feat(paperclip): agent-hermes reads Prometheus via the proxy Role (REN-1345)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge pull request 'chore(edge): retire sml2mqtt for good (REN-802)' (#1203 ) from atlas/ren-802-retire-sml2mqtt into master
2026-10-08 19:17:08 +00:00 · 2026-10-08 19:11:34 +00:00 · 2026-10-08 19:04:10 +00:00 · 2026-10-08 10:35:04 +00:00 · 2026-10-08 10:29:07 +00:00 · 2026-10-08 10:08:38 +00:00
208 changed files with 7987 additions and 1079 deletions
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ steps:
        bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh

  - name: alert-triage-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Paperclip agent runtime images (REN-284 / REN-286): the stock
+# agent-runtime-claude plus a tool set, one image per sandbox environment.
+# Built with kaniko like build-ci-images.yml and pushed with the same
+# ci_images_token (package read+write only, see the header there).
+#
+# Own workflow, not a step in build-ci-images.yml. A change to that file
+# rebuilds all of its images at once and fills the 24-CPU woodpecker-ci-quota;
+# on the REN-286 merge (pipeline 11306) this step then got no pod
+# ("exceeded quota") and the go image was never built. Here it runs only when
+# its own sources change, and it can be re-run alone with a deployment to
+# target `build-agent-runtime`, without rebuilding the other images.
+#
+# The name looks odd on purpose. The kubernetes sandbox plugin keeps the image
+# name and tag `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only the registry prefix
+# (`imageRegistry`), replacing host + org. So each variant needs its own
+# prefix with the same name under it:
+#   imageRegistry gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go
+#   -> gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1
+# `v1` is what the plugin pulls and moves on every build; the date tag is the
+# rollback point. konairius/ because the ci_images_token can push there and
+# it is the target of the gitea_admin/* migration (#330).
+when:
+  - event: push
+    branch: master
+    path:
+      - "ci/images/agent-runtime-*/**"
+      - ".woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml"
+  - event: deployment
+    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-agent-runtime"'
+
+steps:
+  - name: build-agent-runtime
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
+    directory: ci/images
+    # Context is ci/images (not the variant dir) so both Containerfiles can
+    # COPY the shared agent-runtime-common/ files.
+    # One pod, both images one after the other (kaniko --cleanup between
+    # builds), at 1 CPU so it still fits if it overlaps another pipeline.
+    backend_options:
+      kubernetes:
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            cpu: 100m
+            memory: 256Mi
+          limits:
+            cpu: "1"
+            memory: 4Gi
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
+      - |
+        for VARIANT in go ops; do
+          /kaniko/executor \
+            --cleanup \
+            --context . \
+            --dockerfile "agent-runtime-$VARIANT/Containerfile" \
+            --destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:$TAG" \
+            --destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:v1" \
+            || exit 1
+        done
@@ -26,8 +26,14 @@
 # 38-reference change tracked separately in #330 rather than bundled here.
 # Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that motivated the
 # other cutovers does not apply to it.
+#
+# Push builds run on master only. Without the branch filter a feature branch
+# that touches this file started all steps at once: it pushed unreviewed
+# images and used the whole woodpecker-ci-quota, so the PR checks could not
+# get a pod (REN-286).
 when:
  - event: push
+    branch: master
    path:
      - "ci/images/**"
      - "secret-rotator/**"
@@ -37,7 +43,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: build-ansible
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/ansible
    depends_on: []
    # Only rebuild when THIS image's source (or the pipeline file) changed, or
@@ -65,7 +71,7 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest

  - name: build-k8s
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/k8s
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -89,7 +95,7 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest

  - name: build-vmtest
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/vmtest
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -113,7 +119,7 @@ steps:
          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:latest

  - name: build-tofu
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/tofu
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -144,7 +150,7 @@ steps:
  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: a static musl binary in a FROM-scratch image,
  # used as the base for secret-rotation CronJobs. Replaces per-job inline Python.
  - name: build-secret-rotator
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: secret-rotator
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -195,7 +201,7 @@ steps:
  #
  # The gitea_admin/ copy stays until nothing references it any more.
  - name: build-alpine-jq
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ steps:
  # note on build-alpine-jq. Anything an app needs while the cluster is still
  # being built cannot live only in that cluster's own registry.
  - name: build-cni-plugins
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -290,7 +296,7 @@ steps:
  # gitea.renner.uno is not there to serve it. A cold-rebuild rehearsal left
  # paperless in Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
  - name: build-alpine-openssl
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -327,7 +333,7 @@ steps:
  # Ansible converge. Not a ci-* image -- it is a runtime artifact -- but it
  # builds the same way and lands in the same registry so the audit sees it.
  - name: build-heating-can
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/heating-can
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -354,7 +360,7 @@ steps:
  # services (public Ingress hosts -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP).
  # Runtime artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
  - name: build-netbird-service-sync
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/netbird-service-sync
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -380,7 +386,7 @@ steps:
  # bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0 (#576). Runtime
  # artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
  - name: build-bird
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/bird
    depends_on: []
    when:
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Paperclip server image (REN-401): upstream paperclipai/paperclip at a pinned
+# master commit plus the patches in ci/images/paperclip/. Needed while the k8s
+# sandbox fix (upstream PR #13733) is not merged; see the README there for how
+# to go back to upstream nightly.
+#
+# Own workflow for the reason given in build-agent-runtime.yml: a step in
+# build-ci-images.yml runs on every change to that file and competes for the
+# woodpecker-ci-quota. Re-run alone with a deployment to target
+# `build-paperclip`.
+#
+# Tag `build.<unix-ts>` is what the Flux ImagePolicy `paperclip` sorts on
+# (image-automation/paperclip.yaml); image automation then rolls it out.
+# konairius/ and ci_images_token as for the agent-runtime images.
+when:
+  - event: push
+    branch: master
+    path:
+      - "ci/images/paperclip/**"
+      - ".woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml"
+  - event: deployment
+    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-paperclip"'
+
+steps:
+  - name: prepare-source
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
+    commands:
+      - sh ci/images/paperclip/prepare.sh build/paperclip-src
+
+  - name: build-paperclip
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
+    directory: build/paperclip-src
+    depends_on: [prepare-source]
+    # Rust runner + UI + server build in one pod. The server build alone sets
+    # a 4 GiB Node heap, so the memory limit is the LimitRange max (8Gi).
+    backend_options:
+      kubernetes:
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            cpu: "1"
+            memory: 2Gi
+          limits:
+            cpu: "4"
+            memory: 8Gi
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - . ../../ci/images/paperclip/upstream.env
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=build.$(date +%s)
+      # Same target and build args as upstream's docker.yml for nightly.
+      # --compressed-caching=false: pipeline 11717 was killed at the 8Gi limit
+      # (exit 137) in the server build; kaniko otherwise holds compressed
+      # layer tarballs in memory next to the 4 GiB Node heap.
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Dockerfile.kaniko \
+          --target production \
+          --skip-unused-stages \
+          --snapshot-mode=redo \
+          --compressed-caching=false \
+          --build-arg PAPERCLIP_BUILD_COMMIT=$PAPERCLIP_COMMIT \
+          --build-arg PAPERCLIP_BUILD_VERSION=$PAPERCLIP_VERSION \
+          --build-arg CLI_TOOLS_CACHE_EPOCH=$(date -u +%G-W%V) \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:$TAG
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ steps:
  #    --build-arg to the resolved version (not "latest") guarantees the tag and
  #    the image content agree even if a new release lands mid-run.
  - name: build
-    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
    directory: ci/images/claude
    depends_on: [decide]
    environment:
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ steps:
  # whenever it trails the deployed server. If you bump the server, bump here.
  - name: woodpecker-lint
    depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
-    image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.18.0-alpine
+    image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.18.1-alpine@sha256:7eac3c4254befc1ba1e65269c3304c370b6032530b7386fc0c7648378fdd0516
    commands:
      - |
        set -eu
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ steps:
  # separately rather than one this step quietly implies is covered.
  - name: shellcheck
    depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
-    image: koalaman/shellcheck-alpine:v0.11.0
+    image: koalaman/shellcheck-alpine:v0.11.0@sha256:9955be09ea7f0dbf7ae942ac1f2094355bb30d96fffba0ec09f5432207544002
    commands:
      - |
        set -eu
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ steps:
  # writes its stripped mirror under mktemp and never into the workspace.
  - name: promtool
    depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
-    image: prom/prometheus:v3.15.0
+    image: prom/prometheus:v3.15.0@sha256:efd719c99d83b060d9daefdcf00360461adf279f45ef5391f8d111892118753e
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh

@@ -35,18 +35,18 @@ when:
 steps:
  - name: model-selection-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

  - name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh

  - name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+when:
+  # Deploy only on master (merge) + manual — never auto-deploy from a branch.
+  - event: push
+    branch: master
+    path:
+      - "ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/**"
+      - "ansible/plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
+      - "ansible/inventory/group_vars/edge_host/**"
+      - ".woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
+  - event: deployment
+    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge"'
+
+timeout: 30
+
+steps:
+  - name: deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
+    environment:
+      ANSIBLE_FORCE_COLOR: "true"
+      ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING: "false"
+      ANSIBLE_ROLES_PATH: "../roles:./roles"
+      SSH_PRIVATE_KEY:
+        from_secret: ssh_private_key
+      VAULT_PASS:
+        from_secret: vault_pass
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p ~/.ssh
+      - echo "$SSH_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+      - chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+      - printf "Host *\n\tStrictHostKeyChecking no\n\tUserKnownHostsFile /dev/null\n" > ~/.ssh/config
+      - cd ansible
+      - echo "$VAULT_PASS" > .vault_pass && chmod 600 .vault_pass
+      - export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=.vault_pass
+      # Local MQTT bridge on the edge hosts only (REN-1307); restarts only the
+      # local mosquitto on edge-1, never the cluster broker.
+      - ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml -v
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: validate-secrets
-    image: alpine:3.24.1
+    image: alpine:3.24.2@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
    environment:
      TF_VAR_proxmox_api_url:
        from_secret: proxmox_api_url
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ steps:
    # fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
    # ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
    # test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ steps:
      - bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh

  - name: issue-fix-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: pr-review-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: iac-scan
-    image: aquasec/trivy:latest
+    image: aquasec/trivy:latest@sha256:af6acf9a6b85dfe389a1941505c0ce9efef52a4719635e1a962f022a3d855daa
    commands:
      - trivy fs --format json -o trivy-iac.json --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed .

  - name: image-scans
-    image: aquasec/trivy:latest
+    image: aquasec/trivy:latest@sha256:af6acf9a6b85dfe389a1941505c0ce9efef52a4719635e1a962f022a3d855daa
    commands:
      - trivy image --download-db-only
      - |
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
    # this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
    when:
      - branch: master
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: update-audit-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: checkout-notes
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    pull: true
    environment:
      WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ steps:
      - bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh

  - name: distill
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    pull: true
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
@@ -89,14 +89,14 @@ steps:
          -p

  - name: audit
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    pull: true
    commands:
      # Findings are report lines in output/, not a pipeline failure.
      - python3 -B notes/bin/wiki_audit.py --vault "$$PWD/notes"

  - name: consolidate
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    pull: true
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ steps:
        exit $$rc

  - name: push-notes
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.280
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
    pull: true
    environment:
      WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
@@ -46,3 +46,26 @@ approves.

 This is in addition to the normal review and merge by Argus. Argus does
 not merge such a PR without the HA-impact approval.
+
+## Agent runtime images
+
+Pod images for the Paperclip Kubernetes sandbox (REN-284). Each is the stock
+`ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude` (pinned by digest) plus a tool
+set. Base user (1000, non-root), entrypoint and cmd are unchanged; the
+images run with a read-only root FS. Source in `ci/images/agent-runtime-*`,
+built by `.woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml` (re-run alone: deployment to
+target `build-agent-runtime`), versions bumped by Renovate. Both also
+carry `claude-agent-acp` for the ACP engine, pinned and patched like
+Paperclip ships it, SDK override included
+(`ci/images/agent-runtime-common/`); bump it by hand
+together with Paperclip. All tools are on the default `PATH`. Both add
+`tzdata` (the base has no zoneinfo); the default zone stays UTC.
+
+| Image | `imageRegistry` | Adds |
+|---|---|---|
+| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go` | Go toolchain, golangci-lint, govulncheck |
+| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops` | kubectl, flux, kustomize, helm |
+
+The plugin keeps the name `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only host and
+org, hence the nested path. Every build also pushes a date tag
+(`:YYYY-MM-DD`) as the rollback point. `konairius` is public: no pull secret.
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ inventory change.
 |---|---|---|
 | Innomaker USB2CAN (Vitocal/VX3 + E380) | `heating_can` | `plays/install-heating-can.yml` |
 | Nabu Casa ZWA-2 Z-Wave radio | `zwave_gateway` | `plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` |
-| FTDI serial power-meter head | `power_meter` | `plays/install-power-meter.yml` |

 Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. They depend on
 the base play having run: all three need the local MQTT bridge, and two of
@@ -87,7 +86,6 @@ kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.sessio

 ```yaml
 # vault.yml
-vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "..."
 vault_edge_loki_password: "..."   # dedicated edge-1 Loki push cred (see "Logging & eMMC")
@@ -238,6 +236,21 @@ cluster-side change was needed**: one authenticates as the `open3e` user
 out). The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary
 is the host; nothing off-host can reach it.

+**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** The two vault-password bridges are being
+replaced by one bridge as the register account `edge-1`
+(`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`). Its password is pushed
+by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
+esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
+the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
+its own server key, nothing else. On a push it writes
+`/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/edge-1.conf`, deletes `bridge.d/legacy.conf` and
+restarts the local mosquitto. The controller sets a new password whenever the
+bridge reports "not connected" (also after a reinstall), so no play run is
+needed for a rotation. `.woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` runs
+`plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` on merge. Diagnosis: `journalctl -u
+edge-mqtt-cred`, and `mosquitto_sub -t '$SYS/broker/connection/edge-1/state'`
+(retained `1` = connected).
+
 **eMMC:** the local broker writes **nothing** to flash — `persistence false`
 (retained/queued messages in RAM) and `log_dest stdout` (to the volatile
 journal → Loki). Do not add persistence or log-file settings to
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 # Secret indirection — real values live in vault.yml (ansible-vault) next
 # to this file; see docs/edge-host.md for how to populate it from
 # the cluster secrets.
-edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "{{ vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret }}"
 # Loki push credential (dedicated 'edge-1' user, Traefik basic-auth on the
@@ -39,8 +38,8 @@ chrony_hwtimestamp: false

 # --- Local MQTT contract -------------------------------------------------
 # Shared between the broker and its clients, so it belongs to the inventory
-# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can and
-# power-meter-sml publish here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
+# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can
+# publishes here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
 # broker AS the open3e user, so it needs that identity too.
 #
 # Keeping these in one role's defaults only worked while a single play loaded
@@ -41,13 +41,9 @@ edge-1.iot.renner.uno
 [heating_can]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno

-[power_meter]
-edge-1.iot.renner.uno
-
 [edge_host:children]
 zwave_gateway
 heating_can
-power_meter

 # NTP servers. edge-1 was added here so the role would survive the PVE hosts
 # being retired for bare-metal Talos, which cannot run chrony or keepalived
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+# Local MQTT bridge and its credential receiver only (REN-1307). Run by
+# .woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml on merge, so a change to this role
+# reaches edge-1 without a play run by hand. The full base play
+# (install-edge-host.yml) carries the same role.
+- name: Converge the edge MQTT bridge
+  hosts: edge_host
+  become: true
+
+  # The SML power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) is retired for good: owner decision
+  # 2026-09-19, grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus. Its role and
+  # play are gone; this removes the leftover compose project from edge-1 on
+  # the next pipeline run. Idempotent: a no-op once the directory is gone.
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: Check for the retired sml2mqtt compose project
+      ansible.builtin.stat:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt/docker-compose.yml
+      register: edge_sml2mqtt_compose
+
+    - name: Stop the retired sml2mqtt container
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: docker compose down --remove-orphans
+        chdir: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
+      when: edge_sml2mqtt_compose.stat.exists
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Remove the retired sml2mqtt directory
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
+        state: absent
+
+  roles:
+    - mqtt-bridge
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #
 #   plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml   [zwave_gateway]   ZWA-2 radio
 #   plays/install-heating-can.yml     [heating_can]     Innomaker USB2CAN
-#   plays/install-power-meter.yml     [power_meter]     FTDI meter head
 #
 # Splitting the roles without splitting the plays would have kept the coupling:
 # one play applying every role to one group is the monolith again, a layer up.
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---
-# Power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) for hosts with the FTDI serial meter head
-# attached.
-#
-# Targets [power_meter]: membership means the meter head is physically present.
-#
-# Requires the base play (plays/install-edge-host.yml) to have run: it needs
-# docker and publishes to the local MQTT bridge.
- name: Install power-meter reader
-  hosts: power_meter
-  become: true
-
-  roles:
-    - power-meter-sml
@@ -10,3 +10,14 @@
 edge_mqtt_cluster_host: mqtt.renner.uno
 edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port: 8883
 edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
+
+# --- Bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) ------------
+# The cluster account the bridge logs in as (register entry in
+# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml). The controller pushes
+# its password to edge-mqtt-cred and rotates it when the bridge reports
+# "not connected"; there is no copy in ansible-vault.
+edge_mqtt_bridge_account: edge-1
+# HTTPS port of edge-mqtt-cred (esp32 device API, mTLS). Only a client
+# certificate from the MQTT CA with this CN is accepted.
+edge_mqtt_cred_port: 8443
+edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn: mqtt-account-controller
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# Managed by ansible (roles/mqtt-bridge). Receives the cluster bridge password
+# from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) so no plaintext copy lives in
+# ansible-vault and no play run is needed to rotate it.
+#
+# Speaks the controller's esp32 device API over HTTPS:
+#   GET /api/status   -> {"mqtt": {"connected": bool}}
+#   PUT /api/settings <- {"mqtt": {"user": "...", "pass": "..."}}
+# A client certificate from the MQTT CA with CN mqtt-account-controller is
+# required; nothing else may call it. The server key is generated on this
+# host and never leaves it (the controller pins it on first contact).
+#
+# PUT writes the bridge file (template + credentials), removes the legacy
+# vault-password bridges and restarts the local mosquitto. The password is
+# kept only in that 0640 root:mosquitto file.
+import grp
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import ssl
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+CONF = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
+WRITE = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def connected():
+    try:
+        out = subprocess.run(
+            ["mosquitto_sub", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", str(CONF["local_port"]),
+             "-t", CONF["state_topic"], "-C", "1", "-W", "3"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdout
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        return False
+    return out.strip() == "1"
+
+
+def write_bridge(user, password):
+    with open(CONF["template"]) as f:
+        body = f.read()
+    body += f"remote_username {user}\nremote_password {password}\n"
+    d = os.path.dirname(CONF["bridge_file"])
+    fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=d, prefix=".edge-mqtt-cred.")
+    with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
+        f.write(body)
+    os.chown(tmp, 0, grp.getgrnam("mosquitto").gr_gid)
+    os.chmod(tmp, 0o640)
+    os.replace(tmp, CONF["bridge_file"])
+    for legacy in CONF["legacy_files"]:
+        if os.path.exists(legacy):
+            os.remove(legacy)
+    subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "mosquitto"], check=True, timeout=60)
+
+
+def valid(s):
+    # Controller passwords are random URL-safe tokens; anything with
+    # whitespace or a control character would break the config line.
+    return isinstance(s, str) and 0 < len(s) <= 256 and s.isprintable() and not any(c.isspace() for c in s)
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def authorized(self):
+        cert = self.connection.getpeercert() or {}
+        cns = [v for rdn in cert.get("subject", ()) for k, v in rdn if k == "commonName"]
+        if cns != [CONF["allowed_cn"]]:
+            self.send_error(403)
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    def reply(self, code, obj=None):
+        data = b"" if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode()
+        self.send_response(code)
+        if data:
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        if not self.authorized():
+            return
+        if self.path != "/api/status":
+            return self.send_error(404)
+        self.reply(200, {"mqtt": {"connected": connected()}})
+
+    def do_PUT(self):
+        if not self.authorized():
+            return
+        if self.path != "/api/settings":
+            return self.send_error(404)
+        try:
+            n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+            if not 0 < n <= 4096:
+                raise ValueError("body size")
+            m = json.loads(self.rfile.read(n))["mqtt"]
+            user, password = m["user"], m["pass"]
+        except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
+            return self.send_error(400)
+        if user != CONF["user"] or not valid(password):
+            return self.send_error(400)
+        with WRITE:
+            write_bridge(user, password)
+        self.log_message("bridge credentials for %s replaced, mosquitto restarted", user)
+        self.reply(204)
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
+        sys.stderr.write("%s %s\n" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args))
+
+
+class Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    address_family = socket.AF_INET6
+
+    def server_bind(self):
+        self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
+        super().server_bind()
+
+    def get_request(self):
+        # The TLS handshake runs in the request thread, with a timeout, so a
+        # stalled peer cannot block the accept loop.
+        sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
+        sock.settimeout(10)
+        return self.ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False), addr
+
+
+def main():
+    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+    ctx.load_cert_chain(CONF["cert"], CONF["key"])
+    ctx.load_verify_locations(CONF["ca"])
+    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+    srv = Server(("::", CONF["port"]), Handler)
+    srv.ctx = ctx
+    srv.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIUN8ne4k4Wif9O83GDyKiBP0Ma7EIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
+GTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUmVubmVyIE1RVFQgQ0EwHhcNMjYxMDA2MTUzMDE1WhcNMzYx
+MDAzMTUzMDE1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5SZW5uZXIgTVFUVCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49
+AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOZhZF2JDoyvVg2oIXSbJAuAWDcoG22RxPA4oMKRMA/b
+XzIY566D2k6cVnWqbil9s/q4O2mj+Epo7plBw8NwuOOjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
+AwICpDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcqSDDiLZzhrvqq9f16Y08
+CO7QfzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiBFkxd9pXnqIcjReEcOTvCBZ3HxKu2jNQGL
+/le7gunTGgIgZapWAcu4awa+wmZcR/z2luOjD2GhIT15um14Z+sstJk=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
@@ -5,3 +5,9 @@
  ansible.builtin.service:
    name: mosquitto
    state: restarted
+
+- name: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: edge-mqtt-cred
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true
@@ -11,13 +11,39 @@
    name: mosquitto
    state: present

- name: Deploy local mosquitto bridge config
+- name: Create the bridge directory
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
+    state: directory
+    owner: root
+    group: mosquitto
+    mode: "0750"
+
+- name: Check for the controller-managed bridge file
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf"
+  register: edge_mqtt_bridge_managed
+
+# Until mqtt-account-controller has pushed the first password, keep the
+# vault-password bridges so the cluster never loses edge-1's data. Once the
+# managed file exists, never render them again (edge-mqtt-cred removed them).
+- name: Deploy legacy vault-password bridges
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2
+    dest: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf
+    owner: root
+    group: mosquitto
+    mode: "0640"   # carries the legacy cluster bridge credentials
+  when: not edge_mqtt_bridge_managed.stat.exists
+  notify: Restart mosquitto
+
+- name: Deploy local mosquitto config
  ansible.builtin.template:
    src: edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2
    dest: /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
    owner: root
    group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"   # carries the cluster bridge credentials
+    mode: "0640"
  notify: Restart mosquitto

 - name: Enable local mosquitto bridge
@@ -25,3 +51,59 @@
    name: mosquitto
    enabled: true
    state: started
+
+# --- edge-mqtt-cred (REN-1307): receives the bridge password from
+# mqtt-account-controller. edge-1 holds only the public MQTT CA and its own
+# server key, generated here and never copied off the host.
+- name: Create edge-mqtt-cred config directory
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
+    state: directory
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "0700"
+
+- name: Generate edge-mqtt-cred server key and certificate
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    cmd: >-
+      openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1
+      -nodes -days 36500 -subj "/CN={{ inventory_hostname }}"
+      -keyout /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key -out /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt
+    creates: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred files
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: "{{ item.src }}"
+    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.py, dest: /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred, mode: "0755"}
+    # Public CA of the cluster's MQTT client certificates
+    # (kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/mqtt-ca.yaml), valid until 2036-10-03.
+    - {src: mqtt-ca.crt, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt, mode: "0644"}
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred config and bridge template
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: "{{ item.src }}"
+    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json, mode: "0600"}
+    # Read only on the controller's next push: a change here reaches the
+    # running bridge when the password is next set.
+    - {src: edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in, mode: "0600"}
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service, mode: "0644"}
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Enable edge-mqtt-cred
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: edge-mqtt-cred
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+    daemon_reload: true
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). edge-mqtt-cred appends
+# remote_username/remote_password to this and writes the result to
+# /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf. One bridge for
+# open3e, as the register account `{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}`
+# (ACL readwrite open3e/#). sml2mqtt is retired (SML reader, 2026-09-19).
+connection {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}
+address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
+bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
+bridge_insecure false
+remote_clientid edge1-bridge
+cleansession false
+try_private true
+restart_timeout 5 30
+queue_qos0_messages true
+# The bridge state goes to the LOCAL broker only (retained 1/0); edge-mqtt-cred
+# reads it to answer the controller's "connected?".
+notifications true
+notifications_local_only true
+notification_topic $SYS/broker/connection/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}/state
+topic open3e/# out 0
+topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Legacy vault-password bridges, rendered only
+# while /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf does not
+# exist; edge-mqtt-cred deletes this file on the controller's first push
+# (REN-1307). Remove with the vault keys once edge-1 is on the register account.
+# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
+# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
+# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
+connection edge1-open3e
+address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
+bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
+bridge_insecure false
+remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
+remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
+remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
+cleansession false
+try_private true
+notifications false
+restart_timeout 5 30
+queue_qos0_messages true
+topic open3e/# out 0
+topic open3e/cmnd in 0
@@ -22,36 +22,9 @@ log_type notice
 listener 1883 127.0.0.1
 allow_anonymous true

-# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
-# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
-# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
-connection edge1-open3e
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
-
-# --- Bridge 2: power-meter topics, as the cluster `sml2mqtt` user (ACL
-# `write sml2mqtt/#`). Publish-only, so no `in` topics.
-connection edge1-sml2mqtt
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username sml2mqtt
-remote_password {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-sml2mqtt
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic sml2mqtt/# out 0
+# --- Bridges to the cluster broker (REN-1307). bridge.d holds either
+# {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf, written by edge-mqtt-cred with the password
+# mqtt-account-controller pushed, or, until that first push, legacy.conf with
+# the two vault-password bridges. edge-mqtt-cred deletes legacy.conf when it
+# writes the new file.
+include_dir /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{{ {
+  "port": edge_mqtt_cred_port,
+  "allowed_cn": edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn,
+  "user": edge_mqtt_bridge_account,
+  "cert": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt",
+  "key": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key",
+  "ca": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt",
+  "template": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in",
+  "bridge_file": "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ ".conf",
+  "legacy_files": ["/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf"],
+  "local_port": edge_mqtt_port,
+  "state_topic": "$SYS/broker/connection/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ "/state",
+} | to_nice_json }}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). See /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred.
+[Unit]
+Description=Receives the MQTT bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller
+After=network-online.target mosquitto.service
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+# Root only to write the bridge file and restart mosquitto.
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
+ProtectHome=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
-# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
-
-# Service root. Kept per-role so the role is usable on its own.
-edge_base_dir: /opt/edge-host
-
-# Own compose project directory. Unchanged from the path used under the
-# previous shared project.
-sml_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/sml2mqtt"
-
-# The compose file that used to hold both this service and zwave-js. Removed
-# once, so the fixed container_name is released for the new projects.
-edge_legacy_compose: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-
-# Stable by-id symlink -- see the zwave-gateway role.
-edge_stromzaehler_device: /dev/serial/by-id/usb-FTDI_FT230X_Basic_UART_DK0E1GP5-if00-port0
-
-# Hand-pinned on purpose: critical meter bridge, deliberately excluded from
-# image automation.
-edge_sml2mqtt_image: spacemanspiff2007/sml2mqtt:3.6.0
-
-# Secret from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
-#   edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart sml2mqtt
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d --force-recreate
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: true
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
---
-# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
-#
-# Its own compose project. It shared a compose file with the Z-Wave gateway,
-# which meant a change to either recreated both -- two unrelated services bound
-# to different USB devices. Data paths are unchanged.
-
- name: Create sml2mqtt directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# sml2mqtt reads only a config file and has no env override for the password,
-# so the rendered config carries it -- 0600, root-owned, same trust boundary as
-# the k8s init-container approach it replaced.
- name: Deploy sml2mqtt config
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: sml2mqtt-config.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/config.yml"
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart sml2mqtt
-
- name: Deploy sml2mqtt compose project
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: docker-compose.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart sml2mqtt
-
- name: Pull sml2mqtt image
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose pull
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: false
-
-# Tolerates a missing USB device, as for the Z-Wave gateway.
- name: Start sml2mqtt
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  register: sml_compose_up
-  failed_when: >-
-    sml_compose_up.rc != 0
-    and 'error gathering device information' not in sml_compose_up.stderr
-  changed_when: >-
-    'Started' in sml_compose_up.stderr or 'Created' in sml_compose_up.stderr
-    or 'Started' in sml_compose_up.stdout or 'Creating' in sml_compose_up.stdout
-
- name: Warn if sml2mqtt is waiting for its USB device
-  ansible.builtin.debug:
-    msg: >-
-      sml2mqtt could not start -- the FTDI meter head is not present:
-      {{ sml_compose_up.stderr_lines | select('search', 'device') | list }}
-  when: sml_compose_up.rc != 0
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml).
-#
-# Its own compose project -- see the role tasks for why it no longer shares a
-# file with the Z-Wave gateway.
-#
-# Outbound-only (serial in, MQTT out). Host networking sidesteps the docker
-# NAT66 gap: the broker LB is IPv6-first and bridge-network v6 SYNs leave
-# unmasqueraded and die. The host stack reaches it fine (open3e proves it
-# continuously).
-services:
-  sml2mqtt:
-    image: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_image }}
-    container_name: sml2mqtt
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    network_mode: host
-    # Serial exclusivity: this is the ONLY reader of the meter port --
-    # HA's edl21 integration stays disabled.
-    devices:
-      - "{{ edge_stromzaehler_device }}:/dev/stromzaehler"
-    volumes:
-      - ./config.yml:/sml2mqtt/config.yml:ro
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml). Ported 1:1 from the k8s ConfigMap
-# sml2mqtt-config; only host and password delivery differ (broker is now
-# reached via its LoadBalancer hostname, password rendered by ansible
-# instead of an init container).
-logging:
-  level: INFO
-  file: stdout        # 'stdout' -> docker logs (NOT '' — that opens the dir)
-
-mqtt:
-  connection:
-    identifier: sml2mqtt-meter
-    host: {{ edge_mqtt_host }}
-    port: {{ edge_mqtt_port }}
-    user: sml2mqtt
-    password: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
-  topic prefix: sml2mqtt
-  defaults:
-    qos: 0
-    retain: false
-  last will:
-    topic: status
-
-general:
-  Wh in kWh: false      # keep raw Wh to match edl21 history — HA long-term
-                        # stats continue with zero unit discontinuity
-  republish after: 120  # re-emit unchanged values every 120 s
-
-inputs:
-  - type: serial
-    url: /dev/stromzaehler   # FTDI FT230X, mapped by docker compose
-    timeout: 3
-    # 9600 8N1 are sml2mqtt defaults for SML/EDL21 — no override needed.
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+diff --git a/dist/acp-agent.js b/dist/acp-agent.js
+index 0214a509eb5e7b777a69e4e34637941c275d27b1..403be02df66e25eee29e7d5bef14627011e02b30 100644
+--- a/dist/acp-agent.js
+++ b/dist/acp-agent.js
+@@ -2922,9 +2922,19 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
+                                             amount: message.total_cost_usd,
+                                             currency: "USD",
+                                         },
+-                                        ...(message.origin && {
+-                                            _meta: { "_claude/origin": message.origin },
+-                                        }),
+                                        _meta: {
+                                            ...(message.origin && { "_claude/origin": message.origin }),
+                                            // ACP's core Usage shape exposes context occupancy and
+                                            // cost, but not the billable input/output split. Keep the
+                                            // SDK's bounded aggregate in extension metadata so ACPX can
+                                            // normalize it without persisting a raw provider message.
+                                            usage: {
+                                                input_tokens: message.usage.input_tokens,
+                                                output_tokens: message.usage.output_tokens,
+                                                cache_read_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_read_input_tokens,
+                                                cache_creation_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_creation_input_tokens,
+                                            },
+                                        },
+                                     },
+                                 });
+                             }
+@@ -5311,6 +5321,10 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
+             settingSources: ["user", "project", "local"],
+             ...(thinking !== undefined && { thinking }),
+             ...userProvidedOptions,
+            // Paperclip Runner owns the complete session context. Its isolated
+            // user root contains only assigned skills; project/local settings
+            // would reintroduce host prompts, plugins, skills, and MCP servers.
+            ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && { settingSources: ["user"] }),
+             ...(settings && { settings }),
+             env,
+             // Override certain fields that must be controlled by ACP
+@@ -5318,7 +5332,9 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
+             includePartialMessages: true,
+             forwardSubagentText,
+             mcpServers: {
+-                ...(userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {}),
+                ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1"
+                    ? {}
+                    : (userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {})),
+                 ...mcpServers,
+                 ...(fileChangeAuditSupport
+                     ? { [FILE_CHANGE_AUDIT_SERVER_NAME]: fileChangeAuditSupport.mcpServer }
+@@ -5329,6 +5345,16 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
+             allowDangerouslySkipPermissions: ALLOW_BYPASS,
+             permissionMode: initialPermissionMode,
+             canUseTool: this.canUseTool(sessionId),
+            // The runner pins this actual MCP endpoint before provider launch.
+            // Exempt only task delivery/control tools at the SDK dispatch boundary,
+            // not arbitrary provider permission metadata or MCP name prefixes.
+            ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && {
+                allowedTools: mcpServers.paperclip?.type === "http"
+                    && mcpServers.paperclip.url === process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_TASK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL
+                    ? ["paperclip_finish", "paperclip_block", "read_current_wake_comments", "request_human_input"]
+                        .map((tool) => `mcp__paperclip__${tool}`)
+                    : [],
+            }),
+             // Forward MCP elicitation requests onto ACP elicitation. Only attached
+             // when the client advertised support, so non-supporting clients keep the
+             // SDK's default (auto-decline) behavior. (AskUserQuestion is handled in
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "private": true,
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp": "0.73.0"
+  },
+  "overrides": {
+    "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "0.3.280"
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# Paperclip agent runtime + Go toolchain (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
+# image of the `k8s-go` sandbox environment.
+#
+# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
+# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
+# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
+#
+# Both binaries are static; they run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
+FROM golang:1.27.1-bookworm@sha256:69a7b9788769bec032d238959b61854e9ae87f57be9029ec04e9885fabf99195 AS go
+
+# govulncheck (REN-488) has no upstream image: build it in the go stage, static.
+# The version pins the module; go verifies it against sum.golang.org. Renovate
+# does not track it (no regex manager here): bump by hand.
+FROM go AS govulncheck
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOBIN=/out go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.8.0
+
+FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS golangci-lint
+
+# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
+# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
+FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
+
+COPY --from=go /usr/local/go /usr/local/go
+COPY --from=golangci-lint /usr/bin/golangci-lint /usr/local/bin/golangci-lint
+COPY --from=govulncheck /out/govulncheck /usr/local/bin/govulncheck
+# go and gofmt also in /usr/local/bin: a process started with the default PATH
+# (not the image ENV) still finds them.
+USER root
+RUN ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go \
+    && ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
+USER 1000:1000
+
+# Time zones (REN-1196): the base has no /usr/share/zoneinfo, so
+# TZ=Europe/Berlin silently prints UTC and Python ZoneInfo() raises. The
+# default zone stays UTC; agents set TZ where they need local time.
+USER root
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+USER 1000:1000
+
+# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
+# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
+# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
+# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
+# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
+# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
+# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
+# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
+# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
+COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
+COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
+USER root
+RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
+    && npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
+    && git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
+    && npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
+    && ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
+    && rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
+    && npm cache clean --force
+USER 1000:1000
+
+# The sandbox pod has a read-only root FS. Writable mounts: $HOME
+# (/home/paperclip, 1Gi), $HOME/.cache (1Gi), /tmp (2Gi), /workspace.
+# - GOPATH (module cache) goes to /tmp, the biggest one.
+# - GOCACHE and the golangci-lint cache keep their default under $HOME/.cache.
+# - GOTOOLCHAIN=local: a go.mod asking for a newer Go fails clearly instead of
+#   downloading a toolchain through the egress allow-list.
+ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH \
+    GOPATH=/tmp/go \
+    GOTOOLCHAIN=local
+
+# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
+# The PATH check uses the base image's default PATH, not the ENV above.
+RUN TZ=Europe/Berlin date +%Z | grep -Eq '^CES?T$' \
+    && python3 -c "from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo; ZoneInfo('Europe/Berlin')" \
+    && go version && golangci-lint version \
