fix(multus): drop runtime apk add from the CNI plugins installer

Owner directive: tools belong in the image, not installed at container start. This is the highest-blast-radius instance of the pattern left in the repo — a DaemonSet, so it runs on every node. No image was needed. `apk add --no-cache curl tar` turns out to have been unnecessary from the start: verified in alpine:3.21 that `tar` is already busybox (v1.37.0) and handles -xzf, and that busybox `wget` follows GitHub's release redirect to objects.githubusercontent.com over TLS using the base image's /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt. Only `curl` is genuinely absent, and wget covers what it was used for. So this replaces the install with `wget -q -O` rather than introducing another layered image. Severity note for the record: the apk add sat inside the else branch, so steady-state nodes never reached it. It ran when plugins were absent — i.e. on a fresh node or after /opt/cni/bin was wiped, which is precisely the moment you least want a dependency on package-index availability. Verified by running the RENDERED init script in alpine:3.21 against the real release URL, both paths: empty dir -> Fetching ...; Installed: host-local, macvlan, static macvlan executable, /opt/cni/bin owner 0:0, exit 0 already there -> "CNI plugins already installed (CNI macvlan plugin v1.5.1)", exit 0, no fetch The second line is worth noting: that version string comes from executing the extracted binary, so the download and extraction are confirmed good, not merely present. The chown 0:0 also still applies, which the existing comment explains is required or Cilium's apply-sysctl-overwrites init container fails with "Permission denied". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:47:11 +02:00
28 changed files with 133 additions and 671 deletions
@@ -159,61 +159,3 @@ steps:
          --dockerfile Containerfile \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
-
-  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
-  # baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
-  # node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
-  # critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
-  # where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
-  - name: build-cni-plugins
-    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
-    directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
-    depends_on: []
-    when:
-      - event: manual
-      - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
-    environment:
-      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
-      GITEA_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ci_images_token
-    commands:
-      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
-      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
-      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-      - |
-        /kaniko/executor \
-          --context . \
-          --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
-
-  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
-  # needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
-  # fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
-  # every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
-  # base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
-  - name: build-alpine-openssl
-    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
-    directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
-    depends_on: []
-    when:
-      - event: manual
-      - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
-    environment:
-      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
-      GITEA_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: ci_images_token
-    commands:
-      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
-      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
-      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
-      - |
-        /kaniko/executor \
-          --context . \
-          --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
-
-# Alpine plus the openssl CLI. Nothing application-specific — named for what it
-# is, so anything needing `openssl s_client` / `x509` from a shell script can use
-# it.
-#
-# It exists because installing tools at container start is not acceptable here:
-# `apk add` makes every start depend on network and package-index availability,
-# and the resolved version can drift between restarts of an otherwise pinned
-# image.
-#
-# Note the openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine base — verified, the
-# base carries the libraries but not the command — so unlike the multus CNI
-# installer (where busybox wget/tar already covered the need) this one really
-# does require an image rather than just dropping the apk add.
-#
-# First consumer: the paperless fetch-bridge-cert init container, which captures
-# the Proton Mail Bridge's self-signed IMAP certificate via STARTTLS and pins it
-# for paperless to trust. busybox has no s_client equivalent, so openssl is not
-# substitutable there.
-RUN apk add --no-cache openssl
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-# Upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries, baked in at build time.
-#
-# WHY THIS IMAGE EXISTS
-# The multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet used to fetch this tarball from
-# GitHub on the node itself, at node-provisioning time, and extract it straight
-# into /opt/cni/bin. Two problems with that:
-#
-#   1. Security. The download had NO integrity verification — wget, then tar,
-#      into a directory whose contents are executed as root in the CNI path on
-#      every node. A tampered or MITM'd artifact would have got privileged
-#      execution cluster-wide, with nothing to detect it.
-#   2. Node rebuild. It put a live dependency on github.com (and previously the
-#      Alpine package index too) on the critical path of bringing a node up, so
-#      a GitHub outage or slow transfer stalled or broke CNI installation
-#      exactly when a node was being rebuilt.
-#
-# Baking the binaries in fixes both: the fetch happens once, here, where the
-# checksum IS verified, and the installer becomes a local file copy with no
-# network at all.
-#
-# The version and digest are pinned literals, so bumping them is a reviewable
-# commit rather than a silent change in what runs on every node. The digest was
-# cross-checked against upstream's own published
-# cni-plugins-linux-amd64-<version>.tgz.sha256 asset rather than merely recorded
-# from a local download — a download can be tampered with; the point of the
-# check is to compare against what upstream states.
-#
-# amd64 only, matching the ARCH the installer already hardcoded and the cluster's
-# node architecture. Add a second stage if a different arch is ever needed.
