Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 401d23ac48 fix(multus): drop runtime apk add from the CNI plugins installer
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
Owner directive: tools belong in the image, not installed at container
start. This is the highest-blast-radius instance of the pattern left in the
repo — a DaemonSet, so it runs on every node.

No image was needed. `apk add --no-cache curl tar` turns out to have been
unnecessary from the start: verified in alpine:3.21 that `tar` is already
busybox (v1.37.0) and handles -xzf, and that busybox `wget` follows
GitHub's release redirect to objects.githubusercontent.com over TLS using
the base image's /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt. Only `curl` is
genuinely absent, and wget covers what it was used for. So this replaces
the install with `wget -q -O` rather than introducing another layered
image.

Severity note for the record: the apk add sat inside the else branch, so
steady-state nodes never reached it. It ran when plugins were absent — i.e.
on a fresh node or after /opt/cni/bin was wiped, which is precisely the
moment you least want a dependency on package-index availability.

Verified by running the RENDERED init script in alpine:3.21 against the
real release URL, both paths:

  empty dir     -> Fetching ...; Installed: host-local, macvlan, static
                   macvlan executable, /opt/cni/bin owner 0:0, exit 0
  already there -> "CNI plugins already installed (CNI macvlan plugin
                   v1.5.1)", exit 0, no fetch

The second line is worth noting: that version string comes from executing
the extracted binary, so the download and extraction are confirmed good,
not merely present. The chown 0:0 also still applies, which the existing
comment explains is required or Cilium's apply-sysctl-overwrites init
container fails with "Permission denied".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:47:11 +02:00
8 changed files with 556 additions and 359 deletions
-58
View File
@@ -159,61 +159,3 @@ steps:
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
# baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
# node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
# critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
# where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
- name: build-cni-plugins
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
depends_on: []
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
# needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
# fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
# every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
# base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
- name: build-alpine-openssl
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
depends_on: []
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
# Alpine plus the openssl CLI. Nothing application-specific — named for what it
# is, so anything needing `openssl s_client` / `x509` from a shell script can use
# it.
#
# It exists because installing tools at container start is not acceptable here:
# `apk add` makes every start depend on network and package-index availability,
# and the resolved version can drift between restarts of an otherwise pinned
# image.
#
# Note the openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine base — verified, the
# base carries the libraries but not the command — so unlike the multus CNI
# installer (where busybox wget/tar already covered the need) this one really
# does require an image rather than just dropping the apk add.
#
# First consumer: the paperless fetch-bridge-cert init container, which captures
# the Proton Mail Bridge's self-signed IMAP certificate via STARTTLS and pins it
# for paperless to trust. busybox has no s_client equivalent, so openssl is not
# substitutable there.
RUN apk add --no-cache openssl
-68
View File
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# Upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries, baked in at build time.
#
# WHY THIS IMAGE EXISTS
# The multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet used to fetch this tarball from
# GitHub on the node itself, at node-provisioning time, and extract it straight
# into /opt/cni/bin. Two problems with that:
#
# 1. Security. The download had NO integrity verification — wget, then tar,
# into a directory whose contents are executed as root in the CNI path on
# every node. A tampered or MITM'd artifact would have got privileged
# execution cluster-wide, with nothing to detect it.
# 2. Node rebuild. It put a live dependency on github.com (and previously the
# Alpine package index too) on the critical path of bringing a node up, so
# a GitHub outage or slow transfer stalled or broke CNI installation
# exactly when a node was being rebuilt.
#
# Baking the binaries in fixes both: the fetch happens once, here, where the
# checksum IS verified, and the installer becomes a local file copy with no
# network at all.
#
# The version and digest are pinned literals, so bumping them is a reviewable
# commit rather than a silent change in what runs on every node. The digest was
# cross-checked against upstream's own published
# cni-plugins-linux-amd64-<version>.tgz.sha256 asset rather than merely recorded
# from a local download — a download can be tampered with; the point of the
# check is to compare against what upstream states.
#
# amd64 only, matching the ARCH the installer already hardcoded and the cluster's
# node architecture. Add a second stage if a different arch is ever needed.
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d AS fetch
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.5.1
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=77baa2f669980a82255ffa2f2717de823992480271ee778aa51a9c60ae89ff9b