+    && env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
+       sh -ec 'for t in go gofmt golangci-lint govulncheck claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Paperclip agent runtime + cluster tools (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
+# image of the `k8s-ops` sandbox environment.
+#
+# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
+# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
+# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
+#
+# kubectl and flux match the ci-k8s image. All four binaries are static; they
+# run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
+FROM registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.37.1@sha256:b7cab618e281b1ee7484e7b706a96e2135fbb6e072c2a573a7dab4e87d7f2385 AS kubectl
+FROM ghcr.io/fluxcd/flux-cli:v2.9.6@sha256:b1ac18156f227af9a524b842a96f2c20986c7a779ef721df3ba4e4540f449d76 AS flux
+FROM registry.k8s.io/kustomize/kustomize:v5.8.1@sha256:899fcd3bc898160e62bcaf82932b0cb29ba38d16272353db2e7acbba82129429 AS kustomize
+FROM alpine/helm:4.3.0@sha256:a6cf54599ccb99d90cf0712b30f03fdb3cab062e6b94e0418cc4db7e8a1464b2 AS helm
+
+# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
+# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
+FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
+
+COPY --from=kubectl /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
+COPY --from=flux /usr/local/bin/flux /usr/local/bin/flux
+COPY --from=kustomize /app/kustomize /usr/local/bin/kustomize
+COPY --from=helm /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
+
+# Time zones (REN-1196): the base has no /usr/share/zoneinfo, so
+# TZ=Europe/Berlin silently prints UTC and Python ZoneInfo() raises. The
+# default zone stays UTC; agents set TZ where they need local time.
+USER root
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+USER 1000:1000
+
+# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
+# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
+# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
+# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
+# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
+# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
+# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
+# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
+# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
+COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
+COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
+USER root
+RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
+    && npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
+    && git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
+    && npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
+    && ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
+    && rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
+    && npm cache clean --force
+USER 1000:1000
+
+# Read-only root FS: kubectl (~/.kube/cache) and helm (~/.cache, ~/.config)
+# write only under $HOME, which the sandbox pod mounts writable. No ENV needed.
+
+# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
+RUN TZ=Europe/Berlin date +%Z | grep -Eq '^CES?T$' \
+    && python3 -c "from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo; ZoneInfo('Europe/Berlin')" \
+    && kubectl version --client && flux version --client && kustomize version && helm version \
+    && env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
+       sh -ec 'for t in kubectl flux kustomize helm claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 # Alpine plus jq. Nothing application-specific — a general-purpose base for any
 # workload that needs to read JSON from a shell script.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 # Alpine plus the openssl CLI. Nothing application-specific — named for what it
 # is, so anything needing `openssl s_client` / `x509` from a shell script can use
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 RUN apk add --no-cache \
      ansible \
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.22@sha256:14358309a308569c32bdc37e2e0e9694be33a9d99e68afb0f5ff33cc1f695dce
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 # bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0. Distro package, no build
 # step — the image is the binary plus its runtime.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2
+FROM node:24-alpine@sha256:ebfe2f90462722a7a4de65e91990e97fe0d401c70e0e762c5b53302f905ec1c1

 # Default to the latest Claude Code. Pinning a fixed version is the wrong
 # default here: old releases eventually stop working against the API, so a
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
 # amd64 only, matching the ARCH the installer already hardcoded and the cluster's
 # node architecture. Add a second stage if a different arch is ever needed.

-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d AS fetch
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6 AS fetch

-ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.5.1
-ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=77baa2f669980a82255ffa2f2717de823992480271ee778aa51a9c60ae89ff9b
+ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.9.1
+ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=b98f74a0f8522f0a83867178729c1aa70f2158f90c45a2ca8fa791db1c76b303

 # busybox wget and tar are already in the base; nothing is installed here
 # either. sha256sum -c fails the BUILD if the artifact does not match, which is
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ RUN set -eu; \
      [ -x "/plugins/$p" ] || { echo "FATAL: /plugins/$p missing or not executable" >&2; exit 1; }; \
    done

-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 # Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
 # onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 # namespace, so can0 is only reachable with network_mode: host. That is also
 # how the local MQTT broker on 127.0.0.1:1883 is reached. CAN_RAW sockets need
 # no capabilities, so both run unprivileged.
-FROM python:3.13-slim AS build
+FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151 AS build

 # Pins live here, in the artifact, rather than in Ansible variables.
 #
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ RUN git clone --quiet https://github.com/MyHomeMyData/E3onCAN.git /opt/e3oncan \
 && rm -rf /opt/e3oncan/.git


-FROM python:3.13-slim
+FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151

 ARG OPEN3E_REF=6553c10453a6bae1210908f38a5af2481a46a3e5
 ARG E3ONCAN_REF=461dcbdf97e8d72d2edb9929c63b39382af6c3a1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
 ARG VELERO_VERSION=v1.16.0
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # domains -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP) from Ingresses carrying the
 # public label. Standard library only, so the image is the interpreter plus one
 # file; runs unprivileged as its own user.
-FROM python:3.13-slim
+FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151

 RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin controller
 COPY controller.py /opt/controller.py
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Paperclip server image (REN-401)
+
+Upstream `paperclipai/paperclip` at the commit in `upstream.env`, plus every
+`*.patch` in this directory. Built by `.woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml`,
+pushed as `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:build.<unix-ts>`, rolled out
+by Flux image automation (`kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`).
+
+## Why
+
+k8s sandbox runs fail: the run path never sets the lease `remoteCwd`, so file
+sync into the pod fails (paperclipai/paperclip#13864). The fix is
+paperclipai/paperclip#13733, open and not merged.
+`pr-13733-lease-remote-cwd.patch` is that PR's diff (head `5f320bf6`).
+
+#13733 covers only the run path. Adapter environment tests (binding an agent
+to a k8s environment) sync managed config before any workspace is realized,
+so the lease still has no `remoteCwd` and the Claude test fails with
+`claude_managed_config_dir_failed` (REN-409). The fix is
+paperclipai/paperclip#14769, also open: the plugin sets `remoteCwd:
+/workspace` when it acquires or resumes a lease.
+`pr-14769-probe-remote-cwd.patch` is that PR's diff (head `10dc7371`).
+
+Claude auto memory is lost after every run (REN-541): it lives under
+`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, which Paperclip makes fresh per run and deletes.
+`ren-541-claude-auto-memory.patch` makes the ACPX engine write
+`autoMemoryDirectory: <AGENT_HOME>/memory` into the per-run
+`.claude/settings.local.json`. `AGENT_HOME` is restored before and saved after
+every run, local and in k8s pods. The value is not part of the session
+fingerprint, so resume is unchanged. No upstream PR yet; rename the patch to
+`pr-<n>-…` once there is one.
+
+Claude sessions never resume with a managed AI connection (REN-563): the
+server gives every run a fresh temp home (`HOME`, `XDG_*`,
+`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, …) and deletes it after the run.
+`ren-563-acpx-claude-session-resume.patch` fixes both halves for local runs:
+the ACPX engine hashes a fixed placeholder for those paths in the session
+fingerprint (`adapterEnvHash`), as the server's own fingerprint already does,
+and links `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/projects` (the Claude transcripts) to
+`<stateDir>/claude-projects`, which persists. Both must ship together: a
+stable fingerprint without the transcript makes the resumed turn fail with
+"Resource not found" (homelab#1111, reverted in #1113). Remote runs are
+unchanged. No upstream PR yet.
+
+A cancelled or failed k8s pod run blocks its card for good (REN-841). The
+owner's next comment waits on `remote_cleanup`, because the server continues
+only when every remote lease carries a provider termination receipt
+(`explicit-native-continuation.ts`), and the Kubernetes plugin's
+`onEnvironmentReleaseLease` / `onEnvironmentDestroyLease` returned `void`.
+`ren-841-k8s-termination-receipt.patch` makes both return
+`{ providerLeaseId, state: "destroyed" }`, but only after the Sandbox CR or
+Job (and, on destroy, the pod) reads 404, polling for up to 20 s, below the
+server's 30 s plugin RPC timeout. If that check times out or fails, the hook
+returns no receipt, as before. No upstream PR yet.
+
+## Files
+
+- `upstream.env` — pinned commit and the version string stamped into the
+  image. Bump both together.
+- `prepare.sh` — fetches the commit, applies the patches, writes
+  `Dockerfile.kaniko` (upstream's `COPY --parents` line split into plain
+  `COPY` lines; kaniko does not support `--parents`), and adds the build of
+  the Kubernetes sandbox provider plugin to the `build` stage (REN-405):
+  upstream's `production` target ships only its source, so the plugin fails
+  with "no longer exposes a Paperclip manifest". The build fails if
+  `dist/manifest.js` is missing.
+- `*.patch` — applied in name order with `git apply`.
+
+## Moving to a newer upstream commit
+
+Set `PAPERCLIP_COMMIT` to the new master commit and `PAPERCLIP_VERSION` to
+`git describe --tags --match 'v*' --long <commit>`, then run
+`sh prepare.sh /tmp/src`: it fails if a patch no longer applies.
+
+## Exit: when every patch here is merged upstream
+
+Renovate cannot watch an upstream PR, so this is a manual step. Once
+upstream nightly contains all of them:
+
+1. `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`: back to
+   `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip` with `filterTags.pattern: '^nightly$'`
+   (the version before REN-401 in git history).
+2. `renovate.json`: swap `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip` back to
+   `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip` in the image-automation exclusion list.
+3. Delete this directory and `.woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml`.
+
+Image automation then rewrites `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/paperclip.yaml`
+to the nightly digest by itself.
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+diff --git a/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts b/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
+index f3d1fc659..812cae357 100644
+--- a/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
+++ b/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
+@@ -430,6 +430,51 @@ describe("environmentRunOrchestrator — realizeForRun", () => {
+     expect(result.persistedExecutionWorkspace).toEqual(updatedEw);
+   });
+ 
+  it("persists the realized cwd as remoteCwd when realization returns no workspaceRealization payload", async () => {
+    const runtime = makeMockRuntime({
+      realizeWorkspace: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+        cwd: "/workspace",
+        metadata: { provider: "kubernetes", remoteCwd: "/workspace" },
+      }),
+    } as Partial<EnvironmentRuntimeService>);
+    mockResolveEnvironmentExecutionTarget.mockResolvedValue({ kind: "local", environmentId: "env-1", leaseId: "lease-1" });
+
+    const orchestrator = environmentRunOrchestrator(mockDb, { environmentRuntime: runtime });
+
+    await orchestrator.realizeForRun(
+      makeRealizeInput({ environment: makeEnvironment("sandbox") }),
+    );
+
+    expect(mockUpdateLeaseMetadata).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "lease-1",
+      expect.objectContaining({ remoteCwd: "/workspace" }),
+    );
+    // Nothing to record about the realization shape, so the execution workspace
+    // row is left untouched.
+    expect(mockUpdateExecutionWorkspace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("does not rewrite lease metadata when the realized cwd already matches the lease", async () => {
+    const runtime = makeMockRuntime({
+      realizeWorkspace: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+        cwd: "/workspace",
+        metadata: { provider: "kubernetes", remoteCwd: "/workspace" },
+      }),
+    } as Partial<EnvironmentRuntimeService>);
+    mockResolveEnvironmentExecutionTarget.mockResolvedValue({ kind: "local", environmentId: "env-1", leaseId: "lease-1" });
+
+    const orchestrator = environmentRunOrchestrator(mockDb, { environmentRuntime: runtime });
+
+    await orchestrator.realizeForRun(
+      makeRealizeInput({
+        environment: makeEnvironment("sandbox"),
+        lease: makeLease({ metadata: { remoteCwd: "/workspace" } }),
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(mockUpdateLeaseMetadata).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+   it("runs a remote provision command after workspace realization when configured", async () => {
+     mockBuildWorkspaceRealizationRequest.mockReturnValue({
+       version: 1,
+diff --git a/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts b/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
+index 97cca667e..e76f64913 100644
+--- a/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
+++ b/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
+@@ -485,16 +485,29 @@ export function environmentRunOrchestrator(
+     }
+ 
+     // Step 3: Persist realization metadata on lease and execution workspace
+-    if (Object.keys(workspaceRealization).length > 0) {
+    const hasWorkspaceRealization = Object.keys(workspaceRealization).length > 0;
+    // A driver that realizes the workspace reports the directory it prepared
+    // through the realization `cwd`. Persist it on the lease as `remoteCwd`, so
+    // every later step that receives only the lease — native file sync, a
+    // resumed lease, a second run against the same lease — confines itself to
+    // the same root. Without it a driver whose realization returns no
+    // `workspaceRealization` payload leaves the lease without a root at all,
+    // and the sync step fails even though realization succeeded.
+    const currentRemoteCwd =
+      typeof lease.metadata?.remoteCwd === "string" ? lease.metadata.remoteCwd.trim() : "";
+    const realizedRemoteCwd =
+      realizedWorkspaceCwd && realizedWorkspaceCwd !== currentRemoteCwd ? realizedWorkspaceCwd : null;
+    if (hasWorkspaceRealization || realizedRemoteCwd) {
+       const nextLeaseMetadata = {
+         ...(lease.metadata ?? {}),
+-        workspaceRealization,
+        ...(hasWorkspaceRealization ? { workspaceRealization } : {}),
+        ...(realizedRemoteCwd ? { remoteCwd: realizedRemoteCwd } : {}),
+       };
+       const updatedLease = await environmentsSvc.updateLeaseMetadata(lease.id, nextLeaseMetadata);
+       if (updatedLease) {
+         lease = updatedLease;
+       }
+-      if (persistedExecutionWorkspace) {
+      if (hasWorkspaceRealization && persistedExecutionWorkspace) {
+         const updatedEw = await executionWorkspacesSvc.update(persistedExecutionWorkspace.id, {
+           metadata: {
+             ...(persistedExecutionWorkspace.metadata ?? {}),
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/README.md b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/README.md
+index a51c6ecee60e..72618cb11296 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/README.md
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/README.md
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ Every agent pod is:
+ 
+ Plus per-namespace `pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted` and a deny-all NetworkPolicy baseline with explicit egress allow-list (DNS, paperclip-server, configured FQDNs/CIDRs).
+ 
+The lease starts with `/workspace` as the native file-sync confinement root. Adapter environment tests can upload managed config before the server realizes a workspace. When resuming a lease, the provider keeps a previously recorded `remoteCwd` so a custom realized workspace is not replaced with the default.
+
+ The per-run Secret carrying the bootstrap token and adapter API keys has `ownerReferences` pointing at the owning Job, so a single `kubectl delete job …` cascades cleanly to the Pod and Secret.
+ 
+ ## Optional Kata-FC microVM isolation
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+index 8ae47de8ecac..98016385da05 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+@@ -454,6 +454,9 @@ const plugin = definePlugin({
+       secretName,
+       phase: "Pending",
+       backend: config.backend,
+      // Adapter environment probes sync managed assets before workspace
+      // realization. Give native sync the pod's mounted confinement root now.
+      remoteCwd: "/workspace",
+       scopedNetworkPolicyName,
+       scopedNetworkEgress,
+       // Native file sync streams over a pod exec; only the sandbox-cr backend
+@@ -529,6 +532,10 @@ const plugin = definePlugin({
+       secretName,
+       phase: check.phase,
+       backend: leaseBackend,
+      remoteCwd:
+        typeof params.leaseMetadata?.remoteCwd === "string" && params.leaseMetadata.remoteCwd.trim()
+          ? params.leaseMetadata.remoteCwd.trim()
+          : "/workspace",
+       scopedNetworkPolicyName:
+         typeof params.leaseMetadata?.scopedNetworkPolicyName === "string"
+           ? params.leaseMetadata.scopedNetworkPolicyName
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/types.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/types.ts
+index 5626daa93846..ef3d0d889a4c 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/types.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/types.ts
+@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ export interface KubernetesLeaseMetadata {
+   phase: "Pending" | "Running" | "Succeeded" | "Failed";
+   /** Which backend provisioned this lease. */
+   backend: "sandbox-cr" | "job";
+  /** Native sync confinement root; present before workspace realization for probes. */
+  remoteCwd: string;
+   scopedNetworkPolicyName: string | null;
+   scopedNetworkEgress: {
+     allowFqdns: string[];
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+index 7ad0ca4807e5..4c23410d4d15 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ describe("onEnvironmentResumeLease", () => {
+         secretName: "pc-abc-env",
+         phase: "Running",
+         backend: "sandbox-cr",
+        remoteCwd: "/workspace",
+         resumedLease: true,
+         // sandbox-cr has a pod-exec channel, so native file sync stays enabled.
+         nativeFileSyncUnsupported: false,
+@@ -87,6 +88,22 @@ describe("onEnvironmentResumeLease", () => {
+     );
+   });
+ 
+  it("keeps a custom realized cwd when resuming a sandbox lease", async () => {
+    h.clients = {
+      custom: { getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(readySandboxCr("pc-abc-pod")) },
+      core: { readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ status: { phase: "Running" } }) },
+    };
+    const lease = await plugin.definition.onEnvironmentResumeLease!({
+      driverKey: "kubernetes",
+      companyId: "acme",
+      environmentId: "env-1",
+      config: CONFIG,
+      providerLeaseId: "pc-abc",
+      leaseMetadata: leaseMetadata({ remoteCwd: "/workspace/custom" }),
+    });
+    expect(lease.metadata?.remoteCwd).toBe("/workspace/custom");
+  });
+
+   it("flags a resumed job-backend lease as native-sync-unsupported so the server keeps the base64 fallback", async () => {
+     h.clients = {
+       batch: {
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Fetch upstream Paperclip at the pinned commit, apply our patches and make
+# the Dockerfile buildable with kaniko. Usage: prepare.sh <target-dir>
+set -eu
+HERE=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+. "$HERE/upstream.env"
+OUT=$1
+
+rm -rf "$OUT"
+git init -q "$OUT"
+cd "$OUT"
+git fetch -q --depth 1 https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git "$PAPERCLIP_COMMIT"
+git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
+test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$PAPERCLIP_COMMIT"
+
+for p in "$HERE"/*.patch; do
+  echo "applying $(basename "$p")"
+  git apply "$p"
+done
+
+# kaniko does not know `COPY --parents` (BuildKit only). Upstream uses it for
+# one line: every sandbox provider's package.json. Replace it with one plain
+# COPY per provider directory, which copies the same files to the same place.
+grep -c -- '^COPY --parents packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/\./\*/package.json packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/$' Dockerfile | grep -qx 1
+awk '
+  /^COPY --parents packages\/plugins\/sandbox-providers\// {
+    while (("ls -d packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/*/package.json" | getline f) > 0) {
+      d = f; sub(/package.json$/, "", d)
+      print "COPY " f " " d
+    }
+    next
+  }
+  { print }
+' Dockerfile > Dockerfile.kaniko
+if grep -q -- '--parents' Dockerfile.kaniko; then
+  echo "Dockerfile.kaniko still uses COPY --parents" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# Build the Kubernetes sandbox provider into the image (REN-405). Upstream's
+# `production` target ships only its source; the plugin loader needs
+# dist/manifest.js. Same commands as upstream's `cloud-plugins` stage, run in
+# the `build` stage right after the server build, so production's
+# `COPY --from=build /app /app` carries dist/ and node_modules along. No extra
+# stage: kaniko would snapshot the whole build stage again for it.
+export ANCHOR='RUN test -f server/dist/index.js || (echo "ERROR: server build output missing" && exit 1)'
+grep -c -F -x -- "$ANCHOR" Dockerfile.kaniko | grep -qx 1
+K=packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes
+awk -v k="$K" '
+  { print }
+  $0 == ENVIRON["ANCHOR"] {
+    print "RUN pnpm -C " k " install --ignore-workspace --no-lockfile \\"
+    print "  && pnpm -C " k " build \\"
+    print "  && test -f " k "/dist/manifest.js"
+  }
+' Dockerfile.kaniko > Dockerfile.kaniko.new
+mv Dockerfile.kaniko.new Dockerfile.kaniko
+grep -q -- "test -f $K/dist/manifest.js" Dockerfile.kaniko
+rm -rf .git
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+index a26f980..112e2eb 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+@@ -2544,6 +2544,37 @@ describe("shared ACPX engine runtime behavior", () => {
+     expect(note).toBeTruthy();
+   });
+ 
+  it("points Claude auto memory at the run's AGENT_HOME without changing the session fingerprint", async () => {
+    const root = await makeTempRoot();
+    const stateDir = path.join(root, "state");
+    const cwd = path.join(root, "worktree");
+    await fs.mkdir(cwd, { recursive: true });
+    const stableHome = path.join(root, "agent-home");
+    const runAgentHome = (runId: string) => path.join(root, "file-sync", "runs", runId, "live");
+    const readSettings = async () =>
+      JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path.join(cwd, ".claude", "settings.local.json"), "utf8")) as {
+        autoMemoryDirectory?: string;
+        permissions?: { additionalDirectories?: string[] };
+      };
+
+    const first = await runExecutor(
+      { agent: "claude", stateDir, cwd },
+      { context: { paperclipWorkspace: { cwd, agentHome: runAgentHome("a"), agentHomeForPermissions: stableHome } } },
+    );
+    expect((await readSettings()).autoMemoryDirectory).toBe(path.join(runAgentHome("a"), "memory"));
+
+    const second = await runExecutor(
+      { agent: "claude", stateDir, cwd },
+      { context: { paperclipWorkspace: { cwd, agentHome: runAgentHome("b"), agentHomeForPermissions: stableHome } } },
+    );
+    const written = await readSettings();
+    expect(written.autoMemoryDirectory).toBe(path.join(runAgentHome("b"), "memory"));
+    expect(written.permissions?.additionalDirectories).toContain(stableHome);
+    expect(written.permissions?.additionalDirectories).not.toContain(runAgentHome("b"));
+    expect(second.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint).toBeTypeOf("string");
+    expect(second.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint).toBe(first.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint);
+  });
+
+   it("merges Paperclip allowlist into an existing .claude/settings.local.json without losing user entries", async () => {
+     const root = await makeTempRoot();
+     const stateDir = path.join(root, "state");
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+index b1dc569..e5681b8 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+@@ -1558,6 +1558,7 @@ interface PaperclipClaudeSettingsResult {
+   additionalDirectories: string[];
+   defaultMode: string;
+   overrodeDontAsk: boolean;
+  autoMemoryDirectory: string | null;
+ }
+ 
+ function uniqueSorted(values: Array<string | null | undefined>): string[] {
+@@ -1571,10 +1572,19 @@ function uniqueSorted(values: Array<string | null | undefined>): string[] {
+ // denies every non-allowlisted tool and never reaches `canUseTool`), and we
+ // widen the SDK's Read sandbox to include the Paperclip state dirs the agent
+ // needs to talk to its own control plane.
+//
+// It also points Claude's auto memory at `<AGENT_HOME>/memory`. The default
+// location lives under CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, which is a per-run temp home, so
+// memories were lost after every run. AGENT_HOME is restored before and saved
+// after each run, locally and in remote sandboxes. Claude ignores
+// `autoMemoryDirectory` only in checked-in project settings, not local ones.
+ async function writePaperclipClaudeSettings(input: {
+   cwd: string;
+   stateDir: string;
+   agentHome: string;
+  // The run's actual AGENT_HOME (the in-sandbox path for remote runs). It may
+  // differ from `agentHome`, which stays stable for session identity.
+  runAgentHome: string;
+   companyId: string;
+ }): Promise<PaperclipClaudeSettingsResult> {
+   const filePath = path.join(input.cwd, ".claude", "settings.local.json");
+@@ -1630,7 +1640,14 @@ async function writePaperclipClaudeSettings(input: {
+     additionalDirectories: mergedAdditionalDirectories,
+     defaultMode,
+   };
+-  const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...existing, permissions: nextPermissions };
+  const autoMemoryDirectory = input.runAgentHome
+    ? path.posix.join(input.runAgentHome, "memory")
+    : null;
+  const next: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    ...existing,
+    permissions: nextPermissions,
+    ...(autoMemoryDirectory ? { autoMemoryDirectory } : {}),
+  };
+   await writeFileAtomically({
+     target: filePath,
+     contents: `${JSON.stringify(next, null, 2)}\n`,
+@@ -1642,6 +1659,7 @@ async function writePaperclipClaudeSettings(input: {
+     additionalDirectories: mergedAdditionalDirectories,
+     defaultMode,
+     overrodeDontAsk,
+    autoMemoryDirectory,
+   };
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2064,12 +2082,18 @@ async function buildRuntime(input: {
+       // by the company root already granted in these settings; the process env
+       // still receives this run's actual AGENT_HOME.
+       agentHome: asString(workspaceContext.agentHomeForPermissions, agentHome),
+      // Auto memory follows the actual AGENT_HOME so it is saved with the run.
+      // It is not part of the session fingerprint: a moved memory directory
+      // must not invalidate a resumable conversation.
+      runAgentHome: agentHome,
+       companyId: agent.companyId,
+     });
+     skillCommandNotes.push(
+       `Wrote Paperclip-managed Claude settings to ${paperclipClaudeSettings.filePath} (defaultMode=${paperclipClaudeSettings.defaultMode}${
+         paperclipClaudeSettings.overrodeDontAsk ? "; overrode user dontAsk" : ""
+-      }, +${paperclipClaudeSettings.additionalDirectories.length} read root(s), +${paperclipClaudeSettings.allow.length} allow rule(s)).`,
+      }, +${paperclipClaudeSettings.additionalDirectories.length} read root(s), +${paperclipClaudeSettings.allow.length} allow rule(s)${
+        paperclipClaudeSettings.autoMemoryDirectory ? `, autoMemoryDirectory=${paperclipClaudeSettings.autoMemoryDirectory}` : ""
+      }).`,
+     );
+   } else if (acpxAgent === "codex") {
+     // Step 2 — codex-home.seed: the codex managed-home + skills preparation.
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+index 112e2eb..004baf0 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
+@@ -1857,6 +1857,45 @@ describe("shared ACPX engine runtime behavior", () => {
+     expect(changed.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint).not.toBe(first.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint);
+   });
+ 
+  it("keeps the per-run managed AI home out of session identity and keeps Claude transcripts", async () => {
+    const root = await makeTempRoot();
+    const stateDir = path.join(root, "state");
+    const config = { agentCommand: "node ./fake-acp.js", stateDir };
+    async function withManagedHome(home: string, claudeConfigDir = path.join(home, "provider")) {
+      return runExecutor({
+        ...config,
+        managedAiConnection: { identity: "grant-1:shared:abc" },
+        env: {
+          HOME: home,
+          XDG_CONFIG_HOME: path.join(home, "config"),
+          XDG_DATA_HOME: path.join(home, "data"),
+          CODEX_HOME: path.join(home, "provider"),
+          GROK_HOME: path.join(home, "provider"),
+          CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: claudeConfigDir,
+        },
+      }, { context: { taskId: "issue-1" } });
+    }
+    const fp = (run: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof runExecutor>>) => run.result.sessionParams?.configFingerprint;
+    const first = await withManagedHome(path.join(root, "paperclip-ai-a"));
+    const second = await withManagedHome(path.join(root, "paperclip-ai-b"));
+    const overridden = await withManagedHome(path.join(root, "paperclip-ai-c"), path.join(root, "custom-claude"));
+    expect(fp(first)).toBeTypeOf("string");
+    expect(fp(second)).toBe(fp(first));
+    expect(fp(overridden)).not.toBe(fp(first));
+
+    // The transcript dir of each managed home points at one dir in the state
+    // dir, so a resumed session finds its transcript after the home is deleted.
+    const transcripts = path.join(stateDir, "claude-projects");
+    expect(await fs.readlink(path.join(root, "paperclip-ai-a", "provider", "projects"))).toBe(transcripts);
+    expect(await fs.readlink(path.join(root, "paperclip-ai-b", "provider", "projects"))).toBe(transcripts);
+    await expect(fs.lstat(path.join(root, "custom-claude", "projects"))).rejects.toThrow();
+
+    // Without a managed AI connection the same paths are user config and still count.
+    const plainA = await runExecutor({ ...config, env: { HOME: path.join(root, "home-a") } }, { context: { taskId: "issue-1" } });
+    const plainB = await runExecutor({ ...config, env: { HOME: path.join(root, "home-b") } }, { context: { taskId: "issue-1" } });
+    expect(fp(plainB)).not.toBe(fp(plainA));
+  });
+
+   it("busts the session fingerprint when a stable configured PAPERCLIP_* value rotates", async () => {
+     const root = await makeTempRoot();
+     const stateDir = path.join(root, "state");
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+index e5681b8..0fd486c 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.ts
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,26 @@ async function writePaperclipClaudeSettings(input: {
+   };
+ }
+ 
+// Claude keeps conversation transcripts in CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/projects. A
+// managed AI home is a per-run temp dir that the server deletes after the run,
+// so the next run could not resume ("Resource not found"). Point `projects` at
+// a directory in the agent's state dir, like ~/.claude/projects on a normal
+// install. The server's recursive cleanup removes the link, not its target.
+async function linkManagedClaudeTranscripts(input: {
+  claudeConfigDir: string;
+  stateDir: string;
+}): Promise<string> {
+  const target = path.join(input.stateDir, "claude-projects");
+  await fs.mkdir(input.claudeConfigDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  await fs.mkdir(target, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const link = path.join(input.claudeConfigDir, "projects");
+  const current = await fs.readlink(link).catch(() => null);
+  if (current === target) return target;
