k.rennerandClaude Opus 4.8
3eeb2aadca
The broker had no resource limits at all. It's now load-bearing and reachable by ~30 untrusted IoT devices (the Shelly fleet) + the edge host on a single 256Mi replica, so a misbehaving/compromised client is a real DoS vector. Add: - message_size_limit 1048576 — MQTT permits up to 256 MB per publish; one such message would OOM the broker. Every legit payload here (HA discovery, Shelly/open3e/evcc telemetry) is <10 KB. - persistent_client_expiration 1d — reap abandoned persistent sessions (the edge bridges reconnect within seconds, so they never hit this). - max_connections 200 per listener — bound a connection flood (~40 clients today; generous headroom, not the previous unlimited). All values chosen well above real usage, so no legit client is affected. Apply: the ConfigMap has no checksum annotation, so Flux won't restart the pod on its own — needs `kubectl -n home-assistant rollout restart deploy/mosquitto` (brief reconnect; clients auto-reconnect) after reconcile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>