-
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d AS fetch
-
-ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.5.1
-ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=77baa2f669980a82255ffa2f2717de823992480271ee778aa51a9c60ae89ff9b
-
-# busybox wget and tar are already in the base; nothing is installed here
-# either. sha256sum -c fails the BUILD if the artifact does not match, which is
-# the whole point — a bad download must never reach a node.
-RUN set -eu; \
-    F="cni-plugins-linux-amd64-${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}.tgz"; \
-    wget -q -O "/tmp/${F}" \
-      "https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}/${F}"; \
-    echo "${CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256}  /tmp/${F}" | sha256sum -c -; \
-    mkdir -p /plugins; \
-    tar -xzf "/tmp/${F}" -C /plugins; \
-    rm -f "/tmp/${F}"; \
-    # Drop the non-executable payload: the tarball ships LICENSE and README.md,
-    # which the old installer extracted into /opt/cni/bin alongside the binaries.
-    rm -f /plugins/LICENSE /plugins/README.md; \
-    # Fail loudly here rather than shipping an image that silently installs
-    # nothing, if upstream ever restructures the archive.
-    #
-    # This list must cover every plugin the repo actually depends on, not just
-    # the ones the installer happens to log. `dhcp` is included because the
-    # sibling cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet runs that binary and documents that it
-    # ships from here (see kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml)
-    # — without it in the check, upstream dropping `dhcp` while keeping the
-    # others would build green and only surface later as a broken DHCP daemon on
-    # whichever node rolled first.
-    for p in macvlan static host-local dhcp; do \
-      [ -x "/plugins/$p" ] || { echo "FATAL: /plugins/$p missing or not executable" >&2; exit 1; }; \
-    done
-
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
-
-# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
-# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
-COPY --from=fetch /plugins/ /opt/cni-plugins/
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-# Proposal: enrol the mosquitto broker credentials in Class-A rotation
-
-**Status:** proposal, nothing implemented.
-**Scope:** the 8 MQTT broker users and the credentials behind them.
-
-## Problem
-
-Every self-generated secret in this cluster rotates automatically except these.
-`kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/` holds 13 manifests defining 15
-rotator CronJobs (`home-assistant.yaml` alone defines three). Five are **Class-A**
-— authentik, crowdsec, paperless, shelly-manager and woodpecker — meaning
-"self-generated random secret", which is exactly what a broker password is.
-The mosquitto credentials are the only Class-A-shaped secrets not enrolled.
-
-They are currently minted once by seven near-identical bootstrap Jobs
-(`mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml`, 508 lines — the ServiceAccount, Role and RoleBinding
-are inside that same file) which generate a password, hand-build Secret JSON with
-`jq` and POST it to the Kubernetes API with `curl`. Once created they never
-change again.
-
-Three consequences:
-
-1. **They never rotate.** Not on a schedule, not on compromise, not ever.
-2. **They exist only in the Secret object** — not in OpenBao, so not covered by
-   the OpenBao snapshot CronJob, and unrecoverable if lost.
-3. **The Jobs cannot be modified.** A Job's `spec.template` is immutable, so
-   changing even the container image makes the whole `home-assistant`
-   Kustomization fail to reconcile with `field is immutable`. Any edit requires
-   deleting or renaming the Jobs.
-
-## Why the obvious fixes do not work
-
-Recorded because each was tried and rejected on evidence, and the reasons are
-not obvious from the code.
-
-| Approach | Why it fails |
-| --- | --- |
-| ExternalSecrets reading hand-seeded OpenBao paths | Depends on content copied in by hand. Git cannot recreate it; a fresh OpenBao leaves the paths empty and ESO then overwrites live broker credentials with nothing. |
-| ESO `Password` generator | **Overwrites pre-existing Secrets.** Verified: a Secret holding `KNOWN-PREEXISTING-VALUE` was replaced with a freshly generated password on first sync. Adopting it rotates the 7 Job-minted credentials at once, uncoordinated (`evcc` is already ESO-extract-backed and so unaffected). |
-| Keep the Jobs, fix only the image | Blocked by `spec.template` immutability. Renaming the Jobs works but is a hack that recurs on every future edit. |
-
-The common thread: each treats the credential as something to *place*, when the
-real requirement is a credential that can be *replaced*.
-
-## How rotation actually has to work here
-
-The broker rebuilds its password file from scratch on **every pod start**
-(`mosquitto-deployment.yaml`): `rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd` followed by
-`mosquitto_passwd -c -b …` for each of the 8 users, sourced from env vars backed
-by the 8 Secrets.
-
-Two things follow, and they shape the whole design:
-
- **A Secret change has no effect until the broker restarts.** There is no
-  Reloader annotation on the mosquitto Deployment today, unlike the consumers of
-  the existing Class-A rotators.
