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11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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29c91769a7 | ||
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2c47c68a8b | ||
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ceff817d88 | ||
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ea1032e184 | ||
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2856deb4f4 | ||
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4d13acc9dd | ||
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1d21196060 | ||
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7e8077714e | ||
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8e9eedfd16 | ||
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c7fd3e208a | ||
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5d52e42887 |
@@ -32,8 +32,13 @@ netbird_watchdog_fail_threshold: 3
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# Minimum seconds between watchdog-issued restarts, so a genuinely broken
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# backend can't put the proxy into a restart loop. Shared by both the URL-probe
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# watchdog and the flood watchdog below.
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netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 600
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# watchdog and the flood watchdog below. One minute: the route-manager wedge
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# recurs on every routing-peer loss, and rolling node reboots lose one peer
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# every few minutes; a suppressed restart there leaves the wedge standing
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# until the URL probe's three rounds fire (3.5 min of 000 on every domain,
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# measured 2026-09-07). A minute still caps a loop at one restart per
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# probe interval.
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netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 60
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# Log fingerprint of the reverse-proxy route-manager wedge, matched as a plain
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# substring in the proxy's docker logs by the flood watchdog. On this build the
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@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
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service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
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subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
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Traefik untouched, the proxy terminates nothing, and no domain resource is
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involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers.
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involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers. The target sends a
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PROXY protocol v2 header so Traefik (and CrowdSec behind its access log) sees
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the WAN client address instead of the routing peer's pod IP.
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Ownership is derived from NetBird itself, not from local state: a service is
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managed iff its mode is "tls" and its target is this controller's subnet
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@@ -194,9 +196,12 @@ def ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group):
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def service_body(host, resource, target_ip):
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# proxy_protocol: PROXY v2 header carries the WAN client address to
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# Traefik (proxyProtocol.trustedIPs on websecure); TCP/TLS modes only.
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return {"name": host, "domain": host, "mode": "tls", "listen_port": LISTEN_PORT, "enabled": True,
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"targets": [{"target_type": "subnet", "target_id": resource, "protocol": "tcp",
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"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True}]}
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"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True,
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"options": {"proxy_protocol": True}}]}
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def is_managed(svc, resource):
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@@ -208,7 +213,8 @@ def target_matches(svc, target_ip):
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return False
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ts = svc.get("targets") or []
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return len(ts) == 1 and ts[0].get("host") == target_ip and ts[0].get("port") == 443 \
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and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled")
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and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled") \
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and (ts[0].get("options") or {}).get("proxy_protocol") is True
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def reconcile():
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@@ -31,22 +31,12 @@
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# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
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# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
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# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
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---
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#
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# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
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# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
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# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
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# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
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# what the Service resolves to.
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apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
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kind: ServersTransport
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metadata:
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name: crowdsec-lapi
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namespace: crowdsec
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spec:
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serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
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rootCAs:
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- secret: crowdsec-root-secret
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---
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# backend; the ServersTransport carrying it is a traefik.io CRD consumer and
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# lives in post-crds/crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml.
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: Ingress
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metadata:
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@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ resources:
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- cloudnative-pg/
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- mariadb-operator/
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- netbird-ingress/
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- netbird-proxy-services/
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- coredns-config/
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- k8s-gateway/
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- external-dns-unifi/
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@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
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# Reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses that carry
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# dns.renner.uno/public: one TLS-passthrough service per host on :443,
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# targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a subnet resource over the service
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# CIDR (ci/images/netbird-proxy-services/controller.py).
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#
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# openbao namespace, like the rotators: its default-deny already allows egress
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# to OpenBao, DNS, the apiserver and `world` (netbird.renner.uno), and the
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# NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
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# netbird-proxy-services role — policies/netbird-proxy-services.hcl, applied
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# once by hand like the rotator roles. Until that role exists the pod logs an
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# auth error each minute and does nothing.
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: ServiceAccount
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metadata:
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name: netbird-proxy-services
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namespace: openbao
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
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---
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# Read-only, cluster-wide: public Ingresses live in many namespaces, the
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# Traefik Service in ingress/.
