mosquitto: add DoS/resource guards (broker hardening) #128
@@ -12,11 +12,31 @@ data:
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log_type warning
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log_type notice
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# --- Resource / DoS guards ------------------------------------------
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# The broker is now load-bearing and reachable by ~30 untrusted IoT
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# devices (the Shelly fleet) plus the edge host, on a single 256Mi
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# replica. Bound what a misbehaving or compromised client can do:
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# message_size_limit caps a single publish (MQTT allows up to 256 MB —
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# one such message would OOM the broker). Every
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# legit payload here (HA discovery, Shelly/open3e/
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# evcc telemetry) is well under 10 KB.
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# persistent_client_expiration reaps abandoned persistent sessions so
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# their queued state can't accumulate (the edge
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# bridges reconnect within seconds, so they never
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# hit this).
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# max_connections (per listener) bounds a connection flood (~40 clients
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# today; 200 is generous headroom, not unlimited).
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message_size_limit 1048576
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persistent_client_expiration 1d
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# Omit the bind address so mosquitto listens on all interfaces
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# (v4 + v6 wildcard). With a bind address of 0.0.0.0 the broker
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# accepts v4 only and refuses TCP on the v6 LB VIP fd99::81.
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listener 1883
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max_connections 200
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listener 8883
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max_connections 200
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certfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.crt
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keyfile /mosquitto/tls/tls.key
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