @@ spec:
           # at all and put github.com on the critical path of every node rebuild.
           # Dated tag so a version change is a reviewable diff here, matching the
           # ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          #
-          # konairius/, not gitea_admin/, and the difference is what makes a
-          # rebuild possible. Gitea runs inside this cluster, so during a rebuild
-          # it does not exist: a rehearsal sat here in ImagePullBackOff with "no
-          # route to host", and because the plugins never installed there was no
-          # macvlan, so Multus could not attach ceph-san, so Rook's network
-          # canary never started, so the CephCluster hung at "Configuring Ceph
-          # Mons" and OpenBao waited forever on a PVC that could not bind. The
-          # failure surfaced four layers from its cause.
-          #
-          # This used to point straight at ghcr.io, which fixed the rebuild and
-          # broke the normal case: every steady-state pull then left the network
-          # for an image the local registry already holds. The fallback belongs
-          # to the node, not to the manifest — machine.registries.mirrors names
-          # Gitea first and ghcr.io second (bootstrap.sh), so nothing here has to
-          # know about the recovery path.
-          #
-          # Containerd keeps the repository path when it falls through, so the
-          # path must resolve on both registries; the build pushes one digest to
-          # konairius/ on each, verified equal. Bumping the tag means building
-          # first — an unpublished tag is unpullable on both.
-          #
-          # No imagePullSecret: the ghcr namespace is private and its credential
-          # is in machine.registries too, because a Secret would have to come
-          # from OpenBao, which needs Ceph, which needs these binaries.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-09-04
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c

kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/multus-daemonset.yaml

@@ -154,40 +154,6 @@ spec:
         app: multus
         name: multus
     spec:
-      # Upstream ships this DaemonSet with no priority class, so it runs at 0
-      # and can preempt nothing. Any event that makes the pod need a fresh
-      # scheduling decision — a rollout, a node restart, an eviction — then has
-      # to fit it onto a node that may since have filled up, and if it does not
-      # fit it simply stays Pending. The node has no multus after that, and
-      # nothing reports it: pods still start, they just never get their
-      # secondary attachment, and the annotation everything waits on never
-      # appears.
-      #
-      # Seen on a cold rebuild: two of four nodes sat at 99% memory requests
-      # when the DaemonSet rolled, both multus pods went Pending, and Rook's
-      # network canary hung in Init:0/1 waiting for a network-status annotation
-      # that could never come. The CephCluster stayed in Progressing, which is
-      # what infrastructure-ceph-cluster gates on, so the whole apps layer
-      # stopped behind a scheduling decision three layers away.
-      #
-      # node-critical, the same class cilium and cni-dhcp-daemon carry, because
-      # that is what this is: without multus a node cannot attach a secondary
-      # network, and only that node is affected. Nothing cluster-wide fails.
-      #
-      # This does outrank kube-apiserver, which Talos runs as a static pod at
-      # system-cluster-critical (2000000000, against 2000001000 here), and on a
-      # control plane that has run out of memory the kubelet will pick the API
-      # server as the pod to evict. That was observed twice, at 6GiB and at
-      # 8GiB.
-      #
-      # It is not a reason to demote this DaemonSet. Kubernetes puts the CNI
-      # above the control plane deliberately — a node without its CNI cannot run
-      # anything at all — and a class name is a statement about what the pod is,
-      # not a dial for picking a number. The eviction says the control plane is
-      # starved, and that is where it has to be fixed: enough allocatable
-      # memory, or kubeReserved/systemReserved so the static pods keep what they
-      # need. Demoting this to cluster-critical would only move the victim.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
       hostNetwork: true
       hostPID: true
       tolerations:

kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/whereabouts-daemonset.yaml

