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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 d1aba106ce fix(crowdsec): poll the Traefik logs instead of watching them with inotify
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Both agents stopped reading on 2026-08-27 and had read nothing since:
k8s-1 at 12:15:41Z, k8s-2 at 19:14:27Z, each frozen at its line count
(35449 and 29917) while Traefik kept logging normally.

Each had hit its first kubelet log rotation after starting. The paths
under /var/log/containers are symlinks into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
rotates the target at containerLogMaxSize; the inotify tailer reopens
the path, waits for a file that is already present, and never returns.
Nothing about the result looks broken: pods Running and Ready, LAPI
answering, bouncers pulling, cumulative counters still showing large
numbers. The only symptom is that no scenario fires again, which reads
as quiet rather than blind.

So this was not a one-off. Rotation happens roughly every eight hours
here, and the agents die on the first one after every start, which
bounds local detection to a few hours at a time.

CrowdSec diagnoses this itself and names the fix, at agent startup:

  File /var/log/containers/traefik-...log is a symlink, but inotify
  polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
  Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true in your configuration

Upstream carries the identical case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik),
and the chart gained this field in helm-charts#109 to fix it. It does
not conflict with the force_inotify: true the chart hardcodes: that
governs the fsnotify watch on the directory, used to discover the log
of a replacement Traefik pod, while this governs how an already
discovered file is read. Verified by rendering the chart.

The acquisition ConfigMap is checksummed into the agent pod template,
so this rolls the DaemonSet and the stalled agents restart with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 07:17:59 +02:00
k.renner 87cc238d33 Merge pull request 'fix(llama-server): one slot, so 16k belongs to one request' (#771) from llama-single-slot into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#771
2026-09-02 19:34:27 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 353b7882d7 fix(llama-server): one slot, so 16k belongs to one request
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Four Paperless requests overlapped and all four died:

    decode: failed to find free space in the KV cache
    srv decode: Context size has been exceeded.

They wanted 6209, 6472, 4303 and 1271 tokens from a shared pool of
16384. Auto slot count opens four of them and is also what enables
--kv-unified, so they draw on one buffer rather than a quarter each --
generous for a single caller, and impossible for four.

They overlapped because a client timeout does not stop the generation
behind it. The eval abandons a request after 300 s and moves to the next
document; the abandoned one keeps consuming the budget the next one
needs, and one slow document is enough to start the pile-up. With one
slot they queue instead, which is what should happen: nothing calls this
server in parallel on purpose, and Paperless's celery worker runs at
concurrency 1.

Deliberately no liveness probe alongside this. /health answered 200 in
0.4 ms throughout, which looks like the probe failing at its job -- but
the server drained the batch and served again by itself, so a probe that
restarted the pod would have turned a self-healing incident into an
outage. With a single slot, a probe asking for a real completion would
also queue behind live work and kill healthy pods mid-document.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 21:31:05 +02:00
k.renner 403a8e0e90 Merge pull request 'fix(llama-server): back to 16k — 32k per slot corrupts inference' (#770) from llama-ctx-revert into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#770
2026-09-02 19:06:25 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 5023a5971b fix(llama-server): back to 16k — 32k per slot corrupts inference
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#767 broke the model. Asked to classify a document and answer with JSON
only, the server returned 1025 tokens of "!" against a 650-token prompt.
That is the KV cache emitting numbers rather than language, and it takes
everything downstream with it: Paperless ran past its 300 s timeout on
every document, Home Assistant got an empty completion once and a
hallucinated list of devices that do not exist another time.

None of that looked like a backend fault from the outside. The server
starts, /props reports the requested size, /health passes, and the
OpenAI response is well-formed with finish_reason "stop". Only the
generated text gives it away, which is why three separate symptoms got
blamed on prompt size, on tokenizer behaviour and on the RAG context
before anyone read the output.

The boundary is between the two changes rather than at either: #765 left
16384 per slot and produced coherent answers; #767 raised it to 32768 and
produced this. The same Vulkan/Mesa stack already fails at --ubatch-size
2048 with ErrorDeviceLost, so a ceiling here is not a surprise -- only
that it degrades quietly instead of erroring.

--parallel goes with it. Unset, slots return to auto, which is what keeps
--kv-unified enabled ("if number of slots is auto"), so the auto slots
share one buffer and each may draw the full 16384.

