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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-bot 803c741362 fix(ci): tag images with a dated literal, not the commit SHA
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline failed
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The SHA tag was a workaround for not being able to compute a date in a
shell-less build step. That problem is gone — the build timestamp now
lives in the image at /etc/image-build-date — so the tag no longer has
to carry it.

A SHA reads as noise at the point of use and breaks the existing
convention every consumer pin follows (ci-k8s:2026-08-10,
ci-ansible:2026-04-29, alpine-jq:2026-07-30). Dated literals keep the
pins uniform and are bumped in the commit that changes an image, which
is the same trigger the `when:` path filters already use.
2026-08-23 21:14:51 +02:00
claude-bot aff01d5a32 build(ci): record the build timestamp in ci-claude too
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline was successful
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ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
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Completes the pattern across every Containerfile in the repo. ci-claude
was the last one without it.

It was skipped initially over the reproducibility work in a675bf6c, on a
misreading. That commit did not make the whole image reproducible — it
made the npm install layer byte-stable so a rebuild of the same version
dedups in the registry instead of orphaning ~260 MB (#336, #351).

A timestamp added as its own final layer leaves the npm layer untouched,
so that dedup still holds. The cost is a few dozen bytes per build, not
260 MB.
2026-08-23 20:59:29 +02:00
claude-bot 80c3051dc7 build(ci): record the build timestamp in the image instead of the tag
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was canceled
The date was previously computed by `date` in the pipeline step and used
as the image tag, which is why the build step needed a shell and hence
the kaniko debug image.

It does not need to cross between CI steps at all. The base images have
a shell, so a RUN in the Containerfile writes the timestamp during the
build itself — kaniko executes the layer and the value lands in the
image. Nothing has to be propagated, and the build step stays
shell-less.

This also separates two things the tag was conflating: the tag says
which source revision was built, /etc/image-build-date says when.

Placed last so it invalidates only its own layer. secret-rotator writes
it in the rust build stage and copies it across, since its final image
is FROM scratch and has no shell.

Verified against ci/images/alpine-jq:

  $ docker run --rm localtest:jq cat /etc/image-build-date
  2026-08-23T18:56:51Z

Note this makes builds non-reproducible byte-for-byte, which a675bf6c
deliberately arranged for ci-claude. ci-claude is built by
ci-claude-refresh.yml and is not touched here.
2026-08-23 20:57:15 +02:00
claude-bot bbbc42c79f fix(ci): build with the plain kaniko executor instead of the debug image
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
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The `-debug` image ships a busybox shell so a failing build can be
inspected. It was being used as the build image because the steps run
shell to assemble registry auth and compute a tag, which is not what
that variant is for.

The plain executor has no shell, so the eight static builds now pass
flags via `entrypoint` and read credentials from DOCKER_CONFIG. A single
registry-auth step writes `.docker/config.json` into the workspace once,
in alpine, where a shell is the intended interface.

Images are tagged `${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:8}` instead of a build date.
Woodpecker exposes no formatted-date variable — every timestamp built in
is UNIX — and kaniko takes `--destination` only as a literal argument,
with all its file-based flags being outputs. The commit SHA is available
through normal substitution and identifies the source revision the image
was built from, which a build date does not.

Existing dated tags stay in the registry, so the pins that reference
them keep resolving; only newly created tags change format.

Also moves off v1.23.2, picking up the go-git fix for CVE-2025-21613 and
containerd 1.7.18 -> 1.7.27.

ci-claude-refresh.yml keeps its shell step: its destination tag is a
runtime value read from a file written by an earlier step, and the build
is conditionally skipped, neither of which survives a static entrypoint.
Left for #552.

Needs a pipeline run to confirm that substitution applies to
`entrypoint` and `environment` values, and that the auth file written by
registry-auth is visible to the build steps.

Refs #426, #552
2026-08-23 20:52:06 +02:00
k.renner adefaab7e8 Merge pull request 'docs(rook-ceph): cut the narrative out of the ceph manifest comments' (#548) from document-pool-no-redundancy-meaning into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/issue-fix Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#548
2026-08-21 20:28:21 +00:00
claude-bot 9a43330701 docs(rook-ceph): cut the narrative out of the ceph manifest comments
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
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Comments should say what the setting does and what constrains it. The
blocks added in #542, #544, #545 and #547 had grown into incident
write-ups: measurement runs, prior values, how a problem was found,
what a check used to be. That belongs in commit messages and the wiki,
both of which already carry it.

