Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 fe77f262e9 feat(wiki-index): roll out every build via Flux image automation
ci/woodpecker/push/build-ci-images Pipeline was successful
Replaces the per-commit tag pin with the house pattern: the build
publishes build.<unix-ts>, an ImageRepository/ImagePolicy pair tracks
it (numerical, newest wins), and the deployment carries the
$imagepolicy marker so the shared ImageUpdateAutomation bumps it. No
more hand-pinned digests, no same-day tag races. The reflector reads
the package anonymously like the other Gitea-hosted images.

The deployment keeps the verified 2026-09-20-4b529cd1 tag as its
starting value; the first build.* tag after merge replaces it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 11:04:04 +02:00
230 changed files with 1482 additions and 13331 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ steps:
bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: alert-triage-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
-66
View File
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip agent runtime images (REN-284 / REN-286): the stock
# agent-runtime-claude plus a tool set, one image per sandbox environment.
# Built with kaniko like build-ci-images.yml and pushed with the same
# ci_images_token (package read+write only, see the header there).
#
# Own workflow, not a step in build-ci-images.yml. A change to that file
# rebuilds all of its images at once and fills the 24-CPU woodpecker-ci-quota;
# on the REN-286 merge (pipeline 11306) this step then got no pod
# ("exceeded quota") and the go image was never built. Here it runs only when
# its own sources change, and it can be re-run alone with a deployment to
# target `build-agent-runtime`, without rebuilding the other images.
#
# The name looks odd on purpose. The kubernetes sandbox plugin keeps the image
# name and tag `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only the registry prefix
# (`imageRegistry`), replacing host + org. So each variant needs its own
# prefix with the same name under it:
# imageRegistry gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go
# -> gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1
# `v1` is what the plugin pulls and moves on every build; the date tag is the
# rollback point. konairius/ because the ci_images_token can push there and
# it is the target of the gitea_admin/* migration (#330).
when:
- event: push
branch: master
path:
- "ci/images/agent-runtime-*/**"
- ".woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-agent-runtime"'
steps:
- name: build-agent-runtime
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images
# Context is ci/images (not the variant dir) so both Containerfiles can
# COPY the shared agent-runtime-common/ files.
# One pod, both images one after the other (kaniko --cleanup between
# builds), at 1 CPU so it still fits if it overlaps another pipeline.
backend_options:
kubernetes:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: 4Gi
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
- |
for VARIANT in go ops; do
/kaniko/executor \
--cleanup \
--context . \
--dockerfile "agent-runtime-$VARIANT/Containerfile" \
--destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:$TAG" \
--destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:v1" \
|| exit 1
done
+38 -12
View File
@@ -26,14 +26,8 @@
# 38-reference change tracked separately in #330 rather than bundled here.
# Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that motivated the
# other cutovers does not apply to it.
#
# Push builds run on master only. Without the branch filter a feature branch
# that touches this file started all steps at once: it pushed unreviewed
# images and used the whole woodpecker-ci-quota, so the PR checks could not
# get a pod (REN-286).
when:
- event: push
branch: master
path:
- "ci/images/**"
- "secret-rotator/**"
@@ -356,17 +350,17 @@ steps:
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
# netbird-service-sync: the controller that reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy
# netbird-proxy-services: the controller that reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy
# services (public Ingress hosts -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP).
# Runtime artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
- name: build-netbird-service-sync
- name: build-netbird-proxy-services
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/netbird-service-sync
directory: ci/images/netbird-proxy-services
depends_on: []
when:
- event: deployment
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/netbird-service-sync/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
path: ["ci/images/netbird-proxy-services/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
@@ -380,8 +374,40 @@ steps:
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:latest
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:latest
# wiki-index: embedding index over the Notes repo's wiki/, fed from Gitea and
# queried by ~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py. Runtime artifact like netbird-proxy-services.
- name: build-wiki-index
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
directory: ci/images/wiki-index
depends_on: []
when:
- event: deployment
- event: push
path: ["ci/images/wiki-index/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
environment:
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: ci_images_token
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
# `build.<unix-ts>` is the tag Flux image automation tracks
# (infrastructure/image-automation/wiki-index.yaml): unique per build, so
# every push rolls out without a hand-pinned digest. The dated tag is
# rewritten several times a day and is kept for humans only.
- BUILD=build.$(date +%s)
- |
/kaniko/executor \
--context . \
--dockerfile Containerfile \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wiki-index:$TAG \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wiki-index:$BUILD \
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/wiki-index:latest
# bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0 (#576). Runtime
# artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
+21 -17
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
# and ci-claude:latest. The Containerfile makes this layer
# byte-reproducible, so rebuilding an unchanged version dedups
# in the registry instead of orphaning a fresh ~260 MB copy.
# 3. bump-pr — (only when any pin is off the latest version) rewrite every
# consumer pin to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
# 3. bump-pr — (only when the version actually changed) rewrite the 5
# consumer pins to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
# reviews and merges it; nothing auto-merges.
#
# TAG SCHEME — deliberately version tags (ci-claude:<claude-version>), NOT the dated
@@ -107,22 +107,31 @@ steps:
[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*) : ;;
*) echo "npm returned an implausible version '$$NEW' — aborting."; exit 1 ;;
esac
# Distinct tags the consumers currently reference. Divergent pins are
# normal (a pipeline bumped on its own); the bump rewrites all of them.
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ' | sed 's/ $$//')
[ -n "$$CUR" ] || { echo "No ci-claude pin found in the consumers — aborting."; exit 1; }
echo "latest=$$NEW current=[$$CUR] event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
# The tag every consumer currently references. They are kept identical,
# so this must resolve to EXACTLY ONE non-empty tag; anything else
# (no match, or a partial/disagreeing set) aborts rather than risk a
# corrupting sed later. Counting with `grep -c .` (non-empty lines)
# instead of `wc -l` is deliberate: an empty result yields 0 here but
# 1 under wc -l, which would slip past the guard.
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9A-Za-z._-]+' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u)
NTAGS=$$(printf '%s' "$$CUR" | grep -c . || true)
if [ -z "$$CUR" ] || [ "$$NTAGS" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "Expected exactly one ci-claude tag across the consumers, got [$$CUR]."
echo "Refusing to guess — fix the pins by hand."; exit 1
fi
echo "latest=$$NEW current=$$CUR event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
printf '%s' "$$NEW" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version"
printf '%s' "$$CUR" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current"
# Build when any pin is off latest, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump when any pin is off latest.
# Build when the version changed, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump the pins only when the
# version the consumers reference is not the latest.
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ] || [ "$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT" = "push" ]; then
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-build"; echo "will build $$NEW"
else
echo "already on $$NEW — nothing to build"
fi
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ]; then
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR [$$CUR] -> $$NEW"
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR $$CUR -> $$NEW"
else
echo "consumers already pin $$NEW — no PR"
fi
@@ -166,9 +175,6 @@ steps:
- |
[ -f "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump" ] || { echo "no version change — no PR"; exit 0; }
set -eu
# Secret values can carry a trailing newline; it breaks the push URL and the auth header.
PUSH_TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$PUSH_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
[ -n "$$PUSH_TOKEN" ] || { echo "PUSH_TOKEN is empty — aborting"; exit 1; }
NEW=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version")
CUR=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current")
# Both were validated non-empty by the decide step; re-assert before a
@@ -184,11 +190,9 @@ steps:
# is not a maintained list.
CONSUMERS=$$(grep -rlE 'ci-claude:[0-9]' .woodpecker)
[ -n "$$CONSUMERS" ] || { echo "No ci-claude consumers found — refusing to continue."; exit 1; }
# NEW goes into a sed replacement: allow only a plain x.y.z version.
printf '%s' "$$NEW" | grep -qE '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$$' || { echo "refusing non-x.y.z version '$$NEW'"; exit 1; }
# Every version-pinned tag becomes NEW, whatever it was; consumers only.
# Exact-string swap of the current tag for the new one, consumers only.
for f in $$CONSUMERS; do
sed -i "s#ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
sed -i "s#ci-claude:$$CUR#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
done
# Author is claude-bot (the PAT's account); the commit subject makes
# the automated-bump nature clear.
+15 -98
View File
@@ -17,44 +17,30 @@
# here is a static check that either passes or fails on the checkout alone, so it
# can gate PRs without becoming a bottleneck or a flake source.
when:
# Path-filtered on purpose, unlike ci-scripts-test.yml. That pipeline is two
# steps on already-cached images, so running it everywhere is free; this one
# pulls four images and builds every kustomization in the tree, which is real
# Path-filtered on purpose, unlike ci-scripts-test.yml. That pipeline is one
# step on one already-cached image, so running it everywhere is free; this one
# pulls three images and builds every kustomization in the tree, which is real
# cost to put on a docs-only PR. The filter covers everything the steps actually read:
# kubernetes/** for the manifests, scripts and promtool suites, .woodpecker/**
# for the lint (and so an edit to this file re-runs its own checks), and the
# promtool driver script by name.
#
# That last entry is NOT covered by kubernetes/**: promtool-rules.sh lives
# under scripts/, so without it a PR that only edits the script would never run
# the check it drives. It is listed as one file rather than scripts/ci/**
# because the rest of that directory is CI-agent helpers with nothing to do
# with this pipeline, and pulling four images for them is the cost this filter
# exists to avoid. Their own tests run in ci-scripts-test.yml on every PR.
# kubernetes/** for the manifests and scripts, .woodpecker/** for the lint (and
# so an edit to this file re-runs its own checks).
- event: pull_request
path:
- "kubernetes/**"
- ".woodpecker/**"
- "scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh"
- "scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh"
# THE THIRD DISCOVERY CHECK WENT TO A SCRIPT. kustomize-build and shellcheck
# both hand-roll the same shape — `find`, a floor guard against empty discovery,
# then a file-fed `while read`. Two copies was deliberate: the two traps being
# commented around (BusyBox find lacking `-printf`, and a piped loop running in
# a subshell where `fail` cannot propagate) are different, and both are worth
# spelling out where they bite. An earlier revision of this comment said a third
# instance would be the point to stop copying and factor it into `scripts/ci/`,
# where it would gain unit tests — and that is what `promtool` below does. Its
# discovery, floors and guards live in scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh and are
# tested by scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh on every PR via
# ci-scripts-test.yml. A FOURTH inline copy should go the same way; do not add
# one here.
# ADDING A THIRD DISCOVERY CHECK: kustomize-build and shellcheck both hand-roll
# the same shape — `find`, a floor guard against empty discovery, then a
# file-fed `while read`. Two copies is deliberate: the two traps being commented
# around (BusyBox find lacking `-printf`, and a piped loop running in a subshell
# where `fail` cannot propagate) are different, and both are worth spelling out
# where they bite. A third instance is the point to stop copying and factor it
# into a shared script under `scripts/ci/` — which is already covered by
# ci-scripts-test.yml, so it would gain unit tests in the process.
#
# Every step carries `depends_on: []` so all six run in PARALLEL and every
# Every step carries `depends_on: []` so all four run in PARALLEL and every
# failure shows in one run. Woodpecker's default is sequential, which would stop
# at the first failure and make a contributor fix-and-repush to discover the
# next — and these six are independent, cheap, offline checks with no ordering
# next — and these four are independent, cheap, offline checks with no ordering
# between them. Keep it on every step: `depends_on` is per-step, so dropping it
# from one silently re-serialises that step behind the others.
steps:
@@ -272,72 +258,3 @@ steps:
exit 1
fi
echo "ok no digest pins under openbao/rotation/"
