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issue-fix-bot b1901047a0 fix: [alert] CephHealthWarn (rook-ceph) (#562)
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2026-08-24 12:47:12 +00:00
security-bot 394d8995a6 chore(image-automation): bump woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.18.0
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2026-08-24 10:50:03 +00:00
security-bot 0685044ce6 chore(image-automation): bump woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.18.0
Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-24 10:50:01 +00:00
k.renner 89582c9c9f Merge pull request 'chore(ci): bump alpine to 3.24.1 in deploy-infrastructure' (#551) from bump-stale-ci-images into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#551
2026-08-23 20:59:54 +00:00
k.renner 3f8e9fe333 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] CephHealthWarn (rook-ceph) (#557)' (#558) from alert-fix/issue-557 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#558
2026-08-23 20:59:29 +00:00
k.renner fd8412b9d7 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] KubeJobFailed (openbao) (#554)' (#555) from alert-fix/issue-554 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#555
2026-08-23 20:58:45 +00:00
k.renner 1c51b78fda Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] KubeJobFailed (wordpress) (#550)' (#553) from alert-fix/issue-550 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#553
2026-08-23 20:58:28 +00:00
k.renner 96a51f1337 Merge pull request 'docs(zigbee2mqtt): correct the WS90 debounce rationale' (#560) from fix-ws90-debounce-rationale into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#560
2026-08-23 20:57:51 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 87c6f1235c docs(zigbee2mqtt): correct and trim the WS90 debounce comment
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The value is unchanged and correct; the comment committed alongside it in
#559 was neither accurate nor the right place for most of what it said.

Accuracy. It cited the device's ZCL reporting configuration as the bound,
reading minRepIntval 10 as "the station updates every 10s". minRepIntval
is not a cadence: with maxRepIntval 3600 and a reportable change set, the
ZCL reporting model gives periodic reports at the MAXIMUM interval — once
an hour — plus change-driven reports each held back so it lands no sooner
than 10s after the previous. It is a hold-off on change-triggered reports
and says nothing about the gap between reports of different attributes,
which is what a debounce window sees.

The bound that applies is the documented transmit interval — readings
every 2s, transmitted every 8.8s — against Z2M's documented rule not to
set debounce above the sensor's update interval. Shelly's knowledge base
rounds the same figure to 9s.

It also claimed the window had to exceed 1s because "the recovery burst
straddles a second boundary", inferred from log lines stamped 11:42:11
and 11:42:12. Those are second-resolution timestamps and cannot
distinguish 10ms from 900ms. No lower bound was ever established.

Length. The rest was commit-message material sitting in a config file:
justification for the chosen value, gap-distribution and run-length
measurements, and notes reconciling my own earlier misreadings. Comments
state facts about the system, not the history of arriving at them. What
remains is what the device does, what debounce does to it, and the
constraint on the value — 41 lines down to 13.

Verified before writing: post-debounce frames arrive complete (all 22
fields, no partials) at a settled ~10s cadence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 22:39:20 +02:00
k.renner 1ce3f449d4 Merge pull request 'feat(zigbee2mqtt): 2.13.0 and debounce the WS90 report burst' (#559) from worktree-z2m-2.13.0-ws90-debounce into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#559
2026-08-23 20:06:50 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 91e55d3b56 feat(zigbee2mqtt): 2.13.0 and debounce the WS90 report burst
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Two changes to the Wetterstation (Ecowitt WS90, 0xc02cedfffe958f40), both
aimed at the station's recurring zero-drop glitch.

2.13.0 carries zigbee-herdsman-converters#12748, which discards the ZCL
non-value markers (0xffff / 0xff / 0xffffff) the WS90 emits when a reading
is unavailable. Without it those markers are scaled and published as
measurements — the 6553 m/s gust readings in Koenkk/zigbee2mqtt#31048. The
release also recovers the rain rate after a counter reset, which is the
same lifetime-counter dip that packages/wetterstation.yaml compensates for
on the Home Assistant side. Its only breaking change is dropping Node.js 20
for bare-metal installs; the container ships its own runtime. The amd64
manifest was verified pullable before this commit.

debounce: 2 addresses the part 2.13.0 does not fix. Koenkk/zigbee2mqtt#31048
is still open, and the author of #12748 states explicitly that it does not
cover the zero drops: "a zero can be a real reading for these attributes,
only the all-bits-set markers are provably invalid."

The station reports as a burst of seven per-cluster ZCL frames and Z2M
publishes its full cumulative state once per frame, so one device report
becomes seven MQTT messages. During a glitch the zeros appear progressively
across those seven, which is what makes the corruption unrecognisable
downstream: an intermediate frame carrying {"temperature":0,"humidity":92,
"pressure":96.9} is internally consistent (Z2M recomputes dew_point from the
false temperature) and cannot be told apart from a legitimate winter
reading. Merging the burst yields a single frame with the all-zero
signature, which a consumer can reject.

The window is bounded on both sides. Above: the device's own reporting
configuration sets minRepIntval 10 / maxRepIntval 3600 on all seven WS90
clusters (1024/1026/1027/1029 and 0xfc01/0xfc02/0xfc03), so no attribute
repeats inside 10s. Below: the recovery burst straddles a second boundary,
so 1s splits it and emits a partial frame.

Staggering was checked rather than assumed — the 10s floor is per attribute,
and nine attributes report across those clusters, so a trailing-edge timer
could in principle keep resetting and never flush. Over 6h the longest
unbroken chain of sub-2s gaps was 5, bounding worst-case deferral under
~10s.

The device is also absent from the seeded device list, which predates it
joining, so this adds the friendly_name too.

