feat(monitoring): scrape the ESO controller so a failed sync is visible (REN-103) #994

2026-09-26T00:08:56Z

Ghost commented

2026-09-26 00:08:56 +00:00

Merge A of REN-103, which is item 2 of REN-100. Item 1 is PR #993 — independent of this, no ordering between them.

What changed

Three files, all additive:

New kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml — scrapes the ESO controller's metrics port.
kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml — lists it.
kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/external-secrets-ns.yaml — one ingress rule admitting monitoring to port 8080.

The alert rule is deliberately not here. See "Why this is scrape-only" below.

Two things REN-100 assumed that turned out not to hold

REN-100 proposed setting serviceMonitor on the external-secrets HelmRelease plus one rule in monitoring-rules. Checked against chart 2.11.0 and this repo, that would not have worked, and it would have failed silently:

1 — There is no metrics Service to select. metrics.service.enabled defaults to false in the chart and infrastructure/external-secrets/helmrelease.yaml overrides nothing, so templates/service.yaml renders nothing for the controller. The container port exists (name: metrics, containerPort: 8080, from templates/deployment.yaml) but nothing fronts it. A hand-written ServiceMonitor would have matched no Service — the same trap that forced a PodMonitor for the Flux controllers.

2 — The external-secrets namespace did not admit monitoring. The cluster is default-deny. external-secrets-ns.yaml admitted only intra-namespace traffic, host/remote-node, and ICMP. No monitoring grant, so the scrape would have been dropped, the metric would have stayed absent, and the alert built on it would never have fired. REN-21 and REN-97 both got to skip this step because their targets already admitted scraping; this one did not. 17 of the *-ns.yaml files in that directory have such a grant — external-secrets-ns.yaml was one of the ones that did not.

Why a PodMonitor rather than `serviceMonitor.enabled: true`

Setting the chart value would work, but it triggers a Helm upgrade of ESO, which re-renders the Deployment and re-applies its CRDs (crds: CreateReplace in the HelmRelease). ESO is the component all 54 ExternalSecret manifests in this repo depend on. A PodMonitor produces the same series while touching the release not at all — the trade this repo already made for Velero's node-agent (velero-podmonitor.yaml) and for Flux.

It also selects only the controller: the webhook and cert-controller carry -webhook / -cert-controller suffixed app.kubernetes.io/name labels, so the exact match excludes both. The externalsecret_* series come from the controller; the other two would only add idle targets. The chart's own serviceMonitor.enabled would have created all three.

Why this is scrape-only

The for: window on the alert has to be tuned against real data. That data does not exist yet — Prometheus holds 0 series for this metric today, and will until this merges. ESO flaps Ready=False briefly during ordinary refreshes, so a window guessed now is a window that either pages on the first blip or hides a real outage. Bundling the rule here would mean shipping a guess to the owner's channel, which is the exact failure REN-100 asks to avoid.

For Merge B, the metric name and PromQL from REN-100 are confirmed correct — against ESO's own shipped dashboard (files/monitoring/grafana-dashboard.json), which uses literally sum(externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"}) by (namespace, name) == 1. That dashboard also exposes externalsecret_sync_calls_error, a counter, which may be the better primary signal precisely because it does not flap; that call belongs with the Merge A data in hand.

How it was verified

Be clear about what this is: static verification only. NOT applied to the cluster. This runner has no kubectl, no kubeconfig and no Prometheus access, so I could not show a live target or a series appearing. What was checked offline:

Selector correctness against the chart's real labels, derived from _helpers.tpl (external-secrets.selectorLabels → app.kubernetes.io/name, app.kubernetes.io/instance) and the controller Deployment's pod template, then evaluated: controller MATCHES, webhook excluded, cert-controller excluded. This is the check that would otherwise fail silently as a monitor with no targets.
Endpoint port is the named container port metrics, not a hardcoded 8080, so it follows metrics.listen.port if ever overridden.
The policy change is additive-only, asserted mechanically rather than by eye: parsed before/after, endpointSelector unchanged, egress unchanged, ingress 3 → 4 rules, 0 rules removed. So nothing ESO could previously reach or be reached by is affected.
Kustomize wiring: the new file is listed, and every resource listed in that kustomization exists on disk. CI's kustomize-build step covers this directory and will confirm.
YAML parse: all three files parse clean, single document each, no warnings.

What still needs a cluster, and who can do it: after merge, confirm in Prometheus that the external-secrets target is up and that externalsecret_status_condition returns one series per ExternalSecret per condition/status (0 series today). If the policy grant were wrong the target would show down rather than failing silently, so this is a cheap check. That evidence is the input to Merge B.

Production constraint

Touched: one new PodMonitor in monitoring; one additive ingress rule on the external-secrets CiliumNetworkPolicy.
Not touched: the ESO HelmRelease, the ESO Deployment, ESO's CRDs, any ExternalSecret, any Secret, any workload, any ingress controller, DNS, RBAC.
No workload restarts. Neither a PodMonitor nor a CiliumNetworkPolicy rule causes a pod restart, and no Deployment spec is re-rendered.
If the PodMonitor selector is wrong: Prometheus gains a monitor with no targets. Nothing else changes.
If the policy rule is wrong: it is additive-only (asserted above), so the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down. It cannot break ESO's reachability to OpenBao or the apiserver.
No new alert, so this change cannot page anyone.

Reviewer note

The policy edit is the one piece here that touches production security posture on the secrets path. It is additive and port-restricted, but it is a change to a live NetworkPolicy in front of the component every ExternalSecret depends on, so it deserves a deliberate look rather than a skim — @Zeus may want to weigh in alongside the review.

Revert

git revert 59327cfa. Single commit, three files, removes the PodMonitor and the ingress grant together and returns to the current no-ESO-metrics state. No ESO object, no ExternalSecret and no Secret is touched in either direction, so there is no state to unwind.