# busybox wget and tar are already in the base; nothing is installed here
# either. sha256sum -c fails the BUILD if the artifact does not match, which is
# the whole point — a bad download must never reach a node.
RUN set -eu; \
F="cni-plugins-linux-amd64-${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}.tgz"; \
wget -q -O "/tmp/${F}" \
"https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}/${F}"; \
echo "${CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256} /tmp/${F}" | sha256sum -c -; \
mkdir -p /plugins; \
tar -xzf "/tmp/${F}" -C /plugins; \
rm -f "/tmp/${F}"; \
# Drop the non-executable payload: the tarball ships LICENSE and README.md,
# which the old installer extracted into /opt/cni/bin alongside the binaries.
rm -f /plugins/LICENSE /plugins/README.md; \
# Fail loudly here rather than shipping an image that silently installs
# nothing, if upstream ever restructures the archive.
#
# This list must cover every plugin the repo actually depends on, not just
# the ones the installer happens to log. `dhcp` is included because the
# sibling cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet runs that binary and documents that it
# ships from here (see kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml)
# — without it in the check, upstream dropping `dhcp` while keeping the
# others would build green and only surface later as a broken DHCP daemon on
# whichever node rolled first.
for p in macvlan static host-local dhcp; do \
[ -x "/plugins/$p" ] || { echo "FATAL: /plugins/$p missing or not executable" >&2; exit 1; }; \
done
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
COPY --from=fetch /plugins/ /opt/cni-plugins/
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ resources:
- vscode-ingress.yaml
- prometheus-token-externalsecret.yaml
- config-sync-token-externalsecret.yaml
# Broker credentials come from OpenBao via ESO (replaced the bootstrap Jobs).
- mosquitto-credentials-externalsecrets.yaml
- mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
- mosquitto-config.yaml
- mosquitto-certificate.yaml
- mosquitto-service.yaml
@@ -37,9 +36,8 @@ resources:
- esphome-ingress.yaml
# Zigbee2MQTT — ZHA replacement bridge. Ships scaled to 0; the cutover
# runbook (zigbee2mqtt-migration-runbook.md) scales it up. The MQTT
# `zigbee2mqtt` broker user comes from OpenBao via
# mosquitto-credentials-externalsecrets.yaml (above) and wired
# into mosquitto-deployment.yaml (passwd + ACL).
# `zigbee2mqtt` broker user is provisioned by mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
# (above) and wired into mosquitto-deployment.yaml (passwd + ACL).
- zigbee2mqtt-coordinator-backup-externalsecret.yaml
- zigbee2mqtt-config.yaml
- zigbee2mqtt-pvc.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
---
# Generates mosquitto-credentials on first deploy. The password is created
# in-cluster, lives only in the Secret object, and is never written to git
# or seen by a human. The Mosquitto broker hashes it via mosquitto_passwd
# -U at startup; HA reads the same value from this Secret (configured
# manually in the HA MQTT integration UI).
#
# Idempotent: if the Secret already exists, the Job exits 0 without
# regenerating, so subsequent Flux reconciles don't rotate the password.
# To rotate, delete both the Secret and this Job; Flux will re-create
# the Job and a fresh password.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: mosquitto-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: mosquitto-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["secrets"]
verbs: ["get", "create"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: mosquitto-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: mosquitto-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: mosquitto-bootstrap
---
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {"homeassistant-password": $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Third broker user: `admin`. Full readwrite (same as HA) but kept on
# its own credential so a workstation client can hold a password the
# in-cluster HA config never sees, and rotating one doesn't affect the
# other. Retrieve with:
# kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-admin-credentials \
# -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-admin-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-admin-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Second broker user: `shellies`. Separate Secret (not a second key on
# mosquitto-credentials) so each credential's lifecycle is independent —
# rotating one never touches the other, and existing clusters whose
# mosquitto-credentials was already generated for `homeassistant` only
# don't end up with a half-populated Secret.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-shellies-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Fourth broker user: `sml2mqtt` — the power-meter bridge. Publish-only
# under `sml2mqtt/#` (ACL in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so
# its lifecycle is independent of the others. The sml2mqtt pod reads this
# password via its init container and renders it into config.yml.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Fifth broker user: `open3e` — the Viessmann E3 CAN bridge (Vitocal 250-A
# + Vitocharge VX3 via open3e). Scoped to `open3e/#` (ACL in
# mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is
# independent of the others. Retrieve with:
# kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-open3e-credentials \
# -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-open3e-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Broker user `health`: a dedicated, least-privilege credential used ONLY by
# mosquitto's own liveness/readiness probes (mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Its
# ACL is `write health/#` and nothing else — it cannot read any topic or
# write outside the throwaway probe subtree, so a leak is worthless (nothing
# subscribes to health/#). Kept on its own Secret, like every other user, so
# the probe never has to borrow the admin credential.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-health-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
---
# Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
# to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs, exactly like the `shellies` user) and
# `read homeassistant/status` (Z2M re-publishes discovery when HA restarts —
# ACL in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is
# independent of the others. The Z2M init container reads this password and
# renders it into /app/data/secret.yaml.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
NS=home-assistant
NAME=mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg name "$NAME" \
--arg ns "$NS" \
--arg pw "$PW_B64" \
'{apiVersion: "v1",
kind: "Secret",
metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
type: "Opaque",
data: {password: $pw}}')
curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
--data "$body" \
"$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
echo "generated $NAME"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
# The seven mosquitto broker credentials that used to be generated by bootstrap
# Jobs (mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml, now deleted), converted to the same
# OpenBao-backed pattern mosquitto-evcc-credentials already used.
#
# WHY THE JOBS WENT
# Each was ~70 lines of shell that generated a password, base64'd it, hand-built
# Secret JSON with jq and POSTed it to the Kubernetes API with curl, needing a
# ServiceAccount + Role + RoleBinding and an `apk add curl jq` on every run.
# Together: 518 lines to do what 14 declarative lines do here. They also could not
# be modified in place at all — a Job's spec.template is immutable, so changing
# even the container image made the whole Kustomization fail to reconcile.
#
# The passwords were also only ever in the Secret object: not in OpenBao, so not
# backed up, not centrally rotatable, and unrecoverable if the Secret were lost.
# Now they live in OpenBao like every other credential in this namespace.
#
# MIGRATION WAS VALUE-PRESERVING
# The existing live passwords were copied into OpenBao before this landed, and
# each round-trip was verified by sha256 — the broker has already hashed these
# (mosquitto_passwd -U at startup) and every client is using them, so generating
# fresh ones would have broken Home Assistant, zigbee2mqtt, shellies, sml2mqtt,
# open3e and the health check at once. ESO therefore rewrites each Secret with
# byte-identical content and nothing observes a change.
#
# ROTATION, which the Jobs made awkward (delete the Secret AND the Job, then wait
# for Flux), is now: update the value in OpenBao, and within refreshInterval ESO
# republishes it. The broker still needs a restart to re-hash, as before.
#
# ⚠️ NEW COUPLING, absent with the Jobs: creationPolicy is implicitly Owner, so
# ESO sets an ownerReference from each Secret to its ExternalSecret. Combined with
# the Kustomization's prune: true, DELETING AN ExternalSecret BLOCK BELOW NOW
# DELETES THE LIVE SECRET — and with it broker access for that client. The old
# Jobs created Secrets with no ownerReference, so removing a Job left its Secret
# untouched; that safety net is gone. To retire a credential deliberately, remove
# the consumer first. To move one out of ESO's control without losing it, set
# creationPolicy: Orphan on that block before deleting it.
#
# NOTE the key names are not uniform: mosquitto-credentials carries
# `homeassistant-password` while the rest carry `password`. That asymmetry came
# from the original Jobs and is preserved deliberately — the consumers reference
# those key names, so normalising them would be a separate, breaking change.
# `dataFrom.extract` copies whatever keys the OpenBao entry holds, so each entry
# was seeded with the matching key name.
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-credentials # unchanged name; HA's MQTT integration reads this
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-admin-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-admin-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-admin-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-health-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-health-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-shellies-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
+2 -6
View File
@@ -88,17 +88,13 @@ spec:
# trust without disabling verification.
initContainers:
