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claude-botandClaude Opus 5 364cc01291 fix(ci): deploy the proxies when their inventory changes, not just their roles
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Arming the bouncer on proxy-2 (#766) merged and deployed nothing. The switch
lives in ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-2.renner.uno.yml, and the trigger
list covered ansible/roles/** and the play but no inventory path at all. The
change sat in git looking applied while the host kept running dry-run, and
nothing reported a problem — there was simply no pipeline run to fail.

The bouncer's LAPI key has the same shape: it lives in
group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml, so a rotation would never have reached the
hosts either.

Both paths are now listed. pve_hosts.yml deliberately is not: it is the single
inventory file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies
for any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy] group
membership needs a manual deployment run.

Merging this triggers the run itself, since .woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml
is in its own trigger list — so the arming from #766 applies with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:18:03 +02:00
k.renner c99e94cc0b Merge pull request 'feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer on proxy-2' (#766) from arm-crowdsec-proxy-2 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#766
2026-09-02 14:15:42 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 05cd7f3674 feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer on proxy-2
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First host goes from dry-run to enforcing. proxy-2 deliberately: it is the
dual-stack member, while proxy-1 is IPv6-only and the one where every
network-shaped problem has surfaced first — the dhcpcd/resolv.conf breakage,
and a GitHub download that could not work at all. host_vars keeps the change
to one host; proxy-1 stays on the role default.

Verified before committing: ansible-inventory resolves nftables for proxy-2
and nothing for proxy-1.

Adds netbird.renner.uno to capi_whitelists first, and that is not decoration.
The bouncer's chain sits on the INPUT hook, the proxy hosts run no other
firewall, and there is therefore no conntrack rule accepting established flows
ahead of it. A ban on the management address would drop the return traffic of
the proxies' own outbound control connection and take them off the mesh, with
no inbound attack involved at all. The same reasoning already covers the proxy
addresses, which were listed from the start.

Checked at the time of writing: none of these addresses appear in the current
decision set — searched all ~15k entries. That is the state today, not a
guarantee; they are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
community blocklists, which is the whole reason for listing them.

The delivery path was tested end to end beforehand with a decision on
192.0.2.1 (TEST-NET-1, so no real traffic could be affected). Both bouncers
received the ban within one poll cycle — a 206-byte delta against the usual
26 — and the revocation the same way, 203 bytes, ~5s after deletion. What that
did not test is whether a packet is actually dropped, which dry-run cannot
show. This commit is what makes that testable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:13:11 +02:00
3 changed files with 46 additions and 0 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
#
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
---
# Arms the CrowdSec firewall bouncer on THIS host only.
#
# The role defaults to dry-run for the whole netbird_proxy group, so the two
# members can be armed one at a time. proxy-2 goes first deliberately: it is
# the dual-stack member, while proxy-1 is IPv6-only and the one where every
# network-shaped problem has surfaced first — the dhcpcd/resolv.conf breakage,
# and the GitHub download that could not work at all.
#
# What flipping this does: the bouncer stops logging what it would block and
# creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6 crowdsec6) with the decisions
# it holds. It touches no existing chain and sets no chain policy.
#
# Rollback is `systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer` — a clean stop deletes
# both tables itself. Setting this back to dry-run and re-running the play does
# the same through the handler.
#
# Remove this file once proxy-1 follows and the role default moves to nftables.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
@@ -65,6 +65,21 @@ spec:
- 45.157.177.26/32
- 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
- 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
# netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
#
# Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
# hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
# no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
# this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
# outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
# inbound attack involved at all.
#
# Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
# current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
# these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
# community blocklists.
- 162.55.50.97/32
- 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
# mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
# the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is