fix(paperless-eval): open the other half of the embedding path

The egress grant to llama-embed was there; the matching ingress in
ai-ns.yaml was not, so Cilium would have dropped every embedding call —
the one dependency an eval has outside its own pod. The same pairing was
done correctly for home-assistant in #759 and simply missed here.

Scoped to the namespace rather than an app label, unlike the grants
around it. That namespace exists only to run evaluations, and its
workload is jobs created per measurement whose labels vary with what is
being measured; a label match would present later as an embedding call
silently dropped.

Also from the review:

secret.reloader annotation alongside the configmap one, matching
production. The secret refreshes on the same 10m cycle, and without the
annotation a rotated key would sit unused until something else restarted
the pod.

The retention argument in cluster.yaml was too thin, and checking it made
it worse before it made it better: the plugin runs retention from the
instance sidecar on a timer
(instanceSidecarConfiguration.retentionPolicyIntervalSeconds, default
1800), not as part of a backup — so "this cluster never backs up" would
not have covered it.

What does cover it is a second property: retention runs
barman-cloud-backup-delete, which takes a server name and operates inside
<destinationPath>/<serverName>. The production store's status keys its
recovery window by "pprl-pg", confirming that layout; this cluster is
pprleval-pg, so even an accidental retention policy would address an
empty prefix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -7,7 +7,21 @@ when:
       # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
       # so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
       - "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
+      # install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
+      - "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
       - "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
+      # The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
+      # Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
+      # and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
+      # LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
+      # while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
+      #
+      # pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
+      # file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
+      # any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
+      # group membership needs a manual deployment run.
+      - "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
+      - "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
       - ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
   - event: deployment
     evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'

ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/vault.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
+#
+# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
+# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
+# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
+# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
+# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
+#
+# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
+# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
+# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
+# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
+# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
+# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
+vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
+          $ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
+          32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
+          3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
+          36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
+          6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
+          39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
+          6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733

ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml

@@ -26,3 +26,7 @@
     - docker-install
     - netbird-proxy
     - netbird-proxy-watchdog
+    # Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
+    # enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
+    # nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
+    - crowdsec-edge-bouncer

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/defaults/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
+#
+# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
+# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
+# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
+# cluster.
+#
+# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
+# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
+# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
+# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
+
+# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
+# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
+crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
+crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
+
+# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
+# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
+# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
+# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
+# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
+#
+# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
+# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
+# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
+crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
+
+# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
+# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
+# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
+#
+# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
+# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
+# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
+# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
+#
+# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
+# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
+# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
+# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
+# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
+# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
+# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
+crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
+
+crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
+crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
+
+# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
+# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
+# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
+crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/handlers/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
+# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
+# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
+# retry_initial_connect matters.
+- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/tasks/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
+#
+# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
+# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
+# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
+# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
+# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
+# package downloads.
+
+- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: nftables
+    state: present
+
+- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
+    state: directory
+    mode: "0755"
+
+# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
+#
+# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
+# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
+# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
+# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
+# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
+# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
+# it manipulates host netfilter.
+#
+# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
+# there, before anything is copied to a host.
+- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
+  ansible.builtin.get_url:
+    url: >-
+      https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
+      crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
+    dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
+    mode: "0644"
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  run_once: true
+
+# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
+# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
+# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
+# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
+# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
+# host.
+- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    mode: "0644"
+
+# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
+# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
+# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
+- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
+    dest: /opt
+    remote_src: true
+    include:
+      - crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+
+- name: Install the bouncer binary
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    remote_src: true
+    mode: "0755"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
+- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
+    dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+    mode: "0600"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
+    dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    mode: "0644"
+  notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
+
+- name: Enable and start the bouncer
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+    daemon_reload: true
+
+- name: Report how to read it
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: |
+      crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
+
+      What it would block:  journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
+      What it does block:   nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
+      Metrics:              curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
+
+      Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
+      both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
+      removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+#
+# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
+# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
+# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
+# that has to resolve before the first connect.
+[Unit]
+Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
+After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
+# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
+ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=10
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+KillMode=mixed
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/templates/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
+mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
+update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
+
+# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
+# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
+# hosts without journald.
+log_mode: stdout
+log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
+
+api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
+api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
+
+# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
+# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
+# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
+# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
+# absent from the shipped example config.
+retry_initial_connect: true
+
+disable_ipv4: false
+disable_ipv6: false
+deny_action: DROP
+
+supported_decisions_types:
+  - ban
+
+# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
+# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
+# at the default filter priority.
+nftables:
+  ipv4:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec
+    chain: crowdsec-chain
+    priority: -10
+  ipv6:
+    enabled: true
+    set-only: false
+    table: crowdsec6
+    chain: crowdsec6-chain
+    priority: -10
+
+# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
+# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
+# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
+nftables_hooks:
+  - input
+  - forward
+
+prometheus:
+  enabled: true
+  listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
+  listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}

kubernetes/RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md

@@ -2,7 +2,12 @@
 
 Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
 metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
-after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
+after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
+
+All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
+reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
+k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
+rebuild, not as outstanding work.
 
 Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
 actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were

kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml

@@ -877,6 +877,105 @@ data:
             kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
             kubernetes_json_patches: null
 
+      # llama-server WebUI gate
+      #
+      # llama-server has no authentication of its own — it serves its chat UI
+      # and a full OpenAI-compatible API to anyone who can reach the port. That
+      # is why it was LAN-only until now. This gate is what makes a public
+      # hostname defensible: the outpost terminates every request, enforces the
+      # session, and only then forwards to llama-server.
+      #
+      # Same reasoning as vscode-gate, and the same passkey step-up: what sits
+      # behind the gate is entirely unprotected, so the gate is the whole of the
+      # access control rather than a second factor on top of an app login.
+      #
+      # In-cluster consumers (Home Assistant, Paperless, CI) are unaffected:
+      # they address llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local directly and never pass
+      # through Traefik or this outpost.
+      #
+      # No group and no policy binding: any user who can authenticate gets in,
+      # as with Immich, Audiobookshelf, Home Assistant and Music Assistant. The
+      # gates that pin membership to a named user in git — vscode, esphome,
+      # zigbee2mqtt, shelly-manager, prometheus — are admin interfaces, where
+      # the allowlist is the point. A chat UI is not one of those, and deciding
+      # its membership here would put an access-control choice in a manifest
+      # instead of leaving it where the user directory belongs.
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+      - id: llama-gate-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
+        identifiers:
+          name: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          # Both flows, mirroring the Audiobookshelf provider. Setting only
+          # authorization_flow leaves authentication on Authentik's default
+          # flow, which is what made the first login clumsy — the step-up ran
+          # on top of a password prompt instead of replacing it. With the
+          # passwordless flow named explicitly, signing in is the passkey
+          # itself.
+          #
+          # Referenced by !Find rather than !KeyOf: both flows are defined in
+          # the passkey-stepup document of this ConfigMap, and !KeyOf only
+          # resolves within one document.
+          authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
+          authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          mode: proxy
+          internal_host: http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
+          internal_host_ssl_validation: false
+          external_host: https://llm.renner.uno
+          cookie_domain: renner.uno
+          access_token_validity: hours=24
+          refresh_token_validity: days=30
+          intercept_header_auth: true
+          # The WebUI ships `<link rel="manifest">` and registers a service
+          # worker. Per the W3C spec a manifest is fetched with
+          # `credentials: 'omit'`, so it carries no session cookie and the gate
+          # answers it with a 302 to auth.renner.uno — which turns every page
+          # load into a redirect round-trip. This is the failure that forced
+          # paperless-gate's own carve-out and that retired music-assistant-gate
+          # outright. Both paths serve no authenticated content, so letting them
+          # through anonymously costs nothing.
+          skip_path_regex: ^/(manifest\.webmanifest|sw\.js)$
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: Local LLM (Gate)
+          slug: llama-gate
+          provider: !KeyOf llama-gate-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://llm.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "Forward-auth gate in front of the local llama-server WebUI"
+
+      - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
+        identifiers:
+          name: llama-gate
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          type: proxy
+          service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
+          providers:
+            - !KeyOf llama-gate-provider
+          config:
+            log_level: info
+            authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
+            authentik_host_insecure: false
+            authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
+            refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
+            container_image: null
+            object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
+            kubernetes_namespace: authentik
+            kubernetes_replicas: 1
+            kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
+            kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
+            kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
+            kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
+            kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
+            kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
+            kubernetes_json_patches: null
+
       - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
         identifiers:
           name: authentik Embedded Outpost

kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ resources:
   - alertmanager-gate-egress.yaml
   - prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
   - wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
+  - llama-gate-egress.yaml
   - outpost-servicemonitors.yaml
   - ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
   - ldap-outpost-lb.yaml

kubernetes/apps/authentik/llama-gate-egress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+# Lets the llama-gate outpost reach llama-server. The cluster baseline CNP
+# (kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/authentik-ns.yaml) otherwise stops
+# any authentik-namespace pod from entering the ai namespace.
+#
+# The outpost is the trust boundary: it forwards to llama-server only after
+# validating the Authentik session, and the matching ingress rule in
+# ai-ns.yaml admits nothing else — so nothing in the cluster can route around
+# the gate to reach the unauthenticated API through the public hostname.
+#
+# Scoped to this outpost's pod label rather than the whole namespace, so the
+# other gates cannot reach llama-server either.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: llama-gate-egress
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      goauthentik.io/outpost-name: llama-gate
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md