@@ -146,11 +146,6 @@ spec:
         app: whereabouts
         name: whereabouts
     spec:
-      # Same reasoning as multus-daemonset.yaml: this is the IPAM half of the
-      # secondary-network path, so a node without it cannot hand out an address
-      # on ceph-san and the attachment fails just as completely as if multus
-      # itself were missing. Upstream leaves the priority class unset.
-      priorityClassName: system-node-critical
       hostNetwork: true
       serviceAccountName: whereabouts
       # Every node here is a control plane node, so the NoSchedule toleration

kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml

@@ -3,13 +3,6 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: apps
 ---
-# Pull-based off-VPS backup of the NetBird controller state
-# (kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup).
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Namespace
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-backup
----
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
@@ -184,30 +177,14 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: woodpecker
 ---
-# Where the Woodpecker kubernetes backend spawns pipeline step pods, isolated
-# from `apps`. Distinct from `woodpecker`, which holds the service itself.
+# Local LLM inference (kubernetes/apps/llama-server). Declared here, like
+# `woodpecker` above, so the `infrastructure` KS creates it before
+# `infrastructure-crds` applies the namespace's CiliumNetworkPolicies.
 #
-# Here rather than in apps/woodpecker for the reason spelled out above that
-# namespace: post-crds ships this namespace's CiliumNetworkPolicies via
-# ../network-policies/, and infrastructure-crds runs before every app KS. With
-# the namespace declared in the workload KS the order inverted, and a rebuild
-# stopped with
-#
-#   CiliumNetworkPolicy/woodpecker-ci/default-deny-ingress not found:
-#   namespaces "woodpecker-ci" not found
-#
-# which held infrastructure-crds, and with it all twenty app Kustomizations
-# that depend on it. The same reasoning was already written down for
-# `woodpecker` and simply not carried across to its sibling.
-#
-# Image-build steps run a privileged docker/buildx plugin pod (see the server's
-# WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED). Talos enforces Pod Security; without the
-# label the privileged step pods are rejected at admission. The namespace holds
-# nothing but ephemeral CI step pods, so the exemption stays off apps/.
+# No pod-security labels: the workload needs no hostPath or privilege — the
+# Intel GPU device plugin passes the iGPU in through the device-plugin API —
+# so the cluster's default `baseline` enforcement is enough.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
-  name: woodpecker-ci
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: woodpecker
-    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
+  name: ai

kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup/cronjob.yaml

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: CronJob
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-vps-backup
-  namespace: netbird-backup
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-backup
-spec:
-  # Nightly at 02:45, well ahead of the 07:45 Velero Schedule
-  # (post-crds/velero-schedules.yaml) that ships this PVC offsite.
-  schedule: "45 2 * * *"
-  timeZone: Europe/Berlin
-  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
-  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
-  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 5
-  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
-  jobTemplate:
-    spec:
-      backoffLimit: 2
-      activeDeadlineSeconds: 600
-      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
-      template:
-        metadata:
-          labels:
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-backup
-        spec:
-          restartPolicy: Never
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            runAsUser: 65534
-            runAsGroup: 65534
-            fsGroup: 65534
-            seccompProfile:
-              type: RuntimeDefault
-          containers:
-            - name: pull
-              # ci-ansible ships an ssh client and standard coreutils and
-              # is pulled from the local registry; a dedicated slim image
-              # is not worth maintaining for one nightly ssh pull.
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
-              command:
-                - sh
-                - -ec
-                - |
-                  # The key's authorized_keys entry on the VPS is
-                  # restrict,command=… — the server runs the dump script
-                  # regardless of what we request, streaming a tar.gz.
-                  # ssh demands 0600 on the key; secret mounts are group-
-                  # readable, so copy first. The host key is PINNED (no
-                  # TOFU): captured 2026-07-26 via ssh-keyscan and
-                  # cross-checked against the workstation's known_hosts.
-                  # If the VPS is ever reprovisioned with a new host key,
-                  # update this line — the job failing loudly on a key
-                  # mismatch is the desired behavior.
-                  install -m 600 /ssh/ssh-key /tmp/key
-                  printf '%s\n' 'netbird.renner.uno ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKCe8LRXbyn6Y+5V4ia4ErnBEcTFzHI1fAnsTvT77HJU' > /tmp/known_hosts
-                  # Leftover .part files from aborted earlier runs are
-                  # outside the retention glob — clear them up front.
-                  rm -f /backup/*.part
-                  ts=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-                  ssh -i /tmp/key \
-                      -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes \
-                      -o UserKnownHostsFile=/tmp/known_hosts \
-                      -o ConnectTimeout=15 \
-                      root@netbird.renner.uno > "/backup/netbird-$ts.tar.gz.part"
-                  gzip -t "/backup/netbird-$ts.tar.gz.part"
-                  mv "/backup/netbird-$ts.tar.gz.part" "/backup/netbird-$ts.tar.gz"
-                  # Retention: newest 14 dumps (Velero keeps 30 d offsite).
-                  ls -1t /backup/netbird-*.tar.gz | tail -n +15 | xargs -r rm --
-                  ls -lh /backup/
-              env:
-                - name: HOME
-                  value: /tmp
-              securityContext:
-                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-                capabilities:
-                  drop: ["ALL"]
-              resources:
-                requests:
-                  cpu: 25m
-                  memory: 64Mi
-                limits:
-                  memory: 256Mi
-              volumeMounts:
-                - name: ssh-key
-                  mountPath: /ssh
-                  readOnly: true
-                - name: backup
-                  mountPath: /backup
-          volumes:
-            - name: ssh-key
-              secret:
-                secretName: netbird-backup-ssh
-                defaultMode: 0440
-            - name: backup
-              persistentVolumeClaim:
-                claimName: netbird-backup

kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
-kind: Kustomization
-# Pull-based backup of the NetBird controller VPS's management store.
-# The VPS side (dump script + restricted SSH key) is deployed by the
-# netbird-server Ansible role; the Velero Schedule that ships the PVC
-# offsite lives in post-crds/velero-schedules.yaml; the staleness alert
-# in apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml.
-resources:
-  - pvc.yaml
-  - cronjob.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup/pvc.yaml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-backup
-  namespace: netbird-backup
-spec:
-  # 14 daily dumps of a small SQLite store plus config — 5Gi is
-  # generous headroom.
-  storageClassName: ceph-block
-  accessModes:
-    - ReadWriteOnce
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      storage: 5Gi

kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-ingress/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
   - daemonset.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/ai-ns.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny-ingress
+  namespace: ai
+spec:
+  endpointSelector: {}
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+    # Traefik is deliberately NOT admitted. llm.renner.uno is public and
+    # llama-server has no authentication of its own, so the Authentik llama-gate
+    # outpost is the only thing standing in front of it. Traefik routes the
+    # hostname to that outpost and never to llama-server, and this policy is
+    # what makes that structural rather than a matter of configuration: with no
+    # ingress rule for traefik, an Ingress that pointed straight at the Service
+    # — by accident or otherwise — simply would not connect.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
+            goauthentik.io/outpost-name: llama-gate
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    # Paperless calls both models for AI suggestions and RAG embeddings. The
+    # matching egress grant on its side is scoped to these two pods on :8080.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
+    - fromEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    # ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
+    # home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale (CT-RELATED path not
+    # passing related ICMP empirically; per-namespace shape, mirroring
+    # commit 3c517a0's verified-safe pattern with the 66dbe9f type set).
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+    # rook-ceph: the model weights live on a CephFS RWX volume
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+    # host/remote-node: kubelet probes + node-local reach (Ceph mons on host net)
+    # world: image pulls and llama-server's Hugging Face model download
+    - toEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+        - world
+    # ICMP — egress mirror; see ingress block above.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml

@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@ resources:
   - woodpecker-ns.yaml
   - trmnl-ns.yaml
   - wordpress-ns.yaml
+  - ai-ns.yaml
   - allow-cilium-health.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/flux-git.yaml

@@ -10,8 +10,33 @@
 # name hairpins off the ingress LB from a pod. Needs BOTH netpol halves
 # (gitea-allow-flux-rotator + rotator-gitea-flux-egress).
 #
-# The ExternalSecret that publishes the rotated token to Flux lives in
-# ../../post-crds/flux-git-externalsecret.yaml (needs ESO's CRDs).
+# The ExternalSecret MERGES into Flux's existing flux-system secret (does not
+# own it) so a sync failure leaves the last-good value in place; Flux's
+# source-controller reads it fresh each fetch, no restart. OpenBao policy/role
+# rotator-gitea-flux + the gitea-flux bootstrap (flux account password) are
+# provisioned by hand (see policies/rotator-gitea-flux.hcl).
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: flux-system-git-auth
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: flux-system
+    creationPolicy: Merge
+  data:
+    - secretKey: username
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/flux-git
+        property: username
+    - secretKey: password
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/flux-git
+        property: token
 ---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ServiceAccount