# Machine-check the alert rules: parse every PrometheusRule, run the committed
# promtool unit suites, then damage the rules on purpose and require the suites
# to notice. Everything it does lives in scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh; read
# that file and kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/README.md for the why.
#
# The gap it closes: the other four steps prove a PrometheusRule assembles into
# valid YAML and nothing more — not that an expression parses, not that a label
# join matches anything, not that a `for` window does what its comment claims.
# On REN-129 the CNPG surge rule was written `for: 2m`, which fires on six of
# seven measured nights and would have mailed the owner twice a night at 04:16
# and 04:22 local for a backlog that clears itself. Nothing here would have
# caught it, and the arithmetic that did catch it was hand-written from scratch
# twice, in two runs, and thrown away both times because there was nowhere in
# the repo to commit it. REN-152 retired that rule; its `for` margin is now
# guarded by mutations.txt:backlog-for-12m.
#
# Offline, like the rest of this pipeline: no cluster, no registry, no secrets,
# no network. promtool reads files and exits.
#
# IMAGE — prom/prometheus, not a registry-local ci-* image, and pinned to an
# exact upstream version rather than a dated tag. The dated-tag convention
# guarded by no-digest-pins above is about OUR images, whose digests are
# garbage-collected out from under a pin; this is upstream and immutable.
#
# The version must be 3.x, and that is not a preference. The cluster runs
# whatever kube-prometheus-stack >= 72.0.0 ships, which is Prometheus 3, and
# alert `for` evaluation is version-sensitive — a 2.x promtool would be
# checking a different evaluator than production, so the margins the suites
# assert would be claims about the wrong program. promtool-rules.sh asserts the
# major version it was handed and fails on 2.x, so a careless bump here is a
# red step rather than a quietly wrong check. Keep this at the latest stable
# 3.x, per the standing rule that any software uses the latest stable version.
#
# This image is NOT covered by image-automation (same reason as
# woodpecker-lint above: a Woodpecker pipeline file has no apiVersion/kind, so
# an $imagepolicy marker here is silently ignored — fluxcd/flux2#2826). The
# bump is manual.
#
# `prom/prometheus` is busybox-based and ships /bin/sh, so it can run a
# `commands:` block — unlike the plain woodpecker-cli tag, which cannot. Its
# find/grep/awk/sed are BusyBox, which is why promtool-rules.sh avoids
# `find -printf` and `grep -r --include`; it was verified against BusyBox
# 1.35.0 as well as GNU. The image also declares `USER nobody`, so the script
# writes its stripped mirror under mktemp and never into the workspace.
- name: promtool
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: prom/prometheus:v3.15.0
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh
# Comments cite other YAML blocks by anchor name, never by line number
# (REN-183; the exact syntax is in CONTRIBUTING.md, not repeated here because
# an example written in this comment would itself be checked). Line numbers drift on any edit
# above them and nothing noticed: three drift fixes were merged by hand
# before this step existed. This fails on a new line-number citation and on
# a citation whose file or anchor marker does not exist.
# Existence only — it never judges whether the anchored block still says
# what the citing comment claims, so ordinary edits cannot turn it red.
#
# It scans every YAML file in the checkout, but this pipeline only runs on
# the paths in `when:` above, so an edit confined to ansible/ or esphome/ is
# checked on the next PR that does touch kubernetes/ or .woodpecker/.
# Self-test: scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh, in ci-scripts-test.yml.
- name: yaml-citations
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh
+4 -34
View File
@@ -8,45 +8,15 @@
# against adversarial PR input. Running it here fails the offending PR's checks
# before it can merge.
#
# scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh is the same idea for the alert-rule gate.
# What it tests is not whether promtool evaluates PromQL — ci-manifests-test.yml
# does that with the real binary against the real rules — but whether
# promtool-rules.sh REFUSES TO REPORT SUCCESS when it has checked nothing: zero
# manifests discovered, zero suites discovered, a `rule_files` path that does not
# resolve (promtool warns, loads zero rules, and passes every assertion), a
# mutation the suites no longer catch. Those are the states a green pipeline
# cannot tell apart from real coverage, so they need a test that asserts the
# failure. It stubs promtool, so it needs neither the binary nor the heavy image.
#
# Both are unfiltered by path on purpose: this pipeline is two steps on one
# already-cached image, so running it everywhere is free, and a guard whose test
# only runs when someone remembers to touch the right directory is not a guard.
#
# Only in homelab (scripts/ci/ lives here); the file is not deployed to the
# mirrored repos, so it does not run on their PRs. All tests here are offline (no
# token, no network, no cluster) — the ci-claude image just provides sh + jq, and
# it is already pulled by pr-review.yml on the same event, so the runner has it
# cached.
# mirrored repos, so it does not run on their PRs. The test is offline (no token,
# no network, no cluster) — the ci-claude image just provides sh + jq, and it is
# already pulled by pr-review.yml on the same event, so the runner has it cached.
when:
- event: pull_request
# `depends_on: []` on every step so they run in parallel and one failure does not hide
# the other. Same reasoning as the note above `steps:` in ci-manifests-test.yml.
steps:
- name: model-selection-tests
depends_on: []
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
- name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
depends_on: []
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh
- name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
depends_on: []
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh
+3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ when:
branch: master
path:
- "ansible/roles/netbird-server/**"
# install-netbird-server.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-server.yml"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-server.yml"
- event: deployment
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ steps:
# fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
# ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
# test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
commands:
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ steps:
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: issue-fix-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: pr-review-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
# this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
when:
- branch: master
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:
steps:
- name: update-audit-agent
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.250
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
-198
View File
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
# Nightly wiki maintenance for the Notes vault (k.renner/notes), replacing the
# workstation's wiki-maintenance and wiki-consolidate timers: distill the raw/
# backlog into wiki/ (wiki-distill agent), audit wiki/ with the vault's own
# script (structural checks, no model), then consolidate (wiki-consolidate
# agent: verifies a cohort of notes against sources, repos and the live
# cluster and edits them). The pipeline commits and pushes as Claude Bot; the
# push webhook then refreshes the wiki service.
#
# The agents address the vault as ~/Notes and the repos as ~/source/<repo>, so
# each agent step links those into the workspace instead of rewriting them.
when:
- event: cron
cron: wiki-maintenance
# Hand-started runs: `woodpecker pipeline create k.renner/homelab --branch master`.
# The typesafe_api_key secret is scoped to cron and manual, not deployment.
- event: manual
steps:
- name: checkout-notes
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
pull: true
environment:
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
commands:
- |
set -eu
# Token only on the wire, never in .git/config. Secrets set from files carry
# a trailing newline (run 10220: "could not read Username"); strip CR/LF.
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
clone --depth 50 --branch main https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/notes.git notes
echo "raw backlog: $$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l) file(s)"
# Full history for the consolidate agent's `git log` checks; the
# workspace clone is shallow and tree-filtered.
mkdir -p sources
git clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab.git sources/homelab
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homeassistant.git sources/homeassistant
- name: fetch-diag
# Read-only live-cluster access for the consolidate agent, same mechanism
# as issue-fix.yml: ./.ci-diag/kubectl plus a 1h ci-diagnostics token.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
environment:
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
from_secret: sops_age_key
S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID:
from_secret: hetzner_s3_access_key
S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:
from_secret: hetzner_s3_secret_key
commands:
- bash scripts/ci/fetch-kubeconfig.sh
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
- name: distill
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
pull: true
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
commands:
- |
set -eu
# An empty queue must not start the agent: its startup context alone
# costs more than the whole audit.
BACKLOG=$$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l)
if [ "$$BACKLOG" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "distill: raw/ is empty, skipping the agent"
exit 0
fi
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
"$$HOME/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py" --probe-index
MODEL=$$(sh scripts/ci/pick-model.sh "distill raw source notes into atomic wiki notes: read sources, check the wiki for existing coverage, write or merge notes; careful writing, moderate reasoning")
if [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then echo "distill: selected model $$MODEL"; else echo "distill: using the CLI default model"; fi
cd notes
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/distill.md | claude $${MODEL:+--model $$MODEL} \
--agent wiki-distill \
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)" \
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/settings.json \
-p
- name: audit
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
pull: true
commands:
# Findings are report lines in output/, not a pipeline failure.
- python3 -B notes/bin/wiki_audit.py --vault "$$PWD/notes"
- name: consolidate
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
pull: true
environment:
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
commands:
- |
set -eu
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
ln -sfn "$$PWD/sources" "$$HOME/source"
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
if [ -f .ci-diag/kubeconfig ]; then
ln -sf "$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubectl" /usr/local/bin/kubectl
export KUBECONFIG="$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubeconfig"
else
echo "consolidate: no ci-diag kubeconfig, live cluster checks unavailable"
fi
cd notes
# JSON output: the agent's report and the run's cost come out of one
# record at the end instead of a 45-minute silent log.
# One source for the Bash allowlist: the settings file (run 10608: the
# agent writes ~/Notes, the rules carried only /root/Notes).
BASH_RULES=$$(jq -r '[.permissions.allow[] | select(startswith("Bash("))] | join(",")' ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json)
rc=0
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate.md | claude \
--agent wiki-consolidate \
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Agent,$$BASH_RULES" \
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json \
--output-format json \
-p > /tmp/consolidate.json || rc=$$?
# A killed or crashed claude leaves no valid JSON; report rc, not a jq error.
if [ -s /tmp/consolidate.json ] && jq -e . /tmp/consolidate.json > /dev/null; then
jq -r '.result // empty' /tmp/consolidate.json
jq -c '{duration_ms, num_turns, total_cost_usd, is_error}' /tmp/consolidate.json
else
echo "consolidate: no result record (exit $$rc)"; head -c 2000 /tmp/consolidate.json || true
fi
echo "consolidate: git log --oneline of the run:"
git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD
exit $$rc
- name: push-notes
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.283
pull: true
environment:
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
commands:
- |
set -eu
cd notes
git config user.email "claude-bot@renner.uno"
git config user.name "Claude Bot"
# Only the vault content is committed; anything an agent leaves elsewhere
# in the checkout (run 10362: scratch scripts in the root) stays behind.
# The consolidate agent commits its own snapshots, so HEAD may already be
# ahead of origin/main with a clean tree.
git add -A -- wiki raw output .wiki-consolidation-state.json
git diff --cached --quiet || git commit -q -m "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F): distill + audit + consolidate (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)"
if [ "$$(git rev-list --count origin/main..HEAD)" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "wiki-maintenance: no changes"
exit 0
fi
# The workstation pushes main on its own (notes-push.path), so main moves
# while the agents run (run 10241: non-fast-forward). The run's work goes
# to a branch and a PR that this step merges through Gitea; a conflict
# leaves the PR open for a human and fails the run.
BRANCH="wiki-maintenance/$$(date -u +%F)-$$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER"
git checkout -q -b "$$BRANCH"
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" push origin "HEAD:$$BRANCH"
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1/repos/k.renner/notes"
jq -n --arg title "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F) (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)" \
--arg body "Nightly distill + audit + consolidate. Merged by the pipeline; open only if the merge failed." \
--arg head "$$BRANCH" '{title: $$title, body: $$body, head: $$head, base: "main"}' > /tmp/pr.json
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @/tmp/pr.json "$$API/pulls")
echo "POST pull -> HTTP $$code"
[ "$$code" -ge 200 ] && [ "$$code" -lt 300 ] || { cat /tmp/pr-resp.json; exit 1; }
NUM=$$(jq -r '.number' /tmp/pr-resp.json)
# Merge without delete_branch_after_merge: run 10254 got HTTP 500 from that
# call although the merge itself had landed. Verify the PR state instead of
# trusting the status code, then drop the branch as a separate, best-effort step.
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/merge-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"Do":"merge"}' "$$API/pulls/$$NUM/merge")
echo "POST merge #$$NUM -> HTTP $$code"
MERGED=$$(curl -s -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" "$$API/pulls/$$NUM" | jq -r '.merged')
echo "PR #$$NUM merged: $$MERGED"
[ "$$MERGED" = "true" ] || { cat /tmp/merge-resp.json; echo "PR #$$NUM left open"; exit 1; }
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/del-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" \
"$$API/branches/$$(printf '%s' "$$BRANCH" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')")
echo "DELETE branch $$BRANCH -> HTTP $$code (best effort)"
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# Contributing
## Citing other YAML from a comment
- Mark the block you cite with a comment line `# anchor: <name>` (kebab-case, unique in that file). If the block is inside a `|` block scalar, put the marker just above the key, never inside the scalar.
- Cite it as `path.yaml#<name>`, with the path relative to the citing file's directory or to the repo root. Never cite `path.yaml:<line>`, because line numbers go stale on any edit above them.
- `scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh` enforces this in `ci-manifests-test.yml`: it fails on line-number citations and on citations whose file or anchor does not exist.
-70
View File
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
# homelab
GitOps source for the Renner homelab cluster. Flux applies `master` to
production, so every merge is a production change. Changes go in by pull
request only; see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for YAML conventions.
## Change rules that protect Home Assistant
Owner decision (REN-240, REN-243). Home Assistant runs the house, so it
gets two rules on top of normal review.
### 1. Disruptive work runs only 02:00–05:00 Europe/Berlin
Planned work that can restart Home Assistant or disrupt the cluster is
merged and applied only between **02:00 and 05:00 Europe/Berlin**. That
covers:
- node drain, node reboot, Talos upgrade
- CNI (Cilium, Multus) and cluster-wide network policy
- storage (Rook/Ceph, CSI, snapshot controller, CNPG operator)
- Flux core (`kubernetes/clusters/*/flux-system/`, Flux controllers)
- Authentik
- OpenBao, including secret rotation that restarts consumers
- anything in `kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/`
A PR in this list states in its description that it waits for the window.
Flux applies on merge, so "wait for the window" means **merge** in the
window, not just apply. If unsure whether a change is disruptive, treat it
as disruptive.
Not covered: Home Assistant image bumps by Flux image automation. They stay
fully automatic by owner decision. If one breaks Home Assistant, roll it
back with [RUNBOOK-home-assistant-image-rollback.md](kubernetes/RUNBOOK-home-assistant-image-rollback.md).
An incident rollback is not planned work; the owner decides its timing.
### 2. HA-impact review before merge
Every PR that touches `kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/`, or makes a
cluster-wide disruptive change from the list above, needs an **HA-impact
review** before merge: a named reviewer states in the PR what Home
Assistant will notice (restart, lost integration, lost history, none) and
approves.
- Reviewer: Hestia, the Home Assistant maintainer.
- Until Hestia exists: the owner does the HA-impact review.
This is in addition to the normal review and merge by Argus. Argus does
not merge such a PR without the HA-impact approval.
## Agent runtime images
Pod images for the Paperclip Kubernetes sandbox (REN-284). Each is the stock
`ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude` (pinned by digest) plus a tool
set. Base user (1000, non-root), entrypoint and cmd are unchanged; the
images run with a read-only root FS. Source in `ci/images/agent-runtime-*`,
built by `.woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml` (re-run alone: deployment to
target `build-agent-runtime`), versions bumped by Renovate. Both also
carry `claude-agent-acp` for the ACP engine, pinned and patched like
Paperclip ships it, SDK override included
(`ci/images/agent-runtime-common/`); bump it by hand
together with Paperclip. All tools are on the default `PATH`.
| Image | `imageRegistry` | Adds |
|---|---|---|
| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go` | Go toolchain, golangci-lint |
| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops` | kubectl, flux, kustomize, helm |
The plugin keeps the name `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only host and
org, hence the nested path. Every build also pushes a date tag
(`:YYYY-MM-DD`) as the rollback point. `konairius` is public: no pull secret.
+7 -6
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
# Deploy the NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster members (the public edge).
# Deploy a NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (a second proxy host).
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml
#
# Prerequisites:
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
# listed under [netbird_proxy] in inventory/pve_hosts.yml. Docker is
# installed by the (Arch-aware) docker-install role.
# - DNS A/AAAA for the host's own name (e.g. proxy-1.renner.uno) -> its IP.
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared by every member) — no
# new token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the
# cluster.
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's A/AAAA to proxy.renner.uno so
# traffic round-robins across the cluster.
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared with VPS-1) — no new
# token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the cluster.
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's IP to the proxy domain so traffic
# round-robins across the cluster. Repoint proxy.renner.uno away from its
# CNAME to netbird.renner.uno (management host) to A/AAAA records listing
# BOTH proxy IPs (VPS-1 + this host).
- name: Deploy NetBird reverse-proxy cluster member
hosts: netbird_proxy
+1
View File
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@
- common
- docker-install
- netbird-server
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
+4 -4
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@
#
# WHAT IS NOT, and must not be added:
#
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on the
# proxies, an Ansible template — but the
# management server does not validate it from
# any file. It is registered
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on both
# the server and the proxies, all Ansible
# templates — but the management server does not
# validate it from any of them. It is registered
# in the management DATABASE. Rotating it changes
# only what the proxies present, so every proxy
# is locked out: "proxy auth failed: too many
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy on the proxy hosts.
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy (VPS-1 and proxy-1).
#
# Why it exists: the proxy's embedded NetBird client pins each proxied
# domain's route to a specific routing-peer identity. The netbird-ingress
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ netbird_watchdog_probe_hosts:
- home.renner.uno
- immich.renner.uno
# Address the probe connects to. The proxy binds :443 on the host directly.
# Address the probe connects to. 127.0.0.1 reaches the local proxy on both
# members: VPS-1 routes it via Traefik's HostSNI(*) TCP passthrough, proxy-1
# binds :443 directly.
netbird_watchdog_probe_address: 127.0.0.1
netbird_watchdog_container: netbird-proxy
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
# Deploys the reverse-proxy watchdog (see defaults/main.yml for why).
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency)
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency; proxy-1 is Arch, VPS-1 Debian)
ansible.builtin.package:
name: curl
state: present
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
# NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (proxy-only host, e.g. proxy-1).
# Every member uses the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN + token. NetBird load-balances/
# fails the cluster over via DNS round-robin on the proxy domain (see
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
# Joins the same proxy cluster as the VPS-1 proxy: identical NB_PROXY_DOMAIN
# + the same token. NetBird load-balances/fails the cluster over via DNS
# round-robin on the proxy domain (see plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
# MUST match the netbird-server role's netbird_version — the reverse-proxy
# release line has to track the management server it enrolls against.
@@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ netbird_version: "0.73.2"
# Management server this proxy enrolls against (public API, TLS).
netbird_server_host: netbird.renner.uno
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member, and must NOT
# be a subdomain of the management domain (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird
# docs (TLS/routing conflicts).
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member.