NOTE: this file is seed-only. A running Z2M owns its configuration.yaml on
the PVC, so this does not change the live instance — it only makes a fresh
PVC come up correctly. debounce is requiresRestart, so applying it live
needs the option set on the running instance and a restart; the image bump
supplies the restart.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 22:03:17 +02:00
issue-fix-bot 8386f755d1 fix: [alert] CephHealthWarn (rook-ceph) (#557)
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2026-08-23 18:46:50 +00:00
issue-fix-bot cf63aa61be fix: [alert] KubeJobFailed (openbao) (#554)
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2026-08-22 02:45:05 +00:00
issue-fix-bot 08289947a1 fix: [alert] KubeJobFailed (wordpress) (#550)
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2026-08-21 21:47:22 +00:00
security-bot 287cce7d1a chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-21 21:42:10 +00:00
claude-bot 5b6a55c8ba chore(ci): bump alpine to 3.24.1 in deploy-infrastructure
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From the #426 audit. Tag verified present before bumping.

The kaniko bump that was originally in this branch is dropped. It would
have pinned a new `-debug` image, and debug variants are not to run in
the production cluster. kaniko is archived upstream, so the fix is
migration rather than a version bump; tracked in #552 along with the
`-debug` requirement.
2026-08-21 22:55:02 +02:00
k.renner adefaab7e8 Merge pull request 'docs(rook-ceph): cut the narrative out of the ceph manifest comments' (#548) from document-pool-no-redundancy-meaning into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#548
2026-08-21 20:28:21 +00:00
claude-bot 9a43330701 docs(rook-ceph): cut the narrative out of the ceph manifest comments
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Comments should say what the setting does and what constrains it. The
blocks added in #542, #544, #545 and #547 had grown into incident
write-ups: measurement runs, prior values, how a problem was found,
what a check used to be. That belongs in commit messages and the wiki,
both of which already carry it.

Trimmed, no behaviour change:

  cephcluster.yaml       22 lines -> 6   (cephx rotation)
  cephfs-ci.yaml         26 lines -> 7   (why size 2)
  prometheusrule-ceph.yaml                (CephHealthWarn, 43 -> 13;
                                           CephPoolLostRedundancy, 15 -> 7)

The operative facts are kept: which checks are excluded and why they
cannot clear, that POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY reports blocked maintenance and
not only data risk, and that size 1 needs dedicated OSDs.
2026-08-21 22:27:10 +02:00
k.renner 9c796b924b Merge pull request 'fix(rook-ceph): raise cephfs-ci to size 2 — size 1 blocks all OSD maintenance' (#547) from fix-ci-pool-blocks-osd-maintenance into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#547
2026-08-21 20:22:07 +00:00
claude-bot 85996991b6 fix(rook-ceph): raise cephfs-ci to size 2 — size 1 blocks all OSD maintenance
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The unreplicated CI pools introduced in #542 make every OSD on the
cluster permanently un-restartable.

`ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while stopping an OSD would take PGs
offline. A size-1 pool puts every PG on exactly one OSD, so the check
fails for all three:

  Error EBUSY: unsafe to stop osd(s) at this time
               (20 PGs are or would become offline)
  bad_become_inactive: 13.6 13.9 ... 14.1c 14.1d

Pools 13 and 14 are cephfs-ci-metadata and cephfs-ci-data0. The size-2
pools are not implicated — they run min_size 1 and appear under
ok_become_degraded, which is allowed.

Rook gates OSD restarts on that check, so this blocks CephX key
rotation, Ceph upgrades, node drains and reboots, and drive
replacement. It surfaced when #545 deadlocked: Rook retried
ok-to-stop against all three OSDs several times a second and could
never succeed, while `ceph -s` reported 217 pgs active+clean
throughout. Nothing is unhealthy; the restarts are simply refused.

The reasoning in #542 was that unreplicated CI data only risks
in-flight pipelines, since every byte is a fresh git clone. That part
holds. What it missed is that the cost is not scoped to the pool: one
unreplicated pool freezes maintenance for the entire cluster.

Most of #542's saving came from keeping CI churn off `cephfs`, whose
metadataPool is size 3 — that survives this change. Only the second-
order gain from dropping the replica is given up, and cephfs-ci-data0
stores 0 B with cephfs-ci-metadata at 182 MiB, so the backfill is
trivial.

size 1 becomes viable again once these pools sit on OSDs of their own,
where the permanently un-stoppable OSD holds nothing but throwaway
data. That is planned with the retired QLC drives.

Alerting follows the same change:

- POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is no longer excluded from CephHealthWarn. It was
  excluded because cephfs-ci was expected to keep it permanently
  active; no pool is unreplicated now, so the exclusion would only
  hide a real one losing its replicas.
- CephPoolLostRedundancy drops its cephfs-ci exemption for the same
  reason, and its description now states the maintenance consequence,
  not just the data-loss one.
- The AUTH_INSECURE_* exclusion is reworded. Calling it
  "known-accepted" reads as a decision that the risk is fine; it is a
  kernel-blocked remediation (aes256k over the CSI mount path needs
  kernel 7.0+, nodes run 6.18).

Refs #542, #545, #527
2026-08-21 22:21:11 +02:00
k.renner 04b8c93113 Merge pull request 'fix(rook-ceph): rotate CephX daemon keys to close CVE-2025-30156' (#545) from rotate-cephx-daemon-keys into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#545
2026-08-21 20:07:25 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 2abd946c05 fix(rook-ceph): rotate CephX daemon keys to close CVE-2025-30156
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Ceph v19.2.6 ships the fix for CVE-2025-30156, a CephX authentication
bypass: AES-128-CBC service tickets carry no HMAC and use a hard-coded
IV, so a holder of any low-privilege key can bit-flip a ticket into
cluster-admin in linear time. Upgrading the binaries does not resolve
it — the keys themselves must be rotated to the aes256k cipher.

