docs(netpol): deduplicate the home-assistant policy comments #684

Merged
k.renner merged 1 commits from trim-comments-netpol into master 2026-08-28 04:45:24 +00:00
@@ -41,18 +41,14 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# shelly-manager (:8080) is likewise reached only through its own
# Authentik gate outpost. Note this rule and the vscode one are
# port-identical: because this CNP's endpointSelector is {}, a
# `toPorts: 8080` grant here applies to EVERY pod in the namespace that
# listens on 8080, not just the intended one — which is exactly how
# shelly-manager silently rode on the old traefik→:8080 allow written
# for code-server, and why removing that allow in 760e187 took
# shelly-manager's ingress down with it. The `fromEndpoints` selector is
# what keeps these two apart: each gate outpost can only reach its own
# target, enforced on the egress side by the matching CNPs in the
# authentik namespace (vscode-gate-egress.yaml,
# shelly-manager-gate-egress.yaml).
# shelly-manager, behind its own Authentik gate outpost.
#
# CAUTION for every :8080 rule here: this policy's endpointSelector is {},
# so a toPorts grant on 8080 applies to EVERY pod in the namespace
# listening on that port, not just the intended one. Three apps share
# :8080. What keeps them apart is the fromEndpoints selector plus the
# matching per-gate egress CNPs in the authentik namespace. Changing a
# :8080 rule here affects all of them.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
@@ -61,11 +57,8 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# esphome (ESPHome Device Builder, :6052) is likewise reached only through
# its own Authentik gate outpost. Unlike the :8080 vscode/shelly rules
# above, :6052 is unique to esphome, so this namespace-wide (endpointSelector
# {}) toPorts grant doesn't silently apply to any other app — the
# fromEndpoints selector still scopes it to the esphome-gate outpost.
# esphome (:6052), behind its own gate outpost. Port is unique to it, so
# the namespace-wide grant does not reach anything else.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
@@ -74,13 +67,8 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "6052"
protocol: TCP
# zigbee2mqtt (Z2M frontend, :8080) is likewise reached only through its own
# Authentik gate outpost. Like the vscode/shelly-manager rules above this is
# the SHARED :8080 (zigbee2mqtt is the third app on that port), so this
# namespace-wide (endpointSelector {}) grant applies to every :8080 pod — the
# fromEndpoints selector scopes it to the zigbee2mqtt-gate outpost, and the
# matching authentik-side zigbee2mqtt-gate-egress.yaml scopes egress to the
# zigbee2mqtt pod specifically.
# zigbee2mqtt frontend, behind its own gate outpost. Shared :8080 — see the
# caution above.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
@@ -89,11 +77,8 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# zone-configurator (Everything Presence mmWave zone configurator, :42069)
# is likewise reached only through its own Authentik gate outpost. Like
# esphome's :6052, :42069 is unique to it, so this namespace-wide (endpoint
# Selector {}) toPorts grant doesn't silently apply to any other app; the
# fromEndpoints selector scopes it to the zone-configurator-gate outpost.
# zone-configurator (:42069), behind its own gate outpost. Port is unique
# to it.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
@@ -131,25 +116,16 @@ spec:
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# World ingress (IoT-VLAN devices via the BGP LoadBalancers) is NOT
# granted namespace-wide here. A blanket `fromEntities: world` on this
# endpointSelector:{} policy exposed EVERY pod in the namespace to the
# untrusted IoT VLAN / any BGP-routed source — vscode (:8080),
# zone-configurator (:42069), otbr, whisper, etc. — not just the two
# LoadBalancers that need it. World is now scoped per-target in the
# dedicated policies at the bottom of this file: world -> mosquitto
# :1883/:8883 and world -> home-assistant :8123 only. (matter-server on
# 10.2.x.226 rides a multus net1 interface that bypasses Cilium policy
# entirely, so it is unaffected either way.)
# ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 types from any cluster pod.
# Per Cilium docs, "If any layer 4 policy is specified, then ICMP
# will be blocked unless it's related to a connection that is
# otherwise allowed by the policy." The CT-RELATED path is not
# passing these in practice (Hubble shows ICMPv6 DestinationUnreachable
# being POLICY_DENIED on the egress side of established DNS flows),
# so allow ICMP explicitly. Same shape as commit 3c517a0 — widened
# from the error class to the full standard type set. Cilium's
# ICMPField requires an explicit type per entry; no wildcard.
# Do NOT add a blanket `fromEntities: world` to this policy. With
# endpointSelector {} it exposes every pod in the namespace to the IoT
# VLAN and any BGP-routed source, not just the LoadBalancers that need it.
# World is scoped per target in the dedicated policies at the bottom of
# this file. (matter-server rides a multus interface that bypasses Cilium
# policy entirely and is unaffected either way.)
# ICMP must be allowed explicitly: once any L4 policy exists Cilium blocks
# it unless CT-RELATED passes it, which in practice it does not. Cilium's
# ICMPField takes one type per entry — there is no wildcard, so the list
# has to be spelled out.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
@@ -186,10 +162,8 @@ spec:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": apps
# In-cluster InfluxDB: HA's HACS InfluxDB integration writes state
# changes here (replaces the legacy http://influxdb.srv.renner.uno
# target — see kubernetes/apps/influxdb/ha-token-job.yaml for the
# write-bucket token wiring).
# In-cluster InfluxDB: HA's HACS integration writes state changes here.
# Token wiring is in apps/influxdb/ha-token-job.yaml.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
@@ -213,9 +187,8 @@ spec:
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# World: IoT-VLAN devices, ESPHome, HA Cloud, garage S3 (initial
# tarball seed), legacy InfluxDB on VM 108, third-party integration
# endpoints (Hue, Roomba, Philips, Brother IPP, …).
# World: IoT-VLAN devices, HA Cloud, object storage, and third-party
# integration endpoints on the LAN and internet.
- toEntities:
- world
# ICMP — egress mirror of the ingress ICMP allow above. Lets HA