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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-bot 803c741362 fix(ci): tag images with a dated literal, not the commit SHA
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
The SHA tag was a workaround for not being able to compute a date in a
shell-less build step. That problem is gone — the build timestamp now
lives in the image at /etc/image-build-date — so the tag no longer has
to carry it.

A SHA reads as noise at the point of use and breaks the existing
convention every consumer pin follows (ci-k8s:2026-08-10,
ci-ansible:2026-04-29, alpine-jq:2026-07-30). Dated literals keep the
pins uniform and are bumped in the commit that changes an image, which
is the same trigger the `when:` path filters already use.
2026-08-23 21:14:51 +02:00
claude-bot aff01d5a32 build(ci): record the build timestamp in ci-claude too
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
Completes the pattern across every Containerfile in the repo. ci-claude
was the last one without it.

It was skipped initially over the reproducibility work in a675bf6c, on a
misreading. That commit did not make the whole image reproducible — it
made the npm install layer byte-stable so a rebuild of the same version
dedups in the registry instead of orphaning ~260 MB (#336, #351).

A timestamp added as its own final layer leaves the npm layer untouched,
so that dedup still holds. The cost is a few dozen bytes per build, not
260 MB.
2026-08-23 20:59:29 +02:00
claude-bot 80c3051dc7 build(ci): record the build timestamp in the image instead of the tag
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was canceled
The date was previously computed by `date` in the pipeline step and used
as the image tag, which is why the build step needed a shell and hence
the kaniko debug image.

It does not need to cross between CI steps at all. The base images have
a shell, so a RUN in the Containerfile writes the timestamp during the
build itself — kaniko executes the layer and the value lands in the
image. Nothing has to be propagated, and the build step stays
shell-less.

This also separates two things the tag was conflating: the tag says
which source revision was built, /etc/image-build-date says when.

Placed last so it invalidates only its own layer. secret-rotator writes
it in the rust build stage and copies it across, since its final image
is FROM scratch and has no shell.

Verified against ci/images/alpine-jq:

  $ docker run --rm localtest:jq cat /etc/image-build-date
  2026-08-23T18:56:51Z

Note this makes builds non-reproducible byte-for-byte, which a675bf6c
deliberately arranged for ci-claude. ci-claude is built by
ci-claude-refresh.yml and is not touched here.
2026-08-23 20:57:15 +02:00
claude-bot bbbc42c79f fix(ci): build with the plain kaniko executor instead of the debug image
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
The `-debug` image ships a busybox shell so a failing build can be
inspected. It was being used as the build image because the steps run
shell to assemble registry auth and compute a tag, which is not what
that variant is for.

The plain executor has no shell, so the eight static builds now pass
flags via `entrypoint` and read credentials from DOCKER_CONFIG. A single
registry-auth step writes `.docker/config.json` into the workspace once,
in alpine, where a shell is the intended interface.

Images are tagged `${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:8}` instead of a build date.
Woodpecker exposes no formatted-date variable — every timestamp built in
is UNIX — and kaniko takes `--destination` only as a literal argument,
with all its file-based flags being outputs. The commit SHA is available
through normal substitution and identifies the source revision the image
was built from, which a build date does not.

Existing dated tags stay in the registry, so the pins that reference
them keep resolving; only newly created tags change format.

Also moves off v1.23.2, picking up the go-git fix for CVE-2025-21613 and
containerd 1.7.18 -> 1.7.27.

ci-claude-refresh.yml keeps its shell step: its destination tag is a
runtime value read from a file written by an earlier step, and the build
is conditionally skipped, neither of which survives a static entrypoint.
Left for #552.

Needs a pipeline run to confirm that substitution applies to
`entrypoint` and `environment` values, and that the auth file written by
registry-auth is visible to the build steps.