The cluster is mid-procedure. auth_allowed_ciphers (aes, aes256k),
auth_preferred_cipher (aes256k) and auth_service_cipher (aes256k) are
already set, and the rotating service keys were wiped, but no actual
key rotation has happened: every entity in status.cephx is still
keyGeneration 1 with keyType aes, created under 19.2.3.

Rook automates daemon-key rotation but it is opt-in and defaults to
Disabled, so spec.security.cephx was left empty and nothing rotated.
Rook v1.20.6 and Ceph v19.2.6 are both past the version floor the
feature requires.

Rotating daemon keys clears AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE, the only
one of the six new checks at ERR severity. That is the operationally
urgent part: Rook skips CephFS and RGW reconciliation entirely while
health is HEALTH_ERR — which is what deadlocked the mds/rgw rollout in
issue #527 — and the check is presently held down only by a mon-side
mute with a finite TTL. When that mute lapses the cluster returns to
HEALTH_ERR and the reconcile freeze comes back.

CSI keys are deliberately left on aes. aes256k over the CSI mount path
requires a host kernel of 7.0 or newer and these nodes run 6.18, so
`aes` must stay in auth_allowed_ciphers for CSI to authenticate at all.
AUTH_INSECURE_CLIENT_KEY_TYPE, AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_ALLOWED and
AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_CREATABLE therefore stay raised at WARN until the
nodes run a kernel that supports it.

Rotation restarts most Ceph daemons. With size 2 pools across 3 OSDs
this should be applied deliberately rather than alongside other churn,
and Ceph should reach HEALTH_OK before anything else touches the
cluster.

Refs #527, #528

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 22:05:10 +02:00
k.renner 8c0a6b2b1e Merge pull request 'fix(monitoring): CephHealthWarn has been firing continuously and hiding everything' (#544) from fix-ceph-health-alert into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#544
2026-08-21 08:02:00 +00:00
claude-bot cf6ff839be fix(monitoring): CephHealthWarn has been firing continuously and hiding everything
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CephHealthWarn alerted on `ceph_health_status == 1`. It has been FIRING since
at least 2026-08-21T00:26Z and cannot clear: four AUTH_INSECURE_* checks are
permanently active from CVE-2025-30156 (#527) and stay that way until Rook
>=1.20.5 lands. A permanently-firing alert reports nothing -- every Ceph
warning since then has been invisible behind it.

This is a pre-existing gap, not a consequence of the cephfs-ci work, though
that work would have added a second permanent cause (POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY, since
the CI pools are size 1 on purpose).

ceph_health_detail exposes each check as its own series, so the alert now fires
on any check that is NOT known-accepted, and names it. Verified against live
data: 5 checks active, 0 unexpected, so it is quiet now and fires the moment
something genuinely new appears.

Excluding POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY wholesale would give something up: that check is
cluster-wide and does not say WHICH pool, so accepting it for cephfs-ci would
equally hide a production pool dropping to one replica. CephPoolLostRedundancy
restores that. There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
replication factor -- verified live as replicapool 2, cephfs-data0 2,
cephfs-metadata 3, cephfs-ci-metadata 1.

Both alerts were tested against live data before committing, in BOTH
directions. The positive control matters as much as the negative one: an early
draft used a >1e9 floor which silently excluded the CI pools entirely, so the
expression could not have matched anything. It looked correct precisely because
it returned no results. The control caught it; the floor is now 1e6.

The floor is not what suppresses the near-empty rgw pools. Their ratios are
9-36 because per-object overhead dominates, so they never match `< 1.5`.

6h on CephHealthWarn is unchanged -- Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions
and paging on those trains people to ignore the alert.
2026-08-21 09:53:37 +02:00
k.renner a11493ee22 Merge pull request 'perf(woodpecker): put CI workspaces on the unreplicated CephFS' (#543) from repoint-ci-workspaces into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#543
2026-08-21 07:32:11 +00:00
claude-bot 7666d220c5 perf(woodpecker): put CI workspaces on the unreplicated CephFS
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Repoints WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_CLASS at ceph-filesystem-ci, the
dedicated filesystem added in #542 whose pools are both size 1.

Measured 2026-08-21, polling both CephFS pools every 15s:

  CI active   1.5 min (6 intervals):  data0 143.2 MB   metadata 17.2 MB
  CI idle    16.0 min (63 intervals): data0   0.0 MB   metadata 11.0 MB
  CI share of writes: data0 100%, metadata 61%

data0 takes zero bytes across 16 minutes without a pipeline, so its entire
write volume is CI. The 15s cadence is what made this visible: a pipeline
creates, uses and deletes its PVC inside ~2 minutes, so a 5-minute sample
reported no CI pods during bursts CI was causing.

Per pipeline this moves the drive cost from 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB to
~80 MB, since neither pool is replicated on the new filesystem.

RWX is unchanged and still required: pipeline steps share the workspace PVC
and the k8s backend can schedule them on different nodes, so an RWO volume
fails to mount on the second node. Only the filesystem underneath changes.

Also corrects the justification written into #542 for leaving
ceph-filesystem-ephemeral alone. That commit claimed restore-test.sh handles
"REAL data which must not land on unreplicated pools". That is wrong: its
probe PVCs are as throwaway as a CI workspace -- the authoritative copy is the
backup on Hetzner, and losing a probe just means re-running the test.