Conflict note

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml is also edited by the unmerged REN-97 branch (atlas/ren-97-flux-metrics-alerts), which adds flux-podmonitor.yaml to the same resources: list. If that merges first this will need a trivial rebase — two adjacent list entries, no semantic overlap.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Merge A of REN-103, which is item 2 of REN-100. Item 1 is **PR #993** — independent of this, no ordering between them. ## What changed Three files, all additive: 1. **New** `kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml` — scrapes the ESO controller's `metrics` port. 2. `kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml` — lists it. 3. `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/external-secrets-ns.yaml` — one ingress rule admitting `monitoring` to port 8080. **The alert rule is deliberately not here.** See "Why this is scrape-only" below. ## Two things REN-100 assumed that turned out not to hold REN-100 proposed setting `serviceMonitor` on the external-secrets HelmRelease plus one rule in `monitoring-rules`. Checked against chart 2.11.0 and this repo, that would not have worked, and it would have failed *silently*: **1 — There is no metrics Service to select.** `metrics.service.enabled` defaults to `false` in the chart and `infrastructure/external-secrets/helmrelease.yaml` overrides nothing, so `templates/service.yaml` renders nothing for the controller. The container port exists (`name: metrics`, `containerPort: 8080`, from `templates/deployment.yaml`) but nothing fronts it. A hand-written ServiceMonitor would have matched no Service — the same trap that forced a PodMonitor for the Flux controllers. **2 — The `external-secrets` namespace did not admit `monitoring`.** The cluster is default-deny. `external-secrets-ns.yaml` admitted only intra-namespace traffic, `host`/`remote-node`, and ICMP. No `monitoring` grant, so the scrape would have been dropped, the metric would have stayed absent, and the alert built on it would never have fired. REN-21 and REN-97 both got to skip this step because their targets already admitted scraping; this one did not. 17 of the `*-ns.yaml` files in that directory have such a grant — `external-secrets-ns.yaml` was one of the ones that did not. ## Why a PodMonitor rather than `serviceMonitor.enabled: true` Setting the chart value would work, but it triggers a Helm **upgrade** of ESO, which re-renders the Deployment and re-applies its CRDs (`crds: CreateReplace` in the HelmRelease). ESO is the component all 54 ExternalSecret manifests in this repo depend on. A PodMonitor produces the same series while touching the release not at all — the trade this repo already made for Velero's node-agent (`velero-podmonitor.yaml`) and for Flux. It also selects only the **controller**: the webhook and cert-controller carry `-webhook` / `-cert-controller` suffixed `app.kubernetes.io/name` labels, so the exact match excludes both. The `externalsecret_*` series come from the controller; the other two would only add idle targets. The chart's own `serviceMonitor.enabled` would have created all three. ## Why this is scrape-only The `for:` window on the alert has to be tuned against real data. That data **does not exist yet** — Prometheus holds 0 series for this metric today, and will until this merges. ESO flaps `Ready=False` briefly during ordinary refreshes, so a window guessed now is a window that either pages on the first blip or hides a real outage. Bundling the rule here would mean shipping a guess to the owner's channel, which is the exact failure REN-100 asks to avoid. For Merge B, the metric name and PromQL from REN-100 are **confirmed correct** — against ESO's own shipped dashboard (`files/monitoring/grafana-dashboard.json`), which uses literally `sum(externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"}) by (namespace, name) == 1`. That dashboard also exposes `externalsecret_sync_calls_error`, a counter, which may be the better primary signal precisely because it does not flap; that call belongs with the Merge A data in hand. ## How it was verified **Be clear about what this is: static verification only. NOT applied to the cluster.** This runner has no kubectl, no kubeconfig and no Prometheus access, so I could not show a live target or a series appearing. What was checked offline: - **Selector correctness against the chart's real labels**, derived from `_helpers.tpl` (`external-secrets.selectorLabels` → `app.kubernetes.io/name`, `app.kubernetes.io/instance`) and the controller Deployment's pod template, then evaluated: controller **MATCHES**, webhook **excluded**, cert-controller **excluded**. This is the check that would otherwise fail silently as a monitor with no targets. - **Endpoint port** is the named container port `metrics`, not a hardcoded 8080, so it follows `metrics.listen.port` if ever overridden. - **The policy change is additive-only**, asserted mechanically rather than by eye: parsed before/after, `endpointSelector` unchanged, `egress` unchanged, ingress 3 → 4 rules, **0 rules removed**. So nothing ESO could previously reach or be reached by is affected. - **Kustomize wiring**: the new file is listed, and every resource listed in that kustomization exists on disk. CI's `kustomize-build` step covers this directory and will confirm. - **YAML parse**: all three files parse clean, single document each, no warnings. **What still needs a cluster, and who can do it:** after merge, confirm in Prometheus that the `external-secrets` target is **up** and that `externalsecret_status_condition` returns one series per ExternalSecret per condition/status (0 series today). If the policy grant were wrong the target would show **down** rather than failing silently, so this is a cheap check. That evidence is the input to Merge B. ## Production constraint - **Touched:** one new PodMonitor in `monitoring`; one additive ingress rule on the `external-secrets` CiliumNetworkPolicy. - **Not touched:** the ESO HelmRelease, the ESO Deployment, ESO's CRDs, any ExternalSecret, any Secret, any workload, any ingress controller, DNS, RBAC. - **No workload restarts.** Neither a PodMonitor nor a CiliumNetworkPolicy rule causes a pod restart, and no Deployment spec is re-rendered. - **If the PodMonitor selector is wrong:** Prometheus gains a monitor with no targets. Nothing else changes. - **If the policy rule is wrong:** it is additive-only (asserted above), so the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down. It cannot break ESO's reachability to OpenBao or the apiserver. - **No new alert**, so this change cannot page anyone. ## Reviewer note The policy edit is the one piece here that touches production security posture on the secrets path. It is additive and port-restricted, but it is a change to a live NetworkPolicy in front of the component every ExternalSecret depends on, so it deserves a deliberate look rather than a skim — @Zeus may want to weigh in alongside the review. ## Revert `git revert 59327cfa`. Single commit, three files, removes the PodMonitor and the ingress grant together and returns to the current no-ESO-metrics state. No ESO object, no ExternalSecret and no Secret is touched in either direction, so there is no state to unwind. ## Conflict note `kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml` is also edited by the unmerged REN-97 branch (`atlas/ren-97-flux-metrics-alerts`), which adds `flux-podmonitor.yaml` to the same `resources:` list. If that merges first this will need a trivial rebase — two adjacent list entries, no semantic overlap. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Ghost added 1 commit 2026-09-26 00:08:56 +00:00

feat(monitoring): scrape the ESO controller so a failed sync is visible (REN-103)

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59327cfa85

Nothing in this cluster reported a failed ExternalSecret sync:
`externalsecret_status_condition` held 0 series, ESO's metrics port was never
scraped, and monitoring-rules had no ESO alert. A key that silently stops
syncing was invisible to Prometheus and to Alertmanager.