Refs #426, #552
2026-08-23 20:52:06 +02:00
39 changed files with 419 additions and 1092 deletions
+91 -129
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
# Flux-deployed CronJobs, so it is tracked separately in #330 rather than
# bundled here. Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that
# motivated the other cutovers does not apply to it.
#
# The build steps run the plain kaniko executor, which has no shell: they pass
# flags via `entrypoint` and read credentials from DOCKER_CONFIG. Registry auth
# is written once by the registry-auth step below. Dated tags are literals: bump
# them in the commit that changes an image. The build timestamp itself lives in
# the image at /etc/image-build-date, written by a RUN in the Containerfile.
when:
- event: push
path:
@@ -24,10 +30,22 @@ when:
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "build-ci-images"'
steps:
- name: build-ansible
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
directory: ci/images/ansible
- name: registry-auth
image: alpine:3.24.1
depends_on: []
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p .docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > .docker/config.json
- name: build-ansible
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/ansible
depends_on: [registry-auth]
# Only rebuild when THIS image's source (or the pipeline file) changed, or
# on a manual run. Without this every step ran on any matching push, so a
# secret-rotator commit needlessly rebuilt all four ~1.3G ci-* images and
@@ -37,68 +55,47 @@ steps:
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/ansible/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest
- name: build-k8s
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/k8s
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/k8s/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
- name: build-tofu
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/tofu
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/tofu/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:latest
# NOTE: ci-claude is deliberately NOT built here. It tracks upstream Claude
# Code releases on its own cadence and is built + version-tagged by
@@ -108,28 +105,21 @@ steps:
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: a static musl binary in a FROM-scratch image,
# used as the base for secret-rotation CronJobs. Replaces per-job inline Python.
- name: build-secret-rotator
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: secret-rotator
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["secret-rotator/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: a general-purpose alpine + jq base for
# workloads that need to read JSON from a shell script. Named for what it IS,
@@ -137,28 +127,21 @@ steps:
# container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
# the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
- name: build-alpine-jq
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/alpine-jq/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
# baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
@@ -166,28 +149,21 @@ steps:
# critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
# where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
- name: build-cni-plugins
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
# needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
@@ -195,28 +171,21 @@ steps:
# every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
# base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
- name: build-alpine-openssl
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
# Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
# run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an
@@ -224,25 +193,18 @@ steps:
# Ansible converge. Not a ci-* image -- it is a runtime artifact -- but it
# builds the same way and lands in the same registry so the audit sees it.
- name: build-heating-can
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0
directory: ci/images/heating-can
depends_on: []
depends_on: [registry-auth]
when:
- event: manual
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/heating-can/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
DOCKER_CONFIG: "${CI_WORKSPACE}/.docker"
entrypoint:
- /kaniko/executor
- --context=.
- --dockerfile=Containerfile
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:2026-08-23
- --destination=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
+3 -10
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: validate-secrets
image: alpine:3.24.1
image: alpine:3.21
environment:
TF_VAR_proxmox_api_url:
from_secret: proxmox_api_url
@@ -129,20 +129,13 @@ steps:
- echo "$VAULT_PASS" > /tmp/.vault_pass && chmod 600 /tmp/.vault_pass
- export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=/tmp/.vault_pass
- |
# Ensure Talos image exists on all Proxmox nodes via API.
#
# Only nodes still running Proxmox belong in this list. jupiter and
# saturn run Talos on bare metal now, so the storage API returns
# nothing for them and the download-wait loop below would burn its full
# 60x10s per node before giving up. Bare-metal nodes boot the
# metal-amd64 image from their own installed disk instead, and the
# whole step goes away once neptune is converted too.
# Ensure Talos image exists on all Proxmox nodes via API
TALOS_VERSION="v1.12.6"
TALOS_SCHEMATIC="88e3752db032a08082972bd0adf16a80849e3870c3f95cf5b669936c5699e5ad"
TALOS_URL="https://factory.talos.dev/image/$TALOS_SCHEMATIC/$TALOS_VERSION/nocloud-amd64.raw"
TALOS_FILENAME="talos-$TALOS_VERSION-$(echo "$TALOS_SCHEMATIC" | cut -c1-12)-nocloud-amd64.raw"
API_TOKEN="$TF_VAR_proxmox_user!$TF_VAR_proxmox_token_id=$TF_VAR_proxmox_token_secret"
for node in neptune; do
for node in jupiter saturn neptune; do
EXISTS=$(curl -sk "$TF_VAR_proxmox_api_url/api2/json/nodes/$node/storage/local/content" \
-H "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=$API_TOKEN" 2>/dev/null | grep -c "$TALOS_FILENAME" || true)
if [ "$EXISTS" -gt 0 ]; then
+5
View File
@@ -22,3 +22,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# unanchored extraction therefore yields a device link key, and herdsman then
# forms a NEW Zigbee network and drops every device.
RUN apk add --no-cache jq
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# for paperless to trust. busybox has no s_client equivalent, so openssl is not
# substitutable there.
RUN apk add --no-cache openssl
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ RUN pip3 install --break-system-packages --no-cache-dir \
RUN ansible-galaxy collection install \
community.proxmox \
community.docker
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+6
View File
@@ -44,3 +44,9 @@ RUN npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION} \
/usr \
/root \
/tmp
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# version was built, this says when. Deliberately the LAST layer and its own
# layer, so the byte-stable npm layer above still dedups in the registry — that
# dedup is what #351 was for, and a few dozen bytes here does not affect it.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -66,3 +66,8 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
COPY --from=fetch /plugins/ /opt/cni-plugins/
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -120,3 +120,8 @@ USER open3e
WORKDIR /var/lib/open3e
ENTRYPOINT ["supervisord", "-c", "/etc/supervisord.conf"]
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -42,3 +42,8 @@ RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/velero.tar.gz \
&& tar -xz -C /tmp -f /tmp/velero.tar.gz \
&& install "/tmp/velero-${VELERO_VERSION}-linux-amd64/velero" /usr/local/bin/velero \
&& rm -rf "/tmp/velero-${VELERO_VERSION}-linux-amd64" /tmp/velero.tar.gz
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+5
View File
@@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ RUN pip3 install --break-system-packages --no-cache-dir \
RUN ansible-galaxy collection install \
community.proxmox \
community.docker
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Last layer, so it only invalidates
# itself.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /etc/image-build-date
+1 -1
View File
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ permanent recovery.
## CNPG restore-test (verify backups are restorable — non-destructive)
The monthly Velero restore-test (`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`) exercises
The weekly Velero restore-test (`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`) exercises
PVC restores but **explicitly does not touch CNPG** (barman-cloud is a separate
code path). Run this drill periodically to prove the CNPG backups are actually
restorable, **without touching the live clusters**. It restores into a throwaway
-340
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@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
# Runbook — converting a control-plane node from Proxmox VM to bare metal
Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were
all in state that outlived the VM.
## What the node ends up as
| | |
|---|---|
| System disk | Kingston OM8PGP41024Q-A0, selected by serial |
| EPHEMERAL (`/var`) | the retired Crucial P3, selected by serial |
| Ceph OSD | Samsung PM983, selected by `/dev/disk/by-id` |
| Management | VLAN 40 tagged on X710 port 0 |
| v30iot | VLAN 30 on the same port, named `ens19` |
| Ceph cluster net | X710 port 1, `10.99.0.x/29`, MTU 9000 |
## Before you start
- [ ] All three OSDs up, all mons in quorum, PGs `active+clean`. Do not start
from a degraded cluster; the window itself removes one of three.
- [ ] Cluster fits on two nodes. Check `kubectl describe node` allocation on the