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/flux-git-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-# Keeps Flux's flux-system secret supplied with the rotated Gitea credential
-# WITHOUT owning it, so a sync failure leaves the last-good value in place;
-# Flux's source-controller reads it fresh each fetch, no restart. OpenBao
-# policy/role rotator-gitea-flux + the gitea-flux bootstrap (flux account
-# password) are provisioned by hand (see ../openbao/policies/rotator-gitea-flux.hcl).
-#
-# See creationPolicy below for why that is Orphan and not Merge — the
-# distinction is what makes a recovery from the break-glass source possible.
-#
-# Split out of ../openbao/rotation/flux-git.yaml, which still holds the
-# rotation CronJob: external-secrets.io CRDs are installed by the ESO
-# HelmRelease in the infrastructure Kustomization, so this manifest cannot
-# pass server-side dry-run there on a fresh cluster.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: flux-system-git-auth
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: flux-system
-    # Orphan, not Merge: create the Secret if it is absent, but never own it.
-    #
-    # Merge cannot create — it only writes into a Secret that already exists,
-    # on the assumption that `flux bootstrap` made one. That assumption breaks
-    # in exactly the situation this cluster is rebuilt from. The break-glass
-    # bootstrap pulls from the GitHub mirror and keeps its token in
-    # flux-system-breakglass (bootstrap.sh), so `flux-system` is never created,
-    # so this ExternalSecret has nothing to merge into — and reports Ready while
-    # producing no Secret at all. The operator then performs the documented
-    # handover back to Gitea and finds the GitRepository pointing at a Secret
-    # that does not exist.
-    #
-    # Owner would create it but attach an ownerReference, so deleting this
-    # object would take Flux's credential with it. Orphan creates and updates
-    # without ownership, which is what the paragraph at the top of this file
-    # actually wanted: a sync failure, or the loss of this object, leaves the
-    # last-good value in place.
-    #
-    # Safe on a live cluster: the Secret holds exactly the two keys written
-    # below (verified against production), so writing it whole is the same
-    # result as merging into it.
-    creationPolicy: Orphan
-    # Explicit rather than relying on the default, because it is the half that
-    # matters here: if the OpenBao entry ever disappears, keep serving the
-    # credential Flux already has rather than leaving it with none.
-    deletionPolicy: Retain
-  data:
-    - secretKey: username
-      remoteRef:
-        key: infrastructure/flux-git
-        property: username
-    - secretKey: password
-      remoteRef:
-        key: infrastructure/flux-git
-        property: token

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/kustomization.yaml

@@ -10,25 +10,4 @@ resources:
   # configured (2026-07-13): a store that can't turn Ready would block this
   # KS's wait gate and freeze the dependsOn chain.
   - openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml
-  # ExternalSecrets. external-secrets.io CRDs come from the ESO HelmRelease in
-  # the infrastructure Kustomization, so these cannot pass its server-side
-  # dry-run on a fresh cluster — Flux rejects the whole apply set, including
-  # the ESO HelmRelease that would have installed the CRDs. They sat next to
-  # their consumers until a cold-rebuild test hit that deadlock (2026-09-01);
-  # nothing had ever applied this layer against an empty API server before.
-  - crowdsec-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
-  - external-dns-unifi-externalsecret.yaml
-  - flux-git-externalsecret.yaml
-  - netbird-backup-externalsecret.yaml
-  - netbird-ingress-externalsecret.yaml
-  - velero-externalsecret.yaml
-  - velero-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
-  # traefik.io CRDs, same reasoning — installed by the Traefik HelmRelease in
-  # infrastructure. Traefik is deliberately absent from that Kustomization's
-  # healthChecks, so this KS may dry-run before the chart lands; it retries on
-  # retryInterval rather than deadlocking, because nothing here installs the
-  # CRDs it is waiting for.
-  - traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml
-  - traefik-rate-limit-middleware.yaml
-  - traefik-security-headers-middleware.yaml
   - ../network-policies/

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/netbird-backup-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-backup-ssh
-  namespace: netbird-backup
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 1h
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: netbird-backup-ssh
-  # OpenBao path homelab/infrastructure/netbird-backup, key `ssh-key`:
-  # the private half of the dedicated backup keypair whose public half
-  # is pinned (forced-command, restrict) in the VPS's authorized_keys by
-  # the netbird-server role. ONE-TIME provisioning by hand (same pattern
-  # as the rotator bootstrap credentials):
-  #   bao kv put homelab/infrastructure/netbird-backup ssh-key=@<keyfile>
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: infrastructure/netbird-backup