- **There is no make-before-break.** A mosquitto user has exactly one password.
-  The LLAT rotators can mint a second token and revoke the first afterwards; a
-  broker user cannot hold old and new simultaneously. Unless a transitional
-  second user is created, broker and client must cut over together.
-
-### Who holds each credential
-
-This is the part that determines cutover cost, and it is not visible from the
-manifests alone.
-
-| Broker user | Held by | Cutover |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `health` | the broker's own liveness/readiness probes | in-cluster, same pod restart |
-| `zigbee2mqtt` | zigbee2mqtt Deployment (`secretKeyRef`) | in-cluster, pod restart |
-| `evcc` | evcc app; already OpenBao-backed via ESO | in-cluster, pod restart |
-| `sml2mqtt` | edge host, from `vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
-| `open3e` | edge host, from `vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
-| `homeassistant` | HA MQTT integration — a config entry created in the UI | needs an API/WebSocket update, or a manual re-entry |
-| `shellies` | Shelly device firmware | pushed per-device; `shelly-manager` is deployed and is the natural mechanism |
-| `admin` | a workstation client, held by a human | read the new value from OpenBao |
-
-Note `sml2mqtt` and `open3e` currently keep **the same password in two unlinked
-places** — the Kubernetes Secret for the broker, and `ansible-vault` for the
-client — synchronised by hand. That duplication, not any client limitation, is
-what makes rotation feel impossible today.
-
-## Proposed design
-
-Follow the existing Class-A pattern exactly (`rotation/paperless.yaml` is the
-closest model): *generate random bytes → merge-patch into OpenBao → ESO syncs the
-Secret → restart the consumer*.
-
-1. **One rotator CronJob per broker user**, running the existing `secret-rotator`
-   binary in random mode, writing `apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-<user>-credentials`
-   in OpenBao. Reuses the established policy/role/SA pattern; no new machinery.
-2. **ExternalSecrets** project each OpenBao entry to the existing Secret name and
-   key, so `mosquitto-deployment.yaml` and the in-cluster consumers are unchanged.
-   Key names stay as they are (`homeassistant-password` on one, `password` on the
-   rest) — consumers reference them, so normalising is a separate change.
-3. **Add a Reloader annotation to the mosquitto Deployment** so a Secret change
-   restarts the broker, instead of silently taking effect at some unrelated future
-   restart.
-4. **Move the edge host off `ansible-vault` for these two values**, reading the
-   same OpenBao entry instead, so there is one source of truth per credential.
-5. **Rotate one user at a time.** Each rotation then affects exactly one client,
-   not all eight.
-
-### The cutover window
-
-With no make-before-break, each rotation has a window where broker and client
-disagree. Two options:
-
- **Accept a brief window** (recommended for most users). Order: rotator writes
-  OpenBao → client picks up the new value → broker restarts. MQTT clients
-  reconnect automatically; the window is seconds. Because rotation is per-user,
-  only that one client is affected.
-
-  One failure mode to expect rather than be alarmed by: the broker rolls with
-  `maxUnavailable: 0` / `maxSurge: 1`, so mid-rollout **two broker pods with
-  different passwd files sit behind the LB**. A client reconnecting during that
-  window can land on the old pod and fail auth until the rollout completes. It is
-  self-healing and lasts seconds to a minute, but it will look alarming in logs
-  during the first `health` / `zigbee2mqtt` rotation, so it is worth knowing in
-  advance.
- **Transitional dual user** (`<user>` and `<user>-next` in the passwd file and
-  ACL) for any credential where even a brief outage is unacceptable. More moving
-  parts; probably only worth it for `homeassistant`, which carries everything.
-
-## Suggested phasing
-
-Ordered so the risky work happens after the pattern is proven, and so each phase
-is independently valuable.
-
-1. **`health` and `zigbee2mqtt` first.** Both are entirely in-cluster and pick up
-   a new password on pod restart with no external coordination. Proves rotator →
-   OpenBao → ESO → Reloader end to end with the smallest blast radius. `health`
-   is the safest possible start: only the broker's own probes consume it.
-2. **`evcc`.** Already OpenBao-backed via ESO; only the rotator is missing.
-3. **`sml2mqtt` and `open3e`**, together with switching the edge host to read from
-   OpenBao. This is where the duplicate-source-of-truth problem gets fixed.
-4. **`shellies`**, via shelly-manager pushing to devices. Needs investigation:
-   shelly-manager has its own Class-A rotator today, but that rotates
-   shelly-manager's own secret and does not touch device MQTT credentials.