two survivors. Take immich down (`kubernetes/apps/immich`, both
Deployments to `replicas: 0`) — it frees ~1000m against a shortfall of
roughly 200m and takes its image pulls off the remaining nodes.
- [ ] `cephfs-metadata` to size 2 / min_size 1 for the duration. At size 3 on
two hosts every PG is undersized with min_size 2, so one further OSD loss
blocks IO on every CephFS mount cluster-wide.
- [ ] Talos metal ISO on a USB stick. Schematic
`a21cec8f35ae32ab5e9a452e7b13500ca8776053930b8e182b9cb23eed186b64`
(`net.ifnames=1`, intel-ucode, thunderbolt; no qemu-guest-agent).
Verify by comparing partition offsets and sizes against the ISO with
`fdisk -l` — blkid labels lie after a rewrite.
- [ ] Physical access. Secure Boot must be turned off (see below), and that is
the one step nothing can do remotely.
## 1. Evacuate the OSD
```sh
ceph osd out <id>
```
Wait until no PGs are `backfilling` or `backfill_wait`. Do **not** wait for
`ceph osd safe-to-destroy` — pools at size 3 keep the OSD in their acting set
because three copies cannot be placed on two hosts, so it never returns clean.
Then remove it. The node must already be out of `cephcluster.yaml`'s
`storage.nodes` list, or the operator rebuilds the OSD within one reconcile and
starts backfilling onto the drive you are about to pull:
```sh
kubectl -n rook-ceph scale deployment rook-ceph-osd-<id> --replicas=0
ceph osd purge <id> --yes-i-really-mean-it
kubectl -n rook-ceph delete deployment rook-ceph-osd-<id>
```
## 2. Drain, and leave the cluster
```sh
kubectl drain <node> --ignore-daemonsets --delete-emptydir-data --timeout=300s
```
Single-replica workloads with `minAvailable: 1` PDBs will refuse eviction — that
is deliberate, they exist to surface the pod rather than let it be yanked. On
this cluster that is `influxdb-influxdb2-0`, `woodpecker-server` and the
CNPG primary. Move each one deliberately with `kubectl delete pod`; they
reschedule onto the survivors and their RBD volumes follow.
```sh
talosctl -n <node> reset --graceful --wipe-mode system-disk
kubectl delete node <node>
```
`--wipe-mode system-disk` and not the default `all`: the OSD drive is being
pulled anyway and wiping a terabyte of it is wasted time. `--graceful` leaves
etcd cleanly. Delete the Node object — it carries the `unschedulable` flag from
the drain, which the rebuilt node would otherwise inherit.
## 2a. Destroy the VM in OpenTofu — while the host is still a PVE node
Remove `opentofu/vm_15N_k8s_N.tf`, then apply. This **must** happen before the
host leaves the Proxmox cluster: afterwards the provider cannot reach the node,
the plan errors, and the only escape is `tofu state rm`, which is off the table.
Point `proxmox_api_url` at a host that will *survive* the conversion, not the one
being converted.
Manual triggers are currently broken by the Woodpecker v3.18.0 regression
(issue #582). Until that is resolved, run it locally:
```sh
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=… AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=… AWS_REGION=fsn1 \
tofu -chdir=opentofu init -backend-config=<file>
… plan -target=module.k8s_N -var-file=<file> -out=<plan>
… apply <plan>
```
The `AWS_*` environment variables are required *in addition to*
`-backend-config`, or the S3 backend fails `HeadObject` with 403 even with
credentials that can read the object fine via the aws CLI.
## 2b. Proxmox quorum — matters from the second conversion onward
Two nodes remain after jupiter, with `expected_votes: 2` and quorum 2. Removing
one leaves the last node inquorate and `/etc/pve` read-only, which blocks the
final VM destroy. On the surviving node:
```sh
pvecm expected 1
```
This is the official recovery. Proxmox documents it in the storage replication
chapter (`/usr/share/pve-docs/chapter-pvesr.html`), verbatim:
> If you have no quorum, we strongly advise to fix this first and make the node
> operable again. Only if this is not possible at the moment, you may use the
> following command to enforce quorum on the current node: `# pvecm expected 1`
The caveat there is about restoring the missing node instead. Here the missing
node is deliberately gone for good, so enforcing quorum is the correct branch
rather than a workaround.
Run it only once the node is actually alone — attempting it while both nodes are
up fails with `CS_ERR_INVALID_PARAM`, since corosync will not set expected votes
below the members it can currently see. Which is exactly why it becomes valid
when one remains.
Runtime only; it does not survive a reboot, so re-run it if the survivor
restarts before its own conversion.
## 3. Hardware
Power the host off, then:
1. Kingston boot drive out of slot 1, into slot 2.
2. Crucial P3 out of slot 2 — it becomes EPHEMERAL, so put it in slot 3 rather
than setting it aside.
3. Slot 1 switch to **U.2**. Set it before the drive goes in; there is nothing
to record afterwards, the installed drive type implies the position.
4. PM983 onto the included 7mm M.2-to-U.2 adapter, into slot 1.
Boot the host's existing PVE once before touching Talos and check the drive:
```sh
nvme smart-log /dev/nvmeXn1 | grep -iE 'percentage_used|media_errors|critical'
nvme id-ns /dev/nvmeXn1 -H | grep -i 'in use' # want 512b data, 0 metadata
wipefs /dev/nvmeYn1 # Crucial: clear the old bluestore sig
ip link set <ceph-port> up && ethtool <ceph-port> | grep -i 'link detected'
```
This is the last revert point. A bad drive here means the Crucial goes back and
the VM is recreated from tofu with nothing lost. Once Talos writes to the
Kingston, PVE on that host is gone.
Relocating the boot drive is safe: `rpool` is referenced by NVMe EUI and the
UEFI entries by GPT PARTUUID, neither of which encodes a slot.
## 4. Secure Boot
MS-01 ships with Secure Boot on, and Proxmox satisfies it with a
Microsoft-signed shim. The Image Factory `metal-amd64.iso` is an unsigned UKI
and the firmware rejects it outright. **Turn Secure Boot off in the BIOS.**
A signed variant exists per schematic, but it is signed with SideroLabs' key
which firmware does not trust by default, and the installed system would have to
use the secureboot installer image too. That is a separate project.
## 5. Install
Boot the stick. Maintenance mode DHCPs untagged on every link; on these hosts
that lands on `192.168.8.x`, which is routable from the workstation.
Maintenance mode is effectively write-only — `talosctl get` has no `--insecure`
and `version` returns "API is not implemented in maintenance mode". You cannot
inspect disks or links before applying. Verify serials and MACs from the host's
PVE beforehand, in step 3.
Build the config from the **live cluster's secrets**, not a fresh
`talosctl gen config`, or the node forms a new cluster instead of joining:
```sh
talosctl -n <surviving-node> get mc v1alpha1 -o jsonpath='{.spec}' > cp.yaml
talosctl gen secrets --from-controlplane-config cp.yaml -o secrets.yaml
talosctl gen config homelab https://k8s.renner.uno:6443 \
--with-secrets secrets.yaml --output-types controlplane \
--config-patch @talos/patches/cluster.yaml \
--config-patch @<cilium additive half> \
--config-patch @talos/patches/registry-mirror.yaml \
--config-patch @talos/patches/k8s-N.yaml -o install.yaml
```
Confirm `cluster.id` matches the running cluster before applying.
Strip the generated `HostnameConfig` document — it collides with
`machine.network.hostname` from the per-node patch. `bootstrap.sh` does the same.
`cilium-cni.yaml` cannot be passed whole: its `$patch: delete` document fails
against a base with no `inlineManifests` (issue #581). Use only the additive
second document.
Validate, then apply:
```sh
talosctl validate --config install.yaml --mode metal
talosctl apply-config --insecure -n <maintenance-ip> --file install.yaml
```
## 6. The network config will strand the node if it is wrong
Talos stops running default DHCP operators **for the entire machine** as soon as
a single new-style network document exists — the gate is presence of a document,
not success of resolution. If the configured path fails to materialise there is
no fallback on any interface, and recovery needs a console and install media.
Concretely: do not use `LinkAliasConfig` as a `VLANConfig` parent without
verifying it. Aliases *are* supported (confirmed in v1.12.6 source and by a
maintainer), but a selector matching zero links is skipped **silently**, and
`permanent_addr` comes from an ethtool ioctl with no fallback — if the driver
does not answer, the match is against an empty string and everything downstream
that references the alias does nothing.
Address links by predictable kernel name. To introduce aliases later, do it on a
node that is already up, with `talosctl apply-config --mode=try --timeout=5m`,
which rolls back on its own, and check `talosctl get linkaliasspec`.
Interface names derive from PCI topology and are stable — but not immune.
Adding a third NVMe to jupiter renumbered the buses and renamed the unused
second I226 from `enp89s0` to `enp90s0`.
## 7. EPHEMERAL placement is one-shot
```yaml
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
provisioning:
diskSelector:
match: disk.serial == '<crucial serial>'
minSize: 50GiB
grow: true
```
Talos applies volume configuration **only when the volume does not yet exist**.
Applied afterwards it is silently ignored, and relocating EPHEMERAL then needs a
disk wipe and a fresh boot from install media. It must be in the first
`apply-config`.
Match by serial. `disk.transport == 'nvme' && !system_disk` matches the PM983 as
well, and losing that coin flip formats the OSD drive.
Verify afterwards:
```sh
talosctl -n <node> get volumestatus EPHEMERAL -o yaml | grep -E 'location|phase'