The actual reason it cannot move is technical: those probes are snapshot
CLONES, and `ceph fs subvolume snapshot clone` operates within a single
filesystem, so a snapshot taken in `cephfs` cannot be cloned into `cephfs-ci`.
Landing them unreplicated would require a second size-1 data pool inside
`cephfs`; restore-test runs weekly against CI's ~96 pipelines/day, so that is
not worth the complexity.

cephfs-ci verified healthy before this change: PHASE Ready, MDS Running, both
pools reporting size 1.
2026-08-21 09:31:01 +02:00
k.renner baa5e62bbe Merge pull request 'feat(rook-ceph): add an unreplicated CephFS for CI workspaces' (#542) from ci-throwaway-cephfs into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#542
2026-08-21 07:27:47 +00:00
claude-bot 503d2a4876 feat(rook-ceph): add an unreplicated CephFS for CI workspaces
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Woodpecker's Kubernetes backend creates a PVC per pipeline, fills it with a
checkout plus build output, and deletes it when the pipeline ends. Those
workspaces currently live on the shared `cephfs`, so throwaway data is
replicated as if it mattered: 2x in cephfs-data0 and 3x in cephfs-metadata.

Measured 2026-08-21 by polling both pools every 15s. The interval matters --
at 5 minutes a whole pipeline is invisible, because its PVC is created, used
and deleted inside ~2 minutes. Sampling that slowly reported zero CI pods
during bursts CI was causing, which sent this investigation down three wrong
paths before the cadence was fixed.

  one pipeline, a single 15s interval:  data0 +71.6 MB   metadata +8.2 MB
  every interval with no CI pod:        data0   ~0        metadata   ~0

So CI accounts for essentially all CephFS write volume; between pipelines the
metadata pool is quiet at ~4 MB/day. On the shared filesystem one pipeline
costs 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB of drive writes. On this one it costs ~80 MB.

size 1 is correct here even though it was rejected for `cephfs`. There,
metadataPool stays at 3 because losing it destroys the entire filesystem
rather than the objects on one OSD, and 550 GiB of real data depends on it.
Here every byte is a fresh git clone: total loss means in-flight pipelines
fail and get re-run. Replicating throwaway data was the cost, so it is what
gets removed.

`ceph-filesystem-ephemeral` is deliberately NOT repointed. It has a second
consumer -- velero/restore-test.sh restores REAL data through it for
verification, which must not land on unreplicated pools. A new class also
sidesteps StorageClass.parameters being immutable.

Nothing uses ceph-filesystem-ci yet, so this commit is inert: it provisions
the filesystem and its MDS and changes no existing workload. Repointing the
Woodpecker agent is a separate change, once this is confirmed healthy.

Known consequence: size 1 raises POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY, so cluster health will
warn until that is addressed. Silencing it via mon_warn_on_pool_no_redundancy
is cluster-wide and would also hide a production pool dropping to 1, so it
wants a targeted alert instead -- deliberately left out of this commit rather
than switching the warning off blind.

The MDS is 512Mi/1Gi with no standby, not the 4Gi active+standby that `cephfs`
runs. That figure is driven by immich's cached inode count; a CI workspace is
a few thousand files that vanish with the pipeline, and a second daemon to
protect throwaway work is not worth its memory.
2026-08-21 08:55:33 +02:00
security-bot 48407aa202 chore(image-automation): bump redis:8.10.1-alpine
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2026-08-20 17:37:50 +00:00
security-bot ce6e8ba2cb chore(image-automation): bump redis:7.4.11-alpine
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2026-08-20 17:19:40 +00:00
k.renner 96387108ff Merge pull request 'perf(cnpg): roll archive_timeout out to the remaining six clusters' (#541) from rollout-archive-timeout into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#541
2026-08-20 13:39:00 +00:00
claude-bot 119b2c77ef perf(cnpg): roll archive_timeout out to the remaining six clusters
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ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file. archive_timeout forces a switch on a
timer, and the switched-out segment is written and archived at its full size
no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, permitting
288 segments/day per cluster of largely padding.

gf-pg went first as a staged rollout and is now verified: 211 -> 41 MB/hour,
an 81% cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in
step. Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume
was padding rather than data, and the measured result matched the ~35
MB/hour predicted beforehand.

Fleet-wide this is worth roughly 18 GB/day of logical writes, which at
size=2 with ~1.27x BlueStore overhead is ~45 GB/day at the drives -- about
14% of the 328 GB/day the three OSD NVMes currently take.

ak-pg gets 15min rather than 30min. It holds credentials, sessions and
enrolment state, and the extra 15min would save only a further 0.3 GB/day,
which does not justify doubling the worst-case loss window on that data.

ha-pg saves least in relative terms: its segments are already 63% full of
real WAL (4.9 GB/day), so the timer is not what drives most of its switches.

Also corrects two comments in ha-pg-cluster.yaml that this work falsified.

wal_compression: the claim that these clusters "were not getting compression"
was wrong -- "on" is pglz, which was already compressing. Switching to zstd
moved the WAL rate not at all (4911/4976 -> 5002 MB/day, by LSN advance over
20min windows). Full-page images genuinely are ~62% of WAL here (61.9%
measured as a steady-state delta, against 62.4% lifetime -- so the migration
did not skew it, which was my first guess and it was wrong). There was simply
no headroom between pglz and zstd on this data. zstd is kept because it is
not worse and costs nothing, but it is not a lever.

checkpoint_timeout: 15min -> 30min likewise did not move WAL. Probable reason
is that a recorder is append-mostly -- a page is dirtied while it fills and
then not touched again, so it pays its full-page image once whatever the
checkpoint interval. Kept, but flagged as unjustified pending a data-file
measurement: this volume takes ~11 GB/day against 4.9 GB/day of WAL, so most
of its traffic is outside what a WAL measurement can see.

Context: drive-endurance work on three QLC NVMe OSDs at 81-87% wear.
2026-08-20 15:36:26 +02:00
k.renner 1d2248139d Merge pull request 'perf(grafana-db): raise archive_timeout to 30min on gf-pg (re-target of #539)' (#540) from archive-timeout-gf-pg into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#540
2026-08-20 12:49:41 +00:00
claude-bot 0a9d19a7c6 perf(grafana-db): raise archive_timeout to 30min on gf-pg
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file. archive_timeout forces a segment
switch on a timer so the archive never trails reality by more than that
interval, and the switched-out segment is written and archived at its full
16 MiB no matter how few bytes of real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults this to
5min, which permits up to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day per cluster.

