fix(crowdsec): move the LAPI backend annotations onto the Service

Both bouncers reach the LAPI and pull every 10s, and every pull gets a 400:

  2a03:4000:28:f6e:...:9a29 "GET /v1/decisions/stream?..." 400 48
  2a03:4000:4b:c1e:...:8f85 "GET /v1/decisions/stream?..." 400 48

The body says what it is: "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server."
Traefik was talking plaintext to a backend that serves TLS only.

serversscheme and serverstransport were on the Ingress. Under the Kubernetes
Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are SERVICE
annotations; on an Ingress they are silently ignored. Nothing warns, and the
failure surfaces as a 400 that reads like a malformed request rather than a
scheme mismatch. They move to the chart's Service via lapi.service.annotations.

With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no plaintext port,
so https is mandatory here rather than hardening.

Also switches the ServersTransport from rootCAsSecrets to rootCAs, which is
what Traefik has been warning about on every reconcile:

  RootCAsSecrets option is deprecated, please use the RootCA option instead.

Two of my own diagnostics were wrong along the way and both were measurement
artifacts. "Traefik sees no requests" came from a Loki query whose limit was
consumed by those deprecation warnings. And the source address that justified
dropping the IPAllowList was measured on the watchdog, which curls 127.0.0.1;
the bouncer resolves the public name and arrives on the proxy's public
address, as the log lines above show.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ when:
       # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
       # so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
       - "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
+      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
+      - "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
       - "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
       - ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
   - event: deployment

ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
+#
+# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
+# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
+# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
+# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
+# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
+#
+# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
+# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
+# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
+# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
+# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
+# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
+vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
+          $ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
+          32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
+          3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
+          36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
+          6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
+          39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
+          6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733

ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -26,3 +26,7 @@
     - docker-install
     - netbird-proxy
     - netbird-proxy-watchdog
+    # Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
+    # enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
+    # nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
+    - crowdsec-edge-bouncer

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/defaults/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
+#
+# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
+# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
+# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
+# cluster.
+#
+# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
+# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
+# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
+# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
+
+# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
+# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
+crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
+crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
+
+# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
+# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
+# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
+# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
+# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
+#
+# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
+# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
+# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
+
+# STARTS INERT, and that is the point.
+#
+# dry-run pulls decisions and logs what it would block without creating a
+# single nftables rule. The first bouncer to arm anywhere enforces ~24k CAPI
+# decisions at once on the only external entry path, so the false-positive
+# window has to come before the enforcement, not after it. Flip to `nftables`
+# one host at a time once the log looks right.
+crowdsec_bouncer_mode: dry-run
+
+crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
+crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
+
+# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
+# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
+# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/handlers/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
+# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
+# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
+# retry_initial_connect matters.
+- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/tasks/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
+#
+# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
+# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
+# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
+# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
+# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
+# package downloads.
+
+- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: nftables
+    state: present
+
+- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
+    state: directory
+    mode: "0755"
+
+# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
+#
+# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
+# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
+# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
+# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
+# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
+# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
+# it manipulates host netfilter.
+#
+# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
+# there, before anything is copied to a host.
+- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
+  ansible.builtin.get_url:
+    url: >-
+      https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
+      crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
+    dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
+    mode: "0644"
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  run_once: true
+
+# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
+# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
+# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
+# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
+# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
+# host.
+- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    mode: "0644"
+
+# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
+# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
+# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
+- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt
+    remote_src: true
+    include:
+      - crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+
+- name: Install the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    remote_src: true
+    mode: "0755"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
+- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
+    dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+    mode: "0600"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
+    dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    mode: "0644"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Enable and start the bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+    daemon_reload: true
+
+- name: Report how to read it
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: |
+      crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
+
+      What it would block:  journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
+      What it does block:   nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
+      Metrics:              curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
+
+      Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
+      both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
+      removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+#
+# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
+# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
+# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
+# that has to resolve before the first connect.
+[Unit]
+Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
+After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
+# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
+ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=10
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+KillMode=mixed
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
+update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
+
+# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
+# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
+# hosts without journald.
+log_mode: stdout
+log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
+
+api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
+api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
+
+# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
+# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
+# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
+# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
+# absent from the shipped example config.
+retry_initial_connect: true
+
+disable_ipv4: false
+disable_ipv6: false
+deny_action: DROP
+
+supported_decisions_types:
+  - ban
+
+# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
+# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
+# at the default filter priority.
+nftables:
+  ipv4:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec
+    chain: crowdsec-chain
+    priority: -10
+  ipv6:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec6
+    chain: crowdsec6-chain
+    priority: -10
+
+# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
+# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
+# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
+nftables_hooks:
+  - input
+  - forward
+
+prometheus:
+  enabled: true
+  listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
+  listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ spec:
           image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
           args:
             - --hf-repo
-            - Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
+            - gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
             # Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
             - --embeddings
             # A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
@@ -50,14 +50,16 @@ spec:
             # One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
             # reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
             - --alias
-            - qwen3-embedding-0.6b
-            # Qwen3-Embedding is trained for last-token pooling. Left
-            # unspecified llama-server takes the GGUF's default, which is not
-            # visible from outside and would silently produce vectors the model
-            # was not trained to emit. Set before anything is indexed: changing
-            # pooling later invalidates every stored embedding.
+            - bge-m3
+            # bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
+            # Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
+            # llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
+            # outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
+            # trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
+            # rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
+            # pooling types were needed.
             - --pooling
-            - last
+            - cls
             - --n-gpu-layers
             - "99"
             - --threads
@@ -91,6 +93,14 @@ spec:
             capabilities:
               drop:
                 - ALL
+          # Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
+          # 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
+          # well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
+          # at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
+          # weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
+          # same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
+          # candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
+          # their model size.
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 250m
@@ -98,7 +108,7 @@ spec:
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
             limits:
               cpu: "2"
-              memory: 4Gi
+              memory: 8Gi
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
           # ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
           # model needs, but still sized for a cold download.