+  await fs.rm(link, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  await fs.symlink(target, link, "dir");
+  return target;
+}
+
+ // Cross the CLI's staging seam for a runner-backed remote sandbox: ship the
+ // workspace (and, in PR 2, the per-adapter managed-home `assets`) into the
+ // sandbox and obtain the in-sandbox `workspaceRemoteDir` plus the non-null
+@@ -2027,6 +2047,30 @@ async function buildRuntime(input: {
+     // are absent from tempKeysApplied and keep their compatibility protection.
+     if (!scratchKeys.has(key) || value !== scratch.dir) resolvedAdapterEnv[key] = value;
+   }
+  // A managed AI connection gets a fresh server-made temp home on every run
+  // (HOME, XDG_*, and the provider home under it). Hash a fixed placeholder for
+  // those paths so the session can resume; the server's own fingerprint does
+  // the same (managedAiSessionFingerprintConfig). Values that differ from the
+  // managed layout are real overrides and stay in the hash. A Claude session
+  // can only resume if its transcript survives the run, so this pairs with
+  // linkManagedClaudeTranscripts below. Remote runs keep their transcript in
+  // the sandbox and are left as they are.
+  const managedHome = config.managedAiConnection && !executionTargetIsRemote ? resolvedAdapterEnv.HOME : undefined;
+  if (managedHome) {
+    const managedLayout: Record<string, string> = {
+      HOME: "",
+      XDG_CONFIG_HOME: "config",
+      XDG_DATA_HOME: "data",
+      CODEX_HOME: "provider",
+      GROK_HOME: "provider",
+      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: "provider",
+    };
+    for (const [key, sub] of Object.entries(managedLayout)) {
+      if (resolvedAdapterEnv[key] === (sub ? path.join(managedHome, sub) : managedHome)) {
+        resolvedAdapterEnv[key] = sub ? `<managed-ai-home>/${sub}` : "<managed-ai-home>";
+      }
+    }
+  }
+   if (authToken) env.PAPERCLIP_API_KEY = authToken;
+   // For the claude agent, set model via ANTHROPIC_MODEL at startup rather than
+   // via session/set_config_option — the ACP server's set_config_option handler
+@@ -2088,6 +2132,15 @@ async function buildRuntime(input: {
+       runAgentHome: agentHome,
+       companyId: agent.companyId,
+     });
+    // Same condition as the fingerprint placeholder above: a resumable session
+    // must find its transcript in the next run's managed home.
+    if (resolvedAdapterEnv.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR === "<managed-ai-home>/provider" && env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR) {
+      const transcriptsDir = await linkManagedClaudeTranscripts({
+        claudeConfigDir: env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR,
+        stateDir,
+      });
+      skillCommandNotes.push(`Linked Claude transcripts to ${transcriptsDir}.`);
+    }
+     skillCommandNotes.push(
+       `Wrote Paperclip-managed Claude settings to ${paperclipClaudeSettings.filePath} (defaultMode=${paperclipClaudeSettings.defaultMode}${
+         paperclipClaudeSettings.overrodeDontAsk ? "; overrode user dontAsk" : ""
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/lease-lifecycle.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/lease-lifecycle.ts
+index 87e18ae..2224e60 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/lease-lifecycle.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/lease-lifecycle.ts
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { deleteJob, findPodForJob, getJobStatus } from "./job-orchestrator.js";
+ import {
+   deleteSandboxCr,
+   findPodForSandbox,
+  getSandboxCrStatus,
+   waitForSandboxReady,
+ } from "./sandbox-cr-orchestrator.js";
+ 
+@@ -191,3 +192,60 @@ export async function destroyLeaseResources(
+     );
+   }
+ }
+
+export interface WorkloadGoneInput {
+  namespace: string;
+  /** Workload resource name (Sandbox CR name or Job name) == providerLeaseId. */
+  name: string;
+  backend: "sandbox-cr" | "job";
+  podName?: string | null;
+  /** Stays below the server's 30 s default plugin RPC timeout. */
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  pollMs?: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Poll until the workload (and the named pod, if any) returns 404. Deletes use
+ * Foreground propagation, so the workload disappears only after its pod is
+ * gone. True is the evidence behind a `destroyed` termination receipt; false
+ * (still present at the deadline, or a read failed) means the caller must not
+ * claim one. Never throws: the delete itself already succeeded.
+ */
+export async function waitForWorkloadGone(
+  clients: KubeClients,
+  input: WorkloadGoneInput,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + (input.timeoutMs ?? 20_000);
+  const pollMs = input.pollMs ?? 500;
+  const gone = async (read: () => Promise<unknown>): Promise<boolean> => {
+    try {
+      await read();
+      return false;
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (isKubeNotFoundError(err)) return true;
+      throw err;
+    }
+  };
+  try {
+    return await pollUntilGone();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  async function pollUntilGone(): Promise<boolean> {
+    for (;;) {
+      const workloadGone = await gone(() =>
+        input.backend === "sandbox-cr"
+          ? getSandboxCrStatus(clients, input.namespace, input.name)
+          : getJobStatus(clients, input.namespace, input.name),
+      );
+      const podName = input.podName;
+      const podGone = !podName || await gone(() =>
+        clients.core.readNamespacedPod({ namespace: input.namespace, name: podName }),
+      );
+      if (workloadGone && podGone) return true;
+      if (Date.now() >= deadline) return false;
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, pollMs));
+    }
+  }
+}
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+index 9801638..bf5ce0a 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/plugin.ts
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import type {
+   PluginEnvironmentSyncInParams,
+   PluginEnvironmentSyncOutParams,
+   PluginEnvironmentSyncResult,
+  PluginEnvironmentTerminationReceipt,
+   PluginEnvironmentValidateConfigParams,
+   PluginEnvironmentValidationResult,
+ } from "@paperclipai/plugin-sdk";
+@@ -38,7 +39,11 @@ import {
+ } from "./sandbox-cr-orchestrator.js";
+ import { execInPod, execInPodStreaming, wrapCommandWithEnv } from "./pod-exec.js";
+ import { performSyncIn, performSyncOut, type PodStreamExec } from "./file-sync.js";
+-import { checkLeaseResumable, destroyLeaseResources } from "./lease-lifecycle.js";
+import {
+  checkLeaseResumable,
+  destroyLeaseResources,
+  waitForWorkloadGone,
+} from "./lease-lifecycle.js";
+ import {
+   appendNetworkEgressDenyHint,
+   createScopedNetworkEgressPolicyOrReleaseWorkload,
+@@ -578,7 +583,7 @@ const plugin = definePlugin({
+ 
+   async onEnvironmentReleaseLease(
+     params: PluginEnvironmentReleaseLeaseParams,
+-  ): Promise<void> {
+  ): Promise<PluginEnvironmentTerminationReceipt | void> {
+     if (!params.providerLeaseId) return;
+     const config = kubernetesProviderConfigSchema.parse(params.config);
+     const namespace =
+@@ -613,11 +618,22 @@ const plugin = definePlugin({
+         ?? (err as { code?: number; statusCode?: number }).statusCode;
+       if (code !== 404) throw err;
+     }
+
+    // The server grants continuation after a stopped run only with a
+    // termination receipt; without one a cancelled run's queued comment
+    // waits on `remote_cleanup` forever (REN-841). Claim `destroyed` only
+    // once the workload is confirmed gone.
+    const gone = await waitForWorkloadGone(clients, {
+      namespace,
+      name: params.providerLeaseId,
+      backend: leaseBackend,
+    });
+    if (gone) return { providerLeaseId: params.providerLeaseId, state: "destroyed" };
+   },
+ 
+   async onEnvironmentDestroyLease(
+     params: PluginEnvironmentDestroyLeaseParams,
+-  ): Promise<void> {
+  ): Promise<PluginEnvironmentTerminationReceipt | void> {
+     if (!params.providerLeaseId) return;
+     const config = kubernetesProviderConfigSchema.parse(params.config);
+     const namespace =
+@@ -658,6 +674,13 @@ const plugin = definePlugin({
+       podName,
+       secretName,
+     });
+    const gone = await waitForWorkloadGone(clients, {
+      namespace,
+      name: params.providerLeaseId,
+      backend: leaseBackend,
+      podName,
+    });
+    if (gone) return { providerLeaseId: params.providerLeaseId, state: "destroyed" };
+   },
+ 
+   async onEnvironmentExecute(
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/lease-lifecycle.test.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+index af0875f..d775799 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import {
+   checkLeaseResumable,
+   destroyLeaseResources,
+   isKubeNotFoundError,
+  waitForWorkloadGone,
+ } from "../../src/lease-lifecycle.js";
+ 
+ const SANDBOX_GROUP = "agents.x-k8s.io";
+@@ -346,3 +347,64 @@ describe("destroyLeaseResources", () => {
+     ).rejects.toThrow("forbidden");
+   });
+ });
+
+describe("waitForWorkloadGone", () => {
+  const input = { namespace: "ns", name: "pc-abc", backend: "sandbox-cr" as const, pollMs: 1 };
+
+  it("is true once the Sandbox CR and the pod return 404", async () => {
+    const getCr = vi.fn()
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(readySandboxCr("pc-abc-pod"))
+      .mockRejectedValue(notFound());
+    const readPod = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound());
+    const clients = { custom: { getNamespacedCustomObject: getCr }, core: { readNamespacedPod: readPod } };
+
+    await expect(
+      waitForWorkloadGone(clients as never, { ...input, podName: "pc-abc-pod" }),
+    ).resolves.toBe(true);
+    expect(getCr).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(getCr).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
+      group: SANDBOX_GROUP, version: SANDBOX_VERSION, plural: SANDBOX_PLURAL, namespace: "ns", name: "pc-abc",
+    }));
+  });
+
+  it("is false while the workload still exists at the deadline", async () => {
+    const clients = {
+      custom: { getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(readySandboxCr()) },
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      waitForWorkloadGone(clients as never, { ...input, timeoutMs: 5 }),
+    ).resolves.toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false while the pod still exists even if the workload is gone", async () => {
+    const clients = {
+      custom: { getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()) },
+      core: { readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ status: { phase: "Running" } }) },
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      waitForWorkloadGone(clients as never, { ...input, podName: "pc-abc-pod", timeoutMs: 5 }),
+    ).resolves.toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("checks the Job for job-backend leases", async () => {
+    const readJob = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound());
+    const clients = { batch: { readNamespacedJobStatus: readJob } };
+
+    await expect(
+      waitForWorkloadGone(clients as never, { ...input, backend: "job" }),
+    ).resolves.toBe(true);
+    expect(readJob).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ namespace: "ns", name: "pc-abc" });
+  });
+
+  it("is false (never throws) when a read fails with another error", async () => {
+    const clients = {
+      custom: {
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(Object.assign(new Error("x"), { code: 403 })),
+      },
+    };
+
+    await expect(waitForWorkloadGone(clients as never, input)).resolves.toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+index 4c23410..f4fd073 100644
+--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/test/unit/plugin-lease-lifecycle.test.ts
+@@ -184,12 +184,19 @@ describe("onEnvironmentDestroyLease", () => {
+     const deletePod = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({});
+     const deleteSecret = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({});
+     h.clients = {
+-      custom: { deleteNamespacedCustomObject: deleteCr },
+-      core: { deleteNamespacedPod: deletePod, deleteNamespacedSecret: deleteSecret },
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: deleteCr,
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+      core: {
+        deleteNamespacedPod: deletePod,
+        deleteNamespacedSecret: deleteSecret,
+        readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+       batch: { deleteNamespacedJob: vi.fn() },
+     };
+ 
+-    await plugin.definition.onEnvironmentDestroyLease!({
+    const receipt = await plugin.definition.onEnvironmentDestroyLease!({
+       driverKey: "kubernetes",
+       companyId: "acme",
+       environmentId: "env-1",
+@@ -209,14 +216,47 @@ describe("onEnvironmentDestroyLease", () => {
+       namespace: "paperclip-acme",
+       name: "pc-abc-env",
+     });
+    expect(receipt).toEqual({ providerLeaseId: "pc-abc", state: "destroyed" });
+   });
+ 
+   it("is idempotent: resolves cleanly when every resource is already gone (404)", async () => {
+     h.clients = {
+-      custom: { deleteNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()) },
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+       core: {
+         deleteNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+         deleteNamespacedSecret: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+        readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+      batch: { deleteNamespacedJob: vi.fn() },
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      plugin.definition.onEnvironmentDestroyLease!({
+        driverKey: "kubernetes",
+        companyId: "acme",
+        environmentId: "env-1",
+        config: CONFIG,
+        providerLeaseId: "pc-abc",
+        leaseMetadata: leaseMetadata(),
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toEqual({ providerLeaseId: "pc-abc", state: "destroyed" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns no receipt when the gone check cannot read the cluster", async () => {
+    h.clients = {
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(
+          Object.assign(new Error("forbidden"), { code: 403 }),
+        ),
+      },
+      core: {
+        deleteNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+        deleteNamespacedSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+        readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+       },
+       batch: { deleteNamespacedJob: vi.fn() },
+     };
+@@ -261,8 +301,12 @@ describe("onEnvironmentDestroyLease", () => {
+       core: {
+         deleteNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+         deleteNamespacedSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+        readNamespacedPod: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+      batch: {
+        deleteNamespacedJob: deleteJob,
+        readNamespacedJobStatus: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+       },
+-      batch: { deleteNamespacedJob: deleteJob },
+     };
+ 
+     await plugin.definition.onEnvironmentDestroyLease!({
+@@ -280,3 +324,71 @@ describe("onEnvironmentDestroyLease", () => {
+     expect(deleteCr).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+   });
+ });
+
+describe("onEnvironmentReleaseLease", () => {
+  it("returns a destroyed receipt once the Sandbox CR is gone (REN-841)", async () => {
+    const deleteCr = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({});
+    h.clients = {
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: deleteCr,
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+    };
+
+    const receipt = await plugin.definition.onEnvironmentReleaseLease!({
+      driverKey: "kubernetes",
+      companyId: "acme",
+      environmentId: "env-1",
+      config: CONFIG,
+      providerLeaseId: "pc-abc",
+      leaseMetadata: leaseMetadata(),
+    });
+
+    expect(deleteCr).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ namespace: "paperclip-acme", name: "pc-abc" }),
+    );
+    expect(receipt).toEqual({ providerLeaseId: "pc-abc", state: "destroyed" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns a destroyed receipt when the Sandbox CR was already deleted", async () => {
+    h.clients = {
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(notFound()),
+      },
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      plugin.definition.onEnvironmentReleaseLease!({
+        driverKey: "kubernetes",
+        companyId: "acme",
+        environmentId: "env-1",
+        config: CONFIG,
+        providerLeaseId: "pc-abc",
+        leaseMetadata: leaseMetadata(),
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toEqual({ providerLeaseId: "pc-abc", state: "destroyed" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns no receipt when the gone check fails", async () => {
+    h.clients = {
+      custom: {
+        deleteNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+        getNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(
+          Object.assign(new Error("server error"), { code: 500 }),
+        ),
+      },
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      plugin.definition.onEnvironmentReleaseLease!({
+        driverKey: "kubernetes",
+        companyId: "acme",
+        environmentId: "env-1",
+        config: CONFIG,
+        providerLeaseId: "pc-abc",
+        leaseMetadata: leaseMetadata(),
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Upstream paperclipai/paperclip commit this image is built from (REN-401).
+# a027f76 is the master commit the nightly image ran when this was pinned, so
+# the only change against that image is the patch next to this file.
+# PAPERCLIP_VERSION is `git describe --tags --match 'v*' --long` of that
+# commit, the value upstream stamps into its own images. Bump both together.
+PAPERCLIP_COMMIT=a027f76a726e8a556674eded807c2de0e55f5cc0
+PAPERCLIP_VERSION=v2026.916.0-219-ga027f76a7
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 ARG TOFU_VERSION=1.11.0

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6

 # Everything `bootstrap.sh vmtest` needs, so the rebuild test can run as a Job in
 # the cluster instead of on a workstation. The workstation has 31G and the test
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ credentials are out of scope (see "Deferred").
 |---|---|
 | Execution model | **B — server-local runs** (upstream default): agent CLIs are child processes of the server, in the server container. Trial only. |
 | Upgrade path | If Paperclip is kept: **C** — `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes` sandbox provider + kubernetes-sigs agent-sandbox controller (`agents.x-k8s.io`), per-run Pods and Secrets. Separate spec. |
-| Claude auth | **One shared Claude subscription AI connection**, created once via Paperclip's local sign-in (`claude auth login` into `ai-local-logins/<id>`); Paperclip stores and refreshes it. Server-env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is not used: `stripAiAuthBindings` blanks it for managed runs, and upstream accepts no pasted setup-token (the device-code flow needs a Daytona sandbox). |
+| Claude auth | **One shared Claude subscription AI connection**, created once via Paperclip's local sign-in (`claude auth login` into `ai-local-logins/<id>`), then its value replaced with a long-lived `claude setup-token` token. Paperclip stores the value as company secret "My Claude subscription" and injects it per run as `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`; it never refreshes Anthropic credentials, so the login's ~8h access token expires (runs then fail with "ACP agent reported a terminal access failure", 0 tokens). Renew by rotating that secret with a new setup-token (~yearly). Server-env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is not used: `stripAiAuthBindings` blanks it for managed runs, and upstream accepts no pasted setup-token (the device-code flow needs a Daytona sandbox). |
 | Bot credentials | Out of scope. Future "AIR-Manager" Paperclip role handles permission requests. |
 | Exposure | LAN-only, behind an Authentik forward-auth gate, then Paperclip's own login. |

@@ -189,7 +189,8 @@ available since v0.35.0). First use of digest reflection in this repo.
   **as the node user** (the entrypoint makes exec sessions root, and root-owned 0600
   credentials are unreadable to the server):
   `kubectl exec -it -n paperclip deploy/paperclip -- gosu node sh -c 'export CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=<shown path> && mkdir -p "$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR" && claude auth login'`
-   Repeat after loss of the PVC or database.
+   Then Settings → Secrets → "My Claude subscription": replace the value with the
+   output of `claude setup-token`. Repeat both after loss of the database.

 ## Verification
 - Flux Kustomization `paperclip` Ready; CNPG `pclp-pg` healthy; first ScheduledBackup
@@ -165,6 +165,21 @@ permanent recovery.

 ---

+## Velero restore-test: 80% OSD capacity gate
+
+The monthly Velero restore-test restores into the production Ceph pools. Before
+each schedule's restore it projects the restore's raw size (DataUpload
+`totalBytes` x the pool's replication/EC factor, spread over all OSDs) onto
+current OSD usage from Prometheus. If the fullest OSD would go above **80%**
+(`OSD_MAX_PCT` in `restore-test-cronjob.yaml`), that schedule is not restored:
+the Job log shows it as **SKIP** with the projected %, and the summary lists it
+under "Skipped (backup NOT restore-tested)". A SKIP does not fail the Job, so
+read the summary each month. If the projection cannot be made (Prometheus
+down, unsized DataUpload), the schedule is not restored and counts as FAIL.
+Background: REN-441, REN-442.
+
+---
+
 ## CNPG restore-test (verify backups are restorable — non-destructive)

 The monthly Velero restore-test (`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`) exercises
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ spec:
        # cert when doing server-side OIDC token exchange. Bundle both
        # roots into one PEM since NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS accepts one file.
        - name: fetch-le-staging-roots
-          image: curlimages/curl:8.10.1
+          image: curlimages/curl:8.22.0@sha256:58adaa4e8dca9c988bae2aba4ab3434a0bb2da16bbe3f92dec39ec7785166777
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /ca
      containers:
        - name: audiobookshelf
-          image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.36.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
+          image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.37.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 80
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ data:
            # return entries instead of short-circuiting. Built from
            # the samba-bridge repo at
            # gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge .
-            container_image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge-ldap-outpost:2026.5.3-f02b945
+            container_image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge-ldap-outpost:2026.8.3-872f754
            object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
            kubernetes_namespace: authentik
            kubernetes_replicas: 1
@@ -2121,6 +2121,74 @@ data:
            - url: https://dash.renner.uno/login/generic_oauth
              matching_mode: strict

+      # Matrix (REN-567): upstream login for MAS (account.matrix.renner.uno).
+      # Git owns this provider, its application and the member list.
+      # Public client + PKCE, so there is no client secret to share.
+      # RS256 with the built-in self-signed keypair: a public client has no
+      # secret for HS256, and MAS verifies the ID token signature.
+      - id: matrix-users-group
+        model: authentik_core.group
+        identifiers:
+          name: Matrix Users
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          is_superuser: false
+          # Every member can sign in to Matrix and gets an account named
+          # after their Authentik username. Add/remove members HERE.
+          users:
+            - !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
+
+      - id: matrix-mas-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
+        identifiers:
+          name: Matrix (MAS)
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          authentication_flow: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
+          authorization_flow: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          client_type: public
+          client_id: matrix-mas
+          # Authentik 2026.5 checks the grant type against this list, and a
+          # provider created by a blueprint starts with it empty, so every
+          # authorize fails with invalid_request ("Invalid grant_type for
+          # provider"). Providers made in the UI get the defaults.
+          grant_types:
+            - authorization_code
+            - refresh_token
+          signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, authentik Self-signed Certificate]]
+          property_mappings:
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-email]]
+          redirect_uris:
+            # The path ends in the provider ULID from apps/matrix/mas.yaml.
+            - url: https://account.matrix.renner.uno/upstream/callback/01M4480KWZGN9HBNB5SSNGT2M1
+              matching_mode: strict
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: matrix
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: Matrix
+          slug: matrix
+          provider: !KeyOf matrix-mas-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://element.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "Matrix chat (Element)"
+
+      # Only the Matrix Users group passes.
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, matrix]]
+          group: !KeyOf matrix-users-group
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false
+
      # Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
      # Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the
      # identification stage's webauthn_stage FK is SET_NULL and is
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ spec:
      # Pinned to match the samba-bridge fork's app image (server.Dockerfile
      # AUTHENTIK_VERSION). Bump in lockstep with the bridge rebuild — a
      # floating range drifts the chart ahead of the pinned app image.
-      version: "2026.5.3"
+      version: "2026.8.3"
      sourceRef:
        kind: HelmRepository
        name: authentik
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ spec:
        # 2. Pinning means the deployed binary is traceable to a
        #    specific repo commit. Bump the tag whenever a new build
        #    is published from gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge .
-        tag: "2026.5.3-f02b945"
+        tag: "2026.8.3-872f754"
      envFrom:
        # SAMBA_BRIDGE_DOMAIN_SID / _ENABLED_GROUP / _UID_OFFSET
        # consumed by the bridge module at Django app startup. Missing
@@ -100,6 +100,13 @@ spec:
            secretKeyRef:
              name: ldap-outpost-tls
              key: tls.key
+        # 2026.8 honours X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host/-For only from these
+        # networks. Traefik reaches authentik-server (IPv4 single-stack
+        # Service) from a pod IP; same ranges Traefik itself trusts for
+        # forwarded headers. Without them, HTTPS is seen as HTTP and SSO
+        # breaks. Comma-separated, no spaces (authentik list parsing).
+        - name: AUTHENTIK_LISTEN__TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS
+          value: "10.244.0.0/16,fd10:244::/48,127.0.0.0/8,::1/128"

    authentik:
      log_level: info
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ metadata:
  namespace: evcc
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: evcc
+  annotations:
+    # The MQTT client certificate reaches evcc as env (below), which does not
+    # follow a renewal. cert-manager renews it every ~60 days; Reloader then
+    # restarts evcc so it picks up the new PEMs before the old ones expire.
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mqtt-evcc-client-tls
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  # RWO PVC (`evcc-data`, ceph-block) can't be mounted twice, so the
@@ -23,13 +28,36 @@ spec:
      enableServiceLinks: false
      containers:
        - name: evcc
-          image: evcc/evcc:0.310.1
+          image: evcc/evcc:0.316.2@sha256:070c8a8912c5107e8424cef60bf8c3d3cac0eb32aa28d1b021d226545f0aac7b
          # evcc auto-discovers /etc/evcc.yaml on its default search path;
          # the file is delivered (with the MQTT password) via the
          # sops-encrypted evcc-config Secret mounted below.
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
+            # MQTT by client certificate (register account evcc-client,
+            # REN-953) on the mTLS listener. These override the mqtt block of
+            # evcc.yaml (viper AutomaticEnv, checked against 0.316.2); the
+            # file's user/password are ignored there, as the broker takes the
+            # username from the certificate CN. evcc wants the PEM text, not
+            # a path.
+            - name: EVCC_MQTT_BROKER
+              value: tls://mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884
+            - name: EVCC_MQTT_CACERT
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: mqtt-evcc-client-tls
+                  key: ca.crt
+            - name: EVCC_MQTT_CLIENTCERT
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: mqtt-evcc-client-tls
+                  key: tls.crt
+            - name: EVCC_MQTT_CLIENTKEY
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: mqtt-evcc-client-tls
+                  key: tls.key
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 7070
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ metadata:
 #     Web Service 9 = Music Assistant
 #     Web Service 10 = TRMNL
 #     Web Service 11 = Paperless (gate-level only, see its entry)
+#     Web Service 12 = Element Web
+#     Web Service 13 = Matrix (Synapse client API)
+#     Web Service 14 = Matrix Authentication Service
 #
 # CORRECTION (REN-21, 2026-09-25) to the Web Service 11 comment further down,
 # which claims that an in-cluster probe of the paperless ClusterIP "needs a
@@ -44,14 +47,15 @@ metadata:
 # production restart for a comment. This header is outside `data:`, so it is
 # inert; the served config is byte-identical.
 #
-#   * ../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#monitoring-admit
-#     ALREADY admits the whole monitoring namespace on every port, and
-#     monitoring is where
-#     blackbox-exporter runs. Cilium unions the allow rules of every CNP
-#     selecting an endpoint, so no extra policy is required.
-#   * The in-cluster paperless probe therefore exists, added with no change
-#     to the paperless namespace:
-#     monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml, target
+#   * When written, the paperless baseline admitted the whole monitoring
+#     namespace on every port, and monitoring is where blackbox-exporter runs.
+#     That admit is gone (REN-28); the probe is now admitted by the dedicated
+#     ../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#paperless-allow-blackbox,
+#     scoped to blackbox-exporter on the paperless pod's :8000. Cilium unions
+#     the allow rules of every CNP selecting an endpoint, so nothing else is
+#     required.
+#   * The in-cluster paperless probe therefore exists:
+#     ../monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml#paperless-app-health, target
 #     http://paperless.paperless.svc.cluster.local:80/accounts/login/
 #   * The claim does NOT generalise to gatus itself. Gatus runs in `apps`,
 #     which is a different source namespace; a gatus-sourced in-cluster check
@@ -227,6 +231,46 @@ data:
        conditions:
          - "[STATUS] == any(200, 301, 302)"

+      # Matrix (REN-663): Element Web, the Synapse client API and MAS.
+      - name: Web Service 12
+        group: services
+        url: https://element.renner.uno/config.json
+        interval: 60s
+        ui:
+          hide-hostname: true
+          hide-url: true
+          hide-port: true
+          hide-conditions: true
+          hide-errors: true
+        conditions:
+          - "[STATUS] == 200"
+
+      - name: Web Service 13
+        group: services
+        url: https://matrix.renner.uno/_matrix/client/versions
+        interval: 60s
+        ui:
+          hide-hostname: true
+          hide-url: true
+          hide-port: true
+          hide-conditions: true
+          hide-errors: true
+        conditions:
+          - "[STATUS] == 200"
+
+      - name: Web Service 14
+        group: services
+        url: https://account.matrix.renner.uno/.well-known/openid-configuration
+        interval: 60s
+        ui:
+          hide-hostname: true
+          hide-url: true
+          hide-port: true
+          hide-conditions: true
+          hide-errors: true
+        conditions:
+          - "[STATUS] == 200"
+
      # Removed 2026-05-21: Jellyfin (media.renner.uno), Wiki (wiki.renner.uno),
      # InfluxDB (influx.renner.uno) — hostnames NXDOMAIN, no Ingress; services
      # no longer deployed. Re-add when/if they come back.
@@ -6,7 +6,16 @@ kind: Kustomization
 # and verified. See MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md.
 resources:
  - statefulset.yaml
+  # The live size of the data volume; see the file (REN-583).
+  - pvc.yaml
  - service.yaml
  - ingressroute-ssh.yaml
  - ingress.yaml
  - networkpolicy.yaml
+  # Nightly prune of old CI image builds (REN-1203).
+  - package-retention.yaml
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: gitea-package-retention
+    namespace: gitea
+    files:
+      - package-retention.py
@@ -49,3 +49,26 @@ spec:
        - ports:
            - port: "3000"
              protocol: TCP
+---
+# Package retention CronJob (package-retention.yaml, REN-1203). It lists pods
+# to find the running image tags. The namespace baseline does not open the API