@@ -111,9 +111,23 @@ statistics             max_id=13323904    max_start_ts=1787162400.0
 statistics_short_term  max_id=159205762   max_start_ts=1787166000.0
 ```
 
-## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
+## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
 
-Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
+Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
+
+| table | rows | span |
+|---|---|---|
+| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
+| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
+| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
+
+The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
+pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
+across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
+document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
+at Postgres.
+
+The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
 
 **Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
 HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -56,10 +56,9 @@ spec:
         # Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
         # effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
         #
-        # INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
-        # `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
-        # homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
-        # when a referenced secret is missing.
+        # Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
+        # repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
+        # without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
         - name: render-db-url
           image: busybox:1.36
           command:
@@ -96,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
               memory: 32Mi
       containers:
         - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: TZ
               value: Europe/Berlin

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/ha-pg-cluster.yaml

@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
 # That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
 # what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
 #
-# STAGING
-# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
-# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
-# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
-# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
-# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
+# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
+# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
+# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
+# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
+# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
+# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
 apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
 kind: Cluster
 metadata:

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/kustomization.yaml

@@ -60,9 +60,8 @@ resources:
   - zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
   - zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
   # Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
-  # PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
-  # on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
-  # tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
+  # Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
+  # long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
   - ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
   - ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
   - ha-pg-cluster.yaml

kubernetes/apps/immich/cluster.yaml

@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
     # Kept permanently as a standing guard.
     kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
 spec:
-  # Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
-  # pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
-  # paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
-  # vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
-  instances: 1
-  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
-  # the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
-  # down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
-  # even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
+  # A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
+  # vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
+  # long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
+  # format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
+  instances: 2
+  # See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
+  # (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
+  # terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
+  # on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
   smartShutdownTimeout: 10
   stopDelay: 60
   imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ spec:
       database: immich
       owner: immich
   postgresql:
+    # vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
+    # extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
+    # in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
     shared_preload_libraries:
-      - vectors.so
       - vchord.so
     parameters:
       shared_buffers: "512MB"

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml

@@ -75,11 +75,44 @@ spec:
             # many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
             - --threads
             - "4"
-            # 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
-            # and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
-            # layers use full attention.
+            # 16k, and going above it corrupts inference rather than failing.
+            # At 32768 per slot this server answered a 650-token classification
+            # prompt with 1025 tokens of "!" — the KV cache producing numbers
+            # rather than language. It does not crash, it does not warn, and
+            # the OpenAI response looks well-formed, so the damage only shows
+            # in what callers get back: Paperless ran past its 300 s timeout,
+            # and Home Assistant got an empty completion and a hallucinated
+            # device list.
+            #
+            # The same Vulkan/Mesa stack already fails hard at --ubatch-size
+            # 2048; this is the quiet version of that limit. Raise this only
+            # against a generation that is read, not against a server that
+            # merely starts.
+            #
             - --ctx-size
             - "16384"
+            # One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
+            #
+            # Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
+            # also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
+            # of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
+            # 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
+            # "Context size has been exceeded".
+            #
+            # They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
+            # generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
+            # shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
+            # to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
+            # here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
+            # Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
+            #
+            # No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
+            # its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
+            # would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
+            # asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
+            # kill healthy pods during a long document.
+            - --parallel
+            - "1"
             # A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
             # with ErrorDeviceLost.
             - --ubatch-size

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml

@@ -41,15 +41,53 @@ spec:
           image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
           args:
             - --hf-repo
-            - Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
+            - gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
             # Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
             - --embeddings
+            # A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
+            # advertised as the whole --hf-repo string, which would end up
+            # verbatim in Paperless's config and break on the next model swap.
+            # One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
+            # reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
+            - --alias
+            - bge-m3
+            # bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
+            # Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
+            # llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
+            # outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
+            # trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
+            # rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
+            # pooling types were needed.
+            - --pooling
+            - cls
             - --n-gpu-layers
             - "99"
             - --threads
             - "2"
+            # Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
+            # tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
+            # Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
+            # llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
+            # at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
+            # "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
+            #
+            # The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
+            # a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
+            # broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
+            # --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
+            # run them mismatched, so both are set.
+            #
+            # 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
+            # ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
+            # 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
+            # this does not need to find out.
+            - --batch-size
+            - "1536"
+            - --ubatch-size
+            - "1536"
+            # Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
             - --ctx-size
-            - "2048"
+            - "4096"
             # No browser ever talks to this Service, so the WebUI is dead weight
             # and one more unauthenticated surface.
             - --no-webui
@@ -66,6 +104,14 @@ spec:
             capabilities:
               drop:
                 - ALL
+          # Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
+          # 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
+          # well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
+          # at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
+          # weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
+          # same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
+          # candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
+          # their model size.
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 250m
@@ -73,7 +119,7 @@ spec:
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
             limits:
               cpu: "2"
-              memory: 4Gi
+              memory: 8Gi
               gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
           # ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
           # model needs, but still sized for a cold download.

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/gate-service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# ExternalName mirror so the ai-namespace Ingress can backend to the llama-gate
+# outpost that Authentik deploys into the authentik namespace (cross-namespace
+# Service references are not supported in a standard Ingress).
+#
+# Traffic path:
+#   browser → traefik (llm.renner.uno)
+#           → ak-outpost-llama-gate (ExternalName → authentik ns)