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
# A shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a
# valid HA cluster, so one token serves every member.
# Reuse VPS-1's proxy token — a shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the
# same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a valid HA cluster, so no separate token is needed.
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
# Relay auth secret — MUST be identical across every relay instance and the
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
# NetBird reverse-proxy — HA cluster member on a proxy-only host.
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik: the
# proxy owns the port and terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME
# challenges directly.
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik:
# unlike VPS-1 (where the proxy shares :443 with management/signal/relay via
# SNI routing), this host runs nothing else, so the proxy owns the port and
# terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME challenges directly.
services:
proxy:
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
@@ -23,3 +23,9 @@ netbird_datastore_key: "{{ vault_netbird_datastore_key }}"
# Relay secret for WebSocket relay authentication
netbird_relay_secret: "{{ vault_netbird_relay_secret }}"
# Reverse proxy configuration
# IMPORTANT: Proxy domain must NOT be a subdomain of the management domain
# (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird docs - causes TLS/routing conflicts
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
@@ -16,3 +16,7 @@
- name: Restart netbird coturn
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate coturn
- name: Restart netbird proxy
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate proxy
+9 -68
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- /opt/netbird/management
- /opt/netbird/signal
- /opt/netbird/letsencrypt
- /opt/netbird/proxy/certs
- name: Deploy docker-compose.yml
ansible.builtin.template:
@@ -58,83 +59,23 @@
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart netbird coturn
# The public edge is the proxy hosts (plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml); this
# host runs no reverse proxy. The tasks below remove the one it used to run,
# its watchdogs first so they cannot restart it mid-removal, and can go once
# the role has run against every host that ever carried it.
- name: Check for reverse-proxy watchdog units
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}"
loop:
- netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
- netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
register: _proxy_watchdog_units
- name: Stop and disable reverse-proxy watchdogs
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: "{{ item.item }}"
state: stopped
enabled: false
loop: "{{ _proxy_watchdog_units.results }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
when: item.stat.exists
- name: Remove reverse-proxy watchdog units and scripts
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.service
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-watchdog
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog
- /run/netbird-proxy-watchdog
register: _proxy_watchdog_files
- name: Reload systemd after removing the watchdog units
ansible.builtin.systemd:
daemon_reload: true
when: _proxy_watchdog_files.changed
- name: Deploy proxy.env
ansible.builtin.template:
src: proxy.env.j2
dest: /opt/netbird/proxy.env
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart netbird proxy
- name: Pull NetBird container images
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose pull
changed_when: false
# --remove-orphans removes containers of services no longer in the compose
# file (the reverse proxy).
- name: Start NetBird containers
ansible.builtin.shell: |
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d
register: docker_compose_result
changed_when: >-
'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stderr
- name: Remove reverse-proxy volumes
ansible.builtin.shell: |
set -eu
for v in netbird_netbird_proxy_certs netbird_netbird_proxy_data netbird_netbird_proxy_state; do
if [ -n "$(docker volume ls -q --filter "name=^${v}$")" ]; then
docker volume rm "$v"
echo "removed $v"
fi
done
register: _proxy_volumes
changed_when: "'removed' in _proxy_volumes.stdout"
- name: Remove reverse-proxy config and state
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop:
- /opt/netbird/proxy.env
- /opt/netbird/proxy
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state
changed_when: "'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or 'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout"
# The management store has no cluster-side backup. Pulling one put a root
# key on this host that the cluster held, and this server's own state is
@@ -187,9 +187,10 @@ services:
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-management.service=netbird-management"
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.port=33073"
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.scheme=h2c"
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — the proxy hosts (proxy-1, proxy-2)
# connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443 and get
# a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — remote reverse-proxy instances (e.g.
# proxy-1) connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443.
# The local proxy uses management:33073 directly, so it never needed
# this route; remote ones get a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.rule=Host(`{{ netbird_server_host }}`) && PathPrefix(`/management.ProxyService/`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.tls=true"
@@ -220,6 +221,37 @@ services:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Reverse Proxy Service (per docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/migration/enable-reverse-proxy)
proxy:
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
container_name: netbird-proxy
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- netbird
depends_on:
- management
env_file:
- ./proxy.env
volumes:
- netbird_proxy_certs:/certs
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state:/var/lib/netbird
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.rule=HostSNI(`*`)"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.tls.passthrough=true"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.service=proxy-tls"
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.priority=1"
- "traefik.tcp.services.proxy-tls.loadbalancer.server.port=8443"
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
networks:
netbird:
driver: bridge
volumes:
netbird_proxy_certs:
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
NB_PROXY_DOMAIN={{ netbird_proxy_domain }}
NB_PROXY_TOKEN={{ netbird_proxy_token }}
NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=http://management:33073
NB_PROXY_ALLOW_INSECURE=true
NB_PROXY_ADDRESS=:8443
NB_PROXY_ACME_CERTIFICATES=true
NB_PROXY_ACME_CHALLENGE_TYPE=tls-alpn-01
NB_PROXY_CERTIFICATE_DIRECTORY=/certs
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
{
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-consolidate agent in CI: read the vault and the",
"//2": "source repos cloned under /root/source, read the live cluster through the",
"//3": "ci-diagnostics kubeconfig, edit wiki/, output/ and the rotation state only.",
"//4": "Deny rules win; git and kubectl are read-only subcommands, no network tools.",
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
"Read(//root/source/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/.wiki-consolidation-state.json)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes ls-files:*)",
"Bash(kubectl get:*)",
"Bash(kubectl describe:*)",
"Bash(kubectl version:*)",
"Bash(kubectl api-resources:*)",
"Bash(kubectl explain:*)",
"Bash(git log:*)",
"Bash(git show:*)",
"Bash(git status:*)",
"Bash(git diff:*)",
"Bash(git rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant log:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant show:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant status:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant log:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant show:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant status:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(date:*)",
"Bash(wc:*)",
"Bash(stat:*)",
"Bash(head:*)",
"Bash(tail:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Read(//proc/**)",
"Read(//etc/**)",
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
"Read(//root/.kube/**)",
"Read(//woodpecker/**/.ci-diag/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/source/*/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/source/**)",
"Bash(kubectl apply:*)",
"Bash(kubectl delete:*)",
"Bash(kubectl patch:*)",
"Bash(kubectl edit:*)",
"Bash(kubectl scale:*)",
"Bash(kubectl rollout:*)",
"Bash(kubectl exec:*)",
"Bash(kubectl cp:*)",
"Bash(kubectl drain:*)",
"Bash(kubectl cordon:*)",
"Bash(kubectl label:*)",
"Bash(kubectl annotate:*)",
"Bash(git push:*)",
"Bash(git reset:*)",
"Bash(git checkout:*)",
"Bash(git clean:*)",
"Bash(git rebase:*)",
"Bash(git config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab config:*)",
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab config:*)",
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant config:*)",
"Bash(rm:*)",
"Bash(rm -rf:*)",
"Bash(curl:*)",
"Bash(wget:*)",
"Bash(ssh:*)",
"Bash(tea:*)",
"Bash(woodpecker:*)"
]
}
}
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes); the homelab and homeassistant repositories are checked out under ~/source/. `kubectl` reads the live cluster with a read-only identity.
Run the wiki-consolidate agent now for today's scheduled consolidation pass. Follow its instructions exactly: snapshot the vault to git first, abort if that fails, select today's rotating cohort of 20 from the state file, verify claims against both their sources and the live systems, act on the verdicts, write the dated report to ~/Notes/output/, update the state file, and snapshot again at the end. Do not push; the pipeline pushes the run's commits.
Report the counts and the coverage progress when you are done.
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes). Do exactly this, nothing else:
Glob ~/Notes/raw/*.md (top level only, never ~/Notes/raw/_processed/). Distill every file you find into ~/Notes/wiki/ following your process, including the ranker check for every concept. Move each fully processed source to ~/Notes/raw/_processed/. If raw/ has no top-level files besides _index.md, say so and stop.
Do not commit or push; the pipeline does that after you finish. Do not touch anything outside ~/Notes/wiki/ and ~/Notes/raw/.
End with one line per file: which wiki notes it produced or merged into, or "nothing distillable".
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
{
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-maintenance agent (wiki-distill) in CI.",
"//2": "The step's environment holds a Gitea push token, a TypeSafe key and the wiki-index",
"//3": "client credential, so the Read tool is kept away from /proc (env dumps), /root outside",
"//4": "the vault symlink target, /etc and the checkout's .git/. The vault itself is the work.",
"//5": "Mirrors ci/agents/issue-fix/settings.json; absolute globs because the vault is reached",
"//6": "through the ~/Notes symlink the pipeline creates.",
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*)",
"Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
"Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*)",
"Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(date:*)",
"Bash(wc:*)",
"Bash(head:*)",
"Bash(tail:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Read(//proc/**)",
"Read(//etc/**)",
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
"Bash(rm:*)",
"Bash(git:*)",
"Bash(curl:*)",
"Bash(wget:*)"
]
}
}
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/dist/acp-agent.js b/dist/acp-agent.js
index 0214a509eb5e7b777a69e4e34637941c275d27b1..403be02df66e25eee29e7d5bef14627011e02b30 100644
--- a/dist/acp-agent.js
+++ b/dist/acp-agent.js
@@ -2922,9 +2922,19 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
amount: message.total_cost_usd,
currency: "USD",
},
- ...(message.origin && {
- _meta: { "_claude/origin": message.origin },
- }),
+ _meta: {
+ ...(message.origin && { "_claude/origin": message.origin }),
+ // ACP's core Usage shape exposes context occupancy and
+ // cost, but not the billable input/output split. Keep the
+ // SDK's bounded aggregate in extension metadata so ACPX can
+ // normalize it without persisting a raw provider message.
+ usage: {
+ input_tokens: message.usage.input_tokens,
+ output_tokens: message.usage.output_tokens,
+ cache_read_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_read_input_tokens,
+ cache_creation_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_creation_input_tokens,
+ },
+ },
},
});
}
@@ -5311,6 +5321,10 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
settingSources: ["user", "project", "local"],
...(thinking !== undefined && { thinking }),
...userProvidedOptions,
+ // Paperclip Runner owns the complete session context. Its isolated
+ // user root contains only assigned skills; project/local settings
+ // would reintroduce host prompts, plugins, skills, and MCP servers.
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && { settingSources: ["user"] }),
...(settings && { settings }),
env,
// Override certain fields that must be controlled by ACP
@@ -5318,7 +5332,9 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
includePartialMessages: true,
forwardSubagentText,
mcpServers: {
- ...(userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {}),
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1"
+ ? {}
+ : (userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {})),
...mcpServers,
...(fileChangeAuditSupport
? { [FILE_CHANGE_AUDIT_SERVER_NAME]: fileChangeAuditSupport.mcpServer }
@@ -5329,6 +5345,16 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
allowDangerouslySkipPermissions: ALLOW_BYPASS,
permissionMode: initialPermissionMode,
canUseTool: this.canUseTool(sessionId),
+ // The runner pins this actual MCP endpoint before provider launch.
+ // Exempt only task delivery/control tools at the SDK dispatch boundary,
+ // not arbitrary provider permission metadata or MCP name prefixes.
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && {
+ allowedTools: mcpServers.paperclip?.type === "http"
+ && mcpServers.paperclip.url === process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_TASK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL
+ ? ["paperclip_finish", "paperclip_block", "read_current_wake_comments", "request_human_input"]
+ .map((tool) => `mcp__paperclip__${tool}`)
+ : [],
+ }),
// Forward MCP elicitation requests onto ACP elicitation. Only attached
// when the client advertised support, so non-supporting clients keep the
// SDK's default (auto-decline) behavior. (AskUserQuestion is handled in
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"private": true,
"dependencies": {
"@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp": "0.73.0"
},
"overrides": {
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "0.3.280"
}
}
-60
View File
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip agent runtime + Go toolchain (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
# image of the `k8s-go` sandbox environment.
#
# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
#
# Both binaries are static; they run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
FROM golang:1.27.1-bookworm@sha256:69a7b9788769bec032d238959b61854e9ae87f57be9029ec04e9885fabf99195 AS go
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS golangci-lint
# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
COPY --from=go /usr/local/go /usr/local/go
COPY --from=golangci-lint /usr/bin/golangci-lint /usr/local/bin/golangci-lint
# go and gofmt also in /usr/local/bin: a process started with the default PATH
# (not the image ENV) still finds them.
USER root
RUN ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go \
&& ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
USER 1000:1000
# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
USER root
RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
&& npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
&& git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
&& npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
&& ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
&& rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
&& npm cache clean --force
USER 1000:1000
# The sandbox pod has a read-only root FS. Writable mounts: $HOME
# (/home/paperclip, 1Gi), $HOME/.cache (1Gi), /tmp (2Gi), /workspace.
# - GOPATH (module cache) goes to /tmp, the biggest one.
# - GOCACHE and the golangci-lint cache keep their default under $HOME/.cache.
# - GOTOOLCHAIN=local: a go.mod asking for a newer Go fails clearly instead of
# downloading a toolchain through the egress allow-list.
ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH \
GOPATH=/tmp/go \
GOTOOLCHAIN=local
# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
# The PATH check uses the base image's default PATH, not the ENV above.
RUN go version && golangci-lint version \
&& env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
sh -ec 'for t in go gofmt golangci-lint claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
-51
View File
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip agent runtime + cluster tools (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
# image of the `k8s-ops` sandbox environment.
#
# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
#
# kubectl and flux match the ci-k8s image. All four binaries are static; they
# run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
FROM registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.36.5@sha256:0667e3f3e6ef435d7cd4c16684244703ebd67314c17511c2a9f87ea44f6cdf6b AS kubectl
FROM ghcr.io/fluxcd/flux-cli:v2.9.5@sha256:704d5529535570a495249b643159c93a9aa88ffca07813c974a54b7ba6edbd86 AS flux
FROM registry.k8s.io/kustomize/kustomize:v5.8.1@sha256:899fcd3bc898160e62bcaf82932b0cb29ba38d16272353db2e7acbba82129429 AS kustomize
FROM alpine/helm:4.3.0@sha256:a6cf54599ccb99d90cf0712b30f03fdb3cab062e6b94e0418cc4db7e8a1464b2 AS helm
# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
COPY --from=kubectl /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
COPY --from=flux /usr/local/bin/flux /usr/local/bin/flux
COPY --from=kustomize /app/kustomize /usr/local/bin/kustomize
COPY --from=helm /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
USER root
RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
&& npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
&& git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
&& npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
&& ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
&& rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
&& npm cache clean --force
USER 1000:1000
# Read-only root FS: kubectl (~/.kube/cache) and helm (~/.cache, ~/.config)
# write only under $HOME, which the sandbox pod mounts writable. No ENV needed.
# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
RUN kubectl version --client && flux version --client && kustomize version && helm version \
&& env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
sh -ec 'for t in kubectl flux kustomize helm claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
+2 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
FROM node:24-alpine@sha256:ebfe2f90462722a7a4de65e91990e97fe0d401c70e0e762c5b53302f905ec1c1
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2
# Default to the latest Claude Code. Pinning a fixed version is the wrong
# default here: old releases eventually stop working against the API, so a
@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
git \
jq \
openssh-client \
openssl \
python3 \
py3-yaml
openssl
# Install Claude Code, then make the resulting layer byte-stable so that a
# rebuild of the SAME version DEDUPS in the Gitea registry instead of orphaning
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.9
ARG VELERO_VERSION=v1.16.0
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.3
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.5
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
"https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
&& echo "28e9ccd9aebd690fa03d8cf2582221d87ea38b2a1704f411d75a03589c58f2aa /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& echo "7e1d4b7d5846964bdcf63a794e3c8161bb6ef2983d5ace58ea5322f3bf32a27e /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# netbird-service-sync: reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services (public
# netbird-proxy-services: reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services (public
# domains -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP) from Ingresses carrying the
# public label. Standard library only, so the image is the interpreter plus one
# file; runs unprivileged as its own user.
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""netbird-service-sync: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
"""netbird-proxy-services: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
Source of truth: every Ingress carrying the public label (dns.renner.uno/public).
For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
LOG = logging.getLogger("netbird-service-sync")
LOG = logging.getLogger("netbird-proxy-services")
NB = os.environ.get("NB_MANAGEMENT_URL", "https://netbird.renner.uno").rstrip("/")
BAO_ADDR = os.environ.get("BAO_ADDR", "http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200").rstrip("/")
BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "netbird-service-sync")
BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "netbird-proxy-services")
BAO_PAT_PATH = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_PATH", "homelab/data/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird")
BAO_PAT_KEY = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_KEY", "pat")
SERVICE_CIDR = os.environ.get("SERVICE_CIDR", "10.96.0.0/12")
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ def ensure_network(nb):
if n["name"] == NETWORK_NAME:
return n["id"]
n = nb.post("networks", {"name": NETWORK_NAME,
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync; public ingress via TLS passthrough"})
"description": "managed by netbird-proxy-services; public ingress via TLS passthrough"})
LOG.info("created network %s (%s)", NETWORK_NAME, n["id"])
return n["id"]
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ def ensure_resource(nb, net):
if r.get("address") == SERVICE_CIDR:
return r["id"]
r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/resources", {"name": "cluster service CIDR", "address": SERVICE_CIDR,
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync",
"description": "managed by netbird-proxy-services",
"enabled": True, "groups": []})
LOG.info("created subnet resource %s (%s)", SERVICE_CIDR, r["id"])
return r["id"]
+2 -2
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d650
# kubernetes/talos/patches/cluster.yaml. The phase reads the version from that
# file at run time and passes it to the provisioner; this pin only decides which
# client talks to it.
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.9
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
ARG KOPIA_VERSION=0.23.1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
"https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
&& echo "28e9ccd9aebd690fa03d8cf2582221d87ea38b2a1704f411d75a03589c58f2aa /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& echo "7e1d4b7d5846964bdcf63a794e3c8161bb6ef2983d5ace58ea5322f3bf32a27e /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# wiki-index: embedding index over the Notes repo's wiki/, fed from Gitea,
# queried by ~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py. Standard library only; runs unprivileged.
FROM python:3.13-slim
RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin wikiindex
COPY wiki_index.py /opt/wiki_index.py
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
USER wikiindex
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/opt/wiki_index.py"]
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unit tests for wiki_index. Run: python3 -m unittest test_wiki_index"""
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
import wiki_index as wi
NOTE = """---
title: 'UDM intercepts DNS'
type: wiki
tags: [dns, unifi]
aliases: [udm dns interception, dig 1.1.1.1 wrong]
---
# UDM intercepts DNS
The UDM answers every UDP/53 query itself.