+# server: `kube-apiserver` is its own entity in Cilium (see
+# network-policies/paperclip-renner-ns.yaml); port is the post-DNAT 6443. Its
+# Gitea calls go to the in-cluster Service, which the baseline already allows
+# inside the namespace.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention-kube-apiserver
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+  egress:
+    - toEntities:
+        - kube-apiserver
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "6443"
+              protocol: TCP
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+"""Prune old CI image builds from Gitea's container registry (REN-1203).
+
+See package-retention.yaml for what is pruned, what is kept, and why.
+Standard library only.
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import ssl
+import sys
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from datetime import datetime
+
+GITEA = os.environ["GITEA_URL"].rstrip("/")
+TOKEN = os.environ["GITEA_TOKEN"]
+REGISTRY_HOST = os.environ["REGISTRY_HOST"]
+OWNERS = os.environ["OWNERS"].split(",")
+KEEP = int(os.environ["KEEP_IMAGES"])
+GROUP_SECONDS = int(os.environ["GROUP_SECONDS"])
+MAX_DELETES = int(os.environ["MAX_DELETES"])
+EXCLUDE = re.compile(os.environ["EXCLUDE_PACKAGES"])
+DRY_RUN = os.environ.get("DRY_RUN", "false") == "true"
+
+# A package is a CI build package if at least one of its tags looks like this.
+BUILD_TAG = re.compile(r"^(build\.[0-9]+|main-[0-9a-f]{7,40})$")
+ALWAYS_KEEP = {"main", "latest"}
+
+SA = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"
+
+
+def log(msg):
+    print(msg, flush=True)
+
+
+def gitea(method, path):
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        GITEA + path, method=method, headers={"Authorization": "token " + TOKEN}
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
+        body = resp.read()
+        return json.loads(body) if body else None
+
+
+def ts(s):
+    # Gitea returns RFC 3339, e.g. 2026-10-07T18:07:32Z or +02:00.
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(s.replace("Z", "+00:00")).timestamp()
+
+
+def running_images():
+    """Tags in use by any pod, per package. Packages referenced by digest only
+    cannot be matched to a tag, so they are returned in `unsafe` and skipped."""
+    ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=SA + "/ca.crt")
+    with open(SA + "/token") as f:
+        sa_token = f.read().strip()
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        "https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/pods",
+        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + sa_token},
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60, context=ctx) as resp:
+        pods = json.load(resp)["items"]
+    in_use, unsafe = {}, set()
+    prefix = REGISTRY_HOST + "/"
+    for pod in pods:
+        spec = pod["spec"]
+        for c in (
+            spec.get("containers", [])
+            + spec.get("initContainers", [])
+            + spec.get("ephemeralContainers", [])
+        ):
+            image = c["image"]
+            if not image.startswith(prefix):
+                continue
+            ref = image[len(prefix):].split("@", 1)[0]
+            repo, _, tag = ref.rpartition(":")
+            if not repo or "/" in tag:
+                unsafe.add(ref)
+                continue
+            in_use.setdefault(repo, set()).add(tag)
+    return in_use, unsafe
+
+
+def list_packages(owner):
+    out, page = [], 1
+    while True:
+        batch = gitea(
+            "GET", f"/api/v1/packages/{owner}?type=container&limit=50&page={page}"
+        )
+        if not batch:
+            return out
+        out.extend(batch)
+        page += 1
+
+
+def plan(versions, protected):
+    """Group tags into images (one push writes all tags of an image within a
+    few seconds) and return the tags of the images to delete."""
+    tags = sorted(
+        (v for v in versions if not v["version"].startswith("sha256:")),
+        key=lambda v: ts(v["created_at"]),
+        reverse=True,
+    )
+    images, last = [], None
+    for v in tags:
+        t = ts(v["created_at"])
+        if last is None or last - t > GROUP_SECONDS:
+            images.append([])
+        images[-1].append(v["version"])
+        last = t
+    delete = []
+    for i, image in enumerate(images):
+        if i < KEEP or set(image) & (ALWAYS_KEEP | protected):
+            continue
+        delete.extend(image)
+    return images, delete
+
+
+def main():
+    in_use, unsafe = running_images()
+    log(f"running tags from {REGISTRY_HOST}: {sum(len(t) for t in in_use.values())}")
+    work = []
+    for owner in OWNERS:
+        by_name = {}
+        for v in list_packages(owner):
+            by_name.setdefault(v["name"], []).append(v)
+        for name, versions in sorted(by_name.items()):
+            full = f"{owner}/{name}"
+            if EXCLUDE.search(full):
+                log(f"skip {full}: excluded")
+                continue
+            if not any(BUILD_TAG.match(v["version"]) for v in versions):
+                continue
+            if full in unsafe:
+                log(f"skip {full}: a pod pins it by digest only")
+                continue
+            protected = in_use.get(full, set())
+            images, delete = plan(versions, protected)
+            log(f"{full}: {len(images)} images, {len(delete)} tags to delete, running {sorted(protected)}")
+            work += [(owner, name, tag) for tag in delete]
+    if len(work) > MAX_DELETES:
+        log(f"abort: {len(work)} deletes exceed MAX_DELETES={MAX_DELETES}; nothing deleted")
+        return 1
+    failed = 0
+    for owner, name, tag in work:
+        if DRY_RUN:
+            log(f"dry-run: would delete {owner}/{name}:{tag}")
+            continue
+        path = "/api/v1/packages/{}/container/{}/{}".format(
+            owner, urllib.parse.quote(name, safe=""), urllib.parse.quote(tag, safe="")
+        )
+        try:
+            gitea("DELETE", path)
+            log(f"deleted {owner}/{name}:{tag}")
+        except Exception as e:  # keep going; report at the end
+            failed += 1
+            log(f"FAILED {owner}/{name}:{tag}: {e}")
+    log(f"done: {len(work) - failed} deleted, {failed} failed, dry_run={DRY_RUN}")
+    return 1 if failed else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# Nightly retention for CI image builds in Gitea's container registry (REN-1203).
+#
+# Why: nothing pruned old builds, so the data volume filled up (REN-580, at
+# 40Gi) and was down to 24% free again four days after the grow to 60Gi
+# (REN-1203, about 2.2 GB/day). Gitea 1.21 has no API for per-owner cleanup
+# rules, and the owners are human accounts, so the rules cannot live in Gitea.
+# This job applies the rule Hermes ran by hand in REN-1204.
+#
+# What it prunes, per package of the owners in OWNERS:
+#   - only CI build packages: at least one tag is `build.<n>` or `main-<sha>`.
+#     Date-tagged utility images (alpine-jq, cni-plugins, ...) are not touched.
+#   - one image carries several tags (build.N, short and long sha, sometimes
+#     main/latest). Tags pushed within GROUP_SECONDS are one image, and the job
+#     deletes all tags of an image, because a sha tag left behind keeps the
+#     blobs alive.
+#   - keeps the KEEP_IMAGES newest images, any image tagged main or latest, and
+#     any image whose tag a pod in the cluster runs now. A package that a pod
+#     pins by digest only is skipped as a whole.
+#   - never touches gitea_admin/* (CI base images) or EXCLUDE_PACKAGES. The
+#     agent-runtime images are excluded because Paperclip pins their tag in its
+#     own config, not in a pod that exists between runs.
+#   - aborts without deleting if the plan exceeds MAX_DELETES.
+# Freed blobs are removed by Gitea's own `cleanup_packages` cron (daily).
+#
+# Token: `gitea-hermes-bot-package-retention-token` on hermes-bot (site admin),
+# scope `write:package` only (REN-1204). Admin and repo routes return 403 with
+# it. Hermes owns the account and the token.
+#
+# Kubernetes access: list pods, cluster-wide, to find the running tags. Nothing
+# else.
+#
+# Dry run: set DRY_RUN to "true"; the job then only logs the plan.
+# Stop it: `spec.suspend: true` in git. Revert: delete this file, the
+# configMapGenerator entry and the policy in networkpolicy.yaml. Deleted images
+# cannot be restored; CI rebuilds one from its commit.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: gitea-package-retention
+  data:
+    - secretKey: GITEA_TOKEN
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/gitea/hermes-bot
+        property: gitea-hermes-bot-package-retention-token
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["pods"]
+    verbs: ["list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: gitea-package-retention
+    namespace: gitea
+---
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+spec:
+  # Quiet hour for CI pushes. Gitea's own daily cleanup_packages cron frees
+  # the blobs afterwards.
+  schedule: "30 22 * * *"
+  timeZone: Etc/UTC
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
+  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      backoffLimit: 0
+      activeDeadlineSeconds: 1800
+      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 604800
+      template:
+        metadata:
+          labels:
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+        spec:
+          restartPolicy: Never
+          enableServiceLinks: false
+          serviceAccountName: gitea-package-retention
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          containers:
+            - name: retention
+              image: docker.io/library/python:3.13-alpine@sha256:2d9aefe2fef018a7eb2c13064c89c71929800fd2e5dccdbf52ea5da5bb8d929a
+              command: ["python3", "/app/package-retention.py"]
+              env:
+                # In-cluster Service; the public name hairpins off the ingress
+                # LB from a pod (see networkpolicy.yaml).
+                - name: GITEA_URL
+                  value: http://gitea.gitea.svc:3000
+                - name: REGISTRY_HOST
+                  value: gitea.renner.uno
+                - name: OWNERS
+                  value: k.renner,konairius
+                - name: KEEP_IMAGES
+                  value: "5"
+                # Tags of one push land within seconds; the smallest gap
+                # between two images was 379 s (REN-1204).
+                - name: GROUP_SECONDS
+                  value: "60"
+                - name: MAX_DELETES
+                  value: "300"
+                - name: EXCLUDE_PACKAGES
+                  value: "^konairius/agent-runtime"
+                - name: DRY_RUN
+                  value: "false"
+                - name: PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
+                  value: "1"
+              envFrom:
+                - secretRef:
+                    name: gitea-package-retention
+              resources:
+                requests:
+                  cpu: 10m
+                  memory: 32Mi
+                limits:
+                  memory: 128Mi
+              securityContext:
+                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+                capabilities:
+                  drop: ["ALL"]
+              volumeMounts:
+                - name: script
+                  mountPath: /app
+                  readOnly: true
+          volumes:
+            - name: script
+              configMap:
+                name: gitea-package-retention
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# The live data volume of gitea-0, owned here so its size is set in git
+# (REN-583). The StatefulSet controller created this claim from the
+# volumeClaimTemplates in statefulset.yaml, but that template is immutable on
+# an existing StatefulSet, so changing the size there cannot be applied. A
+# PVC's resources.requests.storage CAN grow in place (ceph-block has
+# allowVolumeExpansion: true; ceph-csi grows the RBD image and the filesystem
+# online, no pod restart). Flux applies this over the existing claim with
+# server-side apply and the resize follows.
+#
+# - Name, namespace, accessModes, storageClassName and volumeMode must match
+#   the live claim exactly: they are immutable, a mismatch fails the whole
+#   gitea Kustomization (no change to the live claim).
+# - volumeName must stay: kustomize-controller has owned spec.volumeName
+#   since the namespace move pre-created this claim (eb23d3ac, #878).
+#   Without it, server-side apply tries to clear the field and the API server
+#   rejects the whole claim as an immutable-spec change.
+# - Grow only. A smaller value is rejected by the API server.
+# - prune: disabled, so removing this file from git never deletes the claim
+#   and its data. To hand ownership back, delete the file; the claim stays.
+#
+# Size history: 20Gi -> 40Gi 2026-07-22 (#336, live resize by hand);
+# 40Gi -> 60Gi 2026-10-03 (REN-583, after the volume filled again on REN-580).
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: data-gitea-0
+  namespace: gitea
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+  annotations:
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
+spec:
+  accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
+  storageClassName: ceph-block
+  volumeMode: Filesystem
+  volumeName: pvc-e7c56db2-481d-40cb-b94a-b264b7b4b5be
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 60Gi
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ spec:
          # both handled as explicit steps in MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md. Pinned
          # to match the LXC for a clean SQLite lift; no imagepolicy marker (an
          # auto-bump across versions on live SQLite data must never be applied).
-          image: gitea/gitea:1.21.4-rootless
+          image: gitea/gitea:1.21.4-rootless@sha256:600f1f1e1d090c763866db16882b5eac5c6a80b7664ee53bec0806c656c0033f
          env:
            - name: GITEA_WORK_DIR
              value: /var/lib/gitea
@@ -147,14 +147,10 @@ spec:
        accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
        storageClassName: ceph-block
        resources:
-          # Expanded 20Gi -> 40Gi on 2026-07-22 (ceph-block online resize) to
-          # clear a 100%-full outage (#336). The live PVC was resized directly.
-          # NOTE: volumeClaimTemplates is immutable on an existing StatefulSet,
-          # so bumping this value cannot be `kubectl apply`-ed in place — Flux
-          # will reject the whole object. Landing this size change requires a
-          # one-time `kubectl delete statefulset gitea -n gitea --cascade=orphan`
-          # (pod + PVC keep running) so Flux re-creates the STS from this
-          # template and re-adopts them. After the cleanup_packages GC reclaims
-          # the ~10G of orphaned blobs, real usage is ~9G, so 40Gi is headroom.
+          # This template only applies when the claim does not exist yet. The
+          # live size of data-gitea-0 is set in pvc.yaml (REN-583), not here:
+          # volumeClaimTemplates is immutable on an existing StatefulSet, so a
+          # change to this value cannot be applied and Flux would reject the
+          # whole object. Leave it at 40Gi.
          requests:
            storage: 40Gi
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: home-assistant-backup-password
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 1h
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: home-assistant-backup-password # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/backup-password
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ spec:
        # repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
        # without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
        - name: render-db-url
-          image: busybox:1.36
+          image: busybox:1.38@sha256:fd7dc98638c8e305f4dc34e979f1c0fdfdcaeb0fbf8fcff77ae834b6da3d7e6e
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
              memory: 32Mi
      containers:
        - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ spec:
        # substitution to POD_IP so nginx-runtime variables like $host
        # / $http_x_forwarded_for in the template stay intact.
        - name: proxy
-          image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.27-alpine
+          image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.31-alpine@sha256:26b0bf6fbf07297983cb341998d79c831508787de26627dd2a112321b9c3a4af
          env:
            - name: POD_IP
              valueFrom:
@@ -187,13 +187,62 @@ spec:
              memory: 32Mi
            limits:
              memory: 64Mi
+        # MQTT client certificate for Home Assistant (REN-953). HA keeps
+        # client certificates only as PEMs uploaded into its MQTT config
+        # entry, so a cert-manager renewal (~60 days) could never reach it
+        # without a reconfigure flow and an admin token. Instead HA's config
+        # entry points at 127.0.0.1:11883 (plain, loopback only) and this
+        # sidecar forwards to the broker's mTLS listener :8884 with the
+        # certificate of the register account `home-assistant`. The broker
+        # takes the username from the certificate CN; whatever user/password
+        # HA sends is ignored. --timed-reload picks up a renewed certificate
+        # for new connections without a restart; an open connection stays up
+        # (checked locally with ghostunnel v1.11.3 and mosquitto 2.0.22).
+        #
+        # Probes: liveness only, on the HTTPS status port (process alive). No
+        # readiness probe on purpose: a broker outage must not take HA out of
+        # its Service endpoints.
+        - name: mqtt-tls
+          image: ghostunnel/ghostunnel:v1.11.3@sha256:2599b8a04bae16d70a4209495618dea61b46a00a9a05fcf74da282688ad3517f
+          args:
+            - client
+            - --listen=127.0.0.1:11883
+            - --target=mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884
+            - --cert=/mqtt-tls/tls.crt
+            - --key=/mqtt-tls/tls.key
+            - --cacert=/mqtt-tls/ca.crt
+            - --timed-reload=10m
+            - --status=0.0.0.0:16060
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+          livenessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: 16060
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 4
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
        # Browser-based VS Code editing /config in-place. Sidecar (not
        # separate Deployment) because the config PVC is RWO ceph-block.
        # Exposed LAN-only on vscode.home.renner.uno; --auth=none means
        # any LAN client can edit, matching the user's trust-the-network
        # model. Runs as root so its writes match HA's root-owned files.
        - name: code-server
-          image: codercom/code-server:4.118.0
+          image: codercom/code-server:4.140.0@sha256:1c9ad972a78450f430155144110da4c02d3627c72a598e9197e2781fb9f92e28
          args:
            - "--auth=none"
            - "--bind-addr=0.0.0.0:8080"
@@ -253,7 +302,7 @@ spec:
        # in the PVC's remote URL; reload auth uses a dedicated long-lived token.
        # Runs as root to match HA's root-owned /config files. See config-sync.sh.
        - name: config-sync
-          image: alpine/git:2.54.0
+          image: alpine/git:2.54.0@sha256:a4bb51f1a3553df194ce679fc1db721d8bfba2046fa1a88fe9d4ac551ffbce25
          command: ["/bin/sh", "/scripts/sync.sh"]
          env:
            - name: SYNC_BRANCH
@@ -297,6 +346,14 @@ spec:
        - name: proxy-config
          configMap:
            name: ha-proxy-config
+        # Client certificate of the register account home-assistant, issued
+        # by mqtt-account-controller. Not subPath, so renewals land in place.
+        # 0444 because the sidecar runs as 65534; only this pod mounts it.
+        # Not in the Reloader annotation: a renewal must not restart HA.
+        - name: mqtt-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+            defaultMode: 0444
        # Writable emptyDir for the nginx entrypoint's envsubst output
        # (/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf rendered from the .template).
        - name: proxy-conf-d
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: esphome
-          image: ghcr.io/esphome/esphome:2026.6.2
+          image: ghcr.io/esphome/esphome:2026.9.1@sha256:776a845d508909bf426d2ee7bdd81796361ebe6a7f091807ce1d6d0b48985413
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          # Default entrypoint runs the dashboard (Device Builder) against the
          # mounted /config — no command override needed.
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
-  - backup-password-externalsecret.yaml
  - pvcs.yaml
  - deployment.yaml
  - service.yaml
@@ -13,12 +12,10 @@ resources:
  - prometheus-token-externalsecret.yaml
  - config-sync-token-externalsecret.yaml
  - mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
-  # health broker credential: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (first of the
-  # eight users to migrate off mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml).
+  # Former `health` probe credential. The broker no longer reads it (the
+  # probes use the cert account mosquitto-probe, REN-953); removed with its
+  # rotator in the REN-802 cleanup step.
  - mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
-  # open3e-int broker credential: open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal
-  # CAN; OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated.
-  - mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
  - mosquitto-config.yaml
  - mosquitto-certificate.yaml
  - mosquitto-service.yaml
@@ -69,6 +66,12 @@ resources:
  - ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
  - ha-pg-cluster.yaml
  - ha-pg-scheduled-backup.yaml
+  # MQTT credential management (REN-802): the account controller manages the
+  # production broker's Dynamic Security (REN-900). mosquitto-dynsec-test is
+  # the step-1 test broker, no longer managed; removal follows separately.
+  # Register: mqtt-accounts.yaml (configMapGenerator).
+  - mosquitto-dynsec-test.yaml
+  - mqtt-account-controller.yaml
 configMapGenerator:
  # nginx config for the reverse-proxy sidecar. Hash suffix disabled so
  # the cm name stays stable; editing proxy.conf does not auto-roll the
@@ -104,5 +107,28 @@ configMapGenerator:
    namespace: home-assistant
    files:
      - guard.sh=zigbee2mqtt-discovery-guard.sh
+  # Z2M external converters, copied into /app/data/external_converters by the
+  # seed-data init container on every start. Hash suffix disabled (name stays
+  # stable), so editing a converter does not auto-roll the pod — restart
+  # manually with `kubectl rollout restart deploy/zigbee2mqtt -n home-assistant`.
+  - name: zigbee2mqtt-external-converters
+    namespace: home-assistant
+    files:
+      - wetterstation-ws90.js=zigbee2mqtt-ws90-converter.js
+  # MQTT account register, read by mqtt-account-controller on every loop.
+  # Hash suffix disabled (name stays stable); the volume is not a subPath
+  # mount, so an edit reaches the running controller without a restart.
+  - name: mqtt-accounts
+    namespace: home-assistant
+    files:
+      - mqtt-accounts.yaml
+  # shelly-manager api-proxy sidecar config (REN-935). Hash suffix disabled
+  # (name stays stable), so editing shelly-manager-api-proxy.conf does not
+  # auto-roll the pod — restart manually with
+  # `kubectl rollout restart deploy/shelly-manager -n home-assistant`.
+  - name: shelly-manager-api-proxy
+    namespace: home-assistant
+    files:
+      - api.conf.template=shelly-manager-api-proxy.conf
 generatorOptions:
  disableNameSuffixHash: true
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ spec:
      labels:
        app.kubernetes.io/name: mdns-relay
      annotations:
+        # Bump to restart the pod and re-attach net1 (DHCP via multus).
+        # 2026-10-06: first attach on containernetworking/plugins v1.9.1.
+        homelab.renner.uno/restarted-for: "2026-10-06 cni-plugins v1.9.1 attach check"
        k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: mdns-relay-iot
    spec:
      enableServiceLinks: false
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ spec:
        # deliver, and the ClusterIP has no backend while HA restarts. The
        # trap forwards SIGTERM so the pod still terminates promptly.
        - name: socat-ipv4
-          image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
+          image: alpine/socat:1.8.1.3@sha256:82ad20f6f6e29b91ff33b6662d24063522b1378f08fd8569cd3ab412cac13f50
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          command:
            - /bin/sh
@@ -124,7 +127,7 @@ spec:
        # depends on the kernel's bindv6only default rather than on anything
        # stated here, so the roles are made explicit instead of inherited.
        - name: socat-ipv6
-          image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
+          image: alpine/socat:1.8.1.3@sha256:82ad20f6f6e29b91ff33b6662d24063522b1378f08fd8569cd3ab412cac13f50
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          command:
            - /bin/sh
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ kind: Job
 metadata:
  name: mosquitto-credentials-bootstrap
  namespace: home-assistant
+  annotations:
+    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
+    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
 spec:
  backoffLimit: 4
  template:
@@ -55,7 +59,7 @@ spec:
      restartPolicy: OnFailure
      containers:
        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -112,6 +116,10 @@ kind: Job
 metadata:
  name: mosquitto-admin-credentials-bootstrap
  namespace: home-assistant
+  annotations:
+    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
+    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
 spec:
  backoffLimit: 4
  template:
@@ -123,7 +131,7 @@ spec:
      restartPolicy: OnFailure
      containers:
        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -169,73 +177,6 @@ spec:
            limits:
              memory: 64Mi
 ---
-# Second broker user: `shellies`. Separate Secret (not a second key on
-# mosquitto-credentials) so each credential's lifecycle is independent —
-# rotating one never touches the other, and existing clusters whose
-# mosquitto-credentials was already generated for `homeassistant` only
-# don't end up with a half-populated Secret.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-shellies-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
---
 # Fourth broker user: `sml2mqtt` — the power-meter bridge. Publish-only
 # under `sml2mqtt/#` (ACL in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so
 # its lifecycle is independent of the others. The sml2mqtt pod reads this
@@ -245,6 +186,10 @@ kind: Job
 metadata:
  name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
  namespace: home-assistant
+  annotations:
+    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
+    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
 spec:
  backoffLimit: 4
  template:
@@ -256,7 +201,7 @@ spec:
      restartPolicy: OnFailure
      containers:
        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -313,6 +258,10 @@ kind: Job
 metadata:
  name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials-bootstrap
  namespace: home-assistant
+  annotations:
+    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
+    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
 spec:
  backoffLimit: 4
  template:
@@ -324,7 +273,7 @@ spec:
      restartPolicy: OnFailure
      containers:
        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -372,7 +321,7 @@ spec:
 ---
 # Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
 # to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
-# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs, exactly like the `shellies` user) and
+# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs) and
 # `read homeassistant/status` (HA's birth/will topic; on `online` Z2M
 # republishes cached device states, NOT discovery configs — ACL and the full
 # reasoning in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is
@@ -383,6 +332,10 @@ kind: Job
 metadata:
  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
  namespace: home-assistant
+  annotations:
+    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
+    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
+    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
 spec:
  backoffLimit: 4
  template:
@@ -394,7 +347,7 @@ spec:
      restartPolicy: OnFailure
      containers:
        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -10,3 +10,38 @@ spec:
    kind: ClusterIssuer
  dnsNames:
    - mqtt.renner.uno
+---
+# Server certificate of the mutual-TLS listener :8884 (REN-802). Issued by
+# mqtt-ca because certificate clients and mqtt-account-controller trust only
+# that CA. The Let's Encrypt certificate above stays on :8883 for password
+# clients. In-cluster names only; an outside cert client (edge-1) is REN-802
+# step 3.
+#
+# Long-lived on purpose: mosquitto reads its certificate only at start, and a
+# broker restart is an outage, so nothing restarts it for a renewal. With 2
+# years and renewal after 1, the broker serves a renewed certificate after the
+# next restart of any kind (image bump, node reboot) within that year; the old
+# one stays valid until then.
+apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+kind: Certificate
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-mtls
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  secretName: mosquitto-mtls
+  duration: 17520h
+  renewBefore: 8760h
+  dnsNames:
+    - mosquitto
+    - mosquitto.home-assistant.svc
+    - mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local
+  usages:
+    - digital signature
+    - server auth
+  privateKey:
+    algorithm: ECDSA
+    size: 256
+  issuerRef:
+    group: cert-manager.io
+    kind: ClusterIssuer
+    name: mqtt-ca
@@ -64,6 +64,66 @@ data:
    certfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.crt
    keyfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.key

+    # Mutual TLS for certificate clients (REN-802). Only certificates from
+    # mqtt-ca are accepted, and the certificate's CN is the username. Not on
+    # the LoadBalancer: in-cluster only (Service `mosquitto`).
+    listener 8884
+    max_connections 200
+    cafile /mosquitto/mtls/ca.crt
+    certfile /mosquitto/mtls/tls.crt
+    keyfile /mosquitto/mtls/tls.key
+    require_certificate true
+    use_identity_as_username true
+
    allow_anonymous false
+
+    # Two account sources side by side (REN-802 step 2, tested on 2.0.22 in
+    # REN-900, document `coexistence`):
+    #   Dynamic Security: accounts from the register mqtt-accounts.yaml,
+    #     managed live by mqtt-account-controller over $CONTROL.
+    #   password_file/acl_file: the legacy users, unchanged until each client
+    #     moves to the register (step 3).
+    # Dynamic Security is asked first. For a username it does not know, and
+    # for a request none of its roles match, it defers to the files. A
+    # register entry with the same name as a legacy user therefore replaces
+    # that user's password, while its acl_file block still applies to
+    # whatever the entry's roles do not cover. Delete the legacy user when
+    # its client moves.
+    #
+    # The acl_file check of 2.0 allows every SUBSCRIBE and checks only on
+    # delivery, so the Dynamic Security default must deny publishClientReceive.
+    # Otherwise every Dynamic Security client could read every topic.
+    plugin /usr/lib/mosquitto_dynamic_security.so
+    plugin_opt_config_file /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
    password_file /mosquitto/auth/passwd
    acl_file /mosquitto/auth/acl
+  # Dynamic Security start file, used until mqtt-account-controller has
+  # written the Secret mqtt-dynsec-seed. No secrets: only the controller's
+  # certificate client and a role that reaches the Dynamic Security API and
+  # nothing else.
+  dynamic-security.json: |
+    {
+      "defaultACLAccess": {
+        "publishClientSend": false,
+        "publishClientReceive": false,
+        "subscribe": false,
+        "unsubscribe": true
+      },
+      "clients": [
+        {
+          "username": "mqtt-account-controller",
+          "roles": [{"rolename": "mqtt-account-controller-admin"}]
+        }
+      ],
+      "groups": [],
+      "roles": [
+        {
+          "rolename": "mqtt-account-controller-admin",
+          "acls": [
+            {"acltype": "publishClientReceive", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true},
+            {"acltype": "publishClientSend", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true},
+            {"acltype": "subscribePattern", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true}
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
@@ -5,14 +5,6 @@ metadata:
  namespace: home-assistant
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-  annotations:
-    # REQUIRED for credential rotation to take effect. The startup shim rebuilds
-    # the password file only on pod start, so without this a rotated Secret sits
-    # inert while the old password stays valid indefinitely.
-    #
-    # Listed per-Secret rather than with the blanket auto annotation, so that
-    # enrolling another broker user is a visible edit to this line.
-    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials,mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
 spec:
  replicas: 1
  strategy:
@@ -54,7 +46,7 @@ spec:
        fsGroup: 1883
      containers:
        - name: mosquitto
-          # Pinned tag, auto-bumped within the 2.x line by Flux image-automation
+          # Pinned tag, auto-bumped within the 2.0 line by Flux image-automation
          # (infrastructure/image-automation/mosquitto.yaml). The marker tells
          # Flux where to write; patch/minor updates land as git commits and
          # roll the broker. HA re-publishes its own discovery afterwards, but
@@ -74,24 +66,14 @@ spec:
              set -eu
              rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd
              mosquitto_passwd -c -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd homeassistant "$HA_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd shellies "$SHELLY_PASSWORD"
              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd sml2mqtt "$SML2MQTT_PASSWORD"
              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e "$OPEN3E_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e-int "$OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD"
              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd evcc "$EVCC_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd health "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"
              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd zigbee2mqtt "$ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD"
-              # ACL: HA keeps full access (subscribes to everything); the
-              # shellies user is `readwrite shellies/#` (devices publish state
-              # and subscribe to their command topics) + `write homeassistant/#`
-              # so Shelly Gen2 firmwares can publish HA MQTT-discovery configs.
-              # It is WRITE-only on homeassistant/# on purpose: a publish-only
-              # client never needs to read the whole discovery/state tree, and
-              # denying read removes device-inventory recon for a compromised
-              # Shelly. (Full per-device write scoping isn't expressible with
-              # the flat discovery topic layout; that would need a dynamic-auth
-              # plugin — out of scope.)
+              # ACL: HA keeps full access (subscribes to everything). Shellies
+              # are not legacy users any more: each has its own Dynamic Security
+              # account from mqtt-accounts.yaml (REN-802, REN-1017).
              # `admin` is a workstation/debugging credential — full
              # readwrite, kept on its own credential so its password can
              # be rotated independently of the HA session.
@@ -112,10 +94,6 @@ spec:
              user homeassistant
              topic readwrite #

-              user shellies
-              topic readwrite shellies/#
-              topic write homeassistant/#
-
              user admin
              topic readwrite #

@@ -125,32 +103,15 @@ spec:
              user open3e
              topic readwrite open3e/#

-              # open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal CAN: own subtree
-              # under open3e/ so edge-1's listener on open3e/cmnd never sees
-              # its commands.
-              user open3e-int
-              topic readwrite open3e/int/#
-
              user evcc
              topic read open3e/#
              topic readwrite evcc/#
              topic read energy/#

-              # `health` is the broker's own probe credential (see the
-              # liveness/readiness probes below). Scoped to health/# and
-              # nothing else: the probes publish a random value retained and
-              # read it back to prove the broker actually stores+delivers
-              # (not just PUBACKs) — so the user needs read AND write, but
-              # only under health/#. A leak can only touch the throwaway
-              # probe subtree that nothing else subscribes to.
-              user health
-              topic readwrite health/#
-
              # `zigbee2mqtt` is the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (the ZHA replacement).
              # Owns its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree; may WRITE `homeassistant/#`
-              # to publish HA MQTT-discovery configs (write-only there, like the
-              # shellies user, to deny discovery-tree recon from a compromised
-              # bridge); and READs `homeassistant/status`, HA's birth/will topic.
+              # to publish HA MQTT-discovery configs (write-only there, to deny
+              # discovery-tree recon from a compromised bridge); and READs `homeassistant/status`, HA's birth/will topic.
              #
              # That read grant does NOT buy a discovery re-publish: on
              # `online`, Z2M 2.12.1 republishes bridge/state and cached device
@@ -165,8 +126,21 @@ spec:
              topic write homeassistant/#
              topic read homeassistant/status
              EOF
-              chown 1883:1883 /mosquitto/auth/passwd /mosquitto/auth/acl
-              chmod 0600 /mosquitto/auth/passwd /mosquitto/auth/acl
+              # Dynamic Security start file (REN-802): the controller's seed
+              # if it exists, else the static base file. The seed carries
+              # every register account and its hash, so the broker is in the
+              # desired state before the first client connects. The plugin
+              # rewrites this file on every $CONTROL change, so the broker
+              # user owns it and the directory.
+              if [ -s /mosquitto/seed/dynamic-security.json ]; then
+                cp /mosquitto/seed/dynamic-security.json /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
+                echo "dynsec: loaded seed from Secret mqtt-dynsec-seed"
+              else
+                cp /mosquitto/config/dynamic-security.json /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
+                echo "dynsec: no seed yet, loaded base file"
+              fi
+              chown 1883:1883 /mosquitto/auth /mosquitto/auth/passwd /mosquitto/auth/acl /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
+              chmod 0600 /mosquitto/auth/passwd /mosquitto/auth/acl /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
              exec mosquitto -c /mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf
          env:
            - name: HA_PASSWORD
@@ -174,11 +148,6 @@ spec:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: mosquitto-credentials
                  key: homeassistant-password
-            - name: SHELLY_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials
-                  key: password
            - name: ADMIN_PASSWORD
              valueFrom:
                secretKeyRef:
@@ -194,29 +163,11 @@ spec:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
                  key: password
-            # open3e-int: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (see
-            # mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml).
-            - name: OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-                  key: password
            - name: EVCC_PASSWORD
              valueFrom:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials
                  key: password
-            # Probe-only credential. Now OpenBao-backed and Class-A rotated (see
-            # mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml); its bootstrap Job
-            # is gone.
-            # Present here for the same reason as the others — the startup
-            # shim hashes it into the passwd file — and reused by the exec
-            # probes below, which run inside this container.
-            - name: HEALTH_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-health-credentials
-                  key: password
            # Zigbee2MQTT bridge credential (mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials-
            # bootstrap). Hashed into the passwd file here; Z2M reads the same
            # Secret via its init container to authenticate to the broker.
@@ -232,6 +183,9 @@ spec:
            - name: mqtts
              containerPort: 8883
              protocol: TCP
+            - name: mqtts-cert
+              containerPort: 8884
+              protocol: TCP
          volumeMounts:
            - name: config
              mountPath: /mosquitto/config
@@ -241,6 +195,15 @@ spec:
            - name: tls
              mountPath: /mosquitto/tls
              readOnly: true
+            - name: mtls
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/mtls
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: seed
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/seed
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: probe-tls
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/probe-tls
+              readOnly: true
          # Real MQTT round-trip probes, replacing the old tcpSocket checks.
          # A bare TCP accept proved only that a listener existed. Even a
          # QoS-1 PUBACK proves only that the broker acknowledged the publish
@@ -259,14 +222,14 @@ spec:
          # Liveness and readiness use SEPARATE topics (probe/live vs
          # probe/ready) so their rotating retained values never collide.
          #
-          # Uses the dedicated least-privilege `health` user (ACL: readwrite
-          # health/# only — see the passwd/acl build above and the
-          # mosquitto-health-credentials ExternalSecret). Its password is in
-          # this container's env (HEALTH_PASSWORD) because the startup shim
-          # hashes every user into the passwd file; the exec probes run
-          # inside this container and read it directly. A leak of this
-          # credential can only touch the health/# probe subtree, which
-          # nothing else subscribes to.
+          # Logs in as the register account `mosquitto-probe` (mqtt-accounts.yaml,
+          # REN-953): a client certificate from mqtt-ca on the mTLS listener
+          # :8884, ACL readwrite health/# only. No password exists for it.
+          # The Secret mount is not a subPath, so a cert-manager renewal
+          # reaches the next probe without a restart. --insecure skips only
+          # the hostname check, because the server certificate names the
+          # Service and the probe dials 127.0.0.1; the chain is still checked
+          # against mqtt-ca.
          #
          # mosquitto is a single-replica SPOF (HA, Shelly, sml2mqtt, open3e,
          # evcc). Liveness is deliberately slow to fire — failureThreshold 6
@@ -286,8 +249,9 @@ spec:
                - -c
                - |
                  V="probe-$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' ')"
-                  mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -u health -P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD" -q 1 -r -t health/probe/ready -m "$V" &&
-                  [ "$(mosquitto_sub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -u health -P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD" -t health/probe/ready -C 1 -W 5)" = "$V" ]
+                  T="-h 127.0.0.1 -p 8884 --insecure --cafile /mosquitto/probe-tls/ca.crt --cert /mosquitto/probe-tls/tls.crt --key /mosquitto/probe-tls/tls.key"
+                  mosquitto_pub $T -q 1 -r -t health/probe/ready -m "$V" &&
+                  [ "$(mosquitto_sub $T -t health/probe/ready -C 1 -W 5)" = "$V" ]
            periodSeconds: 15
            timeoutSeconds: 10
            failureThreshold: 3
@@ -298,8 +262,9 @@ spec:
                - -c
                - |
                  V="probe-$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' ')"
-                  mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -u health -P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD" -q 1 -r -t health/probe/live -m "$V" &&
-                  [ "$(mosquitto_sub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1883 -u health -P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD" -t health/probe/live -C 1 -W 5)" = "$V" ]
+                  T="-h 127.0.0.1 -p 8884 --insecure --cafile /mosquitto/probe-tls/ca.crt --cert /mosquitto/probe-tls/tls.crt --key /mosquitto/probe-tls/tls.key"
+                  mosquitto_pub $T -q 1 -r -t health/probe/live -m "$V" &&
+                  [ "$(mosquitto_sub $T -t health/probe/live -C 1 -W 5)" = "$V" ]
            periodSeconds: 30
            timeoutSeconds: 10
            failureThreshold: 6
@@ -320,3 +285,23 @@ spec:
        - name: tls
          secret:
            secretName: mosquitto-tls
+        # mqtt-ca server certificate and CA of the :8884 mTLS listener, read
+        # only at start (renewal timing: mosquitto-certificate.yaml).
+        - name: mtls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mosquitto-mtls
+        # Written by mqtt-account-controller. Optional so the broker still
+        # starts with the base file if the Secret is missing. Not in the
+        # reloader annotation: a register change is applied live over
+        # $CONTROL and must never restart the broker.
+        - name: seed
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-dynsec-seed
+            optional: true
+        # Probe certificate of the register account mosquitto-probe, created
+        # by mqtt-account-controller. Not optional: a pod without it fails its
+        # probes, so it waits for the Secret instead.
+        - name: probe-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-mosquitto-probe-tls
+            defaultMode: 0400
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+# Test broker for mqtt-account-controller (REN-802 step 1, REN-888).
+#
+# A second, throwaway mosquitto with the Dynamic Security plugin and a mutual-
+# TLS listener, so the controller can be proven (cert login, reconcile, seed
+# after restart, revocation) without touching the production broker. Nothing
+# in production connects here.
+#
+# Deliberately NOT labelled app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto: that label is
+# the selector of the production Services and of mosquitto-world-ingress, so
+# reusing it would put this pod behind mqtt.renner.uno and the IoT VLAN.
+# ClusterIP only; reachable from inside the home-assistant namespace.
+#
+# Removal: delete this file and its kustomization.yaml entry once production
+# runs Dynamic Security (REN-802 step 2).
+apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+kind: Certificate
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-dynsec-test-tls
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  secretName: mosquitto-dynsec-test-tls
+  dnsNames:
+    - mosquitto-dynsec-test
+    - mosquitto-dynsec-test.home-assistant.svc
+    - mosquitto-dynsec-test.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local
+  usages:
+    - digital signature
+    - server auth
+  privateKey:
+    algorithm: ECDSA
+    size: 256
+  issuerRef:
+    group: cert-manager.io
+    kind: ClusterIssuer
+    name: mqtt-ca
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-dynsec-test-config
+  namespace: home-assistant
+data:
+  mosquitto.conf: |
+    persistence false
+    log_dest stdout
+    log_type error
+    log_type warning
+    log_type notice
+    log_type information
+
+    # Dynamic Security owns authentication and ACLs. The plugin writes its
+    # state back to this file; it is an emptyDir, refilled by the
+    # initContainer on every start.
+    plugin /usr/lib/mosquitto_dynamic_security.so
+    plugin_opt_config_file /mosquitto/dynsec/dynamic-security.json
+
+    # Mutual TLS only. The client certificate's CN is the username; the
+    # Dynamic Security client of that name supplies the roles.
+    listener 8883
+    cafile /mosquitto/tls/ca.crt
+    certfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.crt
+    keyfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.key
+    require_certificate true
+    use_identity_as_username true
+
+    allow_anonymous false
+  # Start file used until the controller has written the Secret
+  # mqtt-dynsec-seed. No secrets: only the controller's certificate client
+  # and a role that reaches the Dynamic Security API and nothing else. Same
+  # shape as the controller's seed renderer (internal/dynsec/config.go).
+  dynamic-security.json: |
+    {
+      "defaultACLAccess": {
+        "publishClientSend": false,
+        "publishClientReceive": true,
+        "subscribe": false,
+        "unsubscribe": true
+      },
+      "clients": [
+        {
+          "username": "mqtt-account-controller",
+          "roles": [{"rolename": "mqtt-account-controller-admin"}]
+        }
+      ],
+      "groups": [],
+      "roles": [
+        {
+          "rolename": "mqtt-account-controller-admin",
+          "acls": [
+            {"acltype": "publishClientReceive", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true},
+            {"acltype": "publishClientSend", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true},
+            {"acltype": "subscribePattern", "topic": "$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1/#", "priority": 0, "allow": true}
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 10
+      # Runs as the mosquitto UID from the start instead of starting as root
+      # and dropping, so the dynsec file the initContainer writes is the
+      # broker's own.
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1883
+        runAsGroup: 1883
+        fsGroup: 1883
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      initContainers:
+        # Every start: the controller's seed if it exists, else the static
+        # base file. The seed carries every account and password hash, so the
+        # broker is in the desired state before the first client connects.
+        - name: dynsec-seed
+          image: eclipse-mosquitto:2.0.22 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:mosquitto"}
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - |
+              set -eu
+              if [ -s /seed/dynamic-security.json ]; then
+                cp /seed/dynamic-security.json /mosquitto/dynsec/dynamic-security.json
+                echo "dynsec: loaded seed from Secret mqtt-dynsec-seed"
+              else
+                cp /mosquitto/config/dynamic-security.json /mosquitto/dynsec/dynamic-security.json
+                echo "dynsec: no seed yet, loaded base file"
+              fi
+              chmod 0600 /mosquitto/dynsec/dynamic-security.json
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: config
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/config
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: seed
+              mountPath: /seed
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: dynsec
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/dynsec
+      containers:
+        - name: mosquitto
+          # Same tag and image policy as the production broker, so the test
+          # runs the version that production will run.
+          image: eclipse-mosquitto:2.0.22 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:mosquitto"}
+          command: ["mosquitto", "-c", "/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf"]
+          ports:
+            - name: mqtts
+              containerPort: 8883
+              protocol: TCP
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: config
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/config
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: tls
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/tls
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: dynsec
+              mountPath: /mosquitto/dynsec
+          readinessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: mqtts
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: mqtts
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+      volumes:
+        - name: config
+          configMap:
+            name: mosquitto-dynsec-test-config
+        - name: tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mosquitto-dynsec-test-tls
+        # Written by mqtt-account-controller. Optional: absent on the very
+        # first start, when the base file is used instead.
+        - name: seed
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-dynsec-seed
+            optional: true
+        - name: dynsec
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 4Mi
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-dynsec-test
+  ports:
+    - name: mqtts
+      port: 8883
+      targetPort: mqtts
+      protocol: TCP
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Projects the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker credential (open3e-esp32 gateway
-# on the Vitocal internal CAN) from OpenBao into the Secret the broker
-# consumes. Rotator: kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml.
-#
-# creationPolicy is implicitly Owner: deleting this ExternalSecret deletes the
-# live Secret. Set creationPolicy: Orphan first to detach without destroying.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
@@ -12,3 +12,7 @@ spec:
    - name: mqtt
      port: 1883
      targetPort: mqtt
+    # Mutual TLS for certificate clients and mqtt-account-controller (REN-802).
+    - name: mqtts-cert
+      port: 8884
+      targetPort: mqtts-cert
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+# mqtt-account-controller (REN-802, code REN-837, deploy REN-888).
+# Source: konairius/mqtt-account-controller (maintainer Hephaestus). Reconciles
+# the broker's Dynamic Security clients/roles/ACLs, the cert-manager
+# Certificates of `auth: cert` accounts and device passwords to the register
+# mqtt-accounts.yaml, every INTERVAL (2m).
+#
+# Manages the production broker `mosquitto` over its mTLS listener :8884
+# (REN-802 step 2, REN-900). The legacy users in that broker's password_file
+# are not Dynamic Security clients, so the controller never sees or touches
+# them.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+---
+# Find the Certificates it manages (label app.kubernetes.io/managed-by=
+# mqtt-account-controller) in every namespace. List only: no get, watch or
+# write cluster-wide.
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-list-certificates
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: ["cert-manager.io"]
+    resources: ["certificates"]
+    verbs: ["list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-list-certificates
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-list-certificates
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: mqtt-account-controller
+    namespace: home-assistant
+---
+# Per deliver.namespace: manage the account Certificates there (server-side
+# apply = patch, which creates through `create`). One Role + RoleBinding per
+# namespace that appears as `deliver.namespace` in the register: home-assistant,
+# evcc and paperclip.
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: ["cert-manager.io"]
+    resources: ["certificates"]
+    verbs: ["get", "create", "patch", "delete"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: mqtt-account-controller
+    namespace: home-assistant
+---
+# Secrets in home-assistant, by name only. This namespace holds every broker
+# and HA credential, so an unnamed `delete secrets` grant would let the
+# controller wipe all of them.
+#   mqtt-account-hashes, mqtt-dynsec-seed: its own state (server-side apply
+#     creates them, hence create + patch; resourceNames hold for an apply
+#     that creates, because the name is in the request path).
+#   mqtt-<name>-tls: delete on revocation, one entry per cert account
+#     delivered to this namespace. Add the name with the register entry.
+#   mqtt-ha-cert-sync: sha256 of the client certificate last accepted by
+#     Home Assistant's MQTT config entry (HA cert sync, REN-953/REN-1284).
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-secrets-home-assistant
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["secrets"]
+    resourceNames: ["mqtt-account-hashes", "mqtt-dynsec-seed", "mqtt-ha-cert-sync"]
+    verbs: ["get", "create", "patch"]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["secrets"]
+    resourceNames:
+      - mqtt-test-cert-tls
+      - mqtt-mosquitto-probe-tls
+      - mqtt-zigbee2mqtt-bridge-tls
+      - mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+    verbs: ["delete"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-secrets-home-assistant
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-secrets-home-assistant
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: mqtt-account-controller
+    namespace: home-assistant
+---
+# deliver.namespace evcc (account evcc-client): its Certificate, and its
+# Secret by name for revocation.
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: evcc
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: ["cert-manager.io"]
+    resources: ["certificates"]
+    verbs: ["get", "create", "patch", "delete"]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["secrets"]
+    resourceNames:
+      - mqtt-evcc-client-tls
+    verbs: ["delete"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: evcc
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: mqtt-account-controller
+    namespace: home-assistant
+---
+# deliver.namespace paperclip (account agents-read): its Certificate, and its
+# Secret by name for revocation.
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: paperclip
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: ["cert-manager.io"]
+    resources: ["certificates"]
+    verbs: ["get", "create", "patch", "delete"]
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["secrets"]
+    resourceNames:
+      - mqtt-agents-read-tls
+    verbs: ["delete"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+  namespace: paperclip
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-certificates
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: mqtt-account-controller
+    namespace: home-assistant
+---
+# The controller's own MQTT identity: CN = Dynamic Security admin client
+# (ADMIN_USER). Not labelled managed-by, so the controller never treats it
+# as an account certificate and never revokes it. Re-read on every TLS
+# handshake, so a renewal needs no restart.
+apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+kind: Certificate
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  secretName: mqtt-account-controller-tls
+  commonName: mqtt-account-controller
+  usages:
+    - digital signature
+    - client auth
+  privateKey:
+    algorithm: ECDSA
+    size: 256
+    rotationPolicy: Always
+  issuerRef:
+    group: cert-manager.io
+    kind: ClusterIssuer
+    name: mqtt-ca
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+  annotations:
+    # The controller reads the shelly-manager API key once at start; the
+    # quarterly rotation of shelly-manager-auth must restart it too.
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: shelly-manager-auth
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  # One writer at a time: two controllers would race on rotations and the
+  # seed Secret.
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: mqtt-account-controller
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65532
+        runAsGroup: 65532
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: controller
+          # Woodpecker builds main-<sha> on every merge to main; no sortable
+          # tag, so bumps are manual (same as ical-proxy).
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/mqtt-account-controller:main-cb96b1a@sha256:9d9b9e83a9c0f9f567e57edacab11cf4c58e8c0e49e38e8d7b51421cd1242911
+          env:
+            - name: BROKER_URL
+              value: ssl://mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884
+            # Password push to Shellies (accounts with deliver.shelly-manager).
+            # The API-key-only Service (api-proxy sidecar, :8081), like the
+            # agents; same namespace, so the default-deny allows it.
+            - name: SHELLY_MANAGER_URL
+              value: http://shelly-manager-api.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local
+            - name: SHELLY_MANAGER_API_KEY_FILE
+              value: /etc/shelly-manager/api-key
+            # HA cert sync (REN-953, REN-1284): keeps Home Assistant's MQTT
+            # config entry on mosquitto:8884 with the CA and client
+            # certificate of the register account `home-assistant`. After
+            # each loop the controller compares tls.crt (mounted below) with
+            # the last certificate HA accepted (Secret mqtt-ha-cert-sync) and,
+            # only inside 02:00-05:00 Europe/Berlin, runs HA's reconfigure
+            # flow. HA tests the connection before it saves. Defaults:
+            # broker mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884, cert dir
+            # /etc/mqtt-home-assistant-tls. Off while HA_MQTT_ENTRY_ID is unset.
+            - name: HA_MQTT_ENTRY_ID
+              value: 01KRFXD4046FEBWQ0EX0GNE418
+            # HA itself (:8123), not the :8124 XFF proxy; same namespace.
+            - name: HA_URL
+              value: http://home-assistant-bgp.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8123
+            - name: HA_TOKEN_FILE
+              value: /etc/ha-token/token
+            # Not :8080: several :8080 ingress grants in the home-assistant
+            # default-deny apply to every pod in the namespace.
+            - name: LISTEN
+              value: ":8081"
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8081
+              protocol: TCP
+          # /healthz is 200 while a reconcile succeeded within 3 x INTERVAL.
+          # Readiness only: a restart does not fix an unreachable broker.
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: register
+              mountPath: /etc/mqtt-accounts
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: tls
+              mountPath: /etc/mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: shelly-manager-key
+              mountPath: /etc/shelly-manager
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: ha-mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /etc/mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: ha-token
+              mountPath: /etc/ha-token
+              readOnly: true
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+      volumes:
+        # Not a subPath mount, so a register change reaches the running pod
+        # (kubelet sync, ~1 min) and the next loop reads it without a restart.
+        - name: register
+          configMap:
+            name: mqtt-accounts
+        - name: tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-account-controller-tls
+        # Only the api-key item, not the shelly-manager admin password.
+        - name: shelly-manager-key
+          secret:
+            secretName: shelly-manager-auth
+            items:
+              - key: api-key
+                path: api-key
+        # Client certificate HA gets (cert-manager renews it in place; not a
+        # subPath mount, so the next loop sees the new file).
+        - name: ha-mqtt-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+        # HA long-lived token of the service user `MQTT Cert Sync`
+        # (system-admin; config flows need admin). REN-1268.
+        - name: ha-token
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+---
+# HA admin token for the HA cert sync (see the Deployment env). Minted by
+# Hermes on a dedicated HA service user, not the owner's account (REN-1268).
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+  data:
+    - secretKey: token
+      remoteRef:
+        key: apps/home-assistant/mqtt-cert-sync-token
+        property: token
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+# MQTT account register (REN-802). The only definition of who may use the
+# broker: mqtt-account-controller reconciles certificates, device passwords
+# and Dynamic Security clients/roles/ACLs to this list. Format: README of
+# konairius/mqtt-account-controller.
+#
+# Delivered to the controller as the ConfigMap `mqtt-accounts` (see the
+# configMapGenerator in kustomization.yaml). An empty list is refused, so it
+# never revokes everyone.
+#
+# The controller manages the production broker `mosquitto` (REN-900). Its
+# legacy users (password_file in mosquitto-deployment.yaml) are not listed
+# here; each moves here with its client (REN-802 step 3). `test-cert` is the
+# certificate test account from REN-888.
+#
+# A cert account needs its Secret `mqtt-<name>-tls` added to the
+# `mqtt-account-controller-secrets-<namespace>` Role in
+# mqtt-account-controller.yaml, or revoking it fails with 403.
+- name: test-cert
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
+  acl: ["readwrite test/cert/#"]
+# The broker's own liveness/readiness probe (mosquitto-deployment.yaml).
+# Not named `health`: a Dynamic Security client of that name would shadow the
+# legacy password user while the old broker pod still probes with it.
+- name: mosquitto-probe
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
+  acl: ["readwrite health/#"]
+# Zigbee2MQTT and its two sidecars (discovery-guard, interview-watch), one
+# certificate for the pod. Same ACL as the legacy user `zigbee2mqtt`; not
+# named like it, so this entry cannot shadow the password login of a running
+# Z2M (REN-953).
+- name: zigbee2mqtt-bridge
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
+  acl: ["readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#", "write homeassistant/#", "read homeassistant/status"]
+# evcc (evcc namespace). Same ACL as the legacy user `evcc`, different name
+# so it cannot shadow the running password login (REN-953). evcc takes the
+# certificate PEMs by env (EVCC_MQTT_*), see apps/evcc/deployment.yaml.
+- name: evcc-client
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: evcc}
+  acl: ["read open3e/#", "readwrite evcc/#", "read energy/#"]
+# Home Assistant, via the ghostunnel sidecar `mqtt-tls` in its pod (HA keeps
+# client certificates only as uploaded PEMs in its config entry, so a renewal
+# could not reach it without a reconfigure). Same ACL as the legacy user
+# `homeassistant`; not named like it, so it cannot shadow that login (REN-953).
+- name: home-assistant
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
+  acl: ["readwrite #"]
+# Read-only account for agents (REN-953). One account for all of them: the
+# agents share sandboxes, so per-agent separation would be nominal. The
+# Secret lands in `paperclip`; agents fetch it per run with their kubectl
+# identity (Role mqtt-agents-read in apps/paperclip/agent-kubectl-rbac.yaml),
+# so a renewal needs no restart. Network path: agent sandbox pods ->
+# mosquitto :8884 only.
+- name: agents-read
+  auth: cert
+  deliver: {namespace: paperclip}
+  acl: ["read open3e/#", "read zigbee2mqtt/#", "read homeassistant/#"]
+# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan
+# and sml2mqtt, replacing the legacy password users `open3e` and `sml2mqtt`
+# (different name, so it cannot shadow their logins). The controller pushes
+# the password to edge-mqtt-cred on edge-1 (ansible role mqtt-bridge) over
+# HTTPS with its own client certificate, and pins edge-1's self-generated
+# server certificate on first contact (key edge-1.pin in mqtt-account-hashes;
+# delete it after a reinstall of edge-1).
+- name: edge-1
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {esp32: "https://edge-1.iot.renner.uno:8443"}
+  # No sml2mqtt/#: the SML meter reader is retired for good (owner,
+  # 2026-09-19; grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus).
+  acl: ["readwrite open3e/#"]
+# Shellies (REN-1017): one password account per device, pushed by the
+# controller through shelly-manager's per-device API. Name shelly-<id> =
+# shelly-manager device id. ACL as the former shared user `shellies`
+# (removed in REN-1017 step 4). Gen2+ devices reboot once when their password
+# is pushed. A new Shelly needs its entry here first: shelly-manager's MQTT
+# template user no longer exists on the broker.
+- name: shelly-5               # Plus i4, the API test device of REN-929
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 5}
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+# Only devices that log in as `shellies` today. A device with MQTT off never
+# reports connected, so the controller would push (and reboot it) again
+# every ROTATE_GRACE.
+- name: shelly-6
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 6}  # Plus i4 90380c3808b8
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-29
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 29}  # Plus i4 b8d61a8c7f24
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-3
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 3}  # Pro 3EM ac15186d43c0
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-42
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 42}  # 3EM-63 G3 d885ac1c5ab4
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-43
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 43}  # 3EM-63 G3 d885ac1ab274
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-10
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 10}  # Plug S Gen1 4382e5
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-22
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 22}  # Plug S Gen1 87e961
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-25
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 25}  # Plug S Gen1 1c1a8f
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-15
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 15}  # Plug S G3 8cbfea910578
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-16
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 16}  # Plug S G3 b08184a63ef0
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-14
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 14}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518e0be40
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-27
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 27}  # Plus 1PM Mini 348518e06c04
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-13
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 13}  # Plus 2PM 48551997e624
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-19
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 19}  # Plus 2PM 48551999a790
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-21
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 21}  # Plus 2PM 0cdc7efa8d00
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-34
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 34}  # Plus 2PM 3ce90e2f2d7c
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-2
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 2}  # Wall Display 00082266e106
+  # Checked but never rotated on "device not connected" (REN-1066).
+  rotate: false
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-26
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 26}  # Power Strip G4 206ef102a6cc
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-1
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 1}  # Pro 4PM 9454c5b9c954
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-4
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 4}  # Pro 4PM ac15186ca578
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-32
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 32}  # Pro 4PM 30c6f7834ec4
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-33
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 33}  # Pro 3 fce8c0db5f28
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+# HiluX DS8: HA drives them over MQTT only, and their firmware can hang in
+# the MQTT reconnect path until a power cycle (wiki
+# shelly-hilux-ds8-mqtt-reconnect-hang-bug). One unit at a time; 12 is a
+# bathroom mesh receiver, so its wall switch works without MQTT.
+- name: shelly-12
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 12}  # HiluX DS8 34b7da890cfc, Bad Spiegel Rechts
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-9
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 9}  # HiluX DS8 34b7da8c03d0, Bad Badewanne
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-31
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 31}  # HiluX DS8 34b7da888050, Bad Spiegel Links
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-44
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 44}  # HiluX DS8 34b7da894604, Toilette (standalone, no mesh)
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-30
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 30}  # Plus 2PM b48a0a226c28 (reachable again, REN-1108)
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+# Sleeping H&Ts (REN-1107): awake only 8-13 s every 1-2 h, so the
+# controller pushes when the device publishes `online` on its wake topic
+# (shelly-manager topic prefix `shellies/<hostname>`), not in the 2-min loop.
+- name: shelly-35
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 35}  # Plus H&T 08b61fcea690
+  wake: shellies/shellyplusht-08b61fcea690/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-36
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 36}  # Plus H&T 08b61fce90dc
+  wake: shellies/shellyplusht-08b61fce90dc/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-37
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 37}  # H&T G3 84fce63ab4d8
+  wake: shellies/shellyhtg3-84fce63ab4d8/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
+- name: shelly-38
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {shelly-manager: 38}  # H&T G3 ecda3bc0b6a0
+  wake: shellies/shellyhtg3-ecda3bc0b6a0/online
+  acl: ["readwrite shellies/#", "write homeassistant/#"]
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# API-key-only listener for shelly-manager (REN-931, REN-935). Rendered by the
+# nginx-unprivileged entrypoint (envsubst, filtered to POD_IP) into
+# /etc/nginx/conf.d/ at start.
+#
+# shelly-manager signs in whoever X-authentik-username names when the peer is
+# in Auth__ReverseProxy__TrustedProxies (the pod CIDR). Only the Authentik
+# outpost may reach :8080 directly. Paperclip agent pods reach this :8081
+# instead, which drops the identity header, so every request here falls through
+# to the API key (or the login cookie) and a forged header gets 401.
+#
+# Bound to ${POD_IP}, not 0.0.0.0, so it stays off the net1 macvlan (see the
+# ASPNETCORE_URLS comment in shelly-manager-deployment.yaml).
+server {
+    listen ${POD_IP}:8081;
+    server_tokens off;
+    client_max_body_size 64m;
+
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://${POD_IP}:8080;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        # Empty value = nginx does not pass the header at all, whatever the
+        # client's case or how many copies it sent. X-Forwarded-User is the
+        # app's default HeaderName, dropped too in case the setting changes.
+        # Header names with underscores never pass (ignore_invalid_headers).
+        proxy_set_header X-authentik-username "";
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-User "";
+        proxy_read_timeout 300s;
+    }
+}
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: shelly-manager
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/shelly-manager:build.1784957186 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/shelly-manager:build.1791426752 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          ports:
            - name: http
@@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ spec:
            # outpost pod's address is dynamic, so this trusts the cluster pod
            # CIDR and leans on the namespace CNP to keep other pods off the
            # app port. ADMIN_PASSWORD (above) stays as break-glass, e.g. for
-            # port-forward access when authentik is down.
+            # port-forward access when authentik is down. Never open :8080 to
+            # another client: they get the api-proxy sidecar's :8081 (below),
+            # which drops the header (REN-935).
            - name: Auth__ReverseProxy__Enabled
              value: "true"
            - name: Auth__ReverseProxy__HeaderName
@@ -168,7 +170,62 @@ spec:
              memory: 128Mi
            limits:
              memory: 512Mi
+        # API-key-only listener for clients other than the Authentik outpost
+        # (Paperclip agents, REN-931). nginx on ${POD_IP}:8081 proxies to
+        # :8080 and drops X-authentik-username, so the ProxyHeader sign-in
+        # cannot be reached through it. Config and reasoning:
+        # shelly-manager-api-proxy.conf. Service: shelly-manager-api.
+        # No probes: it only serves the agent path, and a probe failure would
+        # also pull the outpost's endpoint out of the shelly-manager Service.
+        - name: api-proxy
+          image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.31-alpine@sha256:26b0bf6fbf07297983cb341998d79c831508787de26627dd2a112321b9c3a4af
+          env:
+            - name: POD_IP
+              valueFrom:
+                fieldRef:
+                  fieldPath: status.podIP
+            - name: NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER
+              value: "^POD_IP$"
+          ports:
+            - name: api
+              containerPort: 8081
+              protocol: TCP
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 101
+            runAsGroup: 101
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 10m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: api-proxy-config
+              mountPath: /etc/nginx/templates
+              readOnly: true
+            # envsubst output of the template above.
+            - name: api-proxy-conf-d
+              mountPath: /etc/nginx/conf.d
+            # pid file and proxy temp paths of the unprivileged image.
+            - name: api-proxy-tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
      volumes:
        - name: data
          persistentVolumeClaim:
            claimName: shelly-manager-data
+        - name: api-proxy-config
+          configMap:
+            name: shelly-manager-api-proxy
+        - name: api-proxy-conf-d
+          emptyDir:
+            medium: Memory
+            sizeLimit: 1Mi
+        - name: api-proxy-tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            medium: Memory
+            sizeLimit: 32Mi
@@ -11,3 +11,21 @@ spec:
      port: 80
      targetPort: http
      protocol: TCP
+---
+# API-key-only entry for Paperclip agent pods (REN-931, REN-935): the
+# api-proxy sidecar, which drops the X-authentik-username header. Agents call
+# http://shelly-manager-api.home-assistant.svc/api/v1/... with the API key.
+# The CNPs admit agents to :8081 only; :8080 stays outpost-only.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: shelly-manager-api
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 80
+      targetPort: api
+      protocol: TCP
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ data:
  # config once the PVC has been seeded — change the on-PVC file (via the Z2M
  # frontend or an edit) instead. Kept here so a fresh PVC comes up configured.
  #
-  # Secrets are NOT in this file: both the MQTT password and the Zigbee
-  # network_key are quoted parseValueRefs (`"!secret <key>"`) resolved from
-  # /app/data/secret.yaml, which the init container renders — the MQTT password
-  # from the broker-credential Secret, and the network_key extracted from the
-  # OpenBao coordinator backup. The non-secret network params (channel/pan_id/
+  # Secrets are NOT in this file: the Zigbee network_key is a quoted
+  # parseValueRef (`"!secret <key>"`) resolved from /app/data/secret.yaml,
+  # which the init container renders from the OpenBao coordinator backup. MQTT
+  # uses the client certificate mounted at /mqtt-tls (REN-953); the Deployment
+  # also sets the mqtt server/ca/cert/key by env, which wins over this file. The non-secret network params (channel/pan_id/
  # ext_pan_id) are in `advanced` below.
  configuration.yaml: |
    # Home Assistant MQTT discovery — Z2M publishes device configs under the
@@ -32,14 +32,12 @@ data:

    mqtt:
      base_topic: zigbee2mqtt
-      server: mqtt://mosquitto:1883
-      user: zigbee2mqtt
-      # MUST be a QUOTED string: Z2M reads secrets via parseValueRef on the
-      # string value (regex `!<file> <key>`), NOT a YAML `!secret` tag. Unquoted
-      # `!secret ...` is parsed as a tag and throws "unknown scalar tag
-      # !<!secret>". The init container renders /app/data/secret.yaml with
-      # `mqtt_password` from the broker-credential Secret.
-      password: "!secret mqtt_password"
+      # Mutual TLS: the broker takes the username from the certificate CN
+      # (zigbee2mqtt-bridge), so no user or password here.
+      server: mqtts://mosquitto:8884
+      ca: /mqtt-tls/ca.crt
+      cert: /mqtt-tls/tls.crt
+      key: /mqtt-tls/tls.key

    # SMLIGHT SLZB-06 (Texas Instruments CC2652, zigpy-znp under ZHA) reached
    # over TCP on the IoT VLAN — the SAME coordinator ZHA uses today
@@ -32,9 +32,11 @@ spec:
        # backup also handles the ZHA<->Z2M ext_pan_id byte-order reversal —
        # which is why we restore a backup rather than hand-set advanced.ext_pan_id).
        # Renders /app/data/secret.yaml (referenced by the config as quoted
-        # "!secret" parseValueRefs) with the MQTT password AND the Zigbee
-        # network_key, the latter extracted from the OpenBao coordinator backup
-        # as a natural-byte-order int array.
+        # "!secret" parseValueRefs) with the Zigbee network_key, extracted from
+        # the OpenBao coordinator backup as a natural-byte-order int array. No
+        # MQTT password since REN-953: `mqtt_password` is absent, so Z2M's
+        # "!secret mqtt_password" resolves to nothing and it logs in by
+        # certificate alone.
        - name: seed-data
          # Our own alpine + jq image, built by build-ci-images.yml. DATED tag,
          # never :latest — rebuilding this base for an unrelated consumer
@@ -114,7 +116,6 @@ spec:
              # hex key "fe0b..2d" -> "0xfe,0x0b,..,0x2d" (natural order)
              NK=$(printf '%s' "$KEY" | sed 's/../0x&,/g; s/,$//')
              cat > /app/data/secret.yaml <<EOF
-              mqtt_password: "${MQTT_PASSWORD}"
              network_key: [${NK}]
              EOF
              if [ ! -f /app/data/configuration.yaml ]; then
@@ -132,12 +133,13 @@ spec:
              else
                echo "existing Z2M state present; NOT touching coordinator_backup.json"
              fi
-          env:
-            - name: MQTT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
-                  key: password
+              # External converters: overwritten from git on EVERY start (not
+              # seed-only). Copied rather than mounted because Z2M writes a temp
+              # copy of each converter into this directory while loading it
+              # (dist/extension/externalJS.js), which a read-only mount refuses.
+              mkdir -p /app/data/external_converters
+              cp /external-converters/*.js /app/data/external_converters/
+              echo "copied external converters: $(ls /external-converters)"
          volumeMounts:
            - name: data
              mountPath: /app/data
@@ -147,6 +149,9 @@ spec:
            - name: coordinator-backup
              mountPath: /backup
              readOnly: true
+            - name: external-converters
+              mountPath: /external-converters
+              readOnly: true
          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 10m
@@ -158,19 +163,36 @@ spec:
          # Pinned tag. No Flux image-automation marker yet (unlike mosquitto) —
          # add an infrastructure/image-automation/zigbee2mqtt.yaml policy as a
          # follow-up if desired; pinned-and-manual is fine for the initial cutover.
-          image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.13.0
+          image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.14.2@sha256:addbfb08fcef2e4477de1535636118241e10d13e898fbe4d9faba8a4d7396311
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_DATA
              value: /app/data
+            # MQTT by client certificate (register account zigbee2mqtt-bridge,
+            # REN-953). Env, not the seed template: configuration.yaml on the
+            # PVC is Z2M's own and is never re-seeded. Z2M copies env values
+            # into that file on its next settings write, so a rollback must
+            # set these to the old values, not just drop them. The file keeps
+            # `user: zigbee2mqtt`; the broker ignores it and uses the CN.
+            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_CONFIG_MQTT_SERVER
+              value: mqtts://mosquitto:8884
+            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_CONFIG_MQTT_CA
+              value: /mqtt-tls/ca.crt
+            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_CONFIG_MQTT_CERT
+              value: /mqtt-tls/tls.crt
+            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_CONFIG_MQTT_KEY
+              value: /mqtt-tls/tls.key
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 8080
          volumeMounts:
            - name: data
              mountPath: /app/data
+            - name: mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
          # The frontend only serves once Z2M has started its adapter+MQTT, so
          # an HTTP 200 on / is a decent liveness/readiness signal. Generous
          # startup budget covers coordinator connect + herdsman network adopt.
@@ -194,12 +216,15 @@ spec:
            periodSeconds: 30
            timeoutSeconds: 5
            failureThreshold: 4
+          # Node sizes the V8 heap from this limit: 512Mi gave a 259 MB heap,
+          # and Z2M died on "JavaScript heap out of memory" (exit 134) at
+          # 2026-09-28 17:56Z and 2026-09-29 07:36Z.
          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 50m
-              memory: 128Mi
+              memory: 256Mi
            limits:
-              memory: 512Mi
+              memory: 1Gi
        # Fires a forced interview whenever a still-un-interviewed device
        # transmits — i.e. at the only moment a sleepy battery device can
        # actually complete one. Z2M itself only retries interviews on a ZDO
@@ -226,19 +251,16 @@ spec:
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          command: [sh, /script/watch.sh]
          env:
-            - name: MQTT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
-                  key: password
-            # These three must track zigbee2mqtt-config.yaml: MQTT_HOST the
-            # mosquitto Service name, MQTT_USER and BASE_TOPIC the mqtt.user and
-            # mqtt.base_topic it connects with. Set explicitly rather than left
-            # to the script's defaults so the coupling is visible here.
+            # Must track the Z2M container: MQTT_HOST/MQTT_PORT the broker it
+            # connects to, BASE_TOPIC its mqtt.base_topic. Set explicitly
+            # rather than left to the script's defaults so the coupling is
+            # visible here. Logs in with the pod's certificate (/mqtt-tls).
            - name: MQTT_HOST
              value: mosquitto
-            - name: MQTT_USER
-              value: zigbee2mqtt
+            - name: MQTT_PORT
+              value: "8884"
+            - name: MQTT_TLS_DIR
+              value: /mqtt-tls
            - name: BASE_TOPIC
              value: zigbee2mqtt
            - name: STATEDIR
@@ -261,6 +283,9 @@ spec:
            - name: interview-watch-script
              mountPath: /script
              readOnly: true
+            - name: mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
            # Cooldown stamps. An explicit emptyDir rather than the image's
            # /tmp, so it stays writable as non-root without depending on the
            # container filesystem.
@@ -292,19 +317,16 @@ spec:
          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
          command: [sh, /script/guard.sh]
          env:
-            # Reuses the Z2M broker credential: its ACL is `readwrite
-            # zigbee2mqtt/#`, which covers reading bridge/state/bridge/groups and
-            # writing bridge/request/restart. No new broker user needed.
-            - name: MQTT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
-                  key: password
-            # Must track zigbee2mqtt-config.yaml, same as interview-watch.
+            # Shares the Z2M certificate: its ACL is `readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#`,
+            # which covers reading bridge/state/bridge/groups and writing
+            # bridge/request/restart. Must track the Z2M container, same as
+            # interview-watch.
            - name: MQTT_HOST
              value: mosquitto
-            - name: MQTT_USER
-              value: zigbee2mqtt
+            - name: MQTT_PORT
+              value: "8884"
+            - name: MQTT_TLS_DIR
+              value: /mqtt-tls
            - name: BASE_TOPIC
              value: zigbee2mqtt
            - name: STATEDIR
@@ -320,6 +342,9 @@ spec:
            - name: discovery-guard-script
              mountPath: /script
              readOnly: true
+            - name: mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
            # Restart cooldown stamp. Its own emptyDir rather than the image's
            # /tmp, so it stays writable as non-root.
            - name: discovery-guard-state
@@ -337,12 +362,24 @@ spec:
        - name: config-template
          configMap:
            name: zigbee2mqtt-config
+        - name: external-converters
+          configMap:
+            name: zigbee2mqtt-external-converters
        - name: coordinator-backup
          secret:
            secretName: zigbee2mqtt-coordinator-backup
        - name: interview-watch-script
          configMap:
            name: zigbee2mqtt-interview-watch-script
+        # Client certificate of the register account zigbee2mqtt-bridge,
+        # issued by mqtt-account-controller. Not subPath, so a cert-manager
+        # renewal reaches the files in place; Z2M reads them at connect, the
+        # sidecars on every call. 0444 because the sidecars run as UID 1883
+        # and Z2M as root; only this pod mounts it.
+        - name: mqtt-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-zigbee2mqtt-bridge-tls
+            defaultMode: 0444
        - name: interview-watch-state
          emptyDir:
            medium: Memory
@@ -61,16 +61,19 @@
 # herdsman-only restart. discover() republishes only configs that are missing or
 # whose payload changed, which after a wipe is all of them.
 #
-# Credentials: reuses the existing zigbee2mqtt broker user, whose ACL is
+# Credentials: the pod's client certificate (register account
+# zigbee2mqtt-bridge, REN-953) on the mTLS listener :8884. Its ACL is
 # `readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#` — enough to read bridge/state and bridge/groups and
-# to write bridge/request/restart. No new broker user, and no read grant on
-# homeassistant/# (checking for the discovery configs directly would have needed
-# one, which the ACL denies on purpose).
+# to write bridge/request/restart. No read grant on homeassistant/# (checking
+# for the discovery configs directly would have needed one, which the ACL
+# denies on purpose).
 set -eu

 MQTT_HOST="${MQTT_HOST:-mosquitto}"
-MQTT_PORT="${MQTT_PORT:-1883}"
-MQTT_USER="${MQTT_USER:-zigbee2mqtt}"
+MQTT_PORT="${MQTT_PORT:-8884}"
+# ca.crt, tls.crt, tls.key of the client certificate. The broker takes the
+# username from the certificate CN.
+MQTT_TLS_DIR="${MQTT_TLS_DIR:-/mqtt-tls}"
 BASE_TOPIC="${BASE_TOPIC:-zigbee2mqtt}"
 # Poll cadence. Worst-case time-to-repair is CHECK_INTERVAL + CONFIRM_DELAY.
 CHECK_INTERVAL="${CHECK_INTERVAL:-300}"
@@ -105,7 +108,7 @@ log() { echo "[$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')] discovery-guard: $*"; }
 # ever paid when the topic is genuinely empty.
 retained() {
  timeout "$((READ_TIMEOUT + 5))" mosquitto_sub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" \
-    -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" \
+    --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" \
    -t "$1" -C 1 -W "$READ_TIMEOUT" 2>/dev/null || true
 }

@@ -152,7 +155,7 @@ while true; do

  log "confirmed — requesting a Zigbee2MQTT restart to re-run discovery"
  if timeout "$PUB_TIMEOUT" mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" \
-       -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" \
+       --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" \
       -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/restart" -m '' 2>/dev/null; then
    date -u +%s > "$STAMP"
    log "restart requested"
@@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ set -u
 DATA=/app/data
 DB="$DATA/database.db"
 MQTT_HOST=${MQTT_HOST:-mosquitto}
-MQTT_USER=${MQTT_USER:-zigbee2mqtt}
+MQTT_PORT=${MQTT_PORT:-8884}
+# ca.crt, tls.crt, tls.key of the pod's client certificate (register account
+# zigbee2mqtt-bridge, REN-953). The broker takes the username from its CN.
+MQTT_TLS_DIR=${MQTT_TLS_DIR:-/mqtt-tls}
 # Must track mqtt.base_topic in zigbee2mqtt-config.yaml. Overridable via env so
 # the two can be kept in step from the Deployment rather than by editing this
 # script; the MQTT ACL for this user is scoped to `zigbee2mqtt/#`, so a change
@@ -219,10 +222,6 @@ while :; do
    fi

    log "frame from $ieee (nwk=$nwk cluster=$cluster) while awake -> requesting interview"
-    # NOTE: mosquitto_pub can only take a password via argv (-P, or an -L URL);
-    # it has no --pw-file or env option, so this cannot be avoided with this
-    # client. Not a cross-container exposure: the pod does not set
-    # shareProcessNamespace, so /proc is not shared with the Z2M container.
    # Bounded with `timeout`, which also covers a TCP connect that hangs rather
    # than being refused. The read loop is single-threaded, so an unbounded
    # publish would stall it and miss other devices' wake windows.
@@ -230,7 +229,8 @@ while :; do
    # NOT `mosquitto_pub -W`: that flag does not exist for mosquitto_pub (it is
    # a mosquitto_sub option), and passing it makes every publish fail on a
    # usage error — verified against the client in this image.
-    if timeout "$PUB_TIMEOUT" mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" \
+    if timeout "$PUB_TIMEOUT" mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" \
+         --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" \
         -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/interview" \
         -m "{\"id\":\"$ieee\"}" 2>/dev/null; then
      # Stamp only on a SUCCESSFUL publish. Stamping unconditionally would burn
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// Wetterstation (WS90) = the built-in zigbee-herdsman-converters definition
+// plus one extra configure step that applies the reporting configuration from
+// zigbee2mqtt-ws90-reporting.md. Z2M runs configure after every interview and
+// on bridge/request/device/configure, so those no longer revert the device to
+// the converter defaults (as happened 2026-09-24..28).
+//
+// The extra step runs after the built-in ones (extend order), so its values
+// win. `version` makes Z2M reconfigure once when this file is first loaded:
+// it re-runs configure when definition.version differs from the device's
+// meta.configured. Bump it whenever REPORTING changes.
+const {definitions} = require("zigbee-herdsman-converters/devices/shelly");
+
+const base = definitions.find((d) => d.model === "WS90");
+if (!base) throw new Error("WS90 definition not found in zigbee-herdsman-converters/devices/shelly");
+
+const SHELLY = 5264;
+
+// [cluster, attribute, reportable_change, manufacturerCode]
+const REPORTING = [
+    ["msTemperatureMeasurement", "measuredValue", 10],
+    ["msRelativeHumidity", "measuredValue", 50],
+    ["msPressureMeasurement", "measuredValue", 1],
+    ["msIlluminanceMeasurement", "measuredValue", 5],
+    ["shellyWS90Wind", "windSpeed", 1, SHELLY],
+    ["shellyWS90Wind", "windDirection", 1, SHELLY],
+    ["shellyWS90Wind", "gustSpeed", 1, SHELLY],
+    ["shellyWS90UV", "uvIndex", 1, SHELLY],
+    ["shellyWS90Rain", "rainStatus", 1, SHELLY],
+    ["shellyWS90Rain", "precipitation", 1, SHELLY],
+];
+
+const reporting = {
+    isModernExtend: true,
+    configure: [
+        async (device) => {
+            const endpoint = device.getEndpoint(1);
+            for (const [cluster, attribute, change, manufacturerCode] of REPORTING) {
+                await endpoint.configureReporting(
+                    cluster,
+                    [{attribute, minimumReportInterval: 5, maximumReportInterval: 3600, reportableChange: change}],
+                    manufacturerCode ? {manufacturerCode} : {},
+                );
+            }
+        },
+    ],
+};
+
+module.exports = {...base, version: "ws90-reporting-1", extend: [...base.extend, reporting]};
@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@

 Records the ZCL attribute-reporting configuration applied to the Wetterstation
 (Ecowitt WS90 powered by Shelly, IEEE `0xc02cedfffe958f40`) and how to restore
-it, because **this configuration lives on the device and in Z2M's
-`database.db`, not in git**. Zigbee2MQTT has no settings-schema field for
-reporting configuration, so there is nothing declarative to reconcile — Flux
-cannot restore it and a fresh PVC will not have it.
+it. The configuration itself lives on the device and in Z2M's `database.db`.
+
+**Since 2026-10-01 it is applied from git:** the external converter
+`zigbee2mqtt-ws90-converter.js` extends the built-in WS90 definition with a
+configure step that sets the values below, so every interview and every
+`bridge/request/device/configure` applies them instead of the converter
+defaults. The manual commands under "Re-applying" are only needed if the
+converter is not loaded. Keep the table and `REPORTING` in the converter in
+sync, and bump the converter's `version` when they change.

 ## Applied configuration

@@ -71,14 +76,16 @@ the modernExtend value is the outlier.

 ## When this is lost

-Anything that makes Z2M re-run `configure` on the device overwrites all of it
-with the converter defaults:
+Without the external converter, anything that makes Z2M re-run `configure` on
+the device overwrites all of it with the converter defaults:

- re-pairing or re-joining the device
+- re-pairing, re-joining or re-interviewing the device
 - an explicit `zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/device/configure`
 - a converter update that changes the definition and triggers reconfiguration

-It also will not exist on a fresh PVC. Re-apply with the commands below.
+With the converter loaded, those same events apply the values above. Check
+that it is loaded: Z2M logs `Successfully configured 'Wetterstation'
+(definition vws90-reporting-1)` after a configure.

 ## Re-applying

@@ -96,25 +103,25 @@ POD=$(kubectl get pod -n home-assistant -l app.kubernetes.io/name=zigbee2mqtt -o
 ```

 ```sh
-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msTemperatureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":10}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msTemperatureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":10}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msRelativeHumidity\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":50}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msRelativeHumidity\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":50}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msPressureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msPressureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msIlluminanceMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":5}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msIlluminanceMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":5}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windDirection\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windDirection\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"gustSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"gustSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90UV\",\"attribute\":\"uvIndex\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90UV\",\"attribute\":\"uvIndex\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"rainStatus\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"rainStatus\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'

-kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"precipitation\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
+kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p "$MQTT_PORT" --cafile "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/ca.crt" --cert "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.crt" --key "$MQTT_TLS_DIR/tls.key" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"precipitation\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
 ```