-5. **`homeassistant`** last. Highest blast radius, and the config entry is UI-created,
-   so it needs an API/WebSocket update path — the HA LLAT rotators
-   (`rotation/home-assistant.yaml`) already talk to HA over WebSocket and are the
-   obvious precedent.
-6. **`admin`** whenever convenient; a human reads the new value from OpenBao.
-
-Only once a user is enrolled does its bootstrap Job become dead code. Delete the
-Jobs incrementally as their users migrate, rather than in one step — that also
-avoids the immutability problem entirely, since the Jobs are deleted, never
-patched.
-
-## Open questions
-
- **Does `secret-rotator` random mode fit unchanged?** The existing rotators write
-  a field into an OpenBao entry; here the entry holds a single password field, so
-  it should, but this needs confirming against the binary rather than assumed.
- **Can shelly-manager push MQTT credentials to devices**, and does it cover both
-  Gen1 (`/settings/mqtt`) and Gen2+ (`Mqtt.SetConfig`) firmwares? If not, the
-  `shellies` user may need a different mechanism or stay manual longest.
- **How is the HA MQTT config entry updated programmatically?** Reusing the
-  WebSocket approach from the LLAT rotator is plausible but unverified.
- **Rotation cadence.** The existing rotators' schedules should be the reference
-  rather than inventing a new one.
- **ESO refresh latency.** Rotator-writes-OpenBao → Secret-updates →
-  Reloader-restarts is delayed by up to one `refreshInterval`; the `evcc`
-  ExternalSecret uses `1h`. That does not widen the outage window — broker and
-  client still move together — but it does stretch how long a rotation takes to
-  land, which matters for verifying one completed and for the cold-rebuild
-  ordering question above. Worth deciding whether these ExternalSecrets want a
-  shorter interval than 1h, or whether the rotator should trigger the sync
-  directly.
- **Bootstrap on a cold rebuild.** On a fresh cluster the rotator must create the
-  OpenBao entry before ESO can sync it; check this against
-  `kubernetes/RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md` so broker bring-up is not blocked.
-
-## What this does not change
-
- Secret names, key names and every `secretKeyRef` in `mosquitto-deployment.yaml`.
- The ACL model and the per-user topic scoping.
- The `evcc` ExternalSecret, which already follows the target pattern.
@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ resources:
  - prometheus-token-externalsecret.yaml
  - config-sync-token-externalsecret.yaml
  - mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
-  # health broker credential: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (first of the
-  # eight users to migrate off mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml).
-  - mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
  - mosquitto-config.yaml
  - mosquitto-certificate.yaml
  - mosquitto-service.yaml
@@ -370,6 +370,74 @@ spec:
            limits:
              memory: 64Mi
 ---
+# Broker user `health`: a dedicated, least-privilege credential used ONLY by
+# mosquitto's own liveness/readiness probes (mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Its
+# ACL is `write health/#` and nothing else — it cannot read any topic or
+# write outside the throwaway probe subtree, so a leak is worthless (nothing
+# subscribes to health/#). Kept on its own Secret, like every other user, so
+# the probe never has to borrow the admin credential.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  backoffLimit: 4
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
+      restartPolicy: OnFailure
+      containers:
+        - name: bootstrap
+          image: alpine:3.21
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - |
+              set -eu
+              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
+
+              NS=home-assistant
+              NAME=mosquitto-health-credentials
+              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
+              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
+              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
+
+              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
+                exit 0
+              fi
+
+              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
+              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+
+              body=$(jq -nc \
+                --arg name "$NAME" \
+                --arg ns "$NS" \
+                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
+                '{apiVersion: "v1",
+                  kind: "Secret",
+                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
+                  type: "Opaque",
+                  data: {password: $pw}}')
+
+              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
+                   --data "$body" \
+                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
+
+              echo "generated $NAME"
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 10m
+              memory: 32Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+---
 # Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
 # to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
 # publish HA MQTT-discovery configs, exactly like the `shellies` user) and
@@ -5,18 +5,6 @@ metadata:
  namespace: home-assistant
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-  annotations:
-    # REQUIRED for credential rotation to take effect at all. The startup shim
-    # rebuilds /mosquitto/auth/passwd from these Secrets on every pod start, so
-    # a rotated Secret is inert until the pod restarts — without this the new
-    # password would sit unused until some unrelated restart, while the old one
-    # stayed valid indefinitely.
-    #
-    # Listed per-Secret rather than using the blanket `reloader.stakater.com/
-    # auto: "true"`, so that enrolling each remaining broker user in rotation is
-    # a visible, reviewable edit to this line rather than something that starts
-    # happening implicitly.
-    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  strategy:
@@ -189,9 +177,7 @@ spec:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials
                  key: password
-            # Probe-only credential. Now OpenBao-backed and Class-A rotated (see
-            # mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml); its bootstrap Job
-            # is gone.