talosctl -n <node> get disks
```
## 8. The mon will not come back on its own
**This is the step that cost the most time on jupiter.** The rebuilt node has a
new MAC and therefore a new DHCP lease, but Ceph has its mon pinned to the old
address in three places. The mon cannot bind an address the host no longer has,
so it crashloops; the operator then tries to restart a *healthy* mon as its next
step, Ceph refuses because that would drop quorum, and it retries every 60
seconds forever without ever reaching the storage reconcile. Nothing else
progresses behind it.
Fix in this order — the order matters, because doing it the other way round has
the operator faithfully recreate the mon from the stale ConfigMap:
```sh
# 1. ConfigMap first
kubectl -n rook-ceph edit cm rook-ceph-mon-endpoints
# remove the dead mon from `data` and from `mapping`
# 2. then the monmap
ceph mon remove <id>
# 3. then the deployment — check it really carries the old address
kubectl -n rook-ceph get deploy rook-ceph-mon-<id> -o yaml | grep public-addr
kubectl -n rook-ceph delete deploy rook-ceph-mon-<id>
```
Rook then creates a **new** mon with the next free ID (jupiter's `c` came back
as `d`), on the correct address. It does not repair the old one.
Note mons use host ports under `network.provider: host`, so a replacement mon
cannot schedule while the broken one's deployment still holds 3300/6789 — the
canary sits `Pending` with "didn't have free ports" until the old deployment is
deleted.
## 9. Re-add the OSD
Add the node back to `cephcluster.yaml` under `storage.nodes`, naming the PM983
by `/dev/disk/by-id`:
```yaml
- name: k8s-N
devices:
- fullpath: /dev/disk/by-id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR-00007_<serial>
```
**Not** a bare device name. Talos enumerates these drives in a different order
than Proxmox did — on jupiter `nvme0n1` is the Kingston *system* disk, and the
PM983 is `nvme2n1`. Rook would probably decline a partitioned system disk, but
that is luck rather than design.
Get the path from `talosctl -n <node> get disk <dev> -o yaml`, under `symlinks`.
## 10. Verify and restore
```sh
kubectl get nodes # Ready
talosctl -n <node> etcd members # 3 members
ceph status # 3 mons in quorum, 3 osds
ceph osd tree # OSD under the right zone/host
ceph device ls # PM983 backing the new OSD
```
Then undo the window changes: `cephfs-metadata` back to size 3, immich back to
1 replica, and `ceph config set osd osd_mclock_profile balanced` if it was
raised to `high_recovery_ops` to speed the evacuation.
The retired Crucial leaves a stale entry in `ceph device ls`. Remove it with
`ceph config-key rm device/<devid>`; the mgr's devicehealth view may lag.
## Known-stale things that will bite
- `bootstrap.sh` cannot generate a config at all right now (issue #581), so a
cold rebuild is broken independently of this work.
- Manual Woodpecker pipelines are broken (issue #582), so anything gated on
`PIPELINE == "..."` must be run another way.
- Cilium's eBPF datapath silently drops VLAN-tagged traffic unless
`bpf.vlanBypass` is set. Both `mgmt0` and `ens19` are VLAN interfaces on a
converted node. Not observed on jupiter, but it is the first place to look if
the v30iot macvlan workloads misbehave there.
-24
View File
@@ -79,30 +79,6 @@ which also pre-seeds the Talos image onto every Proxmox node. Wait until the
node FQDNs (`k8s-{1,2,3}.srv.renner.uno`) resolve and the VMs are up before
Step 2 — `bootstrap.sh` polls DNS but will not create the records.
**k8s-1 is not a VM and OpenTofu does not create it.** jupiter runs Talos on
bare metal, so this step only provisions k8s-2 (saturn) and k8s-3 (neptune).
Before Step 2, boot jupiter from the bare-metal image below so it comes up in
maintenance mode and answers on `k8s-1.srv.renner.uno` — `bootstrap.sh` treats
all three nodes identically from there, since `apply-config --insecure` does
not care whether the target is a VM or bare metal.
```
https://factory.talos.dev/image/a21cec8f35ae32ab5e9a452e7b13500ca8776053930b8e182b9cb23eed186b64/v1.12.6/metal-amd64.iso
```
That schematic is deliberately not the one `.woodpecker/deploy-infrastructure.yml`
seeds onto the Proxmox nodes. It keeps the same `net.ifnames=1` kernel argument
— without it the predictable interface names that `talos/patches/k8s-1.yaml`
matches its VLAN parents against do not exist — and differs in three ways:
- drops `siderolabs/qemu-guest-agent`, which has nothing to talk to on bare metal
- adds `siderolabs/intel-ucode`, since no hypervisor is supplying microcode now
- adds `siderolabs/thunderbolt`, unused so far and inert until
`machine.kernel.modules` requests `thunderbolt`/`thunderbolt_net`. It is
present only so enabling the MS-01 Thunderbolt mesh later does not require a
new image and a reinstall. Note its udev rule auto-authorises any Thunderbolt
device attached to the machine once those modules are loaded.
## Step 2 — talos: form the cluster + get kubeconfig
```sh
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
env:
- name: DB_URI
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: {name: ha-pg-app, key: fqdn-uri}
secretKeyRef: { name: ha-pg-app, key: fqdn-uri }
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /config
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -176,38 +176,3 @@ data:
friendly_name: Treppenhaus Haustür Schalter 1
'0x001788010b00d011':
friendly_name: Treppenhaus Haustür Schalter 2
# Ecowitt WS90 weather station. Joined after the ZHA-mirrored block above
# was written, hence listed apart from it.
#
# This device also carries a non-default ZCL reporting configuration
# (per-attribute min interval and reportable-change deadbands). That is
# device-side state, not expressible here — Z2M has no settings field for
# it — so it is documented, with restore commands, in
# zigbee2mqtt-ws90-reporting.md. It is lost whenever Z2M re-runs
# `configure` on the device, and a fresh PVC will not have it.
#
# The station transmits every 8.8s, as a burst of seven per-cluster ZCL
# frames; Z2M publishes its full cumulative state once per frame. debounce
# merges a burst into one publish carrying the last value per attribute,
# and must stay below the transmit interval — a window that never sees
# silence never flushes.
#
# Every few days the firmware zeroes its readings for ~8s, then skips a
# transmit cycle and recovers on the next. The zeros propagate attribute
# by attribute through a burst rather than arriving together, and they
# start inside an otherwise normal cycle — the last valid reading and the
# first zero are ~20ms apart.
#
# Merging cuts an episode from six published bad frames to one. It does
# NOT make that frame recognisable: it carries whatever subset had zeroed
# when the burst ended, which may be every field or only temperature, and
# a frame reading {"temperature":0,"humidity":92,"pressure":96.9} is not
# separable from a valid winter reading. Since the merge is last-wins and
# the zeros arrive at the tail, it also discards the valid reading that
# led the burst. This bounds the corruption; it does not filter it.
#
# Z2M reads this only at startup (requiresRestart), and this file is
# SEED-ONLY per the header — the running instance takes it from its PVC.
'0xc02cedfffe958f40':
friendly_name: Wetterstation
debounce: 2
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ spec:
# Pinned tag. No Flux image-automation marker yet (unlike mosquitto) —
# add an infrastructure/image-automation/zigbee2mqtt.yaml policy as a
# follow-up if desired; pinned-and-manual is fine for the initial cutover.
image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.13.0
image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.12.1
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
env:
- name: TZ
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
# WS90 Zigbee reporting configuration
Records the ZCL attribute-reporting configuration applied to the Wetterstation
(Ecowitt WS90 powered by Shelly, IEEE `0xc02cedfffe958f40`) and how to restore
it, because **this configuration lives on the device and in Z2M's
`database.db`, not in git**. Zigbee2MQTT has no settings-schema field for
reporting configuration, so there is nothing declarative to reconcile — Flux
cannot restore it and a fresh PVC will not have it.
## Applied configuration
Endpoint 1, all intervals in seconds. `change` is in the attribute's raw ZCL
units; the physical deadband is `change ÷ scale`.
| attribute | cluster | min | max | change | deadband | converter default |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| temperature | `msTemperatureMeasurement` (1026) | 5 | 3600 | 10 | 0.1 °C | 10 / 3600 / 100 |
| humidity | `msRelativeHumidity` (1029) | 5 | 3600 | 50 | 0.5 % | 10 / 3600 / 100 |
| pressure | `msPressureMeasurement` (1027) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | 1 hPa | 10 / 3600 / 50 |
| illuminance | `msIlluminanceMeasurement` (1024) | 5 | 3600 | 5 | 5 lx | 10 / 3600 / 5 |
| windSpeed | `shellyWS90Wind` (0xfc01/0) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
| windDirection | `shellyWS90Wind` (0xfc01/4) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
| gustSpeed | `shellyWS90Wind` (0xfc01/7) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
| uvIndex | `shellyWS90UV` (0xfc02/0) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
| rainStatus | `shellyWS90Rain` (0xfc03/0) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
| precipitation | `shellyWS90Rain` (0xfc03/1) | 5 | 3600 | 1 | — | 10 / 3600 / 1 |
`genPowerCfg.batteryVoltage` (cluster 1, attribute 33) is deliberately left at
its hourly default.
The three `shellyWS90*` clusters are manufacturer-specific and require