Trimmed, no behaviour change:

  cephcluster.yaml       22 lines -> 6   (cephx rotation)
  cephfs-ci.yaml         26 lines -> 7   (why size 2)
  prometheusrule-ceph.yaml                (CephHealthWarn, 43 -> 13;
                                           CephPoolLostRedundancy, 15 -> 7)

The operative facts are kept: which checks are excluded and why they
cannot clear, that POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY reports blocked maintenance and
not only data risk, and that size 1 needs dedicated OSDs.
2026-08-21 22:27:10 +02:00
k.renner 9c796b924b Merge pull request 'fix(rook-ceph): raise cephfs-ci to size 2 — size 1 blocks all OSD maintenance' (#547) from fix-ci-pool-blocks-osd-maintenance into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#547
2026-08-21 20:22:07 +00:00
claude-bot 85996991b6 fix(rook-ceph): raise cephfs-ci to size 2 — size 1 blocks all OSD maintenance
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
The unreplicated CI pools introduced in #542 make every OSD on the
cluster permanently un-restartable.

`ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while stopping an OSD would take PGs
offline. A size-1 pool puts every PG on exactly one OSD, so the check
fails for all three:

  Error EBUSY: unsafe to stop osd(s) at this time
               (20 PGs are or would become offline)
  bad_become_inactive: 13.6 13.9 ... 14.1c 14.1d

Pools 13 and 14 are cephfs-ci-metadata and cephfs-ci-data0. The size-2
pools are not implicated — they run min_size 1 and appear under
ok_become_degraded, which is allowed.

Rook gates OSD restarts on that check, so this blocks CephX key
rotation, Ceph upgrades, node drains and reboots, and drive
replacement. It surfaced when #545 deadlocked: Rook retried
ok-to-stop against all three OSDs several times a second and could
never succeed, while `ceph -s` reported 217 pgs active+clean
throughout. Nothing is unhealthy; the restarts are simply refused.

The reasoning in #542 was that unreplicated CI data only risks
in-flight pipelines, since every byte is a fresh git clone. That part
holds. What it missed is that the cost is not scoped to the pool: one
unreplicated pool freezes maintenance for the entire cluster.

Most of #542's saving came from keeping CI churn off `cephfs`, whose
metadataPool is size 3 — that survives this change. Only the second-
order gain from dropping the replica is given up, and cephfs-ci-data0
stores 0 B with cephfs-ci-metadata at 182 MiB, so the backfill is
trivial.

size 1 becomes viable again once these pools sit on OSDs of their own,
where the permanently un-stoppable OSD holds nothing but throwaway
data. That is planned with the retired QLC drives.

Alerting follows the same change:

- POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is no longer excluded from CephHealthWarn. It was
  excluded because cephfs-ci was expected to keep it permanently
  active; no pool is unreplicated now, so the exclusion would only
  hide a real one losing its replicas.
- CephPoolLostRedundancy drops its cephfs-ci exemption for the same
  reason, and its description now states the maintenance consequence,
  not just the data-loss one.
- The AUTH_INSECURE_* exclusion is reworded. Calling it
  "known-accepted" reads as a decision that the risk is fine; it is a
  kernel-blocked remediation (aes256k over the CSI mount path needs
  kernel 7.0+, nodes run 6.18).