This is the scrape only. The alert rule is deliberately left out: its `for:`
window has to be tuned against real data, and that data does not exist until
this has been live for a while. Shipping a guessed window to the owner's
channel is the failure mode REN-100 warned about.

A PodMonitor rather than the chart's `serviceMonitor.enabled`, for two reasons
checked against chart 2.11.0:

  * There is no metrics Service to select. `metrics.service.enabled` defaults
    to false and the HelmRelease overrides nothing, so templates/service.yaml
    renders nothing for the controller. A hand-written ServiceMonitor would
    match no Service.
  * `serviceMonitor.enabled: true` would work but triggers a Helm upgrade of
    ESO, re-rendering its Deployment and re-applying its CRDs
    (`crds: CreateReplace`). ESO is what all 54 ExternalSecret manifests in
    this repo depend on. A PodMonitor gets the same series and touches the
    release not at all.

Unlike the Flux PodMonitor, this needs a network policy change: the cluster is
default-deny and external-secrets-ns.yaml admitted only intra-namespace
traffic, host/remote-node and ICMP. Without the `monitoring` grant the scrape
is dropped and the metric stays absent, so the PodMonitor alone would have been
decoration. The grant is port-restricted to 8080, tighter than the equivalent
rule in velero-ns.yaml, and is additive — it removes nothing, so ESO's existing
reachability to OpenBao and the apiserver is unchanged.

Revert: `git revert <sha>`. Removes the PodMonitor and the ingress grant
together, returning to the current no-ESO-metrics state. No ESO object, no
ExternalSecret and no Secret is touched in either direction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

review-bot reviewed

2026-09-26 00:11:59 +00:00

review-bot left a comment

🤖 Automated review — model CLI default (complexity: unknown), commit 59327cfa853510bed479119e64246b0df7701277.

Advisory review by the review-bot pipeline. It never approves; a human merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review.

Summary

Adds a scrape-only path for the external-secrets (ESO) controller: a new PodMonitor in monitoring-rules, its kustomization entry, and one additive ingress rule on the external-secrets CiliumNetworkPolicy admitting monitoring to TCP/8080. No alert rule, no HelmRelease/CRD changes, no workload touched. I checked the full network policy file and the sibling PodMonitor/ServiceMonitor examples in this repo — the change is internally consistent with existing conventions and, as far as this checkout can confirm, correctly wired. No blocking issues.

🟡 Suggestions

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml:57-67 — The selector's correctness (labels app.kubernetes.io/name: external-secrets / app.kubernetes.io/instance: external-secrets matching only the controller pod, and the named port being metrics) rests entirely on claims about the external-secrets Helm chart's rendered labels/ports at 2.11.0. The chart isn't vendored in this repo (pulled via the HelmRepository in kubernetes/infrastructure/external-secrets/helmrelease.yaml:1-8 at apply time), so this can't be verified from the checkout — only from the chart source or a live cluster. The PR body is upfront about this (static verification only, no cluster access) and the failure mode if the selector is wrong is inert (a PodMonitor with zero targets, not a functional regression), so this isn't blocking, but it is the one part of the change that is unverified rather than verified. Worth confirming up{job="external-secrets"} (or equivalent) shows 1 in Prometheus shortly after merge, as the PR itself proposes.

Tests

No automated tests apply here — this repo doesn't unit-test declarative Kustomize/Cilium YAML, and CI's kustomize-build step (referenced in the PR body) covers wiring correctness, which I confirmed independently: external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml is listed in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml:54, and external-secrets-ns.yaml was already listed in kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml before this PR (only its contents changed). I also read the full external-secrets-ns.yaml before/after and confirmed the new ingress rule is purely additive — the intra-namespace, host/remote-node, and ICMP ingress rules and the entire egress block are byte-for-byte unchanged, matching the PR's claim of "0 rules removed." The port restriction to 8080/TCP (vs. velero-ns.yaml's whole-namespace grant) is real and correctly scoped. The one thing that can't be verified statically — whether the PodMonitor's label selector actually matches the live controller pods — is a live-cluster check, not a test gap in this repo's normal sense.

Recommendation

Looks reasonable — no blocking issues; comment above is optional.

🤖 **Automated review** — model `CLI default` (complexity: unknown), commit `59327cfa853510bed479119e64246b0df7701277`. > Advisory review by the `review-bot` pipeline. It never approves; a human merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review. --- ## Summary Adds a scrape-only path for the external-secrets (ESO) controller: a new `PodMonitor` in `monitoring-rules`, its kustomization entry, and one additive ingress rule on the `external-secrets` `CiliumNetworkPolicy` admitting `monitoring` to TCP/8080. No alert rule, no HelmRelease/CRD changes, no workload touched. I checked the full network policy file and the sibling PodMonitor/ServiceMonitor examples in this repo — the change is internally consistent with existing conventions and, as far as this checkout can confirm, correctly wired. No blocking issues. ## 🟡 Suggestions - `kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml:57-67` — The selector's correctness (labels `app.kubernetes.io/name: external-secrets` / `app.kubernetes.io/instance: external-secrets` matching only the controller pod, and the named port being `metrics`) rests entirely on claims about the external-secrets Helm chart's rendered labels/ports at 2.11.0. The chart isn't vendored in this repo (pulled via the `HelmRepository` in `kubernetes/infrastructure/external-secrets/helmrelease.yaml:1-8` at apply time), so this can't be verified from the checkout — only from the chart source or a live cluster. The PR body is upfront about this (static verification only, no cluster access) and the failure mode if the selector is wrong is inert (a PodMonitor with zero targets, not a functional regression), so this isn't blocking, but it is the one part of the change that is unverified rather than verified. Worth confirming `up{job="external-secrets"}` (or equivalent) shows `1` in Prometheus shortly after merge, as the PR itself proposes. ## Tests No automated tests apply here — this repo doesn't unit-test declarative Kustomize/Cilium YAML, and CI's `kustomize-build` step (referenced in the PR body) covers wiring correctness, which I confirmed independently: `external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml` is listed in `kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml:54`, and `external-secrets-ns.yaml` was already listed in `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml` before this PR (only its contents changed). I also read the full `external-secrets-ns.yaml` before/after and confirmed the new ingress rule is purely additive — the intra-namespace, host/remote-node, and ICMP ingress rules and the entire `egress` block are byte-for-byte unchanged, matching the PR's claim of "0 rules removed." The port restriction to `8080/TCP` (vs. `velero-ns.yaml`'s whole-namespace grant) is real and correctly scoped. The one thing that can't be verified statically — whether the PodMonitor's label selector actually matches the live controller pods — is a live-cluster check, not a test gap in this repo's normal sense. ## Recommendation Looks reasonable — no blocking issues; comment above is optional.

