feat(paperclip): disable sign-up; document the Claude connection #967
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ credentials are out of scope (see "Deferred").
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| Execution model | **B — server-local runs** (upstream default): agent CLIs are child processes of the server, in the server container. Trial only. |
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| Upgrade path | If Paperclip is kept: **C** — `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes` sandbox provider + kubernetes-sigs agent-sandbox controller (`agents.x-k8s.io`), per-run Pods and Secrets. Separate spec. |
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| Claude auth | **One shared subscription OAuth token** (`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, from `claude setup-token`) for all agents. |
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| Claude auth | **One shared Claude subscription AI connection**, created once via Paperclip's local sign-in (`claude auth login` into `ai-local-logins/<id>`); Paperclip stores and refreshes it. Server-env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is not used: `stripAiAuthBindings` blanks it for managed runs, and upstream accepts no pasted setup-token (the device-code flow needs a Daytona sandbox). |
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| Bot credentials | Out of scope. Future "AIR-Manager" Paperclip role handles permission requests. |
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| Exposure | LAN-only, behind an Authentik forward-auth gate, then Paperclip's own login. |
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@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ credentials are out of scope (see "Deferred").
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Upstream `runChildProcess()` spawns every local adapter with
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`{...sanitizeInheritedPaperclipEnv(process.env), ...opts.env}`; the sanitizer strips only
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`PAPERCLIP_*` keys. Every agent therefore sees `DATABASE_URL`, `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`,
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`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, the shared filesystem (including every other agent's
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workspace) and every agent-scoped secret it can read from disk. Under B, no bot may hold
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the shared filesystem (including every other agent's workspace and the
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`ai-local-logins` credentials) and every agent-scoped secret it can read from disk. Under B, no bot may hold
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a credential we would not tolerate any other bot using. Per-bot isolation is C's job.
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## Architecture
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@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ All modeled on `kubernetes/apps/paperless/` unless stated.
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claim (`/bootstrap/claim`) requires an already signed-in Better Auth account.
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A follow-up flips it to `true`.
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- `PAPERCLIP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1` (read by `resolveTelemetryConfig`).
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- `PAPERCLIP_API_URL=http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100` plus
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`PAPERCLIP_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES=paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local`: upstream
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otherwise hands agents the public URL, and the gate (`intercept_header_auth`)
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rejects their bearer tokens. The Service name also works for sandbox pods under
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option C; agent JWTs still authenticate each call.
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- `envFrom: secretRef paperclip-secrets`
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- Reloader: `secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperclip-secrets`.
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@@ -106,7 +111,6 @@ extract):
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- `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`
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- `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` (64-char hex). Held in OpenBao, not on the PVC, so
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encrypted agent secrets in Postgres survive PVC loss.
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- `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (shared subscription token)
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### Ingress and SSO
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- Hostname `paperclip.renner.uno`, Traefik `Ingress`, `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer:
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@@ -152,10 +156,15 @@ available since v0.35.0). First use of digest reflection in this repo.
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- Nothing is granted under B that we would not tolerate any agent misusing.
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## Bootstrap (one-time)
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1. Place `apps/paperclip` values in OpenBao (generated secrets + shared OAuth token).
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2. Merge; Flux deploys.
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3. Claim the admin account via the `bootstrap-ceo` invite, add yourself to
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"Paperclip Users" in Authentik.
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1. Place `apps/paperclip` values in OpenBao (the three generated secrets).
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2. Merge; Flux deploys with sign-up enabled.
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3. Sign up through the gate and claim the instance as admin; then set
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`PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP=true`.
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4. In onboarding "Connect a model", choose Claude subscription and run the shown login
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**as the node user** (the entrypoint makes exec sessions root, and root-owned 0600
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credentials are unreadable to the server):
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`kubectl exec -it -n paperclip deploy/paperclip -- gosu node sh -c 'export CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=<shown path> && mkdir -p "$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR" && claude auth login'`
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Repeat after loss of the PVC or database.
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## Verification
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- Flux Kustomization `paperclip` Ready; CNPG `pclp-pg` healthy; first ScheduledBackup
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@@ -163,7 +172,7 @@ available since v0.35.0). First use of digest reflection in this repo.
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- `curl https://paperclip.renner.uno/api/health` through the gate returns healthy after
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Authentik login; unauthenticated request redirects to `auth.renner.uno`.
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- Direct pod access from another namespace is denied (CNP).
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- A test agent (claude-local) completes a trivial task using the shared OAuth token.
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- A test agent (claude-local) completes a trivial task using the shared Claude connection.
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- Flux ImagePolicy reports a `nightly@sha256:` digest.
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## Deferred
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@@ -49,9 +49,13 @@ spec:
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value: private
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- name: PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL
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value: https://paperclip.renner.uno
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# Sign-up stays open until the first admin is claimed; the gate restricts who reaches it.
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# Agents reach the API via the Service, not through the Authentik gate.
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- name: PAPERCLIP_API_URL
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value: http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100
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- name: PAPERCLIP_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES
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value: paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local
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- name: PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP
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value: "false"
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value: "true"
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- name: PAPERCLIP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED
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value: "1"
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envFrom:
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