Measured on gf-pg: the database is 21 MB and generates 4.5 MB/day of actual
WAL, while its RBD volume takes 211 MB/hour -- against 192 MB/hour predicted
from 12 switches of 16 MiB. Essentially every byte written to this volume is
padding, roughly 1100x amplification.

This resolves an anomaly that has been open since the start of the endurance
work: gf-pg appeared to write gigabytes per day for a 21 MB database, and
neither WAL volume nor data changes could account for it. Segment padding
does, exactly.

Applied to gf-pg alone as a staged rollout. It is the lowest-risk cluster
and gives the cleanest signal -- its real WAL is small enough that any change
in volume is unambiguously attributable to this parameter. The same default
affects all seven clusters and is worth an estimated ~24 GB/day of logical
writes fleet-wide, but that only goes ahead once this one is verified.

The cost is RPO. On total loss of the cluster, up to 30min of Grafana state
becomes unrecoverable instead of 5min. That state is dashboards, annotations
and preferences, changing at ~4.5 MB/day, so the window is nearly always
empty. Clusters holding credentials or job state get evaluated separately
rather than inheriting this value by default.

archive_timeout is in CNPG's GlobalDefaultSettings, not its
FixedConfigurationParameters, so it is user-overridable -- verified against
pkg/postgres/configuration.go rather than assumed.