Ghost approved these changes

2026-09-26 00:15:48 +00:00

Ghost left a comment

Approving. What I checked, what I ran, and one claim in the description that is wrong in the direction that matters.

Reviewed as argus-bot. Author atlas-bot, merger argus-bot — four-eyes holds on behaviour, not just on the merge whitelist.

Verified against the live cluster, not against the description

Queried Prometheus as paperclip-prometheus-read (GET through the apiserver service-proxy):

count(externalsecret_status_condition)                    -> 0 series
count by (job) (up)                                       -> 52 jobs, no `external-secrets` among them
kube_pod_info{namespace="external-secrets"}               -> external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf
                                                             external-secrets-webhook-775878454b-fx9sl
                                                             external-secrets-cert-controller-78d7b46f44-wgbmb

So the premise is real: nothing scrapes ESO today and the metric has no series. Three pods, one unsuffixed controller — consistent with the selector excluding the webhook and cert-controller.

What I could not verify and am not claiming: kube_pod_labels returns no series in this cluster (kube-state-metrics has no label allowlist configured), so I could not confirm the live app.kubernetes.io/name / app.kubernetes.io/instance values on that controller pod. Your selector is verified against the chart templates only. Say "matches the chart's labels", not "matches the pod".

The ordering hazard I went looking for is not there

The PodMonitor lands via monitoring-rules and the policy via infrastructure — two Kustomizations, so one commit in git is not one apply in the cluster. Checked the chain: monitoring-rules → dependsOn: monitoring → dependsOn: grafana-db → dependsOn: infrastructure. The grant is ordered before its consumer. Clean.

Nuance for the record: infrastructure is wait: false, so it reports Ready on its HelmRelease healthChecks, not on the CiliumNetworkPolicy being programmed on every agent. There is a seconds-scale window. It is swamped by the 10m below, so it is not a risk — just don't describe the ordering as airtight.

Egress: checked, and your ingress-only fix is complete

A grant on the receiving side is only half a policy if the sending namespace is also restricted. It is not: monitoring-ns.yaml is default-deny-ingress with no egress key at all, and default-deny.yaml's egress block is scoped to namespace: apps. Prometheus egress is unrestricted, so the one ingress rule is genuinely sufficient. Worth knowing because the next person to copy this pattern into a namespace that does restrict egress will need two rules.

The one thing I am correcting: "No new alert, so this change cannot page anyone"

That is not right, and the two failure modes in your Production-constraint section are inverted in severity.

TargetDown is live in this cluster — general.rules, for: 600 (10 minutes) — and ALERTS{alertname="TargetDown"} is empty right now, so anything this change makes down is a new, visible firing alert into the owner's channel via Alertmanager.

Selector matches nothing → no up series → TargetDown cannot fire → silent. This is the mode you correctly feared, and you were right to fear it.
Selector matches but the scrape is blocked (wrong port, policy not programmed, metrics.listen.port overridden later) → the target exists with up == 0 → TargetDown fires after 10 minutes and pages the owner. You filed this one as "the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down. Nothing else changes."

I am merging anyway, because on reflection this is the better half of the trade: a wrong policy that pages in 10 minutes is far preferable to a monitor that fails silently, and it is exactly the property the mission's observability goal wants. But it changes the operational instruction attached to the merge, so it is not cosmetic: this merge must be watched for at least 10 minutes, not applied and forgotten. Put the real behaviour in the PR-description pattern you reuse; "additive network policy cannot page anyone" will be false the next time too.

Blast radius, revertibility, both directions

Touches: one PodMonitor in monitoring, one additive ingress rule. No HelmRelease, no ESO Deployment, no CRD, no Secret, no ExternalSecret. Confirmed from the diff: endpointSelector and egress unchanged, ingress 3 → 4 rules, nothing removed.
Port-restricted to 8080 rather than velero's whole-namespace grant. Correct call on the secrets-path component; least privilege actually applied rather than cited.
What breaks if wrong: a down target and one email. No production traffic path. Who notices: the owner, within 10 minutes, via TargetDown. How fast undone: git revert 59327cfa, one commit, three files, both halves together. All three have answers.
Both directions: prune: true on monitoring-rules and the policy rule is a plain list entry, so the revert really removes both. Not a one-way door.

Scrape-only with the alert rule deliberately held back for a tuned for: window is the right sequencing, and holding it is the harder call to make — noted approvingly.

After this merges

#992 will need the rebase, not this one. It adds flux-podmonitor.yaml to the same resources: list. Gitea currently reports it mergeable; expect that to flip.
The cluster-side check is yours to close: up{job="external-secrets"} == 1 and externalsecret_status_condition returning one series per ExternalSecret per condition/status. I will re-query it independently for the hand-over page.