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ spec:
         - influxdb
         - ingress
         - monitoring
-        - netbird-backup # netbird-backup-ssh: the VPS-pull backup key
         - paperless
         - trmnl
         - velero

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/velero-schedules.yaml

@@ -247,40 +247,14 @@ spec:
 ---
 apiVersion: velero.io/v1
 kind: Schedule
-metadata:
-  name: netbird-backup-daily
-  namespace: velero
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
-spec:
-  # Daily at 07:45 local (next free stagger slot after apps-daily at
-  # 07:15). Ships the netbird-backup PVC — nightly pulls of the NetBird
-  # controller VPS's management store (SQLite dump + config, pulled at
-  # 02:45 by the netbird-vps-backup CronJob) — offsite. This is the
-  # only copy of the mesh state that survives losing the Hetzner VPS.
-  # Added 2026-07-26 (SPOF assessment: controller store had zero backup
-  # coverage). No CNPG in this namespace.
-  schedule: "45 7 * * *"
-  useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
-  template:
-    includedNamespaces:
-      - netbird-backup
-    includedResources:
-      - persistentvolumeclaims
-    storageLocation: default
-    ttl: 720h0m0s
-    snapshotMoveData: true
----
-apiVersion: velero.io/v1
-kind: Schedule
 metadata:
   name: trmnl-daily
   namespace: velero
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
 spec:
-  # Daily at 08:15 local (next free stagger slot after netbird-backup-daily
-  # at 07:45). Selects the whole namespace minus the CNPG-labelled PVCs, so
+  # Daily at 08:15 local (next free stagger slot after apps-daily at
+  # 07:15). Selects the whole namespace minus the CNPG-labelled PVCs, so
   # it picks up terminus-data (device screens + synchronised fonts),
   # terminus-valkey-data and trmnl-renderer-data (the renderer's schedule
   # and rendered output) without needing to be edited per PVC. The tr-pg

kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/cephcluster.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ metadata:
   namespace: rook-ceph
 spec:
   cephVersion:
-    image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
+    image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
     allowUnsupported: false
   dataDirHostPath: /var/lib/rook
   # Defaults to false. With three OSDs and size 3 there is no spare copy, so
@@ -78,20 +78,7 @@ spec:
     enabled: true
     ssl: false
   monitoring:
-    # false, and this is not a decision about metrics. `metricsDisabled` is the
-    # switch that turns metrics off; this one only decides whether Rook creates
-    # the ServiceMonitors — and creating them is fatal to the reconcile when it
-    # fails. On an empty cluster monitoring.coreos.com/v1 does not exist, so
-    # Rook's node-daemon reconcile aborted, the CephCluster never left
-    # status.phase Progressing, and infrastructure-ceph-cluster's healthCheckExpr
-    # waits on exactly that — with grafana-db → monitoring → those same CRDs
-    # behind it, closing the loop.
-    #
-    # The ceph-exporter DaemonSet and the mgr metrics endpoint are untouched;
-    # only the scrape wiring moved, to apps/monitoring-rules/
-    # rook-servicemonitors.yaml, where the CRDs exist by the time it applies.
-    # Both objects are reproduced there field for field off the live cluster.
-    enabled: false
+    enabled: true
   # Dedicated Ceph cluster network on VLAN 49, attached to the OSDs through
   # Multus. The attachment is san-network-attachment.yaml.
   #
@@ -144,7 +131,7 @@ spec:
     useAllDevices: false
     # Two forms while the production drives are migrated:
     #
-    #   by-partlabel/r-osd-data  the target. Talos names the drive in the
+    #   by-partlabel/r-ceph-osd  the target. Talos names the drive in the
     #                            machine config (RawVolumeConfig ceph-osd), so
     #                            this file needs to know nothing about models,
     #                            serials or hostnames.
@@ -159,7 +146,7 @@ spec:
     #
     # The second half goes when those three are repartitioned, one node at a
     # time. Until then it is what keeps the running OSDs claimed.
-    devicePathFilter: "^/dev/disk/by-(partlabel/r-osd-data|id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR)"
+    devicePathFilter: "^/dev/disk/by-(partlabel/r-ceph-osd|id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR)"
     config:
       osdsPerDevice: "1"
   # Highest built-in class: kubelet evicts these last and the kernel gives

kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/san-network-attachment.yaml