Context: drive-endurance work on three QLC NVMe OSDs at 81-87% wear.
2026-08-20 14:37:46 +02:00
k.renner 082092c4ba Merge pull request 'perf(cnpg): compress WAL with zstd instead of pglz' (#538) from reduce-pg-wal-fpi into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/issue-fix Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#538
2026-08-20 12:30:18 +00:00
22 changed files with 390 additions and 26 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: validate-secrets
image: alpine:3.21
image: alpine:3.24.1
environment:
TF_VAR_proxmox_api_url:
from_secret: proxmox_api_url
+14
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,20 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 3.2 GB/day here, most of it padding.
#
# 15min, NOT the 30min used elsewhere in this rollout. This cluster holds
# credentials, sessions and enrolment state, so its RPO is worth more than
# the difference: 30min would save a further 0.3 GB/day, which does not
# justify doubling the worst-case loss window on this data.
#
# It does carry a synchronous standby (instances: 2), so the realistic
# exposure is losing both instances, not one -- but the conservative value
# is cheap here and the aggressive one buys almost nothing.
archive_timeout: "15min"
# Async replication makes CNPG switchover slow because the standby has
# to chase missing WAL via barman-cloud and replay queued records
# before it can promote. With one synchronous standby, the standby is
+22
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,28 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# THE dominant write source on this cluster, by three orders of magnitude.
#
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file. archive_timeout forces a segment
# switch on a timer so the archive never lags reality by more than that
# interval -- and the switched-out segment is written and archived at its
# full 16 MiB regardless of how few bytes of real WAL it contains.
#
# CNPG defaults this to 5min, i.e. up to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day.
# Measured here: this database is 21 MB and generates 4.5 MB/day of actual
# WAL, while its RBD volume takes 211 MB/hour. Essentially every byte
# written is padding -- roughly 1100x amplification.
#
# 30min cuts that to 48 segments/day. The cost is RPO: on total loss of
# the cluster, up to 30min of Grafana state is unrecoverable rather than
# 5min. Grafana's state here is dashboards, annotations and preferences,
# and the write rate says it changes ~4.5 MB/day -- so that window is
# nearly always empty anyway.
#
# Applied to gf-pg FIRST, alone, as a staged rollout: it is the lowest-risk
# cluster and has the cleanest signal, since its real WAL is small enough
# that any change in volume is unambiguously this parameter.
archive_timeout: "30min"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
env:
- name: DB_URI
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: ha-pg-app, key: fqdn-uri }
secretKeyRef: {name: ha-pg-app, key: fqdn-uri}
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /config
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -86,8 +86,26 @@ spec:
# inserts scattered across pages, so full-page writes after each
# checkpoint dominate WAL volume; compression cuts that directly.
#
# Measured on this cluster: full-page images are 62.4% of WAL bytes, so
# this is the single largest lever on recorder write volume.
# Full-page images really are ~62% of WAL here: 61.9% measured as a
# steady-state delta over one checkpoint cycle, against 62.4% lifetime.
#
# But switching pglz -> zstd changed NOTHING. Measured by
# pg_current_wal_lsn advance over 20min windows: 4911 and 4976 MB/day
# before, 5002 MB/day after.
#
# The reason is that `wal_compression: "on"` was never "no compression" --
# it is pglz, which was already compressing these page images. zstd only
# changes the ratio, and on recorder pages that margin is too small to
# measure. The original framing of this change (that the clusters "were
# not getting compression") was wrong; they were.
#
# Note the 62% figure is an upper bound: it is computed as
# wal_fpi * 8192 / wal_bytes, which assumes uncompressed 8 KiB pages. With
# compression active the true byte share is lower, which is consistent
# with there being little headroom left for a better algorithm.
#
# Kept because zstd is not worse than pglz and costs nothing. It is simply
# not a lever. The real one on this cluster was archive_timeout, below.
#
# zstd, not "on": the boolean spelling resolves to pglz, the original
# 2016-era algorithm, which is both slower and weaker than the two
@@ -95,9 +113,35 @@ spec:
# best ratio on 8 KiB page images, and the CPU cost lands on a cluster
# that is IO-bound on QLC NVMe, not CPU-bound.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day that is largely padding.
#
# Verified on gf-pg first (the staged rollout): 211 -> 41 MB/hour, an 81%
# cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in step.
# Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume was
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Fewer checkpoints => fewer full-page writes, since a page is only
# fully-logged on its first modification after a checkpoint. Doubling the
# interval halves how often each hot page pays that 8 KiB toll.
# fully-logged on its first modification after a checkpoint.
#
# That reasoning did not show up in WAL volume: 15min -> 30min moved the
# WAL rate not at all (4911/4976 -> 5002 MB/day). The likely reason is
# that this workload is append-mostly -- a page is dirtied while it fills
# and then not touched again, so its full-page image is paid once
# regardless of how often checkpoints run. Interval only helps pages that
# are re-dirtied across many cycles, which is not what a recorder does.
#
# Kept, but NOT because WAL improved. checkpoint_timeout also governs
# data-file writes at checkpoint, and those are unmeasured here: this
# volume takes ~11 GB/day against 4.9 GB/day of WAL, so most of its
# traffic is outside what the WAL measurement covers. Revisit with a
# data-file measurement before treating this value as justified.
#
# Recovery cost is bounded by how much WAL a single interval produces,
# not by the interval itself: at the measured rate 30min is well under
@@ -176,3 +176,22 @@ data:
friendly_name: Treppenhaus Haustür Schalter 1
'0x001788010b00d011':
friendly_name: Treppenhaus Haustür Schalter 2
# Ecowitt WS90 weather station. Joined after the ZHA-mirrored block above
# was written, hence listed apart from it.
#
# The station transmits every 8.8s, as a burst of seven per-cluster ZCL
# frames; Z2M publishes its full cumulative state once per frame. debounce
# merges a burst into one publish carrying the last value per attribute,
# and must stay below the transmit interval — a window that never sees
# silence never flushes.
#
# The firmware drops all readings to zero for a few seconds every few
# days. Merged, that surfaces as a single all-zero frame; unmerged, the
# zeros spread across the seven frames and none of them is individually
# distinguishable from a valid reading.
#
# Z2M reads this only at startup (requiresRestart), and this file is
# SEED-ONLY per the header — the running instance takes it from its PVC.
'0xc02cedfffe958f40':
friendly_name: Wetterstation
debounce: 2
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ spec:
# Pinned tag. No Flux image-automation marker yet (unlike mosquitto) —
# add an infrastructure/image-automation/zigbee2mqtt.yaml policy as a
# follow-up if desired; pinned-and-manual is fine for the initial cutover.
image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.12.1
image: ghcr.io/koenkk/zigbee2mqtt:2.13.0
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
env:
- name: TZ
+14
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day that is largely padding.
#
# Verified on gf-pg first (the staged rollout): 211 -> 41 MB/hour, an 81%
# cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in step.
# Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume was
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Write-reduction tuning. These databases are largely idle, and the
# Postgres defaults favour throughput over storage that wears out.
#
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ spec:
# Pinned to 7.4-alpine to match the LXC 225 compose exactly.
# Any redis major-version bump is a separate migration.
- name: redis