`"options": {"manufacturerCode": 5264}` on every reconfiguration request.
## Why min is 5 and not 10
The station transmits every 8.8 s. `min` is a hold-off: a change-triggered
report is held until at least `min` seconds after the previous one. With
`min: 10` every report was therefore held past a transmit cycle and landed on
the next, so attributes reported at best every 17.6 s and drifted out of phase
with each other — the published stream showed no 8.8 s periodicity at all,
just a smear across 2–8 s.
At `min: 5` each attribute reports on its own transmit. The MQTT stream then
carries one publish per transmit cycle, measured at a mean gap of 8.69 s.
Total publish volume *fell* (~631/h to ~445/h) because each publish now
carries a whole cycle instead of a fragment of one.
Any value below 8.8 s achieves this. 5 leaves margin without approaching the
cycle time.
## Why the deadbands differ from the converter defaults
The defaults come from the shared `modernExtend` helpers in
zigbee-herdsman-converters (`m.temperature()`, `m.pressure()`, `m.humidity()`,
`m.illuminance()`), which the WS90 definition in `shelly.ts` composes without
overrides. They are anti-chatter values sized for battery-powered indoor
sensors, where report volume costs coin-cell life and mesh airtime. This
station is mains-and-solar and exists to resolve small changes, so the
trade-off runs the other way.
Each value above is matched to the resolution the device actually reports:
temperature and pressure arrive in 0.1-unit steps, humidity in whole percent.
Pressure is worth calling out. The converter default of `change: 50` with
`scale: 10` is a 5 kPa (50 hPa) deadband, which real barometric pressure never
traverses — so pressure only ever updated on the hourly `max` heartbeat, and
`pressure_trend` and `weather_condition` were derived from that. The same
library's older `reporting.ts` helper configures the identical ZCL attribute
with `change: 5`, a 5 hPa deadband, so the two code paths disagree by 10× and
the modernExtend value is the outlier.
## When this is lost
Anything that makes Z2M re-run `configure` on the device overwrites all of it
with the converter defaults:
- re-pairing or re-joining the device
- an explicit `zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/device/configure`
- a converter update that changes the definition and triggers reconfiguration
It also will not exist on a fresh PVC. Re-apply with the commands below.
## Re-applying
Published from the `discovery-guard` sidecar, which already holds the
`zigbee2mqtt` broker credential (ACL `readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#`, which covers
`bridge/request/#`) so no credential has to leave the cluster:
Ten separate requests, one per attribute — written out literally rather than
generated by a shell helper, because the nested quoting through `kubectl exec
-- sh -c` is where this goes wrong. Each line below is in the exact form that
was executed and verified.
```sh
POD=$(kubectl get pod -n home-assistant -l app.kubernetes.io/name=zigbee2mqtt -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')
```
```sh
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msTemperatureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":10}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msRelativeHumidity\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":50}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msPressureMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"msIlluminanceMeasurement\",\"attribute\":\"measuredValue\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":5}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"windDirection\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Wind\",\"attribute\":\"gustSpeed\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90UV\",\"attribute\":\"uvIndex\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"rainStatus\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c discovery-guard -- sh -c 'mosquitto_pub -h "$MQTT_HOST" -p 1883 -u "$MQTT_USER" -P "$MQTT_PASSWORD" -t "$BASE_TOPIC/bridge/request/device/configure_reporting" -m "{\"id\":\"0xc02cedfffe958f40\",\"endpoint\":1,\"cluster\":\"shellyWS90Rain\",\"attribute\":\"precipitation\",\"minimum_report_interval\":5,\"maximum_report_interval\":3600,\"reportable_change\":1,\"options\":{\"manufacturerCode\":5264}}"'
```
These are idempotent — re-sending a request that matches the current
configuration is a no-op on the device.
The device must be awake and reachable; each request performs a real
`ConfigureReporting` exchange and fails if it is not.
## Verifying
Read back what the device actually accepted — Z2M records the negotiated
result, so this reflects the device, not the request:
```sh
kubectl exec -n home-assistant "$POD" -c zigbee2mqtt -- \
grep 0xc02cedfffe958f40 /app/data/database.db |
jq -r '.endpoints | to_entries[] | .value.configuredReportings[]?
| "cluster=\(.cluster) attr=\(.attrId) min=\(.minRepIntval) max=\(.maxRepIntval) change=\(.repChange)"'
```
All ten rows above should read `min=5 max=3600`. On the wire, the publish
cadence on `zigbee2mqtt/Wetterstation` should sit at ~8.7 s and temperature
should move in 0.1 °C steps; 1 °C steps mean the defaults are back.
## Making it durable upstream
The lasting fix is for the WS90 definition to pass explicit `reporting`
overrides rather than inherit indoor-sensor defaults, which would fix every
WS90 rather than this one. `m.temperature()` and the other helpers already
accept a `reporting` argument. The pressure divergence between
`modernExtend.ts` and `reporting.ts` is a separate upstream bug worth
reporting on its own.
@@ -6,13 +6,6 @@ metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: immich-machine-learning
spec:
# Scale this and immich-server to 0 for the duration of any single-node
# maintenance — cluster CPU requests exceed what two nodes can hold, and this
# pair frees ~1000m against a shortfall of roughly 200m. Stopping them is the
# right lever rather than lowering their requests: 500m reserved against a
# 2m idle draw looks like waste, but inference bursts hard and the request is
# honest about what it needs when someone uploads photos.
# See RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md.
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: RollingUpdate
-3
View File
@@ -36,9 +36,6 @@ metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: immich-server
spec:
# Scaled to 0 alongside immich-machine-learning during single-node
# maintenance; see the note there. The CNPG Postgres cluster stays running,
# so recovery is just these two replica counts.
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-cilium.yaml
- prometheusrule-hetzner-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-loki.yaml
- prometheusrule-mariadb-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
@@ -25,29 +25,13 @@ spec:
#
# 6h: Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions. Only a warning that
# does not clear is worth paging on.
#
# BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT breaks that premise and is still NOT
# excluded (#557). Ceph holds the check for
# bluestore_slow_ops_warn_lifetime (24h) after the LAST slow op, so
# one multi-second stall outlives the 6h `for` and always pages,
# with latency back to normal long before anyone looks. Measured:
# both episodes in the 30d to 2026-08-23 ran ~26h and cleared
# untouched, the first ~24h after the last stall.
#
# Both began inside the Velero restore-test sweep — a ~5h sustained
# restore that outruns the SLC cache on these QLC NVMe. The sweep
# runs monthly, 08:00-14:00Z on the 1st.
#
# Expected for the hardware, but not excludable:
# this is also the earliest signal of a genuinely failing drive, and
# all three are at 80-87% endurance used (see cephcluster.yaml).
expr: ceph_health_detail{name!~"AUTH_INSECURE_.+"} == 1
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} active for 6h"
description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527). BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT is sticky for 24h after the last stall and clears itself: check whether the stall fell inside the monthly Velero restore-test window (08:00-14:00Z on the 1st), which is expected on these QLC drives — one outside that window, or a repeat on the same OSD, means check that drive (#557). Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527), so this is a new condition. Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
- alert: CephPoolLostRedundancy
# Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: mariadb-backup
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus selects on this label.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: mariadb-backup.rules
rules:
- alert: WordpressMariadbBackupStale
# The nightly 02:45 logical dump (kubernetes/apps/wordpress/mariadb.yaml)
# is the only transaction-consistent copy of www.renner.uno's database
# — Velero snapshots the PVC, which for a running DB is not a restore
# point you would trust.
#
# KubeJobFailed already covers a failed Job, but only while the Job
# object survives. On #550 it cleared when the failed Job was
# garbage-collected, not when a backup succeeded — so a failure that
# is GC'd before anyone looks leaves no signal at all.
# lastSuccessfulTime lives on the CronJob and outlives Job GC.
#
# 26h = one missed cycle plus 2h slack, matching NetbirdVpsBackupStale.
# It counts any Job owned by the CronJob, so a manual
# `kubectl create job --from=cronjob/...` re-run clears it too.
expr: |
time() - kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"} > 26 * 3600
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "WordPress MariaDB backup has not succeeded in 26h+"
