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issue-fix-bot 1ab901d746 fix: [alert] KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck (ai) (#750)
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2026-09-02 10:44:39 +00:00
15 changed files with 15 additions and 618 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
#
# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
#
# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733
-4
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@@ -26,7 +26,3 @@
- docker-install
- netbird-proxy
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
# Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
# enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
# nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
- crowdsec-edge-bouncer
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
---
# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
#
# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
# cluster.
#
# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
#
# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
# STARTS INERT, and that is the point.
#
# dry-run pulls decisions and logs what it would block without creating a
# single nftables rule. The first bouncer to arm anywhere enforces ~24k CAPI
# decisions at once on the only external entry path, so the false-positive
# window has to come before the enforcement, not after it. Flip to `nftables`
# one host at a time once the log looks right.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: dry-run
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
# retry_initial_connect matters.
- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
state: restarted
daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
---
# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
#
# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
# package downloads.
- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
ansible.builtin.package:
name: nftables
state: present
- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
ansible.builtin.file:
path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
state: directory
mode: "0755"
- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release
ansible.builtin.get_url:
url: >-
https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
mode: "0644"
# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.unarchive:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
dest: /opt
remote_src: true
include:
- crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
- name: Install the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
remote_src: true
mode: "0755"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
mode: "0600"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Enable and start the bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
enabled: true
state: started
daemon_reload: true
- name: Report how to read it
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
What it would block: journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
What it does block: nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
Metrics: curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
#
# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
# that has to resolve before the first connect.
[Unit]
Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=notify
# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
LimitNOFILE=65536
KillMode=mixed
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
# hosts without journald.
log_mode: stdout
log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
# absent from the shipped example config.
retry_initial_connect: true
disable_ipv4: false
disable_ipv6: false
deny_action: DROP
supported_decisions_types:
- ban
# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
# at the default filter priority.
nftables:
ipv4:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec
chain: crowdsec-chain
priority: -10
ipv6:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec6
chain: crowdsec6-chain
priority: -10
# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
nftables_hooks:
- input
- forward
prometheus:
enabled: true
listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
spec:
replicas: 1
# The startupProbe below sanctions a 40 min cold download, but the default
# progressDeadlineSeconds is 600. Left implicit the Deployment declares
# ProgressDeadlineExceeded at 10 minutes while the probe is still legitimately
# waiting, and KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck fires 15 min after that on a rollout
# that is fine. Kept above the startup budget, with room for the image pull
# and scheduling that happen before the first probe.
progressDeadlineSeconds: 3000
# A rolling update would load a second copy of the weights onto the same
# iGPU and into the same node's RAM before releasing the first.
strategy:
+5
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
spec:
replicas: 1
# Same reasoning as llama-server: the startupProbe budget (600s) must stay
# below progressDeadlineSeconds, whose default is also 600 — exactly equal, so
# any cold download that uses most of its budget trips
# KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck on a rollout that is still progressing normally.
progressDeadlineSeconds: 900
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
#
# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
#
# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
@@ -36,36 +36,6 @@ spec:
values:
container_runtime: containerd
# Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
#
# This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
# allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
# without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
# so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
# is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
# deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
# thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
#
# Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
# here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
# resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
#
# The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
# clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
# proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
# the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
# Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
config:
capi_whitelists.yaml: |
cidrs:
# The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
# netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
# keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
# proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
- 45.157.177.26/32
- 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
- 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
# mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
# the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
# wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -116,18 +86,10 @@ spec:
requests:
cpu: 50m
podAnnotations:
# Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
# consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
# start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
# the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
# the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
#
# crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
# Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
# env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
# kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
# crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
# ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
# here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
persistentVolume:
data:
# Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -156,17 +118,6 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
key: key
# The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
# endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
# `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
# names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
# registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
# is the source of truth, not the database.
- name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
key: key
agent:
# Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a
@@ -2,6 +2,4 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
- edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
- lapi-ingress.yaml
- helmrelease.yaml
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
#
# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
#
# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
#
# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
# kind of request every round:
#
# 172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
# 172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
#
# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
#
# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
---
# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
# what the Service resolves to.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: ServersTransport
metadata:
name: crowdsec-lapi
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
rootCAsSecrets:
- crowdsec-root-secret
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: crowdsec-lapi
namespace: crowdsec
labels:
# Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
# external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
# NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
# not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: crowdsec.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: crowdsec-service
port:
number: 8080
tls:
- secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
hosts:
- crowdsec.renner.uno
-207
View File
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# End-to-end evaluation of Paperless document suggestions against the real
