fix(monitoring): turn off Alloy and InfluxDB usage telemetry

Both phone home on a timer: every alloy pod to stats.grafana.org (~135 a day each) and influxd to telemetry.influxdata.com (56 a day). Egress policy denies it, so this only removed log noise and wasted SYNs; switch it off at the source like Loki's reporting_enabled: false. --disable-reporting per the "alloy run" reference (chart alloy.extraArgs); INFLUXD_REPORTING_DISABLED per the InfluxDB v2 config options. S28-41 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge pull request 'fix(authentik): admit the UDM's LDAPS sync to the LDAP outpost' (#1600 ) from fix/ldap-outpost-udm-ldaps into main
2026-11-07 22:10:52 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 21:03:33 +00:00 · 2026-11-07 22:02:30 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 22:00:21 +01:00 · 2026-11-07 20:02:17 +00:00 · 2026-11-07 21:00:44 +01:00
97 changed files with 3046 additions and 1655 deletions
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ when:
      - "ci/images/**"
      - "secret-rotator/**"
      - "review-bot/**"
+      - "wlan-setup/**"
      - ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"
  - event: deployment
    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-ci-images"'
@@ -197,6 +198,31 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:$TAG \
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:latest

+  # wlan-setup: the Go service behind wlan.renner.uno (802.1X/Passpoint setup page with per-device
+  # authentik app passwords). Runs after Gitea is up, so no ghcr mirror.
+  - name: build-wlan-setup
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.20-debug@sha256:28af5a3bd9c51fedb353ad91de735eda53592b5c06a34e7f5a9550334725d7f7
+    directory: wlan-setup
+    when:
+      - event: deployment
+      - event: push
+        path: ["wlan-setup/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d-%H%M)
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Containerfile \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:latest
+
  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: a general-purpose alpine + jq base for
  # workloads that need to read JSON from a shell script. Named for what it IS,
  # not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Tests for the wlan-setup Go service (wlan-setup/). Offline: the tests run against a fake
+# authentik server, so the step needs no secret and no network beyond the module cache.
+when:
+  - event: pull_request
+    path: ["wlan-setup/**", ".woodpecker/wlan-setup-test.yml"]
+
+steps:
+  - name: go-test
+    image: golang:1.27.3-bookworm@sha256:d9b6a1beb9474adc2a1ce842573639b44b2a0dd49b6669f51d3821baf9ec37c9
+    commands:
+      - test -z "$(gofmt -l wlan-setup)"
+      - go -C wlan-setup vet ./...
+      - go -C wlan-setup test -race ./...
@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 # edge-host — bare-metal Arch thin client (replaces the k8s-edge Talos VM)

 Runs the hardware-bound services that used to be pinned to the `k8s-edge`
-Talos node (opentofu `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`), plus the new CAN bridge:
+Talos node (opentofu `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`):

 | Service | How it runs | Hardware | Talks to |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | zwave-js-ui | docker compose | ZWA-2 Z-Wave USB radio | HA `zwave_js` via ws://:3000, UI :8091 |
 | sml2mqtt | docker compose | FTDI FT230X meter reader | Mosquitto (`sml2mqtt` user) |
-| open3e | venv + systemd | Innomaker USB2CAN (gs_usb) | Mosquitto (`open3e` user) |
+
+The Viessmann E3 CAN bus is not read by an edge host: the ESP32 gateway
+`vitocal-can` (open3e-esp32) at the Vitocal publishes `open3e/#` directly to
+the cluster broker. `plays/install-edge-host.yml` removes the former
+heating-can stack and the can0 configuration from edge hosts.

 Everything else that once lived on k8s-edge (HA core, matter-server, OTBR,
 music-assistant) already moved to the general node pool and stays in the
@@ -19,17 +23,13 @@ The deployed unit is a **Dell Wyse 3040** (Atom x5-Z8350, 2 GB RAM) on a
 flash-wear handling that hardware implies. The installer also supports an
 N100/NVMe box; it autodetects the target disk, so either works.

-Rationale for leaving Kubernetes for the CAN part: the stock Talos kernel
-ships with `CONFIG_CAN` unset (siderolabs/talos#7686), so SocketCAN cannot
-work in any pod without a custom kernel image per Talos release.
-
 ## Base install (once, from the edge-host installer ISO)

 Build and boot the dedicated installer image — see
 `images/edge-host-iso/README.md`. Short version:

 1. `sudo pacman -S archiso && sudo images/edge-host-iso/build.sh`
-2. Write ISO to a USB stick, boot the target box from it, run `edge-install`
+2. Write ISO to a USB stick, boot the target box from it, run `edge-install <hostname>`
   (partitions the internal disk — NVMe if present, else the eMMC; the
   installer autodetects — installs the ansible-ready base system with SSH
   keys, DHCP, docker — asks for confirmation before wiping).
@@ -58,24 +58,18 @@ inventory change.

 | device | group | playbook |
 |---|---|---|
-| Innomaker USB2CAN (Vitocal/VX3 + E380) | `heating_can` | `plays/install-heating-can.yml` |
 | Nabu Casa ZWA-2 Z-Wave radio | `zwave_gateway` | `plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` |

-Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. They depend on
-the base play having run: all three need the local MQTT bridge, and two of
-them need docker.
+Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. It depends on
+the base play having run: it needs docker.

-A host with nothing attached is simply absent from all three groups and needs
+A host with nothing attached is simply absent from these groups and needs
 none of these commands.

 ## Secrets (before first play run)

 Create `inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml` with ansible-vault. The
-cluster broker has no `open3e` user: edge-1 logs in only as the register
-account `edge-1` (see "MQTT bridge" below), so
-`vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` reaches only the loopback broker, which
-allows anonymous clients; any random value works (`openssl rand -hex 24`).
-The zwave-js value comes out of the cluster:
+zwave-js value comes out of the cluster:

 ```
 # zwave-js session secret
@@ -84,7 +78,6 @@ kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.sessio

 ```yaml
 # vault.yml
-vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "..."
 vault_edge_loki_password: "..."   # dedicated edge-1 Loki push cred (see "Logging & eMMC")
 ```
@@ -102,9 +95,6 @@ The Z-Wave network keys do NOT need separate handling — they live in

 Preparation:
 - [ ] `vault.yml` populated (above), play runs green against edge-1
- [ ] CAN: Innomaker adapter connected to the VX3 external CAN port,
-      `ip -details link show can0` shows `state ERROR-ACTIVE bitrate 250000`,
-      `candump can0 -n 5` shows frames

 zwave-js (order matters — never two servers on one radio):
 - [ ] Copy the store out of the PVC while the pod still runs:
@@ -122,11 +112,6 @@ sml2mqtt:
      port, Wh stays Wh) → remove sml2mqtt from the home-assistant
      kustomization in the follow-up PR

-open3e:
- [ ] Stop any workstation listener (ONE instance per bus, hard rule)
- [ ] Move the USB2CAN adapter, `systemctl start open3e`
- [ ] Topics under `open3e/#` update on the broker
-
 Afterwards:
 - [ ] Retire VM 153: remove `vm_153_k8s_edge.tf`, `talos/patches/k8s-edge.yaml`,
      node from the cluster (`kubectl delete node k8s-edge`, tofu apply)
@@ -141,17 +126,6 @@ Afterwards:
  mesh-connected workstation. The play reads the image's Alpine release
  itself and rebuilds the preloaded `.so` when it changes (see
  "Logging & eMMC" → zwave-js).
- open3e / E3onCAN updates: both are pinned to commits in
-  `roles/heating-can/defaults/main.yml`, so re-running the play does NOT pick
-  up upstream changes -- that is deliberate, these drive the heat pump. The
-  weekly update-audit reports when either falls behind (see
-  `ci/agents/update-audit/prompt.md`); bump the pin and re-run.
-  Pinning to a tag is not an option for open3e: it publishes none.
- Ad-hoc CAN scans: `systemctl stop open3e` first (single-instance rule),
-  restart afterwards.
- can-utils (`candump`) is AUR-only on Arch — install manually via
-  `pamac build can-utils` if needed for debugging; the role deliberately
-  doesn't manage AUR packages.

 ## Logging & eMMC

@@ -164,7 +138,9 @@ role keeps logs off local flash and monitors wear:
 - **Docker logs to journald** (`docker-daemon.json`, `log-driver: journald`)
  instead of unbounded json files under `/var/lib/docker/containers`. Both
  compose services inherit it; `docker logs` still works.
- **Grafana Alloy ships the journal to Loki** (`edge-alloy.service`). Its
+- **Grafana Alloy ships the journal to Loki** (`edge-alloy.service`, which
+  runs the upstream `grafana/alloy` image with `/run/log/journal` mounted
+  read-only; Arch's `grafana-alloy` package has no `loki.source.journal`). Its
  WAL/positions sit on `/run/alloy` (tmpfs), so the agent writes nothing to
  the eMMC either. Net effect: no log writes hit local flash — the trade-off
  is that logs are RAM-only and lost on reboot unless already shipped.
@@ -213,47 +189,3 @@ journal commit).
 - Verify the drop with the eMMC-write sampling described above; roll back by
  removing the `LD_PRELOAD` env + `.so` mount from the compose file.

-## MQTT bridge (TLS to the cluster broker)
-
-open3e, e3oncan and sml2mqtt do **not** publish to the cluster broker directly.
-They connect to a **local mosquitto on loopback** (`127.0.0.1:1883`,
-`edge_mqtt_host`), which **bridges to the cluster broker over TLS**
-(`mqtt.renner.uno:8883`). Two reasons:
-
- **Security:** open3e and e3oncan have no native MQTTS support (their MQTT
-  code does a plain `connect()`), so they can't use the broker's 8883 TLS
-  listener. Terminating TLS in the local broker keeps their plaintext MQTT on
-  loopback only — off the untrusted IoT VLAN — while the actual network hop is
-  encrypted. The public Let's Encrypt cert is validated against the system CA
-  bundle (`edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile`); no cert distribution needed.
- **Availability:** the local broker buffers telemetry (in RAM) if the cluster
-  broker is briefly unreachable, and flushes on reconnect — edge-1 no longer
-  hard-depends on cluster/network uptime for every publish.
-
-The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary is the
-host; nothing off-host can reach it.
-
-**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** One bridge `connection` logs in as the
-register account `edge-1` (`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`)
-and carries `open3e/#` out and `open3e/cmnd` back. The cluster broker does not
-accept the vault-password bridges in `bridge.d/legacy.conf`, which exists only
-until the first push. Its password is pushed
-by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
-esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
-the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
-its own server key, nothing else. On a push it writes
-`/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/edge-1.conf`, deletes `bridge.d/legacy.conf` and
-restarts the local mosquitto. The controller sets a new password whenever the
-bridge reports "not connected" (also after a reinstall), so no play run is
-needed for a rotation. Diagnosis: `journalctl -u
-edge-mqtt-cred`, and `mosquitto_sub -t '$SYS/broker/connection/edge-1/state'`
-(retained `1` = connected).
-
-**eMMC:** the local broker writes **nothing** to flash — `persistence false`
-(retained/queued messages in RAM) and `log_dest stdout` (to the volatile
-journal → Loki). Do not add persistence or log-file settings to
-`edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2`.
-
-Rollback: point `edge_mqtt_host` back to `mqtt.renner.uno` and re-run (clients
-reconnect directly on 1883). Config: `edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2` →
-`/etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf`.
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 # Secret indirection — real values live in vault.yml (ansible-vault) next
 # to this file; see docs/edge-host.md for how to populate it from
 # the cluster secrets.
-edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "{{ vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret }}"
 # Loki push credential (dedicated 'edge-1' user, Traefik basic-auth on the
 # loki.renner.uno ingress; the matching htpasswd line lives in the cluster
@@ -36,25 +35,8 @@ keepalived_ntp_sysctl:
 # Realtek NIC on the Wyse 3040 has no hardware timestamping.
 chrony_hwtimestamp: false

-# --- Local MQTT contract -------------------------------------------------
-# Shared between the broker and its clients, so it belongs to the inventory
-# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can
-# publishes here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
-# broker AS the open3e user, so it needs that identity too.
-#
-# Keeping these in one role's defaults only worked while a single play loaded
-# every role at once. Splitting the plays by capability exposed it: the bridge
-# could not render without a heating-can default, and the CAN services could
-# not render without an mqtt-bridge default.
-edge_mqtt_host: 127.0.0.1
-edge_mqtt_port: 1883
-edge_open3e_mqtt_user: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_topic: open3e
-
 # Units claude-bot may restart (ssh-ca role); the containers go through docker.
 ssh_ca_claude_sudo_units:
-  - mosquitto
-  - edge-mqtt-cred
  - edge-alloy
  - keepalived
  - chronyd
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@ proxy-1.renner.uno ansible_host=proxy-1.nb.renner.uno ansible_user=root
 proxy-2.renner.uno ansible_host=proxy-2.nb.renner.uno ansible_user=root

 # Every bare-metal edge thin client. Gets the host-generic roles only:
-# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the MQTT bridge, the VLAN
-# sub-interface. Nothing here assumes any peripheral is attached.
+# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the VLAN sub-interface. Nothing here
+# assumes any peripheral is attached.
 [edge_host]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno ansible_user=root
+edge-2.iot.renner.uno ansible_user=root

 # Synology NAS (DSM): nas-1 RS1221+ on site, nas-2 DS1522+ off site.
 [synology_nas]
@@ -36,32 +37,18 @@ nas-2.renner.uno ansible_user=root
 # These are children of [edge_host], declared below: a peripheral is added to an
 # edge client, it does not replace the base. Making that a :children relation
 # rather than a comment means a host added only to a capability group still
-# resolves group_vars/edge_host -- where the local MQTT contract lives -- so it
-# cannot silently come up without edge_mqtt_host and friends.
+# resolves group_vars/edge_host.
 [zwave_gateway]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno

-[heating_can]
-edge-1.iot.renner.uno
-
 [edge_host:children]
 zwave_gateway
-heating_can

-# NTP servers. edge-1 was added here so the role would survive the PVE hosts
-# being retired for bare-metal Talos, which cannot run chrony or keepalived
-# itself. That retirement has now happened, so edge-1 is the ONLY member.
-#
-# THIS IS NO LONGER HIGHLY AVAILABLE. The group was jupiter (MASTER, prio 100),
-# saturn (90), neptune (80) and edge-1 (BACKUP, 70); the first three are gone.
-# A single VRRP member takes the address regardless of its configured state, so
-# the service address is still served, but by one thin client with
-# no failover behind it. install-ntp-ha.yml still carries the four-host
-# ntp_servers priority map, which now describes hosts that do not exist.
-#
-# Restoring redundancy needs a second chrony host that is not a Talos node.
-# See plays/install-ntp-ha.yml for why keepalived is scoped more narrowly than
-# chrony within this group.
+# NTP servers: every edge host (edge-1 BACKUP prio 70, edge-2 BACKUP prio 60;
+# see the ntp_servers map in plays/install-ntp-ha.yml). Talos nodes cannot run
+# chrony or keepalived. The jupiter/saturn/neptune entries in that map
+# describe retired PVE hosts. See plays/install-ntp-ha.yml for why keepalived
+# is scoped more narrowly than chrony within this group.
 [ntp_cluster:children]
 edge_host

@@ -73,6 +60,7 @@ proxy-1.renner.uno
 proxy-2.renner.uno
 netbird.renner.uno
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno
+edge-2.iot.renner.uno
 nas-1.renner.uno
 nas-2.renner.uno

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
---
-# Configure VMs to use host time sync via kvm-clock
-# Disables systemd-timesyncd to prevent NTP conflicts
-#
-# VMs get time from Proxmox host via kvm-clock paravirtualized clock
-# This is more accurate and reliable than network NTP for VMs
-
- name: Configure VM time synchronization from host
-  hosts: all
-  become: yes
-  gather_facts: yes
-
-  tasks:
-    - name: Check if running as VM (not LXC)
-      stat:
-        path: /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
-      register: clocksource_file
-
-    - name: Get current clock source
-      slurp:
-        src: /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
-      register: clocksource
-      when: clocksource_file.stat.exists
-
-    - name: Display clock source
-      debug:
-        msg: "Clock source: {{ (clocksource.content | b64decode | trim) if clocksource_file.stat.exists else 'N/A (LXC)' }}"
-
-    - name: Check if systemd-timesyncd is installed
-      command: systemctl list-unit-files systemd-timesyncd.service
-      register: timesyncd_installed
-      check_mode: false
-      failed_when: false
-      changed_when: false
-
-    - name: Stop and disable systemd-timesyncd on VMs using kvm-clock
-      systemd:
-        name: systemd-timesyncd
-        state: stopped
-        enabled: no
-      when:
-        - clocksource_file.stat.exists
-        - clocksource.content is defined
-        - "'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode)"
-        - "'systemd-timesyncd.service' in timesyncd_installed.stdout"
-
-    - name: Mask systemd-timesyncd to prevent re-enabling
-      systemd:
-        name: systemd-timesyncd
-        masked: yes
-      when:
-        - clocksource_file.stat.exists
-        - clocksource.content is defined
-        - "'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode)"
-        - "'systemd-timesyncd.service' in timesyncd_installed.stdout"
-
-    - name: Verify time sync status
-      command: timedatectl show --property=NTPSynchronized
-      register: timesync_status
-      check_mode: false
-      changed_when: false
-      failed_when: false
-
-    - name: Display final status
-      debug:
-        msg: |
-          Host: {{ inventory_hostname }}
-          Type: {{ 'VM (kvm-clock)' if (clocksource_file.stat.exists and 'kvm-clock' in (clocksource.content | b64decode | default(''))) else 'LXC/Other' }}
-          Time sync: {{ timesync_status.stdout | default('unknown') }}
-          Note: VMs sync time from Proxmox host, LXCs inherit host time automatically
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 # their own inventory groups:
 #
 #   plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml   [zwave_gateway]   ZWA-2 radio
-#   plays/install-heating-can.yml     [heating_can]     Innomaker USB2CAN
 #
 # Splitting the roles without splitting the plays would have kept the coupling:
 # one play applying every role to one group is the monolith again, a layer up.
@@ -31,11 +30,96 @@
  # do not silently depend on the connection user staying privileged.
  become: true

+  # The Viessmann E3 CAN bus is read by vitocal-can (open3e-esp32 at the
+  # Vitocal), which publishes to the cluster broker itself, not by an edge
+  # host. These remove the former heating-can stack, the can0 configuration
+  # and the open3e MQTT bridge (loopback mosquitto + edge-mqtt-cred); each is
+  # a no-op where they are absent.
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: Read the service list
+      ansible.builtin.service_facts:
+
+    - name: Stop and disable the retired MQTT bridge services
+      ansible.builtin.systemd:
+        name: "{{ item }}"
+        state: stopped
+        enabled: false
+      loop:
+        - edge-mqtt-cred
+        - mosquitto
+      when: (item ~ '.service') in ansible_facts.services
+
+    - name: Remove the retired MQTT bridge files
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: "{{ item }}"
+        state: absent
+      loop:
+        - /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service
+        - /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred
+        - /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
+        - /etc/mosquitto
+      register: edge_mqtt_bridge_files
+
+    - name: Reload systemd without the edge-mqtt-cred unit
+      ansible.builtin.systemd:
+        daemon_reload: true
+      when: edge_mqtt_bridge_files.changed
+
+    - name: Uninstall mosquitto
+      ansible.builtin.package:
+        name: mosquitto
+        state: absent
+
+    - name: Check for the retired heating-can compose project
+      ansible.builtin.stat:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/heating-can/docker-compose.yml
+      register: edge_heating_can_compose
+
+    - name: Stop and remove the retired heating-can containers and image
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: docker compose down --remove-orphans --rmi all
+        chdir: /opt/edge-host/heating-can
+      when: edge_heating_can_compose.stat.exists
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Remove the retired heating-can directory
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/heating-can
+        state: absent
+
+    - name: Remove the can0 networkd configuration
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /etc/systemd/network/80-can0.network
+        state: absent
+      register: edge_can0_network
+
+    - name: Reload networkd without the can0 configuration
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: networkctl reload
+      when: edge_can0_network.changed
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Read the can0 link flags
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: ip -o link show can0
+      register: edge_can0_link
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      failed_when: false
+
+    - name: Take can0 down
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: ip link set can0 down
+      when:
+        - edge_can0_link.rc == 0
+        - edge_can0_link.stdout is search('[<,]UP[,>]')
+      changed_when: true
+
  roles:
    - certificates
    - common
+    - pacman-cache
    - edge-flash-wear
    - docker-install
    - edge-log-shipper
-    - mqtt-bridge
    - edge-vlan
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus, for hosts with the Innomaker
-# USB2CAN adapter attached.
-#
-# Targets [heating_can]: membership means the adapter is physically present.
-# Two roles because they are two concerns -- the interface is host network
-# state, the services consume it -- but one group, because both need the same
-# hardware.
-#
-# Requires the base play (plays/install-edge-host.yml) to have run: these
-# services publish to the local MQTT bridge it sets up.
- name: Install heating CAN services
-  hosts: heating_can
-  become: true
-
-  roles:
-    - socketcan
-    - heating-can
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  become: true
  roles:
    - common
+    - timesyncd
    - docker-install
    - netbird-proxy
    - netbird-proxy-watchdog
@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
  become: true
  roles:
    - common
+    - timesyncd
    - docker-install
    - netbird-server
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@
      edge-1.iot.renner.uno:
        priority: 70
        state: "BACKUP"
+      edge-2.iot.renner.uno:
+        priority: 60
+        state: "BACKUP"

  roles:
    - role: chrony-ntp-server
@@ -54,18 +54,9 @@
 # via plays/configure-ssh-ca.yml.

 # -------------------------------------------------------
-# 5. Disable NTP on VMs/LXC (use host time)
+# 5. Time sync
 # -------------------------------------------------------
- name: Stop and disable systemd-timesyncd on VMs/LXC
-  systemd:
-    name: systemd-timesyncd
-    state: stopped
-    enabled: no
-    masked: yes
-  when:
-    - ansible_facts['virtualization_role'] == 'guest'
-    - ansible_facts['virtualization_type'] in ['kvm', 'lxc']
-  ignore_errors: yes
+# Moved to separate roles: timesyncd (internet VPS), chrony-ntp-server (edge).

 # -------------------------------------------------------
 # 6. Certificates
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@

 edge_alloy_config_file: /etc/alloy/edge.alloy
 edge_alloy_http_port: 12345
-edge_alloy_bin: /usr/bin/grafana-alloy   # Arch `grafana-alloy` pkg names the binary this, not `alloy`
+# Upstream image: Arch's grafana-alloy 1.21 is built without
+# loki.source.journal. Renovate-tracked (customManagers in renovate.json).
+edge_alloy_image: grafana/alloy:v1.21.3@sha256:8ab871206bd2d8f89277f53abffee5f452a293980788d52f85fa183a87a505a4
 edge_loki_push_url: "https://loki.renner.uno/loki/api/v1/push"
 edge_loki_username: edge-1
 edge_alloy_labels:
@@ -6,15 +6,18 @@
 # directly, so one journal source covers everything. Alloy s storage/WAL sits
 # on /run (tmpfs) so it does not write to flash either.

- name: Install grafana-alloy
+# Alloy runs from the upstream image (see edge-alloy.service); the Arch package
+# lacks journal support.
+- name: Remove the grafana-alloy package
  ansible.builtin.package:
    name: grafana-alloy
-    state: present
+    state: absent

 - name: Create alloy system group
  ansible.builtin.group:
    name: alloy
    system: true
+  register: edge_alloy_group

 - name: Create alloy system user
  ansible.builtin.user:
@@ -24,6 +27,25 @@
    system: true
    create_home: false
    shell: /usr/bin/nologin
+  register: edge_alloy_user
+
+- name: Look up the systemd-journal group
+  ansible.builtin.getent:
+    database: group
+    key: systemd-journal
+
+- name: Set the container identity
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    edge_alloy_uid: "{{ edge_alloy_user.uid }}"
+    edge_alloy_gid: "{{ edge_alloy_group.gid }}"
+    edge_alloy_journal_gid: "{{ ansible_facts.getent_group['systemd-journal'][1] }}"
+
+- name: Pull the alloy image
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [docker, pull, "{{ edge_alloy_image }}"]
+  register: edge_alloy_pull
+  changed_when: "'Downloaded newer image' in edge_alloy_pull.stdout"
+  notify: Restart alloy

 - name: Create alloy config directory
  ansible.builtin.file:
@@ -1,32 +1,35 @@
 [Unit]
-Description=Grafana Alloy (edge-1 log shipper -> Loki)
+Description=Grafana Alloy (journal -> Loki)
 Documentation=https://grafana.com/docs/alloy/
-After=network-online.target
+After=docker.service network-online.target
+Requires=docker.service
 Wants=network-online.target

 [Service]
 Type=simple
-User=alloy
-Group=alloy
-# Read the (volatile) systemd journal.
-SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal
-# WAL + positions on tmpfs so the agent never writes to the eMMC. %t is the
-# runtime dir root (/run); RuntimeDirectory creates /run/alloy owned by us.
-RuntimeDirectory=alloy
-ExecStart={{ edge_alloy_bin }} run \
+# WAL + positions on tmpfs so the agent never writes to the eMMC.
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/install -d -o alloy -g alloy -m 0750 /run/alloy
+ExecStartPre=-/usr/bin/docker rm -f edge-alloy
+# Attached run with --log-driver none: the container's output reaches the
+# journal once, through this unit.
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker run --rm --name edge-alloy \
+  --log-driver none \
+  --network host \
+  --user {{ edge_alloy_uid }}:{{ edge_alloy_gid }} \
+  --group-add {{ edge_alloy_journal_gid }} \
+  --read-only --tmpfs /tmp \
+  --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+  -v /run/log/journal:/run/log/journal:ro \
+  -v /etc/machine-id:/etc/machine-id:ro \
+  -v {{ edge_alloy_config_file }}:/etc/alloy/config.alloy:ro \
+  -v /run/alloy:/var/lib/alloy \
+  {{ edge_alloy_image }} run \
  --server.http.listen-addr=127.0.0.1:{{ edge_alloy_http_port }} \
-  --storage.path=%t/alloy \
-  {{ edge_alloy_config_file }}
-ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-Restart=on-failure
+  --storage.path=/var/lib/alloy \
+  /etc/alloy/config.alloy
+ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker stop edge-alloy
+Restart=always
 RestartSec=10s
-LimitNOFILE=65536
-
-# Hardening (bare metal, no LXC namespace limits here).
-NoNewPrivileges=yes
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=yes
-PrivateTmp=yes

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus: open3e (heat pump) and
-# e3oncan (E380 energy meter). The can0 interface itself is the socketcan
-# role.
-
-# Service root. Kept per-role so the role is usable on its own.
-edge_base_dir: /opt/edge-host
-
-edge_open3e_mqtt_user: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_topic: open3e
-edge_open3e_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
-edge_open3e_poll_seconds: 30
-# Read-only datapoint set (Phase 1 extended set, established 2026-07-02 on
-# the commissioning workstation; see vican repo CLAUDE.md for the rationale).
-# NO -w / write DIDs here — live heating + battery, writes are Phase 3.
-# vx3.266 = ErrorDtcHistory (O3EList) — the VX3 fault log; polled to catch
-# recurrences of FailureCommunicationEnergyMeter (the E380 energy-meter link
-# the internal PV-surplus EMS depends on). Decodes via the master O3EList
-# codec inherited through the vx3plus overlay.
-# vitocal.543/2350/2543/2560: SmartGrid-/EMS-Status-Beobachtung (2026-07-06)
-# — klärt, ob die Eigenstromoptimierung (EMS) bei PV-Überschuss von selbst
-# den WW-Boost auslöst (2543.2 steht laut Scan bereits auf +10 K), bevor
-# SG-Ready-Verdrahtung oder andere Trigger gebaut werden. Alle vier ro.
-# vitocal.259/260 = InfoDtcList/InfoDtcHistory (O3EList) — the HPMU event log,
-# the Vitocal-side counterpart to vx3.266. Both are capped lists (2 and 9
-# entries when added), so the multi-frame read is cheap at a 30 s poll.
-# Records faults/info events only (NormalOperation, LagDeviceDtcReported,
-# LegionellaProtectionTemperatureReached) — NOT setpoint or program changes.
-# onebase.*: the 29 paired ZigBee slots on the One Base gateway (ECU 0x6c3) --
-# 8 radiator valves, 9 climate sensors, 9 underfloor actuators, 3 floor
-# thermostats. Per-device room temperature, active setpoint, humidity, valve
-# opening/demand, battery and RSSI; the local replacement for the ViCare cloud
-# room sensors. Needs the onebase overlay (files/open3e-onebase.py) -- the stock
-# codec declares 57 bytes and a paired slot answers with 68.
-# Only CurrentValues are polled. The room and device registries (1884.., 2084..)
-# are static configuration and are read on demand, not every 30 s.
-edge_open3e_datapoints: >-
-  vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791,onebase.2086,onebase.2089,onebase.2092,onebase.2095,onebase.2098,onebase.2101,onebase.2104,onebase.2107,onebase.2110,onebase.2113,onebase.2116,onebase.2119,onebase.2122,onebase.2125,onebase.2128,onebase.2131,onebase.2134,onebase.2137,onebase.2140,onebase.2143,onebase.2262,onebase.2265,onebase.2268,onebase.2271,onebase.2274,onebase.2277,onebase.2280,onebase.2283,onebase.2286
-# ECU addresses; -dev selects codec set, tx selects the UDS address.
-# vcmu (refrigerant-circuit controller) has no dedicated codec set —
-# omitting dpList makes open3e fall back to the generic datapoint list,
-# which decodes all polled VCMU DIDs.
-edge_open3e_devices:
-  vitocal: { tx: "0x680", dpList: "vcal" }
-  # dpList als Pfad: Overlay-Datei mit den Batteriemodul-DIDs (siehe
-  # files/open3e-vx3plus.py) — die Stock-vx3-Liste filtert sie sonst weg.
-  vx3: { tx: "0x6a1", dpList: "/config/vx3plus.py" }
-  vcmu: { tx: "0x68c" }
-  # One Base ZigBee gateway. Overlay re-declares the paired ZigBee slots at
-  # their real 68-byte length (see files/open3e-onebase.py).
-  onebase: { tx: "0x6c3", dpList: "/config/onebase.py" }
-
-edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds: 10
-edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
-
-# Secrets come from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
-#   edge_open3e_mqtt_password
-
-# The image carrying both readers, built and pinned in CI
-# (ci/images/heating-can/Containerfile). The source pins live in the
-# Containerfile, in the artifact -- not here -- so what is deployed is a tag,
-# and `docker compose up -d` on an unchanged tag is a genuine no-op.
-#
-# Tracked by the weekly update-audit as an ordinary image, which is why this is
-# simpler to keep current than the two git refs it replaced: one publishes no
-# tags at all, the other was pinned to an untagged commit between releases.
-heating_can_image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
-
-# Compose project directory. Separate from the old native layout under
-# {{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e, which this role removes.
-heating_can_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/heating-can"
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the One Base
-# ZigBee gateway on ECU 0x6c3 (BACKENDGATEWAY).
-#
-# Upstream declares ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues as 57 bytes. A PAIRED device
-# slot on this gateway answers with 68: the 57 known bytes plus the parent
-# device serial and three trailing bytes. udsoncan reads only the declared
-# length and then treats the next two bytes -- the first half of that serial --
-# as a foreign data identifier, so every paired slot fails to decode with
-# "Server returned values for data identifier 0x.... that was not requested".
-# The bogus identifier differs per device because the serial does.
-#
-# This overlay re-declares the 29 paired slots at 68 bytes, reusing upstream's
-# sub-type list so the per-device-type O3ESwitch (climate sensor / TRV / floor
-# thermostat / actuator, incl. DeviceTemperatureSetpoint) is inherited rather
-# than copied.
-#
-# EMPTY slots answer with 57 and decode against the stock codec, so they are
-# left alone and are not polled. A slot that is later unpaired therefore starts
-# reporting a decode error on its topic instead of a value.
-#
-# Verified on ECU 0x6c3, 2026-09-17: 29 paired slots, all 68 bytes.
-from open3e.Open3Ecodecs import O3EComplexType, RawCodec
-from open3e.Open3Edatapoints import dataIdentifiers as _master
-
-# ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues of the paired slots: devices 1-20 run 2086..2143
-# in steps of 3, devices 21-29 continue at 2262..2286.
-_PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES = [2086 + 3 * n for n in range(20)] + [
-    2262 + 3 * n for n in range(9)
-]
-
-
-def _with_parent_serial(did):
-    stock = _master["dids"][did]
-    return O3EComplexType(
-        68,
-        stock.id,
-        list(stock.subTypes)
-        + [
-            RawCodec(8, "ParentDeviceSerialnumber"),
-            RawCodec(2, "Unknown_65_66"),
-            RawCodec(1, "Unknown_67"),
-        ],
-        desc=stock.desc,
-        info=stock.info,
-        acc=stock.acc,
-    )
-
-
-dataIdentifiers = {
-    "dids": {
-        **_master["dids"],
-        **{did: _with_parent_serial(did) for did in _PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES},
-    }
-}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the VX3:
-# the stock vx3 list acts as a FILTER (DIDs missing from it are popped
-# from the master table, Open3Eclass.py), so the per-battery-module DIDs
-# were never pollable with dpList "vx3". This overlay re-adds them with
-# codec None (= keep the master/general codec, RawCodec hex strings).
-#
-# Module DIDs (verified answering on ECU 0x6a1, 2026-07-03):
-#   1577-1582  ElectricalEnergyStorageModule{One..Six}OperatingData
-#              (139 B: 8x temperature 0.1 °C + 15x cell voltage mV)
-#   3085-3090  ElectricalEnergyStorageModule{One..Six}Information
-#              (18 B: module voltage 0.01 V, SoH?, counters)
-from open3e.Open3EdatapointsVx3 import dataIdentifiers as _vx3
-
-dataIdentifiers = {
-    "dids": {
-        **_vx3["dids"],
-        1577: None, 1578: None, 1579: None, 1580: None, 1581: None, 1582: None,
-        3085: None, 3086: None, 3087: None, 3088: None, 3089: None, 3090: None,
-    }
-}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Reload systemd
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    daemon_reload: true
-
- name: Restart heating-can
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d --force-recreate
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: true
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
---
-# Heating system over the Viessmann E3 CAN bus.
-#
-# Two readers of the same heating installation, supervised inside one container
-# from one image (ci/images/heating-can):
-#   open3e    UDS request/response to the Vitocal heat pump and Vitocharge VX3
-#   e3oncan   passive CANopen listener for the E380 grid energy meter, which
-#             feeds the heat pump's own energy management
-#
-# They coexist because e3oncan issues no bus writes.
-#
-# Nothing is installed here. The image is built in CI with both sources pinned,
-# published to the registry, and this host only pulls and runs it. That is what
-# removes the churn: these were pip-installed into venvs on the node, and pip
-# re-cloned and rebuilt a VCS requirement on every converge -- restarting the
-# heating bridge each time -- which pinning the SHA did not fix.
-#
-# network_mode: host is required, not incidental: SocketCAN interfaces live in
-# the host network namespace, so can0 is only reachable that way. It is also how
-# the local MQTT broker on 127.0.0.1 is reached. CAN_RAW needs no capabilities,
-# so both run unprivileged.
-#
-# The can0 interface itself belongs to the socketcan role; this role consumes it.
-
- name: Create heating-can directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# --- Migration off the native install ---------------------------------------
-# Must happen before the containers start. Two open3e instances issuing UDS
-# requests on one CAN bus is the failure mode to avoid, so the old units are
-# stopped and masked rather than merely disabled -- masked so a stray
-# `systemctl start` or a leftover dependency cannot bring them back alongside
-# the containers.
- name: Find which native CAN units still exist
-  ansible.builtin.stat:
-    path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}.service"
-  loop:
-    - open3e
-    - e3oncan
-  register: heating_can_native_units
-
-# Stop and disable BEFORE anything else, and do NOT swallow the result.
-#
-# The first version did stop + disable + mask in one call with
-# failed_when: false, then deleted the unit files. Masking a unit whose file
-# still exists conflicts, so the call failed, failed_when hid it, nothing was
-# stopped -- and the next task deleted the unit files out from under two
-# running processes. systemctl is-enabled then reported "not-found" and looked
-# clean while is-active still said "active".
-#
-# The result on 2026-08-10 was two open3e instances issuing UDS requests on the
-# same CAN bus for nine minutes, fighting over the open3e-edge client ID and
-# kicking each other off the broker.
-#
-# Only units that actually exist are touched, so a fresh host does not need an
-# error swallowed to get through this.
- name: Stop and disable the native CAN services
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: "{{ item.item }}"
-    state: stopped
-    enabled: false
-  loop: "{{ heating_can_native_units.results }}"
-  loop_control:
-    label: "{{ item.item }}"
-  when: item.stat.exists
-
-# Masking is deliberately NOT used. It writes a symlink at the same path the
-# next task removes, so the two cancel out -- which is half of how the original
-# failed. With the unit files gone there is nothing left to start.
- name: Remove the native unit files
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}.service"
-    state: absent
-  loop:
-    - open3e
-    - e3oncan
-  notify: Reload systemd
-
-# The invariant that actually matters is "no native process is on the CAN bus",
-# and systemd reporting success is not the same claim. Two open3e instances
-# polling one bus is the failure this whole block exists to prevent, so it is
-# asserted directly rather than inferred from the calls above.
- name: Check for surviving native CAN processes
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    argv: [pgrep, -af, "edge-host/(open3e|e3oncan)"]
-  register: heating_can_survivors
-  check_mode: false
-  changed_when: false
-  failed_when: false
-
- name: Assert no native CAN process survived
-  ansible.builtin.assert:
-    that:
-      - heating_can_survivors.stdout | default('') | length == 0
-    fail_msg: >-
-      A native open3e/e3oncan process is still running after the units were
-      stopped and removed:
-      {{ heating_can_survivors.stdout_lines | default([]) | join('; ') }}.
-      Starting the container now would put two readers on the same CAN bus --
-      two open3e instances issue competing UDS requests and take over each
-      other's MQTT session. Kill the survivors, then re-run.
-    success_msg: No native CAN processes remain; safe to start the container.
-
- name: Remove the native venvs
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ item }}"
-    state: absent
-  loop:
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e/venv"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan/venv"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan/src"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/open3e"
-    - "{{ edge_base_dir }}/e3oncan"
-
-# --- Configuration (bind-mounted into the containers) ------------------------
- name: Deploy open3e devices.json
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    content: "{{ edge_open3e_devices | to_nice_json }}\n"
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/devices.json"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy open3e vx3 datapoint overlay (battery-module DIDs)
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: open3e-vx3plus.py
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/vx3plus.py"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy open3e One Base datapoint overlay (68-byte ZigBee slots)
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: open3e-onebase.py
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/onebase.py"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
-# --- Compose project ---------------------------------------------------------
- name: Deploy the broker credential env file
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: heating-can.env.j2
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/heating-can.env"
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Deploy heating-can compose project
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: docker-compose.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart heating-can
-
- name: Pull the heating-can image
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose pull
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: false
-
-# Unlike the zwave and meter services there is no missing-device tolerance here:
-# can0 is created by the socketcan role from a USB adapter that is part of this
-# host's purpose. If it is absent the heating telemetry is down and the run
-# should say so rather than pass quietly.
- name: Start heating-can services
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d
-    chdir: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}"
-  register: heating_can_up
-  changed_when: >-
-    'Started' in heating_can_up.stderr or 'Created' in heating_can_up.stderr
-    or 'Started' in heating_can_up.stdout or 'Creating' in heating_can_up.stdout
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can).
-#
-# One container. Both CAN readers live in the image and are supervised inside
-# it -- this file supplies configuration and nothing else. It does not know
-# open3e's or E3onCAN's command line.
-#
-# network_mode: host is required: SocketCAN interfaces live in the host network
-# namespace, so {{ edge_can_interface }} is only reachable this way, and it is
-# also how the local MQTT broker is reached. CAN_RAW needs no capabilities, so
-# the image runs unprivileged.
-services:
-  heating-can:
-    image: {{ heating_can_image }}
-    container_name: heating-can
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    network_mode: host
-    volumes:
-      - ./devices.json:/config/devices.json:ro
-      - ./vx3plus.py:/config/vx3plus.py:ro
-      - ./onebase.py:/config/onebase.py:ro
-    env_file:
-      # Broker credential, 0600 -- see heating-can.env.j2.
-      - heating-can.env
-    environment:
-      CAN_INTERFACE: "{{ edge_can_interface }}"
-      MQTT_HOST: "{{ edge_mqtt_host }}"
-      MQTT_PORT: "{{ edge_mqtt_port }}"
-      MQTT_TOPIC: "{{ edge_open3e_mqtt_topic }}"
-      MQTT_FORMAT: "{{ edge_open3e_mqtt_format }}"
-      E3ONCAN_MQTT_FORMAT: "{{ edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format }}"
-      OPEN3E_CONFIG: /config/devices.json
-      OPEN3E_CLIENT_ID: open3e-edge
-      OPEN3E_POLL_SECONDS: "{{ edge_open3e_poll_seconds }}"
-      OPEN3E_DATAPOINTS: "{{ edge_open3e_datapoints }}"
-      E3ONCAN_DEVICE: e380
-      E3ONCAN_GAP_SECONDS: "{{ edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds }}"
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). 0600 -- carries the broker credential.
-#
-# Kept out of docker-compose.yml, which is 0644: the sibling roles on this host
-# do the same (power-meter-sml renders its config at 0600 while its compose file
-# stays world-readable), and the native unit this replaced used a 0600 env file
-# for exactly this value.
-MQTT_USER={{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-MQTT_PASSWORD={{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
-# --- MQTT: edge clients (open3e, e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish to a LOCAL
-# mosquitto on loopback, which bridges to the central cluster broker over TLS
-# (open3e/e3oncan have no native MQTTS). This keeps plaintext on loopback only
-# — off the untrusted IoT VLAN — and buffers telemetry in RAM during cluster
-# blips. The local broker writes nothing to the eMMC (persistence off, logs to
-# the volatile journal). See edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2 and README "MQTT bridge".
-# Upstream cluster broker the local bridge connects to (TLS; the public
-# Let's Encrypt cert is validated against the system CA bundle).
-edge_mqtt_cluster_host: mqtt.renner.uno
-edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port: 8883
-edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
-
-# --- Bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) ------------
-# The cluster account the bridge logs in as (register entry in
-# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml). The controller pushes
-# its password to edge-mqtt-cred and rotates it when the bridge reports
-# "not connected"; there is no copy in ansible-vault.
-edge_mqtt_bridge_account: edge-1
-# HTTPS port of edge-mqtt-cred (esp32 device API, mTLS). Only a client
-# certificate from the MQTT CA with this CN is accepted.
-edge_mqtt_cred_port: 8443
-edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn: mqtt-account-controller
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-# Managed by ansible (roles/mqtt-bridge). Receives the cluster bridge password
-# from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) so no plaintext copy lives in
-# ansible-vault and no play run is needed to rotate it.
-#
-# Speaks the controller's esp32 device API over HTTPS:
-#   GET /api/status   -> {"mqtt": {"connected": bool}}
-#   PUT /api/settings <- {"mqtt": {"user": "...", "pass": "..."}}
-# A client certificate from the MQTT CA with CN mqtt-account-controller is
-# required; nothing else may call it. The server key is generated on this
-# host and never leaves it (the controller pins it on first contact).
-#
-# PUT writes the bridge file (template + credentials), removes the legacy
-# vault-password bridges and restarts the local mosquitto. The password is
-# kept only in that 0640 root:mosquitto file.
-import grp
-import json
-import os
-import socket
-import ssl
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import threading
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-
-CONF = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
-WRITE = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def connected():
-    try:
-        out = subprocess.run(
-            ["mosquitto_sub", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", str(CONF["local_port"]),
-             "-t", CONF["state_topic"], "-C", "1", "-W", "3"],
-            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdout
-    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
-        return False
-    return out.strip() == "1"
-
-
-def write_bridge(user, password):
-    with open(CONF["template"]) as f:
-        body = f.read()
-    body += f"remote_username {user}\nremote_password {password}\n"
-    d = os.path.dirname(CONF["bridge_file"])
-    fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=d, prefix=".edge-mqtt-cred.")
-    with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
-        f.write(body)
-    os.chown(tmp, 0, grp.getgrnam("mosquitto").gr_gid)
-    os.chmod(tmp, 0o640)
-    os.replace(tmp, CONF["bridge_file"])
-    for legacy in CONF["legacy_files"]:
-        if os.path.exists(legacy):
-            os.remove(legacy)
-    subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "mosquitto"], check=True, timeout=60)
-
-
-def valid(s):
-    # Controller passwords are random URL-safe tokens; anything with
-    # whitespace or a control character would break the config line.
-    return isinstance(s, str) and 0 < len(s) <= 256 and s.isprintable() and not any(c.isspace() for c in s)
-
-
-class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    def authorized(self):
-        cert = self.connection.getpeercert() or {}
-        cns = [v for rdn in cert.get("subject", ()) for k, v in rdn if k == "commonName"]
-        if cns != [CONF["allowed_cn"]]:
-            self.send_error(403)
-            return False
-        return True
-
-    def reply(self, code, obj=None):
-        data = b"" if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode()
-        self.send_response(code)
-        if data:
-            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(data)
-
-    def do_GET(self):
-        if not self.authorized():
-            return
-        if self.path != "/api/status":
-            return self.send_error(404)
-        self.reply(200, {"mqtt": {"connected": connected()}})
-
-    def do_PUT(self):
-        if not self.authorized():
-            return
-        if self.path != "/api/settings":
-            return self.send_error(404)
-        try:
-            n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-            if not 0 < n <= 4096:
-                raise ValueError("body size")
-            m = json.loads(self.rfile.read(n))["mqtt"]
-            user, password = m["user"], m["pass"]
-        except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
-            return self.send_error(400)
-        if user != CONF["user"] or not valid(password):
-            return self.send_error(400)
-        with WRITE:
-            write_bridge(user, password)
-        self.log_message("bridge credentials for %s replaced, mosquitto restarted", user)
-        self.reply(204)
-
-    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
-        sys.stderr.write("%s %s\n" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args))
-
-
-class Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-    address_family = socket.AF_INET6
-
-    def server_bind(self):
-        self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
-        super().server_bind()
-
-    def get_request(self):
-        # The TLS handshake runs in the request thread, with a timeout, so a
-        # stalled peer cannot block the accept loop.
-        sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
-        sock.settimeout(10)
-        return self.ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False), addr
-
-
-def main():
-    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
-    ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
-    ctx.load_cert_chain(CONF["cert"], CONF["key"])
-    ctx.load_verify_locations(CONF["ca"])
-    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
-    srv = Server(("::", CONF["port"]), Handler)
-    srv.ctx = ctx
-    srv.serve_forever()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIUN8ne4k4Wif9O83GDyKiBP0Ma7EIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
-GTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUmVubmVyIE1RVFQgQ0EwHhcNMjYxMDA2MTUzMDE1WhcNMzYx
-MDAzMTUzMDE1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5SZW5uZXIgTVFUVCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49
-AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOZhZF2JDoyvVg2oIXSbJAuAWDcoG22RxPA4oMKRMA/b
-XzIY566D2k6cVnWqbil9s/q4O2mj+Epo7plBw8NwuOOjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
-AwICpDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcqSDDiLZzhrvqq9f16Y08
-CO7QfzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiBFkxd9pXnqIcjReEcOTvCBZ3HxKu2jNQGL
-/le7gunTGgIgZapWAcu4awa+wmZcR/z2luOjD2GhIT15um14Z+sstJk=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
---
-# The MQTT clients (zwave-js, sml2mqtt, open3e, e3oncan) reconnect on their
-# own once the local broker is back.
- name: Restart mosquitto
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: mosquitto
-    state: restarted
-
- name: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: edge-mqtt-cred
-    state: restarted
-    daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
---
-# Local MQTT bridge broker.
-#
-# Edge clients (open3e, e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish here over loopback; this
-# broker bridges to the cluster broker over TLS, because those clients have no
-# native MQTTS. Persistence is off and logging goes to stdout so it writes
-# nothing to local flash.
-
- name: Install mosquitto
-  ansible.builtin.package:
-    name: mosquitto
-    state: present
-
- name: Create the bridge directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
-    state: directory
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0750"
-
- name: Check for the controller-managed bridge file
-  ansible.builtin.stat:
-    path: "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf"
-  register: edge_mqtt_bridge_managed
-
-# Until mqtt-account-controller has pushed the first password, keep the
-# vault-password bridges so the cluster never loses edge-1's data. Once the
-# managed file exists, never render them again (edge-mqtt-cred removed them).
- name: Deploy legacy vault-password bridges
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2
-    dest: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"   # carries the legacy cluster bridge credentials
-  when: not edge_mqtt_bridge_managed.stat.exists
-  notify: Restart mosquitto
-
- name: Deploy local mosquitto config
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2
-    dest: /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
-    owner: root
-    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"
-  notify: Restart mosquitto
-
- name: Enable local mosquitto bridge
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: mosquitto
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-
-# --- edge-mqtt-cred (REN-1307): receives the bridge password from
-# mqtt-account-controller. edge-1 holds only the public MQTT CA and its own
-# server key, generated here and never copied off the host.
- name: Create edge-mqtt-cred config directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
-    state: directory
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "0700"
-
- name: Generate edge-mqtt-cred server key and certificate
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: >-
-      openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1
-      -nodes -days 36500 -subj "/CN={{ inventory_hostname }}"
-      -keyout /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key -out /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt
-    creates: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred files
-  ansible.builtin.copy:
-    src: "{{ item.src }}"
-    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
-  loop:
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.py, dest: /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred, mode: "0755"}
-    # Public CA of the cluster's MQTT client certificates
-    # (kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/mqtt-ca.yaml), valid until 2036-10-03.
-    - {src: mqtt-ca.crt, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt, mode: "0644"}
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred config and bridge template
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: "{{ item.src }}"
-    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
-  loop:
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json, mode: "0600"}
-    # Read only on the controller's next push: a change here reaches the
-    # running bridge when the password is next set.
-    - {src: edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in, mode: "0600"}
-    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service, mode: "0644"}
-  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
-
- name: Enable edge-mqtt-cred
-  ansible.builtin.systemd:
-    name: edge-mqtt-cred
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-    daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). edge-mqtt-cred appends
-# remote_username/remote_password to this and writes the result to
-# /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf. One bridge for
-# open3e, as the register account `{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}`
-# (ACL readwrite open3e/#). sml2mqtt is retired (SML reader, 2026-09-19).
-connection {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-# The bridge state goes to the LOCAL broker only (retained 1/0); edge-mqtt-cred
-# reads it to answer the controller's "connected?".
-notifications true
-notifications_local_only true
-notification_topic $SYS/broker/connection/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}/state
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Legacy vault-password bridges, rendered only
-# while /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf does not
-# exist; edge-mqtt-cred deletes this file on the controller's first push
-# (REN-1307). Remove with the vault keys once edge-1 is on the register account.
-# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
-# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
-# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
-connection edge1-open3e
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Local mosquitto that the edge clients (open3e,
-# e3oncan, sml2mqtt) publish to over loopback; it bridges to the central
-# cluster broker over TLS. open3e/e3oncan have no native MQTTS, so this is how
-# edge-1's MQTT gets off plaintext on the untrusted IoT VLAN, and it buffers
-# telemetry in RAM if the cluster broker is briefly unreachable.
-#
-# eMMC: this host runs on a small internal eMMC, so the local broker writes
-# NOTHING to flash — `persistence false` keeps retained/queued messages in RAM
-# only, and `log_dest stdout` goes to the (volatile, RAM) journal that Alloy
-# ships to Loki. Do not add persistence/log-file settings here.
-persistence false
-log_dest stdout
-log_type error
-log_type warning
-log_type notice
-
-# Loopback only — the trust boundary is the host itself. Any process on edge-1
-# may publish here (same trust as the bridged services); nothing off-host can
-# reach it. Real authentication to the cluster happens on the bridge below.
-# Single v4-loopback listener: all edge clients dial 127.0.0.1 (edge_mqtt_host),
-# and a second same-port listener can make some builds refuse to start.
-listener 1883 127.0.0.1
-allow_anonymous true
-
-# --- Bridges to the cluster broker (REN-1307). bridge.d holds either
-# {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf, written by edge-mqtt-cred with the password
-# mqtt-account-controller pushed, or, until that first push, legacy.conf with
-# the two vault-password bridges. edge-mqtt-cred deletes legacy.conf when it
-# writes the new file.
-include_dir /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{{ {
-  "port": edge_mqtt_cred_port,
-  "allowed_cn": edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn,
-  "user": edge_mqtt_bridge_account,
-  "cert": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt",
-  "key": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key",
-  "ca": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt",
-  "template": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in",
-  "bridge_file": "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ ".conf",
-  "legacy_files": ["/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf"],
-  "local_port": edge_mqtt_port,
-  "state_topic": "$SYS/broker/connection/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ "/state",
-} | to_nice_json }}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). See /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred.
-[Unit]
-Description=Receives the MQTT bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller
-After=network-online.target mosquitto.service
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=5
-# Root only to write the bridge file and restart mosquitto.
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadWritePaths=/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
-ProtectHome=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Managed by ansible (roles/pacman-cache).
+# Downloaded packages are not kept; older versions come from the Arch Linux
+# Archive.
+[Trigger]
+Operation = Install
+Operation = Upgrade
+Operation = Remove
+Type = Package
+Target = *
+
+[Action]
+Description = Removing downloaded packages from the cache...
+When = PostTransaction
+Exec = /usr/bin/find /var/cache/pacman/pkg -mindepth 1 -delete
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+# Keep the pacman package cache empty. pacman keeps every downloaded package;
+# on a 7 GB eMMC root the cache grows to gigabytes. Arch hosts only.
+
+- name: Ensure the pacman hook directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/pacman.d/hooks
+    state: directory
+    mode: "0755"
+
+- name: Empty the package cache after every transaction
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: pacman-cache.hook
+    dest: /etc/pacman.d/hooks/pacman-cache.hook
+    mode: "0644"
+
+- name: Empty the package cache
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [find, /var/cache/pacman/pkg, -mindepth, "1", -delete, -print]
+  register: pacman_cache_clean
+  changed_when: pacman_cache_clean.stdout | length > 0
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
-# SocketCAN interface. Consumed by heating-can.
-# --- CAN / open3e (Viessmann E3 external bus) ---
-edge_can_interface: can0
-edge_can_bitrate: 250000
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
-# reload alone only re-reads config files; existing links keep their old state
-# until reconfigured.
- name: Reload networkd
-  ansible.builtin.shell:
-    cmd: networkctl reload && networkctl reconfigure {{ edge_can_interface }}
-  changed_when: true
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
---
-# SocketCAN interface, owned by systemd-networkd.
-#
-# gs_usb is an in-tree module and autoloads when the adapter enumerates;
-# networkd then matches the interface and applies bitrate + up. Separate from
-# the services that consume the bus (heating-can, e380-can-meter) because the
-# interface is host network state shared by both.
-
- name: Configure can0 via systemd-networkd
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: 80-can0.network.j2
-    dest: /etc/systemd/network/80-can0.network
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Reload networkd
-
- name: Enable systemd-networkd
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: systemd-networkd
-    state: started
-    enabled: true
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/socketcan).
-# Viessmann E3 external CAN bus via Innomaker USB2CAN (gs_usb).
-# The adapter is a stub tap on an already-terminated bus (120R jumper OFF).
-[Match]
-Name={{ edge_can_interface }}
-
-[Link]
-# networkd applies [CAN] settings but does not raise a CAN link on its
-# own (observed on edge-1); force it up, and back up after any down.
-ActivationPolicy=always-up
-
-[CAN]
-BitRate={{ edge_can_bitrate }}
-# NO RestartSec here: gs_usb does not support hardware bus-off restart,
-# and networkd fails the ENTIRE link configuration on the unsupported
-# option ("off (failed)", link never raised — found by reboot test).
-# Bus-off recovery falls to the open3e service restart loop.
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@
    group: root
    mode: "0644"

+- name: Install sudo
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: sudo
+    state: present
+  when: not ssh_ca_synouser.stat.exists
+
 - name: Install the Claude sudo rules
  ansible.builtin.template:
    src: sudoers-claude.j2
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+# Keep the system clock on NTP with systemd-timesyncd, on hosts that run no
+# chrony. A KVM guest's clocksource does not steer wall-clock time; without an
+# NTP client the clock drifts until JWT iat/exp checks fail.
+
+- name: Install systemd-timesyncd
+  ansible.builtin.apt:
+    name: systemd-timesyncd
+    state: present
+  when: ansible_facts['os_family'] == 'Debian'
+
+- name: Run systemd-timesyncd
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    name: systemd-timesyncd
+    masked: false
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+
+- name: Wait for the clock to synchronize
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [timedatectl, show, --property=NTPSynchronized, --value]
+  register: timesyncd_synchronized
+  changed_when: false
+  until: timesyncd_synchronized.stdout == "yes"
+  retries: 12
+  delay: 5
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-synology-python.yml
 - name: Base system
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/common.yml
- name: VM time sync
-  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-vm-time-sync.yml

 - name: SSH user CA
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/configure-ssh-ca.yml
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-edge-host.yml
 - name: Z-Wave gateway
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml
- name: Heating CAN
-  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-heating-can.yml
 - name: NTP service
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: plays/install-ntp-ha.yml

@@ -125,7 +125,15 @@ Created through the UniFi Network API (site `default`):
 |---|---|---|
 | Firewall policy "Allow APs RADIUS" | `62c21e63-8c15-4720-adf8-b2333c090e2f` | zone Isolated `10.2.10.0/24` → zone External `10.2.99.91`, UDP `1812-1813`, ALLOW, IPv4 |
 | RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" | `3e5fcfed-63dc-4e7d-ad51-17cbc074e4bb` | auth `10.2.99.91:1812`, acct `10.2.99.91:1813`, secret `DOT1X_NAS_SECRET`, VLAN assignment on (`vlan_wlan_mode: optional`) |
-| WLAN "Renner Test" | `3eba27e7-ddc2-41fb-ad3f-82add317847a` | copy of "Renner UniFi" (WPA2/WPA3 Enterprise transition, fast roaming, BSS transition, same AP group and bands), network (90) Guest as fallback, RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" |
+| WLAN "Renner UniFi" | `ef4122f2-4a83-4dca-9ef3-468d29f39a6b` | WPA3 Enterprise (no transition), PMF required, fast roaming, BSS transition, client isolation off, RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X"; Application Hotspot, type Passpoint (set in the UniFi UI: the API format differs from the UI's) |
+
+Passpoint on "Renner UniFi" (UniFi offers Passpoint only with WPA3 Enterprise):
+venue "Renner", Residential / Private Residence, network type Private with
+Guest Access, IPv4 single NATed private, IPv6 available, NAI realm
+`renner.uno` with EAP-TTLS, sub-methods PAP and username/password, domain
+`renner.uno`, operator friendly name "Renner", connection capability ICMP
+allow. The AKMs on air are `FT/802.1X` and `802.1X/SHA-256`; plain `802.1X`
+is not offered.

 ## Live login check

@@ -146,31 +154,51 @@ For IPv6 set `LIVE_SOURCE` to the workstation's `fd02:50::` address and use
 ## Client setup (SSID "Renner UniFi")

 Setup page: `https://wlan.renner.uno` (behind the Authentik gate, any
-authentik user; `kubernetes/apps/authentik/wlan-setup*.yaml`). It serves the
-Apple profile (caller's username filled in), a Windows file that imports the
-WLAN profile with `netsh`, and the Linux `nmcli` command. None of these carries a password. Android
-gets a Passpoint profile (`application/x-wifi-config`): the page POSTs the
-password the user types there, nginx (njs) builds the profile and keeps it in
-memory for at most 120 s under a one-time token bound to the user, and a tap on
-the resulting link GETs it, as the Android installer requires. It matches WLANs
-that advertise Hotspot 2.0 with domain and NAI realm `renner.uno`
-(EAP-TTLS/PAP).
+authentik user), served by the Go service `wlan-setup/`
+(`kubernetes/apps/authentik/wlan-setup*.yaml`). Android, Apple and Windows get
+Passpoint profiles with their own app password; Linux an `nmcli` command
+(NetworkManager has no Passpoint support) that carries no password.
+
+Passpoint: `/<platform>/install` (`android`, `apple` or `windows`) signs the
+user in through the authentik OAuth2 application `wlan-setup` (scope
+`goauthentik.io/api`). On `/<platform>/callback`, the service exchanges the
+code, creates an app password (`wlan-<platform>-<user>-<timestamp>-<random>`)
+with the user's own access token, and hands out the profile:
+
+- Android: `application/x-wifi-config` in the response to that GET, as its
+  installer requires.
+- Apple: a `.mobileconfig` download.
+- Windows: a CarrierProvisioning XML signed with XML-DSig (enveloped, C14N
+  1.0, rsa-sha1, chain in KeyInfo) by the Let's Encrypt certificate
+  `wlan-setup-signing`; kept for 5 minutes under a single-use token. The
+  browser is sent to `ms-settings:wifi-provisioning?uri=https://wlan.renner.uno/windows/profile/<token>`;
+  Windows Settings fetches it (Ingress `wlan-setup-provisioning`, without the
+  gate) and offers "Add".
+
+The service stores nothing else. Deleting the app password in authentik removes
+that device from the WLAN. The profiles match WLANs that advertise Hotspot 2.0
+with domain and NAI realm `renner.uno` (EAP-TTLS/PAP), i.e. "Renner UniFi".
+Creating the app password needs no admin rights.
+
+App passwords expire when unused. The page creates them with 29 days (the API
+caps new tokens at 30 days unless the group attribute
+`goauthentik.io/user/token-maximum-lifetime` allows more). Every 802.1X login
+with an app password renews it to 60 days: the policy
+`dot1x-app-password-renew` on the `dot1x-login` binding (at most one write per
+day). authentik rejects expired app passwords and deletes them in its
+`clean_expired_models` task. A device that has not connected for 60 days, or a
+profile that was never installed, loses its app password and needs a new
+profile from the page.

 All clients use EAP-TTLS with inner PAP. The server certificate is a public
 Let's Encrypt certificate for `radius.renner.uno`, so no CA needs to be
-installed. Username and password are the authentik credentials. PAP runs
-inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.
+installed. The 802.1X password stage (`dot1x-password`) accepts the authentik
+password and app passwords. PAP runs inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and
+is never sent in clear over the air.

 ### Android

- EAP method: TTLS
- Phase 2 authentication: PAP
- CA certificate: Use system certificates
- Domain: `radius.renner.uno`
- Identity: authentik username
- Anonymous identity: `anonymous` (mandatory; empty sends the login to the
-  UDM, where it fails)
- Password: authentik password
+Passpoint profile from the setup page ("Auf Android installieren").

 ### Linux (NetworkManager)

@@ -184,10 +212,12 @@ inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.

 ### Windows 11

-Settings > Network & Internet > Wi-Fi > Manage known networks > Add network:
+Passpoint profile from the setup page ("Auf Windows installieren"). Manual
+setup without the page: Settings > Network & Internet > Wi-Fi > Manage known
+networks > Add network:

 - Network name: `Renner UniFi`
- Security type: WPA2-Enterprise AES
+- Security type: WPA3-Enterprise AES
 - EAP method: EAP-TTLS
 - Authentication method: Unencrypted password (PAP)
 - Server validation: where offered ("Verify server identity" / trusted
@@ -202,13 +232,14 @@ wireless network" instead.

 ### Apple (iOS, iPadOS, macOS)

-Apple devices need a configuration profile; the setup page serves it with the
-username filled in. Install it via Settings (Profile Downloaded). The device
-asks for the password on the first join. The profile sets security type Any (WPA2/WPA3), outer identity
-`anonymous` and trusted server name `radius.renner.uno`; it contains no
-password and no certificate. Apple
-devices may show a one-time "trust certificate" prompt for `radius.renner.uno`
-on the first join.
+Passpoint configuration profile from the setup page ("Profil laden"),
+installed via Settings (Profile Downloaded) or, on a Mac, System Settings >
+General > Device Management. It sets `IsHotspot` with domain and NAI realm
+`renner.uno` (no SSID), security type Any, outer identity `anonymous`,
+trusted server name `radius.renner.uno`, username and app password; it
+contains no certificate. Its PayloadIdentifier is fixed, so installing it
+replaces an earlier profile. Apple devices may show a one-time "trust
+certificate" prompt for `radius.renner.uno` on the first join.

 ## Measurement: authentication latency per SSID

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The image is the official archiso **releng** profile plus:
 - the extra disk tools the installer needs

 Division of labour: the ISO produces an **ansible-ready base system**;
-all service configuration (zwave-js-ui, sml2mqtt, open3e/CAN) stays in
+all service configuration (zwave-js-ui, sml2mqtt) stays in
 `ansible/docs/edge-host.md` as the single source of truth. Rebuilding the
 box is: boot ISO → `edge-install` → run the play.

@@ -42,10 +42,11 @@ for the CA key; rebuild the ISO after a CA rotation.
 2. Boot the target from it (UEFI, Secure Boot off; one-time F12/setup
   visit if the box doesn't already boot USB first)
 3. Either on the console (auto-login as root) or headless —
-   `ssh root@<dhcp-ip>` with an owner certificate — run `edge-install`. It auto-detects the internal disk
-   (NVMe, else eMMC — covers the Wyse 3040 — else first non-USB disk),
-   shows the target and requires typing the hostname before wiping
-   anything. Override with `edge-install /dev/sdY`.
+   `ssh root@<dhcp-ip>` with an owner certificate — run
+   `edge-install <hostname>` (e.g. `edge-install edge-2`). It auto-detects
+   the internal disk (NVMe, else eMMC — covers the Wyse 3040 — else first
+   non-USB disk), shows the target and requires typing the hostname before
+   wiping anything. Override with `edge-install <hostname> /dev/sdY`.
 4. Reboot. Confirm the box is reachable by name — `ssh root@<host>` — before
   going further; it is identified by name everywhere and its address is
   never recorded. Then add it to `[edge_host]` in
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Installer for edge-1 (bare-metal edge host, replaces the k8s-edge VM).
+# Installer for the bare-metal edge hosts (edge-1, edge-2, ...).
 # Runs from the edge-host ISO live environment. WIPES the target disk.
-# Usage: edge-install [disk]
-# Default: the internal disk — first NVMe, else eMMC (Wyse 3040), else
+# Usage: edge-install <hostname> [disk]
+# Default disk: the internal disk — first NVMe, else eMMC (Wyse 3040), else
 # the first non-USB, non-optical disk. The live USB stick itself is
 # excluded via the ISO9660 label mount.
 set -euo pipefail

-HOST=edge-1
+usage() { echo "usage: edge-install <hostname> [disk]"; exit 1; }
+[ $# -ge 1 ] && [ $# -le 2 ] || usage
+HOST=$1
+# RFC 1123 label: what systemd-networkd sends as the DHCP hostname.
+[[ "$HOST" =~ ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$ ]] \
+  || { echo "invalid hostname: $HOST"; exit 1; }
+shift

 detect_disk() {
  # eMMC needs mmc_block before any /dev/mmcblk* exists (see
@@ -51,7 +57,7 @@ mount --mkdir "$(part 1)" /mnt/boot

 # Everything the edge-host ansible role expects to find; the role itself
 # is applied over SSH after first boot (see ansible/docs/edge-host.md).
-pacstrap -K /mnt base linux linux-firmware intel-ucode openssh python git \
+pacstrap -K /mnt base linux linux-firmware intel-ucode openssh sudo python git \
  docker docker-compose

 genfstab -U /mnt >> /mnt/etc/fstab
@@ -1483,8 +1483,11 @@ data:
          name: dot1x-password
        state: present
        attrs:
+          # App passwords: the WLAN credential that devices store (Android
+          # Passpoint profiles carry it), created by wlan.renner.uno.
          backends:
            - authentik.core.auth.InbuiltBackend
+            - authentik.core.auth.TokenBackend

      - id: dot1x-login
        model: authentik_stages_user_login.userloginstage
@@ -1506,12 +1509,54 @@ data:
          order: 20
        state: present

-      - model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
+      - id: binding-dot1x-login
+        model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
        identifiers:
          target: !KeyOf dot1x-flow
          stage: !KeyOf dot1x-login
          order: 100
        state: present
+        attrs:
+          evaluate_on_plan: false
+          re_evaluate_policies: true
+
+      # Sliding expiry: an app password used for 802.1X expires 60 days
+      # after its last use; authentik rejects and deletes expired app
+      # passwords. auth_method_args.token is set by TokenBackend. Always
+      # passes; failure_result true keeps an error from blocking the login.
+      - id: dot1x-app-password-renew
+        model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
+        identifiers:
+          name: dot1x-app-password-renew
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          expression: |
+            from datetime import timedelta
+            from django.utils.timezone import now
+            from authentik.core.models import Token, TokenIntents
+            ref = (request.context.get("auth_method_args") or {}).get("token")
+            if request.context.get("auth_method") == "token" and isinstance(ref, dict):
+                renewed = now() + timedelta(days=60)
+                count = Token.objects.filter(
+                    pk=ref.get("pk"),
+                    user=request.user,
+                    intent=TokenIntents.INTENT_APP_PASSWORD,
+                    expiring=True,
+                    expires__lt=renewed - timedelta(days=1),
+                ).update(expires=renewed)
+                ak_logger.info("dot1x app password", token=ref.get("name"), renewed=count)
+            return True
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          policy: !KeyOf dot1x-app-password-renew
+          target: !KeyOf binding-dot1x-login
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: true

      - id: dot1x-has-vlan
        model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
@@ -1624,3 +1669,47 @@ data:
            kubernetes_httproute_annotations: {}
            kubernetes_httproute_parent_refs: []
            kubernetes_json_patches: null
+
+      # wlan.renner.uno (wlan-setup.yaml): signs the user in and, with the
+      # user's own access token (scope goauthentik.io/api), creates the WLAN
+      # app password for the Android Passpoint profile. Confidential client;
+      # the secret comes from wlan-setup-oauth (wlan-setup-oauth.yaml). No
+      # policy binding: every authentik user may set up the WLAN.
+      - id: wlan-setup-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
+        identifiers:
+          name: WLAN setup
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          authentication_flow: null
+          authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          client_type: confidential
+          client_id: wlan-setup
+          client_secret: !Env WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+          grant_types:
+            - authorization_code
+          access_token_validity: minutes=5
+          signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, authentik Self-signed Certificate]]
+          property_mappings:
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-authentik_api]]
+          redirect_uris:
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/android/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/apple/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+            - url: https://wlan.renner.uno/windows/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: wlan-setup
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: WLAN setup
+          slug: wlan-setup
+          provider: !KeyOf wlan-setup-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://wlan.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "WLAN setup page; creates WLAN app passwords"
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-11-01-1059 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-11-05-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
          securityContext:
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
@@ -171,10 +171,11 @@ spec:
    worker:
      # Overrides the global key; keep authentik-secrets in the list.
      podAnnotations:
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: authentik-secrets,radius-secrets
-      # Shared secret of the 802.1X Radius provider, set via `!Env` in
-      # dot1x-radius.yaml. Worker only (blueprint applier); optional so a
-      # missing Secret fails only the dot1x blueprint entry.
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: authentik-secrets,radius-secrets,wlan-setup-oauth
+      # Shared secret of the 802.1X Radius provider and client secret of the
+      # WLAN setup provider, set via `!Env` in dot1x-radius.yaml. Worker only
+      # (blueprint applier); optional so a missing Secret fails only the
+      # blueprint entries that use it.
      env:
        - name: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
          valueFrom:
@@ -182,6 +183,12 @@ spec:
              name: radius-secrets
              key: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
              optional: true
+        - name: WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: wlan-setup-oauth
+              key: client_secret
+              optional: true
      resources:
        requests:
          # Same reasoning as server above, and the worker is burstier still:
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ resources:
  - freeradius-network-attachment.yaml
  - freeradius.yaml
  - freeradius-cnp.yaml
-  - wlan-setup-config.yaml
+  - wlan-setup-oauth.yaml
+  - wlan-setup-signing-cert.yaml
  - wlan-setup.yaml
  # ak-pg CNPG Postgres backend (moved here from the retired seed-authentik KS;
  # each carries prune: disabled so ownership transferred without a teardown).
@@ -34,3 +34,10 @@ spec:
              protocol: TCP
            - port: "6636"
              protocol: TCP
+    # The UDM's LDAPS admin-auth sync.
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: udm-k8s-ingress
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "6636"
+              protocol: TCP
@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
-# wlan.renner.uno: setup files for "Renner UniFi" (802.1X, EAP-TTLS/PAP
-# against freeradius, outer identity anonymous, server name radius.renner.uno).
-# Served by wlan-setup (wlan-setup.yaml) behind the Authentik gate; the
-# username comes from X-authentik-username. Only the Android Passpoint profile
-# carries the password (the format requires it); it exists in nginx memory for
-# at most 120 s and is handed out once.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ConfigMap
-metadata:
-  name: wlan-setup
-  namespace: authentik
-data:
-  # The image's nginx.conf plus the njs module and a single worker, so the
-  # one-time tokens of passpoint.js live in one process.
-  nginx.conf: |
-    load_module modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;
-
-    worker_processes 1;
-    error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice;
-    pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
-
-    events {
-        worker_connections 1024;
-    }
-
-    http {
-        proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
-        client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
-        fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
-        uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
-        scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
-
-        include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
-        default_type application/octet-stream;
-
-        log_format main '$remote_addr - [$time_local] "$request" $status $body_bytes_sent "$http_user_agent"';
-        access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log main;
-
-        sendfile on;
-        keepalive_timeout 65;
-
-        include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
-    }
-
-  default.conf: |
-    # Only plain usernames reach a generated file; anything else leaves the
-    # field empty and the device asks for it.
-    map $http_x_authentik_username $wifi_user {
-        "~^[A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{1,64}$" $http_x_authentik_username;
-        default "";
-    }
-
-    js_path /etc/nginx/njs/;
-    js_import passpoint from passpoint.js;
-    # token -> {user, profile}; entries expire after 120 s.
-    js_shared_dict_zone zone=passpoint:1m timeout=120s evict;
-
-    server {
-        listen 8080;
-        listen [::]:8080;
-        server_tokens off;
-        root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-        add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
-
-        location = / {
-            try_files /index.html =404;
-        }
-
-        location = /whoami {
-            default_type text/plain;
-            return 200 $wifi_user;
-        }
-
-        # Apple: com.apple.wifi.managed, TTLS (21) with inner PAP. Fixed
-        # PayloadIdentifier/UUIDs so a reinstall replaces the old profile.
-        location = /renner-unifi.mobileconfig {
-            default_type application/x-apple-aspen-config;
-            add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
-            add_header Content-Disposition 'attachment; filename="renner-unifi.mobileconfig"' always;
-            return 200 '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-    <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
-    <plist version="1.0">
-    <dict>
-    	<key>PayloadContent</key>
-    	<array>
-    		<dict>
-    			<key>PayloadType</key>
-    			<string>com.apple.wifi.managed</string>
-    			<key>PayloadVersion</key>
-    			<integer>1</integer>
-    			<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
-    			<string>uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi.network</string>
-    			<key>PayloadUUID</key>
-    			<string>824959bf-c55d-4ed2-b569-c33f3759c2b6</string>
-    			<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
-    			<string>Renner UniFi</string>
-    			<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
-    			<string>Renner</string>
-    			<key>SSID_STR</key>
-    			<string>Renner UniFi</string>
-    			<key>HIDDEN_NETWORK</key>
-    			<false/>
-    			<key>AutoJoin</key>
-    			<true/>
-    			<key>EncryptionType</key>
-    			<string>Any</string>
-    			<key>EAPClientConfiguration</key>
-    			<dict>
-    				<key>UserName</key>
-    				<string>$wifi_user</string>
-    				<key>OuterIdentity</key>
-    				<string>anonymous</string>
-    				<key>AcceptEAPTypes</key>
-    				<array>
-    					<integer>21</integer>
-    				</array>
-    				<key>TTLSInnerAuthentication</key>
-    				<string>PAP</string>
-    				<key>TLSTrustedServerNames</key>
-    				<array>
-    					<string>radius.renner.uno</string>
-    				</array>
-    			</dict>
-    		</dict>
-    	</array>
-    	<key>PayloadType</key>
-    	<string>Configuration</string>
-    	<key>PayloadVersion</key>
-    	<integer>1</integer>
-    	<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
-    	<string>uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi</string>
-    	<key>PayloadUUID</key>
-    	<string>7175a2a3-ddd3-42ea-b4ad-b7e5501892f3</string>
-    	<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
-    	<string>WLAN Renner UniFi</string>
-    	<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
-    	<string>Renner</string>
-    </dict>
-    </plist>
-    ';
-        }
-
-        location = /renner-unifi-wlan.cmd {
-            default_type application/octet-stream;
-            add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
-            add_header Content-Disposition 'attachment; filename="renner-unifi-wlan.cmd"' always;
-            try_files /renner-unifi-wlan.cmd =404;
-        }
-
-        # Android: the page POSTs the password and gets a one-time token; a tap
-        # on /android/profile/<token> then GETs the Passpoint profile, as the
-        # Android installer requires (application/x-wifi-config, base64,
-        # no Content-Disposition).
-        location = /android/prepare {
-            limit_except POST { deny all; }
-            client_max_body_size 1k;
-            client_body_buffer_size 1k;
-            js_content passpoint.prepare;
-        }
-
-        location ~ "^/android/profile/[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32}$" {
-            js_content passpoint.deliver;
-        }
-
-        location = /healthz {
-            access_log off;
-            default_type text/plain;
-            return 200 "ok\n";
-        }
-
-        location / {
-            return 404;
-        }
-    }
-
-  # Windows: extracts the WLAN profile (everything after line 8 of itself)
-  # into %TEMP% and imports it for the current user with netsh. EAP-TTLS with
-  # PAPAuthentication, outer identity anonymous, server name
-  # radius.renner.uno, trust anchor ISRG Root X1 (SHA-1 thumbprint; the
-  # Let's Encrypt chain of radius-tls ends there). Windows asks for username
-  # and password on connect. CRLF line endings: cmd.exe needs them.
-  renner-unifi-wlan.cmd: "@echo off\r\nrem WLAN Renner UniFi einrichten (802.1X, Anmeldung mit dem authentik-Konto)\r\nset \"WLANXML=%TEMP%\\renner-unifi-wlan.xml\"\r\nmore +8 \"%~f0\" > \"%WLANXML%\"\r\nnetsh wlan add profile filename=\"%WLANXML%\" user=current\r\ndel \"%WLANXML%\"\r\nnetsh wlan connect name=\"Renner UniFi\"\r\npause & exit /b\r\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><WLANProfile xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/WLAN/profile/v1\"><name>Renner UniFi</name><SSIDConfig><SSID><hex>52656E6E657220556E694669</hex><name>Renner UniFi</name></SSID><nonBroadcast>false</nonBroadcast></SSIDConfig><connectionType>ESS</connectionType><connectionMode>auto</connectionMode><MSM><security><authEncryption><authentication>WPA2</authentication><encryption>AES</encryption><useOneX>true</useOneX></authEncryption><OneX xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/OneX/v1\"><cacheUserData>true</cacheUserData><authMode>user</authMode><EAPConfig><EapHostConfig xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostConfig\"><EapMethod><Type xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon\">21</Type><VendorId xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon\">0</VendorId><VendorType xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon\">0</VendorType><AuthorId xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon\">311</AuthorId></EapMethod><Config xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostConfig\"><EapTtls xmlns=\"http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapTtlsConnectionPropertiesV1\"><ServerValidation><ServerNames>radius.renner.uno</ServerNames><TrustedRootCAHash>ca bd 2a 79 a1 07 6a 31 f2 1d 25 36 35 cb 03 9d 43 29 a5 e8</TrustedRootCAHash><DisablePrompt>false</DisablePrompt></ServerValidation><Phase2Authentication><PAPAuthentication/></Phase2Authentication><Phase1Identity><IdentityPrivacy>true</IdentityPrivacy><AnonymousIdentity>anonymous</AnonymousIdentity></Phase1Identity></EapTtls></Config></EapHostConfig></EAPConfig></OneX></security></MSM></WLANProfile>\r\n"
-
-  # Android Passpoint R1 provisioning (source.android.com, Passpoint): the
-  # body is base64 of a MIME multipart with the PPS MO and the trust anchor.
-  # HomeSP FQDN and realm renner.uno match the Hotspot 2.0 domain and NAI realm
-  # the Passpoint WLAN announces; EAP-TTLS (21) with inner PAP. Trust anchor
-  # ISRG Root X1 (the radius-tls chain ends there), AAA server name
-  # radius.renner.uno (Extension/Android/AAAServerTrustedNames, as Android's
-  # PpsMoParser expects it). A token is bound to the user who created it and
-  # can be fetched once.
-  passpoint.js: |
-    const ISRG_ROOT_X1 = "MIIFazCCA1OgAwIBAgIRAIIQz7DSQONZRGPgu2OCiwAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxKTAnBgNVBAoTIEludGVybmV0IFNlY3VyaXR5IFJlc2VhcmNoIEdyb3VwMRUwEwYDVQQDEwxJU1JHIFJvb3QgWDEwHhcNMTUwNjA0MTEwNDM4WhcNMzUwNjA0MTEwNDM4WjBPMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEpMCcGA1UEChMgSW50ZXJuZXQgU2VjdXJpdHkgUmVzZWFyY2ggR3JvdXAxFTATBgNVBAMTDElTUkcgUm9vdCBYMTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoCggIBAK3oJHP0FDfzm54rVygch77ct984kIxuPOZXoHj3dcKi/vVqbvYATyjb3miGbESTtrFj/RQSa78f0uoxmyF+0TM8ukj13Xnfs7j/EvEhmkvBioZxaUpmZmyPfjxwv60pIgbz5MDmgK7iS4+3mX6UA5/TR5d8mUgjU+g4rk8Kb4Mu0UlXjIB0ttov0DiNewNwIRt18jA8+o+u3dpjq+sWT8KOEUt+zwvo/7V3LvSye0rgTBIlDHCNAymg4VMk7BPZ7hm/ELNKjD+Jo2FR3qyHB5T0Y3HsLuJvW5iB4YlcNHlsdu87kGJ55tukmi8mxdAQ4Q7e2RCOFvu396j3x+UCB5iPNgiV5+I3lg02dZ77DnKxHZu8A/lJBdiB3QW0KtZB6awBdpUKD9jf1b0SHzUvKBds0pjBqAlkd25HN7rOrFleaJ1/ctaJxQZBKT5ZPt0m9STJEadao0xAH0ahmbWnOlFuhjuefXKnEgV4We0+UXgVCwOPjdAvBbI+e0ocS3MFEvzG6uBQE3xDk3SzynTnjh8BCNAw1FtxNrQHusEwMFxIt4I7mKZ9YIqioymCzLq9gwQbooMDQaHWBfEbwrbwqHyGO0aoSCqI3Haadr8faqU9GY/rOPNk3sgrDQoo//fb4hVC1CLQJ13hef4Y53CIrU7m2Ys6xt0nUW7/vGT1M0NPAgMBAAGjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBR5tFnme7bl5AFzgAiIyBpY9umbbjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAVR9YqbyyqFDQDLHYGmkgJykIrGF1XIpu+ILlaS/V9lZLubhzEFnTIZd+50xx+7LSYK05qAvqFyFWhfFQDlnrzuBZ6brJFe+GnY+EgPbk6ZGQ3BebYhtF8GaV0nxvwuo77x/Py9auJ/GpsMiu/X1+mvoiBOv/2X/qkSsisRcOj/KKNFtY2PwByVS5uCbMiogziUwthDyC3+6WVwW6LLv3xLfHTjuCvjHIInNzktHCgKQ5ORAzI4JMPJ+GslWYHb4phowim57iaztXOoJwTdwJx4nLCgdNbOhdjsnvzqvHu7UrTkXWStAmzOVyyghqpZXjFaH3pO3JLF+l+/+sKAIuvtd7u+Nxe5AW0wdeRlN8NwdCjNPElpzVmbUq4JUagEiuTDkHzsxHpFKVK7q4+63SM1N95R1NbdWhscdCb+ZAJzVcoyi3B43njTOQ5yOf+1CceWxG1bQVs5ZufpsMljq4Ui0/1lvh+wjChP4kqKOJ2qxq4RgqsahDYVvTH9w7jXbyLeiNdd8XM2w9U/t7y0Ff/9yi0GE44Za4rF2LN9d11TPAmRGunUHBcnWEvgJBQl9nJEiU0Zsnvgc/ubhPgXRR4Xq37Z0j4r7g1SgEEzwxA57demyPxgcYxn/eR44/KJ4EBs+lVDR3veyJm+kXQ99b21/+jh5Xos1AnX5iItreGCc=";
-    const USER = /^[A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{1,64}$/;
-
-    function b64(s) { return Buffer.from(s).toString("base64"); }
-    function node(name, inner) { return "<Node><NodeName>" + name + "</NodeName>" + inner + "</Node>"; }
-    function leaf(name, value) { return node(name, "<Value>" + value + "</Value>"); }
-
-    function profile(user, password) {
-        const pps = '<MgmtTree xmlns="syncml:dmddf1.2"><VerDTD>1.2</VerDTD>' +
-            node("PerProviderSubscription",
-                "<RTProperties><Type><DDFName>urn:wfa:mo:hotspot2dot0-perprovidersubscription:1.0</DDFName></Type></RTProperties>" +
-                node("i001",
-                    node("HomeSP", leaf("FriendlyName", "Renner") + leaf("FQDN", "renner.uno")) +
-                    node("Credential",
-                        leaf("Realm", "renner.uno") +
-                        node("UsernamePassword",
-                            leaf("Username", user) +
-                            leaf("Password", b64(password)) +
-                            node("EAPMethod", leaf("EAPType", "21") + leaf("InnerMethod", "PAP")))) +
-                    node("Extension", node("Android",
-                        node("AAAServerTrustedNames", leaf("FQDN", "radius.renner.uno")))))) +
-            "</MgmtTree>";
-        const mime = "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary={boundary}\r\n" +
-            "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\n" +
-            "--{boundary}\r\n" +
-            "Content-Type: application/x-passpoint-profile\r\n" +
-            "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\n" +
-            b64(pps) + "\r\n" +
-            "--{boundary}\r\n" +
-            "Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert\r\n" +
-            "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\n" +
-            ISRG_ROOT_X1 + "\r\n" +
-            "--{boundary}--\r\n";
-        return b64(mime);
-    }
-
-    function caller(r) {
-        const user = r.headersIn["X-authentik-username"] || "";
-        return USER.test(user) ? user : "";
-    }
-
-    function prepare(r) {
-        const user = caller(r);
-        const password = r.requestText || "";
-        if (!user) { r.return(403); return; }
-        if (!password || password.length > 256) { r.return(400); return; }
-        const bytes = new Uint8Array(24);
-        crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
-        const token = Buffer.from(bytes).toString("base64url");
-        ngx.shared.passpoint.set(token, JSON.stringify({ user: user, body: profile(user, password) }));
-        r.headersOut["Content-Type"] = "text/plain";
-        r.return(200, token);
-    }
-
-    function deliver(r) {
-        const token = r.uri.substring(r.uri.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
-        const dict = ngx.shared.passpoint;
-        const entry = dict.get(token);
-        if (!entry) { r.return(404); return; }
-        const data = JSON.parse(entry);
-        if (data.user !== caller(r)) { r.return(404); return; }
-        dict.delete(token);
-        r.headersOut["Content-Type"] = "application/x-wifi-config";
-        r.headersOut["Content-Transfer-Encoding"] = "base64";
-        r.return(200, data.body);
-    }
-
-    export default { prepare, deliver };
-
-  index.html: |
-    <!doctype html>
-    <html lang="de">
-    <head>
-    <meta charset="utf-8">
-    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-    <title>WLAN einrichten</title>
-    <style>
-      :root { --bg: #ffffff; --fg: #1d1d1f; --muted: #5f6368; --card: #f4f5f7; --accent: #0b63ce; --code: #e9ebef; }
-      @media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
-        :root { --bg: #121314; --fg: #e8eaed; --muted: #9aa0a6; --card: #1e1f22; --accent: #7cacf8; --code: #2a2b2f; }
-      }
-      * { box-sizing: border-box; }
-      body { margin: 0; background: var(--bg); color: var(--fg); font: 16px/1.5 system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif; }
-      main { max-width: 42rem; margin: 0 auto; padding: 1.5rem 1rem 3rem; }
-      h1 { font-size: 1.6rem; margin: 0 0 .25rem; }
-      h2 { font-size: 1.15rem; margin: 0 0 .5rem; }
-      p { margin: .5rem 0; }
-      .muted { color: var(--muted); }
-      section { background: var(--card); border-radius: 12px; padding: 1rem 1.1rem; margin: 1rem 0; }
-      section.current { outline: 2px solid var(--accent); }
-      a.button, button { display: inline-block; background: var(--accent); color: #fff; border: 0; border-radius: 8px; padding: .6rem 1rem; font: inherit; text-decoration: none; cursor: pointer; }
-      @media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) { a.button, button { color: #121314; } }
-      ol { padding-left: 1.3rem; margin: .5rem 0; }
-      pre { background: var(--code); border-radius: 8px; padding: .75rem; overflow-x: auto; white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-all; font-size: .85rem; margin: .5rem 0; }
-      details > summary { cursor: pointer; color: var(--accent); margin: 1.5rem 0 .5rem; }
-    </style>
-    </head>
-    <body>
-    <main>
-      <h1>WLAN einrichten</h1>
-      <p>WLAN <strong>Renner UniFi</strong>. Anmeldung mit deinem Konto <strong id="user">…</strong> und deinem authentik-Passwort.</p>
-
-      <div id="detected"></div>
-
-      <details id="others">
-        <summary>Andere Geräte</summary>
-        <div id="rest"></div>
-      </details>
-
-      <template id="t-android">
-        <section data-os="android">
-          <h2>Android</h2>
-          <form id="android-form">
-            <p><label>Passwort für <strong class="u">…</strong><br>
-              <input type="password" id="android-password" autocomplete="current-password" required></label></p>
-            <p><button type="submit">Profil vorbereiten</button></p>
-          </form>
-          <p><a class="button" id="android-install" href="#" hidden>Auf Android installieren</a></p>
-          <p class="muted" id="android-status"></p>
-          <p class="muted">Ändert sich dein Passwort, hier einfach neu installieren.</p>
-        </section>
-      </template>
-
-      <template id="t-apple">
-        <section data-os="apple">
-          <h2>iPhone, iPad, Mac</h2>
-          <p><a class="button" href="/renner-unifi.mobileconfig">Profil laden</a></p>
-          <ol>
-            <li>iPhone/iPad: Einstellungen → „Profil geladen“ → Installieren. Mac: Systemeinstellungen → Allgemein → Geräteverwaltung → Profil doppelklicken.</li>
-            <li>Beim ersten Verbinden mit „Renner UniFi“ dein Passwort eingeben.</li>
-          </ol>
-        </section>
-      </template>
-
-      <template id="t-windows">
-        <section data-os="windows">
-          <h2>Windows</h2>
-          <p><a class="button" href="/renner-unifi-wlan.cmd">Einrichtungsdatei laden</a></p>
-          <ol>
-            <li>Die geladene Datei doppelklicken. Fragt Windows nach („Der Computer wurde durch Windows geschützt“): „Weitere Informationen“ → „Trotzdem ausführen“.</li>
-            <li>Beim Verbinden Benutzername <strong class="u">…</strong> und dein Passwort eingeben.</li>
-          </ol>
-        </section>
-      </template>
-
-      <template id="t-linux">
-        <section data-os="linux">
-          <h2>Linux (NetworkManager)</h2>
-          <p>Im Terminal ausführen, danach fragt NetworkManager nach dem Passwort:</p>
-          <pre id="nmcli"></pre>
-          <p><button type="button" id="copy-nmcli">Befehl kopieren</button></p>
-        </section>
-      </template>
-    </main>
-    <script>
-    (function () {
-      var ua = navigator.userAgent;
-      var os = "other";
-      if (/Android/i.test(ua)) os = "android";
-      else if (/iPhone|iPad|iPod|Macintosh/i.test(ua)) os = "apple";
-      else if (/Windows/i.test(ua)) os = "windows";
-      else if (/Linux|X11/i.test(ua)) os = "linux";
-
-      var detected = document.getElementById("detected");
-      var rest = document.getElementById("rest");
-      ["android", "apple", "windows", "linux"].forEach(function (name) {
-        var node = document.getElementById("t-" + name).content.cloneNode(true);
-        if (name === os) { node.querySelector("section").classList.add("current"); detected.appendChild(node); }
-        else rest.appendChild(node);
-      });
-      if (os === "other") document.getElementById("others").open = true;
-
-      var currentUser = "";
-      function quote(s) { return "'" + s.replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + "'"; }
-      function render(user) {
-        currentUser = user;
-        var shown = user || "(dein Benutzername)";
-        document.getElementById("user").textContent = shown;
-        document.querySelectorAll(".u").forEach(function (el) { el.textContent = shown; });
-        document.getElementById("nmcli").textContent =
-          "nmcli connection add type wifi con-name 'Renner UniFi' ssid 'Renner UniFi' " +
-          "wifi-sec.key-mgmt wpa-eap 802-1x.eap ttls 802-1x.phase2-auth pap " +
-          "802-1x.anonymous-identity anonymous 802-1x.identity " + quote(user || "BENUTZERNAME") + " " +
-          "802-1x.domain-suffix-match radius.renner.uno 802-1x.system-ca-certs yes " +
-          "802-1x.password-flags 2 && nmcli --ask connection up 'Renner UniFi'";
-      }
-      render("");
-      fetch("/whoami", { credentials: "same-origin" })
-        .then(function (r) { return r.ok ? r.text() : ""; })
-        .then(function (t) { render(t.trim()); })
-        .catch(function () {});
-
-      // Android: the server builds the Passpoint profile from the password and
-      // keeps it under a one-time token; the installer only starts on a GET
-      // that the user triggers by tapping, so the token becomes a link.
-      document.getElementById("android-form").addEventListener("submit", function (ev) {
-        ev.preventDefault();
-        var field = document.getElementById("android-password");
-        var install = document.getElementById("android-install");
-        var status = document.getElementById("android-status");
-        if (!field.value) return;
-        fetch("/android/prepare", { method: "POST", credentials: "same-origin", body: field.value })
-          .then(function (r) { if (!r.ok) throw new Error(r.status); return r.text(); })
-          .then(function (token) {
-            field.value = "";
-            install.href = "/android/profile/" + token.trim();
-            install.hidden = false;
-            status.textContent = "Bereit. Gültig für 2 Minuten.";
-          })
-          .catch(function () { status.textContent = "Das hat nicht geklappt. Bitte neu laden und erneut versuchen."; });
-      });
-
-      document.getElementById("copy-nmcli").addEventListener("click", function () {
-        var text = document.getElementById("nmcli").textContent;
-        var btn = this;
-        navigator.clipboard.writeText(text).then(function () {
-          btn.textContent = "Kopiert";
-          setTimeout(function () { btn.textContent = "Befehl kopieren"; }, 2000);
-        });
-      });
-    })();
-    </script>
-    </body>
-    </html>
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Client secret of the "WLAN setup" OAuth2 provider (dot1x-radius blueprint).
+# Generated once; the authentik worker reads it as WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+# for the blueprint, wlan-setup reads it for the code exchange.
+apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Password
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  length: 64
+  digits: 16
+  symbols: 0
+  allowRepeat: true
+  noUpper: false
+  secretKeys:
+    - client_secret
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  refreshPolicy: CreatedOnce
+  target:
+    name: wlan-setup-oauth
+  dataFrom:
+    - sourceRef:
+        generatorRef:
+          apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+          kind: Password
+          name: wlan-setup-oauth
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+# Signs the Windows Wi-Fi provisioning XML of wlan.renner.uno (XML-DSig in the
+# wlan-setup service). Issued via the cluster-wide Cloudflare DNS-01
+# ClusterIssuer.
+apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+kind: Certificate
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-signing
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  secretName: wlan-setup-signing
+  issuerRef:
+    name: letsencrypt-cluster
+    kind: ClusterIssuer
+  dnsNames:
+    - wlan.renner.uno
+  privateKey:
+    algorithm: RSA
+    size: 2048
+    encoding: PKCS8
+    rotationPolicy: Always
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-# wlan.renner.uno: setup page for the 802.1X WLAN "Renner UniFi" (Apple
-# profile, Windows import file, Linux nmcli command; config and files in
-# wlan-setup-config.yaml). Public, so a device can reach it before it is in the
-# WLAN (mobile data, Renner Gast). Any Authentik user passes the gate (no
-# group): the page holds no secrets, only the caller's own username.
+# wlan.renner.uno: setup page for the 802.1X WLAN "Renner UniFi", served by the
+# wlan-setup Go service (wlan-setup/). Android, Apple and Windows get Passpoint
+# profiles with a per-device authentik app password; Linux an nmcli command.
+# Public, so a device can reach it before it is in the WLAN (mobile data,
+# Renner Gast). Any Authentik user passes the gate (no group); the service
+# stores no user credentials beyond the 5-minute single-use Windows profile.
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
 metadata:
@@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ metadata:
  namespace: authentik
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
+  annotations:
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wlan-setup-oauth
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
@@ -19,19 +22,26 @@ spec:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app.kubernetes.io/name: wlan-setup
-      annotations:
-        configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: wlan-setup
    spec:
      automountServiceAccountToken: false
      securityContext:
        runAsNonRoot: true
-        runAsUser: 101
-        runAsGroup: 101
+        runAsUser: 65534
+        runAsGroup: 65534
+        # Group of the signing key files (defaultMode 0440).
+        fsGroup: 65534
        seccompProfile:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
-        - name: nginx
-          image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.31-alpine@sha256:b5047b9b76845eac124358373c6852377c52e4b05834a47647e955dd91cb8f1e
+        - name: wlan-setup
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup:2026-11-05-1517 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wlan-setup"}
+          env:
+            # Client secret of the "WLAN setup" OAuth2 provider.
+            - name: WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: wlan-setup-oauth
+                  key: client_secret
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 8080
@@ -56,55 +66,21 @@ spec:
            limits:
              memory: 64Mi
          volumeMounts:
-            # subPath: replaced on rollout, which the reloader annotation
-            # triggers on every ConfigMap change.
-            - name: main
-              mountPath: /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
-              subPath: nginx.conf
+            # Key and chain that sign the Windows provisioning XML; read per
+            # request, so cert-manager renewals need no restart.
+            - name: signing
+              mountPath: /etc/wlan-signing
              readOnly: true
-            - name: config
-              mountPath: /etc/nginx/conf.d
-              readOnly: true
-            - name: njs
-              mountPath: /etc/nginx/njs
-              readOnly: true
-            - name: html
-              mountPath: /usr/share/nginx/html
-              readOnly: true
-            # pid file and temp paths of the unprivileged image.
-            - name: tmp
-              mountPath: /tmp
      volumes:
-        - name: main
-          configMap:
-            name: wlan-setup
+        - name: signing
+          secret:
+            secretName: wlan-setup-signing
+            defaultMode: 0440
            items:
-              - key: nginx.conf
-                path: nginx.conf
-        - name: config
-          configMap:
-            name: wlan-setup
-            items:
-              - key: default.conf
-                path: default.conf
-        - name: njs
-          configMap:
-            name: wlan-setup
-            items:
-              - key: passpoint.js
-                path: passpoint.js
-        - name: html
-          configMap:
-            name: wlan-setup
-            items:
-              - key: index.html
-                path: index.html
-              - key: renner-unifi-wlan.cmd
-                path: renner-unifi-wlan.cmd
-        - name: tmp
-          emptyDir:
-            medium: Memory
-            sizeLimit: 16Mi
+              - key: tls.key
+                path: tls.key
+              - key: tls.crt
+                path: tls.crt
 ---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
@@ -152,3 +128,30 @@ spec:
                name: wlan-setup
                port:
                  number: 80
+---
+# Without the gate: Windows Settings fetches the signed provisioning XML
+# without the browser's session; the single-use token in the path is the only
+# gate. Traefik reaches the pods through the CNP wlan-setup-gate that
+# gate-sync creates for the Ingress above.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup-provisioning
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - wlan.renner.uno
+      secretName: wlan-setup-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: wlan.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /windows/profile/
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: wlan-setup
+                port:
+                  number: 80
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-10-29-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-11-05-1401 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
          env:
            - name: CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN
              valueFrom:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gitea-mcp
-          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.12.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
+          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.13.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
          # Image has no ENTRYPOINT (binary is in CMD), so args alone would replace it.
          command:
            - /app/gitea-mcp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ spec:
      annotations:
        # Bump to restart the pod and re-attach net1 (DHCP via multus).
        # 2026-10-06: first attach on containernetworking/plugins v1.9.1.
-        homelab.renner.uno/restarted-for: "2026-10-06 cni-plugins v1.9.1 attach check"
+        homelab.renner.uno/restarted-for: "2026-11-07 net1 without RA (S28-36)"
        k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: mdns-relay-iot
    spec:
      # Runs where the node patch declares the IoT VLAN (ens19).
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ spec:
  # dropped. The relay's forward path to Home Assistant runs over eth0, so
  # that route has to stay intact.
  #
+  # sbr covers IPv4 only. With Router Advertisements net1 gets a global IPv6
+  # address and default route in the main table, and the IPv6 forward to the
+  # Service leaves via net1 with an IoT source, which HA's CNP drops. tuning
+  # turns RA processing off; the link-local address ff02::fb needs stays.
+  #
  # Requires the cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet in infrastructure/multus.
  config: |
    {
@@ -45,6 +50,13 @@ spec:
            "type": "dhcp"
          }
        },
+        {
+          "type": "tuning",
+          "sysctl": {
+            "net.ipv6.conf.IFNAME.accept_ra": "0",
+            "net.ipv6.conf.IFNAME.autoconf": "0"
+          }
+        },
        {
          "type": "sbr"
        }
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: shelly-manager
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/shelly-manager:2026-11-05-0732 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/shelly-manager:2026-11-07-1918 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          ports:
            - name: http
@@ -49,17 +49,12 @@
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite #"]
-# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan.
-# The controller pushes
-# the password to edge-mqtt-cred on edge-1 (ansible role mqtt-bridge) over
-# HTTPS with its own client certificate, and pins edge-1's self-generated
-# server certificate on first contact (key edge-1.pin in mqtt-account-hashes;
-# delete it after a reinstall of edge-1).
- name: edge-1
+# vitocal-can: open3e-esp32 CAN gateway at the Vitocal 250-A (S28-28).
+# The firmware registers its compiled-in DHCP name `open3e`, not its
+# configured hostname.
+- name: vitocal-can
  auth: password
-  deliver: {esp32: "https://edge-1.iot.renner.uno:8443"}
-  # No sml2mqtt/#: the SML meter reader is retired for good (owner,
-  # 2026-09-19; grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus).
+  deliver: {esp32: "http://open3e.iot.renner.uno"}
  acl: ["readwrite open3e/#"]
 # Shellies (REN-1017): one password account per device, pushed by the
 # controller through shelly-manager's per-device API. Name shelly-<id> =
@@ -106,6 +101,10 @@
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 25}  # Plug S Gen1 1c1a8f
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-41
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 41}  # Plug Gen1 f4cfa26d9cb2
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
 - name: shelly-15
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 15}  # Plug S G3 8cbfea910578
@@ -188,6 +187,34 @@
  auth: password
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 30}  # Plus 2PM b48a0a226c28 (reachable again, REN-1108)
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-7
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 7}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518df3500
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-23
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 23}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518e05b88
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-11
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 11}  # Plus 2PM ccdba7d0b804
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-28
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 28}  # Plus 2PM 0cdc7efa8dc0
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-17
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 17}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daed2054
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-18
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 18}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daecc47c
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-20
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 20}  # Plus Plug S d4d4daecb690
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
 # Sleeping H&Ts (REN-1107): awake only 8-13 s every 1-2 h, so the
 # controller pushes when the device publishes `online` on its wake topic
 # (shelly-manager topic prefix `shellies/<hostname>`), not in the 2-min loop.
@@ -211,3 +238,8 @@
  deliver: {shelly-manager: 38}  # H&T G3 ecda3bc0b6a0
  wake: shellies/shellyhtg3-ecda3bc0b6a0/online
  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-40
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 40}  # Flood G4 7c2c67732e08
+  wake: shellies/shellyfloodg4-7c2c67732e08/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ spec:
          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
          # keeps the repository path when it falls through — so the path has to
          # exist on both registries. Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ spec:
      # Keep tokens unhashed; enable hashing later as its own change.
      - name: INFLUXD_USE_HASHED_TOKENS
        value: "false"
+      # No usage telemetry to telemetry.influxdata.com (egress is denied).
+      - name: INFLUXD_REPORTING_DISABLED
+        value: "true"
    # The chart defaults to liveness/readiness with initialDelaySeconds=0,
    # so after a crash restart the kubelet kills the pod before shards
    # finish opening. Give it 10 minutes to come up cleanly.
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-10-30-1314 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-11-05-1355 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
          env:
            - name: KUMA_URL
              value: https://kuma.renner.uno
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ spec:
      # non-RFC-framed payload). Scoped to this single-purpose receiver
      # only — the pod-log Alloy DaemonSet stays at default stability.
      stabilityLevel: experimental
+      # No usage reporting to stats.grafana.org (egress is denied anyway).
+      extraArgs:
+        - --disable-reporting
      resources:
        requests:
          cpu: 20m
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ spec:
      retries: 3
  values:
    alloy:
+      # No usage reporting to stats.grafana.org (egress is denied anyway).
+      extraArgs:
+        - --disable-reporting
      configMap:
        content: |
          // Discover and collect K8s pod logs
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gotenberg
-          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.39.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
+          image: gotenberg/gotenberg:8.40.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gotenberg"}
          args:
            - "gotenberg"
            - "--chromium-disable-javascript=true"
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ spec:
          # exist on both registries — hence konairius/, which matches the ghcr
          # namespace. Steady state still pulls from Gitea and never leaves the
          # network.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-openssl"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-openssl"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: review-bot
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:2026-11-02-1054 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:review-bot"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:2026-11-05-1350 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:review-bot"}
          env:
            - name: GITEA_URL
              value: https://gitea.renner.uno
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ spec:
          # (machine.registries.mirrors, applied by bootstrap.sh), and containerd
          # keeps the repository path, so it has to exist on both registries.
          # Steady state still pulls from Gitea.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:alpine-jq"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -156,13 +156,39 @@ spec:
    k8sServicePort: 7445
    # Hubble itself is on in every agent (chart default); the relay aggregates
    # the three nodes' flow buffers behind one gRPC endpoint so `hubble observe`
-    # works without exec into kube-system (REN-487). Renders no change to
-    # cilium-config or the agent DaemonSet, so the reloader annotation above
-    # does not roll the CNI. The relay has no client auth; who may reach it is
-    # network-policies/kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml.
+    # works without exec into kube-system (REN-487). The relay has no client
+    # auth; who may reach it is network-policies/kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml.
    hubble:
      relay:
        enabled: true
+      # Every policy drop goes to the agent's stdout and from there to Loki
+      # ({namespace="kube-system", container="cilium-agent"} |= "POLICY_DENIED"),
+      # so denied traffic can be reviewed after the fact. Changes cilium-config,
+      # so the reloader rolls the agents.
+      export:
+        static:
+          enabled: true
+          filePath: stdout
+          allowList:
+            - '{"verdict":["DROPPED"],"drop_reason_desc":["POLICY_DENIED"],"event_type":[{"type":1}]}'
+          fieldMask:
+            - time
+            - node_name
+            - verdict
+            - drop_reason_desc
+            - traffic_direction
+            - IP
+            - l4
+            - source.namespace
+            - source.pod_name
+            - source.identity
+            - source.workloads
+            - source_names
+            - destination.namespace
+            - destination.pod_name
+            - destination.identity
+            - destination.workloads
+            - destination_names
    l2announcements:
      enabled: true
    externalIPs:
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ existing `flux-system` GitRepository whose Secret was created by
 | authentik-gate-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | kuma-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | cloudflare-lb-sync | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
+| wlan-setup | `YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins |
 | secret-rotator | `YYYY-MM-DD` | In-house (build-ci-images.yml); newest tag wins; staged: only the Home Assistant rotation CronJobs carry the marker so far |
 | gatus | `5.x` | v-prefix filter |
 | velero-plugin-for-aws | `1.13.x` | Tight: must match velero server major.minor |
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ resources:
  - velero-plugin-for-aws.yaml
  - vsftpd.yaml
  - wiki.yaml
+  - wlan-setup.yaml
  - woodpecker.yaml
  - wyoming.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImageRepository
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wlan-setup
+  interval: 30m
+---
+# build-ci-images.yml tags each build YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM; newest wins.
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImagePolicy
+metadata:
+  name: wlan-setup
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  imageRepositoryRef:
+    name: wlan-setup
+  filterTags:
+    pattern: '^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{4}$'
+  policy:
+    alphabetical:
+      order: asc
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ spec:
          # No imagePullSecret: the ghcr namespace is private and its credential
          # is in machine.registries too, because a Secret would have to come
          # from OpenBao, which needs Ceph, which needs these binaries.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-10-29-1348 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cni-plugins"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:2026-11-05-1353 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cni-plugins"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ spec:
              value: "netbird-ingress-$(NODE_NAME)"
            - name: NB_LOG_LEVEL
              value: "info"
+            # stdout only; the image default also writes client.log into the
+            # 16Mi state tmpfs.
+            - name: NB_LOG_FILE
+              value: "console"
            # rootless image needs a writable HOME for its state.
            - name: USER
              value: "netbird"
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# Client networks as Cilium CIDR groups, referenced from CNPs via
+# fromCIDRSet.cidrGroupRef. ULA + IPv4 only: the ISP-delegated GUA prefixes
+# change and are not listed.
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-default
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd00::/64
+    - 192.168.8.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-management
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:10::/64
+    - 10.2.10.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-radius
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:11::/64
+    - 10.2.11.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-video
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.20.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-iot
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:30::/64
+    - 10.2.30.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-server
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:40::/64
+    - fd40::/64
+    - 10.2.40.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-node
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:46::/64
+    - 10.2.46.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-ingress
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:47::/64
+    - 10.2.47.0/24
+---
+# The UDM's own address on k8s-ingress, which it sources from towards the
+# cluster's LoadBalancer IPs.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: udm-k8s-ingress
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:47::1/128
+    - 10.2.47.1/32
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-k8s-pod
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:48::/64
+    - 10.2.48.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-privat
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - fd02:50::/64
+    - 10.2.50.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-phone
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.60.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-access
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.70.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-vpn
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.80.0/24
+    - 192.168.32.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-guest
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.90.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-multi-transfer
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.122.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-multi-lan
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.123.0/24
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumCIDRGroup
+metadata:
+  name: net-mutti
+spec:
+  externalCIDRs:
+    - 10.2.200.0/24
@@ -186,14 +186,21 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "1883"
              protocol: TCP
            - port: "8883"
              protocol: TCP
+    # MQTT clients on the private LAN, TLS only.
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8883"
+              protocol: TCP
 ---
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
@@ -205,8 +212,11 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-server
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8123"
@@ -225,8 +235,8 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8082"
@@ -489,7 +499,7 @@ spec:
            - port: "6638"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
-# mqtt-account-controller: credential delivery to edge-1 (deliver.esp32 in mqtt-accounts.yaml).
+# mqtt-account-controller: credential delivery to deliver.esp32 targets in mqtt-accounts.yaml.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -514,11 +524,12 @@ spec:
          rules:
            dns:
              - matchPattern: "*"
+    # vitocal-can (open3e-esp32), plain HTTP API.
    - toFQDNs:
-        - matchName: "edge-1.iot.renner.uno"
+        - matchName: "open3e.iot.renner.uno"
      toPorts:
        - ports:
-            - port: "8443"
+            - port: "80"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
 # whisper and speech-to-phrase: model downloads over HTTPS.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# CoreDNS is reachable from the LAN through the kube-dns-lb LoadBalancer
+# (ETP=Local, client address reaches the pod). Selecting the pods makes
+# them default-deny for ingress, so the whole cluster (pods, nodes, kubelet
+# probes, Prometheus) is allowed on every port; LAN clients only on 53.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: coredns-ingress
+  namespace: kube-system
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      k8s-app: kube-dns
+  ingress:
+    - fromEntities:
+        - cluster
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-default
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-management
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-radius
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-video
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-server
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-node
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-ingress
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-pod
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-phone
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-access
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-guest
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-multi-transfer
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-multi-lan
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-mutti
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: TCP
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
+  - cidr-groups.yaml
  - default-deny.yaml
  - allow-ingress.yaml
  - ingress-isolation.yaml
@@ -40,3 +41,4 @@ resources:
  - allow-cilium-health.yaml
  - cnpg-barman-s3.yaml
  - kube-system-hubble-relay.yaml
+  - kube-system-coredns.yaml
@@ -1,13 +1,6 @@
-# Targeted carve-out: alloy-syslog needs world ingress on the syslog
-# ports specifically. The Service is ETP=Cluster, so external syslog
-# senders (Proxmox, LXC hosts, network gear) hit the LB IP, get DNAT'd
-# to an alloy pod, and get SNAT'd to the receiving node's cilium_host
-# address. Cilium then sees the source as `world-ipv4` identity (the
-# cilium_host IP isn't a known endpoint), NOT `host` — so the broad
-# monitoring CNP's `fromEntities: host` rule doesn't catch it.
-#
-# Scoped via endpointSelector so this only widens ingress on the
-# alloy-syslog pod, not the whole namespace.
+# Syslog senders reaching the alloy-syslog LB (ETP=Local, client address
+# reaches the pod): network gear on Management, the SLZB coordinators on
+# IoT, and the UDM itself, which sources from its k8s-ingress address.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -19,8 +12,10 @@ spec:
      app.kubernetes.io/instance: alloy-syslog
      app.kubernetes.io/name: alloy
  ingress:
-    - fromEntities:
-        - world
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-management
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-k8s-ingress
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "514"
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ spec:
            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
 ---
-# Allow FTP access (from scanners on the LAN) to the ftp-scanner pod.
+# FTP from the scanners (IoT and Privat) to the ftp-scanner pod.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -123,8 +123,24 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: ftp-scanner
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "21"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21100"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21101"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21102"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21103"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "21104"
+              protocol: TCP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -142,7 +158,7 @@ spec:
            - port: "21104"
              protocol: TCP
 ---
-# Allow Syncthing peer-to-peer sync from the LAN/world.
+# Allow Syncthing peer-to-peer sync from Privat and VPN.
 # - 22000 TCP+QUIC: actual sync traffic between peers.
 # - 21027 UDP: local-discovery broadcast packets from peers on the LAN.
 # UI (8384) is intentionally NOT listed — authentik-gate-sync generates the
@@ -157,8 +173,18 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: syncthing
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-privat
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-vpn
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "22000"
+              protocol: TCP
+            - port: "22000"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "21027"
+              protocol: UDP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -62,9 +62,10 @@ spec:
 # CA, so this bypasses Traefik entirely and the namespace default-deny has
 # to be opened for it — same shape as paperless's allow-ftp-scanner.
 #
-# Scoped to the terminus pods and port 2345 only. Requests still have to
-# carry a known device MAC in the `ID` header plus its api_key; this rule
-# opens the port, not the application.
+# Scoped to the terminus pods, port 2345 and the IoT network (the panel's
+# network; the LB is ETP=Local, so the client address reaches the pod).
+# Requests still have to carry a known device MAC in the `ID` header plus
+# its api_key; this rule opens the port, not the application.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -75,8 +76,13 @@ spec:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: terminus
  ingress:
+    - fromCIDRSet:
+        - cidrGroupRef: net-iot
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "2345"
+              protocol: TCP
    - fromEntities:
-        - world
        - host
        - remote-node
      toPorts:
@@ -154,6 +160,12 @@ spec:
 ---
 # In-cluster + DNS for every pod except terminus (terminus-egress is its
 # allowlist; selecting it here would widen it to all of `cluster`).
+#
+# trmnl-renderer's Chromium calls clients2.google.com:80,
+# update.googleapis.com:443 and accounts.google.com:443; these drops are
+# expected and harmless. The launch flags are fixed in upstream
+# trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/screenshot.ts (PUPPETEER_ARGS, no override) and lack
+# --disable-background-networking.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-02 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:secret-rotator"}
              args: ["ha-token"]
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: backup-verify
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-10-29 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:backup-verify"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-11-05 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:backup-verify"}
              command: ["bash", "/script/backup-verify.sh"]
              env:
                - name: HOME
@@ -68,13 +68,14 @@ locals {
  # idx is a static per-network slot for rule_index derivation — never
  # reuse a freed idx for a new network.
  #
-  # Deliberately absent: (40) Server idx=4, (42) Ingress idx=5, and
-  # (49) k8s Ceph idx=6. The cluster nodes have interfaces on those VLANs,
-  # so a DNATed flow's reply would go directly over the shared L2 and
-  # bypass the UDM's conntrack (asymmetric, connection drops) — and
-  # clients there are the nodes themselves, whose DNS chain (CoreDNS ->
-  # k8s_gateway) already resolves the public names in-cluster. Their idx
-  # slots stay reserved.
+  # Deliberately absent: (40) Server idx=4, (49) k8s Ceph idx=6,
+  # (46) k8s Node, (47) k8s Ingress and (48) k8s Pod. The cluster nodes
+  # have interfaces on those VLANs (mgmt0, node0, ingress0, pod0), so a
+  # DNATed flow's reply would go directly over the shared L2 and bypass
+  # the UDM's conntrack (asymmetric, connection drops) — and clients there
+  # are the nodes themselves, whose DNS chain (CoreDNS -> k8s_gateway)
+  # already resolves the public names in-cluster. idx=5 stays reserved
+  # (its network, (42) Ingress, no longer exists).
  hairpin_networks = {
    "Default"              = { id = "5d4fba77ce63ee614841d53d", idx = 0 }
    "(10) Management"      = { id = "600334abf9ee0c059da6be8f", idx = 1 }
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/wlan-setup
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# wlan-setup — static Go binary in a FROM-scratch image.
+#
+# Nothing in the final image but the binary and the CA bundle (the binary has no shell and no
+# package manager to patch or to exec).
+FROM golang:1.27.3-bookworm@sha256:d9b6a1beb9474adc2a1ce842573639b44b2a0dd49b6669f51d3821baf9ec37c9 AS build
+
+WORKDIR /build
+COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+RUN go mod download
+COPY *.go index.html ./
+
+RUN go vet ./... \
+ && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" -o /wlan-setup .
+
+FROM scratch
+COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
+COPY --from=build /wlan-setup /wlan-setup
+
+# Matches runAsUser in the Deployment. There is no /etc/passwd in a scratch image, so this is a
+# bare uid by necessity.
+USER 65534:65534
+EXPOSE 8080
+ENTRYPOINT ["/wlan-setup"]
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// authentikHost is the Host header of every call: authentik routes by it.
+const authentikHost = "auth.renner.uno"
+
+// maxReply bounds what is read of an authentik reply.
+const maxReply = 1 << 20
+
+var credential = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+$`)
+
+// Authentik calls authentik's OAuth and API endpoints at its internal address.
+type Authentik struct {
+	base   string
+	secret string
+	http   *http.Client
+}
+
+// call sends one request and decodes the JSON reply into out. Errors name the method, path and
+// status, never the credential or the request body.
+func (a *Authentik) call(ctx context.Context, method, path, auth, contentType string, body []byte, out any) error {
+	var rd io.Reader
+	if body != nil {
+		rd = bytes.NewReader(body)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, a.base+path, rd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %w", method, path, err)
+	}
+	req.Host = authentikHost
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth)
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	if contentType != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
+	}
+	resp, err := a.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %w", method, path, err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxReply+1))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: reading the reply: %w", method, path, err)
+	}
+	if len(data) > maxReply {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s -> %d: reply larger than %d bytes", method, path, resp.StatusCode, maxReply)
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode > 299 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s -> %d %s", method, path, resp.StatusCode, snippet(data))
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, out); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: decoding the reply: %w", method, path, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func snippet(b []byte) string {
+	s := strings.ToValidUTF8(string(b), "?")
+	if len(s) > 300 {
+		s = s[:300]
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func bearer(token string) (string, error) {
+	if !credential.MatchString(token) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("no access token")
+	}
+	return "Bearer " + token, nil
+}
+
+// Exchange trades the authorization code for an access token.
+func (a *Authentik) Exchange(ctx context.Context, code, redirectURI string) (string, error) {
+	basic := "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(clientID+":"+a.secret))
+	body := form("grant_type", "authorization_code", "code", code, "redirect_uri", redirectURI)
+	var grant struct {
+		AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
+	}
+	if err := a.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/application/o/token/", basic, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+		[]byte(body), &grant); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if !credential.MatchString(grant.AccessToken) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("POST /application/o/token/: no access token in the reply")
+	}
+	return grant.AccessToken, nil
+}
+
+// Username returns the username of the access token's user.
+func (a *Authentik) Username(ctx context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
+	auth, err := bearer(token)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	var me struct {
+		User struct {
+			Username string `json:"username"`
+		} `json:"user"`
+	}
+	if err := a.call(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/v3/core/users/me/", auth, "", nil, &me); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return me.User.Username, nil
+}
+
+type tokenRequest struct {
+	Identifier  string `json:"identifier"`
+	Intent      string `json:"intent"`
+	Description string `json:"description"`
+	Expiring    bool   `json:"expiring"`
+	Expires     string `json:"expires"`
+}
+
+// AppPassword creates an app password as the token's user and returns its key.
+func (a *Authentik) AppPassword(ctx context.Context, token string, t tokenRequest) (string, error) {
+	auth, err := bearer(token)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(t)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	var created json.RawMessage
+	if err := a.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/v3/core/tokens/", auth, "application/json", body, &created); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	var view struct {
+		Key string `json:"key"`
+	}
+	path := "/api/v3/core/tokens/" + url.PathEscape(t.Identifier) + "/view_key/"
+	if err := a.call(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, auth, "", nil, &view); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if view.Key == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("GET %s: no key in the reply", path)
+	}
+	return view.Key, nil
+}
+
+// form encodes key/value pairs in the given order, like encodeURIComponent.
+func form(pairs ...string) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i := 0; i+1 < len(pairs); i += 2 {
+		if i > 0 {
+			b.WriteByte('&')
+		}
+		b.WriteString(escape(pairs[i]))
+		b.WriteByte('=')
+		b.WriteString(escape(pairs[i+1]))
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func escape(s string) string {
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(url.QueryEscape(s), "+", "%20")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Config is the service configuration, read from the environment.
+type Config struct {
+	ClientSecret string
+	// AuthentikURL is where the calls go; they carry Host auth.renner.uno.
+	AuthentikURL string
+	AuthorizeURL string
+	PublicURL    string
+	SigningKey   string
+	SigningCert  string
+	Listen       string
+}
+
+func loadConfig(getenv func(string) string) (Config, error) {
+	get := func(key, def string) string {
+		if v := strings.TrimSpace(getenv(key)); v != "" {
+			return v
+		}
+		return def
+	}
+	c := Config{
+		ClientSecret: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET")),
+		AuthentikURL: strings.TrimRight(get("AUTHENTIK_INTERNAL_URL", "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"), "/"),
+		AuthorizeURL: get("AUTHENTIK_AUTHORIZE_URL", "https://auth.renner.uno/application/o/authorize/"),
+		PublicURL:    strings.TrimRight(get("PUBLIC_URL", "https://wlan.renner.uno"), "/"),
+		SigningKey:   get("SIGNING_KEY", "/etc/wlan-signing/tls.key"),
+		SigningCert:  get("SIGNING_CERT", "/etc/wlan-signing/tls.crt"),
+		Listen:       get("LISTEN", ":8080"),
+	}
+	var errs []error
+	if c.ClientSecret == "" {
+		errs = append(errs, errors.New("WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET is not set"))
+	}
+	for key, v := range map[string]string{
+		"AUTHENTIK_INTERNAL_URL":  c.AuthentikURL,
+		"AUTHENTIK_AUTHORIZE_URL": c.AuthorizeURL,
+		"PUBLIC_URL":              c.PublicURL,
+	} {
+		if u, err := url.Parse(v); err != nil || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") || u.Host == "" {
+			errs = append(errs, errors.New(key+" must be an absolute http(s) URL"))
+		}
+	}
+	return c, errors.Join(errs...)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+module gitea.renner.uno/konairius/homelab/wlan-setup
+
+go 1.27
+
+require (
+	github.com/beevik/etree v1.7.0
+	github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig v1.6.1
+	howett.net/plist v1.0.1
+)
+
+require github.com/jonboulle/clockwork v0.5.0 // indirect
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+github.com/beevik/etree v1.7.0 h1:xjBk9O4p4x7D1YajePjfLzdaFC4/uYUENA7P0pv6gXA=
+github.com/beevik/etree v1.7.0/go.mod h1:bh4zJxiIr62SOf9pRzN7UUYaEDa9HEKafK25+sLc0Gc=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
+github.com/jessevdk/go-flags v1.4.0/go.mod h1:4FA24M0QyGHXBuZZK/XkWh8h0e1EYbRYJSGM75WSRxI=
+github.com/jonboulle/clockwork v0.5.0 h1:Hyh9A8u51kptdkR+cqRpT1EebBwTn1oK9YfGYbdFz6I=
+github.com/jonboulle/clockwork v0.5.0/go.mod h1:3mZlmanh0g2NDKO5TWZVJAfofYk64M7XN3SzBPjZF60=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
+github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig v1.6.1 h1:SB7R5ttvrGIDB2juJAK/i7DQ2Ivr7agG+ohfNJjwyYU=
+github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig v1.6.1/go.mod h1:haZkRcLs9W/Xp989fIjP3BrTdbFQveRF0QNZSYoH09w=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
+gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v1 v1.0.0-20140924161607-9f9df34309c0/go.mod h1:WDnlLJ4WF5VGsH/HVa3CI79GS0ol3YnhVnKP89i0kNg=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
+howett.net/plist v1.0.1 h1:37GdZ8tP09Q35o9ych3ehygcsL+HqKSwzctveSlarvM=
+howett.net/plist v1.0.1/go.mod h1:lqaXoTrLY4hg8tnEzNru53gicrbv7rrk+2xJA/7hw9g=
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="de">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<title>WLAN einrichten</title>
+<style>
+  :root { --bg: #ffffff; --fg: #1d1d1f; --muted: #5f6368; --card: #f4f5f7; --accent: #0b63ce; --code: #e9ebef; }
+  @media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
+    :root { --bg: #121314; --fg: #e8eaed; --muted: #9aa0a6; --card: #1e1f22; --accent: #7cacf8; --code: #2a2b2f; }
+  }
+  * { box-sizing: border-box; }
+  body { margin: 0; background: var(--bg); color: var(--fg); font: 16px/1.5 system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif; }
+  main { max-width: 42rem; margin: 0 auto; padding: 1.5rem 1rem 3rem; }
+  h1 { font-size: 1.6rem; margin: 0 0 .25rem; }
+  h2 { font-size: 1.15rem; margin: 0 0 .5rem; }
+  p { margin: .5rem 0; }
+  .muted { color: var(--muted); }
+  section { background: var(--card); border-radius: 12px; padding: 1rem 1.1rem; margin: 1rem 0; }
+  section.current { outline: 2px solid var(--accent); }
+  a.button, button { display: inline-block; background: var(--accent); color: #fff; border: 0; border-radius: 8px; padding: .6rem 1rem; font: inherit; text-decoration: none; cursor: pointer; }
+  @media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) { a.button, button { color: #121314; } }
+  ol { padding-left: 1.3rem; margin: .5rem 0; }
+  pre { background: var(--code); border-radius: 8px; padding: .75rem; overflow-x: auto; white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-all; font-size: .85rem; margin: .5rem 0; }
+  details > summary { cursor: pointer; color: var(--accent); margin: 1.5rem 0 .5rem; }
+</style>
+</head>
+<body>
+<main>
+  <h1>WLAN einrichten</h1>
+  <p>WLAN <strong>Renner UniFi</strong> für dein Konto <strong id="user">…</strong>. Android, iPhone, iPad, Mac und Windows bekommen ein eigenes WLAN-App-Passwort; Linux meldet sich mit deinem authentik-Passwort an.</p>
+
+  <div id="detected"></div>
+
+  <details id="others">
+    <summary>Andere Geräte</summary>
+    <div id="rest"></div>
+  </details>
+
+  <template id="t-android">
+    <section data-os="android">
+      <h2>Android</h2>
+      <p><a class="button" href="/android/install">Auf Android installieren</a></p>
+      <p class="muted">Das Gerät bekommt ein eigenes WLAN-App-Passwort in deinem authentik-Konto; dort gelöscht, ist das Gerät aus dem WLAN.</p>
+    </section>
+  </template>
+
+  <template id="t-apple">
+    <section data-os="apple">
+      <h2>iPhone, iPad, Mac</h2>
+      <p><a class="button" href="/apple/install">Profil laden</a></p>
+      <ol>
+        <li>iPhone/iPad: Einstellungen → „Profil geladen“ → Installieren. Mac: Systemeinstellungen → Allgemein → Geräteverwaltung → Profil doppelklicken.</li>
+        <li>Das Gerät verbindet sich danach selbst mit „Renner UniFi“.</li>
+      </ol>
+      <p class="muted">Das Gerät bekommt ein eigenes WLAN-App-Passwort in deinem authentik-Konto; dort gelöscht, ist das Gerät aus dem WLAN.</p>
+    </section>
+  </template>
+
+  <template id="t-windows">
+    <section data-os="windows">
+      <h2>Windows</h2>
+      <p><a class="button" href="/windows/install">Auf Windows installieren</a></p>
+      <p>Windows öffnet die Einstellungen und fragt, ob das WLAN-Profil hinzugefügt werden soll: „Hinzufügen“ wählen.</p>
+      <p class="muted">Das Gerät bekommt ein eigenes WLAN-App-Passwort in deinem authentik-Konto; dort gelöscht, ist das Gerät aus dem WLAN.</p>
+    </section>
+  </template>
+
+  <template id="t-linux">
+    <section data-os="linux">
+      <h2>Linux (NetworkManager)</h2>
+      <p>Im Terminal ausführen, danach fragt NetworkManager nach dem Passwort:</p>
+      <pre id="nmcli"></pre>
+      <p><button type="button" id="copy-nmcli">Befehl kopieren</button></p>
+    </section>
+  </template>
+</main>
+<script>
+(function () {
+  var ua = navigator.userAgent;
+  var os = "other";
+  if (/Android/i.test(ua)) os = "android";
+  else if (/iPhone|iPad|iPod|Macintosh/i.test(ua)) os = "apple";
+  else if (/Windows/i.test(ua)) os = "windows";
+  else if (/Linux|X11/i.test(ua)) os = "linux";
+
+  var detected = document.getElementById("detected");
+  var rest = document.getElementById("rest");
+  ["android", "apple", "windows", "linux"].forEach(function (name) {
+    var node = document.getElementById("t-" + name).content.cloneNode(true);
+    if (name === os) { node.querySelector("section").classList.add("current"); detected.appendChild(node); }
+    else rest.appendChild(node);
+  });
+  if (os === "other") document.getElementById("others").open = true;
+
+  function quote(s) { return "'" + s.replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + "'"; }
+  function render(user) {
+    document.getElementById("user").textContent = user || "(dein Benutzername)";
+    document.getElementById("nmcli").textContent =
+      "nmcli connection add type wifi con-name 'Renner UniFi' ssid 'Renner UniFi' " +
+      "wifi-sec.key-mgmt wpa-eap 802-1x.eap ttls 802-1x.phase2-auth pap " +
+      "802-1x.anonymous-identity anonymous 802-1x.identity " + quote(user || "BENUTZERNAME") + " " +
+      "802-1x.domain-suffix-match radius.renner.uno 802-1x.system-ca-certs yes " +
+      "802-1x.password-flags 2 && nmcli --ask connection up 'Renner UniFi'";
+  }
+  render("");
+  fetch("/whoami", { credentials: "same-origin" })
+    .then(function (r) { return r.ok ? r.text() : ""; })
+    .then(function (t) { render(t.trim()); })
+    .catch(function () {});
+
+  document.getElementById("copy-nmcli").addEventListener("click", function () {
+    var text = document.getElementById("nmcli").textContent;
+    var btn = this;
+    navigator.clipboard.writeText(text).then(function () {
+      btn.textContent = "Kopiert";
+      setTimeout(function () { btn.textContent = "Befehl kopieren"; }, 2000);
+    });
+  });
+})();
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// wlan-setup serves wlan.renner.uno behind the authentik gate: the setup page for the WLAN
+// "Renner UniFi" and, per device, an authorization-code sign-in that creates an authentik app
+// password as the user and answers with a Passpoint profile (Android, Apple) or a signed
+// CarrierProvisioning document that Windows Settings fetches once.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
+	cfg, err := loadConfig(os.Getenv)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Error("invalid configuration", "err", err)
+		os.Exit(2)
+	}
+	ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
+	defer stop()
+	if err := run(ctx, cfg, log); err != nil {
+		log.Error("stopped", "err", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}
+
+func run(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, log *slog.Logger) error {
+	srv := &http.Server{
+		Addr:              cfg.Listen,
+		Handler:           newServer(cfg, log).routes(),
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
+		ReadTimeout:       30 * time.Second,
+		// A callback makes up to four authentik calls of at most 10 s each.
+		WriteTimeout:   60 * time.Second,
+		IdleTimeout:    2 * time.Minute,
+		MaxHeaderBytes: 64 << 10,
+	}
+	failed := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { failed <- srv.ListenAndServe() }()
+	log.Info("listening", "addr", cfg.Listen)
+
+	select {
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+	case err := <-failed:
+		if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	log.Info("shutting down")
+	shutdown, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	return srv.Shutdown(shutdown)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"fmt"
+	"mime"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/textproto"
+
+	"github.com/beevik/etree"
+	"howett.net/plist"
+)
+
+// isrgRootX1 is the trust anchor of the radius-tls chain (DER, base64).
+const isrgRootX1 = "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"
+
+// carrierID identifies the Windows provisioning document; a reinstall replaces the profile.
+const carrierID = "{5423c37a-7530-4ce9-8f87-a2574ea006bc}"
+
+// mimeBoundary separates the parts of the Android profile.
+const mimeBoundary = "renner-passpoint-profile"
+
+// ppsNode is a node of the PPS MO management tree: a leaf carries a Value, an interior node
+// further nodes.
+type ppsNode struct {
+	XMLName      xml.Name         `xml:"Node"`
+	NodeName     string           `xml:"NodeName"`
+	RTProperties *ppsRTProperties `xml:"RTProperties,omitempty"`
+	Value        *string          `xml:"Value,omitempty"`
+	Nodes        []ppsNode        `xml:"Node"`
+}
+
+type ppsRTProperties struct {
+	DDFName string `xml:"Type>DDFName"`
+}
+
+type ppsTree struct {
+	XMLName xml.Name  `xml:"syncml:dmddf1.2 MgmtTree"`
+	VerDTD  string    `xml:"VerDTD"`
+	Nodes   []ppsNode `xml:"Node"`
+}
+
+func ppsLeaf(name, value string) ppsNode { return ppsNode{NodeName: name, Value: &value} }
+
+func ppsInterior(name string, nodes ...ppsNode) ppsNode {
+	return ppsNode{NodeName: name, Nodes: nodes}
+}
+
+// androidProfile is the application/x-wifi-config body: base64 of a MIME multipart with the
+// Passpoint R1 PPS MO and the trust anchor, each part base64.
+func androidProfile(user, password string) ([]byte, error) {
+	subscription := ppsInterior("PerProviderSubscription",
+		ppsInterior("i001",
+			ppsInterior("HomeSP", ppsLeaf("FriendlyName", "Renner"), ppsLeaf("FQDN", "renner.uno")),
+			ppsInterior("Credential",
+				ppsLeaf("Realm", "renner.uno"),
+				ppsInterior("UsernamePassword",
+					ppsLeaf("Username", user),
+					ppsLeaf("Password", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(password))),
+					ppsInterior("EAPMethod", ppsLeaf("EAPType", "21"), ppsLeaf("InnerMethod", "PAP")))),
+			ppsInterior("Extension", ppsInterior("Android",
+				ppsInterior("AAAServerTrustedNames", ppsLeaf("FQDN", "radius.renner.uno"))))))
+	subscription.RTProperties = &ppsRTProperties{DDFName: "urn:wfa:mo:hotspot2dot0-perprovidersubscription:1.0"}
+	pps, err := xml.Marshal(ppsTree{VerDTD: "1.2", Nodes: []ppsNode{subscription}})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("pps: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var parts bytes.Buffer
+	mw := multipart.NewWriter(&parts)
+	if err := mw.SetBoundary(mimeBoundary); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for _, p := range []struct{ contentType, body string }{
+		{"application/x-passpoint-profile", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pps)},
+		{"application/x-x509-ca-cert", isrgRootX1},
+	} {
+		w, err := mw.CreatePart(textproto.MIMEHeader{
+			"Content-Type":              {p.contentType},
+			"Content-Transfer-Encoding": {"base64"},
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if _, err := w.Write([]byte(p.body)); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := mw.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	var message bytes.Buffer
+	fmt.Fprintf(&message, "Content-Type: %s\r\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\n",
+		mime.FormatMediaType("multipart/mixed", map[string]string{"boundary": mw.Boundary()}))
+	message.Write(parts.Bytes())
+	return []byte(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(message.Bytes())), nil
+}
+
+type appleEAP struct {
+	UserName                string
+	UserPassword            string
+	OuterIdentity           string
+	AcceptEAPTypes          []int
+	TTLSInnerAuthentication string
+	TLSTrustedServerNames   []string
+}
+
+type appleWiFi struct {
+	PayloadType                   string
+	PayloadVersion                int
+	PayloadIdentifier             string
+	PayloadUUID                   string
+	PayloadDisplayName            string
+	PayloadOrganization           string
+	IsHotspot                     bool
+	DomainName                    string
+	NAIRealmNames                 []string
+	DisplayedOperatorName         string
+	ServiceProviderRoamingEnabled bool
+	AutoJoin                      bool
+	EncryptionType                string
+	EAPClientConfiguration        appleEAP
+}
+
+type appleConfiguration struct {
+	PayloadContent      []appleWiFi
+	PayloadType         string
+	PayloadVersion      int
+	PayloadIdentifier   string
+	PayloadUUID         string
+	PayloadDisplayName  string
+	PayloadOrganization string
+}
+
+// appleProfile is the .mobileconfig: com.apple.wifi.managed with Passpoint matching. Fixed
+// identifiers and UUIDs, so a reinstall replaces the previous profile.
+func appleProfile(user, password string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return plist.MarshalIndent(appleConfiguration{
+		PayloadContent: []appleWiFi{{
+			PayloadType:                   "com.apple.wifi.managed",
+			PayloadVersion:                1,
+			PayloadIdentifier:             "uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi.network",
+			PayloadUUID:                   "824959bf-c55d-4ed2-b569-c33f3759c2b6",
+			PayloadDisplayName:            "Renner UniFi",
+			PayloadOrganization:           "Renner",
+			IsHotspot:                     true,
+			DomainName:                    "renner.uno",
+			NAIRealmNames:                 []string{"renner.uno"},
+			DisplayedOperatorName:         "Renner",
+			ServiceProviderRoamingEnabled: false,
+			AutoJoin:                      true,
+			EncryptionType:                "Any",
+			EAPClientConfiguration: appleEAP{
+				UserName:                user,
+				UserPassword:            password,
+				OuterIdentity:           "anonymous",
+				AcceptEAPTypes:          []int{21},
+				TTLSInnerAuthentication: "PAP",
+				TLSTrustedServerNames:   []string{"radius.renner.uno"},
+			},
+		}},
+		PayloadType:         "Configuration",
+		PayloadVersion:      1,
+		PayloadIdentifier:   "uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi",
+		PayloadUUID:         "7175a2a3-ddd3-42ea-b4ad-b7e5501892f3",
+		PayloadDisplayName:  "WLAN Renner UniFi",
+		PayloadOrganization: "Renner",
+	}, plist.XMLFormat, "\t")
+}
+
+// Namespaces of the CarrierProvisioning document.