@@ -3,26 +3,33 @@
 # without every Ceph daemon landing on host networking to get there. The
 # alternative and why it was rejected is in cephcluster.yaml.
 #
-# host-device: the SAN NIC is dedicated to Ceph and has exactly one consumer
-# per node — the OSD pod — so it is handed to that pod whole, not virtualised
-# under it. The device keeps its identity (MAC, MTU) and moves back to the
-# host when the pod goes away.
-#
-# `device` names the role, not hardware: every machine renames its own SAN
-# interface to ceph-san at boot (udev rule in its Talos patch). No kernel
-# interface name appears in this file.
-#
 # ISOLATION
 #
-# VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else. No gateway and no
-# routes: there is no router on this segment and there must not be one.
-# whereabouts adds neither unless asked, so nothing here can leak onto or off
-# the SAN.
+# VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else. Two consequences
+# are deliberate:
 #
-# The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6 — headroom for a leaked
-# allocation to sit until the reconciler collects it. One address per node is
-# in use; a second OSD on a node would need a second SAN interface, which is a
-# hardware change, not a config one.
+#   No gateway and no routes. There is no router on this segment and there
+#   must not be one. whereabouts adds neither unless asked, so nothing here
+#   can leak onto or off the SAN. This also means no `sbr` chaining is
+#   needed — unlike the v30iot attachments, there is no DHCP-supplied default
+#   route to confine, because there is no DHCP and no default route.
+#
+#   The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6. It was .4-.6 while the
+#   migration ran, because the nodes still held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph
+#   needed host networking to reach this link — three addresses for three
+#   OSDs, no spare. The nodes have since given those up (the link is only a
+#   macvlan parent now and needs no address of its own), so the reservation
+#   has nothing left to avoid.
+#
+#   Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it elsewhere on the
+#   segment is not cosmetic. There is no router here, so an address outside
+#   the /29 would be unreachable from anything still using one inside it —
+#   which is exactly what would break a future rolling change, where migrated
+#   and un-migrated OSDs have to keep talking to each other.
+#
+#   Six addresses for three OSDs is the headroom the migration could not
+#   afford: room for a leaked allocation to sit until the reconciler collects
+#   it, and room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.
 #
 # IPAM
 #
@@ -30,18 +37,29 @@
 # a server that must not exist here, and host-local keeps its state per node
 # with no cluster-wide coordination, so two nodes would hand out the same
 # address on shared L2. See infrastructure/multus/whereabouts-daemonset.yaml.
+#
+# MTU 9000 matches the link. macvlan children inherit the master's MTU, but
+# it is stated so that a change to the parent does not silently halve
+# replication throughput without anything in the tree recording the
+# expectation.
 apiVersion: k8s.cni.cncf.io/v1
 kind: NetworkAttachmentDefinition
 metadata:
   name: ceph-san
   namespace: rook-ceph
 spec:
+  # `master` is an interface name. enp2s0f1np1 is the second X710 SFP+ port,
+  # a busPath-derived predictable name (net.ifnames=1 via the Image Factory
+  # schematic) that is identical on k8s-1/2/3 and cannot shuffle across
+  # reboots.
   config: |
     {
       "cniVersion": "0.3.1",
       "name": "ceph-san",
-      "type": "host-device",
-      "device": "ceph-san",
+      "type": "macvlan",
+      "master": "enp2s0f1np1",
+      "mode": "bridge",
+      "mtu": 9000,
       "ipam": {
         "type": "whereabouts",
         "range": "10.99.0.0/29",

kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/toolbox.yaml

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
       serviceAccountName: rook-ceph-default
       containers:
         - name: rook-ceph-tools
-          image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
+          image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
           command:
             - /bin/bash
             - -c

kubernetes/infrastructure/traefik/kustomization.yaml

@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - helmrelease.yaml
+  - crowdsec-middleware.yaml
+  - security-headers-middleware.yaml
+  - rate-limit-middleware.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - externalsecret.yaml
+  - hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
   - snapshot-readonly-storageclass.yaml
   - node-agent-config.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml
+  - servicemonitor.yaml
+  - podmonitor.yaml
   - restore-test-rbac.yaml
   - restore-test-cronjob.yaml
 # Velero Schedule CRs live in kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/restore-test.sh