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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
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kind: ClusterRole
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metadata:
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name: netbird-proxy-services-read
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rules:
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- apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
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resources: ["ingresses"]
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verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
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- apiGroups: [""]
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resources: ["services"]
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verbs: ["get"]
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---
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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
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kind: ClusterRoleBinding
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metadata:
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name: netbird-proxy-services-read
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roleRef:
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apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
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kind: ClusterRole
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name: netbird-proxy-services-read
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subjects:
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- kind: ServiceAccount
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name: netbird-proxy-services
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namespace: openbao
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---
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apiVersion: apps/v1
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kind: Deployment
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metadata:
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name: netbird-proxy-services
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namespace: openbao
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
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spec:
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replicas: 1
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# One writer against the management API at a time.
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strategy:
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type: Recreate
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selector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
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template:
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metadata:
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
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spec:
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serviceAccountName: netbird-proxy-services
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securityContext:
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runAsNonRoot: true
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# Numeric, or the kubelet refuses the image's named user with
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# "cannot verify user is non-root". The script needs no home and no
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# writable path, so nobody/nogroup is enough.
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runAsUser: 65534
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runAsGroup: 65534
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seccompProfile:
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type: RuntimeDefault
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containers:
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- name: controller
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# Pinned by digest: the date tag is rebuilt on every push of the
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# image directory, so the tag alone cannot express a new build.
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image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:2026-09-07@sha256:0d266b0288aec692c698ff5c05f76c826e247bfef365e0306a0b9a6541ebf180
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securityContext:
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
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capabilities:
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drop: ["ALL"]
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env:
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- name: NB_MANAGEMENT_URL
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value: https://netbird.renner.uno
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- name: BAO_ADDR
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value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
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- name: BAO_ROLE
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value: netbird-proxy-services
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# Must match cluster.network.serviceSubnets in talos/patches/cluster.yaml.
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- name: SERVICE_CIDR
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value: "10.96.0.0/12"
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- name: TRAEFIK_SERVICE
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value: ingress/traefik
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- name: INTERVAL_SECONDS
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value: "60"
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 10m
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memory: 32Mi
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limits:
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memory: 64Mi
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
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kind: Kustomization
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resources:
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- deployment.yaml
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@@ -31,7 +31,5 @@ resources:
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- traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml
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- traefik-rate-limit-middleware.yaml
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- traefik-security-headers-middleware.yaml
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# Phase 1 of a two-Kustomization move: also still in crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml
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# until this layer has applied it once, so prune never runs ahead of apply.
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- crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml
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- ../network-policies/
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@@ -93,13 +93,17 @@ spec:
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# Real client-IP visibility. The netbird-ingress routing peer
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# re-originates every mesh + WAN-via-proxy connection from its own
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# pod IP (rootless userspace WireGuard), so Traefik's TCP peer for
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# that traffic is always a pod IP (e.g. fd10:244::2de1) — collapsing
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# all external clients to one source. The NetBird reverse-proxy
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# (HTTP mode, on the VPS) sets X-Forwarded-For with the real WAN
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# client IP; trust the pod CIDRs so Traefik reads it instead. Without
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# this, a CrowdSec bouncer bans the shared pod IP and 403s everyone
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# (the 2026-06-27 IPv6 outage). Harmless no-op when no XFF is present
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# (direct LAN/mesh) — those keep their RemoteAddr.
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# that traffic is always a pod IP — collapsing all external clients
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# to one source. The NetBird reverse-proxy services are TLS
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# passthrough and carry the WAN client address in a PROXY protocol
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# v2 header (options.proxy_protocol, set by netbird-proxy-services);
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# X-Forwarded-For stays trusted for HTTP-mode services. Both are
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# accepted from the pod CIDRs only; connections without a header
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# (direct LAN/mesh) keep their RemoteAddr.
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proxyProtocol:
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trustedIPs:
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- "10.244.0.0/16"
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- "fd10:244::/56"
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forwardedHeaders:
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trustedIPs:
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- "10.244.0.0/16"
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user