 These are idempotent — re-sending a request that matches the current
@@ -46,12 +46,15 @@ spec:
          # Retry-After). main-73b5d97 then raises the server WriteTimeout
          # from 10s to 40s (the 30s upstream fetch timeout + 10s headroom),
          # so a slow-but-legitimate upstream is no longer cut off before
-          # /proxy can answer. The summary_match/summary_replace parameters
-          # this deployment needs are unchanged.
+          # /proxy can answer. main-926ead0 caps the upstream response body
+          # at 2 MiB (larger feeds get 413 instead of being buffered whole,
+          # REN-230) and logs upstream fetch failures with the host,
+          # answering 502 instead of 500. The summary_match/summary_replace
+          # parameters this deployment needs are unchanged.
          #
          # Bumping this is a manual, reviewed edit. The tag format is
          # main-<short-sha>, the first 7 characters of the main commit.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/ical-proxy:main-73b5d97
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/ical-proxy:main-926ead0
          ports:
            - containerPort: 8080
              name: http
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: immich-machine-learning
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.3.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 3003
@@ -8,26 +8,11 @@
 # back into `kubernetes/apps/immich/` at retirement is the cleanup.
 #
 # Sizing:
-# - library: 300Gi — LXC 225's /mnt/media/immich is currently ~250 GiB.
-#   StorageClass ceph-filesystem has allowVolumeExpansion=true; grow with
-#   `kubectl patch pvc immich-library -p '{"spec":{"resources":{"requests":{"storage":"<new>"}}}}'`.
+# - library-bulk: 300Gi — the media library is ~250 GiB.
+#   StorageClass ceph-filesystem-bulk has allowVolumeExpansion=true; grow with
+#   `kubectl patch pvc immich-library-bulk -p '{"spec":{"resources":{"requests":{"storage":"<new>"}}}}'`.
 # - ml-cache: 20Gi — face-recognition + CLIP model cache. Survives pod
 #   restarts so ML doesn't re-download on every rollout.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
-metadata:
-  name: immich-library
-  namespace: immich
-  annotations:
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
-spec:
-  accessModes:
-    - ReadWriteMany
-  storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      storage: 300Gi
---
 # Media root on the EC 2+1 bulk pool; thumbs mount separately below.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ spec:
        # The library PVC is populated by the seed phase before this
        # Deployment reconciles, so no rsync init is needed here.
        - name: fetch-le-staging-roots
-          image: curlimages/curl:8.10.1
+          image: curlimages/curl:8.22.0@sha256:58adaa4e8dca9c988bae2aba4ab3434a0bb2da16bbe3f92dec39ec7785166777
          command:
            - sh
            - -c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /ca
      containers:
        - name: immich-server
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.3.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 3001
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More