+            # Probe-only credential (mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap).
            # Present here for the same reason as the others — the startup
            # shim hashes it into the passwd file — and reused by the exec
            # probes below, which run inside this container.
@@ -244,7 +230,7 @@ spec:
          #
          # Uses the dedicated least-privilege `health` user (ACL: readwrite
          # health/# only — see the passwd/acl build above and the
-          # mosquitto-health-credentials ExternalSecret). Its password is in
+          # mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap Job). Its password is in
          # this container's env (HEALTH_PASSWORD) because the startup shim
          # hashes every user into the passwd file; the exec probes run
          # inside this container and read it directly. A leak of this
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Projects the mosquitto `health` broker credential from OpenBao into the Secret
-# the broker already consumes. FIRST of the eight broker users to move off the
-# bootstrap Jobs and onto Class-A rotation (see
-# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
-# file lands with it)); the rotator lives at
-# kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-health.yaml.
-#
-# Secret name and key are UNCHANGED (`password`), so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
-# secretKeyRef and the exec probes that read $HEALTH_PASSWORD need no edit.
-#
-# refreshInterval is 10m rather than the 1h used by mosquitto-evcc-credentials:
-# a rotation only lands once ESO re-reads, so 1h would mean up to an hour between
-# the rotator running and the broker actually using the new password, with the
-# old one still valid in the meantime. 10m keeps that window short without
-# polling OpenBao pointlessly hard.
-#
-# ⚠️ OWNERSHIP: creationPolicy is implicitly Owner, so ESO sets an ownerReference
-# on the Secret. Deleting this ExternalSecret therefore DELETES the live Secret
-# and with it the broker's probe credential — the bootstrap Job it replaces had
-# no such coupling. To detach without destroying, set creationPolicy: Orphan
-# before removing it.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-health-credentials
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: mosquitto-health-credentials
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ spec:
        # stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
        # policy) — no extra dependency.
        - name: reconcile-publish-ip
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.10 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.9 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
          volumeMounts:
            - name: data
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
      containers:
        - name: music-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.10 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.9 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: LOG_LEVEL
              value: info
@@ -88,17 +88,13 @@ spec:
      # trust without disabling verification.
      initContainers:
        - name: fetch-bridge-cert
-          # alpine + the openssl CLI, built by .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml
-          # from ci/images/alpine-openssl/. Replaces `apk add --no-cache openssl`
-          # on every paperless pod start: tools belong in the image, not
-          # installed at runtime. Dated tag so a change is a reviewable diff
-          # here, matching the ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-07-30
+          image: alpine:3.21
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
            - |
              set -e
+              apk add --no-cache openssl
              # Wait until the bridge presents a cert via STARTTLS.
              # Re-fetched on every paperless restart so a bridge cert
              # rotation only requires a paperless rollout to pick up.
@@ -36,15 +36,6 @@ spec:
    kubeProxyReplacement: true
    socketLB:
      enabled: true
-    prometheus:
-      # The agent exported no metrics at all, so BPF map utilisation was
-      # invisible: when per-endpoint policy maps (cilium_policy_v3_*) run out
-      # of space the agent only says "no space left on device" in its log and
-      # pod sandbox creation fails (issue #452). cilium_bpf_map_pressure makes
-      # that observable — and alertable — before it stalls a rollout.
-      enabled: true
-      serviceMonitor:
-        enabled: true
    bpf:
      # Let pods reach the cluster's own LoadBalancer external IPs; Cilium
      # redirects the socket directly to the backend pod instead of sending
@@ -38,57 +38,54 @@ spec:
          effect: NoExecute
      initContainers:
        - name: install
-          # Plugin binaries are baked into this image, checksum-verified at build
-          # time (ci/images/cni-plugins/Containerfile). This replaces fetching the
-          # release tarball from GitHub on the node, which had NO integrity check
-          # at all and put github.com on the critical path of every node rebuild.
-          # Dated tag so a version change is a reviewable diff here, matching the
-          # ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-07-30
+          image: alpine:3.21
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
            - |
              set -eu
-              SRC=/opt/cni-plugins
-              DST=/host/opt/cni/bin
-
-              # No network, no download, no "already installed?" guard. The old
-              # guard existed to avoid re-fetching; a local copy is cheap, so
-              # copying unconditionally is better — the node then always matches
-              # the version pinned in this manifest instead of keeping whatever
-              # it happened to install first.
-              for src in "$SRC"/*; do
-                name=${src##*/}
-                # Copy to a temp name in the SAME directory and rename over the
-                # target. A plain `cp` onto a plugin the kubelet is currently
-                # executing can fail with ETXTBSY; rename(2) never does, and is
-                # atomic, so a concurrent CNI invocation sees either the old or
-                # the new binary and never a partial one.