+#           → outpost validates the session + passkey step-up
+#           → http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
+#
+# In-cluster consumers skip all of this and address llama-server directly.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: ak-outpost-llama-gate
+  namespace: ai
+spec:
+  type: ExternalName
+  externalName: ak-outpost-llama-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
+  ports:
+    - port: 9000
+      targetPort: 9000

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/ingress.yaml

@@ -1,12 +1,31 @@
 ---
-# LAN-only: no `dns.renner.uno/public` label, so the Cloudflare external-dns
-# instance skips it and only the UDM instance publishes the record. The API is
-# unauthenticated, so it must not be reachable from the internet.
+# llm.renner.uno — the chat WebUI, public and behind Authentik.
+#
+# Traefik no longer reaches llama-server directly. This Ingress backends the
+# llama-gate proxy outpost (ExternalName → authentik ns), which enforces a
+# passkey step-up and forwards only after the session validates. The ai
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy is tightened so ONLY that outpost pod may reach
+# llama-server, so nothing in the cluster can route around the gate. Pattern
+# mirrors kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/vscode-ingress.yaml.
+#
+# The gate is the entire access control here: llama-server has no
+# authentication of its own and serves a full OpenAI-compatible API on the same
+# port as the UI. That is what kept this hostname LAN-only until now.
+#
+# In-cluster consumers — Home Assistant, Paperless, CI — address
+# llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080 directly and never pass through
+# Traefik or the outpost, so they need no credentials and are unaffected by the
+# gate.
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
   name: llama-server
   namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    # Public: Cloudflare wildcard → tunnel → NetBird proxy → Traefik. The UDM
+    # external-dns instance skips anything carrying this, and LAN clients reach
+    # the same hostname through the hairpin NAT.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
   annotations:
     cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,6 +42,6 @@ spec:
             pathType: Prefix
             backend:
               service:
-                name: llama-server
+                name: ak-outpost-llama-gate
                 port:
-                  number: 8080
+                  number: 9000

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/kustomization.yaml

@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ resources:
   - pvc.yaml
   - deployment.yaml
   - embed.yaml
+  - gate-service.yaml
   - ingress.yaml

kubernetes/apps/llama-server/pvc.yaml

@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
 ---
-# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by the Deployment's initContainer.
-# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away several
-# GiB of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
+# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
+# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
+# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
 #
-# ReadWriteMany so a second replica or a one-off benchmark Job can mount the
-# same weights; the models are read-only at inference time.
+# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
+# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
+# inference time.
+#
+# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
+# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
+# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
+# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
+# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
+#
+# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
+# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
@@ -18,4 +28,4 @@ spec:
   storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
   resources:
     requests:
-      storage: 40Gi
+      storage: 120Gi

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Scrapes CrowdSec. Until this landed, nothing did: `up{namespace="crowdsec"}`
+# returned zero series and Prometheus held no cs_* metric at all, so the
+# detection side of the ingress path was invisible — including whether the
+# agents were reading logs and whether any bouncer was pulling decisions.
+#
+# One monitor for both services. They carry the same shape (a `metrics` port on
+# 6060) and differ only in `app`, so a matchExpressions selector keeps this to
+# a single object rather than two near-identical ones:
+#
+#   crowdsec-service        the LAPI      — decisions, bouncer + machine requests
+#   crowdsec-agent-service  the agents    — acquisition, parsers, scenarios
+#
+# The crowdsec-ns CiliumNetworkPolicy already admits the monitoring namespace
+# without a port restriction, so no policy change is needed.
+#
+# `release: kube-prometheus-stack` is what the chart's Prometheus selects on.
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec
+  namespace: crowdsec
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: crowdsec
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchExpressions:
+      - key: app
+        operator: In
+        values:
+          - crowdsec-service
+          - crowdsec-agent-service
+  endpoints:
+    - port: metrics
+      path: /metrics
+      interval: 30s

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/kustomization.yaml

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ resources:
   - prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
   - alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
   - cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
+  - crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
   - home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
   - immich-servicemonitor.yaml
   - loki-servicemonitor.yaml

kubernetes/apps/monitoring/dashboards/crowdsec-overview.json

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+{
+  "annotations": {"list": []},
+  "description": "CrowdSec: Erkennung im Cluster, Durchsetzung am NetBird-Edge",
+  "editable": true,
+  "fiscalYearStartMonth": 0,
+  "graphTooltip": 1,
+  "id": null,
+  "links": [],
+  "panels": [
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Aktive Ban-Entscheidungen in der LAPI, ganz überwiegend aus den CAPI-Community-Blocklisten. Das ist die Menge, die ein scharfgeschalteter Bouncer durchsetzt.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 0, "y": 0},
+      "id": 1,
+      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(cs_active_decisions)", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Aktive Decisions",
+      "type": "stat"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Bouncer, die in den letzten 10 Minuten Decisions abgeholt haben. Fällt das unter die erwartete Zahl, holt ein Bouncer nichts mehr — und setzt damit einen veralteten Stand durch, ohne dass irgendetwas ausfällt.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}]}, "unit": "short"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 6, "y": 0},
+      "id": 2,
+      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[10m])) > 0)", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Bouncer, die abholen",
+      "type": "stat"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Vom Agent gelesene Logzeilen pro Sekunde. Steht das auf 0, detektiert CrowdSec nichts mehr — der häufigste stille Ausfall, weil alles andere weiterläuft.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 0.01}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 12, "y": 0},
+      "id": 3,
+      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[5m]))", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Gelesene Logzeilen/s",
+      "type": "stat"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Szenario-Overflows der letzten 24 h — also lokal erkannte Angriffe, im Gegensatz zu den von CAPI übernommenen.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 18, "y": 0},
+      "id": 4,
+      "options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[24h]))", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Lokale Overflows (24 h)",
+      "type": "stat"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Abholrate je Bouncer. Der Firewall-Bouncer auf den Proxies fragt alle 10 s. Die LAPI legt bei jeder neuen beobachteten Client-Adresse einen Eintrag `<name>@<ip>` an, und beobachtet wird die Pod-IP des netbird-ingress-Peers — deshalb erscheint ein logischer Bouncer hier mehrfach und nach Pod-Rollen unter neuen Namen.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 4},
+      "id": 5,
+      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{bouncer}}", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Bouncer-Abholrate",
+      "type": "timeseries"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund. `http:scan` dominiert und stammt aus den CAPI-Blocklisten.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 20, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 4},
+      "id": 6,
+      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (cs_active_decisions)", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund",
+      "type": "timeseries"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Welche Szenarien lokal auslösen. Das ist das, was CrowdSec selbst aus den Traefik-Logs erkennt.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "bars", "fillOpacity": 70, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 12},
+      "id": 7,
+      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["sum"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (name) (increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[1h]))", "legendFormat": "{{name}}", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Szenario-Overflows (je Stunde)",
+      "type": "timeseries"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Geparste gegen nicht geparste Zeilen. Ein Anstieg bei `ko` heißt meist, dass sich ein Logformat geändert hat und der Parser nicht mehr greift — CrowdSec liest dann weiter, erkennt aber nichts mehr.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 12},
+      "id": 8,
+      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
+      "targets": [
+        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "geparst", "refId": "A"},
+        {"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ko_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "nicht geparst", "refId": "B"}
+      ],
+      "title": "Parser",
+      "type": "timeseries"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "description": "Whitelist-Treffer nach Grund. Nützlich beim Scharfschalten: was hier zählt, wäre sonst ein Kandidat für einen Ban gewesen.",
+      "fieldConfig": {
+        "defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
+        "overrides": []
+      },
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 20},
+      "id": 9,
+      "options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
+      "targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (rate(cs_node_wl_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
+      "title": "Whitelist-Treffer",
+      "type": "timeseries"
+    },
+    {
+      "datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
+      "gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 20},
+      "id": 10,
+      "options": {
+        "code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
+        "content": "## Was dieses Dashboard NICHT zeigt\n\nAlle Panels stammen aus der LAPI und den Agents im Cluster. Die **Bouncer auf proxy-1 und proxy-2 exportieren eigene Metriken**, die hier fehlen:\n\n- `fw_bouncer_active_decisions` — was tatsächlich in den nftables-Sets steht\n- `fw_bouncer_dropped_packets` / `_bytes` — was wirklich verworfen wurde\n- `lapi_requests_total` / `_failures_total` — aus Sicht des Bouncers\n\nSie liegen auf `127.0.0.1:60601` der Proxy-Hosts. Die Hosts sind öffentlich und haben bisher keinerlei Metrik-Pfad; den Port ins Internet zu öffnen, nur um ein Scrape-Ziel zu bekommen, wäre der falsche Tausch.\n\n**Konsequenz:** „Bouncer-Abholrate\" oben zeigt, dass ein Bouncer *fragt* — nicht, dass er die Antwort auch angewandt hat. Solange der Modus `dry-run` ist, wendet er ohnehin nichts an.\n\nEin Scrape-Pfad für die Hosts ist eigene Arbeit und Voraussetzung dafür, dass „was wird wirklich geblockt\" beantwortbar wird."