Refs #542, #545, #527
2026-08-21 22:21:11 +02:00
k.renner 04b8c93113 Merge pull request 'fix(rook-ceph): rotate CephX daemon keys to close CVE-2025-30156' (#545) from rotate-cephx-daemon-keys into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#545
2026-08-21 20:07:25 +00:00
k.renner 8c0a6b2b1e Merge pull request 'fix(monitoring): CephHealthWarn has been firing continuously and hiding everything' (#544) from fix-ceph-health-alert into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/e2e Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/cron/security-scan Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/issue-fix Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#544
2026-08-21 08:02:00 +00:00
13 changed files with 169 additions and 220 deletions
+91 -129
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
# Flux-deployed CronJobs, so it is tracked separately in #330 rather than
# bundled here. Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that
# motivated the other cutovers does not apply to it.
#
# The build steps run the plain kaniko executor, which has no shell: they pass
# flags via `entrypoint` and read credentials from DOCKER_CONFIG. Registry auth
# is written once by the registry-auth step below. Dated tags are literals: bump
# them in the commit that changes an image. The build timestamp itself lives in
# the image at /etc/image-build-date, written by a RUN in the Containerfile.
when:
- event: push
path:
@@ -24,10 +30,22 @@ when:
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "build-ci-images"'
steps:
- name: build-ansible
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
directory: ci/images/ansible
- name: registry-auth
image: alpine:3.24.1
depends_on: []
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p .docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > .docker/config.json
- name: build-ansible
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/ansible
depends_on: [registry-auth]
# Only rebuild when THIS image's source (or the pipeline file) changed, or
# on a manual run. Without this every step ran on any matching push, so a
# secret-rotator commit needlessly rebuilt all four ~1.3G ci-* images and
@@ -37,68 +55,47 @@ steps:
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/ansible/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest
- name: build-k8s
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/k8s
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/k8s/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
- name: build-tofu
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/tofu
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/tofu/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:latest
# NOTE: ci-claude is deliberately NOT built here. It tracks upstream Claude
# Code releases on its own cadence and is built + version-tagged by
@@ -108,28 +105,21 @@ steps:
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: a static musl binary in a FROM-scratch image,
# used as the base for secret-rotation CronJobs. Replaces per-job inline Python.
- name: build-secret-rotator
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: secret-rotator
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["secret-rotator/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: a general-purpose alpine + jq base for
# workloads that need to read JSON from a shell script. Named for what it IS,
@@ -137,28 +127,21 @@ steps:
# container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
# the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
- name: build-alpine-jq
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/alpine-jq/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
# baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
@@ -166,28 +149,21 @@ steps:
# critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
# where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
- name: build-cni-plugins
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
# needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
@@ -195,28 +171,21 @@ steps:
# every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
# base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
- name: build-alpine-openssl
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
# Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
# run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an
@@ -224,25 +193,18 @@ steps:
# Ansible converge. Not a ci-* image -- it is a runtime artifact -- but it
# builds the same way and lands in the same registry so the audit sees it.
- name: build-heating-can
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/heating-can
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/heating-can/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
+5
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@@ -22,3 +22,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# unanchored extraction therefore yields a device link key, and herdsman then
# forms a NEW Zigbee network and drops every device.
RUN apk add --no-cache jq
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# for paperless to trust. busybox has no s_client equivalent, so openssl is not
# substitutable there.
RUN apk add --no-cache openssl
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ RUN pip3 install --break-system-packages --no-cache-dir \
RUN ansible-galaxy collection install \
community.proxmox \
community.docker
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+6