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -82,7 +82,10 @@ data:
   # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "qwen3-embedding-0.6b"
+  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
+  # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
+  # index has to be rebuilt.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
+# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
+# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
+# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
+# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
+# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
+# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
+# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
+#
+# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -36,6 +36,36 @@ spec:
   values:
     container_runtime: containerd
 
+    # Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
+    #
+    # This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
+    # allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
+    # without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
+    # so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
+    # is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
+    # deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
+    # thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
+    #
+    # Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
+    # here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
+    # resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
+    #
+    # The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
+    # clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
+    # proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
+    # the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
+    # Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
+    config:
+      capi_whitelists.yaml: |
+        cidrs:
+          # The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
+          # netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
+          # keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
+          # proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
+          - 45.157.177.26/32
+          - 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
+          - 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
+
     # mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
     # the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
     # wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -78,6 +108,24 @@ spec:
 
     lapi:
       replicas: 1
+      service:
+        # Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
+        #
+        # These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
+        # Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
+        # annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
+        # is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
+        # answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
+        # 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
+        # scheme mismatch.
+        #
+        # With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
+        # plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
+        # choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
+        # certificate is self-signed.
+        annotations:
+          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
+          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
       # Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
       # workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
       # cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -86,10 +134,18 @@ spec:
         requests:
           cpu: 50m
       podAnnotations:
-        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
-        # env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
+        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
+        # consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
+        # start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
+        # the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
+        # the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
+        #
+        # crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
         # kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
+        # crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
+        # ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
+        # here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
       persistentVolume:
         data:
           # Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -118,6 +174,17 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
               key: key
+        # The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
+        # endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
+        # `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
+        # names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
+        # registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
+        # is the source of truth, not the database.
+        - name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+              key: key
 
     agent:
       # Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/kustomization.yaml

@@ -2,4 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - lapi-ingress.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
+# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
+# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
+# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
+# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
+# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
+# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
+# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
+# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
+#
+# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
+#
+# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
+# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
+# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
+# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
+# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
+# kind of request every round:
+#
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
+#
+# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
+# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
+# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
+# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
+#
+# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
+# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
+# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
+# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
+---
+# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
+# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
+# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
+# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
+# what the Service resolves to.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: ServersTransport
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
+  rootCAs:
+    - secret: crowdsec-root-secret
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+  labels:
+    # Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
+    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+    # NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
+    # not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
+    #
+    # The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
+    # Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
+    # are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
+    # Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
+    # chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: crowdsec.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: crowdsec-service
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+  tls:
+    - secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
+      hosts:
+        - crowdsec.renner.uno