description: "The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob's last successful run is over 26 hours old. Check the newest Job's pod logs in the wordpress namespace: `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs`. The 2026-08-19 failure was `The specified bucket does not exist.` against renner-uno-k8s-mariadb while the endpoint itself probed healthy, so a green HetznerBackupEndpointDown does not clear this."
- alert: WordpressMariadbBackupNeverRan
# The staleness expression above goes blind when the metric is
# absent, which is what happens once the operator recreates the
# CronJob. Without this guard "never backed up" is quieter than
# "backed up late".
expr: |
kube_cronjob_created{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"}
unless
kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"}
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "WordPress MariaDB backup has no recorded successful run"
description: "The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob exists but has no lastSuccessfulTime: either it has not completed once since the Backup CR was recreated, or every run since has failed. Check `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs` and that the hetzner-s3-creds ExternalSecret is synced."
+2 -2
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ spec:
# Image automation, range 3.x (see image-automation/woodpecker.yaml).
# MUST stay version-matched with woodpecker-server (gRPC parity) — both
# track the same range/filter so they bump together on each release.
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.18.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.17.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
env:
- name: WOODPECKER_SERVER
value: woodpecker.woodpecker.svc.cluster.local:9000 # in-cluster gRPC, replaces LXC :9000
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ spec:
# authoritative copy is the backup on Hetzner, and a lost probe just
# means re-running the test -- so they are equally undeserving of
# replication. Landing them unreplicated would mean a second size-1
# data pool inside `cephfs`, and restore-test runs MONTHLY against
# data pool inside `cephfs`, and restore-test runs WEEKLY against
# CI's ~96 pipelines/day, so it is not worth the complexity.
- name: WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_CLASS
value: ceph-filesystem-ci
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ spec:
# minor + patch auto-update within 3.x; only the 4.0 major is held for
# a reviewed bump. Safe now the DB is postgres (the old sqlite-surprise
# -bump hazard is gone). Stays in lockstep with the agent.
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.18.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.17.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
env:
- name: WOODPECKER_HOST
value: https://ci.renner.uno
+1 -1
View File
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ EOF
# 120x15s = 30 min, not the old 60x5s = 5 min. node-agent has no
# loadConcurrency override, so Velero's default of one data path per node
# applies: while the restore-test sweep holds the slot, even this 1 GiB
# applies: while the Sunday restore-test sweep holds the slot, even this 1 GiB
# DataUpload sits in phase Prepared for well over 5 minutes. The old 300 s wait
# then let the teardown below delete the source namespace and the Backup
# mid-upload ("Cancel du under phase Prepared because it is being deleted"),
@@ -87,16 +87,6 @@ spec:
lapi:
replicas: 1
# The chart defaults request 500m. Measured steady-state draw is 2m, and
# the request is what the scheduler reserves, so the default parks half a
# core of unusable capacity per LAPI. That is affordable on three nodes
# and is not on two: with one node out for maintenance the remaining pair
# sit at 100% of requested CPU while actually using ~22%, and nothing new
# can be placed. The limit stays at the chart default so a log flood can
# still burst; only the reservation shrinks.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
podAnnotations:
# Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
# env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
@@ -132,12 +122,6 @@ spec:
key: key
agent:
# Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a
# DaemonSet, so the chart's 500m default reserves half a core on every
# node to run a process that measures 1-2m.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
# The agent parses the ingress controller's access logs (read from
# the pod's stdout) to detect attacks. Repointed from the retired
# ingress-nginx (decommissioned 2026-05-17) to Traefik. The
@@ -51,15 +51,7 @@ spec:
startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
jobTemplate:
spec:
# 4 (not the sibling rotators' 1-2) because this is the only DAILY
# rotator — every other CronJob here is quarterly, so it takes ~90x as
# many runs and is correspondingly more exposed to per-run transients.
# backoffLimit: 1 gave two attempts ~11 s apart, and on 2026-08-19 a
# sub-minute resolver transient took both out (Job
# claude-oauth-secret-sync-29785100, BackoffLimitExceeded), costing a
# day's sync. 4 spreads the attempts over ~150 s (10/20/40/80 s backoff),
# still well inside activeDeadlineSeconds.
backoffLimit: 4
backoffLimit: 1
activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
template:
@@ -160,41 +160,11 @@ spec:
- "10.2.40.0/24"
cluster:
- "10.99.0.0/29"
# Nodes are listed explicitly rather than useAllNodes, so that a node can be
# taken out of the storage fleet by removing it here. Under useAllNodes the
# operator re-provisions an OSD on any node whose device still carries a
# BlueStore signature, which makes purging an OSD ahead of pulling its drive
# impossible: the OSD is recreated within a reconcile and starts backfilling
# onto the drive being replaced.
#
# nvme0n1 on k8s-2/k8s-3 is the NVMe drive PCI-passed-through from saturn and
# neptune, and is the only block device those guests can see, so a bare device
# name is unambiguous there.
#
# k8s-1 is bare metal and sees three NVMe drives, so it names its OSD by
# /dev/disk/by-id path instead. A bare name would be actively wrong: Talos
# enumerates this machine's drives in a different order than Proxmox did, and
# nvme0n1 here is the Kingston SYSTEM disk. Rook would probably decline it for
# carrying partitions, but that is luck rather than intent. The by-id path is
# derived from model and serial and does not depend on enumeration at all.
#
# nvme0n1 50026B7382B48B86 Kingston — Talos system disk
# nvme1n1 2332E86B749A Crucial — Talos EPHEMERAL (/var)
# nvme2n1 S437NX0M400426 PM983 — this OSD
storage:
useAllNodes: false
useAllNodes: true
useAllDevices: false
nodes:
# k8s-2 is absent while saturn's OSD drive is swapped and the node is
# converted to bare metal. RE-ADD IT once the PM983 is in and the node has
# rejoined, naming the device by /dev/disk/by-id as k8s-1 does — bare
# metal sees three NVMe drives and the bare name is not the OSD.
- name: k8s-3
devices:
- name: nvme0n1
- name: k8s-1
devices:
- fullpath: /dev/disk/by-id/nvme-SAMSUNG_MZQLB960HAJR-00007_S437NX0M400426
devices:
- name: nvme0n1 # NVMe drive PCI-passed-through from each PVE node
config:
osdsPerDevice: "1"
# Storage layer must never be evicted by kubelet under node pressure
@@ -87,31 +87,15 @@ metadata:
name: cephfs
namespace: rook-ceph
spec:
# TEMPORARY — RESTORE TO size 3 / no min_size OVERRIDE ONCE SATURN AND
# NEPTUNE HAVE BOTH BEEN CONVERTED TO BARE METAL. It stays at 2/1 across all
# three conversions rather than being toggled per node: each change
# re-replicates the pool, and the window reopens with the next node anyway.
#
# The standing trade for this pool is size 3: it holds ~253 MiB against the
# data pool's 280 GiB, so it contributes nothing measurable to drive wear —
# the entire reason data0 dropped to 2 — while losing it would destroy the
# whole filesystem, not just the objects on the lost OSD. Paying 3x on a
# quarter of a gigabyte to keep that intact is the right trade in steady
# state.
#
# It does not hold while one of three hosts is out. size 3 on two remaining
# hosts leaves every PG undersized at two copies with min_size 2, so a single
# further OSD loss drops the pool below min_size and blocks IO on every
# CephFS mount cluster-wide. At 2/1 the same two copies are active+clean
# instead, and a further loss degrades rather than blocks — availability
# bought at the cost of accepting writes onto a single copy while degraded.
#
# See RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md.
# metadataPool STAYS at size 3 while the data pool drops to 2. It holds
# 467 MiB against the data pool's 275 GiB, so it contributes nothing
# measurable to drive wear — the entire reason for the size reduction — while
# losing it would destroy the whole filesystem, not just the objects on the
# lost OSD. Paying 3x on half a gigabyte to keep that intact is the right
# trade; the wear saving comes from data0.
metadataPool:
replicated:
size: 2
parameters:
min_size: "1"
size: 3
dataPools:
- name: data0
# size 2 / min_size 1 for the same reasons as replicapool above — see
@@ -1,30 +1,19 @@
---