# archive, comparing the two engines Paperless ships:
#
# /api/documents/<id>/suggestions/ the built-in scikit-learn classifier,
# trained on the existing corpus
# /api/documents/<id>/ai_suggestions/ the LLM path, optionally with RAG
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS
#
# scripts/embed-eval-real.sh measures whether a document's nearest neighbours
# carry its labels. That is a proxy: Paperless does not act on the neighbours
# directly, it hands them to an LLM as context, alongside the document text and
# a candidate list of existing tags and correspondents. The LLM can override
# poor context, or fail with good context. So a better embedding score does not
# automatically mean better suggestions, and nothing so far has verified that it
# does.
#
# This measures the thing that is actually wanted: does Paperless suggest the
# labels a human already chose? Everything else — MTEB scores, retrieval
# accuracy — is only interesting insofar as it predicts this number.
#
# It also answers a question that predates the LLM work: with ten years of
# hand-curated labels, the built-in classifier has excellent training data. It
# cannot invent a new tag or a title, which is the LLM's advantage — but for
# assigning labels that already exist it may simply be better. Running both on
# the same documents settles that rather than assuming it.
#
# Ground truth is the current filing. Where the two disagree with it, that is
# not automatically an error: over ten years filing conventions change, and an
# old document may carry an older convention. Treat the absolute numbers as
# indicative and the comparison between engines as the result.
#
# Requires a Paperless API token in PAPERLESS_TOKEN. The API is only reachable
# from inside the cluster (the namespace policy admits the Authentik gate
# outpost alone), so requests are issued from within the paperless pod.
#
# Usage:
# PAPERLESS_TOKEN=... scripts/paperless-eval.sh [-n 100] [--engine both|classic|ai]
set -uo pipefail
SAMPLE="${PAPERLESS_EVAL_SAMPLE:-100}"
ENGINE=both
PG_POD="${PAPERLESS_EVAL_PG_POD:-pprl-pg-2}"
APP_POD="${PAPERLESS_EVAL_APP_POD:-deploy/paperless}"
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
-n|--sample) SAMPLE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--engine) ENGINE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-h|--help) sed -n '2,40p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "unknown argument: $1 (try --help)" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
if [ -z "${PAPERLESS_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
echo "PAPERLESS_TOKEN is not set." >&2
echo "Create one for an existing user, then remove it when finished." >&2
exit 2
fi
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
# Deterministic sample, so repeated runs and different engines see the same
# documents. Only documents that carry both labels are useful as ground truth.
echo "reading $SAMPLE labelled documents from postgres ($PG_POD)..."
# Names come along with the ids because the AI engine reports an unresolved
# guess as a name string rather than an id; see the lenient scoring below.
# Tab-separated rather than '|', which occurs in correspondent names.
kubectl -n paperless exec "$PG_POD" -- psql -U postgres -d paperless -tA -F$'\t' -c \
"select d.id, d.correspondent_id, d.document_type_id, c.name, t.name
from documents_document d
join documents_correspondent c on c.id = d.correspondent_id
join documents_documenttype t on t.id = d.document_type_id
where d.correspondent_id is not null
and d.document_type_id is not null
and length(d.content) > 400
order by md5(d.id::text)
limit $SAMPLE;" > "$WORK/docs.txt" 2>"$WORK/pg-err.txt"
if ! [ -s "$WORK/docs.txt" ]; then
echo "no documents returned from postgres." >&2
[ -s "$WORK/pg-err.txt" ] && cat "$WORK/pg-err.txt" >&2
exit 2
fi
N=$(grep -c . "$WORK/docs.txt")
# The floor: always guessing the most frequent label. Without it a number like
# "70% correct" cannot be read, because a skewed archive gives that away for
# free — one correspondent holds several hundred of ~3900 documents.
kubectl -n paperless exec "$PG_POD" -- psql -U postgres -d paperless -tAc \
"select max(c) from (select count(*) c from documents_document
where correspondent_id is not null group by correspondent_id) x;" \
> "$WORK/corr_max.txt" 2>"$WORK/pg-err.txt"
kubectl -n paperless exec "$PG_POD" -- psql -U postgres -d paperless -tAc \
"select count(*) from documents_document where correspondent_id is not null;" \
> "$WORK/corr_total.txt" 2>"$WORK/pg-err.txt"
api() { # path -> body on stdout
kubectl -n paperless exec "$APP_POD" -c paperless -- \
curl -sS -m 300 -H "Authorization: Token $PAPERLESS_TOKEN" \
"http://127.0.0.1:8000$1" 2>"$WORK/err.txt"