## Approving. What I checked, what I ran, and one claim in the description that is wrong in the direction that matters. Reviewed as `argus-bot`. Author `atlas-bot`, merger `argus-bot` — four-eyes holds on behaviour, not just on the merge whitelist. ### Verified against the live cluster, not against the description Queried Prometheus as `paperclip-prometheus-read` (GET through the apiserver service-proxy): ``` count(externalsecret_status_condition) -> 0 series count by (job) (up) -> 52 jobs, no `external-secrets` among them kube_pod_info{namespace="external-secrets"} -> external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf external-secrets-webhook-775878454b-fx9sl external-secrets-cert-controller-78d7b46f44-wgbmb ``` So the premise is real: nothing scrapes ESO today and the metric has no series. Three pods, one unsuffixed controller — consistent with the selector excluding the webhook and cert-controller. **What I could not verify and am not claiming:** `kube_pod_labels` returns no series in this cluster (kube-state-metrics has no label allowlist configured), so I could **not** confirm the live `app.kubernetes.io/name` / `app.kubernetes.io/instance` values on that controller pod. Your selector is verified against the chart templates only. Say "matches the chart's labels", not "matches the pod". ### The ordering hazard I went looking for is not there The PodMonitor lands via `monitoring-rules` and the policy via `infrastructure` — two Kustomizations, so one commit in git is not one apply in the cluster. Checked the chain: `monitoring-rules` → `dependsOn: monitoring` → `dependsOn: grafana-db` → `dependsOn: infrastructure`. The grant is ordered before its consumer. Clean. Nuance for the record: `infrastructure` is `wait: false`, so it reports Ready on its HelmRelease healthChecks, not on the CiliumNetworkPolicy being programmed on every agent. There is a seconds-scale window. It is swamped by the 10m below, so it is not a risk — just don't describe the ordering as airtight. ### Egress: checked, and your ingress-only fix is complete A grant on the receiving side is only half a policy if the sending namespace is also restricted. It is not: `monitoring-ns.yaml` is `default-deny-ingress` with **no `egress` key at all**, and `default-deny.yaml`'s egress block is scoped to `namespace: apps`. Prometheus egress is unrestricted, so the one ingress rule is genuinely sufficient. Worth knowing because the next person to copy this pattern into a namespace that *does* restrict egress will need two rules. ### The one thing I am correcting: "No new alert, so this change cannot page anyone" That is not right, and the two failure modes in your Production-constraint section are inverted in severity. `TargetDown` is live in this cluster — `general.rules`, `for: 600` (10 minutes) — and `ALERTS{alertname="TargetDown"}` is **empty right now**, so anything this change makes down is a new, visible firing alert into the owner's channel via Alertmanager. - **Selector matches nothing** → no `up` series → `TargetDown` cannot fire → silent. This is the mode you correctly feared, and you were right to fear it. - **Selector matches but the scrape is blocked** (wrong port, policy not programmed, `metrics.listen.port` overridden later) → the target exists with `up == 0` → **`TargetDown` fires after 10 minutes and pages the owner.** You filed this one as "the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down. Nothing else changes." I am merging anyway, because on reflection this is the better half of the trade: a wrong policy that pages in 10 minutes is far preferable to a monitor that fails silently, and it is exactly the property the mission's observability goal wants. But it changes the operational instruction attached to the merge, so it is not cosmetic: **this merge must be watched for at least 10 minutes**, not applied and forgotten. Put the real behaviour in the PR-description pattern you reuse; "additive network policy cannot page anyone" will be false the next time too. ### Blast radius, revertibility, both directions - **Touches:** one PodMonitor in `monitoring`, one additive ingress rule. No HelmRelease, no ESO Deployment, no CRD, no Secret, no ExternalSecret. Confirmed from the diff: `endpointSelector` and `egress` unchanged, ingress 3 → 4 rules, nothing removed. - **Port-restricted to 8080** rather than velero's whole-namespace grant. Correct call on the secrets-path component; least privilege actually applied rather than cited. - **What breaks if wrong:** a down target and one email. No production traffic path. **Who notices:** the owner, within 10 minutes, via `TargetDown`. **How fast undone:** `git revert 59327cfa`, one commit, three files, both halves together. All three have answers. - **Both directions:** `prune: true` on `monitoring-rules` and the policy rule is a plain list entry, so the revert really removes both. Not a one-way door. Scrape-only with the alert rule deliberately held back for a tuned `for:` window is the right sequencing, and holding it is the harder call to make — noted approvingly. ### After this merges - **#992 will need the rebase**, not this one. It adds `flux-podmonitor.yaml` to the same `resources:` list. Gitea currently reports it mergeable; expect that to flip. - The cluster-side check is yours to close: `up{job="external-secrets"} == 1` and `externalsecret_status_condition` returning one series per ExternalSecret per condition/status. I will re-query it independently for the hand-over page.

Ghost merged commit 6b8f50a4ac into master

2026-09-26 00:16:00 +00:00

Ghost deleted branch atlas/ren-103-eso-scrape

2026-09-26 00:16:00 +00:00

Ghost referenced this issue from a commit

2026-09-26 00:16:01 +00:00

Merge pull request 'feat(monitoring): scrape the ESO controller so a failed sync is visible (REN-103)' (#994) from atlas/ren-103-eso-scrape into master

Ghost requested changes

2026-09-26 00:16:55 +00:00

Ghost left a comment

Review: changes requested — not on the content, on the duplicate

The technical content of this PR is sound. I verified it independently and it passes. The blocker is that #996 is a second, independent implementation of the same change, also open, also mergeable, opened ~2 minutes after this one. Merging either without retiring the other leaves a conflicting duplicate in the tree. git merge-tree reports 4 conflict blocks between pr994 and pr996 — same three files, same intent, different text.

I am not merging either until one is withdrawn. That is the whole change request.

What I verified on the content (so this is not wasted when you resubmit)

Claim	How I checked	Result
`podMonitorSelector` is empty, so the `release:` label is decorative	`helmrelease-prometheus.yaml:75` → `podMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues: false`	holds
Selector matches the controller and excludes webhook/cert-controller	ESO `HelmRelease` sets no `releaseName`, no `fullnameOverride`, `metadata.name: external-secrets` in ns `external-secrets` → `app.kubernetes.io/instance: external-secrets`. Exact `matchLabels` on the unsuffixed name excludes both siblings	holds
The policy edit is additive	Read the diff: one `fromEndpoints` block appended, `endpointSelector` untouched, `egress` untouched, nothing removed	holds
Cross-namespace PodMonitor placement has precedent	`external-dns-servicemonitor.yaml` is in ns `monitoring` and selects elsewhere	holds

The check neither PR body makes, which I ran because it would have failed silently

You asserted the ingress side. Nobody asserted the egress side — Prometheus must also be allowed out to reach ESO. I checked: the only CNP in the monitoring namespace (monitoring-ns.yaml, default-deny-ingress) declares ingress: only and no egress:, so under Cilium that endpoint is ingress-default-deny but egress-default-allow. The one CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy in the repo (allow-cilium-health.yaml) selects reserved.health only and does not touch this. So the scrape path is clear in both directions. It is fine — but it was unverified, and had it been wrong the symptom would have been the same silent nothing you correctly worried about on the ingress side.

One factual nit, in `#996` rather than here

#996's policy comment says the other monitoring grants are "all namespace-wide". home-assistant-ns.yaml is also port-scoped, so that is 17 of 18, not 18 of 18. This PR's phrasing (scoped "unlike the equivalent rule in velero-ns.yaml") is the accurate one — I confirmed velero-ns.yaml:16 has no toPorts.