+      },
+      "title": "Blinder Fleck",
+      "type": "text"
+    }
+  ],
+  "refresh": "30s",
+  "schemaVersion": 38,
+  "style": "dark",
+  "tags": ["homelab", "crowdsec", "security"],
+  "templating": {"list": []},
+  "time": {"from": "now-6h", "to": "now"},
+  "timepicker": {},
+  "timezone": "",
+  "title": "CrowdSec Overview",
+  "uid": "crowdsec-overview",
+  "version": 1,
+  "weekStart": ""
+}

kubernetes/apps/monitoring/dashboards/kustomization.yaml

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ configMapGenerator:
   - name: dashboard-blackbox-overview
     files:
       - blackbox-overview.json
+  - name: dashboard-crowdsec-overview
+    files:
+      - crowdsec-overview.json
   - name: dashboard-disk-health
     files:
       - disk-health.json

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/cluster.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+---
+# A read-only view of paperless's backup store, used as a recovery source and
+# nothing else.
+#
+# It points at the production prefix, which is the whole point — the eval
+# instance is a copy of the real archive's metadata — and that makes what is
+# ABSENT here the safety-critical part:
+#
+#   no retentionPolicy   The production store has "30d". Without one here
+#                        there is no policy to enforce, and enforcement is not
+#                        tied to taking a backup: the plugin runs it from the
+#                        instance sidecar on a timer
+#                        (instanceSidecarConfiguration.retentionPolicyIntervalSeconds,
+#                        default 1800). So "this cluster never backs up" would
+#                        not have been enough on its own.
+#
+# A second property makes it belt-and-braces. Retention runs
+# barman-cloud-backup-delete, which takes a server name and works inside
+# <destinationPath>/<serverName> — the store's own status keys its recovery
+# window by "pprl-pg", confirming that layout. This cluster is pprleval-pg, so
+# even an accidental retention policy would address a prefix that holds nothing
+# rather than production's backups.
+#
+# The cluster below completes the guarantee with isWALArchiver: false, so
+# nothing is written back either. It does load the plugin — that is required
+# for the restore to work at all — and read-only comes from the flag rather
+# than from leaving the plugin out.
+apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: ObjectStore
+metadata:
+  name: pprleval-pg-source
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  configuration:
+    destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pprl-pg
+    endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
+    s3Credentials:
+      accessKeyId:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
+      secretAccessKey:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
+      region:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: REGION
+    wal:
+      compression: gzip
+    data:
+      compression: gzip
+---
+# A disposable clone of the paperless database, for measuring how well the
+# local LLM classifies documents without running the experiment against the
+# live archive.
+#
+# Losing this cluster costs a re-restore and nothing else, which is the intent
+# — it is rebuilt whenever a test needs a clean starting point.
+#
+# One instance, not two. Replication buys availability, and an eval instance
+# that is down is simply an eval that waits.
+apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: Cluster
+metadata:
+  name: pprleval-pg
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  instances: 1
+  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
+  enableSuperuserAccess: true
+  storage:
+    # Delete-reclaim, unlike the Retain default: this volume is a copy that
+    # gets rebuilt, so it should vanish with the cluster rather than leave a
+    # Released PV and an orphaned RBD image behind (issue #262).
+    storageClass: ceph-block-ephemeral
+    size: 10Gi
+  # Declared with isWALArchiver: false, which is what kubernetes/RECOVERY.md
+  # arrived at after an earlier version of that runbook said to omit it: the
+  # instance manager loads this plugin to replay WAL during the restore, and
+  # without it the instance never starts ("Unknown plugin:
+  # barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io").
+  #
+  # externalClusters below only says WHERE the backup is; it does not get the
+  # plugin injected into the pod. So "no plugin" is not the way to keep this
+  # read-only — "plugin, not archiving" is, and it is the combination verified
+  # on im-pg on 2026-07-25.
+  plugins:
+    - name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
+      enabled: true
+      isWALArchiver: false
+      parameters:
+        barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
+  bootstrap:
+    recovery:
+      source: pprl-pg
+      database: paperless
+      owner: paperless
+  externalClusters:
+    - name: pprl-pg
+      plugin:
+        name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
+        parameters:
+          barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
+          serverName: pprl-pg
+  postgresql:
+    parameters:
+      shared_buffers: "256MB"
+      max_connections: "100"
+      # The production tuning for write reduction is deliberately not copied.
+      # It exists to spare the SSDs under a database that runs for years; this
+      # one is read-only for hours at a time and then deleted.
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      cpu: 200m
+      memory: 512Mi
+    limits:
+      memory: 1Gi

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: paperless-eval
+resources:
+  - secrets.yaml
+  - cluster.yaml
+  - pvcs.yaml
+  - redis.yaml
+  - paperless.yaml

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/paperless.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+# Deliberately much smaller than the production ConfigMap. Everything that
+# exists to serve people is gone: no remote-user auth, no CSRF origins, no
+# barcode or mail consumption, no Tika/Gotenberg. Nothing consumes documents
+# here, and nothing signs in.
+#
+# What remains is the database connection and the AI settings, because those
+# are what the evaluation measures.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-config
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+data:
+  PAPERLESS_URL: "http://paperless.paperless-eval.svc.cluster.local"
+  PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
+  PAPERLESS_TIME_ZONE: "Europe/Berlin"
+  PAPERLESS_REDIS: "redis://redis:6379"
+  PAPERLESS_DBENGINE: "postgresql"
+  PAPERLESS_DBHOST: "pprleval-pg-rw"
+  PAPERLESS_DBNAME: "paperless"
+  # Polling off, so a pod that finds an empty consume volume does not spend a
+  # thread looking at it every ten seconds for the length of a run.
+  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING_INTERVAL: "0"
+
+  # The AI settings under test. The endpoints are placeholders that each eval
+  # job overrides for the model it is measuring — a job runs its own
+  # llama-server beside paperless in the same pod, so the value that matters at
+  # run time is the one in the job, not the one here.
+  #
+  # Same caveat as production, and sharper here: paperless reads these from an
+  # ApplicationConfiguration row and falls back to the environment only when
+  # that row is empty. The row comes across in the restored database, so
+  # anything configured in the production admin UI arrives with it and silently
+  # wins over this ConfigMap — an eval would then measure production's settings
+  # while appearing to measure the job's.
+  #
+  # Check it before trusting any result, and after every fresh restore:
+  #
+  #   select llm_backend, llm_model, llm_embedding_backend, llm_embedding_model
+  #     from paperless_applicationconfiguration;
+  #
+  # Every column must be null for the environment to apply.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "900"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_OUTPUT_LANGUAGE: "de-de"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
+---
+# A base instance that proves the restored database is usable and that the
+# search index and classifier build against it. The evaluation itself does not
+# run here — each job brings its own paperless container so it can point at its
+# own model — but this is what makes a broken clone visible before a job spends
+# hours on it.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: paperless
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+  annotations:
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-config
+    # Both, like production: the secret refreshes on the same 10m cycle, and
+    # without this the pod would keep a rotated key until something else
+    # restarted it — which defeats the point of matching the interval.
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-secrets
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+    spec:
+      enableServiceLinks: false
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: paperless
+          # No $imagepolicy marker, unlike apps/paperless: a measurement is
+          # only comparable against a fixed version, so this tag moves when
+          # somebody decides to re-measure, not when a release lands.
+          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8000
+          envFrom:
+            - configMapRef:
+                name: paperless-eval-config
+          env:
+            - name: PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: paperless-eval-secrets
+                  key: secret-key
+            - name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: pprleval-pg-app
+                  key: username
+            - name: PAPERLESS_DBPASS
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: pprleval-pg-app
+                  key: password
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/data
+            - name: media
+              mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/media
+            - name: consume
+              mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/consume
+          # 60 minutes, against production's 10, and matching this app's Flux
+          # Kustomization timeout.
+          #
+          # Production's budget was sized for a from-scratch boot on this same
+          # corpus and held, so 10 would probably do — but there the volume is
+          # Retain and the index survives, making that a one-off. Here the
+          # volume is ephemeral and the index is rebuilt on every re-test, so
+          # the expensive path is the normal one. A killed pod starts the work
+          # over rather than resuming, which turns a slow boot into a
+          # crash-loop that stalls Flux behind wait: true.
+          #
+          # The LLM index is not in this budget: it is a celery task, and boot
+          # only runs init-llmindex-migrate, a migration check.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /accounts/login/
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 180
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /accounts/login/
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 120
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            timeoutSeconds: 10
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /accounts/login/
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 30
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 200m
+              memory: 512Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 2Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: paperless-eval-data
+        - name: media
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: paperless-eval-media
+        - name: consume
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: paperless-eval-consume
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: paperless
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+  ports:
+    - port: 80
+      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/pvcs.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+# All four use ceph-block-ephemeral rather than the Retain default. Everything
+# here is derived — a restored database, an index built from it, a cache —  so