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@@ -44,3 +44,9 @@ RUN npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION} \
/usr \
/root \
/tmp
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# version was built, this says when. Deliberately the LAST layer and its own
# layer, so the byte-stable npm layer above still dedups in the registry — that
# dedup is what #351 was for, and a few dozen bytes here does not affect it.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -66,3 +66,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
COPY --from=fetch /plugins/ /opt/cni-plugins/
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -120,3 +120,8 @@ USER open3e
WORKDIR /var/lib/open3e
ENTRYPOINT ["supervisord", "-c", "/etc/supervisord.conf"]
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -42,3 +42,8 @@ RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/velero.tar.gz \
&& tar -xz -C /tmp -f /tmp/velero.tar.gz \
&& install "/tmp/velero-${VELERO_VERSION}-linux-amd64/velero" /usr/local/bin/velero \
&& rm -rf "/tmp/velero-${VELERO_VERSION}-linux-amd64" /tmp/velero.tar.gz
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
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@@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ RUN pip3 install --break-system-packages --no-cache-dir \
RUN ansible-galaxy collection install \
community.proxmox \
community.docker
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
@@ -12,65 +12,43 @@ spec:
- name: ceph.rules
rules:
- alert: CephHealthWarn
# Was `ceph_health_status == 1`, which had been FIRING CONTINUOUSLY
# since at least 2026-08-21T00:26Z and was therefore telling us
# nothing: four AUTH_INSECURE_* checks are permanently active
# (CVE-2025-30156, issue #527) and cannot clear until Rook >=1.20.5.
# A permanently-firing alert masks every subsequent Ceph warning,
# which is the opposite of what this rule is for.
# Per-check rather than ceph_health_status, so one permanently-active
# check cannot mask every other Ceph warning.
#
# ceph_health_detail exposes each check individually, so alert on any
# check that is NOT a known-accepted one. Verified against live data:
# 5 checks active, 0 unexpected — so this is quiet now and fires the
# moment a genuinely new condition appears.
# AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded: it cannot clear until the nodes run a
# kernel supporting aes256k over the CSI mount path (#527).
#
# Accepted, each for a documented reason:
# AUTH_INSECURE_* CVE-2025-30156, tracked in #527
# POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY cephfs-ci is size 1 ON PURPOSE (CI
# workspaces are throwaway). Non-CI pools
# losing redundancy is caught by
# CephPoolLostRedundancy below, since this
# check does not say WHICH pool.
# POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is in scope. An unreplicated pool makes
# `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuse for every OSD, so it reports blocked
# maintenance and not just data risk — do not exclude it for a pool
# that is unreplicated deliberately.
#
# 6h is kept: Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions — a slow
# BlueStore op during the Sunday restore sweep, a mon briefly below
# its disk threshold — and paging on those trains people to ignore
# the alert. What matters is a warning that does not clear.
expr: ceph_health_detail{name!~"AUTH_INSECURE_.+|POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY"} == 1
# 6h: Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions. Only a warning that
# does not clear is worth paging on.
expr: ceph_health_detail{name!~"AUTH_INSECURE_.+"} == 1
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} active for 6h"
description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Known-accepted checks (AUTH_INSECURE_*, POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY) are excluded from this alert, so this is a new condition. Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527), so this is a new condition. Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
- alert: CephPoolLostRedundancy
# Restores what excluding POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY from CephHealthWarn
# gives up. That check fires cluster-wide without naming a pool, so
# accepting it for cephfs-ci would also hide a PRODUCTION pool
# dropping to one replica.
# Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.
#
# There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
# replication factor. Verified live: replicapool 2, cephfs-data0 2,
# cephfs-metadata 3, cephfs-ci-metadata 1.
# replication factor. The >1e6 floor drops pools too small to measure
# meaningfully, empty ones included.
#
# The >1e6 floor excludes trivially small pools. It is not needed to
# suppress the near-empty rgw pools — their ratios are 9-36 because
# per-object overhead dominates, so they never match `< 1.5` anyway.
#
# Both directions were tested against live data before committing:
# including cephfs-ci the expression matches (pool 13), excluding it
# the expression is empty. An alert that cannot fire is worse than no
# alert, so the positive control matters as much as the negative.
# No pool is exempt.
expr: |
(ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5 and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6)
and on(pool_id) ceph_pool_metadata{name!~"cephfs-ci-.+"}
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5 and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6