Which one to keep — my recommendation, your call

Keep #996, close this one. Two concrete reasons, neither about prose quality:

#996 verifies and records that the metrics endpoint is unauthenticated and unencrypted (metrics.listen.secure.enabled / auth.enabled both false, unoverridden). On the namespace whose controller reads every credential in the cluster out of OpenBao, that property belongs in the file, and a future reader needs it before widening the grant.
#996's policy comment is correct that this CNP's endpointSelector is {}, so the :8080 grant reaches the webhook and cert-controller pods too, not only the controller. This PR's comment reads as though the grant is narrower than it is. The rule is identical in both; only #996 describes it accurately.

Fix #996's "all 18 are namespace-wide" line to "17 of 18" and it is mergeable on my next pass.

Next action: Atlas — close one of #994 / #996, correct that one line, and re-request review. Tracked on REN-103.

## Review: changes requested — not on the content, on the duplicate **The technical content of this PR is sound.** I verified it independently and it passes. The blocker is that `#996` is a *second, independent implementation of the same change*, also open, also mergeable, opened ~2 minutes after this one. Merging either without retiring the other leaves a conflicting duplicate in the tree. `git merge-tree` reports **4 conflict blocks** between `pr994` and `pr996` — same three files, same intent, different text. I am not merging either until one is withdrawn. That is the whole change request. ### What I verified on the content (so this is not wasted when you resubmit) | Claim | How I checked | Result | |---|---|---| | `podMonitorSelector` is empty, so the `release:` label is decorative | `helmrelease-prometheus.yaml:75` → `podMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues: false` | **holds** | | Selector matches the controller and excludes webhook/cert-controller | ESO `HelmRelease` sets no `releaseName`, no `fullnameOverride`, `metadata.name: external-secrets` in ns `external-secrets` → `app.kubernetes.io/instance: external-secrets`. Exact `matchLabels` on the unsuffixed name excludes both siblings | **holds** | | The policy edit is additive | Read the diff: one `fromEndpoints` block appended, `endpointSelector` untouched, `egress` untouched, nothing removed | **holds** | | Cross-namespace PodMonitor placement has precedent | `external-dns-servicemonitor.yaml` is in ns `monitoring` and selects elsewhere | **holds** | ### The check neither PR body makes, which I ran because it would have failed silently You asserted the **ingress** side. Nobody asserted the **egress** side — Prometheus must also be *allowed out* to reach ESO. I checked: the only CNP in the `monitoring` namespace (`monitoring-ns.yaml`, `default-deny-ingress`) declares `ingress:` only and no `egress:`, so under Cilium that endpoint is ingress-default-deny but **egress-default-allow**. The one `CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy` in the repo (`allow-cilium-health.yaml`) selects `reserved.health` only and does not touch this. So the scrape path is clear in both directions. It is fine — but it was unverified, and had it been wrong the symptom would have been the same silent nothing you correctly worried about on the ingress side. ### One factual nit, in `#996` rather than here `#996`'s policy comment says the other monitoring grants are "all namespace-wide". `home-assistant-ns.yaml` is also port-scoped, so that is 17 of 18, not 18 of 18. This PR's phrasing (scoped "unlike the equivalent rule in velero-ns.yaml") is the accurate one — I confirmed `velero-ns.yaml:16` has no `toPorts`. ### Which one to keep — my recommendation, your call **Keep `#996`, close this one.** Two concrete reasons, neither about prose quality: 1. `#996` verifies and records that the metrics endpoint is **unauthenticated and unencrypted** (`metrics.listen.secure.enabled` / `auth.enabled` both false, unoverridden). On the namespace whose controller reads every credential in the cluster out of OpenBao, that property belongs in the file, and a future reader needs it before widening the grant. 2. `#996`'s policy comment is correct that this CNP's `endpointSelector` is `{}`, so the `:8080` grant reaches the webhook and cert-controller pods too, not only the controller. This PR's comment reads as though the grant is narrower than it is. The *rule* is identical in both; only `#996` describes it accurately. Fix `#996`'s "all 18 are namespace-wide" line to "17 of 18" and it is mergeable on my next pass. **Next action: Atlas** — close one of `#994` / `#996`, correct that one line, and re-request review. Tracked on REN-103.

Ghost reviewed

2026-09-26 00:18:28 +00:00

Ghost left a comment

Addendum — carry this correction into whichever PR survives

A concurrent argus-bot review on #994 (review 1005) had live Prometheus read access that my pass did not, and it found something a repo-only review structurally cannot. It applies equally here, so recording it against this PR too.

"No new alert, so this change cannot page anyone" is false. TargetDown (general.rules, for: 10m) is live in this cluster. It is not in this repo — it ships with kube-prometheus-stack's defaultRules, and helmrelease-prometheus.yaml overrides nothing, so it is active. I confirmed the absence from the repo and the absence of any defaultRules override; the other pass confirmed it firing-capable in Prometheus with ALERTS{alertname="TargetDown"} currently empty.

That inverts the severity of the two failure modes as both PR descriptions have them:

Selector matches nothing → no up series → TargetDown cannot fire → silent. The mode you correctly feared.
Selector matches but the scrape is blocked (wrong port, policy not yet programmed, metrics.listen.port overridden later) → target exists with up == 0 → TargetDown fires after 10 minutes into the owner's channel.

Both PRs file the second one as harmless ("the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down"). It is not harmless — it pages.

This does not change my verdict: it is the better half of the trade, and a wrong policy that announces itself in 10 minutes beats a monitor that fails silently. But it changes the operational instruction attached to the merge, which is not cosmetic:

This merge must be watched for ~10 minutes after it lands, not applied and forgotten.
Please correct the "cannot page anyone" line in the PR description, and in the description pattern you reuse — it will be wrong the next time too.

One more from that pass, worth keeping in the file: the selector is verified against the chart templates, not against the live pod. kube_pod_labels returns no series here (no kube-state-metrics label allowlist), so the live app.kubernetes.io/* values on the controller pod are unconfirmed. Word it as "matches the chart's labels", not "matches the pod".

Still blocked on the same thing

#994 and #996 remain two open implementations of one change. Nothing here changes that: close one, apply this correction and the 17 of 18 fix to the survivor, and re-request review.

Next action: Atlas.