## Details
More.
"""
class ParseTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_note_text(self):
title, text = wi.note_text("udm-dns", NOTE)
self.assertEqual(title, "UDM intercepts DNS")
self.assertIn("udm dns UDM intercepts DNS udm dns interception", text)
self.assertIn("dns unifi", text)
self.assertTrue(text.endswith("The UDM answers every UDP/53 query itself."))
self.assertLessEqual(len(text), wi.EMBED_CHARS)
def test_credentials_are_stripped(self):
original = wi.http
wi.http = lambda method, url, body=None, headers=None, timeout=60.0: (
{"auth": {"client_token": "t"}} if url.endswith("/login")
else {"data": {"data": {"gitea_token": "abc\n", "webhook_secret": " s3cret\n"}}})
original_sa = wi.SA_TOKEN
try:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
wi.SA_TOKEN = Path(d) / "token"
wi.SA_TOKEN.write_text("jwt\n")
self.assertEqual(wi.Credentials().fetch(), {"gitea_token": "abc", "webhook_secret": "s3cret"})
finally:
wi.http, wi.SA_TOKEN = original, original_sa
def test_tree_paging_stops_on_short_last_page(self):
# Gitea: truncated=true on every page including the last, "tree": null past it.
pages = {
1: {"tree": [{"path": f"wiki/n{i}.md", "type": "blob", "sha": f"s{i}"} for i in range(1000)], "truncated": True, "total_count": 1192},
2: {"tree": [{"path": f"wiki/n{i}.md", "type": "blob", "sha": f"s{i}"} for i in range(1000, 1192)] + [{"path": "raw/x.md", "type": "blob", "sha": "r"}, {"path": "wiki/sub/y.md", "type": "blob", "sha": "y"}], "truncated": True, "total_count": 1192},
3: {"tree": None, "truncated": False, "total_count": 1192},
}
calls = []
original = wi.http
def fake_http(method, url, body=None, headers=None, timeout=60.0):
page = int(url.rsplit("page=", 1)[1])
calls.append(page)
return pages[page]
wi.http = fake_http
try:
tree = wi.Gitea("t").tree("abc")
finally:
wi.http = original
self.assertEqual(calls, [1, 2])
self.assertEqual(len(tree), 1192)
self.assertNotIn("raw/x.md", tree)
self.assertNotIn("wiki/sub/y.md", tree)
self.assertEqual(tree["wiki/n1191.md"], "s1191")
def test_signature(self):
body = b'{"ref":"refs/heads/master"}'
sig = hmac.new(b"s3cret", body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
self.assertTrue(wi.verify_signature("s3cret", body, sig))
self.assertFalse(wi.verify_signature("other", body, sig))
self.assertFalse(wi.verify_signature("s3cret", body, ""))
class FakeGitea:
def __init__(self, head, tree, files):
self._head, self._tree, self.files = head, tree, files
self.raw_calls = []
def head(self):
return self._head
def tree(self, commit):
return self._tree
def raw(self, path, ref):
self.raw_calls.append(path)
return self.files[path]
class IndexTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.path = Path(self.tmp.name) / "index.json"
self.original_embed = wi.embed
self.embed_calls = []
def fake_embed(texts, batch=2):
self.embed_calls.append(list(texts))
return [wi.unit([1.0, float(len(t) % 7)]) for t in texts]
wi.embed = fake_embed
def tearDown(self):
wi.embed = self.original_embed
self.tmp.cleanup()
def test_sync_is_incremental_and_persists(self):
files = {"wiki/udm-dns.md": NOTE, "wiki/ceph.md": "---\ntitle: Ceph\n---\n# Ceph\n\nOSD.\n", "wiki/_index.md": "---\ntitle: Wiki\n---\n"}
tree = {"wiki/udm-dns.md": "aaa", "wiki/ceph.md": "bbb", "wiki/_index.md": "ccc"}
g = FakeGitea("c1", tree, files)
idx = wi.Index(self.path)
s = idx.sync(g)
self.assertEqual((s["changed"], s["removed"], s["notes"]), (2, 0, 2))
self.assertEqual(set(idx.notes), {"udm-dns", "ceph"})
self.assertEqual(idx.notes["udm-dns"]["title"], "UDM intercepts DNS")
self.assertTrue(self.path.exists())
# head unchanged: nothing fetched
s = idx.sync(g)
self.assertEqual(s.get("skipped"), "head unchanged")
self.assertEqual(len(g.raw_calls), 2)
# one note changed, one removed, new head
g2 = FakeGitea("c2", {"wiki/udm-dns.md": "aaa2"}, {"wiki/udm-dns.md": NOTE.replace("itself", "itself!")})
s = idx.sync(g2)
self.assertEqual((s["changed"], s["removed"], s["notes"]), (1, 1, 1))
self.assertEqual(g2.raw_calls, ["wiki/udm-dns.md"])
# restart loads the persisted index
idx2 = wi.Index(self.path)
self.assertEqual(idx2.commit, "c2")
self.assertEqual(set(idx2.notes), {"udm-dns"})
def test_rank_orders_by_cosine(self):
idx = wi.Index(self.path)
idx.notes = {"a": {"sha": "1", "title": "A", "vector": wi.unit([1.0, 0.0])},
"b": {"sha": "2", "title": "B", "vector": wi.unit([0.0, 1.0])}}
wi.embed = lambda texts, batch=2: [wi.unit([0.2, 1.0])]
rows = idx.rank("q", k=5)
self.assertEqual([r["slug"] for r in rows], ["b", "a"])
self.assertGreater(rows[0]["score"], rows[1]["score"])
def test_status_reports_age_and_errors(self):
idx = wi.Index(self.path)
self.assertFalse(idx.status()["ready"])
g = FakeGitea("c1", {"wiki/a.md": "x"}, {"wiki/a.md": "---\ntitle: A\n---\n# A\n\nt\n"})
idx.sync(g)
st = idx.status()
self.assertTrue(st["ready"])
self.assertEqual(st["notes"], 1)
self.assertEqual(st["commit"], "c1")
class Broken(FakeGitea):
def head(self):
raise wi.ApiError("gitea down")
with self.assertRaises(wi.ApiError):
idx.sync(Broken("c1", {}, {}))
self.assertIn("gitea down", idx.status()["last_error"])
self.assertEqual(idx.status()["notes"], 1) # last good index kept
self.assertTrue(idx.status()["ready"]) # and still served
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+408
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""wiki-index: embedding index over the Notes repo's wiki/, fed from Gitea.
Source of truth is the notes repository on Gitea. The index holds, per wiki
note, the git blob sha, title and a bge-m3 vector of slug/title/aliases/tags/
first paragraph. A sync fetches the repo tree, embeds every note whose blob sha
changed (via wiki-embed, in-cluster) and drops notes that left the tree; it
runs at start, on every push webhook from Gitea, and every RESYNC_SECONDS.
HTTP:
POST /rank {"query": str, "k": int} -> {"rows": [{"slug","title","score"}], "index": {...}}
GET /health -> 200 always (liveness) with {"ready", "notes", "commit", "synced_at", "age_s", "syncing", "last_error"}
GET /ready -> 200 when an index exists, else 503 (readiness)
POST /webhook Gitea push event, HMAC-SHA256 in X-Gitea-Signature -> {"queued": true}
Credentials (Gitea token, webhook secret) are read from OpenBao through the
Kubernetes auth role on every use; they never land in a Secret or a log line.
Standard library only.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import sys
import threading
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
LOG = logging.getLogger("wiki-index")
GITEA_URL = os.environ.get("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.renner.uno").rstrip("/")
NOTES_REPO = os.environ.get("NOTES_REPO", "k.renner/notes")
NOTES_BRANCH = os.environ.get("NOTES_BRANCH", "master")
WIKI_DIR = os.environ.get("WIKI_DIR", "wiki").strip("/")
EMBED_URL = os.environ.get("EMBED_URL", "http://wiki-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080").rstrip("/")
EMBED_MODEL = os.environ.get("EMBED_MODEL", "bge-m3")
EMBED_CHARS = int(os.environ.get("EMBED_CHARS", "1500"))
INDEX_PATH = Path(os.environ.get("INDEX_PATH", "/data/index.json"))
RESYNC_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("RESYNC_SECONDS", "1800"))
LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "8080"))
BAO_ADDR = os.environ.get("BAO_ADDR", "http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200").rstrip("/")
BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "wiki-index")
BAO_SECRET_PATH = os.environ.get("BAO_SECRET_PATH", "homelab/data/apps/ai/wiki-index")
SA_TOKEN = Path(os.environ.get("SA_TOKEN", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"))
class ApiError(Exception):
pass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- http helpers
def http(method: str, url: str, body=None, headers=None, timeout: float = 60.0):
data = None
hdrs = dict(headers or {})
if body is not None:
data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8")
hdrs.setdefault("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers=hdrs)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
raw = resp.read()
ctype = resp.headers.get("Content-Type", "")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
raise ApiError(f"{method} {url}: HTTP {e.code}: {e.read().decode('utf-8', 'replace')[:300]}") from e
except urllib.error.URLError as e:
raise ApiError(f"{method} {url}: {e.reason}") from e
if "json" in ctype:
return json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
return raw
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- credentials
class Credentials:
"""Gitea token and webhook secret from OpenBao, fetched per use."""
def __init__(self, static: dict | None = None):
self.static = static # tests / local runs
def fetch(self) -> dict:
if self.static is not None:
return self.static
jwt = SA_TOKEN.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
login = http("POST", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/auth/kubernetes/login", {"role": BAO_ROLE, "jwt": jwt})
token = login["auth"]["client_token"]
kv = http("GET", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/{BAO_SECRET_PATH}", headers={"X-Vault-Token": token})
data = {k: str(v).strip() for k, v in kv["data"]["data"].items()} # `bao kv put key=@file` keeps the file's newline
for key in ("gitea_token", "webhook_secret"):
if not data.get(key):
raise ApiError(f"OpenBao {BAO_SECRET_PATH} has no key {key}")
return data
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- gitea
class Gitea:
def __init__(self, token: str, base: str = GITEA_URL, repo: str = NOTES_REPO, branch: str = NOTES_BRANCH):
self.base, self.repo, self.branch = base, repo, branch
self.headers = {"Authorization": f"token {token}"}
def api(self, path: str, **params):
q = ("?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(params)) if params else ""
return http("GET", f"{self.base}/api/v1/repos/{self.repo}{path}{q}", headers=self.headers)
def head(self) -> str:
return self.api(f"/branches/{urllib.parse.quote(self.branch, safe='')}")["commit"]["id"]
def tree(self, commit: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""path -> blob sha for every wiki note at that commit."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
page, per_page, seen = 1, 1000, 0
while True:
t = self.api(f"/git/trees/{commit}", recursive="true", per_page=per_page, page=page)
entries = t.get("tree") or [] # Gitea answers "tree": null past the last page
for e in entries:
p = e.get("path", "")
if e.get("type") == "blob" and p.startswith(WIKI_DIR + "/") and p.endswith(".md") and "/" not in p[len(WIKI_DIR) + 1:]:
out[p] = e["sha"]
seen += len(entries)
total = int(t.get("total_count") or 0)
if not entries or len(entries) < per_page or (total and seen >= total):
break
page += 1
if page > 50:
raise ApiError("tree paging runaway")
return out
def raw(self, path: str, ref: str) -> str:
data = http("GET", f"{self.base}/api/v1/repos/{self.repo}/raw/{urllib.parse.quote(path)}?ref={urllib.parse.quote(ref, safe='')}",
headers=self.headers)
return data.decode("utf-8") if isinstance(data, bytes) else json.dumps(data)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- notes
def parse_frontmatter(text: str) -> tuple[dict, str]:
m = re.match(r"^---[ \t]*\n(.*?)\n---[ \t]*(?:\n|$)", text, re.DOTALL)
if not m:
return {}, text
fm: dict = {}
for line in m.group(1).splitlines():
mm = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][\w-]*):\s*(.*)$", line)
if mm:
fm[mm.group(1)] = mm.group(2).strip()
return fm, text[m.end():]
def as_list(value: str) -> list[str]:
s = (value or "").strip()
if s.startswith("[") and s.endswith("]"):
s = s[1:-1]
return [p.strip().strip("'\"") for p in s.split(",") if p.strip()]
def first_paragraph(body: str) -> str:
para: list[str] = []
seen_h1 = False
for line in body.splitlines():
if line.startswith("# "):
seen_h1 = True
continue
if not seen_h1:
continue
if line.strip() == "" or line.startswith("#"):
if para:
break
continue
para.append(line.strip())
return " ".join(para)
def note_text(slug: str, text: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""(title, embedding text) for one note file."""
fm, body = parse_frontmatter(text)
title = (fm.get("title") or slug).strip().strip("'\"")
parts = [slug.replace("-", " "), title, " ".join(as_list(fm.get("aliases", ""))),
" ".join(as_list(fm.get("tags", ""))), first_paragraph(body)]
return title, " ".join(parts)[:EMBED_CHARS]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- embeddings
def embed(texts: list[str], batch: int = 2) -> list[list[float]]:
out: list[list[float]] = []
for i in range(0, len(texts), batch):
resp = http("POST", f"{EMBED_URL}/v1/embeddings", {"model": EMBED_MODEL, "input": texts[i:i + batch]}, timeout=120)
rows = sorted(resp["data"], key=lambda d: d["index"])
out.extend(unit(d["embedding"]) for d in rows)
return out
def unit(v: list[float]) -> list[float]:
n = sum(x * x for x in v) ** 0.5 or 1.0
return [round(x / n, 5) for x in v]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- index
class Index:
def __init__(self, path: Path):
self.path = path
self.lock = threading.Lock()
self.notes: dict[str, dict] = {} # slug -> {sha, title, vector}
self.commit = ""
self.synced_at = 0.0
self.syncing = False
self.last_error = ""
if path.exists():
try:
d = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
self.notes, self.commit, self.synced_at = d.get("notes", {}), d.get("commit", ""), d.get("synced_at", 0.0)
LOG.info("loaded index: %d notes at %s", len(self.notes), self.commit[:8])
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
LOG.warning("index unreadable (%s); starting empty", e)
def save(self) -> None:
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
tmp = self.path.with_suffix(".tmp")
tmp.write_text(json.dumps({"notes": self.notes, "commit": self.commit, "synced_at": self.synced_at}), encoding="utf-8")
tmp.replace(self.path)
def sync(self, gitea: Gitea) -> dict:
"""Bring the index to the branch head; returns a summary."""
with self.lock:
self.syncing = True
try:
head = gitea.head()
if head == self.commit and self.notes:
summary = {"commit": head, "changed": 0, "removed": 0, "notes": len(self.notes), "skipped": "head unchanged"}
self.synced_at = time.time()
self.save()
return summary
tree = gitea.tree(head)
slugs = {p[len(WIKI_DIR) + 1:-3]: (p, sha) for p, sha in tree.items() if not p.endswith("/_index.md")}
todo = [s for s, (p, sha) in slugs.items() if self.notes.get(s, {}).get("sha") != sha]
removed = [s for s in list(self.notes) if s not in slugs]
LOG.info("sync %s: %d notes, %d to embed, %d removed", head[:8], len(slugs), len(todo), len(removed))
fresh: dict[str, dict] = {}
for i in range(0, len(todo), 20):
chunk = todo[i:i + 20]
texts, titles = [], {}
for s in chunk:
title, text = note_text(s, gitea.raw(slugs[s][0], head))
titles[s] = title
texts.append(text)
for s, vec in zip(chunk, embed(texts)):
fresh[s] = {"sha": slugs[s][1], "title": titles[s], "vector": vec}
with self.lock:
for s in removed:
self.notes.pop(s, None)
self.notes.update(fresh)
self.commit = head
self.synced_at = time.time()
self.last_error = ""
self.save()
return {"commit": head, "changed": len(todo), "removed": len(removed), "notes": len(self.notes)}
except Exception as e:
with self.lock:
self.last_error = str(e)[:300]
raise
finally:
with self.lock:
self.syncing = False
def rank(self, query: str, k: int = 60) -> list[dict]:
q = embed([query])[0]
with self.lock:
rows = [(s, n["title"], sum(a * b for a, b in zip(q, n["vector"]))) for s, n in self.notes.items()]
rows.sort(key=lambda r: -r[2])
return [{"slug": s, "title": t, "score": round(sc, 4)} for s, t, sc in rows[:k]]
def status(self) -> dict:
"""`ready` = an index exists and can answer /rank; a failed sync keeps the last good index."""