Home Assistant needed 18910 tokens for one Assist request and cannot have
them at this ceiling. That path is closed, and Paperless -- which fits in
16k and never needed more -- is what this restores.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 21:05:03 +02:00
k.renner 1951497175 Merge pull request 'feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer everywhere, drop the per-host override' (#769) from arm-crowdsec-proxy-1 into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#769
2026-09-02 18:57:09 +00:00
security-bot ad32ab566b chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-09-02 16:23:17 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b96260cef2 feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer everywhere, drop the per-host override
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proxy-2 has been enforcing since 14:21:54 without incident, so the role
default moves to nftables and the host_vars override goes away rather than
being duplicated for proxy-1. proxy-2's rendered config is unchanged by this,
so it will not restart; only proxy-1 does.

The staged rollout did its job and can be read off the deploy log:

  proxy-1: deployed in mode "dry-run"
  proxy-2: deployed in mode "nftables"

and only proxy-2 restarted, which showed up as a 1,887,882-byte startup pull
from its address alone.

The delivery path was tested in enforcing mode with a decision on 192.0.2.1
(TEST-NET-1): both hosts had the ban 3s later as a 205-byte delta, and the
revocation as a 203-byte delta 1-2s after deletion.

What is still not proven is that a packet is actually dropped, and the
measurement for that argues for finishing the rollout rather than waiting.
Requests from banned addresses reaching Traefik stopped after proxy-2 armed —
1 at 14:02, 3 at 14:07, 22 at 14:08, 1 at 14:18, none after — but 25 of those
27 arrived in a single burst beforehand, so at this volume that is consistent
with enforcement rather than evidence of it. With both hosts armed the claim
becomes falsifiable instead: no request from an address in the decision set
should reach Traefik at all, and a single one would prove otherwise.

dry-run remains available per host through inventory/host_vars, which is what
a newly added proxy should get before it enforces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:28:25 +02:00
k.renner 67b0fece93 Merge pull request 'fix(ci): deploy the proxies when their inventory changes, not just their roles' (#768) from fix-proxy-deploy-triggers into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#768
2026-09-02 14:19:21 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 364cc01291 fix(ci): deploy the proxies when their inventory changes, not just their roles
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Arming the bouncer on proxy-2 (#766) merged and deployed nothing. The switch
lives in ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-2.renner.uno.yml, and the trigger
list covered ansible/roles/** and the play but no inventory path at all. The
change sat in git looking applied while the host kept running dry-run, and
nothing reported a problem — there was simply no pipeline run to fail.

The bouncer's LAPI key has the same shape: it lives in
group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml, so a rotation would never have reached the
hosts either.

Both paths are now listed. pve_hosts.yml deliberately is not: it is the single
inventory file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies
for any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy] group
membership needs a manual deployment run.

Merging this triggers the run itself, since .woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml
is in its own trigger list — so the arming from #766 applies with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:18:03 +02:00
k.renner 91849e31ff Merge pull request 'fix(llama-server): --ctx-size is the total, so ask for 65536' (#767) from llama-ctx-fix into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#767
2026-09-02 14:17:24 +00:00
k.renner c99e94cc0b Merge pull request 'feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer on proxy-2' (#766) from arm-crowdsec-proxy-2 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#766
2026-09-02 14:15:42 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 05cd7f3674 feat(crowdsec): arm the bouncer on proxy-2
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First host goes from dry-run to enforcing. proxy-2 deliberately: it is the
dual-stack member, while proxy-1 is IPv6-only and the one where every
network-shaped problem has surfaced first — the dhcpcd/resolv.conf breakage,
and a GitHub download that could not work at all. host_vars keeps the change
to one host; proxy-1 stays on the role default.

Verified before committing: ansible-inventory resolves nftables for proxy-2
and nothing for proxy-1.

Adds netbird.renner.uno to capi_whitelists first, and that is not decoration.
The bouncer's chain sits on the INPUT hook, the proxy hosts run no other
firewall, and there is therefore no conntrack rule accepting established flows
ahead of it. A ban on the management address would drop the return traffic of
the proxies' own outbound control connection and take them off the mesh, with
no inbound attack involved at all. The same reasoning already covers the proxy
addresses, which were listed from the start.

Checked at the time of writing: none of these addresses appear in the current
decision set — searched all ~15k entries. That is the state today, not a
guarantee; they are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
community blocklists, which is the whole reason for listing them.