- name: fetch-bridge-cert
# alpine + the openssl CLI, built by .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml
# from ci/images/alpine-openssl/. Replaces `apk add --no-cache openssl`
# on every paperless pod start: tools belong in the image, not
# installed at runtime. Dated tag so a change is a reviewable diff
# here, matching the ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-07-30
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -e
apk add --no-cache openssl
# Wait until the bridge presents a cert via STARTTLS.
# Re-fetched on every paperless restart so a bridge cert
# rotation only requires a paperless rollout to pick up.
@@ -38,57 +38,54 @@ spec:
effect: NoExecute
initContainers:
- name: install
# Plugin binaries are baked into this image, checksum-verified at build
# time (ci/images/cni-plugins/Containerfile). This replaces fetching the
# release tarball from GitHub on the node, which had NO integrity check
# at all and put github.com on the critical path of every node rebuild.
# Dated tag so a version change is a reviewable diff here, matching the
# ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-07-30
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
SRC=/opt/cni-plugins
DST=/host/opt/cni/bin
# No network, no download, no "already installed?" guard. The old
# guard existed to avoid re-fetching; a local copy is cheap, so
# copying unconditionally is better — the node then always matches
# the version pinned in this manifest instead of keeping whatever
# it happened to install first.
for src in "$SRC"/*; do
name=${src##*/}
# Copy to a temp name in the SAME directory and rename over the
# target. A plain `cp` onto a plugin the kubelet is currently
# executing can fail with ETXTBSY; rename(2) never does, and is
# atomic, so a concurrent CNI invocation sees either the old or
# the new binary and never a partial one.
cp "$src" "$DST/.$name.tmp"
chmod 0755 "$DST/.$name.tmp"
mv -f "$DST/.$name.tmp" "$DST/$name"
done
echo "Installed from $(basename "$SRC") image:"
ls -la "$DST/macvlan" "$DST/static" "$DST/host-local"
echo "Version: $("$DST/macvlan" 2>&1 | head -1 || true)"
# Kept, but now as a REPAIR rather than a workaround. The original
# cause is gone: extracting the tarball on the node applied the
# archive's `./` entry uid/gid (1001/127 — the github-actions runner
# that built the release) to the destination directory, and `cp`
# into an existing directory does not touch its ownership, so that
# can no longer happen.
#
# It still runs because nodes provisioned by the old installer may
# ALREADY carry the wrong ownership, and this is what fixes them.
# Why it matters: Cilium's apply-sysctl-overwrites init container
# runs as root without DAC_OVERRIDE, so with /opt/cni/bin not owned
# by root it fails with "Permission denied" copying cilium-sysctlfix
# into /hostbin. The old cluster only survived because the original
# Cilium pods initialised before the chown and were never re-rolled;
# a rolling daemonset replacement on rebuild is what exposed it.
# Safe to drop once every node has been through this version.
VERSION=v1.5.1
ARCH=amd64
URL="https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${VERSION}/cni-plugins-linux-${ARCH}-${VERSION}.tgz"
cd /host/opt/cni/bin
if [ -x ./macvlan ] && [ -x ./static ] && [ -x ./host-local ]; then
installed=$(./macvlan 2>&1 | head -1 || true)
echo "CNI plugins already installed (${installed})"
else
echo "Fetching ${URL}"
# busybox wget + tar, NOT `apk add --no-cache curl tar`.
# Installing tools at container start is not acceptable here: it
# makes the install path depend on package-index availability at
# exactly the moment a node is being (re)built, and this is a
# DaemonSet — it runs on every node.
#
# Nothing needed to be added in the first place. Verified in
# alpine:3.21: `tar` is already busybox (v1.37.0) and handles
# -xzf, and busybox `wget` follows GitHub's release redirect to
# objects.githubusercontent.com over TLS using the base image's
# /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt — fetched the real 48MB
# tarball and extracted an executable macvlan from it.
# Only `curl` is genuinely absent from the base, and wget covers
# what it was used for here.
wget -q -O /tmp/plugins.tgz "${URL}"
# Extract everything: the tarball entries are stored with a
# `./` prefix, so selective extraction by bare name fails.
# All standard plugins are tiny (~5-10MB total) and harmless
# to keep alongside Cilium's CNI binaries.
tar -xzf /tmp/plugins.tgz -C .
echo "Installed: $(ls -la macvlan static host-local)"
fi
# Always restore root ownership of /opt/cni/bin. The cni-plugins
# tarball includes a `./` directory entry whose uid/gid (1001/127
# — the github-actions runner that built the release) gets
# applied to the destination during extract. After that, Cilium's
# apply-sysctl-overwrites init container fails with "Permission
# denied" trying to `cp` cilium-sysctlfix into /hostbin, because
# the init runs root without DAC_OVERRIDE and the directory is
# no longer owned by root. The previous cluster only worked
# because the original Cilium pods initialised before the chown
# happened and were never re-rolled; on rebuild, the rolling
# daemonset replacement bites.
chown 0:0 /host/opt/cni/bin
securityContext:
privileged: true