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
 #   1. Velero Restore reaches phase=Completed against yesterday's
 #      scheduled Backup (real artifact, not a synthetic one).
 #   2. Each restored PVC is mountable and its file count is within ±10%
-#      of the live source volume, ignoring the transient subtrees listed
-#      in volatile_paths_for().
+#      (or ±ABS_PARITY_SLACK files, whichever is wider) of the live
+#      source volume, ignoring the transient subtrees listed in
+#      volatile_paths_for().
 #
 # What this does NOT exercise:
 #   - CNPG database restore (barman-cloud, separate code path).
@@ -317,11 +318,37 @@ EOF
     count_files_in_pvc "$src_ns" "$tmp_pvc" "src-${pvc:0:40}-${RUN_ID}" "$excludes"
 }
 
-# Restored count must be within ±10% of the source's current file count.
-# That tolerance absorbs day-of drift since the backup ran without
-# letting "lost half the data" pass silently. Volatile subtrees are pruned
-# from BOTH sides — keyed off the source identity, since the PVC name is
-# preserved across the restore but the destination namespace is not.
+# Restored count must be within max(±10%, ±ABS_PARITY_SLACK files) of the
+# source's current file count. That tolerance absorbs day-of drift since
+# the backup ran without letting "lost half the data" pass silently.
+# Volatile subtrees are pruned from BOTH sides — keyed off the source
+# identity, since the PVC name is preserved across the restore but the
+# destination namespace is not.
+#
+# Why the absolute floor exists. A purely relative window is structurally
+# unable to pass a small volume: ±10% of 9 files is ±0.9, i.e. a budget of
+# ZERO files, and ±10% of 2 files is ±0.2. The 2026-09-01 run failed on
+# exactly that — audiobookshelf/libation-config source=9 restored=8 and
+# trmnl/trmnl-renderer-data source=2 restored=3, both off by one file and
+# in opposite directions, with all 12 restores at phase=Completed and the
+# other 46 checks green. Parity compares a backup taken up to ~24 h ago
+# against the live volume *now*, so a single config write on a tiny volume
+# between those two moments is expected, not a defect in the backup.
+#
+# The floor only governs volumes below ~10*ABS_PARITY_SLACK files; above
+# that the 10% window still binds, so real data loss on the volumes that
+# carry data keeps failing loudly. Two files of slack rather than one
+# because a single logical write on a config volume routinely moves more
+# than one file (an app writing a settings file plus a transient sidecar),
+# and a floor that buys exactly one month is not worth the change.
+#
+# What the floor must NOT swallow, and does not: a non-empty source that
+# restored to an *empty* volume fails unconditionally below, before any
+# tolerance is applied. The old relative-only check caught that case as a
+# side effect (delta = 1.0 > 0.10); it is now explicit so the floor cannot
+# erode it on a volume of ABS_PARITY_SLACK files or fewer.
+ABS_PARITY_SLACK=${ABS_PARITY_SLACK:-2}
+
 verify_pvc_file_count_parity() {
     local src_ns="$1" dst_ns="$2" pvc="$3"
     local restored source excludes
@@ -339,11 +366,15 @@ verify_pvc_file_count_parity() {
     if [[ "$source" -eq 0 && "$restored" -eq 0 ]]; then
         return 0
     fi
-    # Use awk to compute a 10% window without bc.
-    awk -v s="$source" -v r="$restored" 'BEGIN {
-        if (s == 0) { exit !(r == 0) }
-        delta = (r - s) / s; if (delta < 0) delta = -delta
-        exit !(delta <= 0.10)
+    # Empty on either side while the other has data: never tolerable.
+    if [[ "$source" -eq 0 || "$restored" -eq 0 ]]; then
+        return 1
+    fi
+    # Use awk to compute the window without bc.
+    awk -v s="$source" -v r="$restored" -v slack="$ABS_PARITY_SLACK" 'BEGIN {
+        delta = r - s; if (delta < 0) delta = -delta
+        tol = 0.10 * s; if (tol < slack) tol = slack
+        exit !(delta <= tol)
     }'
 }
 