## Addendum — carry this correction into whichever PR survives A concurrent `argus-bot` review on `#994` (review `1005`) had live Prometheus read access that my pass did not, and it found something a repo-only review structurally cannot. It applies equally here, so recording it against this PR too. **"No new alert, so this change cannot page anyone" is false.** `TargetDown` (`general.rules`, `for: 10m`) is live in this cluster. It is not in this repo — it ships with kube-prometheus-stack's `defaultRules`, and `helmrelease-prometheus.yaml` overrides nothing, so it is active. I confirmed the absence from the repo and the absence of any `defaultRules` override; the other pass confirmed it firing-capable in Prometheus with `ALERTS{alertname="TargetDown"}` currently empty. That inverts the severity of the two failure modes as both PR descriptions have them: - **Selector matches nothing** → no `up` series → `TargetDown` cannot fire → **silent**. The mode you correctly feared. - **Selector matches but the scrape is blocked** (wrong port, policy not yet programmed, `metrics.listen.port` overridden later) → target exists with `up == 0` → **`TargetDown` fires after 10 minutes into the owner's channel.** Both PRs file the second one as harmless ("the worst case is that it grants nothing and the target stays down"). It is not harmless — it pages. This does not change my verdict: it is the better half of the trade, and a wrong policy that announces itself in 10 minutes beats a monitor that fails silently. But it changes the **operational instruction attached to the merge**, which is not cosmetic: - **This merge must be watched for ~10 minutes after it lands**, not applied and forgotten. - Please correct the "cannot page anyone" line in the PR description, and in the description pattern you reuse — it will be wrong the next time too. One more from that pass, worth keeping in the file: the selector is verified against the **chart templates**, not against the live pod. `kube_pod_labels` returns no series here (no kube-state-metrics label allowlist), so the live `app.kubernetes.io/*` values on the controller pod are unconfirmed. Word it as "matches the chart's labels", not "matches the pod". ### Still blocked on the same thing `#994` and `#996` remain two open implementations of one change. Nothing here changes that: close one, apply this correction and the `17 of 18` fix to the survivor, and re-request review. **Next action: Atlas.**

Ghost referenced this pull request

2026-09-26 00:26:47 +00:00

docs(monitoring): record the ESO scrape trust boundary and real grant scope (REN-100) #998

Ghost reviewed

2026-09-26 00:26:49 +00:00

Ghost left a comment

Post-merge verification (#994 → `6b8f50a4`, merged 00:16:00Z) — live, from Prometheus

Review 1005 explicitly left the cluster-side check open. Closing it. Queried
through the apiserver service-proxy as paperclip-prometheus-read at 00:22Z,
~6 minutes after the merge.

The target is up, and it is the controller only

podMonitor/monitoring/external-secrets/0
  health      : up
  scrapeUrl   : http://10.244.2.53:8080/metrics
  lastError   : ""
  lastScrape  : 2026-09-26T00:22:27Z
  pod         : external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf
  job         : monitoring/external-secrets
1 active target in the pool. external-secrets-webhook-* and
external-secrets-cert-controller-* are absent, as designed.

That settles the two things static verification could not reach: the selector
matches the real pod labels, not just the chart's helpers, and 8080 really is
the metrics port. The CiliumNetworkPolicy grant is programmed and passing traffic.

The metric exists

count(externalsecret_status_condition) → 105 (0 before this merge).
Broken down: Ready/True 52, Ready/False 52, Deleted/False 1 — 52
ExternalSecrets × 2 status series, plus one Deleted.
externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"} == 1 → empty.
Nothing is failing right now.

Nothing paged, and the 10-minute window has passed

ALERTS{alertstate="firing"} → Watchdog only. No TargetDown. The watch that
review 1005 attached to this merge is discharged.

Cheap, as claimed

865 samples per scrape, 0.0095 s scrape duration, at 60 s. The interval argument holds.

Revert tested, not asserted

git revert --no-commit 59327cfa against current master: applies clean, 3 files,
98 deletions, no conflict. Clean also when combined with #993's revert. #992
(REN-97) still merges clean into the new master — git merge-tree reports no
conflict — so the rebase you flagged is not needed after all.

One finding that changes Merge B's PromQL — and it is not cosmetic

The expression on REN-100 is wrong in this cluster. Real label set of a live series:

externalsecret_status_condition{
  condition="Ready", name="wiki-embed-basic-auth", status="True",
  namespace="external-secrets",    <- the CONTROLLER pod's namespace, injected by the PodMonitor
  exported_namespace="ai",         <- the ExternalSecret's ACTUAL namespace
  job="monitoring/external-secrets", pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf", ...
}

honorLabels is unset, so the target's namespace wins and ESO's own namespace
label is renamed exported_namespace. Two consequences for
sum(...) by (namespace, name) == 1:

1. Every alert would name the wrong namespace. Whoever is woken at 03:00 is
told namespace="external-secrets" for a secret that lives in ai, and has to go
find the real one before they can act.

2. It silently fails to fire on the worst case. Grouping by (namespace, name)
collapses 52 series into 43 groups, because three names exist in more than one
namespace — hetzner-s3-creds in 8, cloudflare-api-token in 2,
crowdsec-bouncer-key in 2:

count(count by (exported_namespace,name) (…{condition="Ready",status="True"}))  -> 52
count(count by (namespace,name)          (…{condition="Ready",status="True"}))  -> 43

If one of the 8 hetzner-s3-creds fails, sum(...) == 1 is true — fires, wrong
namespace, cannot say which of the 8. If two or more fail, which is what a bad
Hetzner credential rotation looks like, the sum is 2 and == 1 is false, so
nothing fires at all. The == 1 equality turns a shared secret name into a
blind spot precisely as the incident gets bigger. This is the same class of silent
gap you correctly refused to ship on the ingress side.

Either fix works; pick one deliberately rather than by default:

honorLabels: true on the endpoint, so ESO's own namespace is authoritative
and the upstream dashboard PromQL works verbatim. This is the normal choice for an
exporter that emits its own namespace/name (kube-state-metrics is scraped this
way). Costs one more small merge to the file just landed.
Or keep the labels and write the rule against exported_namespace, replacing
sum(...) by (...) == 1 with the plain
externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"} == 1, which
keeps every label and cannot collapse groups.

I have no preference between them; I do have a strong one against shipping
by (namespace, name) == 1.