-                cp "$src" "$DST/.$name.tmp"
-                chmod 0755 "$DST/.$name.tmp"
-                mv -f "$DST/.$name.tmp" "$DST/$name"
-              done
-
-              echo "Installed from $(basename "$SRC") image:"
-              ls -la "$DST/macvlan" "$DST/static" "$DST/host-local"
-              echo "Version: $("$DST/macvlan" 2>&1 | head -1 || true)"
-              # Kept, but now as a REPAIR rather than a workaround. The original
-              # cause is gone: extracting the tarball on the node applied the
-              # archive's `./` entry uid/gid (1001/127 — the github-actions runner
-              # that built the release) to the destination directory, and `cp`
-              # into an existing directory does not touch its ownership, so that
-              # can no longer happen.
-              #
-              # It still runs because nodes provisioned by the old installer may
-              # ALREADY carry the wrong ownership, and this is what fixes them.
-              # Why it matters: Cilium's apply-sysctl-overwrites init container
-              # runs as root without DAC_OVERRIDE, so with /opt/cni/bin not owned
-              # by root it fails with "Permission denied" copying cilium-sysctlfix
-              # into /hostbin. The old cluster only survived because the original
-              # Cilium pods initialised before the chown and were never re-rolled;
-              # a rolling daemonset replacement on rebuild is what exposed it.
-              # Safe to drop once every node has been through this version.
+              VERSION=v1.5.1
+              ARCH=amd64
+              URL="https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${VERSION}/cni-plugins-linux-${ARCH}-${VERSION}.tgz"
+              cd /host/opt/cni/bin
+              if [ -x ./macvlan ] && [ -x ./static ] && [ -x ./host-local ]; then
+                installed=$(./macvlan 2>&1 | head -1 || true)
+                echo "CNI plugins already installed (${installed})"
+              else
+                echo "Fetching ${URL}"
+                # busybox wget + tar, NOT `apk add --no-cache curl tar`.
+                # Installing tools at container start is not acceptable here: it
+                # makes the install path depend on package-index availability at
+                # exactly the moment a node is being (re)built, and this is a
+                # DaemonSet — it runs on every node.
+                #
+                # Nothing needed to be added in the first place. Verified in
+                # alpine:3.21: `tar` is already busybox (v1.37.0) and handles
+                # -xzf, and busybox `wget` follows GitHub's release redirect to
+                # objects.githubusercontent.com over TLS using the base image's
+                # /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt — fetched the real 48MB
+                # tarball and extracted an executable macvlan from it.
+                # Only `curl` is genuinely absent from the base, and wget covers
+                # what it was used for here.
+                wget -q -O /tmp/plugins.tgz "${URL}"
+                # Extract everything: the tarball entries are stored with a
+                # `./` prefix, so selective extraction by bare name fails.
+                # All standard plugins are tiny (~5-10MB total) and harmless
+                # to keep alongside Cilium's CNI binaries.
+                tar -xzf /tmp/plugins.tgz -C .
+                echo "Installed: $(ls -la macvlan static host-local)"
+              fi
+              # Always restore root ownership of /opt/cni/bin. The cni-plugins
+              # tarball includes a `./` directory entry whose uid/gid (1001/127
+              # — the github-actions runner that built the release) gets
+              # applied to the destination during extract. After that, Cilium's
+              # apply-sysctl-overwrites init container fails with "Permission
+              # denied" trying to `cp` cilium-sysctlfix into /hostbin, because
+              # the init runs root without DAC_OVERRIDE and the directory is
+              # no longer owned by root. The previous cluster only worked
+              # because the original Cilium pods initialised before the chown
+              # happened and were never re-rolled; on rebuild, the rolling
+              # daemonset replacement bites.
              chown 0:0 /host/opt/cni/bin
          securityContext:
            privileged: true
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# OpenBao policy: rotator-mosquitto-health
-#
-# Least-privilege policy for the mosquitto `health` broker-credential rotation
-# CronJob (kubernetes auth role `rotator-mosquitto-health`). PER-SECRET
-# isolation, same template as rotator-paperless: one policy + one role per
-# rotated secret, so a compromised rotation Job cannot touch any other secret.
-#
-# Scoped to the `health` credential ALONE, deliberately not to a wildcard over
-# apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-*. The broker has eight users and they are being
-# enrolled one at a time; a wildcard would silently grant the first rotator write
-# access to the other seven before they are ready, which is exactly the blast
-# radius this per-secret pattern exists to avoid.
-#
-# Plan and phasing: kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/
-# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md — added by PR #453, which is not yet
-# merged, so that path does not resolve until it lands.