+# the volumes should go when the namespace does instead of leaving Released PVs
+# and orphaned RBD images to reclaim by hand (issue #262).
+#
+# /data holds the Tantivy search index and the classifier pickle, both rebuilt
+# from the database, and the LLM index — which is the expensive one at roughly
+# three hours for the full corpus.
+#
+# Measured on production for the same ~3900 documents: 36 MiB search index,
+# 125 MiB LLM index. 10Gi is far more than that needs, and deliberately so —
+# an embedding model with wider vectors than bge-m3's 1024 dimensions is
+# exactly what phase two varies, and running out of space mid-run would cost
+# the whole rebuild.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-data
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 10Gi
+---
+# Empty, and stays that way. Paperless refuses to start without the path, but
+# the AI path reads title, content and filename out of the database and never
+# opens a file — so the documents themselves are not copied here. That is what
+# keeps this instance cheap and keeps a second copy of the archive off the
+# cluster.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-media
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 1Gi
+---
+# Also empty: nothing is consumed here, but the path has to exist.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-consume
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 1Gi
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-redis
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 1Gi

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/redis.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: redis
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 999
+        fsGroup: 999
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: redis
+          # No $imagepolicy marker; see the note on the paperless image.
+          image: redis:8.10.1-alpine
+          # No --save: this holds the celery queue and the suggestion cache,
+          # both of which are regenerated. Persisting them across a restart of
+          # a throwaway instance would only preserve stale suggestions.
+          args:
+            - redis-server
+            - --save
+            - ""
+            - --loglevel
+            - warning
+          ports:
+            - name: redis
+              containerPort: 6379
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+          livenessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: redis
+            initialDelaySeconds: 10
+          readinessProbe:
+            exec:
+              command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 20m
+              memory: 64Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 256Mi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: paperless-eval-redis
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: redis
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
+  ports:
+    - port: 6379
+      targetPort: redis

kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/secrets.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+# The same Hetzner S3 key every CNPG-using namespace pulls, needed here only so
+# the recovery source can be read. See apps/paperless for why one shared key
+# rather than per-app paths.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
+---
+# Django's secret key, shared with the production instance rather than given
+# its own vault entry.
+#
+# It signs sessions and CSRF tokens, and this instance has no ingress and no
+# users — nothing signs in, so nothing is at stake in sharing it. A separate
+# entry would mean a vault write before the namespace can start, for a
+# throwaway instance that gets rebuilt.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval-secrets
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  # 10m, matching apps/paperless rather than the 1h default: the point of
+  # sharing the key is that the two hold the same value, and a slower refresh
+  # here would let them diverge for up to an hour after a rotation.
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: paperless-eval-secrets
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: apps/paperless

kubernetes/apps/paperless/MIGRATION-data-to-block.md

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-# paperless-data: CephFS → RBD
-
-## Why
-
-`paperless-data` is `ReadWriteMany` on `ceph-filesystem`, but **only the paperless
-Deployment mounts it**. Verified 2026-08-20:
-
-```
-$ pods mounting paperless-data
-paperless-68cb8b8744-7hjb8      <- one, and only one
-
-paperless-data     ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem
-paperless-media    ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem   <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
-paperless-consume  ReadWriteMany  ceph-filesystem   <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
-```
-
-Its contents are single-writer state — the 50 MB Whoosh index,
-`classification_model.pickle`, `celerybeat-schedule.db`, `log/`,
-`migration_lock`, `protonmail.pem`. 75 files. Nothing else reads or writes them.
-
-It is on CephFS by default, not by requirement.
-
-## What it costs
-
-Every access goes through the MDS. Measured with **zero CI pipelines running**:
-
-```
-paperless-data client   request_load_avg 22   (all other sessions 0-1)
-MDS over 180s           4,052 client requests  = 22.5/s
-                        2,718 journal events   = 15/s
-                            2 dir commits      <- almost none: not file writes
-```
-
-So it is cap/inode churn from repeated access, not data being written. That is
-most of the constant **7-8 GB/day** written to `cephfs-metadata`, and since that
-pool is `size: 3`, roughly **21-24 GB/day** reaches the drives.
-
-`cephfs-metadata` deliberately stays at size 3. Losing it destroys the entire
-filesystem rather than the objects on one OSD, and the 275 GiB in `cephfs-data0`
-depends on it. Cutting the writes at source is correct; cutting the replication
-is not.
-
-## Sequence
-
-Staged deliberately: the PVC lands first and empty, so merging it changes
-nothing. The copy and the repoint are separate.
-
-### Phase 1 — provision (this PR)
-
-`paperless-data-block` (RWO, `ceph-block`, 10Gi) is created and mounted by
-nothing. Inert.
-
-Verify: `kubectl -n paperless get pvc paperless-data-block` → Bound.
-
-### Phase 2 — copy
-
-The Whoosh index must come across intact. Paperless *can* rebuild it
-(`document_index reindex`), but that reprocesses every document, so copying is
-both faster and less disruptive.
-
-1. Scale paperless to 0. The source must be quiescent — `celerybeat-schedule.db`
-   and the Whoosh index are both live-written, and copying them under an active
-   writer gives a torn read.
-2. Run a one-off pod that mounts BOTH PVCs and copies:
-   ```
-   cp -a /src/. /dst/
-   ```
-   The RWO target pins the pod to one node; the RWX source will follow.
-3. Verify file count and index size match:
-   ```
-   find /src -type f | wc -l   ==   find /dst -type f | wc -l
-   du -sh /src/index           ==   du -sh /dst/index
-   ```
-
-### Phase 3 — repoint
-
-Change the Deployment's `data` volume to `claimName: paperless-data-block`,
-merge, let it roll.
-
-Verify afterwards:
-- paperless starts, search returns results (proves the Whoosh index survived)
-- `ceph tell mds.cephfs-b session ls` no longer shows a busy `paperless-data`
-  client
-- `rate(ceph_pool_wr_bytes{pool_id="3"})` drops from its 7-8 GB/day baseline
-
-**Do not delete `paperless-data` until search has been confirmed working.** It is
-the rollback, and it is `prune: disabled` so Flux will not remove it.
-
-## Expected effect
-
-~7-8 GB/day off `cephfs-metadata`, so ~21-24 GB/day off the drives once
-replication is counted. Against ~432 GB/day cluster-wide that is roughly 5% —
-worth doing, but it is a correctness fix (a single-writer volume does not belong
-on a shared filesystem) more than a large win.
-
-It also removes 22 req/sec of MDS load, which benefits the workloads that
-genuinely need CephFS — Woodpecker CI workspaces share the same MDS.

kubernetes/apps/paperless/network-policy.yaml

@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@ spec:
               protocol: UDP
             - port: "53"
               protocol: TCP
+    # The cluster's own LLM, for AI suggestions and RAG embeddings. Scoped to
+    # the two pods and the one port rather than the ai namespace as a whole, so
+    # this grant cannot widen if something else is ever placed there.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
     # External HTTPS only — Tika model downloads, runtime image
     # fetches, etc. RFC1918 + ULA are excluded from `world` via the
     # CIDR-deny pattern. `world` covers public IPs / DNS-resolvable

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -31,12 +31,14 @@ data:
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_DELETE_DUPLICATES: "true"
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_ENABLE_BARCODES: "true"
   PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_ENABLE_ASN_BARCODE: "true"
-  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_BARCODE_SCANNER: "ZXING"
+  # No CONSUMER_BARCODE_SCANNER: zxing-cpp is the only backend, so the
+  # setting no longer exists. pyzbar and libzbar are gone from the image.
+  #
   # CephFS does not propagate inotify across nodes — files written
   # via the RWX consume PVC from a pod on a different node than
   # paperless never fire IN_CREATE in paperless's kernel. Polling
   # is the reliable backstop. See wiki: cephfs-inotify-no-cross-node-propagation.
-  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING: "10"
+  PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING_INTERVAL: "10"
   PAPERLESS_REDIS: "redis://redis:6379"
   PAPERLESS_DBENGINE: "postgresql"
   PAPERLESS_DBHOST: "pprl-pg-rw"
@@ -44,6 +46,47 @@ data:
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENABLED: "1"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT: "http://tika:9998"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT: "http://gotenberg:3000"
+  # AI suggestions against the cluster's own LLM (kubernetes/apps/llama-server).
+  # Nothing leaves the cluster: both endpoints are ClusterIP Services, so
+  # document text is never sent to a third party and there is no API key to
+  # rotate — llama-server has no authentication, and the ai namespace's network
+  # policy is what restricts who may reach it.
+  #
+  # CAVEAT, and it is a real one: paperless reads these from an
+  # ApplicationConfiguration row in the database and falls back to the
+  # environment only when that row is empty. A value set in the admin UI
+  # therefore overrides this ConfigMap silently. Configure AI in ONE place —
+  # here — and leave those fields untouched in the UI.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml. The
+  # server ignores the field on the wire, but paperless sends it and the value
+  # is what appears in its logs.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
+  # ClusterIP addresses are private, and paperless blocks non-public endpoints
+  # unless this is set. Default is already true; explicit because the whole
+  # integration silently stops working if it ever flips.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
+  # Under llama-server's own 16384, leaving room for the response.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
+  # The 120s default is too tight at ~11 tok/s: a classification is roughly
+  # 2-4k prompt tokens plus a second round trip for localisation.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "300"
+  # Matched against Django's settings.LANGUAGES, so the region is required —
+  # "de" alone does not resolve. Without it the model returns German tags but
+  # English document types, which was reproducible against this endpoint.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_OUTPUT_LANGUAGE: "de-de"
+  # RAG embeddings from llama-embed. Its Qwen3-Embedding covers 100+ languages,
+  # where paperless's default all-MiniLM-L6-v2 is documented as suited to
+  # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
+  # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
+  # index has to be rebuilt.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
 ---
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -56,6 +99,13 @@ metadata:
     # Reloader restarts paperless when paperless-secrets changes (e.g. after a