image: redis:7.4.10-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:redis-immich"}
image: redis:7.4.11-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:redis-immich"}
args:
- redis-server
- --save
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-cilium.yaml
- prometheusrule-hetzner-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-loki.yaml
- prometheusrule-mariadb-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
@@ -12,18 +12,66 @@ spec:
- name: ceph.rules
rules:
- alert: CephHealthWarn
# ceph_health_status: 0 = HEALTH_OK, 1 = HEALTH_WARN, 2 = HEALTH_ERR.
# 6h is deliberately long. Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions —
# a slow BlueStore op during the Sunday restore sweep, a mon briefly
# below its disk threshold — and paging on those trains people to
# ignore the alert. What matters is a warning that does not clear.
expr: ceph_health_status == 1
# Per-check rather than ceph_health_status, so one permanently-active
# check cannot mask every other Ceph warning.
#
# AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded: it cannot clear until the nodes run a
# kernel supporting aes256k over the CSI mount path (#527).
#
# POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is in scope. An unreplicated pool makes
# `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuse for every OSD, so it reports blocked
# maintenance and not just data risk — do not exclude it for a pool
# that is unreplicated deliberately.
#
# 6h: Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions. Only a warning that
# does not clear is worth paging on.
#
# BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT breaks that premise and is still NOT
# excluded (#557). Ceph holds the check for
# bluestore_slow_ops_warn_lifetime (24h) after the LAST slow op, so
# one multi-second stall outlives the 6h `for` and always pages,
# with latency back to normal long before anyone looks. Measured:
# three episodes in the 30d to 2026-08-24 (Sun Jul 26, Aug 2 and
# Aug 23), each ran ~24-26h and cleared untouched.
#
# All began inside the weekly Velero restore-test window (Sun 08:00Z
# plus up to 6h, see velero/restore-test-cronjob.yaml) — a sustained
# restore that outruns the SLC cache on these QLC NVMe. Expected for
# the hardware, but not excludable: this is also the earliest signal
# of a genuinely failing drive, and all three are at 80-87%
# endurance used (see cephcluster.yaml).
#
# No metric names the stalling OSD: ceph_health_detail carries no osd
# label, and ceph_daemon_health_metrics{type="SLOW_OPS"} reads 0 at
# every scrape (a stall is shorter than the scrape interval). Only
# the OSD's own log has it, hence the Loki query in the description.
# Jul 26 and Aug 2 hit osd.0+1+2 together, which is load-driven;
# Aug 23 hit osd.1 alone in one burst. If osd.1 alone repeats,
# suspect that drive rather than the restore load.
expr: ceph_health_detail{name!~"AUTH_INSECURE_.+"} == 1
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph has been HEALTH_WARN for 6h"
description: "The Ceph cluster has held HEALTH_WARN for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Get the detail with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
summary: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} active for 6h"
description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527). BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT is sticky for 24h after the last stall and clears itself: check whether the stall fell inside the Sunday 08:00-14:00Z Velero restore-test window (08:00 start, 6h activeDeadlineSeconds cap), which is expected on these QLC drives — one outside that window, or a repeat on the same OSD, means check that drive (#557). No metric names the OSD — get it from Loki, which also works after the check clears: `{namespace=\"rook-ceph\",pod=~\"rook-ceph-osd-.*\"} |= \"slow operation observed\"`. While still active, `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail` adds the op detail."
- alert: CephPoolLostRedundancy
# Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.
#
# There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
# replication factor. The >1e6 floor drops pools too small to measure
# meaningfully, empty ones included.
#
# No pool is exempt.
expr: |
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5 and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6
for: 30m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Ceph pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} is running unreplicated"
description: "Pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning a single OSD loss destroys data. No pool is meant to be unreplicated — an unreplicated pool also blocks ALL OSD maintenance cluster-wide, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- alert: CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: mariadb-backup
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus selects on this label.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: mariadb-backup.rules
rules:
- alert: WordpressMariadbBackupStale
# The nightly 02:45 logical dump (kubernetes/apps/wordpress/mariadb.yaml)
# is the only transaction-consistent copy of www.renner.uno's database
# — Velero snapshots the PVC, which for a running DB is not a restore
# point you would trust.
#
# KubeJobFailed already covers a failed Job, but only while the Job
# object survives. On #550 it cleared when the failed Job was
# garbage-collected, not when a backup succeeded — so a failure that
# is GC'd before anyone looks leaves no signal at all.
# lastSuccessfulTime lives on the CronJob and outlives Job GC.
#
# 26h = one missed cycle plus 2h slack, matching NetbirdVpsBackupStale.
# It counts any Job owned by the CronJob, so a manual
# `kubectl create job --from=cronjob/...` re-run clears it too.
expr: |
time() - kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"} > 26 * 3600
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "WordPress MariaDB backup has not succeeded in 26h+"
description: "The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob's last successful run is over 26 hours old. Check the newest Job's pod logs in the wordpress namespace: `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs`. The 2026-08-19 failure was `The specified bucket does not exist.` against renner-uno-k8s-mariadb while the endpoint itself probed healthy, so a green HetznerBackupEndpointDown does not clear this."
- alert: WordpressMariadbBackupNeverRan
# The staleness expression above goes blind when the metric is
# absent, which is what happens once the operator recreates the
# CronJob. Without this guard "never backed up" is quieter than
# "backed up late".
expr: |
kube_cronjob_created{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"}
unless
kube_cronjob_status_last_successful_time{namespace="wordpress", cronjob="wordpress-mariadb-backup"}
for: 6h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "WordPress MariaDB backup has no recorded successful run"
description: "The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob exists but has no lastSuccessfulTime: either it has not completed once since the Backup CR was recreated, or every run since has failed. Check `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs` and that the hetzner-s3-creds ExternalSecret is synced."
+12
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 4.1 GB/day that is largely padding.
#
# Verified on gf-pg first (the staged rollout): 211 -> 41 MB/hour, an 81%
# cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in step.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if both instances
# are lost. The documents themselves live on the media PVC, not in
# Postgres -- this database holds their metadata.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# See ak-pg cluster.yaml for the rationale on synchronous replication.
synchronous:
method: any
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: redis
image: redis:8.10.0-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:redis-paperless"}
image: redis:8.10.1-alpine # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:redis-paperless"}
args:
- redis-server
- --save
+14
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,20 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day that is largely padding.