-#
-# NOT applied by Flux — OpenBao policies/roles are not Kubernetes resources
-# (same convention as eso-read.hcl and every other rotator policy). Apply ONCE
-# with an admin token:
-#
-#   bao policy write rotator-mosquitto-health \
-#     kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl
-#
-#   bao write auth/kubernetes/role/rotator-mosquitto-health \
-#     bound_service_account_names=mosquitto-health-secret-rotator \
-#     bound_service_account_namespaces=openbao \
-#     policies=rotator-mosquitto-health ttl=15m
-#
-# Do NOT set token_no_default_policy=true — the `bao kv patch` kv-v2 preflight
-# needs the default policy (see rotator.hcl). The rotator writes via patch, so
-# hardening the role that way would break rotation rather than tighten it.
-#
-# BOOTSTRAP: `random` mode calls assert_fields_exist BEFORE patching, so it
-# ROTATES an existing field and never creates one. The path must already hold a
-# `password` field or the Job fails safe without writing. Seed it once:
-#
-#   bao kv put homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials \
-#     password="$(kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-health-credentials \
-#                 -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d)"
-#
-# (Reads are already covered by eso-read.hcl's `homelab/data/*`, so the
-# ExternalSecret needs no policy change.)
-path "homelab/data/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials" {
-  capabilities = ["read", "patch"]
-}
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["random"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: sync-woodpecker
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
              args: ["woodpecker-secret"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:978fe53cad83a8d55319f6201ecd171775a101b21aaa21b7ec3c7b14304c6a42
              args: ["cloudflare-roll"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["random"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:978fe53cad83a8d55319f6201ecd171775a101b21aaa21b7ec3c7b14304c6a42
              args: ["cloudflare-roll"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:b41cc3645f144179dddaa5ab1d32282c57c257432a613c15a6e15634fd0c4b81
              args: ["gitea-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -4,46 +4,6 @@ kind: Kustomization
 # (intra-namespace OpenBao access → no NetworkPolicy needed). One file per rotated
 # secret. The matching OpenBao policy/role for each lives in ../policies/ and is
 # bootstrapped manually (not GitOps-managed).
-#
-# IMAGE PINNING: every rotator here uses a DATED TAG of secret-rotator
-# (`:YYYY-MM-DD`), never a digest and never `:latest`. This is a registry-local
-# image, so it does not need digest pinning, and a dated tag makes "what actually
-# runs" a reviewable diff.
-#
-# Digests were tried and actively broke: untagged manifests are garbage-collected
-# once :latest and the dated tags move past them, so a digest pinned today stops
-# resolving after a few rebuilds. That decay is driven by edits to
-# .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml — a shared file — so adding an UNRELATED image
-# republishes secret-rotator and orphans the manifest every rotator here was
-# pinned to. 11 of these were pinned to digests that no longer existed and would
-# have ImagePullBackOff'd on their first scheduled run (issue #458); because they
-# are quarterly, that would have looked like nothing happening rather than like a
-# failure.
-#
-# Keep them all on one tag: it is a single binary containing every mode
-# (random | ha-token | cloudflare-roll | netbird-key | proxmox-token |
-# gitea-token | woodpecker-secret), so a split serves no purpose and just makes
-# the next bump partial.
-#
-# ADDING A ROTATOR: copy an existing file, and check you did not inherit a
-# digest pin from an older example — nothing enforces this automatically, so it
-# is easy to reintroduce silently and the failure only shows up months later on
-# the first scheduled run:
-#
-#   grep -l 'image:.*@sha256' \
-#     kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/*.yaml | grep -v kustomization.yaml
-#
-# (want: no output. The trailing filter is not padding — this file documents the
-# pattern, so it necessarily matches its own grep. Verified both directions:
-# silent across this directory as it stands, and it still reports a file that
-# actually carries an `image: …@sha256:` pin.)
-#
-# BUMPING the tag: verify the new one exists BEFORE committing — a tag that was
-# never built fails exactly like the digests did, and just as quietly:
-#
-#   kubectl run tagcheck --rm -i --restart=Never \
-#     --image=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:<DATE> \
-#     --command -- /secret-rotator          # prints the usage/mode list if the tag resolves
 resources:
  - paperless.yaml
  - woodpecker.yaml
@@ -58,4 +18,3 @@ resources:
  - home-assistant.yaml
  - review-bot.yaml
  - claude-oauth.yaml
-  - mosquitto-health.yaml
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
---
-# Class-A automated rotation of the mosquitto `health` broker credential — a
-# self-generated random secret.