     # secret-key rotation). See kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/paperless.yaml.
     secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-secrets
+    # And when paperless-config changes. The ConfigMap is consumed with
+    # envFrom, and Kubernetes does not restart a pod when a ConfigMap it reads
+    # that way is updated — the running container keeps the environment it
+    # started with. Without this, a settings change applies cleanly in git and
+    # in the cluster while the application never sees it, which is how the AI
+    # settings landed with no effect at all.
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-config
 spec:
   replicas: 1
   strategy:
@@ -120,7 +170,7 @@ spec:
               drop: ["ALL"]
       containers:
         - name: paperless
-          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:2.20.15 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
+          image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperless-ngx"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 8000
@@ -172,6 +222,25 @@ spec:
           # Safe against ALLOWED_HOSTS: the kubelet sends the pod IP as Host,
           # and PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS is "*". Narrowing that value later
           # means giving these probes an explicit Host header.
+
+          # The container does not serve until its init sequence finishes:
+          # s6 makes svc-webserver depend on init-migrations and
+          # init-search-index. On the first 3.x start those are the SHA256
+          # checksum backfill, which opens and reads every original and every
+          # archive file, and a full Tantivy index build, since the Whoosh
+          # index cannot be converted. Both scale with the corpus.
+          #
+          # startupProbe holds liveness and readiness off until the webserver
+          # answers, giving that boot 30 * 20s = 10 minutes. Without it the
+          # 120s liveness delay plus three 30s periods kills the pod 210s in,
+          # part-way through a migration, and the next boot starts over.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /accounts/login/
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 30
           livenessProbe:
             httpGet:
               path: /accounts/login/
@@ -220,22 +289,16 @@ spec:
             seccompProfile:
               type: RuntimeDefault
       volumes:
-        # paperless-data-block (RWO, ceph-block), NOT paperless-data
-        # (RWX, ceph-filesystem). Only this Deployment ever mounted the volume,
-        # and its contents are single-writer state — the Whoosh index,
-        # classification model, celerybeat schedule, logs. Being on CephFS meant
-        # every access went through the MDS: 22 requests/sec sustained with zero
-        # CI running, ~15 journal events/sec against 2 directory commits per
-        # 180s, i.e. cap/inode churn rather than file writes. That was most of
-        # the constant 7-8 GB/day on cephfs-metadata, and that pool is size 3.
+        # `data` is RWO on ceph-block, not RWX on ceph-filesystem. Only this
+        # Deployment mounts it and its contents are single-writer state — the
+        # search index, classification model, celerybeat schedule, logs. On
+        # CephFS every access went through the MDS: 22 requests/sec sustained
+        # with zero CI running, ~15 journal events/sec against 2 directory
+        # commits per 180s, i.e. cap/inode churn rather than file writes. That
+        # was most of the constant 7-8 GB/day on cephfs-metadata, a size 3 pool.
         #
         # `consume` and `media` below STAY on CephFS: the ftp-scanner writes to
         # those from another node, so they genuinely need RWX.
-        #
-        # paperless-data is retained (prune: disabled) as the rollback. Do not
-        # delete it until search has been confirmed working — that is what
-        # proves the Whoosh index survived the copy, not merely that paperless
-        # starts. Migration record: MIGRATION-data-to-block.md.
         - name: data
           persistentVolumeClaim:
             claimName: paperless-data-block

kubernetes/apps/paperless/pvcs.yaml

@@ -3,33 +3,18 @@
 # (e.g. when the seed initContainer or the Garage migration creds are
 # removed once we're done with the migration phase). Velero's
 # bootstrap-restore then owns their contents.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
-metadata:
-  name: paperless-data
-  namespace: paperless
-  annotations:
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
-spec:
-  accessModes:
-    - ReadWriteMany
-  storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      storage: 10Gi
----
-# Replacement for paperless-data, on RBD instead of CephFS.
+
+# paperless's single-writer state, on RBD rather than CephFS.
 #
-# WHY: paperless-data is declared ReadWriteMany on ceph-filesystem, but only ONE
-# pod ever mounts it — the paperless Deployment itself. Its contents are all
-# single-writer state: the 50 MB Whoosh index, classification_model.pickle,
-# celerybeat-schedule.db, logs, migration_lock. Nothing shares it. Only `consume`
-# and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the FTP scanner writes to those from a
-# different node.
+# WHY RWO: only ONE pod mounts it — the paperless Deployment itself. Its
+# contents are all single-writer state: the Tantivy search index,
+# classification_model.pickle, celerybeat-schedule.db, logs, migration_lock.
+# Nothing shares it. Only `consume` and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the
+# FTP scanner writes to those from a different node.
 #
-# COST OF LEAVING IT: every access goes through the MDS. Measured 2026-08-20 with
-# zero CI running, this volume's client was doing 22 MDS requests/sec sustained,
-# and the MDS logged ~15 journal events/sec against only 2 directory commits per
+# WHY NOT CEPHFS: every access goes through the MDS. With zero CI running, this
+# volume's client sustained 22 MDS requests/sec, and the MDS logged ~15 journal
+# events/sec against only 2 directory commits per
 # 180s — i.e. cap and inode churn from repeated access, not file writes. That is
 # most of the constant 7-8 GB/day written to cephfs-metadata, which is a size 3
 # pool, so ~21-24 GB/day actually hits the drives.
@@ -38,10 +23,6 @@ spec:
 # the metadata pool destroys the whole filesystem, not just the objects on one
 # OSD, so the 275 GiB in cephfs-data0 rides on it. Reducing the writes at source
 # is the right fix; reducing the replication is not.
-#
-# MIGRATION: this PVC is created EMPTY and nothing mounts it yet. The data copy
-# and the deployment repoint are a separate, staged step — see
-# MIGRATION-data-to-block.md. Merging this alone is inert.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:

kubernetes/apps/whisper/deployment.yaml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ spec:
     spec:
       containers:
         - name: whisper
-          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.6.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
+          image: rhasspy/wyoming-whisper:3.7.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:wyoming-whisper"}
           args:
             - --model=base-int8
             - --language=de

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperless-eval.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  # A throwaway copy of paperless for measuring the local LLM against the real
+  # corpus. Its Cluster restores from paperless's backup store and archives
+  # nothing back; see kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/cluster.yaml.
+  #
+  # prune: true and no prune-disabled annotations anywhere underneath — the
+  # data here is a copy, and being able to delete the whole namespace by
+  # removing this file is the point.
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 1m
+  # 30m is not enough: the first start restores the database and then builds
+  # the search index over ~3900 documents before the webserver answers.
+  timeout: 60m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds
+    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
+    - name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
+  healthCheckExprs:
+    - apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+      kind: Cluster
+      failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
+      current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"

kubernetes/e2e-test.sh

@@ -530,24 +530,6 @@ check "alertmanager: no severity=critical alerts active" bash -c '
 # manifests were valid in each case and the endpoint still misbehaved.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-# llm_chat: POST a chat completion through the ingress. Body lands in
-# /tmp/llm_body for the caller to assert against. Generous --max-time: the
-# model runs on an iGPU at ~12 tok/s, so a short answer still takes seconds.
-llm_chat() {
-    local model="$1" prompt="$2" max="${3:-64}" out body code payload
-    payload=$(jq -nc --arg m "$model" --arg p "$prompt" --argjson n "$max" \
-        '{model:$m,messages:[{role:"user",content:$p}],max_tokens:$n,temperature:0}')
-    out=$(curl -sk --resolve "llm.renner.uno:443:$LB_IP" --max-time 300 \
-          -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$payload" \
-          -w $'\n__CODE__:%{http_code}' \
-          "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/chat/completions" 2>&1)
-    code=${out##*__CODE__:}
-    body=${out%$'\n'__CODE__:*}
-    printf 'code=%s body=%s\n' "$code" "${body:0:300}"
-    [[ "$code" == "200" ]] || return 1
-    printf '%s' "$body" > /tmp/llm_body
-}
-export -f llm_chat
 export LB_IP
 
 # helper_post: POST JSON from inside e2e-helper, for Services with no ingress.
@@ -571,54 +553,66 @@ helper_post() {
 }
 export -f helper_post
 
+# llm_chat: POST a chat completion to llama-server from inside the cluster.
+# It goes to the Service, not the public hostname: llm.renner.uno now answers
+# with an Authentik redirect, and the API is deliberately in-cluster only —
+# which is also how every real consumer reaches it. Result lands in
+# /tmp/helper_body.
+llm_chat() {
+    local prompt="$1" max="${2:-64}"
+    helper_post "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/chat/completions" \
+        "$(jq -nc --arg p "$prompt" --argjson n "$max" \
+            '{model:"qwen3.6-35b-a3b",messages:[{role:"user",content:$p}],max_tokens:$n,temperature:0}')"
+}
+export -f llm_chat
+
 echo "=== Local AI inference ==="
 
-check "llama-server /health returns 200" \
-    http_code "https://llm.renner.uno/health" 200
+# The gate is the whole of the access control on the public hostname:
+# llama-server has no authentication and serves the API on the same port as the
+# UI. An anonymous request must be bounced to Authentik, never answered. A 200
+# here would mean the ingress is reaching llama-server directly again.
+check "public hostname is gated by authentik" \
+    bash -c 'code=$(curl -sk --resolve "llm.renner.uno:443:$LB_IP" --max-time 15 \
+                 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/models")
+             echo "got=$code"; [[ "$code" =~ ^(302|307|401|403)$ ]]'
 
-# The chat model is named for what it is, so a picker and a log line say which
-# model answered. `chat` stays valid alongside it as a stable handle, so a
-# consumer's config survives the next model swap.
 # Asserts the id specifically, not merely that the string appears somewhere:
 # every configured name shows up in the `aliases` array regardless of order, so
 # a substring match passes even when the picker is showing the wrong one.
 check "descriptive name is the advertised id" \
-    http_body "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/models" '"id":"qwen3.6-35b-a3b"'
+    bash -c 'helper_curl "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/models" &&
+             jq -e ".data[0].id == \"qwen3.6-35b-a3b\"" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
+
+# Only one name is configured. A second would be advertised alongside it and,
+# if it sorted first, would take the id — which is what a picker displays.
+check "no second name competes for the id" \
+    bash -c 'jq -e ".data[0].aliases | length == 1" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
 