#
# Verified on gf-pg first (the staged rollout): 211 -> 41 MB/hour, an 81%
# cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in step.
# Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume was
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Write-reduction tuning. These databases are largely idle, and the
# Postgres defaults favour throughput over storage that wears out.
#
+33 -6
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ spec:
# Image automation, range 3.x (see image-automation/woodpecker.yaml).
# MUST stay version-matched with woodpecker-server (gRPC parity) — both
# track the same range/filter so they bump together on each release.
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.17.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.18.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
env:
- name: WOODPECKER_SERVER
value: woodpecker.woodpecker.svc.cluster.local:9000 # in-cluster gRPC, replaces LXC :9000
@@ -50,12 +50,39 @@ spec:
# clone + subsequent steps share the workspace PVC and the k8s backend
# can schedule them on different nodes -> an RWO volume then fails to
# mount on the second node. CephFS (RWX) lets the workspace follow
# the pipeline across nodes. The -ephemeral variant (reclaim Delete,
# rook-ceph-cluster/storageclass.yaml) is REQUIRED here: workspaces
# are throwaway, and the Retain class leaked one Released PV per
# finished pipeline (issue #262 follow-up).
# the pipeline across nodes. Reclaim MUST be Delete: workspaces are
# throwaway, and a Retain class leaked one Released PV per finished
# pipeline (issue #262 follow-up).
#
# ceph-filesystem-ci, not ceph-filesystem-ephemeral: a dedicated
# CephFS whose pools are BOTH size 1 (infrastructure/
# rook-ceph-cluster/cephfs-ci.yaml). The shared filesystem
# replicates data0 2x and metadata 3x, which is the correct trade
# for real data and pure waste for a git clone that is deleted
# minutes later.
#
# Measured 2026-08-21, polling both pools every 15s (a 5-minute
# interval misses an entire pipeline -- PVC created, used and
# deleted inside ~2 minutes):
# CI active 1.5min: data0 143.2 MB, metadata 17.2 MB
# CI idle 16.0min: data0 0.0 MB, metadata 11.0 MB
# data0 write volume is 100% CI. Per pipeline this moves the drive
# cost from 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB to ~80 MB.
#
# ceph-filesystem-ephemeral is NOT repointed, and the reason is a
# technical constraint rather than a safety one. Its other consumer
# is velero/restore-test.sh, whose probe PVCs are snapshot CLONES:
# `ceph fs subvolume snapshot clone` operates within one filesystem,
# so a snapshot taken in `cephfs` cannot be cloned into `cephfs-ci`.
#
# Those probes are just as throwaway as a CI workspace -- the
# authoritative copy is the backup on Hetzner, and a lost probe just
# means re-running the test -- so they are equally undeserving of
# replication. Landing them unreplicated would mean a second size-1
# data pool inside `cephfs`, and restore-test runs WEEKLY against
# CI's ~96 pipelines/day, so it is not worth the complexity.
- name: WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_CLASS
value: ceph-filesystem-ephemeral
value: ceph-filesystem-ci
- name: WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_RWX
value: "true"
# MUST be a JSON object literal — the backend json.Unmarshal's this
+14
View File
@@ -80,6 +80,20 @@ spec:
# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
wal_compression: "zstd"
# A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file, and archive_timeout forces a switch
# on a timer -- the segment is then written and archived at its full size
# no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, i.e. up
# to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day that is largely padding.
#
# Verified on gf-pg first (the staged rollout): 211 -> 41 MB/hour, an 81%
# cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in step.
# Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume was
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ spec:
# minor + patch auto-update within 3.x; only the 4.0 major is held for
# a reviewed bump. Safe now the DB is postgres (the old sqlite-surprise
# -bump hazard is gone). Stays in lockstep with the agent.
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.17.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.18.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
env:
- name: WOODPECKER_HOST
value: https://ci.renner.uno
@@ -51,7 +51,15 @@ spec:
startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 1
# 4 (not the sibling rotators' 1-2) because this is the only DAILY
# rotator — every other CronJob here is quarterly, so it takes ~90x as
# many runs and is correspondingly more exposed to per-run transients.
# backoffLimit: 1 gave two attempts ~11 s apart, and on 2026-08-19 a
# sub-minute resolver transient took both out (Job
# claude-oauth-secret-sync-29785100, BackoffLimitExceeded), costing a
# day's sync. 4 spreads the attempts over ~150 s (10/20/40/80 s backoff),
# still well inside activeDeadlineSeconds.
backoffLimit: 4
activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
template:
@@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ spec:
modules:
- name: pg_autoscaler
enabled: true
# Rotates daemon keys to aes256k for CVE-2025-30156 (#527). Opt-in; disabled
# by default. Increment keyGeneration to rotate again.
#
# Daemon keys only — aes256k over the CSI mount path needs kernel 7.0+ and
# these nodes run 6.18, so CSI stays on aes and the client-key checks stay
# raised. keyType is unset so Rook picks it.
security:
cephx:
daemon:
keyRotationPolicy: KeyGeneration
keyGeneration: 2
# Bump CephFS subvolume cloner pool from 4 → 16. Velero CSI Snapshot
# Data Movement provisions a backupPVC per source PVC by cloning the
# VolumeSnapshot, and a 4-thread default stalls migrate-immich's
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
---
# A SEPARATE CephFS whose only purpose is Woodpecker CI workspaces. Each
# pipeline gets a PVC that is created, filled and deleted within ~2 minutes;
# keeping that churn off `cephfs` spares its size-3 metadataPool.
#
# size 2, not 1: an unreplicated pool makes `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuse for
# every OSD, blocking all OSD maintenance cluster-wide. size 1 is viable only
# once these pools have OSDs of their own.
apiVersion: ceph.rook.io/v1
kind: CephFilesystem
metadata:
name: cephfs-ci
namespace: rook-ceph
spec:
metadataPool:
replicated:
size: 2
dataPools:
- name: data0
replicated:
size: 2
metadataServer:
activeCount: 1
# No standby-replay, unlike `cephfs`. A standby exists there so a failed
# MDS does not hang every CephFS mount cluster-wide; here the only casualty
# is a running pipeline, and a second daemon to protect throwaway work is
# not worth its memory.
activeStandby: false
resources:
# Deliberately NOT the 4Gi that `cephfs` needs. That figure is driven by
# immich's millions of cached inodes; a CI workspace is a few thousand
# short-lived files that vanish with the pipeline.
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
---
# CI-only class. `ceph-filesystem-ephemeral` is deliberately left pointing at
# the main filesystem: velero/restore-test.sh uses it to restore REAL data for
# verification, which must not land on unreplicated pools.
#
# A new class rather than repointing the old one — StorageClass.parameters are
# immutable, so `fsName` cannot be edited in place.
apiVersion: storage.k8s.io/v1
kind: StorageClass
metadata:
name: ceph-filesystem-ci
provisioner: rook-ceph.cephfs.csi.ceph.com
parameters:
clusterID: rook-ceph
fsName: cephfs-ci
pool: cephfs-ci-data0
csi.storage.k8s.io/provisioner-secret-name: rook-csi-cephfs-provisioner
csi.storage.k8s.io/provisioner-secret-namespace: rook-ceph
csi.storage.k8s.io/controller-expand-secret-name: rook-csi-cephfs-provisioner
csi.storage.k8s.io/controller-expand-secret-namespace: rook-ceph
csi.storage.k8s.io/node-stage-secret-name: rook-csi-cephfs-node
csi.storage.k8s.io/node-stage-secret-namespace: rook-ceph
# Delete, for the same reason ceph-filesystem-ephemeral uses it: with Retain,
# every finished pipeline leaks a Released PV pinning a subvolume (191 of them
# by 2026-07-16, issue #262 follow-up).
reclaimPolicy: Delete
allowVolumeExpansion: true
@@ -4,5 +4,6 @@ resources:
- cephcluster.yaml
- toolbox.yaml
- storageclass.yaml
- cephfs-ci.yaml
- volumesnapshotclass.yaml
- objectstore.yaml