# Monthly Velero restore-test CronJob — 08:00 UTC on the 1st.
# Weekly Velero restore-test CronJob.
#
# The sweep restores every discovered schedule, immich's ~180 GiB library
# included. At `size: 2` that is ~360 GiB raw, ~120 GiB per OSD, against a
# ~65 GB/day weekday baseline on three QLC NVMe at 81-87% endurance used —
# ~47% of each drive's weekly write budget. Monthly keeps every restore path
# exercised and cuts that share ~4x.
#
# 08:00 — *after* that day's own daily backups have finished (paperless
# 03:15 through apps 07:15, each normally ~1 min). The previous 02:00 slot
# was chosen as "well before the next day's backups", which missed that the
# daily schedules fire on the same day: a sweep starting at 02:00 and
# running ~5 h sat on top of the entire 03:15-07:15 backup window and
# Sunday 08:00 UTC — *after* Sunday's own daily backups have finished
# (paperless 03:15 through apps 07:15, each normally ~1 min). The previous
# 02:00 slot was chosen as "well before Monday's backups", which missed
# that the daily schedules also fire on Sunday: a sweep starting at 02:00
# and running ~5 h sat on top of the entire 03:15-07:15 backup window and
# starved it of node-agent DataUpload concurrency. Observed effect on
# 2026-07-19 and 2026-07-26 — audiobookshelf-daily took 2 h 18 m and
# 2 h 33 m respectively against a ~1 min baseline, with the books
# DataUpload not starting until 06:18. Both are Sundays, the only day the
# sweep ran then; no other day shows it.
# DataUpload not starting until 06:18. Both are Sundays; no other day
# shows it.
#
# 08:00 + the 6 h activeDeadlineSeconds cap still lands well clear of the
# next day's 03:15.
#
# Day-of-month rather than a fixed weekday: Kubernetes parses cron with
# robfig/cron's standard parser, which has no `#` nth-weekday operator, and
# restricting both day fields (`0 8 1-7 * 0`) ORs them — every Sunday plus
# the 1st through 7th.
# 08:00 + the 6 h activeDeadlineSeconds cap still lands well clear of
# Monday's 03:15.
#
# Concurrency policy Forbid: the immich restore (~180 GiB, millions of
# small files) alone can run multiple hours, so the full sweep is sized
@@ -40,7 +29,7 @@ metadata:
name: restore-test
namespace: velero
spec:
schedule: "0 8 1 * *"
schedule: "0 8 * * 0"
timeZone: Etc/UTC
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
@@ -50,7 +39,7 @@ spec:
spec:
backoffLimit: 0
activeDeadlineSeconds: 21600 # 6 h hard cap (immich alone can take ~3 h)
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 3456000 # 40 d — enough to inspect after the next monthly run
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 1209600 # 14 d — enough to inspect after the next weekly run
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: restore-test
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
# RBAC for the monthly restore-test CronJob.
# RBAC for the weekly restore-test CronJob.
#
# Permissions required by restore-test.sh:
# - velero.io: read schedules/backups/BSL, create+delete restores
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Monthly verification that Velero PVC backups are actually restorable.
# Weekly verification that Velero PVC backups are actually restorable.
#
# What this exercises (per service):
# 1. Velero Restore reaches phase=Completed against yesterday's
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ check() {
# and ceph-filesystem StorageClasses ship with reclaimPolicy: Retain so that
# production PVC deletions can be undone manually. The restore-test has the
# opposite need: every PVC it creates is throwaway and MUST not survive the
# iteration. Without this, each run leaks O(100 GiB) of CephFS
# iteration. Without this, each weekly run leaks O(100 GiB) of CephFS
# subvolumes and the cluster eventually goes OSD_FULL (incident 2026-05-17).
#
# Why this still exists after ceph-*-ephemeral landed. Three categories of
+50 -117
View File
@@ -1,129 +1,62 @@
# k8s-1 runs Talos directly on jupiter's MS-01 hardware; k8s-2 and k8s-3 are
# still Proxmox VMs. Every machine-specific selector below differs from theirs
# for that reason: there are no virtio NICs, no PCI-passthrough layer, and all
# four physical NICs and all three NVMe drives are visible to Talos at once.
#
# Networking uses the v1.12 multi-document config rather than the deprecated
# machine.network.interfaces. That is deliberate: the docs do not define what
# happens when the same link is configured by both schemas, so this file keeps
# every link in one schema instead of straddling them.
machine:
network:
hostname: k8s-1
# Shared control-plane VIP — etcd-elected leader hosts 10.2.40.60 as a
# secondary IP. Exposed via UniFi DNS as k8s.renner.uno.
#
# Two virtio NICs (mgmt + v30iot). `driver: virtio_net` would match
# both, so each is pinned by its PCI bus path:
# - 0000:06:12.0 — original mgmt NIC (the only virtio before)
# - 0000:06:13.0 — extra_network_bridges = ["v30iot"] in tofu
# Bus paths are consistent across k8s-{1,2,3}; verified live 2026-05-13.
# The X710 selector stays driver-based (i40e is unambiguous) and
# tolerates kernel renaming.
interfaces:
- deviceSelector:
busPath: "0000:06:12.0"
dhcp: true
vip:
ip: 10.2.40.60
# v30iot: LINK ONLY — no host addressing. The NIC is the macvlan
# parent for the v30iot pod attachments (matter/otbr/shelly-manager),
# whose children do their own DHCP on the L2; host addresses were
# never needed for that. Host DHCP (formerly dhcp + routeMetric 4096)
# installed a connected 10.2.30.0/24 route, so node replies to
# IoT-subnet clients bypassed the UDM and broke every UDM-DNATed
# flow (hairpin NAT: un-translated SYN-ACK -> client kernel RST,
# verified live 2026-07-23). The purpose the old comment claimed —
# Cilium L2 announce for an IoT LB pool — does not exist (no
# L2AnnouncementPolicy, no such pool). v6 RA addressing on this NIC
# is disabled via machine.sysctls for the same reason.
- deviceSelector:
busPath: "0000:06:13.0"
dhcp: false
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on the X710 SFP+ port (PCI passthrough,
# mapping x710-port1 in opentofu/vm_150_k8s_1.tf). Separate /29 on VLAN 49,
# MTU 9000, no default route — used by Rook for OSD↔OSD replication via
# CephCluster.spec.network.addressRanges.cluster.
- deviceSelector:
driver: i40e
addresses:
- 10.99.0.1/29
mtu: 9000
sysctls:
# ens19 (VLAN 30, v30iot) is LINK ONLY — no host addressing. It exists as
# the macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments
# (matter/otbr/shelly-manager/music-assistant), whose children do their own
# DHCP on that L2. Host addresses were never needed and are actively
# harmful: a connected 10.2.30.0/24 route makes node replies to IoT-subnet
# clients bypass the UDM, which breaks every UDM-DNATed flow (hairpin NAT:
# un-translated SYN-ACK -> client kernel RST, verified live 2026-07-23).
# This disables v6 entirely on that link, including link-local.
# v30iot NIC carries no host addressing (see interfaces above); this
# disables v6 entirely (incl. link-local) so the host is unreachable on that L2.
#
# Keyed on the STABLE predictable name `ens19` (busPath 0000:06:13.0 =
# v30iot). Predictable naming is re-enabled via the Image Factory
# schematic (net.ifnames=1; see .woodpecker/deploy-infrastructure.yml),
# so `ens19` is topology-derived and does NOT shuffle across reboots —
# unlike the former `eth0/1/2` (driver-probe order) which renamed on a
# k8s-3 reboot and silently mis-targeted this sysctl onto mgmt. The four
# v30iot macvlan NADs key on the same `ens19`.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are ordinary block devices to Talos here: the Kingston
# OM8PGP41024Q-A0 system disk, the Samsung PM983 that Rook claims as the
# Ceph OSD, and the retired Crucial P3 that carries EPHEMERAL (see the
# VolumeConfig below). Every one of them is selected by serial. Nothing in
# this file may use a broad selector: `disk.transport == 'nvme'` matches all
# three, and the failure mode is Talos taking the OSD drive.
diskSelector:
serial: 50026B7382B48B86
disk: /dev/vda
certSANs:
- k8s-1.srv.renner.uno
nodeLabels:
topology.kubernetes.io/zone: jupiter
cluster:
allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
---
# EPHEMERAL (/var) goes on the retired Crucial P3, not the system disk.
#
# That drive is at 87% of its rated endurance and was this node's Ceph OSD until
# the PM983 replaced it. /var is exactly the right role for a disk in that
# state: containerd's image and snapshot store, pod logs and the Ceph mon store
# are all reconstructible, so the drive is consumable here in a way it is not as
# an OSD. It also gives /var ~931 GB instead of the 64 GB the VM-era zvol had,
# which is the constraint that makes k8s-2 and k8s-3 trip DiskPressure whenever
# they absorb another node's pods.
#
# THIS ONLY TAKES EFFECT ON FIRST PROVISION. Talos applies volume configuration
# solely when the volume does not yet exist; a config applied after EPHEMERAL
# has been created elsewhere is silently ignored, and relocating it then
# requires wiping the disk and booting install media again.
#
# Matched by serial deliberately. `disk.transport == 'nvme' && !system_disk`
# would match the PM983 as well, and losing that coin flip means Talos formats
# the OSD drive.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
provisioning:
diskSelector:
match: disk.serial == '2332E86B749A'
minSize: 50GiB
grow: true
---
# X710 port 0 carries the switch trunk. It takes no addressing itself — the
# port's untagged VLAN is the 192.168.8.0/24 network, which this node has no
# business being on — so management and v30iot both ride it as tagged VLANs.
#
# Links are addressed by predictable kernel name. Those derive from PCI
# topology, not probe order — though not immune: adding the third NVMe
# renumbered the buses and moved the unused second I226 from enp89s0 to
# enp90s0. Neither name used here was affected.
#
# LinkAliasConfig would be the better way to pin these, and is worth
# reintroducing — but only once it is proven. Aliasing both X710 ports by
# permanent MAC and using the aliases as VLAN parents produced a node with no
# address on any interface: the aliases were never created, so every document
# referencing them did nothing, including the static address on port 1. Verify
# any alias-based revision with `talosctl apply-config --mode=try`, which rolls
# back on its own, before making it permanent.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Management, VLAN 40. Carries the node IP, etcd, the API and Ceph's public
# network. The k8s-1 VM reached 10.2.40.174 over this same physical port via
# Proxmox's v40srv VNet (vmbr0.40), so the switch trunks VLAN 40 here.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VLANConfig
name: mgmt0
vlanID: 40
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: DHCPv4Config
name: mgmt0
---
# Shared control-plane VIP, etcd-elected. Exposed via UniFi DNS as
# k8s.renner.uno.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: Layer2VIPConfig
name: 10.2.40.60
link: mgmt0
---
# Named ens19 on purpose. The four v30iot macvlan NADs hard-code
# `master: ens19`, and k8s-2/k8s-3 still present the VLAN as a virtio NIC of
# that name. VLANConfig.name is free-form, so keeping it lets one set of NADs
# serve both VM and bare-metal nodes for as long as the cluster is mixed.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VLANConfig
name: ens19
vlanID: 30
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49 / 10.99.0.0/29,
# untagged on the wire. Used by Rook for OSD<->OSD replication via
# CephCluster.spec.network.addressRanges.cluster. Not routed off its own
# segment, and deliberately has no default route.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f1np1
up: true
mtu: 9000
addresses:
- address: 10.99.0.1/29
+19 -87
View File
@@ -1,99 +1,31 @@
# k8s-2 runs Talos directly on saturn's MS-01 hardware. Structurally identical
# to k8s-1.yaml — see that file for the reasoning behind each choice; only the
# serials, MACs and addresses differ. k8s-3 is still a Proxmox VM and keeps the
# VM-era layout until neptune is converted.
machine:
network:
hostname: k8s-2
# Shared control-plane VIP — see k8s-1.yaml for the busPath rationale.
interfaces:
- deviceSelector:
busPath: "0000:06:12.0"
dhcp: true
vip:
ip: 10.2.40.60
# v30iot: link only, no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
- deviceSelector:
busPath: "0000:06:13.0"
dhcp: false
# See k8s-1.yaml for context on the dedicated Ceph cluster network.
- deviceSelector:
driver: i40e
addresses:
- 10.99.0.2/29
mtu: 9000
sysctls:
# ens19 (VLAN 30, v30iot) is LINK ONLY — no host addressing. It is the
# macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments; host addresses on that L2
# make node replies bypass the UDM and break every UDM-DNATed flow.
# v30iot NIC carries no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
# order the kernel enumerates them in — Talos and Proxmox do not agree on
# that order.
diskSelector:
serial: 50026B7382DA5F6E
disk: /dev/vda
certSANs:
- k8s-2.srv.renner.uno
nodeLabels:
topology.kubernetes.io/zone: saturn
cluster:
allowSchedulingOnControlPlanes: true
---
# EPHEMERAL (/var) goes on the retired Crucial P3, not the system disk. That
# drive is at 81% of its rated endurance and is finished as an OSD, but
# everything EPHEMERAL holds is reconstructible, so it is consumable in this
# role. It also gives /var ~931 GB instead of the 64 GB the VM-era zvol had.
#
# ONLY TAKES EFFECT ON FIRST PROVISION. Talos applies volume configuration
# solely when the volume does not yet exist; applied later it is silently
# ignored and relocating needs a disk wipe and a boot from install media.
#
# Matched by serial deliberately: a broad selector such as
# `disk.transport == 'nvme' && !system_disk` would match the PM983 as well.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VolumeConfig
name: EPHEMERAL
provisioning:
diskSelector:
match: disk.serial == '2332E86B74BC'
minSize: 50GiB
grow: true
---
# X710 port 0 carries the switch trunk and takes no addressing itself — the
# port's untagged VLAN is not one this node belongs on. Management and v30iot
# both ride it as tagged VLANs.
#
# Addressed by predictable kernel name, not by LinkAliasConfig. Aliases are
# valid VLAN parents, but a selector matching zero links is skipped silently
# and Talos disables default DHCP machine-wide as soon as any new-style network
# document exists — so a silent miss leaves the node with no address on any
# interface. See RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Management, VLAN 40. Node IP, etcd, the API and Ceph's public network.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VLANConfig
name: mgmt0
vlanID: 40
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: DHCPv4Config
name: mgmt0
---
# Shared control-plane VIP, etcd-elected. Exposed via UniFi DNS as
# k8s.renner.uno.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: Layer2VIPConfig
name: 10.2.40.60
link: mgmt0
---
# Named ens19 on purpose: the four v30iot macvlan NADs hard-code
# `master: ens19`, and k8s-3 still presents the VLAN as a virtio NIC of that
# name. VLANConfig.name is free-form, so one set of NADs serves both.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: VLANConfig
name: ens19
vlanID: 30
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49 / 10.99.0.0/29,
# untagged on the wire. OSD<->OSD replication only. Not routed off its own
# segment and deliberately has no default route.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f1np1
up: true
mtu: 9000
addresses:
- address: 10.99.0.2/29
+2 -7
View File
@@ -47,13 +47,8 @@ variable "tags" {
}
variable "template_name" {
type = string
# No default clone source. The ubuntu-24.04-template it used to name was
# deleted with saturn's conversion to bare metal, and Proxmox is being
# retired, so a default pointing at a template that does not exist would
# only fail at apply time. Set it explicitly if a clone source is ever
# wanted again.
default = null
type = string
default = "ubuntu-24-04-template"
}
variable "full_clone" {
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
module "k8s_1" {
source = "./modules/proxmox_vm"
name = "k8s-1.srv.renner.uno"
target_node = "jupiter"
vmid = 150
memory = 49152
cores = 8
template_name = null
cloud_init = false
full_clone = false
bios = "ovmf"
machine = "q35"
boot = "order=virtio0"
agent_enabled = true
# Second NIC on v30iot so Cilium L2 announce can win ARP on the IoT
# VLAN from this node (previously only k8s-edge had v30iot, so any
# IoT-pool LB lease landing here was unreachable from devices).
extra_network_bridges = ["v30iot"]
disks = [
{
storage = "local-zfs"
size = "64G"
format = "raw"
slot = "virtio0"
file_id = local.talos_image
}
]
hostpci = [
{
mapping = "osd-ssd"
},
{
mapping = "x710-port1"
}
]
tags = "kubernetes;talos;controlplane"
ssh_public_keys = local.common_ssh_keys
vm_state = "running"
# Rebuild pipeline issues `-replace`; skip graceful shutdown so a
# non-responsive Talos guest can't hang the destroy for 30 minutes.
stop_on_destroy = true
}
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
module "k8s_2" {
source = "./modules/proxmox_vm"
name = "k8s-2.srv.renner.uno"
target_node = "saturn"
vmid = 151
memory = 49152
cores = 8
template_name = null
cloud_init = false
full_clone = false
bios = "ovmf"
machine = "q35"
boot = "order=virtio0"
agent_enabled = true
# Second NIC on v30iot so Cilium L2 announce can win ARP on the IoT
# VLAN from this node (previously only k8s-edge had v30iot, so any
# IoT-pool LB lease landing here was unreachable from devices).
extra_network_bridges = ["v30iot"]
disks = [
{
storage = "local-zfs"
size = "64G"
format = "raw"
slot = "virtio0"
file_id = local.talos_image
}
]
hostpci = [
{
mapping = "osd-ssd"
},
{
mapping = "x710-port1"
}
]
tags = "kubernetes;talos;controlplane"
ssh_public_keys = local.common_ssh_keys
vm_state = "running"
# Rebuild pipeline issues `-replace`; skip graceful shutdown so a
# non-responsive Talos guest can't hang the destroy for 30 minutes.
stop_on_destroy = true
}
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
resource "proxmox_virtual_environment_vm" "ubuntu_24_04_template" {
name = "ubuntu-24.04-template"
node_name = "saturn"
vm_id = 605
started = false
template = true
on_boot = false
keyboard_layout = "en-us"
bios = "seabios"
agent {
enabled = true
}
cpu {
cores = 2
type = "x86-64-v3"
}
memory {
dedicated = 2048
}
initialization {
datastore_id = "local-zfs"
ip_config {
ipv4 {
address = "dhcp"
}
}
user_account {
username = "ladmin"
keys = [
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPzFNBP3bq2m/6JqDqod9w+FP/uxXxHMolqhq3Ojflr1 krenner@fortress"
]
}
}
disk {
datastore_id = "local-zfs"
interface = "scsi0"
size = 32
file_format = "raw"
iothread = false
}
network_device {
bridge = "v40srv"
model = "virtio"
}
serial_device {}
scsi_hardware = "virtio-scsi-pci"
lifecycle {
ignore_changes = [
node_name,
started,
initialization,
disk,
cpu,
memory
]
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,14 @@ COPY src ./src
RUN cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl \
&& strip target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/secret-rotator
# Build timestamp, recorded in the image rather than the tag: the tag says which
# source revision was built, this says when. Written here because the final
# image is scratch and has no shell to run `date` in.
RUN date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > /build/image-build-date
FROM scratch
COPY --from=build /build/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/secret-rotator /secret-rotator
COPY --from=build /build/image-build-date /etc/image-build-date
# Matches runAsUser on the rotation Jobs. There is no /etc/passwd in a scratch
# image, so this is a bare uid by necessity — which is also all Kubernetes needs.