with self.lock:
return {"ready": bool(self.notes), "notes": len(self.notes), "commit": self.commit,
"synced_at": self.synced_at, "age_s": round(time.time() - self.synced_at) if self.synced_at else None,
"syncing": self.syncing, "last_error": self.last_error or None}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- syncer
class Syncer(threading.Thread):
"""One worker: syncs on demand (webhook) and every RESYNC_SECONDS."""
def __init__(self, index: Index, creds: Credentials, interval: int):
super().__init__(daemon=True, name="syncer")
self.index, self.creds, self.interval = index, creds, interval
self.wake = threading.Event()
def trigger(self) -> None:
self.wake.set()
RETRY_SECONDS = 60
def run(self) -> None:
while True:
try:
data = self.creds.fetch()
summary = self.index.sync(Gitea(data["gitea_token"]))
LOG.info("sync done: %s", summary)
wait = self.interval
except Exception as e: # keep serving the last good index; retry soon, not next interval
LOG.error("sync failed: %s", e)
wait = self.RETRY_SECONDS
self.wake.wait(wait)
self.wake.clear()
def verify_signature(secret: str, body: bytes, signature: str) -> bool:
digest = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
return hmac.compare_digest(digest, (signature or "").strip())
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- server
def make_handler(index: Index, syncer: Syncer, creds: Credentials):
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
LOG.info("%s %s", self.address_string(), fmt % args)
def send_json(self, code: int, obj) -> None:
data = json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8")
self.send_response(code)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def body(self) -> bytes:
n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
return self.rfile.read(n) if n else b""
def do_GET(self):
if self.path == "/health": # liveness: the process serves
return self.send_json(200, index.status())
if self.path == "/ready": # readiness: an index exists
st = index.status()
return self.send_json(200 if st["ready"] else 503, st)
self.send_json(404, {"error": "not found"})
def do_POST(self):
if self.path == "/rank":
try:
req = json.loads(self.body() or b"{}")
query = str(req.get("query", "")).strip()
k = max(1, min(int(req.get("k", 60)), 500))
if not query:
return self.send_json(400, {"error": "query required"})
rows = index.rank(query, k)
return self.send_json(200, {"rows": rows, "index": index.status()})
except ApiError as e:
return self.send_json(502, {"error": str(e)})
except (ValueError, TypeError) as e:
return self.send_json(400, {"error": str(e)})
if self.path == "/webhook":
raw = self.body()
try:
secret = creds.fetch()["webhook_secret"]
except ApiError as e:
return self.send_json(503, {"error": str(e)})
if not verify_signature(secret, raw, self.headers.get("X-Gitea-Signature", "")):
return self.send_json(403, {"error": "bad signature"})
try:
event = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
except ValueError:
return self.send_json(400, {"error": "bad json"})
ref = event.get("ref", "")
if ref and ref != f"refs/heads/{NOTES_BRANCH}":
return self.send_json(200, {"queued": False, "ref": ref})
syncer.trigger()
return self.send_json(200, {"queued": True})
self.send_json(404, {"error": "not found"})
return Handler
def main() -> int:
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s", stream=sys.stdout)
index = Index(INDEX_PATH)
creds = Credentials()
syncer = Syncer(index, creds, RESYNC_SECONDS)
syncer.start()
server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("", LISTEN_PORT), make_handler(index, syncer, creds))
LOG.info("listening on :%d, repo %s@%s, embed %s", LISTEN_PORT, NOTES_REPO, NOTES_BRANCH, EMBED_URL)
server.serve_forever()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
@@ -1,976 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Deploy Paperclip (server-local agent runs, option B) into the homelab cluster behind an Authentik gate, with CNPG Postgres and OpenBao-sourced secrets.
**Architecture:** One Flux `Kustomization` (`paperclip`) applies `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/`: a single-replica Deployment on a ceph-block PVC, CNPG `pclp-pg` (PG17) with barman backups to Hetzner, and a Traefik Ingress that backends only the `paperclip-gate` Authentik outpost. Namespace, baseline CNP, ClusterSecretStore allowlist and image automation live in the existing `infrastructure` tree.
**Tech Stack:** Flux v2 (kustomize-controller, image-reflector v1.2.5), CNPG + barman-cloud plugin, External Secrets → OpenBao, Cilium CNP, Traefik, Authentik blueprints.
**Spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-paperclip-design.md`
## Global Constraints
- Worktree: `/home/krenner/source/homelab-worktrees/paperclip`, branch `feat/paperclip`. Never edit the main checkout.
- Commits as claude-bot: `git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit …`, message ends with `Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>`.
- Push: `git -c credential.helper='store --file=/home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/creds' push …`. PR via `tea pr create --login claude-bot`. Never self-merge.
- One Bash command per call: no `&&`, `;`, `|` chaining, no `2>/dev/null`, no `python -c`.
- Namespace `paperclip`; hostname `paperclip.renner.uno`; LAN-only (no `dns.renner.uno/public` label).
- Image `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip`, tag `nightly`, digest-pinned, `digestReflectionPolicy: Always`.
- Postgres: CNPG `pclp-pg`, `ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17`, 2 instances, `ceph-block`.
- PVC `paperclip-data`, `ceph-block`, 20Gi, mounted at `/paperclip`.
- OpenBao key `apps/paperclip` with fields `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`, `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`, `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` (64-char hex), `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
- Env: `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`, `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE=private`, `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL=https://paperclip.renner.uno`, `HOST=0.0.0.0`, `PORT=3100`.
- Manifest comments: one terse factual line; rationale goes in commit messages/PR.
- No `kubectl apply`/`exec`/`rollout restart` against the live cluster; Flux applies after merge. Server-side `--dry-run=server` is allowed.
## Review Focus
1. **Pod replaced mid agent run** (image bump, secret rotation via Reloader, node drain) — `Recreate` kills in-flight runs; expected: Paperclip marks them failed/recoverable on restart, not wedged. Covered in Task 9 Step 6.
2. **Shared OAuth token expired or missing** — expected: agent runs fail with a visible auth error in Paperclip, server stays healthy. Covered in Task 9 Step 7.
3. **Direct access bypassing the gate** from another namespace pod — expected: connection refused/dropped by CNP. Covered in Task 9 Step 4.
4. **Unauthenticated LAN request** to `paperclip.renner.uno` — expected: redirect to Authentik, never Paperclip's UI. Covered in Task 9 Step 3.
5. **Nightly image with a breaking DB migration** — expected: a base backup exists before the first bump lands. Covered in Task 9 Step 5.
---
### Task 1: Upstream facts that decide two manifest values
No repo changes; produces two decisions consumed by Task 6.
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `SIGNUP_DISABLED` (`"true"` or `"false"`), `CONFIG_PARTIAL_OK` (yes/no), `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT` (yes/no).
- [ ] **Step 1: Sign-up vs instance claim.** Read upstream `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts`, `server/src/routes/auth.ts`, and the claim flow for `authenticated`+`private` (search `claim` under `server/src`):
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/routes/auth.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Decide: if the first-admin claim creates the account through a path that ignores `disableSignUp` (e.g. invite/claim token handler calling the adapter directly), `SIGNUP_DISABLED="true"`. Otherwise `SIGNUP_DISABLED="false"` — the Authentik gate is the access control, and a follow-up PR flips it to `"true"` after the admin is claimed.
- [ ] **Step 2: Partial config.json.** Read `server/src/config.ts` and the config-file loader it calls (search `PAPERCLIP_CONFIG` / `readConfigFile`).
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/config.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Decide `CONFIG_PARTIAL_OK=yes` if a file containing only `{"telemetry":{"enabled":false}}` parses (every other section optional/defaulted). If not, stop and report to the user — do not invent config fields.
- [ ] **Step 3: Entrypoint privilege.**
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/docker-entrypoint.sh -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
`ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT=yes` if it calls `usermod`/`groupmod`/`chown`/`gosu`. Record the result for Task 6.
- [ ] **Step 4: Anonymous health response.**
Run: `gh api repos/paperclipai/paperclip/contents/server/src/routes/health.ts -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"`
Confirm `GET /api/health` returns HTTP 200 to an anonymous caller when healthy (probes use it). If it returns 401 anonymously, use a `tcpSocket` probe on 3100 in Task 6 instead.
---
### Task 2: Namespace, baseline CNP, ClusterSecretStore allowlist
**Files:**
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml` (append)
- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperclip-ns.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml` (sorted list)
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: namespace `paperclip`; ESO may reference `openbao` from it.
- [ ] **Step 1: Append the namespace** to the end of `namespaces.yaml`:
```yaml
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperclip
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Create `paperclip-ns.yaml`** (copy of `paperless-ns.yaml`'s `default-deny-ingress`, ns renamed, paperless-only CNPs dropped):
```yaml
# Traefik is not admitted: the only entry is the paperclip-gate outpost (apps/paperclip/network-policy.yaml).
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
- world
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Register it** — in `network-policies/kustomization.yaml` add ` - paperclip-ns.yaml` directly after ` - paperless-ns.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Allowlist the namespace** — in `openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml` insert ` - paperclip` between ` - monitoring` and ` - paperless` (list is sorted).
- [ ] **Step 5: Render check.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies`
Expected: output contains `namespace: paperclip`, exit 0.
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml`
Expected: `clustersecretstore.external-secrets.io/openbao configured (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(paperclip): namespace, baseline CNP and OpenBao allowlist`.
---
### Task 3: OpenBao secret `apps/paperclip`
Out-of-repo; must exist before merge or the ExternalSecret never becomes Ready.
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: OpenBao KV `apps/paperclip` with the four fields in Global Constraints.
- [ ] **Step 1:** Ask wiki-synth for the claude-bot OpenBao write procedure (note `claude-bot-openbao-write-only-identity`): login method, KV mount, exact `bao kv put`/`patch` syntax for an `apps/<name>` key. Use exactly what it returns.
- [ ] **Step 2: Write the generated fields** as claude-bot (write-only identity — never read values back). Values generated inline by the command:
`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` = `openssl rand -hex 32`, `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET` = `openssl rand -hex 32`, `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` = `openssl rand -hex 32` (64 hex chars = 32 bytes, accepted format).
Generate each with a separate `openssl rand -hex 32` call and pass it directly into the `bao kv put` from Step 1; do not echo or log them.
- [ ] **Step 3: Ask the user** to add the shared token themselves (never handle it): "Run `claude setup-token`, then `bao kv patch <mount>/apps/paperclip CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<token>`." Wait for confirmation.
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify field names only** (no values): `bao kv metadata get <mount>/apps/paperclip` shows a current version ≥2. If claude-bot cannot read metadata, ask the user to confirm the four keys exist.
---
### Task 4: Image automation + initial digest
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: ImagePolicy `flux-system:paperclip`; `INITIAL_DIGEST` (`sha256:…`) for Task 6.
- [ ] **Step 1: Create `paperclip.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: ImageRepository
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip
interval: 1h
---
# Upstream publishes no semver tags; track the nightly tag by digest.
apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: ImagePolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
imageRepositoryRef:
name: paperclip
digestReflectionPolicy: Always
filterTags:
pattern: '^nightly$'
policy:
alphabetical:
order: asc
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Register** — add ` - paperclip.yaml` after ` - paperless-ngx.yaml` in `image-automation/kustomization.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Server dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`
Expected: both objects `created (server dry run)`; no `unknown field "digestReflectionPolicy"` error.
- [ ] **Step 4: Resolve the current nightly digest.**
The workstation has `docker` only (no skopeo/crane/buildx, checked 2026-09-25); `docker manifest inspect` lists per-platform digests but not the index digest, so pull once:
Run: `docker pull ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
Run: `docker image inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
Expected: `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip@sha256:<64 hex>`. Record the `sha256:…` part as `INITIAL_DIGEST`.
Run: `docker image rm ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly`
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** `feat(paperclip): Flux image automation tracks the nightly digest`.
---
### Task 5: Postgres (CNPG) and secrets in the app directory
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/cluster.yaml`, `objectstore.yaml`, `scheduled-backup.yaml`, `hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml`, `externalsecret.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: Secret `pclp-pg-app` (CNPG, key `uri`), Service `pclp-pg-rw`, Secret `paperclip-secrets`.
- [ ] **Step 1: `cluster.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: pclp-pg
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # data guard
spec:
instances: 2
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
# PG17: upstream's external Postgres target (docker/docker-compose.yml).
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
size: 10Gi
plugins:
- name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
isWALArchiver: true
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pclp-pg-store
bootstrap:
initdb:
database: paperclip
owner: paperclip
postgresql:
parameters:
shared_buffers: "256MB"
max_connections: "200"
checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
max_wal_size: "2GB"
wal_compression: "zstd"
archive_timeout: "30min"
synchronous:
method: any
number: 1
dataDurability: preferred
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `objectstore.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ObjectStore
metadata:
name: pclp-pg-store
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # backup target
spec:
configuration:
destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pclp-pg
endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKey:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
region:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: REGION
wal:
compression: gzip
data:
compression: gzip
retentionPolicy: "30d"
```
- [ ] **Step 3: `scheduled-backup.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ScheduledBackup
metadata:
name: pclp-pg-daily
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # backup schedule
spec:
schedule: "0 45 2 * * *"
immediate: true
backupOwnerReference: self
cluster:
name: pclp-pg
method: plugin
pluginConfiguration:
name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
```
- [ ] **Step 4: `hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # barman S3 creds
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
```
- [ ] **Step 5: `externalsecret.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: paperclip-secrets
namespace: paperclip
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: paperclip-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/paperclip
```
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(paperclip): CNPG pclp-pg with barman backups and OpenBao secrets`. (Rendered together with Task 6's kustomization.)
---
### Task 6: Server workload, storage, ingress, network policy
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/pvc.yaml`, `paperclip.yaml`, `gate-service.yaml`, `ingress.yaml`, `network-policy.yaml`, `kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `pclp-pg-app` (`uri`), `paperclip-secrets`, ImagePolicy `flux-system:paperclip`, `INITIAL_DIGEST` (Task 4), `SIGNUP_DISABLED` / `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT` / probe choice (Task 1).
- Produces: pods labelled `app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip` listening on 3100; Service `paperclip:3100`; ExternalName `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate:9000`.
- [ ] **Step 1: `pvc.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperclip-data
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled # data guard
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: ceph-block
resources:
requests:
storage: 20Gi
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `paperclip.yaml`** — replace `<INITIAL_DIGEST>` with the Task 4 value and `<SIGNUP_DISABLED>` with the Task 1 value. If Task 1 found `ENTRYPOINT_NEEDS_ROOT=no`, replace the container `securityContext` with `runAsNonRoot: true`, `runAsUser: 1000`, `runAsGroup: 1000`, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`, `capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}`. If Task 1 chose `tcpSocket`, replace each `httpGet` block with `tcpSocket: {port: http}`.
```yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
annotations:
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperclip-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
spec:
enableServiceLinks: false
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# Telemetry is only configurable in config.json.
- name: disable-telemetry
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@<INITIAL_DIGEST> # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
f=/paperclip/instances/default/config.json
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$f")"
if [ -s "$f" ]; then
jq '.telemetry.enabled = false' "$f" > "$f.tmp"
else
printf '%s\n' '{"telemetry":{"enabled":false}}' > "$f.tmp"
fi
mv "$f.tmp" "$f"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /paperclip
containers:
- name: paperclip
image: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@<INITIAL_DIGEST> # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3100
env:
- name: DATABASE_URL
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pclp-pg-app
key: uri
- name: HOST
value: "0.0.0.0"
- name: PORT
value: "3100"
- name: PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE
value: authenticated
- name: PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE
value: private
- name: PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL
value: https://paperclip.renner.uno
- name: PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP
value: "<SIGNUP_DISABLED>"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: paperclip-secrets
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /paperclip
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 60
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/health
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 1Gi
limits:
memory: 4Gi
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperclip-data
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
ports:
- name: http
port: 3100
targetPort: http
```
- [ ] **Step 3: `gate-service.yaml`:**
```yaml
# ExternalName mirror so the Ingress can backend the paperclip-gate outpost in the authentik namespace.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate
namespace: paperclip
spec:
type: ExternalName
externalName: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate.authentik.svc.cluster.local
ports:
- port: 9000
targetPort: 9000
```
- [ ] **Step 4: `ingress.yaml`:**
```yaml
# LAN-only (no dns.renner.uno/public label); backends the gate outpost, never the Service.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: paperclip
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
tls:
- hosts:
- paperclip.renner.uno
secretName: paperclip-tls
rules:
- host: paperclip.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: ak-outpost-paperclip-gate
port:
number: 9000
```
- [ ] **Step 5: `network-policy.yaml`** (Traefik pod-side port is 8443, verified via `kubectl get pods -n ingress -l app.kubernetes.io/name=traefik`):
```yaml
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-ingress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": authentik
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
---
# Covers the server and every agent it spawns (same pod).
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-egress
namespace: paperclip
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
cnpg.io/cluster: pclp-pg
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "5432"
protocol: TCP
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- port: "53"
protocol: TCP
# Gitea, Woodpecker, HA, Loki via their *.renner.uno names.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8443"
protocol: TCP
- toEntities:
- kube-apiserver
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "6443"
protocol: TCP
- toEntities:
- world
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "443"
protocol: TCP
```
- [ ] **Step 6: `kustomization.yaml`:**
```yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- externalsecret.yaml
- hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
- cluster.yaml
- objectstore.yaml
- scheduled-backup.yaml
- pvc.yaml
- paperclip.yaml
- gate-service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
- network-policy.yaml
```
- [ ] **Step 7: Render check.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/paperclip`
Expected: exit 0; output contains `kind: Cluster`, `kind: Deployment`, `claimName: paperclip-data`, and no literal `<INITIAL_DIGEST>` or `<SIGNUP_DISABLED>`.
Run: `grep -rn "<INITIAL_DIGEST>\|<SIGNUP_DISABLED>" kubernetes/apps/paperclip`
Expected: no output, exit 1.
- [ ] **Step 8: Commit** `feat(paperclip): server Deployment, PVC, gated Ingress and CNPs`.
---
### Task 7: Authentik gate
**Files:**
- Modify: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml` (insert before the line ` # navidrome-gate: the Navidrome web UI.`)
- Create: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`
- Modify: `kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: outpost pods labelled `goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate`, Service `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate.authentik:9000`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Insert blueprint entries** (same indentation as the neighbouring `wiki-gate` block):
```yaml
# paperclip-gate: Paperclip UI; the CNP admits only this outpost. Paperclip keeps its own login behind it.
- id: paperclip-users-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Paperclip Users
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: paperclip-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://paperclip.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Paperclip
slug: paperclip-gate
provider: !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://paperclip.renner.uno
meta_description: "Paperclip agent orchestration"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, paperclip-gate]]
group: !KeyOf paperclip-users-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
```
- [ ] **Step 2: `paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`:**
```yaml
# Lets the paperclip-gate outpost reach the Paperclip server; scoped to this outpost's pods.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Register** — add ` - paperclip-gate-egress.yaml` after ` - paperless-gate-egress.yaml` in `apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Render + dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/authentik`
Expected: exit 0 (valid YAML incl. the blueprint ConfigMap).
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml`
Expected: `ciliumnetworkpolicy.cilium.io/paperclip-gate-egress created (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** `feat(authentik): paperclip-gate outpost and Paperclip Users group`.
---
### Task 8: Flux Kustomization
**Files:**
- Create: `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`
- [ ] **Step 1:**
```yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: paperclip
namespace: flux-system
spec:
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 1m
timeout: 20m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperclip
prune: true
wait: true
dependsOn:
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
- name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Server dry-run.**
Run: `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`
Expected: `kustomization.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/paperclip created (server dry run)`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit** `feat(paperclip): Flux Kustomization`.
---
### Task 9: PR, merge by user, live verification
- [ ] **Step 1: Push and open the PR** (Task 3 must be complete).
Run: `git -c credential.helper='store --file=/home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/creds' push -u origin feat/paperclip`
Run: `tea pr create --login claude-bot --base master --head feat/paperclip --title "feat(paperclip): deploy Paperclip (server-local runs, trial)" --description "<summary of spec decisions + link to spec + bootstrap steps>\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)"`
Then wait for the user to merge. Do not merge.
- [ ] **Step 2: Reconciliation.** After merge:
Run: `flux get kustomizations paperclip`
Expected: `Ready True`. If False, read `kubectl describe kustomization paperclip -n flux-system` and the failing object's events; diagnose, don't poke.
Run: `kubectl get cluster -n paperclip pclp-pg`
Expected: `Cluster in healthy state`, 2 ready instances.
Run: `kubectl get pods -n paperclip -l app.kubernetes.io/name=paperclip`
Expected: `1/1 Running`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Gate enforced (Review Focus 4).**
Run: `curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' https://paperclip.renner.uno/`
Expected: `302` redirecting to `https://paperclip.renner.uno/outpost.goauthentik.io/…` or `auth.renner.uno`, never `200`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Gate not bypassable (Review Focus 3).**
`default` has no CNPs (verified 2026-09-25), so its egress is open and only paperclip's ingress policy can block the probe.
Run: `kubectl get ciliumnetworkpolicies -n default`
Expected: `No resources found` (else pick another CNP-free namespace).
Run: `kubectl run cnp-probe -n default --rm -i --restart=Never --image=curlimages/curl:8.10.1 -- curl -sS -m 5 http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100/api/health`
Expected: timeout (exit 28), no HTTP response.
- [ ] **Step 5: First backup (Review Focus 5).**
Run: `kubectl get backup -n paperclip`
Expected: one `pclp-pg-daily-…` with phase `completed`.
- [ ] **Step 6: Image policy.**
Run: `kubectl get imagepolicy -n flux-system paperclip -o jsonpath='{.status.latestRef}'`
Expected: `nightly` tag with a `sha256:` digest.
- [ ] **Step 7: Hand-over to the user (browser steps, theirs):**
1. Open `https://paperclip.renner.uno`, pass Authentik, claim the instance as admin.
2. Create a test agent with the `claude-local` adapter and a trivial task ("reply with OK"); it must complete with the shared token (Review Focus 2: if it fails, report the run's error text — an expired token must show as an auth error, not a hang).
3. If `SIGNUP_DISABLED` was `"false"`, open the follow-up PR flipping `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` to `"true"` once the admin is claimed.
4. Review Focus 1 is observed on the first nightly bump: check the interrupted-run status in the UI.
- [ ] **Step 8: Wiki.** Route the verified Paperclip facts (execution topology, env vars, image tags, digest-reflection usage) through wiki-ingest → wiki-distill once the deployment has proven out.
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
# Paperclip in the homelab cluster — design
Date: 2026-09-25
Status: draft, awaiting review
## Goal
Run [Paperclip](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip) (MIT, agent-orchestration
server + UI) in the homelab cluster for real use: its agents do actual work against
homelab systems. This spec covers the **platform** only. Bot identities and their
credentials are out of scope (see "Deferred").
## Decisions
| Topic | Decision |
|---|---|
| Execution model | **B — server-local runs** (upstream default): agent CLIs are child processes of the server, in the server container. Trial only. |
| Upgrade path | If Paperclip is kept: **C** — `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes` sandbox provider + kubernetes-sigs agent-sandbox controller (`agents.x-k8s.io`), per-run Pods and Secrets. Separate spec. |
| Claude auth | **One shared Claude subscription AI connection**, created once via Paperclip's local sign-in (`claude auth login` into `ai-local-logins/<id>`); Paperclip stores and refreshes it. Server-env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is not used: `stripAiAuthBindings` blanks it for managed runs, and upstream accepts no pasted setup-token (the device-code flow needs a Daytona sandbox). |
| Bot credentials | Out of scope. Future "AIR-Manager" Paperclip role handles permission requests. |
| Exposure | LAN-only, behind an Authentik forward-auth gate, then Paperclip's own login. |
### Known trade-off of B (accepted for the trial)
Upstream `runChildProcess()` spawns every local adapter with
`{...sanitizeInheritedPaperclipEnv(process.env), ...opts.env}`; the sanitizer strips only
`PAPERCLIP_*` keys. Every agent therefore sees `DATABASE_URL`, `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`,
the shared filesystem (including every other agent's workspace and the
`ai-local-logins` credentials) and every agent-scoped secret it can read from disk. Under B, no bot may hold
a credential we would not tolerate any other bot using. Per-bot isolation is C's job.
## Architecture
```
LAN client ─▶ Traefik ─▶ ExternalName svc ─▶ ak-outpost-paperclip-gate (authentik ns)
│ forward-auth OK
▼
paperclip Deployment (ns paperclip, 1 replica)
├─ server :3100 (+ agent CLIs as child processes)
├─ PVC /paperclip (ceph-block)
└─▶ pclp-pg-rw (CNPG, PG17, 2 instances) ─▶ barman ▶ Hetzner S3
```
## Components
All modeled on `kubernetes/apps/paperless/` unless stated.
### Namespace and baseline policy
- `Namespace paperclip` in `kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml`.
- Baseline default-deny CNP `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperclip-ns.yaml`
(copy of `paperless-ns.yaml`, renamed).
- Add `paperclip` to the `openbao` ClusterSecretStore namespace allowlist.
### Flux
- `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/paperclip.yaml`: Flux `Kustomization`,
`path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperclip`, `prune: true`, `wait: true`, same `dependsOn` and
CNPG `healthCheckExprs` as `paperless.yaml`.
- `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/kustomization.yaml`: plain resource list.
### Server Deployment (`paperclip.yaml`)
- Image `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:nightly@sha256:<digest>` with the Flux
image-automation marker for digest updates.
- `replicas: 1`, `strategy: Recreate` (single writer on an RWO PVC).
- Starts as root: upstream `docker-entrypoint.sh` remaps the `node` user, chowns
`/paperclip`, then drops to uid 1000 via `gosu`. Caps limited to CHOWN,
DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, SETGID, SETUID; `fsGroup: 1000`.
- `serviceAccountName: paperclip-prometheus-read` with
`automountServiceAccountToken: true`. All agents share the pod filesystem, so all
of them can read that token — it is mounted anyway because the Role behind it
grants exactly `get` on `services/proxy` for
`kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus:9090` and
`kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager:9093` in `monitoring`, and nothing else
(`kubernetes/apps/paperclip/prometheus-read-rbac.yaml`, REN-36 then REN-95).
It was `false` until then.
Three things about that grant are worth knowing before you use or debug it:
- **It scopes the HTTP method, not the endpoint.** The apiserver maps GET→`get`,
POST→`create`, PUT→`update` on a service-proxy request, so `get` alone refuses
`POST /-/reload` and `POST /-/quit` in the authorizer. It does *not* narrow
which GET endpoints are reachable: the whole read surface of both services is,
including `/api/v1/status/config` (scrape credentials there render as
`<secret>`) and the web UI.
- **Force GET in the caller.** Prometheus accepts both GET and POST on
`/api/v1/query`; under this Role only the GET form works, so a client library
that switches to POST for long queries will 403 for a reason that has nothing
to do with the query.
- **If reads start 403ing, check the Service name against `resourceNames`
first.** `resourceNames` is matched verbatim, and
`kubernetes/apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml` floats the chart at
`>=72.0.0` — a release rename breaks this path silently,
with everything still looking correct in git. The port-qualified form is the
only one granted: `svc`, `svc:9090` and `http:svc:9090` are three different
strings to the authorizer.
- Port 3100; `Service paperclip` ClusterIP :3100.
- Probes: startup and readiness on `GET /api/health` with `Host: localhost` (the
private-hostname guard rejects the pod IP); liveness is a TCP check, since
`/api/health` runs `SELECT 1` and a DB outage must not restart the server.
- Env:
- `DATABASE_URL` assembled from CNPG `pclp-pg-app` Secret (`uri` key).
- `HOST=0.0.0.0`, `PORT=3100`
- `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`
- `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_EXPOSURE=private`
- `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL=https://paperclip.renner.uno`
- `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP=false` until the first admin is claimed: the
claim (`/bootstrap/claim`) requires an already signed-in Better Auth account.
A follow-up flips it to `true`.
- `PAPERCLIP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1` (read by `resolveTelemetryConfig`).
- `PAPERCLIP_API_URL=http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100` plus
`PAPERCLIP_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES=paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local`: upstream
otherwise hands agents the public URL, and the gate (`intercept_header_auth`)
rejects their bearer tokens. The Service name also works for sandbox pods under
option C; agent JWTs still authenticate each call.
- `envFrom: secretRef paperclip-secrets`
- Reloader: `secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperclip-secrets`.
### Storage
- `PVC paperclip-data`, `ceph-block`, 20Gi, mounted at `/paperclip` (`PAPERCLIP_HOME`
and `HOME`): instance config, workspaces, repo checkouts, per-agent `claude-runtime`
dirs.
### Postgres
- CNPG `Cluster pclp-pg`: 2 instances, `imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17`,
`ceph-block` 10Gi, `bootstrap.initdb {database: paperclip, owner: paperclip}`,
barman-cloud plugin as WAL archiver.
- `ObjectStore pclp-pg-store` → `s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pclp-pg`, creds via the
existing `hetzner-s3-creds` ExternalSecret pattern.
- `ScheduledBackup` nightly, `method: plugin`, `backupOwnerReference: self`.
- `kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled` on Cluster, ObjectStore, ScheduledBackup.
- PG17 deviates from the cluster-wide PG16 convention because upstream's external
Postgres target is `postgres:17` (`docker/docker-compose.yml`) and its embedded default
is PG18.
### Secrets
One ExternalSecret `paperclip-secrets` ← OpenBao `apps/paperclip` (whole-object
extract):
- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
- `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`
- `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` (64-char hex). Held in OpenBao, not on the PVC, so
encrypted agent secrets in Postgres survive PVC loss.
### Ingress and SSO
- Hostname `paperclip.renner.uno`, Traefik `Ingress`, `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer:
letsencrypt-cluster`, **no** `dns.renner.uno/public` label (LAN-only).
- Authentik gate, per the paperless pattern:
- blueprint entries in `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml`:
proxy provider `paperclip-gate` (`internal_host:
http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100`, `external_host:
https://paperclip.renner.uno`), application, group "Paperclip Users", policy binding;
- outpost `ak-outpost-paperclip-gate`;
- `kubernetes/apps/authentik/paperclip-gate-egress.yaml` (no `auth.renner.uno`
outpost Ingress: like wiki/shelly gates, the outpost serves its own callback on
`paperclip.renner.uno`);
- `ExternalName` Service in `paperclip` ns pointing at the outpost; the app Ingress
targets it on :9000.
- Paperclip's own email/password login stays on (no header/OIDC login upstream).
### Network policy (`kubernetes/apps/paperclip/network-policy.yaml`)
Covers the server **and every agent** (same pod under B).
- Ingress to the app pod: only from the `paperclip-gate` outpost (by label) on 3100.
- Egress from the app pod:
- `pclp-pg` pods :5432
- kube-dns :53
- `ingress` namespace (Traefik) :8443 (pod-side websecure port) — reaches Gitea, Woodpecker, HA, Loki by their
`*.renner.uno` names
- `kube-apiserver` entity :6443
- `world` TCP :443 (Anthropic API, GitHub, npm)
- No SSH egress; git over HTTPS only. The namespace baseline
(`paperclip-ns.yaml`) also restricts `world` to TCP 443 — Cilium unions allows
across CNPs, so an unrestricted baseline would override this list.
- Known gap (house baseline): pods in `monitoring`/`database` and other pods in
`paperclip` can reach :3100 without the gate; Paperclip's own login still applies.
### Image automation
`kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`: `ImageRepository`
(`ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip`) + `ImagePolicy` filtering tag `^nightly$` with
`digestReflectionPolicy: Always` (image-reflector-controller v1.2.5 in cluster; field
available since v0.35.0). First use of digest reflection in this repo.
## Guardrails
- No bot receives cluster-admin or any binding in `flux-system`, `authentik`, `openbao`.
- Git work goes through PRs; bots get no merge rights on protected branches.
- Nothing is granted under B that we would not tolerate any agent misusing.
## Bootstrap (one-time)
1. Place `apps/paperclip` values in OpenBao (the three generated secrets).
2. Merge; Flux deploys with sign-up enabled.
3. Sign up through the gate and claim the instance as admin; then set
`PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP=true`.
4. In onboarding "Connect a model", choose Claude subscription and run the shown login
**as the node user** (the entrypoint makes exec sessions root, and root-owned 0600
credentials are unreadable to the server):
`kubectl exec -it -n paperclip deploy/paperclip -- gosu node sh -c 'export CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=<shown path> && mkdir -p "$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR" && claude auth login'`
Repeat after loss of the PVC or database.
## Verification
- Flux Kustomization `paperclip` Ready; CNPG `pclp-pg` healthy; first ScheduledBackup
completes.
- `curl https://paperclip.renner.uno/api/health` through the gate returns healthy after
Authentik login; unauthenticated request redirects to `auth.renner.uno`.
- Direct pod access from another namespace is denied (CNP).
- A test agent (claude-local) completes a trivial task using the shared Claude connection.
- Flux ImagePolicy reports a `nightly@sha256:` digest.
## Deferred
- **Option C** (sandboxed runs) — required before any per-bot credential isolation.
- **AIR-Manager** role and all bot identities/credentials.
- Public exposure.
+91 -73
View File
@@ -1,99 +1,117 @@
# Traffic classes on the k8s nodes
Issue #576. Five classes, each on its own VLAN.
Issue #576. Three of the four classes are separated; management is not.
## Where each class runs
| class | link | mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Ceph replication | `ceph-san`, VLAN 49 | the whole link is handed to the OSD pod (Multus `host-device`) |
| pod↔pod | `pod0`, VLAN 48 | pod-sourced traffic is routed from table 47; bird puts the peers' pod CIDRs there via `pod0` |
| world↔pod | `ingress0`, VLAN 47 | BGP session sourced there (next hop of every LoadBalancer VIP); pod egress takes table 47's default |
| node↔node | `node0`, VLAN 46 | the node InternalIP and etcd live there; so do apiserver↔kubelet, cilium-health and host→remote-pod traffic |
| world↔node | `mgmt0`, VLAN 40 | API VIP for kubectl, talosctl from outside, node egress (DNS, NTP, image pulls) |
| world→pod | `ingress0`, VLAN 47 | BGP session sourced there, so the advertised next hop is that address |
| pod→world | `ingress0`, VLAN 47 | routing rule on the pod source prefix → table 47 |
| pod↔pod | `pod0`, VLAN 48 | routing rule on pod source **and** destination → table 48 |
| management | `mgmt0`, VLAN 40 | not started |
Hard constraint, set by the owner: inter-node and pod traffic never traverses
the UDM. Everything but world↔node stays on the 10G switch. VLAN 46 and 48 are
statically addressed, without a gateway; VLAN 46 is isolated in UniFi.
the UDM. Everything above stays on the 10G switch.
## Pod traffic: one table
## Why policy routing rather than moving the node IP
Two rules, one per family, send every packet with a pod source to table 47
(`talos/patches/site-homelab.yaml`, priorities 1000/1001, below main). The
table decides by longest prefix; no rule carves out exceptions.
Cilium reaches a peer's pods at that peer's Kubernetes InternalIP, in native
and tunnel mode alike. `--ipv4-node` is overwritten from the Node object, and
`nodePort.directRoutingDevice` selects the BPF NodePort device, not a next hop.
Both were established by test (#837, #838), not by reading.
bird (`kubernetes/infrastructure/bird/`) owns table 47 and fills it with:
So the InternalIP decides where pod traffic goes — unless the lookup happens in
a different table. The rules do that, and nothing about the node's identity
moves. The routing decision runs before Cilium's masquerade hook, so a rule
matching the pod source sees the pod address, and the masquerade then rewrites
it to the egress link's.
- the node's attached networks — `mgmt0`, `ingress0`, `pod0`, `node0` —
taken from the interfaces;
- the peers' pod CIDRs, learned over an iBGP mesh on `pod0`, next hop the
peer's `pod0` address;
- the node's own pod CIDR via `cilium_host`, originated rather than read back
from the kernel (reading it back made BIRD depend on the shape of Cilium's
route, and KRT rejects the IPv4 one);
- the egress default via the UDM on `ingress0`, from the node annotations
`net.renner.uno/egress-gw-v4/v6`.
## Rule order
`node0` has to be in the table: a pod reaching a node address — the
`kubernetes` ClusterIP, which socket LB rewrites to the apiserver's advertise
address, or a hostNetwork pod — would otherwise take the default to the UDM.
Lower priority runs first.
The routing decision runs before Cilium's masquerade hook, so the rule sees the
pod address and the masquerade then rewrites it to the egress link's.
| prio | match | table |
|---|---|---|
| 980 | src pod, dst pod | 48 |
| 981 | src pod, dst pod (v4) | 48 |
| 990 | dst `fd00::/8` | main |
| 991 | dst `10.0.0.0/8` | main |
| 1000 | src pod | 47 |
| 1001 | src pod (v4) | 47 |
Node-originated traffic does not match the rules and uses main, where Cilium
routes each peer's pod CIDR via the peer's InternalIP — on `node0`.
980/981 match source **and** destination. Source alone would also catch the
node's own traffic to a pod, which would then leave with a `pod0` source — an
address `CiliumNode.spec.addresses` does not list, so Cilium classifies it as
`world` rather than `host`.
990/991 are Cilium's `ipv4/ipv6NativeRoutingCIDR`, and they are what keeps
cluster-internal traffic out of table 47. Without them a pod's packet to a
service matches the source rule, finds only a default route, and leaves for the
UDM — measured, in-cluster DNS stopped resolving.
Traffic to a pod on the same node falls through on its own: table 48 holds only
the peers' CIDRs, so the lookup misses and 990/991 send it to main.
## Where each table comes from
- **47** — two default routes declared per node in `talos/patches/k8s-*.yaml`.
The IPv6 gateway is the UDM's configured address on the segment, not the
RA-learned link-local; `accept_ra_defrtr` stays `0` on `ingress0` so the RA
default does not land in main.
- **48** — filled by the `bird` DaemonSet: an iBGP mesh over `pod0`, one route
per peer pod CIDR with the peer's `pod0` address as next hop.
## The bird mesh
`kubernetes/infrastructure/bird/`. Each node advertises only its own pod CIDR
and installs what it learns into table 48. Cilium's routes in main are
untouched, which is why the two coexist.
No address is written into this repo twice. Each node publishes its `pod0`
addresses as `nodeAnnotations` beside the `VLANConfig` that assigns them; the
pod CIDRs come from the Node objects. bird's init container renders both from
the API and ends with `bird -p`, so BIRD's own parser gates startup.
addresses as `nodeAnnotations`, beside the `VLANConfig` that assigns them; the
pod CIDRs come from the Node objects. An init container renders both from the
API with `kubectl -o go-template-file`, excludes the node itself with a field
selector, and ends with `bird -p` so BIRD's own parser gates startup.
## Node↔node
`kubelet.nodeIP.validSubnets` and `cluster.etcd.advertisedSubnets` point at
VLAN 46. Talos picks one InternalIP per family, IPv4 first — the service CIDR
is IPv4, and the apiserver's advertise address must match it.
The API VIP stays on `mgmt0` for kubectl. No in-cluster client uses it:
kubelet, scheduler, controller-manager and Cilium go through KubePrism
(`localhost:7445`), which balances over every address of every control-plane
member; pods use the ClusterIP.
Talos never updates an existing etcd member's peer URLs
(siderolabs/talos#12720). Changing `advertisedSubnets` means, per member:
stage the config, `talosctl etcd forfeit-leadership`, `talosctl etcd leave`,
reboot. `leave` removes only `/var/lib/etcd`; the node rejoins as a learner
and is promoted. EPHEMERAL does not need a wipe.
## Moving node IPs: the mixed state
While some nodes have their InternalIP on the new network and some on the old,
host→remote-pod traffic leaves with a node address that is not an InternalIP:
the kernel picks the source from the route to the peer's InternalIP. Cilium
classifies that as `world`, and every ingress policy that admits only
`host`/`remote-node` (rook-ceph, monitoring, …) drops it. Kernel Ceph clients
lose the OSDs on the other side; RBD mounts hang.
Bridge it for the duration with a temporary `CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy`
admitting the node subnets of both networks, both families, with
`enableDefaultDeny: false` so it restricts nothing else, and delete it once
every node has moved. Keep all OSD nodes schedulable while one is drained:
draining two takes Ceph below its data availability.
The node's own CIDR is **originated**, not read back from the kernel. Reading
it back made BIRD depend on the shape Cilium installs, and the IPv4 route is
rejected outright: its next hop sits inside the prefix it describes, which KRT
refuses with `strange next-hop`. The IPv6 route is a device route and passed,
so the failure was silent on one family only.
## Failure behaviour
If bird stops, table 47 empties, the rules find nothing and fall through to
main: pod traffic returns to the node networks, unseparated rather than
misrouted. The same holds during a cold rebuild until Gitea serves bird's
image. The default route lives in table 47, not in the Talos config, so a
default cannot outlive the specific routes and send pod traffic to the UDM.
Benign at every layer. An empty or absent table 48 makes 980/981 fall through
to main, and pod traffic returns to VLAN 40 — unseparated, not broken. The same
holds if the DaemonSet cannot start, which is the case during a cold rebuild
until Gitea serves its image.
## Management, the remaining class
Not started. The levers differ per service and none of them is the node IP:
| service | can leave the node IP? | lever |
|---|---|---|
| etcd | yes | `cluster.etcd.advertisedSubnets`; needs a reboot per node |
| kube-apiserver endpoint | yes | it is a VIP — `Layer2VIPConfig.link` |
| Talos API | n/a | `apid` answers on every node address; a firewall question |
| kubelet | no | it *is* the node IP |
Two approaches were rejected by the owner and are not to be proposed again:
moving the node IP and etcd to `pod0` (#838), and relabelling VLAN 40 as the
cluster VLAN while moving etcd and the API VIP to a new management VLAN.
Replacing the CNI (#839, Antrea) was shelved.
Note that the reasoning which produced that list also concluded pod↔pod was
blocked, which policy routing disproved. Treat it as a record of decisions, not
as an exhaustive analysis.
## Sources
Cilium v1.20 `pkg/datapath/linux/node.go`; BIRD 2.17 user manual (kernel
protocol, `strict bind`, `direct`); Talos v1.13 `RoutingRuleConfig`,
`machine.nodeAnnotations`, configuration patching (lists are appended,
`$patch: delete`), etcd `LeaveCluster`; KubePrism docs;
siderolabs/talos#12720. PRs #831, #833, #835, #836, #837, #842, #852, #854,
#855, #857, #858, #918, #919, #922; closed unmerged: #830, #838, #839.
Cilium v1.20.1 `pkg/datapath/linux/node.go`, `pkg/node/types/node.go`,
`pkg/node/sync/local_node_sync.go`; BIRD 2.17 user manual (kernel protocol,
`learn all`, `strict bind`, `direct`); Talos v1.13 `RoutingRuleConfig` and
`machine.nodeAnnotations`. PRs #831, #833, #835, #836, #837, #842, #852, #854,
#855; closed unmerged: #830, #838, #839.
-315
View File
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
# Wiki: local web interface and agent API, as a modular .NET solution
## Goal
A web interface for the Notes wiki that runs entirely in the cluster, and an
HTTP API through which agents ask the wiki typed questions and deposit facts.
Built as one C# solution with a MudBlazor front end, and built so that every
external dependency is replaceable: where the notes live, which model embeds
them, what judges a typed question, what runs an agent, how the vector index
is stored. The first adapters are what the homelab uses today. The point of
the design is that the next one is a project and a config line, not a
rewrite.
## Where we are
- `wiki-index` (Python, ns `ai`) syncs `wiki/` from `k.renner/notes` by blob
SHA, embeds through `wiki-embed` (bge-m3 on llama-server), answers
`POST /rank`. It keeps slug, title and vector, not the text. LAN-only behind
Traefik BasicAuth; the Gitea webhook hits the ClusterIP.
- `~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py` and `wiki_ask.py` rank through the index, build a
document context from a local vault checkout, send it with typed questions
to TypeSafe, gate on `covered`. The wiki-synth agent composes answers from
those judgements.
- New knowledge enters as a file in `raw/` (facts with provenance, never
hypotheses), distilled nightly in CI.
- The house C# project, shelly-manager, sets the conventions: net10.0, an
`.slnx` with `src/` and `test/`, xUnit, MudBlazor 9, Blazor Web App with
interactive server rendering, minimal APIs, an Authentik proxy-header
authentication handler for humans and an API-key handler for machines, a
multi-stage Dockerfile, `dotnet test` on every push and a kaniko release
pipeline to the Gitea registry. Human-facing apps sit behind an Authentik
outpost (`<app>-gate`) with a CNP that admits only that outpost.
## Architecture: ports in the core, adapters around it
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Host (ASP.NET Core + Blazor/Mud) │ composition root,
│ /api/v1, /rank, /webhook, UI pages │ config, auth
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
│ uses
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Application (use cases) │ Sync, Rank, Ask,
│ │ DepositFact, Queue-
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘ Question, Evaluate
│ depends only on
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────┐
│ Wiki.Core (domain + ports) │ Note, RawSource,
│ no package references │ Report, LinkGraph,
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘ the interfaces
implemented by ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
Adapters.Gitea Adapters.LlamaCpp Adapters.TypeSafe Adapters.FileIndex Adapters.Anthropic
(later: Database, Ollama/Onnx, local Jev, pgvector/Qdrant, OpenAI-compatible answer models)
```
Rules that keep it modular, enforced by project references and a test:
- `Wiki.Core` references nothing. It holds the domain types and the port
interfaces. Adapters reference Core only; they never reference each other
or the host. `Wiki.Host` is the only project that knows which adapters
exist.
- Every port has a **contract test suite** in `test/Wiki.Contracts` that
runs against every adapter of that port. A new adapter is done when the
suite is green. That is what makes "swap the storage" a safe operation.
- Adapters are selected by configuration and registered by name (keyed
services), so several can be active at once. The UI's lab page and the
evaluator use that to compare, the API uses the one marked active.
- Nothing in Core or Application knows about HTTP, Gitea, TypeSafe, files or
Kubernetes.
### Ports
| port | what it abstracts | first adapter | examples of the next ones |
|---|---|---|---|
| `INoteStore` | read notes, raw sources and reports at a head; create a new document (a fact becomes a raw note in the application layer, the store only moves text) | Gitea repository API (`k.renner/notes`, blob SHA) | git checkout on a volume; a database (CNPG Postgres) with the vault imported; an Obsidian sync folder |
| `IEmbeddingModel` | text → vector, with a model id and dimension | llama-server `/v1/embeddings` (bge-m3 via wiki-embed, the model that won the German-document comparison on accuracy per cost) | the qwen3 embedding variants from that comparison; ONNX in-process; any OpenAI-compatible endpoint |
| `IVectorIndex` | store vectors per (model id, document), query top-k | in-memory cosine with a file snapshot per model, as today | pgvector in the database; Qdrant |
| `IChunker` | split a document into addressable units for typed questions | paragraph splitter (headings, fences), as in `wiki_ask.py` | sentence windows; semantic chunks |
| `IJudge` | typed questions over a state: Choice, Noul, Score, with probabilities | TypeSafe System One (`jev-latest`, cloud; the wiki records no locally hosted Jev today) | a locally hosted Jev with the same request shape, should TypeSafe offer one; a constrained-output local LLM adapter, flagged as uncalibrated |
| `IAnswerModel` | prose from a question plus evidence: the selected paragraphs with their notes and the judgements; must cite by slug; streaming | Anthropic Messages API (Claude, model from config, Sonnet by default) | any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, including the local llama-server; a different Claude model per question |
| `IEvaluator` | measure a retrieval or judge configuration against the labelled set (questions and cited sources in `output/`) | recall@k, hit rate, MRR, as `wiki_rank_eval.py` | judge accuracy against hand-labelled paragraphs |
| `IIdentity` | who is calling, for attribution of facts and saved answers | Authentik proxy headers (humans), API key (machines), as in shelly-manager | OIDC bearer tokens |
Two ports deserve a sentence of scope each. The judge returns judgements
with probabilities, never prose, and the UI never presents its output as an
answer, only as ranked, quoted evidence. The answer model turns that
evidence into words and is allowed nothing else: it sees the selected
paragraphs and the judgements, not the whole context, and its output is
shown next to the evidence it was given. Both are single model calls inside
the request. The service runs no agent: no tool loop, no vault edits. The
wiki-synth agent in a Claude session remains the path for artifacts and for
multi-question synthesis, and it can call `/questions` itself.