@@ -492,7 +523,7 @@ EOF
         check "${src_ns}: at least one PVC was restored" false
     else
         for pvc in "${PVCS[@]}"; do
-            check "${src_ns}: PVC ${pvc} file count parity (±10%)" \
+            check "${src_ns}: PVC ${pvc} file count parity (±10% / ±${ABS_PARITY_SLACK})" \
                 verify_pvc_file_count_parity "$src_ns" "$dst_ns" "$pvc"
         done
     fi

kubernetes/talos/patches/hcloud-1.yaml

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-# First machine of the throwaway cluster on Hetzner.
-#
-# enp1s0 is the public NIC; the private networks are enp7s0 and enp8s0, in the
-# order bootstrap.sh attaches them.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-1
-  nodeLabels:
-    # Holds a Ceph OSD device; the CephCluster selects OSD nodes by this label.
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN NIC to the role name at boot. Matched by PCI bus path
-    # rather than MAC: the address follows from the order bootstrap.sh attaches
-    # the networks, while the MAC is assigned by Hetzner at attach time and is
-    # not known when this file is written.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
----
-# In the generated schema rather than machine.network.hostname: naming the host
-# in both is rejected at apply time. `auto: off` switches off the generated
-# `auto: stable`, which is mutually exclusive with a static name.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-1
----
-# Every interface is stated, the public one included. Talos stops running its
-# default DHCP operators for the whole machine as soon as one new-style network
-# document exists, so an omitted interface gets no address.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
----
-# Ceph cluster network, renamed to the role name by the udev rule in the
-# machine section. The node holds no address here; the link exists for the OSD
-# pod. No mtu: a Hetzner network carries 1450, not production's 9000.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    # Two disks: the system disk and the attached volume. Matching on transport
-    # as the qemu patches do selects nothing here — a Hetzner volume arrives
-    # over virtio-scsi, and a selector matching zero disks is skipped silently.
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  # bootstrap.sh reads this size and creates the volume to match.
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true

kubernetes/talos/patches/hcloud-2.yaml

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# Second machine. See hcloud-1.yaml.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-2
-  nodeLabels:
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # See hcloud-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-2
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
----
-# See hcloud-1.yaml.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true

kubernetes/talos/patches/hcloud-3.yaml

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# Third machine. See hcloud-1.yaml.
-machine:
-  install:
-    disk: /dev/sda
-  certSANs:
-    - hcloud-3
-  nodeLabels:
-    storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # See hcloud-1.yaml.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", KERNELS=="0000:08:00.0", NAME="ceph-san"
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: HostnameConfig
-auto: off
-hostname: hcloud-3
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp1s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp1s0
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: enp7s0
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: DHCPv4Config
-name: enp7s0
----
-# See hcloud-1.yaml.
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
-up: true
----
-apiVersion: v1alpha1
-kind: RawVolumeConfig
-name: osd-data
-provisioning:
-  diskSelector:
-    match: '!system_disk'
-  minSize: 50GiB
-  grow: true

kubernetes/talos/patches/k8s-1.yaml

@@ -28,13 +28,6 @@ machine:
     # this label instead of listing hostnames, so which boxes carry storage is
     # stated once, here, by the machine that knows.
     storage.renner.uno/ceph-osd: "true"
-  udev:
-    # Renames the SAN port (X710 port 1, matched by its burned-in MAC) to the
-    # role name at boot, before the network stack opens links — a rule applied
-    # to a RUNNING node cannot rename (Resource busy) and takes effect at the
-    # next reboot.
-    rules:
-      - SUBSYSTEM=="net", ACTION=="add", ATTR{address}=="58:47:ca:74:70:28", NAME="ceph-san"
 cluster:
   allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
 ---
@@ -131,15 +124,14 @@ parent: enp2s0f0np0
 up: true
 ---
 # Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49, untagged on the
-# wire. OSD-to-OSD replication and nothing else. The udev rule in the machine
-# section above renames the port to ceph-san at boot, so shared manifests name
-# the role and only this file knows the hardware.
+# wire. OSD-to-OSD replication and nothing else.
 #
-# The node holds NO address here on purpose: the link is handed whole to the
-# OSD pod (host-device attachment). Giving the node an address would put it on
-# a segment reserved for Ceph-internal traffic.
+# The node holds NO address here on purpose. Rook attaches the link to the OSD
+# pods through a Multus macvlan, and a macvlan parent only needs to be up.
+# Giving the node an address would put it on a segment reserved for
+# Ceph-internal traffic.
 apiVersion: v1alpha1
 kind: LinkConfig
-name: ceph-san
+name: enp2s0f1np1
 up: true
 mtu: 9000