The delivery path was tested end to end beforehand with a decision on
192.0.2.1 (TEST-NET-1, so no real traffic could be affected). Both bouncers
received the ban within one poll cycle — a 206-byte delta against the usual
26 — and the revocation the same way, 203 bytes, ~5s after deletion. What that
did not test is whether a packet is actually dropped, which dry-run cannot
show. This commit is what makes that testable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:13:11 +02:00
5 changed files with 104 additions and 29 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
#
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
@@ -28,14 +28,23 @@ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
# STARTS INERT, and that is the point.
# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
#
# dry-run pulls decisions and logs what it would block without creating a
# single nftables rule. The first bouncer to arm anywhere enforces ~24k CAPI
# decisions at once on the only external entry path, so the false-positive
# window has to come before the enforcement, not after it. Flip to `nftables`
# one host at a time once the log looks right.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: dry-run
# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
#
# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
+34 -21
View File
@@ -75,31 +75,44 @@ spec:
# many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
- --threads
- "4"
# 32k because Home Assistant's Assist agent measured 18910 tokens
# for a single request: ~12k of exposed-entity overview plus ~7k of
# base instructions and tool schemas, whose parameters enumerate
# every exposed name, area and floor. At 16384 the request was
# refused outright.
# 16k, and going above it corrupts inference rather than failing.
# At 32768 per slot this server answered a 650-token classification
# prompt with 1025 tokens of "!" — the KV cache producing numbers
# rather than language. It does not crash, it does not warn, and
# the OpenAI response looks well-formed, so the damage only shows
# in what callers get back: Paperless ran past its 300 s timeout,
# and Home Assistant got an empty completion and a hallucinated
# device list.
#
# --ctx-size is the total and llama.cpp divides it across the
# slots, so 65536 over two slots is 32768 each.
# The same Vulkan/Mesa stack already fails hard at --ubatch-size
# 2048; this is the quiet version of that limit. Raise this only
# against a generation that is read, not against a server that
# merely starts.
#
# It does not read that way without --parallel, and the reason is
# in `llama-server --help`: --kv-unified defaults to enabled only
# "if number of slots is auto". Leaving --parallel unset therefore
# bought a single KV buffer shared across sequences, where every
# slot could draw the full --ctx-size — which is why this server
# once reported n_ctx_slot 16384 across four slots. Naming a slot
# count turns that off and splits the context instead.
#
# Two slots is what is actually in use: one holds Home Assistant's
# prompt, one holds Paperless's. A third caller would queue rather
# than evict either, which is the better failure mode given a cold
# prefill of this prompt costs around two minutes.
- --ctx-size
- "65536"
- "16384"
# One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
#
# Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
# also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
# of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
# 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
# "Context size has been exceeded".
#
# They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
# generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
# shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
# to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
# here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
# Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
#
# No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
# its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
# would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
# asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
# kill healthy pods during a long document.
- --parallel
- "2"
- "1"
# A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
# with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --ubatch-size
@@ -65,6 +65,21 @@ spec:
- 45.157.177.26/32
- 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
- 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
# netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
#
# Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
# hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
# no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
# this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
# outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
# inbound attack involved at all.
#
# Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
# current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
# these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
# community blocklists.
- 162.55.50.97/32
- 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
# mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
# the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
@@ -202,6 +217,32 @@ spec:
- namespace: ingress
podName: traefik-*
program: traefik
# Read by polling, not inotify. Every path under
# /var/log/containers is a symlink into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
# rotates the target once it reaches containerLogMaxSize (10Mi,
# roughly every eight hours for Traefik here). An inotify tailer
# does not survive that rotation: it reopens the path, waits for a
# file that is in fact already present, and never reads another
# line. Nothing about that state looks broken from outside — the
# pod stays Running and Ready, the LAPI keeps answering, and the
# cumulative counters keep displaying whatever they reached, so the
# only symptom is that no scenario ever fires again.
#
# CrowdSec detects the hazard itself and logs it at startup, with
# this exact remedy in the message: "is a symlink, but inotify
# polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
# Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true". Upstream carries
# the same case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik), and the chart
# gained this field in helm-charts#109 specifically to fix it.
#
# Orthogonal to the force_inotify: true that the chart hardcodes
# into acquis.yaml and offers no way to unset. That one governs the
# fsnotify watch on the directory, i.e. discovering the log of a
# replacement Traefik pod; this one governs how an already
# discovered file is read. Both true is the supported combination.
#
# Costs CPU per open file per upstream docs — two files per node.
poll_without_inotify: true
env:
- name: COLLECTIONS
value: "crowdsecurity/traefik crowdsecurity/http-cve crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules"