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issue-fix-bot e0a00f6b05 fix: [alert] KubeHpaMaxedOut (authentik) (#761)
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2026-09-02 13:45:55 +00:00
33 changed files with 36 additions and 2889 deletions
-12
View File
@@ -10,18 +10,6 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
#
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
@@ -28,23 +28,14 @@ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
# STARTS INERT, and that is the point.
#
# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
#
# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
# dry-run pulls decisions and logs what it would block without creating a
# single nftables rule. The first bouncer to arm anywhere enforces ~24k CAPI
# decisions at once on the only external entry path, so the false-positive
# window has to come before the enforcement, not after it. Flip to `nftables`
# one host at a time once the log looks right.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: dry-run
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
+13 -2
View File
@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ spec:
server:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
# 500m, not 200m: the HPA below targets 70% of *this* request, so at
# 200m the scale-up threshold sat at 140m — below the pod's own
# ordinary peak. Measured over 7d, a warm server pod p99s at ~108m
# and peaks at ~190m, and a freshly-started one burns ~300m booting
# Django. That made the HPA oscillate 2<->3<->4 all day and pin at
# maxReplicas (KubeHpaMaxedOut, issue #761). At 500m the threshold
# is 350m/pod, above the boot burst, so only real load scales out.
cpu: 500m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
@@ -154,7 +161,11 @@ spec:
worker:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
# Same reasoning as server above, and the worker is burstier still:
# over 7d its per-pod p99 reaches ~336m and peaks hit ~630m while
# running blueprint applies and scheduled tasks. 200m understated
# that badly enough that routine task batches read as saturation.
cpu: 500m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
+3 -54
View File
@@ -75,62 +75,11 @@ spec:
# many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
- --threads
- "4"
# 16k is room to spare, not a safety limit. The limit that matters
# is not set here at all.
#
# Isolated by bisection on a scratch pod: this stack breaks on
# PROMPT length, and the value of --ctx-size makes no difference to
# it. Measured at --ctx-size 65536 with a single slot, so with four
# times the headroom:
#
# 13588 prompt tokens coherent answer
# 15086 one token, immediate EOS, empty content
# 16088 CJK characters and digit runs
#
# A single request past that boundary then poisons the slot: the
# same 13588-token prompt that answered cleanly a minute earlier
# returns one empty token afterwards, and stays broken until the
# pod restarts. That is why it looked intermittent, and why a
# 650-token classification once came back as 1025 tokens of "!" —
# it followed Home Assistant's ~19k prompts through the same slot.
#
# Nothing reports any of it: finish_reason "stop", a well-formed
# OpenAI response, HTTP 200, /health green.
#
# So the operating rule is about callers, not this flag. Paperless
# sits near 5k and is safe; Home Assistant's Assist prompt measured
# 18910 and never had a chance. An earlier version of this comment
# blamed --ctx-size 32768, which the bisection disproves — 32768
# and 65536 both answer correctly as long as the prompt stays under
# the boundary.
#
# The same stack also fails hard at --ubatch-size 2048, which is
# the loud version of a limit this one keeps quiet about.
#
# 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
# and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
# layers use full attention.
- --ctx-size
- "16384"
# One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
#
# Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
# also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
# of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
# 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
# "Context size has been exceeded".
#
# They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
# generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
# shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
# to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
# here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
# Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
#
# No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
# its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
# would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
# asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
# kill healthy pods during a long document.
- --parallel
- "1"
# A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
# with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --ubatch-size
+8 -19
View File
@@ -64,27 +64,16 @@ spec:
- "99"
- --threads
- "2"
# Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
# tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
# Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
# llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
# at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
# "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
#
# The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
# a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
# broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
# --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
# run them mismatched, so both are set.
#
# 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
# ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
# 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
# this does not need to find out.
# Paperless chunks documents at 1024 tokens. The defaults are
# batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with --embeddings llama-server
# clamps both down to 512 rather than run them mismatched — below
# the chunk size. Matching both to 1024 fits a whole chunk in one
# pass; 2048 is deliberately avoided, since that is where this
# Vulkan stack fails with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --batch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
- --ubatch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
# Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
- --ctx-size
- "4096"
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# Scrapes CrowdSec. Until this landed, nothing did: `up{namespace="crowdsec"}`
# returned zero series and Prometheus held no cs_* metric at all, so the
# detection side of the ingress path was invisible — including whether the
# agents were reading logs and whether any bouncer was pulling decisions.
#
# One monitor for both services. They carry the same shape (a `metrics` port on
# 6060) and differ only in `app`, so a matchExpressions selector keeps this to
# a single object rather than two near-identical ones:
#
# crowdsec-service the LAPI — decisions, bouncer + machine requests
# crowdsec-agent-service the agents — acquisition, parsers, scenarios
#
# The crowdsec-ns CiliumNetworkPolicy already admits the monitoring namespace
# without a port restriction, so no policy change is needed.
#
# `release: kube-prometheus-stack` is what the chart's Prometheus selects on.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: ServiceMonitor
metadata:
name: crowdsec
namespace: crowdsec
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: crowdsec
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
selector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app
operator: In
values:
- crowdsec-service
- crowdsec-agent-service
endpoints:
- port: metrics
path: /metrics
interval: 30s
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
- alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
- cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
- crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
- home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
- immich-servicemonitor.yaml
- loki-servicemonitor.yaml
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
{
"annotations": {"list": []},
"description": "CrowdSec: Erkennung im Cluster, Durchsetzung am NetBird-Edge",
"editable": true,
"fiscalYearStartMonth": 0,
"graphTooltip": 1,
"id": null,
"links": [],
"panels": [
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Aktive Ban-Entscheidungen in der LAPI, ganz überwiegend aus den CAPI-Community-Blocklisten. Das ist die Menge, die ein scharfgeschalteter Bouncer durchsetzt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 0, "y": 0},
"id": 1,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(cs_active_decisions)", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Aktive Decisions",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Bouncer, die in den letzten 10 Minuten Decisions abgeholt haben. Fällt das unter die erwartete Zahl, holt ein Bouncer nichts mehr — und setzt damit einen veralteten Stand durch, ohne dass irgendetwas ausfällt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 6, "y": 0},
"id": 2,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[10m])) > 0)", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Bouncer, die abholen",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Vom Agent gelesene Logzeilen pro Sekunde. Steht das auf 0, detektiert CrowdSec nichts mehr — der häufigste stille Ausfall, weil alles andere weiterläuft.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 0.01}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 12, "y": 0},
"id": 3,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[5m]))", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Gelesene Logzeilen/s",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Szenario-Overflows der letzten 24 h — also lokal erkannte Angriffe, im Gegensatz zu den von CAPI übernommenen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 18, "y": 0},
"id": 4,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[24h]))", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Lokale Overflows (24 h)",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Abholrate je Bouncer. Der Firewall-Bouncer auf den Proxies fragt alle 10 s. Die LAPI legt bei jeder neuen beobachteten Client-Adresse einen Eintrag `<name>@<ip>` an, und beobachtet wird die Pod-IP des netbird-ingress-Peers — deshalb erscheint ein logischer Bouncer hier mehrfach und nach Pod-Rollen unter neuen Namen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 4},
"id": 5,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{bouncer}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Bouncer-Abholrate",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund. `http:scan` dominiert und stammt aus den CAPI-Blocklisten.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 20, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 4},
"id": 6,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (cs_active_decisions)", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Welche Szenarien lokal auslösen. Das ist das, was CrowdSec selbst aus den Traefik-Logs erkennt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "bars", "fillOpacity": 70, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 12},
"id": 7,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["sum"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (name) (increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[1h]))", "legendFormat": "{{name}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Szenario-Overflows (je Stunde)",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Geparste gegen nicht geparste Zeilen. Ein Anstieg bei `ko` heißt meist, dass sich ein Logformat geändert hat und der Parser nicht mehr greift — CrowdSec liest dann weiter, erkennt aber nichts mehr.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 12},
"id": 8,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [
{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "geparst", "refId": "A"},
{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ko_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "nicht geparst", "refId": "B"}
],
"title": "Parser",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Whitelist-Treffer nach Grund. Nützlich beim Scharfschalten: was hier zählt, wäre sonst ein Kandidat für einen Ban gewesen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 20},
"id": 9,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (rate(cs_node_wl_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Whitelist-Treffer",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 20},
"id": 10,
"options": {
"code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
"content": "## Was dieses Dashboard NICHT zeigt\n\nAlle Panels stammen aus der LAPI und den Agents im Cluster. Die **Bouncer auf proxy-1 und proxy-2 exportieren eigene Metriken**, die hier fehlen:\n\n- `fw_bouncer_active_decisions` — was tatsächlich in den nftables-Sets steht\n- `fw_bouncer_dropped_packets` / `_bytes` — was wirklich verworfen wurde\n- `lapi_requests_total` / `_failures_total` — aus Sicht des Bouncers\n\nSie liegen auf `127.0.0.1:60601` der Proxy-Hosts. Die Hosts sind öffentlich und haben bisher keinerlei Metrik-Pfad; den Port ins Internet zu öffnen, nur um ein Scrape-Ziel zu bekommen, wäre der falsche Tausch.\n\n**Konsequenz:** „Bouncer-Abholrate\" oben zeigt, dass ein Bouncer *fragt* — nicht, dass er die Antwort auch angewandt hat. Solange der Modus `dry-run` ist, wendet er ohnehin nichts an.\n\nEin Scrape-Pfad für die Hosts ist eigene Arbeit und Voraussetzung dafür, dass „was wird wirklich geblockt\" beantwortbar wird."
},
"title": "Blinder Fleck",
"type": "text"
}
],
"refresh": "30s",
"schemaVersion": 38,
"style": "dark",
"tags": ["homelab", "crowdsec", "security"],
"templating": {"list": []},
"time": {"from": "now-6h", "to": "now"},
"timepicker": {},
"timezone": "",
"title": "CrowdSec Overview",
"uid": "crowdsec-overview",
"version": 1,
"weekStart": ""
}
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
- name: dashboard-blackbox-overview
files:
- blackbox-overview.json
- name: dashboard-crowdsec-overview
files:
- crowdsec-overview.json
- name: dashboard-disk-health
files:
- disk-health.json
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
---
# A read-only view of paperless's backup store, used as a recovery source and
# nothing else.
#
# It points at the production prefix, which is the whole point — the eval
# instance is a copy of the real archive's metadata — and that makes what is
# ABSENT here the safety-critical part:
#
# no retentionPolicy The production store has "30d". Without one here
# there is no policy to enforce, and enforcement is not
# tied to taking a backup: the plugin runs it from the
# instance sidecar on a timer
# (instanceSidecarConfiguration.retentionPolicyIntervalSeconds,
# default 1800). So "this cluster never backs up" would
# not have been enough on its own.
#
# A second property makes it belt-and-braces. Retention runs
# barman-cloud-backup-delete, which takes a server name and works inside
# <destinationPath>/<serverName> — the store's own status keys its recovery
# window by "pprl-pg", confirming that layout. This cluster is pprleval-pg, so
# even an accidental retention policy would address a prefix that holds nothing
# rather than production's backups.
#
# The cluster below completes the guarantee with isWALArchiver: false, so
# nothing is written back either. It does load the plugin — that is required
# for the restore to work at all — and read-only comes from the flag rather
# than from leaving the plugin out.
apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ObjectStore
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg-source
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
configuration:
destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pprl-pg
endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKey:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
region:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: REGION
wal:
compression: gzip
data:
compression: gzip
---
# A disposable clone of the paperless database, for measuring how well the
# local LLM classifies documents without running the experiment against the
# live archive.
#
# Losing this cluster costs a re-restore and nothing else, which is the intent
# — it is rebuilt whenever a test needs a clean starting point.
#
# One instance, not two. Replication buys availability, and an eval instance
# that is down is simply an eval that waits.
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
enableSuperuserAccess: true
storage:
# Delete-reclaim, unlike the Retain default: this volume is a copy that
# gets rebuilt, so it should vanish with the cluster rather than leave a
# Released PV and an orphaned RBD image behind (issue #262).
storageClass: ceph-block-ephemeral
size: 10Gi
# Declared with isWALArchiver: false, which is what kubernetes/RECOVERY.md
# arrived at after an earlier version of that runbook said to omit it: the
# instance manager loads this plugin to replay WAL during the restore, and
# without it the instance never starts ("Unknown plugin:
# barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io").
#
# externalClusters below only says WHERE the backup is; it does not get the
# plugin injected into the pod. So "no plugin" is not the way to keep this
# read-only — "plugin, not archiving" is, and it is the combination verified
# on im-pg on 2026-07-25.
plugins:
- name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
enabled: true
isWALArchiver: false
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
bootstrap:
recovery:
source: pprl-pg
database: paperless
owner: paperless
externalClusters:
- name: pprl-pg
plugin:
name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
serverName: pprl-pg
postgresql:
parameters:
shared_buffers: "256MB"
max_connections: "100"
# The production tuning for write reduction is deliberately not copied.
# It exists to spare the SSDs under a database that runs for years; this
# one is read-only for hours at a time and then deleted.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: paperless-eval
# The instance only. The measurement harness lives in scripts/paperless-eval/
# and is applied by hand — a Job is immutable, re-running one means deleting and
# recreating it, and Flux would just put the old one back. Nothing here should
# converge on a finished measurement.
resources:
- secrets.yaml
- cluster.yaml
- pvcs.yaml
- redis.yaml
- paperless.yaml
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
---
# Deliberately much smaller than the production ConfigMap. Everything that
# exists to serve people is gone: no remote-user auth, no CSRF origins, no
# barcode or mail consumption, no Tika/Gotenberg. Nothing consumes documents
# here, and nothing signs in.
#
# What remains is the database connection and the AI settings, because those
# are what the evaluation measures.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-config
namespace: paperless-eval
data:
PAPERLESS_URL: "http://paperless.paperless-eval.svc.cluster.local"
PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
PAPERLESS_TIME_ZONE: "Europe/Berlin"
PAPERLESS_REDIS: "redis://redis:6379"
PAPERLESS_DBENGINE: "postgresql"
PAPERLESS_DBHOST: "pprleval-pg-rw"
PAPERLESS_DBNAME: "paperless"
# Polling off, so a pod that finds an empty consume volume does not spend a
# thread looking at it every ten seconds for the length of a run.
PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING_INTERVAL: "0"
# The AI settings under test. The endpoints are placeholders that each eval
# job overrides for the model it is measuring — a job runs its own
# llama-server beside paperless in the same pod, so the value that matters at
# run time is the one in the job, not the one here.
#
# Same caveat as production, and sharper here: paperless reads these from an
# ApplicationConfiguration row and falls back to the environment only when
# that row is empty. The row comes across in the restored database, so
# anything configured in the production admin UI arrives with it and silently
# wins over this ConfigMap — an eval would then measure production's settings
# while appearing to measure the job's.
#
# Check it before trusting any result, and after every fresh restore:
#
# select llm_backend, llm_model, llm_embedding_backend, llm_embedding_model
# from paperless_applicationconfiguration;
#
# Every column must be null for the environment to apply.
PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "900"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_OUTPUT_LANGUAGE: "de-de"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
---
# A base instance that proves the restored database is usable and that the
# search index and classifier build against it. The evaluation itself does not
# run here — each job brings its own paperless container so it can point at its
# own model — but this is what makes a broken clone visible before a job spends
# hours on it.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: paperless
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
annotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-config
# Both, like production: the secret refreshes on the same 10m cycle, and
# without this the pod would keep a rotated key until something else
# restarted it — which defeats the point of matching the interval.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
spec:
enableServiceLinks: false
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: paperless
# No $imagepolicy marker, unlike apps/paperless: a measurement is
# only comparable against a fixed version, so this tag moves when
# somebody decides to re-measure, not when a release lands.
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8000
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: paperless-eval-config
env:
- name: PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
key: secret-key
- name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PAPERLESS_DBPASS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/data
- name: media
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/media
- name: consume
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/consume
# 60 minutes, against production's 10, and matching this app's Flux
# Kustomization timeout.
#
# Production's budget was sized for a from-scratch boot on this same
# corpus and held, so 10 would probably do — but there the volume is
# Retain and the index survives, making that a one-off. Here the
# volume is ephemeral and the index is rebuilt on every re-test, so
# the expensive path is the normal one. A killed pod starts the work
# over rather than resuming, which turns a slow boot into a
# crash-loop that stalls Flux behind wait: true.
#
# The LLM index is not in this budget: it is a celery task, and boot
# only runs init-llmindex-migrate, a migration check.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
periodSeconds: 20
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 180
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 120
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
# Production's context verbatim, and it has to be: the paperless-ngx
# entrypoint starts as root, chowns the mounted data/media/consume
# volumes and then drops to uid 1000 via setgid/setuid. Without these
# the same image fails that sequence with EPERM.
#
# It bites harder here than in production, where those volumes were
# chowned once years ago and keep their ownership. These are fresh on
# every rebuild, so the chown is not a no-op.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-golden
- name: media
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-media
- name: consume
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-consume
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: paperless
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
ports:
- port: 80
targetPort: http
-129
View File
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
---
# All four use ceph-block-ephemeral rather than the Retain default. Everything
# here is derived — a restored database, an index built from it, a cache — so
# the volumes should go when the namespace does instead of leaving Released PVs
# and orphaned RBD images to reclaim by hand (issue #262).
#
# /data holds the Tantivy search index and the classifier pickle, both rebuilt
# from the database, and the LLM index — which is the expensive one at roughly
# three hours for the full corpus.
#
# Measured on production for the same ~3900 documents: 36 MiB search index,
# 125 MiB LLM index. 10Gi is far more than that needs, and deliberately so —
# an embedding model with wider vectors than bge-m3's 1024 dimensions is
# exactly what phase two varies, and running out of space mid-run would cost
# the whole rebuild.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
# Named for its role rather than its mount point: the smoke-test deployment
# builds /data here, and every eval job copies it out. Replaces the earlier
# RWO paperless-eval-data, whose access mode could not be widened in place —
# a bound claim's spec is immutable.
name: paperless-eval-golden
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
# RWX, because the eval jobs read it too — each copies it into its own
# emptyDir rather than mounting it live. The vector store is SQLite, and
# SQLite locking across pods over CephFS is not something to rely on.
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 10Gi
---
# Empty, and stays that way. Paperless refuses to start without the path, but
# the AI path reads title, content and filename out of the database and never
# opens a file — so the documents themselves are not copied here. That is what
# keeps this instance cheap and keeps a second copy of the archive off the
# cluster.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-media
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
# Also empty: nothing is consumed here, but the path has to exist.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-consume
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
# The eval jobs' model cache, RWX so several jobs can read the same weights at
# once — that is the whole point of measuring two candidates in parallel.
#
# Separate from the ai namespace's llama-server-models despite holding some of
# the same files: PVCs do not cross namespaces. A model therefore downloads
# once here and is then shared by every job, which is the cost a new candidate
# carries anyway.
#
# NOT ephemeral, unlike everything else in this namespace: re-downloading tens
# of gigabytes on a slow uplink is a worse outcome than an orphaned volume.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: llama-models
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 120Gi
---
# Results outlive the jobs that produce them: a Job is deleted and recreated to
# re-run a configuration, and comparing configurations is the entire exercise.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-results
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-redis
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
-81
View File
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: redis
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 999
fsGroup: 999
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: redis
# No $imagepolicy marker; see the note on the paperless image.
image: redis:8.10.1-alpine
# No --save: this holds the celery queue and the suggestion cache,
# both of which are regenerated. Persisting them across a restart of
# a throwaway instance would only preserve stale suggestions.
args:
- redis-server
- --save
- ""
- --loglevel
- warning
ports:
- name: redis
containerPort: 6379
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
livenessProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: redis
initialDelaySeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
resources:
requests:
cpu: 20m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-redis
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: redis
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
ports:
- port: 6379
targetPort: redis
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
---
# The same Hetzner S3 key every CNPG-using namespace pulls, needed here only so
# the recovery source can be read. See apps/paperless for why one shared key
# rather than per-app paths.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
---
# Django's secret key, shared with the production instance rather than given
# its own vault entry.
#
# It signs sessions and CSRF tokens, and this instance has no ingress and no
# users — nothing signs in, so nothing is at stake in sharing it. A separate
# entry would mean a vault write before the namespace can start, for a
# throwaway instance that gets rebuilt.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
# 10m, matching apps/paperless rather than the 1h default: the point of
# sharing the key is that the two hold the same value, and a slower refresh
# here would let them diverge for up to an hour after a rotation.
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/paperless
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: paperless-eval
namespace: flux-system
spec:
# A throwaway copy of paperless for measuring the local LLM against the real
# corpus. Its Cluster restores from paperless's backup store and archives
# nothing back; see kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/cluster.yaml.
#
# prune: true and no prune-disabled annotations anywhere underneath — the
# data here is a copy, and being able to delete the whole namespace by
# removing this file is the point.
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 1m
# 30m is not enough: the first start restores the database and then builds
# the search index over ~3900 documents before the webserver answers.
timeout: 60m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval
prune: true
wait: true
dependsOn:
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
- name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"
@@ -65,21 +65,6 @@ spec:
- 45.157.177.26/32
- 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
- 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
# netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
#
# Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
# hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
# no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
# this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
# outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
# inbound attack involved at all.
#
# Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
# current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
# these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
# community blocklists.
- 162.55.50.97/32
- 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
# mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
# the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
@@ -123,24 +108,6 @@ spec:
lapi:
replicas: 1
service:
# Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
#
# These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
# Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
# annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
# is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
# answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
# 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
# scheme mismatch.
#
# With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
# plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
# choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
# certificate is self-signed.
annotations:
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
# Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
# workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
# cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -217,32 +184,6 @@ spec:
- namespace: ingress
podName: traefik-*
program: traefik
# Read by polling, not inotify. Every path under
# /var/log/containers is a symlink into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
# rotates the target once it reaches containerLogMaxSize (10Mi,
# roughly every eight hours for Traefik here). An inotify tailer
# does not survive that rotation: it reopens the path, waits for a
# file that is in fact already present, and never reads another
# line. Nothing about that state looks broken from outside — the
# pod stays Running and Ready, the LAPI keeps answering, and the
# cumulative counters keep displaying whatever they reached, so the
# only symptom is that no scenario ever fires again.
#
# CrowdSec detects the hazard itself and logs it at startup, with
# this exact remedy in the message: "is a symlink, but inotify
# polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
# Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true". Upstream carries
# the same case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik), and the chart
# gained this field in helm-charts#109 specifically to fix it.
#
# Orthogonal to the force_inotify: true that the chart hardcodes
# into acquis.yaml and offers no way to unset. That one governs the
# fsnotify watch on the directory, i.e. discovering the log of a
# replacement Traefik pod; this one governs how an already
# discovered file is read. Both true is the supported combination.
#
# Costs CPU per open file per upstream docs — two files per node.
poll_without_inotify: true
env:
- name: COLLECTIONS
value: "crowdsecurity/traefik crowdsecurity/http-cve crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules"
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ metadata:
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
rootCAs:
- secret: crowdsec-root-secret
rootCAsSecrets:
- crowdsec-root-secret
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
@@ -60,12 +60,8 @@ metadata:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
# NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
# not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
#
# The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
# Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
# are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
# Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
# chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
@@ -69,13 +69,6 @@ kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperless
---
# A disposable copy of paperless's database, for measuring how the local LLM
# classifies documents without experimenting on the live archive.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperless-eval
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
@@ -34,33 +34,6 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# The paperless-eval namespace reaches the embedding endpoint for the same
# reason paperless does; its chat model runs inside each eval job's own pod
# and needs no grant here.
#
# Scoped to the namespace rather than to an app label, unlike the grants
# around it: that namespace exists only to run evaluations, and its
# workload is jobs created per measurement whose labels vary with what is
# being measured. A label match would be a trap that presents as an
# embedding call silently dropped.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# Home Assistant's llama.cpp conversation agent calls the chat model only —
# it has no use for the embedding endpoint, so unlike paperless above this
# grant does not extend to llama-embed.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": home-assistant
app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
@@ -167,18 +167,6 @@ spec:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
# The cluster's own chat model, for the llama.cpp conversation agent that
# backs Assist. Scoped to the one pod and port rather than the ai namespace
# as a whole, so this grant cannot widen if something else is placed there —
# the embedding endpoint next to it is deliberately not included.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# traefik for east-west OIDC roundtrips that go through the
# public hostname via k8s_gateway.
- toEndpoints:
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ resources:
- ingress-isolation.yaml
- authentik-ns.yaml
- paperless-ns.yaml
- paperless-eval-ns.yaml
- audiobookshelf-ns.yaml
- home-assistant-ns.yaml
- spegel-ns.yaml
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
# Narrower than paperless-ns.yaml, because this namespace serves nobody.
#
# There is no ingress, no gate outpost and no hostname: the only things that
# talk to it are its own pods. Monitoring is admitted so a run can be watched,
# and host/remote-node for the kubelet probes.
#
# Egress reaches the ai namespace for the embedding endpoint, which is the one
# dependency an eval job has outside its own pod, and world:443 so the CNPG
# recovery can read the backup store on Hetzner.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
# home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
# The embedding endpoint. The chat model runs inside each job's own pod, so
# it needs no grant; the embedder is shared with production because it is
# read-only and cheap, and swapping it is a phase-two concern.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# world:443 — the CNPG recovery reads the backup store on Hetzner Object
# Storage, and image pulls.
- toEntities:
- world
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "443"
protocol: TCP
# ICMP — egress mirror; see ingress block above.
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
---
# The CNPG operator polls each instance's status endpoint over HTTPS
# (https://<pod-ip>:8000/pg/status) to populate Cluster status. Without it the
# Cluster reports "Instance Status Extraction Error: HTTP communication issue"
# while Postgres serves normally — issue #433, where the operator's dial timed
# out because the apps baseline never allowed the database namespace.
#
# It matters here even for a throwaway: the Flux Kustomization waits on
# Cluster status, and a smoke test that cannot report its own health is not one.
#
# Scoped to the pprleval-pg endpoints and that one port, like the equivalent
# rules for wp-pg and ha-pg: the barman and mariadb operators sharing the
# database namespace have no reason to reach anything here.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg-allow-cnpg-operator
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
cnpg.io/cluster: pprleval-pg
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudnative-pg
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8000"
protocol: TCP
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ spec:
- ingress
- monitoring
- paperless
- paperless-eval # same apps/paperless key plus the shared barman S3 creds
- trmnl
- velero
- woodpecker # wp-pg barman creds; woodpecker moving out of `apps` (#433)
-198
View File
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
# Comparing chat models on Paperless suggestions
Which local LLM is worth running behind paperless-ngx's AI suggestions, measured
against documents a human already filed, in the `paperless-eval` namespace
rather than against the live archive.
**Applied by hand, not by Flux.** A Job is immutable, so re-running a
configuration means deleting and recreating it, and a Flux-managed Job would
simply come back. The namespace itself *is* managed
(`kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/`); only the measurement is not.
## Running one
Screen first, always:
```sh
./run-candidate.sh qwen3-8b 5 # ~5 min to a rejection, ~10 to a pass
kubectl -n paperless-eval logs -f job/eval-qwen3-8b -c eval
kubectl -n paperless-eval delete job eval-qwen3-8b
./run-candidate.sh qwen3-8b # the real measurement, 50 documents
```
Three of the first four candidates could not do the task at all, and each was
left running for an hour before anyone looked. eval.py now stops after three
consecutive failures from the first document, so a screening run rejects a
hopeless candidate in about five minutes.
Screening uses genuine paperless requests. That matters — `probe-toolcall.sh`
is cheaper still and worth a first pass, but it passed two candidates that then
failed on document one, because a synthesised request cannot reproduce the RAG
neighbours and taxonomy candidate lists that make a real prompt what it is.
Never compare numbers across sample sizes. A screen is a gate; the comparison
happens at 50.
Candidates live in `candidates.tsv`; the runner substitutes the model-specific
values into `job-template.yaml` and refreshes the `eval.py` ConfigMap. Adding a
candidate is a line in that file, not a copy of the manifest — the sidecar
configuration deliberately exists once.
Two run at a time: the pod anti-affinity puts one per node, and only two nodes
have a free iGPU. A third waits.
Re-running after an edit needs the old Job gone first:
`kubectl -n paperless-eval delete job eval-<label>`.
Results land on the `paperless-eval-results` PVC as `<label>.jsonl` (one row per
document) and `<label>.summary.json`, and in the pod log.
## What is being compared
The candidates against each other. The scikit-learn classifier runs in every
job as a fixed reference line — it costs 15 seconds and keeps running in
production whatever the LLM does, so `llm_rescued` against `llm_only_wrong`
says what *this* model adds on top of it.
Do not read the classifier's own score as a quality bar. `train()` fits on every
non-inbox document with no holdout, so the evaluation documents are in its
training set and its numbers are memorisation. That does not matter for ranking
models — it is the same constant under all of them.
## Reading the output
`correspondent_offered` against `correspondent_recognised` is the
`MATCH_THRESHOLD = 0.8` gap: the model names the right entity and difflib
rejects it. Measured, not hypothetical — "GOTOOLS GmbH" against the stored
"GOTOOLS" scores ~0.74 and is thrown away despite being an exact prefix.
`type_specific` against `type_catchall` splits on whether the true type is
"Sonstige", which holds 1133 of ~3900 documents and is the one label with no
semantic content. A model reading the document has to infer "none of the above".
`failed` counts documents where the model produced nothing usable. With
`--n-predict 768` in place, that is mostly non-termination: paperless reports
the truncated response as a flat `Invalid AI configuration` and discards the
content, so what the model was doing is visible only in the llama-server log.
## Results so far
| model | corr. offered | corr. recognised | type | specific | catchall | failed | seconds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *classifier (reference)* | 72.0 | 72.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0 | 18 |
| Qwen3.6-35B-A3B Q4_K_M | 72.9 | 77.1 | 85.4 | 94.9 | 44.4 | 2 | 5494 |
| Ministral-3 3B Q4_K_M | 71.4 | 76.2 | 76.2 | 83.3 | 33.3 | **29** | 5511 |
| Ministral-3 8B Q4_K_M | — | — | — | — | — | 3/3 | aborted |
| Granite 3.3 8B Q4_K_M | — | — | — | — | — | all | not measurable |
Read the Ministral-3 3B row with its failure count, not without it. It scored 21
documents and failed 29 — and on those 21 its correspondent numbers sit within
the noise floor of Qwen3.6's. That is not a near-tie: the 21 are the documents
it could answer at all, which is a set selected for being easy, and the
classifier does better on them too (11 of 21 both right against 30 of 48).
A model that declines three documents in five has no usable accuracy number.
Qwen3.6 complement: 30 both right, 5 rescued, 4 broken, 9 both wrong — and two
of those four "broken" are the difflib gap above, not model errors.
### How big a difference means anything
Qwen3.6 was measured twice over the same 50 documents, once with the deprecated
--chat-template-kwargs and once with --reasoning off:
70.8 / 75.0 / 83.3 / 94.9 / 33.3 two failures
72.9 / 77.1 / 85.4 / 94.9 / 44.4 two failures
Every one of those gaps is a single document out of 48 — the catchall one is
one document out of nine. So that is the noise floor: **a difference between
two candidates smaller than about two documents says nothing.** Decoding is
sampled, and the same model on the same input does not give the same answer
twice.
Worth knowing before reading a 2-point lead as a result.
## The instrument is checked, not assumed
Every AI run asks the model "Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich" before the
documents, every ten documents, and again if it aborts. If Paris does not come
back, the run stops and says so.
This exists because a whole day of results turned out to be measuring a broken
instrument. On this Vulkan stack a prompt past some model-specific length stops
llama.cpp producing language — it repeats one token, " de de de" or
" phosphorus phosphorus" or whitespace — at HTTP 200 with finish_reason "stop"
and nothing in the log. The slot then stays broken for every request after it
until the pod restarts.
So a run against a poisoned slot reports fifty failures that are one event, and
reads exactly like a model that cannot classify. Six candidates were written up
that way. gemma-4-26B-A4B answers "Die Hauptstadt von Frankreich ist Paris."
perfectly on a fresh pod and produces whitespace at a 2334-token prompt; its
recorded classification scores described a corrupted slot and nothing else.
**A run whose canary breaks is void, not a result.** Failures adjacent to the
break are one fault. Use `probe-length.sh` to find where the model's boundary
actually sits before judging it — paperless needs ~5300 tokens.
## Bounds of the harness, not of the model
Two numbers in here are mine and both have produced misleading results:
`--n-predict` caps generation server-side, default 768. A candidate that stops
exactly there has hit MY bound. Six candidates were written up as incapable on
that signal before anyone checked whether they would have finished at 900
tokens. A working answer takes 241-291 tokens, so 768 looked generous — and
"looked generous" is not evidence.
`EVAL_TIMEOUT` bounds the client, default 300 s. Raising the token cap alone
just moves the failure here: at 6 tok/s a 4096-token budget needs 620 s of
generation, so the run fails with TimeoutError instead. Raise both together.
./run-candidate.sh <label> <sample> <n_predict> <timeout>
./run-candidate.sh gemma4-26b-a4b 3 4096 900
The Q8 precision comparison had to be thrown away over this. Q8's uncapped
answers run 460-520 tokens against Q4's 280-443 — about 60% longer for the same
task — so 20 of 50 documents hit the 768 cap against Q4's one, and the run
looked like "Q8 classifies worse" when it measured "Q8 is wordier than my
bound". Before comparing two configurations, check that neither is sitting on
the cap.
## What to watch for
**Prompt length.** Past roughly 14k tokens this stack stops producing language
and starts producing garbage or nothing, without any error — and a single such
request poisons the llama.cpp slot until the pod restarts. Paperless prompts sit
near 5k, but the 252 documents over 14000 characters push toward the boundary
with their RAG neighbours. A run that starts scoring zeros mid-way is more
likely this than the model.
**Ground truth.** It is the current filing, and over ten years conventions
change. A disagreement with an old document is not automatically an error.
## The models volume fills up
Each candidate leaves its weights on the shared `llama-models` PVC — 2.5 GB for
a small dense model, 17-25 GB for an MoE, 34 GB for a Q8. The volume is 120 GiB
and nine screened candidates filled it completely.
A full volume does not announce itself. llama-server cannot write its metadata
cache, so it cannot resolve the repository listing, and says:
no GGUF files found in repository <repo>
Available GGUF files:
- <whatever it had cached before the disk filled>
which reads as a wrong model reference. The pod then sits in
`Init:CrashLoopBackOff`, which from outside is indistinguishable from a slow
34 GB download. Two jobs spent three hours that way.
**Check `df -h /models` before believing anything llama-server says about a
repository.** Clear out rejected candidates when the volume gets tight — the
weights are re-downloadable, so deleting them costs only bandwidth:
```sh
kubectl -n paperless-eval exec <a pod mounting llama-models> -- \
sh -c 'cd /models && du -sh * | sort -h'
```
-238
View File
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
# label hf-repo hf-file alias mem-request mem-limit
#
# Every candidate must do function calling: paperless calls the model through
# chat_with_tools(..., tool_required=True) with DocumentClassifierSchema as a
# tool, not via JSON mode. A model whose chat template has no tool support does
# not score badly here, it fails outright.
#
# Instruct variants, never Reasoning ones. Qwen3.6 spent two of fifty documents
# generating until something cut it off, and a model tuned to think first does
# that by design. The one exception is Qwen3.6 itself, which is measured with
# thinking switched off.
#
# Sizes. An earlier version of this note said "a smaller dense model gains at
# both ends" and chose the Ministral pair on that basis. Measured, it is wrong:
#
# Ministral-3 8B dense, ~4.7 GB weights 7.1-8.2 tok/s
# Qwen3.6 35B-A3B MoE, ~20 GB weights 11 tok/s
#
# The largest model is the fastest one here. But the bandwidth explanation I
# gave for it is wrong, and measuring Q8 disproved it:
#
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B Q4_K_M ~21 GB 11.0 tok/s
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B Q8_0 ~34 GB 10.3 tok/s
#
# Doubling the bytes per active parameter cost ten percent, not half. So decode
# is NOT bandwidth-bound for this MoE — it is compute-bound on many small
# per-expert matmuls, which also explains the earlier measurement of 21.4 GB/s
# effective against a 53.9 GB/s ceiling: it was already leaving 60% of the bus
# unused.
#
# Consequences: the bytes-per-token formula predicts dense models and not this
# one, and higher precision is nearly free on an MoE here — about 10% slower
# for double the weight precision.
#
# So the order to prefer is: MoE with few active parameters, then dense 3-9B,
# then dense 10-14B only for an exceptional model (~4 tok/s, roughly three
# hours for 50 documents), and nothing dense above 14B.
qwen35 ggml-org/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-GGUF Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3.6-35b-a3b 24Gi 32Gi
#
# The same model at higher precision, to find out what Q4 costs. Everything in
# this file is Q4_K_M, so the whole comparison could be sitting on quantisation
# damage nobody has measured — and there is a concrete suspicion, not just a
# worry: Ministral-3's leak of [THINK] and [TOOL_CALLS] as literal text is the
# kind of fault a 4-bit quantisation can produce, and Q8 would separate "the
# model cannot do this" from "Q4 broke it".
#
# ~34 GB resident against Q4's ~21, and roughly 6 tok/s against 11, so about
# double the wall clock. Read the result against the noise floor in README.md:
# below about two documents of difference, this says nothing.
qwen35-q8 ggml-org/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-GGUF Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-Q8_0.gguf qwen3.6-35b-a3b-q8 40Gi 48Gi
#
# --- MoE, few active parameters: the shape that wins on this hardware ---
qwen3-30b-a3b bartowski/Qwen_Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507-GGUF Qwen_Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3-30b-a3b 22Gi 28Gi
nemotron3-30b-a3b bartowski/nvidia_Nemotron-3-Nano-30B-A3B-GGUF nvidia_Nemotron-3-Nano-30B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf nemotron3-30b-a3b 28Gi 34Gi
glm47-flash bartowski/zai-org_GLM-4.7-Flash-GGUF zai-org_GLM-4.7-Flash-Q4_K_M.gguf glm-4.7-flash 20Gi 26Gi
gemma4-26b-a4b unsloth/gemma-4-26B-A4B-it-GGUF gemma-4-26B-A4B-it-UD-Q4_K_M.gguf gemma-4-26b-a4b 20Gi 26Gi
qwen35-35b-a3b bartowski/Qwen_Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-GGUF Qwen_Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3.5-35b-a3b 24Gi 30Gi
nemotron35-30b-a3b bartowski/NVIDIA-Nemotron-3.5-Lightning-30B-A3B-GGUF NVIDIA-Nemotron-3.5-Lightning-30B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf nemotron3.5-30b-a3b 28Gi 34Gi
#
# --- dense, small, with German named in the model's own card ---
glm4-9b bartowski/glm-4-9b-chat-GGUF glm-4-9b-chat-Q4_K_M.gguf glm-4-9b 10Gi 14Gi
commandr7b bartowski/c4ai-command-r7b-12-2024-GGUF c4ai-command-r7b-12-2024-Q4_K_M.gguf command-r7b 10Gi 14Gi
qwen25-7b bartowski/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-GGUF Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen2.5-7b 10Gi 14Gi
llama31-8b bartowski/Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-GGUF Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-Q4_K_M.gguf llama-3.1-8b 10Gi 14Gi
nemotron-nano-12b bartowski/nvidia_NVIDIA-Nemotron-Nano-12B-v2-GGUF nvidia_NVIDIA-Nemotron-Nano-12B-v2-Q4_K_M.gguf nemotron-nano-12b 12Gi 16Gi
phi4-mini bartowski/microsoft_Phi-4-mini-instruct-GGUF microsoft_Phi-4-mini-instruct-Q4_K_M.gguf phi-4-mini 8Gi 12Gi
#
# --- dense, small, no German claim but no thinking risk either ---
qwen3-4b-2507 bartowski/Qwen_Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507-GGUF Qwen_Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3-4b 8Gi 12Gi
qwen35-9b bartowski/Qwen_Qwen3.5-9B-GGUF Qwen_Qwen3.5-9B-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3.5-9b 10Gi 14Gi
#
# WHAT THE RESEARCH RULED OUT, so nobody re-derives it
#
# Hard-excluded on tool calling, chat template inspected directly rather than
# assumed — the string "tool" appears zero times in any of them:
# Gemma 3, every size (4B/12B/27B) phi-4 14B (the mini DOES have it)
# Cohere Aya, all variants InternLM 2.5 / 3
#
# Hard-excluded on German, stated by the vendor rather than merely missing:
# Falcon 3 — "supports EN, FR, ES, PT", German is not on the list
# EXAONE — the small ones are English/Korean; the ones with German are 33B+
#
# German fine-tunes are a dead end, and for one consistent reason: SauerkrautLM,
# DiscoLM, LeoLM, Occiglot and Teuken all overwrite their base model's chat
# template with a minimal ChatML loop that drops tool calling. VAGOsolutions
# does this even on bases that have it (Llama-3.1, Qwen2.5). Assume any German
# tune is tool-incapable until its own tokenizer_config.json says otherwise.
#
# On llama.cpp's tool parsing, which explains the Granite failure: current
# builds have no per-vendor parser table any more. common/chat.cpp exposes
# PEG_SIMPLE / PEG_NATIVE / PEG_GEMMA4 / PEG_MINIMAX_M3 and derives the grammar
# from the model's own template. Hermes-style <tool_call> JSON is a first-class
# tested fixture in tests/test-chat.cpp; Granite's format is not. So this is not
# "Granite is unsupported" so much as "Granite's template shape is outside what
# the auto-parser was validated against".
#
# SCREENING RESULTS, and a pattern that reframes the whole search
#
# qwen35 MoE 35B total / 3B active works, 2 of 50 failed
# qwen3-8b dense 8B 4 of 5 failed
# hermes4-14b dense 14B 3 of 3 failed, aborted
# ministral8b dense 8B 3 of 3 failed, aborted
# ministral3b dense 3B 29 of 50 failed
# granite8b dense 8B every document failed
#
# Five dense models from 3B to 14B cannot produce a valid call against
# paperless's 14-field schema; the one mixture-of-experts model can. Hermes is
# the cleanest of these failures: its <tool_call> JSON is an explicitly tested
# fixture in llama.cpp's own test suite, so the parser demonstrably handles the
# format and the failure has to be the model.
#
# Working hypothesis: holding a long grammar-constrained structure needs model
# capacity, and what supplies it is TOTAL parameters, not active ones. If that
# is right, "go smaller for speed" is a dead end here — and the consolation is
# that the fastest shape on this hardware, MoE with few active parameters, is
# also the only one that works.
#
# qwen3-30b-a3b tests it directly: 30B total, 3B active.
#
# CORRECTION: Gemma is not excluded after all. Gemma *3* has no tool support —
# "tool" appears zero times in its chat template at every size, checked
# directly. Gemma *4* 26B-A4B does have it, documented in the template, plus
# "140+ languages pretrained, 35+ out of the box". Excluding a family by its
# previous generation was sloppy.
#
# Two of these carry a Vulkan risk worth checking in the llama-server log
# before trusting a run: Nemotron-3.5 interleaves real Mamba2 layers and
# Qwen3.5 uses DeltaNet linear attention, and llama.cpp's Vulkan SSM shaders
# are less exercised on Iris Xe than on Arc. Issue #19957 reported exactly this
# for Qwen3.5-35B-A3B and it turned out to be a stale build, fixed months
# before b10731 — but confirm layers are actually offloaded rather than
# silently falling back to CPU, which would read as a slow model.
#
# Ruled out after checking: ERNIE-4.5-21B-A3B (only the Thinking variant has
# tool calling; the instruct one has none), Ling-3.0-flash (124B total),
# Granite-4.0-H-Small (9B active), DeepSeek-V2-Lite and OLMoE (under 20B
# total), Cohere North Mini (code-only, no ggml-org/bartowski conversion,
# cohere2_moe support in llama.cpp unverified), gpt-oss-20b (a reasoning-effort
# model in Harmony format rather than plain instruct).
#
# THE MoE HYPOTHESIS IS DEAD. qwen3-30b-a3b — MoE, 30B total, 3B active, the
# shape that was supposed to explain everything — scored 1 of 5 and failed 4,
# indistinguishable from the dense 8B.
#
# So neither architecture nor size predicts success:
#
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B MoE 35B/3B Apr 2026 2 of 50 failed
# Qwen3-30B-A3B MoE 30B/3B older 4 of 5 failed
# Qwen3-8B dense 8B older 4 of 5 failed
# Hermes-4-14B dense 14B — 3 of 3 failed
#
# The only thing correlating with success so far is how new and how strong the
# model is. That is an unsatisfying hypothesis because it predicts nothing
# cheaply — but it is what the data says, and two architectural theories have
# already died here.
#
# qwen35-35b-a3b isolates it: same architecture, same total and active
# parameters as the working baseline, one generation older. If it fails, the
# generation is the variable and shape is noise.
#
# qwen35-35b-a3b PASSES the screen: 5 of 5, no failures, 584 s. So the
# generation hypothesis is dead too — Qwen3.5 is a generation OLDER than the
# working Qwen3.6 and handles the schema cleanly.
#
# What the two working models share is 35B total parameters; the one failing
# MoE has 30B. But that is confounded — Qwen3-30B-A3B is both smaller and
# older, and three data points cannot separate the two.
#
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B 35B total newest works
# Qwen3.5-35B-A3B 35B total older works
# Qwen3-30B-A3B 30B total oldest 4 of 5 failed
#
# glm47-flash separates them: 30B total, newest generation. If it works,
# generation is what matters and 35B is not a threshold. If it fails, total
# size is, and the search should stop looking below ~35B.
#
# PREFILL SPEED IS A SELECTION CRITERION AND I WAS NOT TRACKING IT.
# Measured on this hardware, prompt processing varies more than sixfold across
# architectures, and it is roughly half of a run's wall clock:
#
# dense 8B (Ministral) 240 tok/s
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B 100 tok/s
# GLM-4.7-Flash 31 tok/s decode 4.9 tok/s
#
# GLM-4.7-Flash is disqualified on that alone. At 31 tok/s a 5300-token prompt
# takes 168 s, times ~2.6 requests per document, is over seven minutes per
# document and about six hours for a run — before considering whether its
# answers are any good.
#
# It also shows why the 300 s REQUEST_TIMEOUT needs care: 4453 prompt tokens at
# 31.5 tok/s plus 768 generated at 4.9 tok/s is 298 s, so a slow model turns a
# content failure into a TimeoutError and muddies the diagnosis. Read the
# llama-server timings, not just the eval error.
#
# glm47-flash: aborted, 3 of 3 — but every one a TimeoutError, not an invalid
# answer, so this does NOT settle the size-versus-generation question it was
# started to settle. It failed on speed. Document 1 did reach the --n-predict
# cap without producing a call, but 2 and 3 were cut off by the 300 s client
# bound before anything could be concluded about them.
#
# Disqualified regardless: 31 tok/s prefill and 4.9 tok/s decode is over seven
# minutes per document and about six hours for a full run.
#
# gemma4-26b-a4b is the better discriminator — 26B total, well under 35, and
# newest generation. Works means generation and quality matter rather than a
# 35B threshold; fails is consistent with total size being the line.
#
# gemma4-26b-a4b: aborted, 3 of 3, all HTTP 400 rather than timeouts, and the
# server log shows it ran to the --n-predict cap on every one. So it is the
# same capability failure as the small dense models, not a template mismatch.
# (Prefill 45-50 tok/s, decode 6 tok/s — also not fast.)
#
# THE SIZE THRESHOLD SURVIVED ITS FIRST REAL TEST. gemma-4 was chosen
# specifically because it could refute it — newest generation, 26B total — and
# it did not:
#
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B 35B newest works
# Qwen3.5-35B-A3B 35B older works
# Qwen3-30B-A3B 30B oldest fails
# gemma-4-26B-A4B 26B NEWEST fails
# Hermes-4-14B 14B — fails
# dense 3-8B — — fail
#
# Two generations work at 35B total; everything at 30B and below fails,
# including the newest model in the field. Operating rule until something
# contradicts it: do not spend a screening slot on anything under ~35B total.
#
# Not pinned further on purpose. Whether the line sits at 31B or 34B is
# interesting and not decision-relevant — there are two working candidates and
# the useful next number is a full 50-document run of the second one.
#
# Re-enabled for length probing, not for scoring. Their classification numbers
# were taken against a slot that may already have been corrupted, so the only
# honest thing to do with them is find out where each one's boundary sits.
hermes4-14b bartowski/NousResearch_Hermes-4-14B-GGUF NousResearch_Hermes-4-14B-Q4_K_M.gguf hemes-4-14b 14Gi 20Gi
qwen3-8b bartowski/Qwen_Qwen3-8B-GGUF Qwen_Qwen3-8B-Q4_K_M.gguf qwen3-8b 12Gi 16Gi
ministral8b bartowski/mistralai_Ministral-3-8B-Instruct-2512-GGUF mistralai_Ministral-3-8B-Instruct-2512-Q4_K_M.gguf ministral-3-8b 12Gi 16Gi
granite8b bartowski/ibm-granite_granite-3.3-8b-instruct-GGUF ibm-granite_granite-3.3-8b-instruct-Q4_K_M.gguf granite-3.3-8b 12Gi 16Gi
Can't render this file because it contains an unexpected character in line 13 and column 47.
-544
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@@ -1,544 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Measure what Paperless suggests for documents whose labels a human already chose.
Runs both engines against the same documents:
/api/documents/<id>/suggestions/ the built-in scikit-learn classifier
/api/documents/<id>/ai_suggestions/ the LLM path, with RAG
WHAT THIS ANSWERS, AND WHAT AN EARLIER VERSION DID NOT
The two engines are not alternatives — the classifier costs 0.6 s per document
and keeps running whatever the LLM does. So the useful question is not "which
scores higher" but "what does the LLM add where the classifier is wrong", and
that cannot be recovered from two aggregate percentages: 74% and 72% could
overlap almost entirely or barely at all, and the difference between those two
worlds is the entire value of running an LLM.
So every document is written out individually, with both engines' verdicts, and
the summary is derived from that rather than counted along the way.
SCORING
Correspondent and document type are each scored twice:
offered the true label's id came back in `correspondents` /
`document_types` — what the UI actually presents
recognised also counting the true label's name appearing wordwise in
`suggested_correspondents` / `suggested_document_types`
The gap between them is one specific failure: the model names the right entity
but paperless_ai.matching cannot resolve it, because difflib runs at
MATCH_THRESHOLD = 0.8 and a correct but more verbose answer falls below it —
"Generali Deutschland Krankenversicherung AG" against the existing "Generali
AG". Reporting only the first blames the model for a matcher problem; only the
second claims a usefulness the UI does not deliver.
Document type is additionally split on whether the true type is "Sonstige",
which holds 1133 of ~3900 documents and is the one label with no semantic
content — a restaurant reservation lands there because nothing else fits. The
classifier can memorise that; a model reading the document has to infer "none
of the above". Scored separately rather than dropped, because the model does
sometimes get it right.
GROUND TRUTH
The current filing, which deserves care: over ten years conventions change, and
a disagreement with an old document is not automatically an error. Treat the
comparison between engines as the result and the absolute numbers as
indicative.
Env:
PAPERLESS_URL default http://127.0.0.1:8000
PGHOST/PGDATABASE standard libpq, for ground truth and the API token
EVAL_SAMPLE documents to score, default 50
EVAL_ENGINES comma-separated subset of classic,ai — default both
EVAL_LABEL free-text name for this configuration, recorded in the
output so results from different jobs stay distinguishable
EVAL_OUT directory for results, default /results
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import secrets
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
import psycopg
PAPERLESS_URL = os.environ.get("PAPERLESS_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8000")
SAMPLE = int(os.environ.get("EVAL_SAMPLE", "50"))
ENGINES = os.environ.get("EVAL_ENGINES", "classic,ai").split(",")
LABEL = os.environ.get("EVAL_LABEL", "unlabelled")
OUT_DIR = os.environ.get("EVAL_OUT", "/results")
# A backstop, not the real bound. Generation is capped server-side by
# --n-predict on the llama-server sidecar, which is what actually stops a model
# that will not terminate; this catches everything else — a wedged sidecar, a
# request that never reaches it.
#
# 300 s against the ~73 s a healthy document takes end to end, prompt included.
# It does work: llama-server logs `stop: cancel task` on the disconnect and
# starts the next request 0.4 s later.
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = int(os.environ.get("EVAL_TIMEOUT", "300"))
# Consecutive failures from the very first document that mean the engine is
# unusable rather than merely weak. Three, because one could be a single hard
# document and two could be coincidence.
ABORT_AFTER = 3
CATCHALL_TYPE = "Sonstige"
def log(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"[eval] {msg}", flush=True)
def api_token(conn) -> str:
"""A token for this run, against a user belonging to this run alone.
The API needs one and this database is a disposable clone, so the run
issues its own rather than depending on a token that happened to come
across in the restore.
The per-label user is not tidiness. Django's authtoken holds one token per
user, so an earlier version took the first superuser and deleted its
existing token first — which meant the second of two candidates running
concurrently silently revoked the first one's credentials. That surfaced as
a mid-run `HTTP 401: Invalid token` sitting among genuine model failures,
where it reads like one more broken document rather than the harness
sabotaging itself. Both jobs share this database; only the user can differ.
"""
token = secrets.token_hex(20)
username = f"eval-{LABEL}"
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute("select id from auth_user where username = %s", (username,))
row = cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
cur.execute(
"""
insert into auth_user (password, is_superuser, username,
first_name, last_name, email, is_staff,
is_active, date_joined)
values ('!unusable', true, %s, '', '', '', true, true, now())
returning id
""",
(username,),
)
row = cur.fetchone()
user_id = row[0]
cur.execute("delete from authtoken_token where user_id = %s", (user_id,))
cur.execute(
"insert into authtoken_token (key, created, user_id) values (%s, now(), %s)",
(token, user_id),
)
conn.commit()
return token
def sample(conn) -> list[dict]:
"""The documents to score, ordered by md5 of the id.
Deterministic, so every engine and every configuration sees the same
documents and results stay comparable across jobs. Only documents carrying
both labels are usable as ground truth.
"""
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"""
select d.id, d.correspondent_id, d.document_type_id, c.name, t.name
from documents_document d
join documents_correspondent c on c.id = d.correspondent_id
join documents_documenttype t on t.id = d.document_type_id
where d.correspondent_id is not null
and d.document_type_id is not null
and length(d.content) > 400
order by md5(d.id::text)
limit %s
""",
(SAMPLE,),
)
return [
{
"id": r[0],
"correspondent_id": r[1],
"document_type_id": r[2],
"correspondent_name": r[3],
"document_type_name": r[4],
}
for r in cur.fetchall()
]
def floor(conn) -> float:
"""Always guessing the most frequent correspondent.
Without it a number like "70% correct" cannot be read: one correspondent
holds several hundred of ~3900 documents.
"""
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"""
select max(c), sum(c) from (
select count(*) c from documents_document
where correspondent_id is not null group by correspondent_id
) x
""",
)
top, total = cur.fetchone()
# float() on both: psycopg returns Postgres numerics as Decimal, and
# mixing that with a float literal raises TypeError rather than coercing.
return 100.0 * float(top) / float(total) if total else 0.0
def fetch(path: str, token: str) -> tuple[dict | None, str | None, float]:
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{PAPERLESS_URL}{path}",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {token}"},
)
start = time.monotonic()
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
body = resp.read()
return json.loads(body), None, time.monotonic() - start
except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
return None, f"HTTP {err.code}: {err.read()[:200]!r}", time.monotonic() - start
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 — a failed document is data, not a crash
return None, f"{type(err).__name__}: {err}", time.monotonic() - start
def normalise(text: str) -> set[str]:
return {w for w in re.split(r"[^\w]+", text.lower()) if w}
def recognised(payload: dict, field: str, want_name: str) -> bool:
"""True when a suggested name contains every word of the true label's name.
Handles the observed failure directly: the model answers with a superset of
the stored name, which difflib rejects at 0.8 but a reader would accept.
"""
want = normalise(want_name)
return any(want <= normalise(name) for name in payload.get(field) or [])
def degenerate(payload: dict) -> str | None:
"""Whether this looks like broken inference rather than a wrong guess.
Past roughly 14k prompt tokens this stack stops producing language — first
empty completions, then runs of digits and CJK characters — and one such
request poisons the llama.cpp slot until the pod restarts. Nothing in the
HTTP response says so: status 200, finish_reason "stop", well-formed JSON.
Scored as a wrong answer it would silently depress a candidate's numbers,
and because the slot stays poisoned it would take the rest of the run with
it. Flagged instead, so the failure is visible as itself.
"""
title = payload.get("title") or ""
if not title.strip():
return "empty title"
# Digits, punctuation and whitespace are normal in a document title —
# "Rechnung 2025-5425541" is 8 letters in 21 characters and tripped an
# earlier version of this check. What broken inference produces is
# characters from other scripts, so look for those directly rather than
# inferring them from a shortage of Latin ones.
foreign = sum(c.isalpha() and not (c.isascii() or c in "äöüÄÖÜßáéèêíóúàçñ") for c in title)
if foreign > 0.2 * len(title):
return f"non-latin title: {title[:40]!r}"
return None
def score_document(payload: dict, doc: dict) -> dict:
offered_corr = doc["correspondent_id"] in (payload.get("correspondents") or [])
offered_type = doc["document_type_id"] in (payload.get("document_types") or [])
return {
"correspondent_offered": offered_corr,
"correspondent_recognised": offered_corr
or recognised(payload, "suggested_correspondents", doc["correspondent_name"]),
"type_offered": offered_type,
"type_recognised": offered_type
or recognised(payload, "suggested_document_types", doc["document_type_name"]),
"suggested_correspondents": payload.get("suggested_correspondents") or [],
"suggested_document_types": payload.get("suggested_document_types") or [],
"title": payload.get("title"),
}
LLM_ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1")
def canary() -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Ask the model something it cannot get wrong, and check it did not.
The instrument has to be shown working before its readings mean anything,
and this one can fail silently in a way that looks like a bad model. On
this Vulkan stack a prompt past some model-specific length stops llama.cpp
producing language: it repeats one token — " de de de", " phosphorus
phosphorus", whitespace — at HTTP 200 with finish_reason "stop". The slot
stays broken for every request after it until the pod restarts.
So a run that measured 50 documents against a poisoned slot reports 50
failures that are really one event, and reads as a model that cannot
classify. That is exactly what happened before this existed.
Run before the documents and again after: healthy then broken means the
failures in between are one fault, not evidence about the model.
"""
body = json.dumps({
"model": os.environ.get("PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL", "probe"),
"max_tokens": 40,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich."}],
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{LLM_ENDPOINT}/chat/completions",
data=body,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=120) as resp:
payload = json.loads(resp.read())
text = payload["choices"][0]["message"].get("content") or ""
text += payload["choices"][0]["message"].get("reasoning_content") or ""
return ("Paris" in text), text[:80]
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001
return False, f"{type(err).__name__}: {err}"
def run(engine: str, suffix: str, docs: list[dict], token: str) -> list[dict]:
log(f"=== {engine}: {len(docs)} documents")
rows = []
if engine == "ai":
ok, text = canary()
log(f" canary before: {'OK' if ok else 'BROKEN'} — {text!r}")
if not ok:
log(" The model is not answering a trivial question correctly, so")
log(" nothing measured after this describes its classification.")
return [{"engine": engine, "canary_before": False, "canary_text": text}]
for n, doc in enumerate(docs, 1):
payload, error, elapsed = fetch(
f"/api/documents/{doc['id']}/{suffix}",
token,
)
row = {
"engine": engine,
"document_id": doc["id"],
"seconds": round(elapsed, 1),
"truth_correspondent": doc["correspondent_name"],
"truth_type": doc["document_type_name"],
"catchall_type": doc["document_type_name"] == CATCHALL_TYPE,
}
if payload is None:
# An authentication failure is never a fact about the model, and
# counted alongside real ones it reads like one more broken
# document. Stop loudly instead: something revoked this run's
# credentials mid-flight, and every number after it is worthless.
if error and error.startswith("HTTP 401"):
raise SystemExit(
f"[eval] FATAL: {error}\n"
f"[eval] This run's token stopped working part-way through. "
f"Django's authtoken holds one token per user, so another "
f"job sharing this database and this user revoked it.",
)
row["error"] = error
log(f" {doc['id']}: {error}")
else:
row.update(score_document(payload, doc))
# Only the AI path returns a title; the classifier answers with ids
# alone, so an "empty title" there is normal rather than broken.
if engine == "ai" and (broken := degenerate(payload)) is not None:
row["degenerate"] = broken
log(f" {doc['id']}: DEGENERATE — {broken}")
rows.append(row)
# Clear the slot between documents so the next one is measured on a
# clean server. The corruption this guards against is stateful: one bad
# request leaves the slot returning a single repeated token for
# everything after it, and without this a run counts that once per
# remaining document.
if engine == "ai":
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(
urllib.request.Request(
f"{LLM_ENDPOINT.rsplit('/v1', 1)[0]}/slots/0?action=erase",
data=b"",
method="POST",
),
timeout=30,
)
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 — best effort, never fatal
if n == 1:
log(f" slot erase unavailable ({type(err).__name__}) — "
f"failures after a corrupt document will not be independent")
if n % 10 == 0:
log(f" {n}/{len(docs)}")
# Re-check the instrument, not just the progress. A slot corrupted
# part-way through turns every remaining document into a failure
# that says nothing about the model, and scattered failures — 29 of
# 50 in one earlier run — are exactly the shape that a
# start-of-run check alone would miss.
if engine == "ai":
ok, text = canary()
if not ok:
log(f" CANARY BROKEN at {n}/{len(docs)} — {text!r}")
log(" The model can no longer answer a trivial question, so")
log(" everything from here would measure a dead slot. Stopping.")
log(" Failures recorded before this point are still usable;")
log(" the ones adjacent to it are one fault, not several.")
rows.append({"engine": engine, "canary_failed_at": n, "canary_text": text})
break
# Stop early when a model cannot do the task at all, rather than
# spending an hour writing the same error fifty times. Three candidates
# in a row failed this way — Granite because llama.cpp cannot read its
# tool calls back, both Ministral sizes because they fill the tool
# call's first string with their own [THINK]/[TOOL_CALLS] control
# tokens until the token cap. In each case document one already said
# so, and the remaining forty-nine said nothing new.
#
# Deliberately not a ratio: a model that fails a third of the time is a
# result worth measuring in full. This only catches the case where
# nothing has ever worked.
if len(rows) == ABORT_AFTER and all("error" in r for r in rows):
ok, text = canary()
log(f" canary after {ABORT_AFTER} failures: {'OK' if ok else 'BROKEN'} — {text!r}")
if not ok:
log(" The slot is corrupted, so these are ONE fault and not")
log(f" {ABORT_AFTER} independent results. Probe the model's prompt-length")
log(" boundary with probe-length.sh before judging it.")
log(f" ABORT — first {ABORT_AFTER} documents all failed:")
log(f" {rows[0]['error']}")
log(" Nothing has succeeded, so the rest would measure nothing.")
log(" Check the model's tool calling before re-running:")
log(" curl -s $ENDPOINT/v1/chat/completions -d @probe.json")
log(" A usable candidate answers with finish_reason 'tool_calls'.")
break
# And once at the end, whatever happened. A short run whose first
# document succeeds trips neither the abort check nor the every-tenth
# one, so without this a five-document screen can finish having never
# re-verified the instrument it just used.
if engine == "ai":
ok, text = canary()
log(f" canary after: {'OK' if ok else 'BROKEN'} — {text!r}")
if not ok:
log(" Healthy before, broken after: the failures in this run are")
log(" one fault and not independent results.")
rows.append({"engine": engine, "canary_after": False, "canary_text": text})
return rows
def pct(hits: int, total: int) -> float:
return round(100.0 * hits / total, 1) if total else 0.0
def summarise(rows: list[dict], engine: str) -> dict:
mine = [r for r in rows if r["engine"] == engine]
# Degenerate rows are excluded from the accuracy figures: they measure the
# backend giving up, not the model choosing wrongly, and leaving them in
# would quietly punish whichever candidate happened to trip the slot.
scored = [r for r in mine if "error" not in r and "degenerate" not in r]
failed = [r for r in mine if "error" in r]
broken = [r for r in mine if "degenerate" in r]
specific = [r for r in scored if not r["catchall_type"]]
catchall = [r for r in scored if r["catchall_type"]]
return {
"engine": engine,
"scored": len(scored),
"failed": len(failed),
# Non-zero means the run is suspect from that point on, not that the
# model is bad — the slot stays poisoned until the pod restarts.
"degenerate": len(broken),
"seconds_total": round(sum(r["seconds"] for r in mine)),
"correspondent_offered": pct(
sum(r["correspondent_offered"] for r in scored), len(scored)
),
"correspondent_recognised": pct(
sum(r["correspondent_recognised"] for r in scored), len(scored)
),
"type_offered": pct(sum(r["type_offered"] for r in scored), len(scored)),
"type_specific": pct(
sum(r["type_offered"] for r in specific), len(specific)
),
"type_catchall": pct(
sum(r["type_offered"] for r in catchall), len(catchall)
),
}
def complement(rows: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
"""What the LLM adds where the classifier is wrong, and what it costs.
The reason this script writes per-document rows at all. Only computed when
both engines ran, and only over documents both actually scored.
"""
by_engine = {"classic": {}, "ai": {}}
for row in rows:
usable = "error" not in row and "degenerate" not in row
if usable and row["engine"] in by_engine:
by_engine[row["engine"]][row["document_id"]] = row
both = set(by_engine["classic"]) & set(by_engine["ai"])
if not both or not by_engine["ai"]:
return None
rescued = missed = broken = agreed = 0
for doc_id in both:
classic_hit = by_engine["classic"][doc_id]["correspondent_offered"]
ai_hit = by_engine["ai"][doc_id]["correspondent_offered"]
if classic_hit and ai_hit:
agreed += 1
elif not classic_hit and ai_hit:
rescued += 1
elif classic_hit and not ai_hit:
broken += 1
else:
missed += 1
return {
"documents": len(both),
"both_right": agreed,
"llm_rescued": rescued,
"llm_only_wrong": broken,
"both_wrong": missed,
}
def main() -> int:
os.makedirs(OUT_DIR, exist_ok=True)
with psycopg.connect() as conn:
token = api_token(conn)
docs = sample(conn)
guess_floor = floor(conn)
log(f"label={LABEL} documents={len(docs)} floor={guess_floor:.1f}%")
rows: list[dict] = []
for engine, suffix in (("classic", "suggestions/"), ("ai", "ai_suggestions/")):
if engine in ENGINES:
rows.extend(run(engine, suffix, docs, token))
result = {
"label": LABEL,
"sample": len(docs),
"floor": round(guess_floor, 1),
"summaries": [summarise(rows, e) for e in ENGINES if e in ("classic", "ai")],
"complement": complement(rows),
}
with open(f"{OUT_DIR}/{LABEL}.jsonl", "w") as handle:
for row in rows:
handle.write(json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
with open(f"{OUT_DIR}/{LABEL}.summary.json", "w") as handle:
json.dump(result, handle, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
# Also to stdout, so the numbers are in the pod log and reachable via Loki
# without mounting the volume.
log(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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@@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
---
# One configuration under test, complete in one pod.
#
# A paperless instance can only point at one chat endpoint, so measuring two
# candidates at once means two paperless instances — which makes the pod, not
# the namespace, the right unit. Everything a measurement needs is here except
# the database and the embedding endpoint, both of which are read-only and
# shared.
#
# The three services are native sidecars (initContainers with
# restartPolicy: Always), not regular containers. That matters twice: they
# start in order and each must pass its probes before the next begins, which
# is what keeps paperless from racing the database; and when the eval
# container exits they are torn down, so the Job actually completes instead of
# running forever behind a llama-server that never returns.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: eval-__LABEL__
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-eval
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
spec:
# A failed run is re-read, not retried blind: a retry would spend another
# hour reproducing whatever went wrong.
backoffLimit: 0
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-eval
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
enableServiceLinks: false
# One measurement per node. Two jobs sharing a node would share its iGPU,
# and every timing in the result would then describe contention rather
# than the model — which is exactly how a decode rate of 4.7 tokens/s got
# attributed to context length once already.
affinity:
podAntiAffinity:
requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
- labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# A private copy of /data — the search index and, the expensive part,
# the LLM index the RAG path needs.
#
# It cannot be mounted live and shared: LLM_INDEX_DIR is hardcoded to
# DATA_DIR / "llm_index", the store behind it is SQLite, and SQLite
# locking across pods over CephFS is not dependable. Nor can it be left
# out — an empty llm_index makes retrieve_similar_nodes return nothing,
# and the job would quietly measure the no-RAG path while reporting a
# RAG result.
#
# ~160 MiB, so seconds. A regular initContainer: it must finish before
# the sidecars start.
- name: seed-data
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -e
# -r, not -a: preserving ownership needs CHOWN, which this
# container does not have, and cp then exits non-zero after
# copying the files anyway. Running as 1000 makes the copy land
# with the ownership paperless needs — it writes to the LLM index
# while serving.
cp -r /golden/. /data/
du -sh /data/index /data/llm_index
# Refuse to start rather than measure the wrong thing. An empty
# llm_index makes retrieve_similar_nodes return nothing, and the
# run would report a RAG result having never retrieved anything —
# which is exactly what the first attempt at this job did, because
# the golden volume had not been populated yet. The index is
# ~125 MiB once built; anything under 1 MiB is not one.
bytes=$(du -sb /data/llm_index | cut -f1)
if [ "$bytes" -lt 1000000 ]; then
echo "FATAL: llm_index is ${bytes} bytes — build it on the" >&2
echo "smoke-test deployment first:" >&2
echo " kubectl -n paperless-eval exec deploy/paperless -- \\" >&2
echo " python manage.py document_llmindex rebuild" >&2
exit 1
fi
volumeMounts:
- name: golden
mountPath: /golden
readOnly: true
- name: data
mountPath: /data
securityContext:
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: llama-server
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
restartPolicy: Always
args:
- --hf-repo
- __HF_REPO__
# The exact filename rather than the :QUANT shorthand. The
# shorthand matches by substring across the whole repo and repos do
# carry several files under one tag — ggml-org ships mmproj-, mtp-
# and dflash- variants at Q8_0 beside the model — so naming the file
# removes a real ambiguity and costs nothing.
#
# It is NOT what caused the three-hour crashloop that prompted this,
# and an earlier version of this comment claimed it was. The real
# cause was the llama-models volume being 100% full: llama-server
# could not write its metadata cache, so it could not resolve the
# repo listing, and reported
# no GGUF files found in repository <repo>
# followed by a truncated list of what it had cached before the
# disk filled. That reads as a bad reference and is a full disk.
#
# If a model will not load, check `df -h /models` before believing
# anything llama-server says about the repository.
- --hf-file
- __HF_FILE__
- --alias
- __ALIAS__
- --n-gpu-layers
- "99"
- --threads
- "4"
# The production ceiling. Not because the flag value itself breaks
# anything — bisection showed the corruption boundary is prompt
# length, around 14000 tokens, whatever --ctx-size says — but
# because measuring against a different ceiling than production
# runs would not describe production.
- --ctx-size
- "16384"
- --parallel
- "1"
- --ubatch-size
- "1024"
# The default is -1, infinity: nothing on the server caps how long
# a request generates, and paperless sets no budget of its own and
# waits. A classification that needs ~300 tokens ran to 10269 at a
# healthy 11 tok/s, and three of the first eleven documents did it
# — 900 s each, most of an hour spent on four documents.
#
# 768 is generous against the ~300 a correct answer takes. Note
# that paperless reports a truncated response as a flat
# "Invalid AI configuration" and discards the content, so what the
# model was actually doing is visible only in this container's log.
- --n-predict
- "__N_PREDICT__"
# Without this, Qwen3.6 spends the response on reasoning_content
# and returns empty content — 983 tokens into a classification that
# needs a hundred, at a perfectly healthy 11 tok/s. It reads as a
# slow or broken model and is neither.
#
# NOT --chat-template-kwargs '{"enable_thinking": false}'. That is
# deprecated, llama-server says so at startup, and it is not the
# harmless no-op it looks like on a template that never reads the
# variable: injecting it into Mistral's render context produced
# token salad — "1UnComplete1Self1UnCompleteSDirect11S..." — on a
# 681-token prompt, while the identical request against a server
# without the flag returned a clean tool call. It reads exactly
# like a broken model and is a broken prompt.
- --reasoning
- "off"
# Enables POST /slots/0?action=erase, which the eval calls between
# documents. Without it the endpoint answers 501.
#
# This is what makes the measurements independent. A request that
# corrupts the slot otherwise takes every document after it, so a
# run reports N failures for one fault — "4 of 5 failed" was really
# "document 2 broke the slot". Erasing costs the prefix cache and
# some prefill speed, which is the right trade for numbers that
# mean what they say.
- --slot-save-path
- /tmp/slots
- --no-webui
env:
- name: LLAMA_CACHE
value: /models
ports:
- name: llm
containerPort: 8080
volumeMounts:
- name: models
mountPath: /models
# 60 minutes. Sized for a FIRST DOWNLOAD from HuggingFace, not for
# reading a warm PVC — an earlier version allowed 20 minutes on the
# latter reasoning and killed GLM-4.7-Flash mid-download at 17.8 GB.
# The container then restarts and begins again, so too small a budget
# is not "slow start", it is a loop that never finishes.
#
# The kill shows up as exitCode 137 with reason "Error" rather than
# OOMKilled, which is how to tell a probe kill from a memory limit.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: llm
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 180
resources:
requests:
cpu: "1"
memory: __MEM_REQ__
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
limits:
memory: __MEM_LIM__
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: redis
# Its own, not the namespace's: two paperless instances sharing a
# celery broker would take each other's tasks.
image: redis:8.10.1-alpine
restartPolicy: Always
args: ["redis-server", "--save", "", "--loglevel", "warning"]
startupProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: 6379
periodSeconds: 2
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
requests:
cpu: 20m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: paperless
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
restartPolicy: Always
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: paperless-eval-config
env:
# Overrides the namespace ConfigMap: this pod's own llama-server,
# and its own redis rather than the shared Service.
- name: PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT
value: http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1
- name: PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL
value: __ALIAS__
- name: PAPERLESS_REDIS
value: redis://127.0.0.1:6379
- name: PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
key: secret-key
- name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PAPERLESS_DBPASS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8000
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/data
- name: media
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/media
- name: consume
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/consume
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 180
# Same as production, and required: the entrypoint starts as root,
# chowns the volumes and drops to uid 1000 via setgid/setuid.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
containers:
- name: eval
# The paperless image again, for psycopg and a python that matches
# the application — not because the script needs paperless itself.
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
command: ["python3", "/eval/eval.py"]
env:
- name: EVAL_LABEL
value: __LABEL__
- name: EVAL_SAMPLE
value: "__SAMPLE__"
# Raised alongside --n-predict for a diagnostic run. The two bounds
# interact: lifting the token cap alone just moves the failure from
# "hit the cap" to "hit the clock", which is what happened the first
# time gemma-4 was retried at 4096.
- name: EVAL_TIMEOUT
value: "__TIMEOUT__"
- name: PGHOST
value: pprleval-pg-rw
- name: PGDATABASE
value: paperless
- name: PGUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PGPASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
volumeMounts:
- name: script
mountPath: /eval
- name: results
mountPath: /results
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llama-models
- name: results
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-results
- name: script
configMap:
name: paperless-eval-script
# The namespace's /data, mounted read-only and copied out by seed-data
# above. Never mounted as the live /data of a job.
- name: golden
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-golden
readOnly: true
# paperless insists on all three paths existing. media and consume stay
# empty — nothing is consumed during a measurement — while data is
# seeded with the copy.
- name: data
emptyDir: {}
- name: media
emptyDir: {}
- name: consume
emptyDir: {}
-149
View File
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Where does this model's output stop being language?
#
# ./probe-length.sh <label>
#
# THE TEST THAT SHOULD HAVE COME FIRST. On this Vulkan/Iris Xe stack every
# model has a prompt length past which llama.cpp stops producing language and
# starts repeating a single token — " de de de", " the the the", " phosphorus
# phosphorus", or plain whitespace. It is silent: HTTP 200, finish_reason
# "stop" or "length", nothing in the log.
#
# It is also STATEFUL. One request past the boundary leaves the slot broken for
# every request after it, until the pod restarts. So in a 50-document run the
# first bad document takes the rest with it, and "failed 3 of 3" is one
# measurement, not three.
#
# A real paperless request is ~5300 tokens once the document, its RAG
# neighbours and the taxonomy lists are in. So the only question that matters
# about a candidate is whether its boundary is above that — and answering it
# takes minutes, against ninety for a classification run that would have
# measured the same thing badly.
#
# Measured so far:
# Qwen3.6-35B-A3B coherent at 13588, broken at 15086
# gemma-4-26B-A4B coherent at ~350, whitespace at 2334
set -eu
label="${1:?usage: probe-length.sh <label> (labels are in candidates.tsv)}"
here="$(dirname "$0")"
ns=paperless-eval
pod="lenprobe-$(echo "$label" | tr 'A-Z._' 'a-z--' | cut -c1-40)"
row="$(grep -v '^#' "$here/candidates.tsv" | awk -v l="$label" '$1==l')"
[ -n "$row" ] || { echo "unknown candidate '$label'" >&2; exit 1; }
repo="$(echo "$row" | cut -f2)"
hffile="$(echo "$row" | cut -f3)"
memreq="$(echo "$row" | cut -f5)"
memlim="$(echo "$row" | cut -f6)"
cleanup() { kubectl -n "$ns" delete pod "$pod" --wait=false >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
cleanup; sleep 2
kubectl -n "$ns" apply -f - >/dev/null <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: $pod, namespace: $ns}
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: llama-server
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args: ["--hf-repo","$repo","--hf-file","$hffile","--alias","probe",
"--n-gpu-layers","99","--threads","4","--ctx-size","16384",
"--parallel","1","--ubatch-size","1024","--n-predict","200","--no-webui"]
env: [{name: LLAMA_CACHE, value: /models}]
volumeMounts: [{name: models, mountPath: /models}]
resources:
requests: {cpu: "1", memory: $memreq, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
limits: {memory: $memlim, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
securityContext: {allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}}
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim: {claimName: llama-models}
EOF
# Say which of the two it is doing. There are only two iGPUs, so a probe
# started while both are busy sits Pending indefinitely — and an earlier run
# spent an hour reporting nothing before giving up with "never became healthy",
# which reads as a broken model rather than a queue.
echo "waiting for $label"
i=0
until kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$pod" -- curl -sf --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:8080/health >/dev/null 2>&1; do
i=$((i+1))
if [ $(( i % 8 )) -eq 0 ]; then
ph=$(kubectl -n "$ns" get pod "$pod" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>&1)
why=$(kubectl -n "$ns" get pod "$pod" -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="PodScheduled")].message}' 2>&1)
echo " ${ph}${why:+ — $why}"
[ "$ph" = "Pending" ] && [ -n "$why" ] && { echo "FAIL: cannot schedule — free a GPU first"; exit 1; }
fi
[ "$i" -gt 240 ] && { echo "FAIL: never became healthy after 60 min"; exit 1; }
sleep 15
done
# Fresh pod per size. The defect poisons the slot, so probing sizes in sequence
# against one server would measure the first bad request and nothing after it.
for reps in 4 20 40 70 110 160; do
kubectl -n "$ns" delete pod "$pod" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
sleep 2
kubectl -n "$ns" apply -f - >/dev/null <<EOF2
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: $pod, namespace: $ns}
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: llama-server
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args: ["--hf-repo","$repo","--hf-file","$hffile","--alias","probe",
"--n-gpu-layers","99","--threads","4","--ctx-size","16384",
"--parallel","1","--ubatch-size","1024","--n-predict","200","--no-webui"]
env: [{name: LLAMA_CACHE, value: /models}]
volumeMounts: [{name: models, mountPath: /models}]
resources:
requests: {cpu: "1", memory: $memreq, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
limits: {memory: $memlim, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
securityContext: {allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}}
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim: {claimName: llama-models}
EOF2
until kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$pod" -- curl -sf --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:8080/health >/dev/null 2>&1; do sleep 10; done
filler=""; n=0
while [ $n -lt $reps ]; do
filler="${filler}Die Rechnung wurde am fuenften Maerz ausgestellt und umfasst mehrere Positionen aus dem laufenden Wartungsvertrag. "
n=$((n+1))
done
printf '{"model":"probe","max_tokens":200,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"%s Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich."}]}' "$filler" > /tmp/lp.json
kubectl -n "$ns" cp /tmp/lp.json "$pod":/tmp/lp.json >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
r=$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$pod" -- curl -s --max-time 400 -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @/tmp/lp.json)
pt=$(printf '%s' "$r" | grep -oE '"prompt_tokens":[0-9]+' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2)
# Test for DEGENERATION, not for the right answer. Two earlier versions of
# this check asked whether "Paris" came back and failed a working model
# twice: once because a thinking model leaves `content` empty and puts its
# answer in `reasoning_content`, then because 64 tokens is not enough for one
# to think its way to the answer at all.
#
# What actually marks the defect is a single token repeated — " de de de",
# " phosphorus phosphorus", whitespace. That signature survives truncation
# and does not care which field the model writes to or whether it finished,
# so it tests the thing itself instead of a proxy for it.
txt=$(printf '%s' "$r" | grep -oE '"(reasoning_)?content":"[^"]*' | sed 's/"[a-z_]*content":"//' | tr '\n' ' ')
rep=$(printf '%s' "$txt" | tr -s ' ' '\n' | grep -c . || echo 0)
top=$(printf '%s' "$txt" | tr -s ' ' '\n' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -1 | awk '{print $1}')
: "${top:=0}"
if [ "$rep" -gt 8 ] && [ $(( top * 2 )) -gt "$rep" ]; then
verdict="BROKEN" # one token is more than half the output
elif [ "$rep" -le 1 ]; then
verdict="EMPTY" # nothing came back at all — also not healthy
else
verdict="OK"
fi
printf '%-6s prompt=%-6s %s %s\n' "$verdict" "${pt:-?}" "$(printf '%.50s' "$txt")" ""
[ "$verdict" != "OK" ] && { echo; echo "boundary is below ${pt:-?} prompt tokens"; echo "paperless needs ~5300 — $([ "${pt:-0}" -lt 6000 ] && echo 'DISQUALIFIED' || echo 'still above the bar')"; exit 0; }
done
echo
echo "coherent through the largest size probed — boundary is above that"
-95
View File
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Can this model make one valid tool call against paperless's real schema?
#
# ./probe-toolcall.sh ggml-org/Ministral-3-8B-Instruct-2512-GGUF:Q8_0
#
# Two minutes, against ninety for a full run. Every candidate must pass this
# before it is worth measuring, because three in a row failed here and the
# remaining forty-nine documents of each run said nothing the first one had not.
#
# WHAT THIS CAN AND CANNOT TELL YOU
#
# A FAIL is conclusive: the model cannot make the call, do not spend a run.
# A PASS is not. This payload has been too easy twice — first with three fields
# instead of fourteen, then with a 1191-token prompt instead of production's
# ~5300 — and each time a pass sent a ninety-minute run after a model that
# failed on document one.
#
# It carries the real DocumentClassifierSchema and ~5000 tokens now, but it
# still cannot reproduce what actually inflates a paperless prompt: the RAG
# neighbours and the full taxonomy candidate lists, hundreds of names with IDs
# the model must copy exactly and align by position. Document 1970 is 1976
# characters and still produced a 5333-token prompt.
#
# So treat this as a cheap smoke test, not a gate. The real gate is
# ABORT_AFTER in eval.py, which stops a run after three failed documents —
# five minutes lost instead of ninety, using the genuine request.
set -eu
repo="${1:?usage: probe-toolcall.sh <hf-repo:quant> [extra llama-server args...]}"
shift || true
here="$(dirname "$0")"
ns=paperless-eval
pod="toolprobe-$(echo "$repo" | tr 'A-Z/:._' 'a-z----' | cut -c1-40 | sed 's/-*$//')"
cleanup() { kubectl -n "$ns" delete pod "$pod" --wait=false >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
cleanup
sleep 2
echo "probing $repo"
kubectl -n "$ns" apply -f - >/dev/null <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: $pod
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: llama-server
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args: ["--hf-repo","$repo","--alias","probe","--n-gpu-layers","99",
"--threads","4","--ctx-size","16384","--parallel","1",
"--ubatch-size","1024","--n-predict","768","--reasoning","off",
"--no-webui"$(for a in "$@"; do printf ',"%s"' "$a"; done)]
env: [{name: LLAMA_CACHE, value: /models}]
volumeMounts: [{name: models, mountPath: /models}]
resources:
requests: {cpu: "1", memory: 12Gi, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
limits: {memory: 20Gi, gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"}
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim: {claimName: llama-models}
EOF
echo "waiting for the model to load (a first download takes minutes)"
i=0
until kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$pod" -- curl -sf --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:8080/health >/dev/null 2>&1; do
i=$((i + 1))
[ "$i" -gt 120 ] && { echo "FAIL: server never became healthy"; kubectl -n "$ns" logs "$pod" --tail=20; exit 1; }
sleep 10
done
sed "s/\"MODEL\"/\"probe\"/" "$here/toolcall-probe.json" > /tmp/tcp.json
kubectl -n "$ns" cp /tmp/tcp.json "$pod":/tmp/probe.json >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
r=$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$pod" -- curl -s --max-time 300 \
-X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @/tmp/probe.json)
finish=$(printf '%s' "$r" | grep -oE '"finish_reason":"[a-z_]+"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
echo
echo "finish_reason: ${finish:-<none>}"
printf '%s' "$r" | grep -oE '"arguments":"[^"]{0,300}' | head -1 || true
echo
# finish_reason "tool_calls" is the whole test. "length" means it never stopped,
# "stop" with no tool_calls means the server could not read the call back.
if [ "$finish" = "tool_calls" ]; then
echo "PASS — usable, worth a full run"
else
echo "FAIL — do not spend a run on this until the cause is understood"
exit 1
fi
-90
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@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Start one candidate's measurement.
#
# ./run-candidate.sh ministral8b
#
# Exists so the sidecar configuration lives in one file. Four copies of a
# 300-line Job manifest is how --chat-template-kwargs ended up on the isolation
# pod but not on the first eval job, and the run that followed measured empty
# completions for two hours before anyone noticed.
set -eu
label="${1:?usage: run-candidate.sh <label> [sample] (labels are in candidates.tsv)}"
# Screen before you measure. A candidate that cannot do the task at all is
# rejected by eval.py's ABORT_AFTER within three documents, so a screening run
# costs about five minutes; a full run costs ninety. Three of the first four
# candidates were rejections, and each one was allowed to run for an hour or
# more before anyone looked.
#
# ./run-candidate.sh <label> 5 screen
# ./run-candidate.sh <label> measure, 50 documents
#
# Screening uses genuine paperless requests, which matters: the standalone
# probe-toolcall.sh passed two candidates that then failed on document one,
# because a synthesised request cannot reproduce the RAG neighbours and the
# taxonomy candidate lists that make a real prompt what it is.
#
# Never compare numbers across sample sizes. A screen is a gate, not a
# measurement; the comparison happens at 50.
sample="${2:-50}"
# Third argument raises the server-side generation cap for a diagnostic run.
#
# The default 768 is MINE, not a property of any model, and every candidate
# recorded as failing at exactly 768 tokens is failing against my bound rather
# than demonstrably failing the task. A model that needs 900 tokens for a valid
# call looks identical to one that never terminates. Raise it and find out
# before calling a model incapable:
#
# ./run-candidate.sh gemma4-26b-a4b 5 4096
npredict="${3:-768}"
# Client-side bound, raised with the cap. At 6 tok/s a 4096-token budget needs
# 620 s of generation alone, so leaving this at 300 turns the diagnostic into a
# different failure rather than an answer.
timeout="${4:-300}"
here="$(dirname "$0")"
row="$(grep -v '^#' "$here/candidates.tsv" | awk -v l="$label" '$1==l')"
if [ -z "$row" ]; then
echo "unknown candidate '$label'. Known:" >&2
grep -v '^#' "$here/candidates.tsv" | awk 'NF{print " " $1}' >&2
exit 1
fi
repo="$(echo "$row" | cut -f2)"
hffile="$(echo "$row" | cut -f3)"
alias="$(echo "$row" | cut -f4)"
memreq="$(echo "$row" | cut -f5)"
memlim="$(echo "$row" | cut -f6)"
if [ -z "$hffile" ]; then
echo "candidate '$label' has no hf-file column — refusing to guess." >&2
echo "Resolve the exact .gguf filename from the HF API and add it." >&2
exit 1
fi
# The script is mounted from a ConfigMap, so it has to be current before the
# Job starts. Shared by every candidate — they run the same measurement.
kubectl -n paperless-eval create configmap paperless-eval-script \
--from-file=eval.py="$here/eval.py" --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
if [ "$sample" -lt 50 ]; then
echo "SCREENING $label at $sample documents — a gate, not a measurement"
fi
echo "candidate=$label repo=$repo alias=$alias mem=$memreq/$memlim sample=$sample n_predict=$npredict timeout=$timeout"
sed -e "s#__LABEL__#$label#g" \
-e "s#__HF_REPO__#$repo#g" \
-e "s#__ALIAS__#$alias#g" \
-e "s#__MEM_REQ__#$memreq#g" \
-e "s#__MEM_LIM__#$memlim#g" \
-e "s#__SAMPLE__#$sample#g" \
-e "s#__HF_FILE__#$hffile#g" \
-e "s#__N_PREDICT__#$npredict#g" \
-e "s#__TIMEOUT__#$timeout#g" \
"$here/job-template.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
echo
echo "follow: kubectl -n paperless-eval logs -f job/eval-$label -c eval"
echo "re-run: kubectl -n paperless-eval delete job eval-$label # a Job is immutable"
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