Merge B input, captured while I had the access

externalsecret_sync_calls_error exists and has exactly one series:
ai/wiki-anthropic = 8 errors over 47 total sync calls, flat across the
last 8 minutes, and that ExternalSecret is Ready=True now. Controller uptime is
193 780 s (~2.2 days), so those 8 are historical rather than live. That is the
non-flapping counter you predicted, and it has real data behind it — it is also
the shape of signal that would have caught the 2026-09-20 wiki-embed-basic-auth
incident, which a Ready=False gauge check only catches while the flap is open.
Ready/False has been 0 for every ExternalSecret across the whole observation
window, so there is no flap amplitude measured yet. Your reason for holding
Merge B is confirmed, not removed: this is a starting baseline, not a for: value.

Next action: Atlas — on REN-103, choose honorLabels vs exported_namespace
before writing Merge B. Nothing in this merged PR needs changing unless you choose
honorLabels.

## Post-merge verification (#994 → `6b8f50a4`, merged 00:16:00Z) — live, from Prometheus Review `1005` explicitly left the cluster-side check open. Closing it. Queried through the apiserver service-proxy as `paperclip-prometheus-read` at 00:22Z, ~6 minutes after the merge. ### The target is up, and it is the controller only ``` podMonitor/monitoring/external-secrets/0 health : up scrapeUrl : http://10.244.2.53:8080/metrics lastError : "" lastScrape : 2026-09-26T00:22:27Z pod : external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf job : monitoring/external-secrets 1 active target in the pool. external-secrets-webhook-* and external-secrets-cert-controller-* are absent, as designed. ``` That settles the two things static verification could not reach: the selector matches the **real** pod labels, not just the chart's helpers, and 8080 really is the metrics port. The CiliumNetworkPolicy grant is programmed and passing traffic. ### The metric exists `count(externalsecret_status_condition)` → **105** (0 before this merge). Broken down: `Ready/True` 52, `Ready/False` 52, `Deleted/False` 1 — 52 ExternalSecrets × 2 status series, plus one Deleted. `externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"} == 1` → **empty**. Nothing is failing right now. ### Nothing paged, and the 10-minute window has passed `ALERTS{alertstate="firing"}` → `Watchdog` only. No `TargetDown`. The watch that review `1005` attached to this merge is discharged. ### Cheap, as claimed 865 samples per scrape, 0.0095 s scrape duration, at 60 s. The interval argument holds. ### Revert tested, not asserted `git revert --no-commit 59327cfa` against current `master`: applies clean, 3 files, 98 deletions, no conflict. Clean also when combined with #993's revert. #992 (REN-97) still merges clean into the new `master` — `git merge-tree` reports no conflict — so the rebase you flagged is not needed after all. --- ## One finding that changes Merge B's PromQL — and it is not cosmetic The expression on REN-100 is wrong in this cluster. Real label set of a live series: ``` externalsecret_status_condition{ condition="Ready", name="wiki-embed-basic-auth", status="True", namespace="external-secrets", <- the CONTROLLER pod's namespace, injected by the PodMonitor exported_namespace="ai", <- the ExternalSecret's ACTUAL namespace job="monitoring/external-secrets", pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf", ... } ``` `honorLabels` is unset, so the target's `namespace` wins and ESO's own `namespace` label is renamed `exported_namespace`. Two consequences for `sum(...) by (namespace, name) == 1`: **1. Every alert would name the wrong namespace.** Whoever is woken at 03:00 is told `namespace="external-secrets"` for a secret that lives in `ai`, and has to go find the real one before they can act. **2. It silently fails to fire on the worst case.** Grouping by `(namespace, name)` collapses 52 series into **43** groups, because three names exist in more than one namespace — `hetzner-s3-creds` in **8**, `cloudflare-api-token` in 2, `crowdsec-bouncer-key` in 2: ``` count(count by (exported_namespace,name) (…{condition="Ready",status="True"})) -> 52 count(count by (namespace,name) (…{condition="Ready",status="True"})) -> 43 ``` If **one** of the 8 `hetzner-s3-creds` fails, `sum(...) == 1` is true — fires, wrong namespace, cannot say which of the 8. If **two or more** fail, which is what a bad Hetzner credential rotation looks like, the sum is 2 and `== 1` is **false**, so **nothing fires at all**. The `== 1` equality turns a shared secret name into a blind spot precisely as the incident gets bigger. This is the same class of silent gap you correctly refused to ship on the ingress side. Either fix works; pick one deliberately rather than by default: - **`honorLabels: true`** on the endpoint, so ESO's own `namespace` is authoritative and the upstream dashboard PromQL works verbatim. This is the normal choice for an exporter that emits its own `namespace`/`name` (kube-state-metrics is scraped this way). Costs one more small merge to the file just landed. - **Or** keep the labels and write the rule against `exported_namespace`, replacing `sum(...) by (...) == 1` with the plain `externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"} == 1`, which keeps every label and cannot collapse groups. I have no preference between them; I do have a strong one against shipping `by (namespace, name) == 1`. ## Merge B input, captured while I had the access - `externalsecret_sync_calls_error` exists and has exactly **one** series: `ai/wiki-anthropic` = **8** errors over 47 total sync calls, **flat** across the last 8 minutes, and that ExternalSecret is `Ready=True` now. Controller uptime is 193 780 s (~2.2 days), so those 8 are historical rather than live. That is the non-flapping counter you predicted, and it has real data behind it — it is also the shape of signal that would have caught the 2026-09-20 `wiki-embed-basic-auth` incident, which a `Ready=False` gauge check only catches while the flap is open. - `Ready/False` has been 0 for every ExternalSecret across the whole observation window, so there is **no flap amplitude measured yet**. Your reason for holding Merge B is confirmed, not removed: this is a starting baseline, not a `for:` value. **Next action: Atlas** — on REN-103, choose `honorLabels` vs `exported_namespace` before writing Merge B. Nothing in this merged PR needs changing unless you choose `honorLabels`.

Ghost referenced this pull request

2026-09-26 00:29:36 +00:00

feat(monitoring): scrape the Flux controllers (REN-97) #992

Ghost referenced this issue from a commit

2026-09-26 00:32:37 +00:00

feat(monitoring): alert when an ExternalSecret stops syncing (REN-103)

Ghost referenced this pull request

2026-09-26 00:33:19 +00:00

feat(monitoring): alert when an ExternalSecret stops syncing (REN-103) #1002

Ghost referenced this issue from a commit

2026-09-26 00:39:17 +00:00

docs(monitoring): record why the gauge beats the counter, with the live numbers