+const (
+	nsCarrierControl  = "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/v1"
+	nsWLAN            = "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/WLAN/v1"
+	nsOneX            = "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/OneX/v1"
+	nsEapHostConfig   = "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostConfig"
+	nsEapCommon       = "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon"
+	nsEapTtlsConn     = "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapTtlsConnectionPropertiesV1"
+	nsEapHostUserCred = "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostUserCredentials"
+	nsEapTtlsUser     = "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapTtlsUserPropertiesV1"
+)
+
+// add appends an element named tag to parent. ns, when set, becomes its default namespace.
+func add(parent *etree.Element, tag, ns string) *etree.Element {
+	el := parent.CreateElement(tag)
+	if ns != "" {
+		el.CreateAttr("xmlns", ns)
+	}
+	return el
+}
+
+// addText appends an element named tag with text content to parent.
+func addText(parent *etree.Element, tag, ns, text string) *etree.Element {
+	el := add(parent, tag, ns)
+	el.SetText(text)
+	return el
+}
+
+// windowsProfile is the unsigned CarrierProvisioning document: one Hotspot 2.0 WLAN profile
+// (domain and NAI realm renner.uno), WPA3-Enterprise, EAP-TTLS with inner PAP, and the user's
+// credentials. Valid against the schemas Windows ships in %SYSTEMROOT%\schemas\provisioning
+// (TestWindowsProfileSchema); SubscriberId is base:SubscriberType, i.e. \w+ and at most 20
+// characters.
+func windowsProfile(user, password string) *etree.Document {
+	doc := etree.NewDocument()
+	doc.WriteSettings = etree.WriteSettings{CanonicalEndTags: true, CanonicalText: true, CanonicalAttrVal: true}
+	doc.CreateProcInst("xml", `version="1.0"`)
+	doc.CreateText("\n")
+	root := add(&doc.Element, "CarrierProvisioning", nsCarrierControl)
+
+	global := add(root, "Global", "")
+	addText(global, "CarrierId", "", carrierID)
+	addText(global, "SubscriberId", "", "rennerunifi")
+
+	wlan := add(add(root, "WLANProfiles", ""), "WLANProfile", nsWLAN)
+	addText(wlan, "name", "", "Renner UniFi")
+	addText(add(add(wlan, "SSIDConfig", ""), "SSID", ""), "name", "", "Renner UniFi")
+	hotspot2 := add(wlan, "Hotspot2", "")
+	addText(hotspot2, "DomainName", "", "renner.uno")
+	addText(add(hotspot2, "NAIRealm", ""), "name", "", "renner.uno")
+
+	security := add(add(wlan, "MSM", ""), "security", "")
+	auth := add(security, "authEncryption", "")
+	addText(auth, "authentication", "", "WPA3ENT")
+	addText(auth, "encryption", "", "AES")
+	addText(auth, "useOneX", "", "true")
+
+	oneX := add(security, "OneX", nsOneX)
+	addText(oneX, "authMode", "", "user")
+	eapHost := add(add(oneX, "EAPConfig", ""), "EapHostConfig", nsEapHostConfig)
+	method := add(eapHost, "EapMethod", "")
+	addText(method, "Type", nsEapCommon, "21")
+	addText(method, "VendorId", nsEapCommon, "0")
+	addText(method, "VendorType", nsEapCommon, "0")
+	addText(method, "AuthorId", nsEapCommon, "311")
+	ttls := add(add(eapHost, "Config", ""), "EapTtls", nsEapTtlsConn)
+	validation := add(ttls, "ServerValidation", "")
+	addText(validation, "ServerNames", "", "radius.renner.uno")
+	addText(validation, "TrustedRootCAHash", "", "ca bd 2a 79 a1 07 6a 31 f2 1d 25 36 35 cb 03 9d 43 29 a5 e8")
+	addText(validation, "DisablePrompt", "", "true")
+	add(add(ttls, "Phase2Authentication", ""), "PAPAuthentication", "")
+	identity := add(ttls, "Phase1Identity", "")
+	addText(identity, "IdentityPrivacy", "", "true")
+	addText(identity, "AnonymousIdentity", "", "anonymous")
+
+	userCred := add(security, "EapHostUserCredentials", nsEapHostUserCred)
+	userCred.CreateAttr("xmlns:eapCommon", nsEapCommon)
+	userMethod := add(userCred, "EapMethod", "")
+	addText(userMethod, "eapCommon:Type", "", "21")
+	addText(userMethod, "eapCommon:AuthorId", "", "311")
+	credentials := add(add(userCred, "Credentials", ""), "EapTtls", nsEapTtlsUser)
+	addText(credentials, "Username", "", user)
+	addText(credentials, "Password", "", password)
+	return doc
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	_ "embed"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+//go:embed index.html
+var indexHTML []byte
+
+const (
+	clientID     = "wlan-setup"
+	stateCookie  = "wlan_oauth_state"
+	lifetimeDays = 29
+	restart      = "Bitte die Einrichtung neu starten.\n"
+	failed       = "Die Einrichtung ist fehlgeschlagen.\n"
+)
+
+// userPattern admits only plain usernames into a generated file.
+var userPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{1,64}$`)
+
+var identifierUnsafe = regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-z0-9-]`)
+
+var platformLabels = map[string]string{"android": "Android", "apple": "Apple", "windows": "Windows"}
+
+// Server serves the setup page and the per-platform flows.
+type Server struct {
+	cfg       Config
+	authentik *Authentik
+	profiles  *ProfileStore
+	now       func() time.Time
+	log       *slog.Logger
+}
+
+func newServer(cfg Config, log *slog.Logger) *Server {
+	return &Server{
+		cfg:       cfg,
+		authentik: &Authentik{base: cfg.AuthentikURL, secret: cfg.ClientSecret, http: &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}},
+		profiles:  newProfileStore(time.Now),
+		now:       time.Now,
+		log:       log,
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *Server) routes() http.Handler {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		_, _ = w.Write(indexHTML)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /whoami", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+		if u := r.Header.Get("X-authentik-username"); userPattern.MatchString(u) {
+			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, u)
+		}
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "ok\n")
+	})
+	for name := range platformLabels {
+		mux.HandleFunc("GET /"+name+"/install", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.install(w, r, name) })
+		mux.HandleFunc("GET /"+name+"/callback", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.callback(w, r, name) })
+	}
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /windows/profile/{token}", s.windowsProfile)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/", http.NotFound)
+	return noStore(mux)
+}
+
+func noStore(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	})
+}
+
+func random(n int) string {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	_, _ = rand.Read(b)
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) redirectURI(name string) string { return s.cfg.PublicURL + "/" + name + "/callback" }
+
+func setStateCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, name, value string, maxAge int) {
+	w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", stateCookie+"="+value+"; Path=/"+name+"/; Max-Age="+strconv.Itoa(maxAge)+
+		"; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax")
+}
+
+func redirect(w http.ResponseWriter, location string) {
+	w.Header().Set("Location", location)
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+}
+
+func text(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body string) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
+	w.WriteHeader(status)
+	_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
+}
+
+// install starts an authorization-code sign-in at authentik; the user is already signed in there.
+func (s *Server) install(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, name string) {
+	state := random(24)
+	setStateCookie(w, name, state, 300)
+	redirect(w, s.cfg.AuthorizeURL+"?"+form(
+		"response_type", "code",
+		"client_id", clientID,
+		"redirect_uri", s.redirectURI(name),
+		"scope", "openid profile goauthentik.io/api",
+		"state", state,
+	))
+}
+
+func stateFrom(r *http.Request) string {
+	c, err := r.Cookie(stateCookie)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return c.Value
+}
+
+// callback creates a new app password as the user and answers with the platform's profile.
+func (s *Server) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, name string) {
+	q := r.URL.Query()
+	state, code := stateFrom(r), q.Get("code")
+	if state == "" || code == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(state), []byte(q.Get("state"))) != 1 {
+		text(w, http.StatusBadRequest, restart)
+		return
+	}
+	fail := func(reason string, args ...any) {
+		s.log.Error("wlan-setup "+name+": "+reason, args...)
+		text(w, http.StatusBadGateway, failed)
+	}
+
+	// Windows signs the profile: without key and chain there is nothing to hand out, so no app
+	// password is created.
+	var signer *Signer
+	if name == "windows" {
+		var err error
+		if signer, err = loadSigner(s.cfg.SigningKey, s.cfg.SigningCert); err != nil {
+			fail("cannot load the signing key", "err", err)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	ctx := r.Context()
+	access, err := s.authentik.Exchange(ctx, code, s.redirectURI(name))
+	if err != nil {
+		fail("token exchange", "err", err)
+		return
+	}
+	user, err := s.authentik.Username(ctx, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		fail("user lookup", "err", err)
+		return
+	}
+	if !userPattern.MatchString(user) || user != r.Header.Get("X-authentik-username") {
+		s.log.Warn("wlan-setup "+name+": the token's user is not the signed-in user", "user", user)
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+		return
+	}
+
+	now := s.now().UTC()
+	suffix := strings.Map(func(c rune) rune {
+		if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+			return c
+		}
+		return 'x'
+	}, random(24)[:6])
+	identifier := "wlan-" + name + "-" + identifierUnsafe.ReplaceAllString(strings.ToLower(user), "-") + "-" +
+		now.Format("20060102T150405") + "-" + suffix
+	key, err := s.authentik.AppPassword(ctx, access, tokenRequest{
+		Identifier:  identifier,
+		Intent:      "app_password",
+		Description: "WLAN " + platformLabels[name] + ", " + now.Format("2006-01-02") + " (wlan.renner.uno)",
+		Expiring:    true,
+		Expires:     now.Add(lifetimeDays * 24 * time.Hour).Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		fail("app password", "err", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch name {
+	case "android":
+		body, err := androidProfile(user, key)
+		if err != nil {
+			fail("building the profile", "err", err)
+			return
+		}
+		setStateCookie(w, name, "", 0)
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-wifi-config")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Transfer-Encoding", "base64")
+		_, _ = w.Write(body)
+	case "apple":
+		body, err := appleProfile(user, key)
+		if err != nil {
+			fail("building the profile", "err", err)
+			return
+		}
+		setStateCookie(w, name, "", 0)
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-apple-aspen-config")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename="renner-unifi.mobileconfig"`)
+		_, _ = w.Write(body)
+	case "windows":
+		body, err := signer.Sign(windowsProfile(user, key))
+		if err != nil {
+			fail("signing the profile", "err", err)
+			return
+		}
+		token := random(32)
+		if !s.profiles.Put(token, body) {
+			fail("too many profiles waiting to be fetched")
+			return
+		}
+		setStateCookie(w, name, "", 0)
+		redirect(w, "ms-settings:wifi-provisioning?uri="+s.cfg.PublicURL+"/windows/profile/"+token)
+	}
+}
+
+// windowsProfile hands out a signed profile once. Windows Settings fetches it without the
+// authentik session: the unguessable single-use token is the only gate.
+func (s *Server) windowsProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	token := r.PathValue("token")
+	if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
+		if !s.profiles.Has(token) {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/xml")
+		return
+	}
+	body, ok := s.profiles.Take(token)
+	if !ok {
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+		return
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/xml")
+	_, _ = w.Write(body)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,880 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"math/big"
+	"mime"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/textproto"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"reflect"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/beevik/etree"
+	dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
+	"howett.net/plist"
+)
+
+const (
+	testSecret = "client-secret"
+	testAccess = "access-token-123"
+	testKey    = "app-password-<&>-456"
+	testCode   = "code-789"
+)
+
+// fakeAuthentik answers the four calls of a callback and records what it received.
+type fakeAuthentik struct {
+	t        *testing.T
+	username string
+	fail     string // path that answers 500
+
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	requests []string
+	created  tokenRequest
+}
+
+func (f *fakeAuthentik) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	f.requests = append(f.requests, r.Method+" "+r.URL.Path)
+	f.mu.Unlock()
+	t := f.t
+	if r.Host != "auth.renner.uno" {
+		t.Errorf("%s: Host %q", r.URL.Path, r.Host)
+	}
+	if r.Header.Get("Cookie") != "" {
+		t.Errorf("%s: a cookie reached authentik", r.URL.Path)
+	}
+	if r.URL.Path == f.fail {
+		http.Error(w, `{"detail":"broken"}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	bearer := func() bool {
+		if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer "+testAccess {
+			t.Errorf("%s: Authorization %q", r.URL.Path, got)
+			return false
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	switch {
+	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == "/application/o/token/":
+		user, pass, ok := r.BasicAuth()
+		if !ok || user != "wlan-setup" || pass != testSecret {
+			t.Errorf("token: Basic auth %q %v", user, ok)
+		}
+		if ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" {
+			t.Errorf("token: Content-Type %q", ct)
+		}
+		if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if r.PostForm.Get("grant_type") != "authorization_code" || r.PostForm.Get("code") != testCode {
+			t.Errorf("token: form %v", r.PostForm)
+		}
+		platform := strings.Split(r.PostForm.Get("redirect_uri"), "/")[3]
+		if want := "https://wlan.renner.uno/" + platform + "/callback"; r.PostForm.Get("redirect_uri") != want {
+			t.Errorf("token: redirect_uri %q", r.PostForm.Get("redirect_uri"))
+		}
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"access_token":"`+testAccess+`","token_type":"Bearer"}`)
+	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == "/api/v3/core/users/me/":
+		if bearer() {
+			_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"user": map[string]any{"username": f.username}})
+		}
+	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == "/api/v3/core/tokens/":
+		if !bearer() {
+			return
+		}
+		if ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+			t.Errorf("tokens: Content-Type %q", ct)
+		}
+		var tr tokenRequest
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&tr); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		f.mu.Lock()
+		f.created = tr
+		f.mu.Unlock()
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"identifier":"`+tr.Identifier+`"}`)
+	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v3/core/tokens/") &&
+		strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/view_key/"):
+		f.mu.Lock()
+		want := "/api/v3/core/tokens/" + f.created.Identifier + "/view_key/"
+		f.mu.Unlock()
+		if r.URL.Path != want {
+			t.Errorf("view_key: path %q, want %q", r.URL.Path, want)
+		}
+		if bearer() {
+			_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"key": testKey})
+		}
+	default:
+		t.Errorf("unexpected call %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+	}
+}
+
+type testCert struct {
+	cert     *x509.Certificate
+	keyFile  string
+	certFile string
+}
+
+// writeSigningFiles writes a fresh RSA key (PKCS#8) and a chain of a self-signed leaf plus a
+// second certificate, as cert-manager would mount them.
+func writeSigningFiles(t *testing.T) testCert {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	mk := func(cn string, k *rsa.PrivateKey) []byte {
+		tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+			SerialNumber: big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
+			Subject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+			NotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
+			NotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+			KeyUsage:     x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
+		}
+		der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &k.PublicKey, k)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return der
+	}
+	leaf := mk("wlan.renner.uno", key)
+	other, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	intermediate := mk("intermediate", other)
+	pkcs8, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	tc := testCert{keyFile: filepath.Join(dir, "tls.key"), certFile: filepath.Join(dir, "tls.crt")}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(tc.keyFile, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: pkcs8}), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	chain := append(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leaf}),
+		pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: intermediate})...)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(tc.certFile, chain, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	tc.cert, _ = x509.ParseCertificate(leaf)
+	return tc
+}
+
+type harness struct {
+	srv     *Server
+	handler http.Handler
+	fake    *fakeAuthentik
+	signing testCert
+	clock   *fakeClock
+}
+
+type fakeClock struct {
+	mu  sync.Mutex
+	now time.Time
+}
+
+func (c *fakeClock) Now() time.Time { c.mu.Lock(); defer c.mu.Unlock(); return c.now }
+func (c *fakeClock) Add(d time.Duration) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	c.now = c.now.Add(d)
+}
+
+func newHarness(t *testing.T) *harness {
+	t.Helper()
+	fake := &fakeAuthentik{t: t, username: "Alice.Smith"}
+	upstream := httptest.NewServer(fake)
+	t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
+	signing := writeSigningFiles(t)
+	cfg, err := loadConfig(env(map[string]string{
+		"WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET": testSecret,
+		"AUTHENTIK_INTERNAL_URL":   upstream.URL,
+		"SIGNING_KEY":              signing.keyFile,
+		"SIGNING_CERT":             signing.certFile,
+	}))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	srv := newServer(cfg, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
+	clock := &fakeClock{now: time.Date(2026, 11, 5, 9, 8, 7, 0, time.UTC)}
+	srv.now = clock.Now
+	srv.profiles.now = clock.Now
+	return &harness{srv: srv, handler: srv.routes(), fake: fake, signing: signing, clock: clock}
+}
+
+func env(m map[string]string) func(string) string { return func(k string) string { return m[k] } }
+
+func (h *harness) do(req *http.Request) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Header().Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
+		panic("no Cache-Control: no-store on " + req.URL.Path)
+	}
+	return rec
+}
+
+func (h *harness) callback(platform, cookieState, queryState, user string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	q := url.Values{"state": {queryState}, "code": {testCode}}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/"+platform+"/callback?"+q.Encode(), nil)
+	if cookieState != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Cookie", "other=1; wlan_oauth_state="+cookieState)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("X-authentik-username", user)
+	return h.do(req)
+}
+
+func TestInstall(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	for _, platform := range []string{"android", "apple", "windows"} {
+		rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/"+platform+"/install", nil))
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: status %d", platform, rec.Code)
+		}
+		cookie := rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie")
+		m := regexp.MustCompile(`^wlan_oauth_state=([A-Za-z0-9_-]{32}); Path=/` + platform +
+			`/; Max-Age=300; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax$`).FindStringSubmatch(cookie)
+		if m == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: cookie %q", platform, cookie)
+		}
+		loc := rec.Header().Get("Location")
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "https://auth.renner.uno/application/o/authorize/?response_type=code&") {
+			t.Errorf("%s: location %q", platform, loc)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(loc, "scope=openid%20profile%20goauthentik.io%2Fapi") {
+			t.Errorf("%s: scope not encoded like encodeURIComponent: %q", platform, loc)
+		}
+		u, err := url.Parse(loc)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		q := u.Query()
+		if q.Get("client_id") != "wlan-setup" || q.Get("redirect_uri") != "https://wlan.renner.uno/"+platform+"/callback" ||
+			q.Get("scope") != "openid profile goauthentik.io/api" || q.Get("state") != m[1] || q.Get("response_type") != "code" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: query %v", platform, q)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackStateMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	for _, c := range []struct{ cookie, query string }{{"abc", "abd"}, {"", "abc"}, {"abc", ""}} {
+		rec := h.callback("android", c.cookie, c.query, "Alice.Smith")
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || rec.Body.String() != "Bitte die Einrichtung neu starten.\n" {
+			t.Errorf("%+v: %d %q", c, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/apple/callback?state=abc", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Cookie", "wlan_oauth_state=abc")
+	if rec := h.do(req); rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Errorf("no code: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if len(h.fake.requests) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("authentik was called: %v", h.fake.requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackUserMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	if rec := h.callback("android", "s", "s", "bob"); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("other user: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	h.fake.username = "bad user"
+	if rec := h.callback("apple", "s", "s", "bad user"); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("unsafe username: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	for _, r := range h.fake.requests {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(r, "POST /api/v3/core/tokens/") {
+			t.Errorf("an app password was created for a mismatched user")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackUpstreamError(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, path := range []string{"/application/o/token/", "/api/v3/core/users/me/", "/api/v3/core/tokens/"} {
+		h := newHarness(t)
+		h.fake.fail = path
+		rec := h.callback("android", "s", "s", "Alice.Smith")
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusBadGateway || rec.Body.String() != "Die Einrichtung ist fehlgeschlagen.\n" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: %d %q", path, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie"), "Max-Age=0") {
+			t.Errorf("%s: the state cookie was cleared on failure", path)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackWindowsWithoutSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	h.srv.cfg.SigningKey = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.key")
+	if rec := h.callback("windows", "s", "s", "Alice.Smith"); rec.Code != http.StatusBadGateway {
+		t.Errorf("status %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if len(h.fake.requests) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("authentik was called without a signing key: %v", h.fake.requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func checkCreated(t *testing.T, h *harness, platform, label string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	got := h.fake.created
+	if !regexp.MustCompile(`^wlan-` + platform + `-alice-smith-20261105T090807-[A-Za-z0-9]{6}$`).MatchString(got.Identifier) {
+		t.Errorf("identifier %q", got.Identifier)
+	}
+	if got.Intent != "app_password" || !got.Expiring || got.Expires != "2026-12-04T09:08:07.000Z" ||
+		got.Description != "WLAN "+label+", 2026-11-05 (wlan.renner.uno)" {
+		t.Errorf("token request %+v", got)
+	}
+	want := []string{"POST /application/o/token/", "GET /api/v3/core/users/me/", "POST /api/v3/core/tokens/",
+		"GET /api/v3/core/tokens/" + got.Identifier + "/view_key/"}
+	if strings.Join(h.fake.requests, "|") != strings.Join(want, "|") {
+		t.Errorf("calls %v", h.fake.requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func checkCleared(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, platform string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie"); got != "wlan_oauth_state=; Path=/"+platform+"/; Max-Age=0; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax" {
+		t.Errorf("cookie %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackAndroid(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	rec := h.callback("android", "s", "s", "Alice.Smith")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	checkCreated(t, h, "android", "Android")
+	checkCleared(t, rec, "android")
+	if rec.Header().Get("Content-Type") != "application/x-wifi-config" ||
+		rec.Header().Get("Content-Transfer-Encoding") != "base64" || rec.Header().Get("Content-Disposition") != "" {
+		t.Errorf("headers %v", rec.Header())
+	}
+	raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(rec.Body.String())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	msg, err := textproto.NewReader(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))).ReadMIMEHeader()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	mediaType, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(msg.Get("Content-Type"))
+	if err != nil || mediaType != "multipart/mixed" || params["boundary"] == "" ||
+		msg.Get("Content-Transfer-Encoding") != "base64" {
+		t.Fatalf("message header %v", msg)
+	}
+	body := raw[bytes.Index(raw, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))+4:]
+	mr := multipart.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(body), params["boundary"])
+	parts := map[string][]byte{}
+	var order []string
+	for {
+		p, err := mr.NextRawPart()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if p.Header.Get("Content-Transfer-Encoding") != "base64" {
+			t.Errorf("part %v is not base64", p.Header)
+		}
+		b, err := io.ReadAll(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		ct := p.Header.Get("Content-Type")
+		order = append(order, ct)
+		parts[ct] = b
+	}
+	if strings.Join(order, ",") != "application/x-passpoint-profile,application/x-x509-ca-cert" {
+		t.Errorf("parts %v", order)
+	}
+	if string(parts["application/x-x509-ca-cert"]) != isrgRootX1 {
+		t.Error("the trust anchor part is not ISRG Root X1")
+	}
+	pps, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(string(parts["application/x-passpoint-profile"]))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	type node struct {
+		Name  string  `xml:"NodeName"`
+		DDF   string  `xml:"RTProperties>Type>DDFName"`
+		Value *string `xml:"Value"`
+		Nodes []node  `xml:"Node"`
+	}
+	var tree struct {
+		XMLName xml.Name
+		VerDTD  string `xml:"VerDTD"`
+		Nodes   []node `xml:"Node"`
+	}
+	if err := xml.Unmarshal(pps, &tree); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pps: %v\n%s", err, pps)
+	}
+	if tree.XMLName != (xml.Name{Space: "syncml:dmddf1.2", Local: "MgmtTree"}) || tree.VerDTD != "1.2" ||
+		len(tree.Nodes) != 1 || tree.Nodes[0].Name != "PerProviderSubscription" ||
+		tree.Nodes[0].DDF != "urn:wfa:mo:hotspot2dot0-perprovidersubscription:1.0" {
+		t.Fatalf("pps %s", pps)
+	}
+	// value follows NodeNames below PerProviderSubscription/i001.