 # Regression: the embedding model used to share this port. It appeared in the
 # chat picker, and selecting it returned fluent nonsense ("capital capital
 # capital ...") instead of an error, because --embeddings does not refuse chat
-# completions. It now lives on a ClusterIP-only Service; if it ever reappears
-# here, it is selectable again and this must fail.
+# completions. It now lives on a separate Service; if it ever reappears here,
+# it is selectable again and this must fail.
 check "embedding model absent from chat endpoint" \
-    bash -c '! curl -sk --resolve "llm.renner.uno:443:$LB_IP" --max-time 15 \
-        "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/models" | grep -qi "embed"'
-
-check "embeddings not exposed through the ingress" \
-    http_code "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/embeddings" 501
+    bash -c '! grep -qi embed /tmp/helper_body'
 
 # Regression: with thinking enabled by default the model spent its whole token
 # budget on reasoning_content and returned an EMPTY content with
 # finish_reason "length" — a 200 response that answers nothing. Asserting on
 # the status code alone would have passed.
 check "chat completion returns non-empty content" \
-    bash -c 'llm_chat chat "Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich." 64 &&
-             jq -e ".choices[0].message.content | length > 0" /tmp/llm_body >/dev/null'
+    bash -c 'llm_chat "Nenne die Hauptstadt von Frankreich." 64 &&
+             jq -e ".choices[0].message.content | length > 0" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
 
 check "chat completion stops rather than truncating" \
-    bash -c 'jq -e ".choices[0].finish_reason == \"stop\"" /tmp/llm_body >/dev/null'
+    bash -c 'jq -e ".choices[0].finish_reason == \"stop\"" /tmp/helper_body >/dev/null'
 
 # Coherence, not just liveness. This is what catches a model answering from the
 # wrong weights or a numerically broken backend — llama-bench measures
 # throughput and would report excellent numbers while emitting garbage.
 check "chat answer is coherent (knows Paris)" \
-    bash -c 'jq -re ".choices[0].message.content" /tmp/llm_body | grep -qi paris'
-
-# Only one name is configured. A second would be advertised alongside it and,
-# if it sorted first, would take the id — which is what a picker displays.
-check "no second name competes for the id" \
-    bash -c 'test "$(curl -sk --resolve "llm.renner.uno:443:$LB_IP" --max-time 15 \
-        "https://llm.renner.uno/v1/models" | jq -r ".data[0].aliases | length")" = "1"'
+    bash -c 'jq -re ".choices[0].message.content" /tmp/helper_body | grep -qi paris'
 
 # Reached from the monitoring namespace, which ai-ns.yaml admits; there is no
 # ingress for this Service by design.

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
+# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
+# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
+# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
+# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
+# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
+# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
+# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
+#
+# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -36,6 +36,51 @@ spec:
   values:
     container_runtime: containerd
 
+    # Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
+    #
+    # This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
+    # allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
+    # without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
+    # so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
+    # is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
+    # deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
+    # thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
+    #
+    # Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
+    # here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
+    # resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
+    #
+    # The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
+    # clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
+    # proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
+    # the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
+    # Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
+    config:
+      capi_whitelists.yaml: |
+        cidrs:
+          # The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
+          # netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
+          # keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
+          # proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
+          - 45.157.177.26/32
+          - 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
+          - 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
+          # netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
+          #
+          # Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
+          # hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
+          # no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
+          # this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
+          # outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
+          # inbound attack involved at all.
+          #
+          # Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
+          # current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
+          # these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
+          # community blocklists.
+          - 162.55.50.97/32
+          - 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
+
     # mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
     # the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
     # wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -78,6 +123,24 @@ spec:
 
     lapi:
       replicas: 1
+      service:
+        # Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
+        #
+        # These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
+        # Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
+        # annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
+        # is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
+        # answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
+        # 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
+        # scheme mismatch.
+        #
+        # With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
+        # plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
+        # choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
+        # certificate is self-signed.
+        annotations:
+          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
+          traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
       # Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
       # workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
       # cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -86,10 +149,18 @@ spec:
         requests:
           cpu: 50m
       podAnnotations:
-        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
-        # env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
+        # Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
+        # consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
+        # start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
+        # the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
+        # the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
+        #
+        # crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
         # kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
-        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
+        # crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
+        # ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
+        # here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
+        secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
       persistentVolume:
         data:
           # Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -118,6 +189,17 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
               key: key
+        # The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
+        # endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
+        # `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
+        # names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
+        # registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
+        # is the source of truth, not the database.
+        - name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
+              key: key
 
     agent:
       # Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a
@@ -135,6 +217,32 @@ spec:
         - namespace: ingress
           podName: traefik-*
           program: traefik
+          # Read by polling, not inotify. Every path under
+          # /var/log/containers is a symlink into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
+          # rotates the target once it reaches containerLogMaxSize (10Mi,
+          # roughly every eight hours for Traefik here). An inotify tailer
+          # does not survive that rotation: it reopens the path, waits for a
+          # file that is in fact already present, and never reads another
+          # line. Nothing about that state looks broken from outside — the
+          # pod stays Running and Ready, the LAPI keeps answering, and the
+          # cumulative counters keep displaying whatever they reached, so the
+          # only symptom is that no scenario ever fires again.
+          #
+          # CrowdSec detects the hazard itself and logs it at startup, with
+          # this exact remedy in the message: "is a symlink, but inotify
+          # polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
+          # Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true". Upstream carries
+          # the same case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik), and the chart
+          # gained this field in helm-charts#109 specifically to fix it.
+          #
+          # Orthogonal to the force_inotify: true that the chart hardcodes
+          # into acquis.yaml and offers no way to unset. That one governs the
+          # fsnotify watch on the directory, i.e. discovering the log of a
+          # replacement Traefik pod; this one governs how an already
+          # discovered file is read. Both true is the supported combination.
+          #
+          # Costs CPU per open file per upstream docs — two files per node.
+          poll_without_inotify: true
       env:
         - name: COLLECTIONS
           value: "crowdsecurity/traefik crowdsecurity/http-cve crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules"

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/kustomization.yaml

@@ -2,4 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
+  - lapi-ingress.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
+#
+# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
+# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
+# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
+# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
+# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
+# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
+# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
+# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
+# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
+#
+# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
+#
+# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
+# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
+# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
+# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
+# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
+# kind of request every round:
+#
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
+#   172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
+#
+# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
+# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
+# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
+# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
+#
+# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
+# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
+# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
+# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
+---
+# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
+# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
+# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
+# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
+# what the Service resolves to.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: ServersTransport
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+spec:
+  serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
+  rootCAs:
+    - secret: crowdsec-root-secret
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: crowdsec-lapi
+  namespace: crowdsec
+  labels:
+    # Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
+    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+    # NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
+    # not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
+    #
+    # The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
+    # Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
+    # are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
+    # Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
+    # chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: crowdsec.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: crowdsec-service
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+  tls:
+    - secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
+      hosts:
+        - crowdsec.renner.uno

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperless-ngx.yaml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ spec:
   image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx
   interval: 1h
 ---
-# Allow only patch + minor bumps within the 2.x line. A 3.0 release
+# Allow only patch + minor bumps within the 3.x line. A 4.0 release
 # requires manual policy widening — major upgrades typically need a
 # migration plan and shouldn't land via auto-merge.
 apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ spec:
     name: paperless-ngx
   policy:
     semver:
-      range: "2.x"
+      range: "3.x"

kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml

@@ -69,6 +69,13 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: paperless
 ---
+# A disposable copy of paperless's database, for measuring how the local LLM
+# classifies documents without experimenting on the live archive.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: paperless-eval
+---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/ai-ns.yaml

@@ -9,10 +9,58 @@ spec:
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+    # Traefik is deliberately NOT admitted. llm.renner.uno is public and
+    # llama-server has no authentication of its own, so the Authentik llama-gate
+    # outpost is the only thing standing in front of it. Traefik routes the
+    # hostname to that outpost and never to llama-server, and this policy is
+    # what makes that structural rather than a matter of configuration: with no
+    # ingress rule for traefik, an Ingress that pointed straight at the Service
+    # — by accident or otherwise — simply would not connect.
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
+            goauthentik.io/outpost-name: llama-gate
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    # Paperless calls both models for AI suggestions and RAG embeddings. The
+    # matching egress grant on its side is scoped to these two pods on :8080.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    # The paperless-eval namespace reaches the embedding endpoint for the same
+    # reason paperless does; its chat model runs inside each eval job's own pod
+    # and needs no grant here.
+    #
+    # Scoped to the namespace rather than to an app label, unlike the grants
+    # around it: that namespace exists only to run evaluations, and its
+    # workload is jobs created per measurement whose labels vary with what is
+    # being measured. A label match would be a trap that presents as an
+    # embedding call silently dropped.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    # Home Assistant's llama.cpp conversation agent calls the chat model only —
+    # it has no use for the embedding endpoint, so unlike paperless above this
+    # grant does not extend to llama-embed.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": home-assistant
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/home-assistant-ns.yaml

@@ -167,6 +167,18 @@ spec:
     - toEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
+    # The cluster's own chat model, for the llama.cpp conversation agent that
+    # backs Assist. Scoped to the one pod and port rather than the ai namespace
+    # as a whole, so this grant cannot widen if something else is placed there —
+    # the embedding endpoint next to it is deliberately not included.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
     # traefik for east-west OIDC roundtrips that go through the
     # public hostname via k8s_gateway.
     - toEndpoints:

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ resources:
   - ingress-isolation.yaml
   - authentik-ns.yaml
   - paperless-ns.yaml
+  - paperless-eval-ns.yaml
   - audiobookshelf-ns.yaml
   - home-assistant-ns.yaml
   - spegel-ns.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-eval-ns.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+# Narrower than paperless-ns.yaml, because this namespace serves nobody.
+#
+# There is no ingress, no gate outpost and no hostname: the only things that
+# talk to it are its own pods. Monitoring is admitted so a run can be watched,
+# and host/remote-node for the kubelet probes.
+#
+# Egress reaches the ai namespace for the embedding endpoint, which is the one
+# dependency an eval job has outside its own pod, and world:443 so the CNPG
+# recovery can read the backup store on Hetzner.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny-ingress
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  endpointSelector: {}
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
+    - fromEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    # ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
+    # home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
+    # The embedding endpoint. The chat model runs inside each job's own pod, so
+    # it needs no grant; the embedder is shared with production because it is
+    # read-only and cheap, and swapping it is a phase-two concern.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+    - toEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    # world:443 — the CNPG recovery reads the backup store on Hetzner Object
+    # Storage, and image pulls.
+    - toEntities:
+        - world
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "443"
+              protocol: TCP
+    # ICMP — egress mirror; see ingress block above.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+---
+# The CNPG operator polls each instance's status endpoint over HTTPS
+# (https://<pod-ip>:8000/pg/status) to populate Cluster status. Without it the
+# Cluster reports "Instance Status Extraction Error: HTTP communication issue"
+# while Postgres serves normally — issue #433, where the operator's dial timed
+# out because the apps baseline never allowed the database namespace.
+#
+# It matters here even for a throwaway: the Flux Kustomization waits on
+# Cluster status, and a smoke test that cannot report its own health is not one.
+#
+# Scoped to the pprleval-pg endpoints and that one port, like the equivalent
+# rules for wp-pg and ha-pg: the barman and mariadb operators sharing the
+# database namespace have no reason to reach anything here.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: pprleval-pg-allow-cnpg-operator
+  namespace: paperless-eval
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      cnpg.io/cluster: pprleval-pg
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudnative-pg
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8000"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/restore-test.sh

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
 #   1. Velero Restore reaches phase=Completed against yesterday's
 #      scheduled Backup (real artifact, not a synthetic one).
 #   2. Each restored PVC is mountable and its file count is within ±10%
-#      of the live source volume, ignoring the transient subtrees listed
-#      in volatile_paths_for().
+#      (or ±ABS_PARITY_SLACK files, whichever is wider) of the live
+#      source volume, ignoring the transient subtrees listed in
+#      volatile_paths_for().
 #
 # What this does NOT exercise:
 #   - CNPG database restore (barman-cloud, separate code path).
@@ -317,11 +318,37 @@ EOF
     count_files_in_pvc "$src_ns" "$tmp_pvc" "src-${pvc:0:40}-${RUN_ID}" "$excludes"
 }
 
-# Restored count must be within ±10% of the source's current file count.
-# That tolerance absorbs day-of drift since the backup ran without
-# letting "lost half the data" pass silently. Volatile subtrees are pruned
-# from BOTH sides — keyed off the source identity, since the PVC name is
-# preserved across the restore but the destination namespace is not.
+# Restored count must be within max(±10%, ±ABS_PARITY_SLACK files) of the
+# source's current file count. That tolerance absorbs day-of drift since
+# the backup ran without letting "lost half the data" pass silently.
+# Volatile subtrees are pruned from BOTH sides — keyed off the source
+# identity, since the PVC name is preserved across the restore but the
+# destination namespace is not.
+#
+# Why the absolute floor exists. A purely relative window is structurally
+# unable to pass a small volume: ±10% of 9 files is ±0.9, i.e. a budget of
+# ZERO files, and ±10% of 2 files is ±0.2. The 2026-09-01 run failed on
+# exactly that — audiobookshelf/libation-config source=9 restored=8 and
+# trmnl/trmnl-renderer-data source=2 restored=3, both off by one file and
+# in opposite directions, with all 12 restores at phase=Completed and the
+# other 46 checks green. Parity compares a backup taken up to ~24 h ago
+# against the live volume *now*, so a single config write on a tiny volume
+# between those two moments is expected, not a defect in the backup.
+#
+# The floor only governs volumes below ~10*ABS_PARITY_SLACK files; above
+# that the 10% window still binds, so real data loss on the volumes that
+# carry data keeps failing loudly. Two files of slack rather than one
+# because a single logical write on a config volume routinely moves more
+# than one file (an app writing a settings file plus a transient sidecar),
+# and a floor that buys exactly one month is not worth the change.
+#
+# What the floor must NOT swallow, and does not: a non-empty source that
+# restored to an *empty* volume fails unconditionally below, before any
+# tolerance is applied. The old relative-only check caught that case as a
+# side effect (delta = 1.0 > 0.10); it is now explicit so the floor cannot
+# erode it on a volume of ABS_PARITY_SLACK files or fewer.
+ABS_PARITY_SLACK=${ABS_PARITY_SLACK:-2}
+
 verify_pvc_file_count_parity() {
     local src_ns="$1" dst_ns="$2" pvc="$3"
     local restored source excludes
@@ -339,11 +366,15 @@ verify_pvc_file_count_parity() {
     if [[ "$source" -eq 0 && "$restored" -eq 0 ]]; then
         return 0
     fi
-    # Use awk to compute a 10% window without bc.
-    awk -v s="$source" -v r="$restored" 'BEGIN {
-        if (s == 0) { exit !(r == 0) }
-        delta = (r - s) / s; if (delta < 0) delta = -delta
-        exit !(delta <= 0.10)
+    # Empty on either side while the other has data: never tolerable.
+    if [[ "$source" -eq 0 || "$restored" -eq 0 ]]; then
+        return 1
+    fi
+    # Use awk to compute the window without bc.
+    awk -v s="$source" -v r="$restored" -v slack="$ABS_PARITY_SLACK" 'BEGIN {
+        delta = r - s; if (delta < 0) delta = -delta
+        tol = 0.10 * s; if (tol < slack) tol = slack
+        exit !(delta <= tol)
     }'
 }
 
@@ -492,7 +523,7 @@ EOF
         check "${src_ns}: at least one PVC was restored" false
     else
         for pvc in "${PVCS[@]}"; do
-            check "${src_ns}: PVC ${pvc} file count parity (±10%)" \
+            check "${src_ns}: PVC ${pvc} file count parity (±10% / ±${ABS_PARITY_SLACK})" \
                 verify_pvc_file_count_parity "$src_ns" "$dst_ns" "$pvc"
         done
     fi