-#
-# FIRST of the eight mosquitto broker users to be enrolled. The credentials were
-# previously minted once by bootstrap Jobs and then never changed at all: no
-# schedule, no compromise response, and they existed only in the Secret object,
-# outside the OpenBao snapshot. See kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/
-# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
-# file lands with it) for the full plan and phasing.
-#
-# `health` deliberately goes first: it is the broker's OWN liveness/readiness
-# probe credential, consumed by exec probes inside the mosquitto container via
-# the same Secret that seeds the passwd file. Nothing outside the pod holds it,
-# so a rotation needs no coordination with any client — the smallest possible
-# blast radius for proving rotator -> OpenBao -> ESO -> Reloader end to end.
-#
-# Runs the secret-rotator binary (random mode): generate 32 random bytes,
-# standard-base64 encode, and merge-patch into OpenBao. assert_fields_exist runs
-# FIRST, so a misconfigured path fails safe (no rotation) rather than adding a
-# stray field — which also means this ROTATES an existing value and never
-# bootstraps one. Seeding is a one-time out-of-band step, documented in
-# policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl.
-#
-# Base64 output is safe for this credential specifically: the probes pass it as
-# `-P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"` to mosquitto_pub/sub inside the container, so the `+`,
-# `/` and `=` characters are never parsed by a URL or a config file. That is NOT
-# automatically true of the other seven users (sml2mqtt and open3e templates on
-# the edge host, Shelly device firmware, the HA config entry), so the charset
-# must be re-checked per user before enrolling each one — the old bootstrap Jobs
-# generated alphanumeric-only passwords with `tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9'`.
-#
-# openbao-ns pattern: the Job runs in the openbao namespace, reaching the
-# OpenBao API intra-namespace — no NetworkPolicy needed. It writes OpenBao only;
-# ESO syncs mosquitto-health-credentials (ns home-assistant) and Reloader
-# restarts the broker so the passwd file is rebuilt from the new value.
-#
-# Rotation is not instant: it completes only after the ExternalSecret's
-# refreshInterval elapses and the broker rolls. During that roll two broker pods
-# with different passwd files sit behind the LB (maxUnavailable: 0/maxSurge: 1),
-# so a probe against the outgoing pod can fail auth briefly. Self-healing.
-#
-# ON-DEMAND: kubectl -n openbao create job --from=cronjob/mosquitto-health-secret-rotate mosquitto-health-secret-rotate-now
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ServiceAccount
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
---
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: CronJob
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotate
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
-spec:
-  # Quarterly, offset one month from paperless (which runs Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct) so
-  # unrelated rotations do not land in the same window and complicate diagnosis.
-  schedule: "0 4 1 2,5,8,11 *"
-  timeZone: Europe/Berlin
-  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
-  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
-  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 5
-  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
-  jobTemplate:
-    spec:
-      backoffLimit: 2
-      activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
-      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
-      template:
-        metadata:
-          labels:
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-            app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
-        spec:
-          serviceAccountName: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
-          restartPolicy: Never
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            runAsUser: 65534
-            runAsGroup: 65534
-            seccompProfile:
-              type: RuntimeDefault
-          containers:
-            - name: rotate
-              # Dated tag, per the convention documented in kustomization.yaml —
-              # every rotator here now uses the same one. Verified for this tag:
-              # it pulls, `random` is among its modes, and it carries the
-              # RANDOM_BYTES>=16 floor documented below (RANDOM_BYTES=8 exits
-              # "refusing to generate a weak secret").
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
-              args: ["random"]
-              securityContext:
-                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
-                capabilities:
-                  drop: ["ALL"]
-              env:
-                - name: BAO_ADDR
-                  value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
-                - name: BAO_ROLE
-                  value: rotator-mosquitto-health
-                - name: BAO_PATH
-                  value: homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
-                # Matches the key the ExternalSecret projects and the key the
-                # Secret already carries, so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
-                # secretKeyRef is unchanged.
-                - name: BAO_FIELDS
-                  value: "password"
-                # 32 bytes -> 44 base64 chars. The binary refuses anything below
-                # 16 bytes outright.
-                - name: RANDOM_BYTES
-                  value: "32"
-              resources:
-                requests:
-                  cpu: 25m
-                  memory: 16Mi
-                limits:
-                  memory: 48Mi
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:49bfddd8eeb5fd871cbeb05bc3b4e2fcaaab7d9e24cc3007caae6084b4634c18
              args: ["netbird-key"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["random"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:97c22bcff324a93d2bb7bf3adb2894b405ed1a8035d02ad1ff6baced3813cefe
              args: ["proxmox-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          initContainers:
            - name: rotate-mint
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
              args: ["gitea-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ spec:
                  memory: 48Mi
          containers:
            - name: sync-woodpecker
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
              args: ["woodpecker-secret"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["random"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
              args: ["random"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false