+	value := func(path string) string {
+		nodes := tree.Nodes[0].Nodes
+		var cur *node
+		for _, name := range strings.Split("i001/"+path, "/") {
+			cur = nil
+			for i := range nodes {
+				if nodes[i].Name == name {
+					cur = &nodes[i]
+				}
+			}
+			if cur == nil {
+				return "<no node>"
+			}
+			nodes = cur.Nodes
+		}
+		if cur.Value == nil {
+			return "<no value>"
+		}
+		return *cur.Value
+	}
+	for path, want := range map[string]string{
+		"HomeSP/FriendlyName":                               "Renner",
+		"HomeSP/FQDN":                                       "renner.uno",
+		"Credential/Realm":                                  "renner.uno",
+		"Credential/UsernamePassword/Username":              "Alice.Smith",
+		"Credential/UsernamePassword/Password":              base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(testKey)),
+		"Credential/UsernamePassword/EAPMethod/EAPType":     "21",
+		"Credential/UsernamePassword/EAPMethod/InnerMethod": "PAP",
+		"Extension/Android/AAAServerTrustedNames/FQDN":      "radius.renner.uno",
+	} {
+		if got := value(path); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", path, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallbackApple(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	rec := h.callback("apple", "s", "s", "Alice.Smith")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	checkCreated(t, h, "apple", "Apple")
+	checkCleared(t, rec, "apple")
+	if rec.Header().Get("Content-Type") != "application/x-apple-aspen-config" ||
+		rec.Header().Get("Content-Disposition") != `attachment; filename="renner-unifi.mobileconfig"` {
+		t.Errorf("headers %v", rec.Header())
+	}
+	var top map[string]any
+	format, err := plist.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &top)
+	if err != nil || format != plist.XMLFormat {
+		t.Fatalf("plist (format %d): %v\n%s", format, err, rec.Body.Bytes())
+	}
+	want := map[string]any{
+		"PayloadContent": []any{map[string]any{
+			"PayloadType":                   "com.apple.wifi.managed",
+			"PayloadVersion":                uint64(1),
+			"PayloadIdentifier":             "uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi.network",
+			"PayloadUUID":                   "824959bf-c55d-4ed2-b569-c33f3759c2b6",
+			"PayloadDisplayName":            "Renner UniFi",
+			"PayloadOrganization":           "Renner",
+			"IsHotspot":                     true,
+			"DomainName":                    "renner.uno",
+			"NAIRealmNames":                 []any{"renner.uno"},
+			"DisplayedOperatorName":         "Renner",
+			"ServiceProviderRoamingEnabled": false,
+			"AutoJoin":                      true,
+			"EncryptionType":                "Any",
+			"EAPClientConfiguration": map[string]any{
+				"UserName":                "Alice.Smith",
+				"UserPassword":            testKey,
+				"OuterIdentity":           "anonymous",
+				"AcceptEAPTypes":          []any{uint64(21)},
+				"TTLSInnerAuthentication": "PAP",
+				"TLSTrustedServerNames":   []any{"radius.renner.uno"},
+			},
+		}},
+		"PayloadType":         "Configuration",
+		"PayloadVersion":      uint64(1),
+		"PayloadIdentifier":   "uno.renner.wifi.renner-unifi",
+		"PayloadUUID":         "7175a2a3-ddd3-42ea-b4ad-b7e5501892f3",
+		"PayloadDisplayName":  "WLAN Renner UniFi",
+		"PayloadOrganization": "Renner",
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(top, want) {
+		t.Errorf("profile\n got %#v\nwant %#v", top, want)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Contains(rec.Body.Bytes(), []byte("<string>app-password-&lt;&amp;&gt;-456</string>")) {
+		t.Error("the password is not escaped as XML text")
+	}
+}
+
+func (h *harness) windowsToken(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	rec := h.callback("windows", "s", "s", "Alice.Smith")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	checkCleared(t, rec, "windows")
+	m := regexp.MustCompile(`^ms-settings:wifi-provisioning\?uri=https://wlan\.renner\.uno/windows/profile/([A-Za-z0-9_-]{43})$`).
+		FindStringSubmatch(rec.Header().Get("Location"))
+	if m == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("location %q", rec.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+	return m[1]
+}
+
+func validate(cert *x509.Certificate, body []byte) error {
+	doc := etree.NewDocument()
+	if err := doc.ReadFromBytes(body); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	ctx := dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(&dsig.MemoryX509CertificateStore{Roots: []*x509.Certificate{cert}})
+	_, err := ctx.Validate(doc.Root())
+	return err
+}
+
+func TestCallbackWindows(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	token := h.windowsToken(t)
+	checkCreated(t, h, "windows", "Windows")
+
+	// No header or cookie: Windows Settings fetches it outside the authentik session.
+	head := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodHead, "/windows/profile/"+token, nil))
+	if head.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("HEAD: %d", head.Code)
+	}
+	rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/windows/profile/"+token, nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Header().Get("Content-Type") != "text/xml" {
+		t.Fatalf("first fetch: %d %v", rec.Code, rec.Header())
+	}
+	body := rec.Body.Bytes()
+	if again := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/windows/profile/"+token, nil)); again.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("second fetch: %d", again.Code)
+	}
+
+	if err := validate(h.signing.cert, body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signature does not verify: %v\n%s", err, body)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		`<CarrierProvisioning xmlns="http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/v1">`,
+		`<Username>Alice.Smith</Username><Password>app-password-&lt;&amp;&gt;-456</Password>`,
+		`<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><SignedInfo>`,
+		`<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"></CanonicalizationMethod>`,
+		`<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"></SignatureMethod>`,
+		`<Reference URI=""><Transforms><Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"></Transform>`,
+		`<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"></DigestMethod>`,
+		`</Signature></CarrierProvisioning>`,
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
+			t.Errorf("missing %s", want)
+		}
+	}
+	// The reference digest is the SHA-1 of the canonical unsigned document; written with
+	// canonical settings, the unsigned root is already in that form.
+	unsigned := etree.NewDocument()
+	unsigned.SetRoot(windowsProfile("Alice.Smith", testKey).Root())
+	unsigned.WriteSettings = etree.WriteSettings{CanonicalEndTags: true, CanonicalText: true, CanonicalAttrVal: true}
+	unsignedBytes, err := unsigned.WriteToBytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	canonical, err := dsig.MakeC14N10RecCanonicalizer().Canonicalize(unsigned.Root())
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(canonical, unsignedBytes) {
+		t.Fatalf("the unsigned document is not canonical: %v\n%s\n%s", err, canonical, unsignedBytes)
+	}
+	sum := sha1.Sum(canonical)
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "<DigestValue>"+base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])+"</DigestValue>") {
+		t.Error("the digest is not the SHA-1 of the unsigned document")
+	}
+	signed := etree.NewDocument()
+	if err := signed.ReadFromBytes(body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if pi, ok := signed.Child[0].(*etree.ProcInst); !ok || pi.Target != "xml" || pi.Inst != `version="1.0"` {
+		t.Errorf("the document does not start with the XML declaration: %q", s[:min(len(s), 40)])
+	}
+	root := signed.Root()
+	if last := root.ChildElements()[len(root.ChildElements())-1]; last.Tag != "Signature" {
+		t.Errorf("the last child of the root is %s", last.Tag)
+	}
+	root.RemoveChild(root.SelectElement("Signature"))
+	if stripped, err := dsig.MakeC14N10RecCanonicalizer().Canonicalize(root); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stripped, canonical) {
+		t.Errorf("without the signature, the document differs from the unsigned one: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Only the enveloped-signature transform, as in Microsoft's signed samples.
+	if n := strings.Count(s, "<Transform "); n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("%d transforms, want 1", n)
+	}
+	if n := strings.Count(s, "<X509Certificate>"); n != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("%d certificates in KeyInfo, want the whole chain (2)", n)
+	}
+	leaf := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(h.signing.cert.Raw)
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "<X509Data><X509Certificate>"+leaf+"</X509Certificate>") {
+		t.Error("the leaf is not the first certificate")
+	}
+
+	tampered := bytes.Replace(body, []byte("Alice.Smith"), []byte("Alice.Smitx"), 1)
+	if err := validate(h.signing.cert, tampered); err == nil {
+		t.Error("a tampered profile verifies")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestWindowsProfileSchema validates the signed document with xmllint against the schemas
+// Windows ships in %SYSTEMROOT%\schemas\provisioning. They are Microsoft's files and not in the
+// repo: point WLAN_SETUP_PROVISIONING_XSD at a copy of that folder to run it.
+func TestWindowsProfileSchema(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := os.Getenv("WLAN_SETUP_PROVISIONING_XSD")
+	if dir == "" {
+		t.Skip("WLAN_SETUP_PROVISIONING_XSD not set")
+	}
+	xmllint, err := exec.LookPath("xmllint")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skip("xmllint not installed")
+	}
+	tc := writeSigningFiles(t)
+	signer, err := loadSigner(tc.keyFile, tc.certFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := signer.Sign(windowsProfile("Alice.Smith", testKey))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// The schemas import each other by namespace only; a wrapper schema gives libxml2 the
+	// locations. Dependencies first, so the later imports find their namespaces loaded.
+	wrapper := etree.NewDocument()
+	schema := wrapper.CreateElement("xs:schema")
+	schema.CreateAttr("xmlns:xs", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema")
+	schema.CreateAttr("targetNamespace", "urn:wlan-setup:schema-test")
+	for _, s := range []struct{ ns, file string }{
+		{"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/Base/v1", "provisioning_base_v1.xsd"},
+		{"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/Plans/v1", "provisioning_plans_v1.xsd"},
+		{"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/WWAN/v1", "provisioning_wwan_v1.xsd"},
+		{"http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/WLAN/v1", "provisioning_wlan_v1.xsd"},
+		{dsig.Namespace, "provisioning_sig_v1.xsd"},
+		{nsCarrierControl, "provisioning_v1.xsd"},
+	} {
+		imp := schema.CreateElement("xs:import")
+		imp.CreateAttr("namespace", s.ns)
+		imp.CreateAttr("schemaLocation", "file://"+filepath.Join(dir, s.file))
+	}
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	wrapperFile := filepath.Join(tmp, "wrapper.xsd")
+	if err := wrapper.WriteToFile(wrapperFile); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	docFile := filepath.Join(tmp, "profile.xml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(docFile, body, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	out, err := exec.Command(xmllint, "--noout", "--schema", wrapperFile, docFile).CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("xmllint: %v\n%s", err, out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsProfileDocument(t *testing.T) {
+	tc := writeSigningFiles(t)
+	signer, err := loadSigner(tc.keyFile, tc.certFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := signer.Sign(windowsProfile("Alice.Smith", testKey))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := validate(tc.cert, body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signature does not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	var wellFormed struct{}
+	if err := xml.Unmarshal(body, &wellFormed); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("not well-formed: %v", err)
+	}
+	doc := etree.NewDocument()
+	if err := doc.ReadFromBytes(body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	root := doc.Root()
+	const (
+		wlan  = "WLANProfiles/WLANProfile/"
+		sec   = wlan + "MSM/security/"
+		eap   = sec + "OneX/EAPConfig/EapHostConfig/"
+		ttls  = eap + "Config/EapTtls/"
+		creds = sec + "EapHostUserCredentials/"
+		sig   = "Signature/"
+	)
+	for path, want := range map[string]string{
+		"Global/CarrierId":                                carrierID,
+		"Global/SubscriberId":                             "rennerunifi",
+		wlan + "name":                                     "Renner UniFi",
+		wlan + "SSIDConfig/SSID/name":                     "Renner UniFi",
+		wlan + "Hotspot2/DomainName":                      "renner.uno",
+		wlan + "Hotspot2/NAIRealm/name":                   "renner.uno",
+		sec + "authEncryption/authentication":             "WPA3ENT",
+		sec + "authEncryption/encryption":                 "AES",
+		sec + "authEncryption/useOneX":                    "true",
+		sec + "OneX/authMode":                             "user",
+		eap + "EapMethod/Type":                            "21",
+		eap + "EapMethod/VendorId":                        "0",
+		eap + "EapMethod/VendorType":                      "0",
+		eap + "EapMethod/AuthorId":                        "311",
+		ttls + "ServerValidation/ServerNames":             "radius.renner.uno",
+		ttls + "ServerValidation/TrustedRootCAHash":       "ca bd 2a 79 a1 07 6a 31 f2 1d 25 36 35 cb 03 9d 43 29 a5 e8",
+		ttls + "ServerValidation/DisablePrompt":           "true",
+		ttls + "Phase2Authentication/PAPAuthentication":   "",
+		ttls + "Phase1Identity/IdentityPrivacy":           "true",
+		ttls + "Phase1Identity/AnonymousIdentity":         "anonymous",
+		creds + "EapMethod/eapCommon:Type":                "21",
+		creds + "EapMethod/eapCommon:AuthorId":            "311",
+		creds + "Credentials/EapTtls/Username":            "Alice.Smith",
+		creds + "Credentials/EapTtls/Password":            testKey,
+		sig + "SignedInfo/Reference/Transforms/Transform": "",
+	} {
+		el := root.FindElement(path)
+		if el == nil {
+			t.Errorf("no element %s", path)
+			continue
+		}
+		if el.Text() != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", path, el.Text(), want)
+		}
+	}
+	for path, want := range map[string]string{
+		".":                                    "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/v1",
+		"Global/CarrierId":                     "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/v1",
+		"WLANProfiles":                         "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/v1",
+		wlan + "Hotspot2/DomainName":           "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/CarrierControl/WLAN/v1",
+		sec + "OneX/authMode":                  "http://www.microsoft.com/networking/OneX/v1",
+		eap + "EapMethod":                      "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostConfig",
+		eap + "EapMethod/Type":                 "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon",
+		eap + "EapMethod/AuthorId":             "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon",
+		ttls + "ServerValidation":              "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapTtlsConnectionPropertiesV1",
+		creds + "EapMethod":                    "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapHostUserCredentials",
+		creds + "EapMethod/eapCommon:Type":     "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapCommon",
+		creds + "Credentials/EapTtls/Password": "http://www.microsoft.com/provisioning/EapTtlsUserPropertiesV1",
+		"Signature":                            dsig.Namespace,
+		sig + "SignedInfo/Reference":           dsig.Namespace,
+	} {
+		if el := root.FindElement(path); el == nil || el.NamespaceURI() != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: namespace not %s", path, want)
+		}
+	}
+	if si := root.FindElement(sig + "SignedInfo"); si == nil || len(si.Attr) != 0 {
+		t.Error("SignedInfo carries its own attributes")
+	}
+	for path, want := range map[string]string{
+		sig + "SignedInfo/CanonicalizationMethod":         "http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315",
+		sig + "SignedInfo/SignatureMethod":                "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1",
+		sig + "SignedInfo/Reference/Transforms/Transform": "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature",
+		sig + "SignedInfo/Reference/DigestMethod":         "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1",
+	} {
+		if el := root.FindElement(path); el == nil || el.SelectAttrValue("Algorithm", "") != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: Algorithm not %s", path, want)
+		}
+	}
+	if ref := root.FindElement(sig + "SignedInfo/Reference"); ref == nil || ref.SelectAttrValue("URI", "-") != "" {
+		t.Error(`Reference URI is not ""`)
+	}
+	if n := len(root.FindElements(sig + "SignedInfo/Reference/Transforms/Transform")); n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("%d transforms, want 1", n)
+	}
+	certs := root.FindElements(sig + "KeyInfo/X509Data/X509Certificate")
+	if len(certs) != 2 || certs[0].Text() != base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(tc.cert.Raw) {
+		t.Errorf("KeyInfo holds %d certificates, want the chain with the leaf first", len(certs))
+	}
+	if _, err := signer.Sign(doc); err == nil {
+		t.Error("an already signed document was signed again")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsProfileExpires(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	token := h.windowsToken(t)
+	h.clock.Add(profileTTL)
+	if rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/windows/profile/"+token, nil)); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expired: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if len(h.srv.profiles.profiles) != 0 {
+		t.Error("the expired profile was not purged")
+	}
+	if rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/windows/profile/unknown", nil)); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("unknown: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWhoamiHealthzIndexNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness(t)
+	for _, c := range []struct{ user, want string }{{"Alice.Smith", "Alice.Smith"}, {"a b", ""}, {"", ""},
+		{strings.Repeat("a", 65), ""}} {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/whoami", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-authentik-username", c.user)
+		rec := h.do(req)
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != c.want || !strings.HasPrefix(rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"), "text/plain") {
+			t.Errorf("whoami %q: %d %q", c.user, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != "ok\n" {
+		t.Errorf("healthz: %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	rec := h.do(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `href="/windows/install"`) ||
+		strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), ".cmd") {
+		t.Errorf("index: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	for _, req := range []*http.Request{
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/renner-unifi-wlan.cmd", nil),
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/linux/install", nil),
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil),
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/android/install", nil),
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/index.html", nil),
+	} {
+		if rec := h.do(req); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s: %d", req.Method, req.URL.Path, rec.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := loadConfig(env(nil)); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET is not set") {
+		t.Errorf("missing secret: %v", err)
+	}
+	c, err := loadConfig(env(map[string]string{"WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET": "x"}))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if c.AuthentikURL != "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local" ||
+		c.AuthorizeURL != "https://auth.renner.uno/application/o/authorize/" || c.PublicURL != "https://wlan.renner.uno" ||
+		c.SigningKey != "/etc/wlan-signing/tls.key" || c.SigningCert != "/etc/wlan-signing/tls.crt" || c.Listen != ":8080" {
+		t.Errorf("defaults %+v", c)
+	}
+	if _, err := loadConfig(env(map[string]string{"WLAN_SETUP_CLIENT_SECRET": "x", "PUBLIC_URL": "wlan"})); err == nil {
+		t.Error("relative PUBLIC_URL accepted")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/beevik/etree"
+	dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
+)
+
+// Signer holds the key and chain that sign the Windows provisioning document.
+type Signer struct {
+	key   *rsa.PrivateKey
+	chain [][]byte
+}
+
+// loadSigner reads the PEM key (PKCS#8 RSA) and the PEM chain (leaf first). It runs per request:
+// cert-manager rotates the files.
+func loadSigner(keyFile, certFile string) (*Signer, error) {
+	keyPEM, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key: %w", err)
+	}
+	certPEM, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+	return parseSigner(keyPEM, certPEM)
+}
+
+func parseSigner(keyPEM, certPEM []byte) (*Signer, error) {
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(keyPEM)
+	if block == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("signing key: no PEM block")
+	}
+	var key *rsa.PrivateKey
+	switch block.Type {
+	case "PRIVATE KEY":
+		k, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key: %w", err)
+		}
+		rk, ok := k.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.New("signing key: not an RSA key")
+		}
+		key = rk
+	case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
+		k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key: %w", err)
+		}
+		key = k
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key: unexpected PEM block %q", block.Type)
+	}
+	var chain [][]byte
+	for rest := certPEM; ; {
+		var b *pem.Block
+		b, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
+		if b == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if b.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(b.Bytes); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing certificate: %w", err)
+		}
+		chain = append(chain, b.Bytes)
+	}
+	if len(chain) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("signing certificate: no certificate")
+	}
+	leaf, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(chain[0])
+	if pub, ok := leaf.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok || !pub.Equal(&key.PublicKey) {
+		return nil, errors.New("signing certificate: the first certificate does not match the key")
+	}
+	return &Signer{key: key, chain: chain}, nil
+}
+
+const dsigNS = dsig.Namespace
+
+// Sign appends an enveloped XML-DSig signature as the last child of doc's root and returns the
+// serialized document, in the form of Microsoft's CarrierProvisioning samples: Reference URI=""
+// with only the enveloped-signature transform, inclusive C14N 1.0, RSA-SHA1, SHA-1 digest, and
+// every certificate of the chain in KeyInfo/X509Data.
+func (s *Signer) Sign(doc *etree.Document) ([]byte, error) {
+	root := doc.Root()
+	if root == nil || root.Tag != "CarrierProvisioning" || root.SelectElement(dsig.SignatureTag) != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("signing: not an unsigned CarrierProvisioning document")
+	}
+	c14n := dsig.MakeC14N10RecCanonicalizer()
+	canonical, err := c14n.Canonicalize(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing: %w", err)
+	}
+	digest := sha1.Sum(canonical)
+
+	signature := root.CreateElement(dsig.SignatureTag)
+	signature.CreateAttr("xmlns", dsigNS)
+	signedInfo := signature.CreateElement(dsig.SignedInfoTag)
+	signedInfo.CreateElement(dsig.CanonicalizationMethodTag).
+		CreateAttr(dsig.AlgorithmAttr, c14n.Algorithm().String())
+	signedInfo.CreateElement(dsig.SignatureMethodTag).CreateAttr(dsig.AlgorithmAttr, dsig.RSASHA1SignatureMethod)
+	reference := signedInfo.CreateElement(dsig.ReferenceTag)
+	reference.CreateAttr(dsig.URIAttr, "")
+	reference.CreateElement(dsig.TransformsTag).CreateElement(dsig.TransformTag).
+		CreateAttr(dsig.AlgorithmAttr, dsig.EnvelopedSignatureAltorithmId.String())
+	reference.CreateElement(dsig.DigestMethodTag).CreateAttr(dsig.AlgorithmAttr, dsigNS+"sha1")
+	reference.CreateElement(dsig.DigestValueTag).SetText(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(digest[:]))
+
+	// In place, the canonicalizer adds the namespace SignedInfo inherits from Signature.
+	canonical, err = c14n.Canonicalize(signedInfo)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing: %w", err)
+	}
+	hashed := sha1.Sum(canonical)
+	value, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, s.key, crypto.SHA1, hashed[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing: %w", err)
+	}
+	signature.CreateElement(dsig.SignatureValueTag).SetText(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(value))
+	x509Data := signature.CreateElement(dsig.KeyInfoTag).CreateElement(dsig.X509DataTag)
+	for _, c := range s.chain {
+		x509Data.CreateElement(dsig.X509CertificateTag).SetText(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c))
+	}
+	return doc.WriteToBytes()
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// profileTTL is how long a signed Windows profile waits for Windows Settings to fetch it.
+const profileTTL = 5 * time.Minute
+
+// maxProfiles bounds the profiles held at once.
+const maxProfiles = 1000
+
+type storedProfile struct {
+	body    []byte
+	expires time.Time
+}
+
+// ProfileStore keeps signed Windows profiles in memory, each fetchable once until it expires.
+type ProfileStore struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	now      func() time.Time
+	profiles map[string]storedProfile
+}
+
+func newProfileStore(now func() time.Time) *ProfileStore {
+	return &ProfileStore{now: now, profiles: map[string]storedProfile{}}
+}
+
+func (s *ProfileStore) purge(now time.Time) {
+	for k, p := range s.profiles {
+		if !now.Before(p.expires) {
+			delete(s.profiles, k)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Put stores body under token; false when the store is full.
+func (s *ProfileStore) Put(token string, body []byte) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	now := s.now()
+	s.purge(now)
+	if len(s.profiles) >= maxProfiles {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.profiles[token] = storedProfile{body: body, expires: now.Add(profileTTL)}
+	return true
+}
+
+// Take returns the profile stored under token and deletes it.
+func (s *ProfileStore) Take(token string) ([]byte, bool) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.purge(s.now())
+	p, ok := s.profiles[token]
+	if ok {
+		delete(s.profiles, token)
+	}
+	return p.body, ok
+}
+
+// Has reports whether a profile is stored under token, without taking it.
+func (s *ProfileStore) Has(token string) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.purge(s.now())
+	_, ok := s.profiles[token]
+	return ok
+}