for: 30m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Ceph pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} is running unreplicated"
description: "Pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning a single OSD loss destroys data. Only the cephfs-ci pools are meant to be unreplicated. Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
description: "Pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning a single OSD loss destroys data. No pool is meant to be unreplicated — an unreplicated pool also blocks ALL OSD maintenance cluster-wide, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- alert: CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
@@ -17,28 +17,12 @@ spec:
modules:
- name: pg_autoscaler
enabled: true
# CVE-2025-30156: CephX AES-128-CBC service tickets carry no HMAC and use a
# hard-coded IV, so a holder of any low-privilege key can bit-flip a ticket
# into cluster-admin. The fix is rotating keys to the aes256k cipher —
# upgrading the binaries alone does not close it. Rotation is opt-in and
# defaults to Disabled, so it must be requested here.
# Rotates daemon keys to aes256k for CVE-2025-30156 (#527). Opt-in; disabled
# by default. Increment keyGeneration to rotate again.
#
# Daemon keys only. CSI keys stay on aes: aes256k over the CSI mount path
# needs a host kernel of 7.0 or newer and these nodes run 6.18. `aes`
# therefore has to remain in auth_allowed_ciphers for CSI to authenticate,
# which leaves AUTH_INSECURE_CLIENT_KEY_TYPE, AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_ALLOWED and
# AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_CREATABLE raised. Revisit once the nodes run a kernel
# that supports it.
#
# Rotating the daemon keys clears AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE, the only
# one of the six checks at ERR severity. That matters beyond the CVE itself:
# Rook skips CephFS and RGW reconciliation entirely while health is
# HEALTH_ERR, and that check is currently held down only by a mon-side mute
# with a finite TTL.
#
# keyType is deliberately unset — Rook picks the best type for daemon keys.
# To rotate again later, increment keyGeneration; Rook restarts the daemons
# to pick up the new keys.
# Daemon keys only — aes256k over the CSI mount path needs kernel 7.0+ and
# these nodes run 6.18, so CSI stays on aes and the client-key checks stay
# raised. keyType is unset so Rook picks it.
security:
cephx:
daemon:
@@ -1,29 +1,11 @@
---
# A SEPARATE CephFS whose only purpose is Woodpecker CI workspaces, with both
# pools at size 1.
# A SEPARATE CephFS whose only purpose is Woodpecker CI workspaces. Each
# pipeline gets a PVC that is created, filled and deleted within ~2 minutes;
# keeping that churn off `cephfs` spares its size-3 metadataPool.
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS
# Woodpecker's Kubernetes backend creates a PVC per pipeline, fills it with a
# checkout plus build output, and deletes it when the pipeline ends. Measured
# 2026-08-21 by polling both pools at 15s (a 5-minute interval misses a whole
# pipeline — its PVC is created, used and deleted inside ~2 minutes):
#
# one pipeline, a single 15s interval: data0 +71.6 MB metadata +8.2 MB
# every interval without a CI pod: data0 ~0 metadata ~0
#
# CI drove essentially all of it. On the shared filesystem that costs
# 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB of drive writes per pipeline. Here it costs ~80 MB.
#
# WHY size 1 IS CORRECT HERE, HAVING BEEN REJECTED FOR THE MAIN FILESYSTEM
# `cephfs` keeps metadataPool at size 3 because losing it destroys the whole
# filesystem, not the objects on one OSD, and 550 GiB in cephfs-data0 depends
# on it. None of that applies to this filesystem. Every byte in it is a fresh
# git clone; the worst case of total loss is that in-flight pipelines fail and
# get re-run. Replicating throwaway data is the thing being paid for, so it is
# the thing removed.
#
# Losing an OSD takes these PGs offline and kills running pipelines. That is
# not a regression: CI already breaks during Ceph maintenance.
# size 2, not 1: an unreplicated pool makes `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuse for
# every OSD, blocking all OSD maintenance cluster-wide. size 1 is viable only
# once these pools have OSDs of their own.
apiVersion: ceph.rook.io/v1
kind: CephFilesystem
metadata:
@@ -32,15 +14,11 @@ metadata:
spec:
metadataPool:
replicated:
size: 1
# Rook refuses size 1 without this — it is asserting that an unreplicated
# pool is deliberate rather than a typo. It is.
requireSafeReplicaSize: false
size: 2
dataPools:
- name: data0
replicated:
size: 1
requireSafeReplicaSize: false
size: 2
metadataServer:
activeCount: 1
# No standby-replay, unlike `cephfs`. A standby exists there so a failed
+6
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@@ -21,8 +21,14 @@ COPY src ./src
RUN cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl \
&& strip target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/secret-rotator
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Written here because the final
# image is scratch and has no shell to run `date` in.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /build/image-build-date
FROM scratch
COPY --from=build /build/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/secret-rotator /secret-rotator
COPY --from=build /build/image-build-date /etc/image-build-date
# Matches runAsUser on the rotation Jobs. There is no /etc/passwd in a scratch
# image, so this is a bare uid by necessity — which is also all Kubernetes needs.