}
# A hit under two definitions, because the AI engine can be right in a way the
# API response does not record as a suggestion:
#
# strict the true label's id appears in `.correspondents` /
# `.document_types`. This is what the UI actually offers, so it is
# the number that describes the feature as experienced.
#
# lenient strict, OR the true label's name is contained wordwise in one of
# `.suggested_correspondents` / `.suggested_document_types`.
#
# The gap between them is one specific failure: the LLM names the right entity
# but paperless_ai.matching cannot resolve the name to the existing object,
# because difflib.get_close_matches runs at MATCH_THRESHOLD = 0.8 and a correct
# but more verbose answer falls below it — observed with "Generali Deutschland
# Krankenversicherung AG" against the existing "Generali AG", which yielded an
# empty `correspondents` list.
#
# Reporting only the strict number would blame the model for a matcher problem;
# reporting only the lenient one would claim a usefulness the UI does not
# deliver. The classic engine emits no `suggested_*` fields at all, so both
# numbers coincide for it and the comparison stays fair in either column.
LENIENT_JQ='
def norm: ascii_downcase | gsub("[^\\p{L}\\p{N}]+"; " ") | split(" ") | map(select(length > 0));
def contains_all($want): . as $have | $want | all(. as $t | $have | index([$t]) != null);
($want_name | norm) as $w
| ((.[$id_field] // []) | index($want_id) != null)
or ([(.[$name_field] // [])[] | norm] | any(contains_all($w)))
'
# score <engine> <url-suffix>
score() {
local engine="$1" suffix="$2"
local n=0 corr_hit=0 type_hit=0 corr_len=0 type_len=0 fails=0 start elapsed
echo ""
echo "=== $engine"
start=$(date +%s)
while IFS=$'\t' read -r id want_corr want_type want_corr_name want_type_name; do
[ -n "$id" ] || continue
n=$((n + 1))
body=$(api "/api/documents/$id/$suffix")
if ! printf '%s' "$body" | jq -e . >/dev/null 2>&1; then
fails=$((fails + 1))
[ "$fails" -le 3 ] && printf ' %s: keine gueltige Antwort: %s\n' \
"$id" "$(printf '%s' "$body" | tr '\n' ' ' | head -c 120)" >&2
continue
fi
if printf '%s' "$body" | jq -e --argjson w "$want_corr" \
'.correspondents // [] | index($w) != null' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
corr_hit=$((corr_hit + 1))
fi
if printf '%s' "$body" | jq -e --argjson w "$want_type" \
'.document_types // [] | index($w) != null' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
type_hit=$((type_hit + 1))
fi
if printf '%s' "$body" | jq -e \
--argjson want_id "$want_corr" --arg want_name "$want_corr_name" \
--arg id_field correspondents --arg name_field suggested_correspondents \
"$LENIENT_JQ" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
corr_len=$((corr_len + 1))
fi
if printf '%s' "$body" | jq -e \
--argjson want_id "$want_type" --arg want_name "$want_type_name" \
--arg id_field document_types --arg name_field suggested_document_types \
"$LENIENT_JQ" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
type_len=$((type_len + 1))
fi
[ $((n % 25)) -eq 0 ] && echo " $n/$N"
done < "$WORK/docs.txt"
elapsed=$(( $(date +%s) - start ))
pct() { awk -v a="$1" -v b="$2" 'BEGIN{if (b>0) printf "%.1f", 100*a/b; else print "0.0"}'; }
printf ' correspondent, offered : %5s%% recognised: %5s%%\n' \
"$(pct "$corr_hit" "$n")" "$(pct "$corr_len" "$n")"
printf ' document type, offered : %5s%% recognised: %5s%%\n' \
"$(pct "$type_hit" "$n")" "$(pct "$type_len" "$n")"
printf ' no usable answer : %s of %s\n' "$fails" "$n"
printf ' %ss total, %.1fs per document\n' "$elapsed" "$(awk -v e="$elapsed" -v n="$n" 'BEGIN{print e/n}')"
printf '%-9s %7s %7s %7s %7s %6s %8ss\n' "$engine" \
"$(pct "$corr_hit" "$n")" "$(pct "$corr_len" "$n")" \
"$(pct "$type_hit" "$n")" "$(pct "$type_len" "$n")" \
"$fails" "$elapsed" >> "$WORK/summary.txt"
}
: > "$WORK/summary.txt"
FLOOR=$(awk -v m="$(cat "$WORK/corr_max.txt")" -v t="$(cat "$WORK/corr_total.txt")" \
'BEGIN{if (t>0) printf "%.1f", 100*m/t; else print "?"}')
echo "documents: $N most-frequent-correspondent floor: ${FLOOR}%"
case "$ENGINE" in
both) score classic suggestions/; score ai ai_suggestions/ ;;
classic) score classic suggestions/ ;;
ai) score ai ai_suggestions/ ;;
*) echo "unknown engine: $ENGINE" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
echo ""
echo "================================================================"
printf '%-9s %7s %7s %7s %7s %6s %9s\n' \
ENGINE CORR CORR+ TYPE TYPE+ FAILS TIME
cat "$WORK/summary.txt"
printf '%-9s %7s\n' "floor" "$FLOOR"
echo "================================================================"
echo "CORR/TYPE = true label offered as a resolved id (what the UI shows)"
echo "CORR+/TYPE+ = also counting names the LLM got right but matching dropped"