### Solution layout
```
Wiki.slnx
src/
Wiki.Core/ domain types, ports, frontmatter and link parsing
Wiki.Application/ use cases; depends on Core only
Wiki.Adapters.Gitea/ INoteStore (read at a head, create)
Wiki.Adapters.LlamaCpp/ IEmbeddingModel (OpenAI-compatible embeddings)
Wiki.Adapters.TypeSafe/ IJudge (System One client)
Wiki.Adapters.FileIndex/ IVectorIndex (memory + snapshot per model)
Wiki.Adapters.Anthropic/ IAnswerModel (Messages API, streaming)
Wiki.Host/ ASP.NET Core: API, webhook, MudBlazor UI, auth,
composition root, appsettings
test/
Wiki.Core.Tests/ parsing, link graph, chunker
Wiki.Contracts/ one suite per port, parameterised over adapters
Wiki.Application.Tests/ use cases with fake ports
Wiki.Host.Tests/ API surface, auth handlers
```
Own repository `k.renner/wiki`, same shape as shelly-manager: `Dockerfile`,
`.woodpecker/test.yml` on pull requests, `.woodpecker/release.yml` building
the image with kaniko into the Gitea registry on push to `main`, tagged
`build.<unix-ts>` plus the commit SHA so Flux image automation can follow
it. The homelab repo holds only the manifests. `claude-bot` needs write
access to the new repository.
Two things the shelly-manager history settles in advance: the TypeSafe
client is written from the documented field contract (endpoint, bearer key,
`jev-latest`, Noul/Choice/Score, 255-option cap, 32k-token state budget),
there is no prior C# client to copy; and the UI needs no login page, because
identity comes from the outpost's headers, which avoids the Blazor-circuit
sign-in constraint shelly-manager ran into.
### Configuration
Adapters are declared in `appsettings` and selected by name; secrets come
through environment variables, filled by ExternalSecret, never from the file.
```json
"Wiki": {
"NoteStore": { "Active": "gitea", "gitea": { "Repository": "k.renner/notes", "Branch": "main" } },
"Embeddings": {
"Active": "bge-m3",
"Models": {
"bge-m3": { "Adapter": "LlamaCpp", "Url": "http://wiki-embed.ai.svc:8080", "Model": "bge-m3" },
"e5-large": { "Adapter": "Ollama", "Url": "http://ollama.ai.svc:11434", "Model": "multilingual-e5-large" }
}
},
"Judges": {
"Active": "typesafe",
"Models": {
"typesafe": { "Adapter": "TypeSafe", "Url": "https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone", "Model": "jev-latest" },
"jev-local": { "Adapter": "TypeSafe", "Url": "http://jev.ai.svc:8080/v1/systemone", "Model": "jev" } // illustration: same adapter, other endpoint
}
},
"Index": { "Active": "file", "file": { "Path": "/data/index" } },
"AnswerModels": {
"Active": "claude-sonnet",
"Models": {
"claude-sonnet": { "Adapter": "Anthropic", "Model": "claude-sonnet-5" },
"qwen-local": { "Adapter": "OpenAI", "Url": "http://llama-server.ai.svc:8080/v1", "Model": "qwen3.6-35b-a3b" }
}
}
}
```
Every embedding model gets its own index namespace. Switching the active
model is a config change after the new index has been built in the
background; until then both exist and can be compared. Nothing is
re-embedded in place.
## The web interface (MudBlazor)
Blazor Web App, interactive server rendering, hosted in `Wiki.Host`. Static
assets vendored into the image, no CDN. Pages:
1. **Search**: a query box, results ranked by the active index with score and
tags; for a phrased question, optionally the paragraph-level hits from the
judge with their probabilities, shown as quoted evidence.
2. **Note**: frontmatter, rendered body with `[[wikilinks]]` resolved,
backlinks, sources linking to their raw file.
3. **Browse**: by tag, by `updated`, recently changed, orphans.
4. **Answers**: a question box. The answer streams in within seconds: rank,
judge, compose, all in the request. Below it the evidence: the paragraphs
the judge selected with their notes and probabilities, and the `covered`
gate; a low gate is shown as "the wiki does not cover this" instead of an
answer. A save button writes the answer to `output/` with the wiki-synth
frontmatter (`question`, `sources`, `confidence`), so it joins the
labelled set. Underneath, the saved answers, newest first, including the
ones the wiki-synth agent wrote from a session.
5. **Maintenance**: the raw queue with ages, the last consolidation and audit
reports, index and sync status.
6. **Lab**: pick any registered embedding model and judge, run the same query
through them side by side, and run the evaluator on the labelled set to
get recall@k per configuration. This is the page for "play around with
different models".
7. **Settings**: read-only view of the active adapters and their health.
No editing of notes in the browser. The vault stays a git repository edited
by the consolidate agent and by hand.
## API v1
Reads are authenticated by the hostname's gate (humans) or API key
(machines); writes always need an API key so a fact carries its author.
| method and path | purpose |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/v1/status` | index commit and age, counts, active adapters |
| `GET /api/v1/notes?q=&tag=&limit=` | list; `q` ranks through the active index |
| `GET /api/v1/notes/{slug}` | frontmatter, body, links, backlinks, sources |
| `GET /api/v1/tags` | tags with counts |
| `POST /api/v1/rank` | `{question, k, model?}` → ranked slugs; also served at `/rank` for the existing scripts |
| `POST /api/v1/ask` | `{queries, questions, k, judge?, model?}` → context, typed judgements with the answering paragraphs verbatim, `covered`. For agents and code. |
| `POST /api/v1/questions` | `{question, k?, judge?, model?, answerModel?, save?}` → the answer text with `[[slug]]` citations, the evidence (paragraphs, probabilities), `covered`, model and token usage; streamed as server-sent events when requested; with `save`, the `output/` path and commit |
| `POST /api/v1/facts` | deposit a raw source: title, source, `kind: fact`, observed_at, content, tags → path and commit |
| `GET /api/v1/raw` | the distill queue with ages |
| `GET /api/v1/reports` | `output/` documents by type, newest first |
| `POST /api/v1/lab/eval` | run the evaluator for a (model, judge) pair |
| `POST /webhook` | Gitea push, HMAC as today |
`POST /api/v1/facts` is rejected without `source`, with a `kind` other than
`fact`, or with content under a minimum length. The raw rule is enforced by
shape: there is no field for a hypothesis. The file gets the vault's
provenance frontmatter with `captured_by` set from the API key's identity.
`POST /api/v1/ask` is `wiki_ask.py` moved server-side, so the scripts become
thin clients and agents no longer need a vault checkout. Its result is
judgements and quotations, never prose.
`POST /api/v1/questions` is `/ask` plus one answer-model call, in process:
rank the question, build the context, run the default typed questions
(answered, where, covered), hand the selected paragraphs and judgements to
the answer model, stream the prose back. Below the `covered` threshold it
returns the gap instead of an answer. Time is the sum of the parts, about
0.2 s rank, 1 to 4 s judge, a few seconds of generation. Cost is one model
call over a few thousand tokens, a few cents on Sonnet, against a quarter
dollar for a full agent run.
## Auth and network
- Humans: `wiki.renner.uno`, LAN-only (no `dns.renner.uno/public` label),
Ingress backend `ak-outpost-wiki-gate:9000`, a `wiki-gate-egress` CNP in
`authentik`, the proxy-header handler trusts `X-Authentik-*` only from that
outpost.
- Machines: `wiki-index.renner.uno` with the API-key handler; the workstation
key stays where it is. CI reaches the ClusterIP.
- Secrets (Gitea token, webhook secret, API keys, TypeSafe key, Anthropic
key) reach the
pod as environment variables from Kubernetes Secrets filled by
ExternalSecret from the `openbao` ClusterSecretStore. The pod itself has
no OpenBao access. The Python service fetched its secrets from OpenBao
directly through its own Kubernetes-auth role; that role, its policy and
the `ai` → `openbao` CNP entry are retired with it.
- Egress from the pod: Gitea, wiki-embed, `api.typesafe.ai:443`,
`api.anthropic.com:443`. Every
further adapter that talks to a new endpoint gets its own CNP line, which
is the one place adding an adapter touches the cluster.
## Health endpoints
Three endpoints with three different meanings, wired to the .NET health
checks with tags so that the probes and the humans see the right thing:
| endpoint | meaning | probe |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /health` | the process serves HTTP. Always 200 once Kestrel listens; no dependency checks. | liveness |
| `GET /ready` | the active note store has synced at least once and the active index is loaded; 503 while the first sync or index build runs. A failed later sync keeps the last good state and stays ready. | readiness, plus a startup probe with enough budget for the first sync (the Python service was killed mid-build when its `/health` returned 503 during the initial sync) |
| `GET /api/v1/status` | the full picture for humans and the Settings page: index commit and age, counts, queue lengths, and one entry per registered adapter with its last check result and latency. | none |
Adapter checks (Gitea reachable, embeddings endpoint answering, judge
endpoint answering, answer model answering) are reported in `/status` and
on the Settings page and are never part of `/ready`: a judge outage must not
take the reader down. Their failures show up as red entries, not as
restarts.
## Phases
One PR each, verified before the next. The Python `wiki-index` keeps running
until phase 3 proves parity.
0. **Skeleton.** Repository, solution, `Wiki.Core` with the ports and domain
types, `Wiki.Contracts` with the suites, `Wiki.Host` serving `/health`,
`/ready` and `/api/v1/status`. CI: test and release pipelines. Verify:
image in the registry, pipeline green, the Deployment's three probes
wired and the pod Ready.
1. **Parity with the Python service.** Gitea, LlamaCpp and FileIndex
adapters, the sync use case, `/rank` and `/webhook`. Verify: the 40-query
recall eval gives the same numbers as the Python service on the same
commit; `wiki_rank.py --probe-index` against the new service passes.
2. **Read API and UI.** Notes, tags, raw, reports; Search, Note, Browse,
Maintenance pages; `wiki-gate`. Verify: a note renders with resolved
links; an unauthenticated request is redirected to Authentik.
3. **Ask.** Chunker, TypeSafe adapter, `/api/v1/ask`, scripts as clients.
Verify: `test_wiki_ask.py` passes against the API; a wiki-synth run with
the definition unchanged. Then the Python service is retired and the
`wiki-index` hostname points at the new one.
4. **Facts.** API keys as an ExternalSecret, the deposit-fact use case, `/api/v1/facts`. Verify:
a fact posted from the workstation shows as a `claude-bot` commit and in
the next distill.
5. **Questions.** Anthropic adapter, `/api/v1/questions` with streaming,
the Answers page with save. Verify: a question answered in under ten
seconds with citations that resolve to the shown evidence; a question the
wiki does not cover returns the gap; a saved answer appears in `output/`
with the wiki-synth frontmatter and is picked up by the evaluator.
6. **Lab.** Evaluator, a second embedding model and a second answer model
registered, the Lab page. Verify: two models compared on the labelled set
from the UI.
## Not in scope
- Editing notes in the browser.
- Replacing Obsidian; the vault stays a git repository and `notes-push.path`
keeps pushing.
- Public exposure; LAN and VPN only.
- Running or triggering agents. The service makes single model calls inside
a request; it never runs a tool loop or edits the vault. Distill,
consolidate and multi-question synthesis stay Claude processes in CI or in
a session; the service shows their inputs and outputs and serves their API
calls.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ config, and the nodes are addressed by name.
## Step 1b — boot all three machines from install media
```
https://factory.talos.dev/image/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9/v1.13.10/metal-amd64.iso
https://factory.talos.dev/image/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9/v1.13.9/metal-amd64.iso
```
Write it to a USB stick and boot each MS-01 from it. Each comes up in
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
# Runbook — roll back a Home Assistant image bump
Use when an automatic Home Assistant update (a
`chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:<new>`
commit on `master`) breaks Home Assistant. The owner approves the rollback
and its timing. Atlas writes the PR; Argus merges it.
## Why a plain `git revert` is not enough
Image automation (`kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/`) re-scans
the registry every hour and rewrites the tag every 30 minutes to the
highest release matching the `home-assistant` ImagePolicy. A plain revert
of the bump commit would be bumped forward again within about an hour.
So the rollback commit does two things at once: it reverts the tag **and**
drops the `# {"$imagepolicy": ...}` marker from that image line. Without
the marker the Setters strategy has nothing to rewrite, so the old tag
stays pinned. It is still one commit, and reverting that commit restores
automation.
## Before you roll back
1. Find the bump commit:
```sh
git log --oneline -5 origin/master -- kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml
```
2. Check the release notes of the broken version for a **database schema**
change. Home Assistant migrates the recorder schema (CNPG cluster
`ha-pg`) on start and cannot downgrade it. An older version started on a
newer schema runs without recorder history until the schema matches
again. If the bump crossed a schema change, tell the owner before going
on: the choice is roll back without history, or restore the recorder
database from backup as a separate step.
## Roll back (one commit, one PR)
```sh
git worktree add -b atlas/ha-rollback-<old> "$WT" origin/master && cd "$WT"
git revert --no-commit <bump-sha>
# In kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml, delete the trailing
# # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
# from the home-assistant image line. Leave every other line alone.
git diff --cached --stat # expect: 1 file, 1 line changed
git commit -m "fix(home-assistant): pin <old>, pause image automation (bump to <new> broke HA)"
git push -u origin HEAD
```
The PR description states: broken version, pinned version, symptom, schema
check result, and "revert this commit to resume automatic updates".
HA-impact review and merge follow [README.md](../README.md#2-ha-impact-review-before-merge).
On merge Flux applies the Deployment (strategy `Recreate`): Home Assistant
restarts once, about one to two minutes of downtime.
## Verify
```sh
kubectl -n home-assistant get deploy home-assistant \
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="home-assistant")].image}'
kubectl -n home-assistant rollout status deploy/home-assistant
```
Read-only commands only (see REN-240 protection rule 1). One hour after
merge, confirm no new `chore(image-automation)` commit touched
`deployment.yaml`.
## Resume automatic updates
When a fixed Home Assistant release is out, revert the rollback commit. The
marker comes back, and image automation bumps to the newest release on its
next pass. That bump is itself a Home Assistant restart.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /ca
containers:
- name: audiobookshelf
image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.37.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.36.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 80
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ spec:
claimName: audiobookshelf-metadata
- name: books
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
claimName: audiobookshelf-books
- name: le-ca
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
+2 -2
View File
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ spec:
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
name: audiobookshelf-books
namespace: audiobookshelf
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-bulk
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
@@ -976,280 +976,6 @@ data:
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# wiki-gate: the wiki service (ns ai) behind the same passkey flows as
# llama-gate. The service trusts X-Authentik-Username only from pod
# addresses, and its CNP admits only this outpost, so the gate is the
# whole access control for wiki.renner.uno.
- id: wiki-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://wiki.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://wiki.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Wiki
slug: wiki-gate
provider: !KeyOf wiki-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://wiki.renner.uno
meta_description: "Notes wiki: search, notes, answers, maintenance"
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: wiki-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf wiki-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# paperclip-gate: Paperclip UI; the CNP admits only this outpost. Paperclip keeps its own login behind it.
- id: paperclip-users-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Paperclip Users
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: paperclip-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
authentication_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-passwordless-authentication]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, passkey-stepup-authorization]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://paperclip.paperclip.svc.cluster.local:3100
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://paperclip.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Paperclip
slug: paperclip-gate
provider: !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://paperclip.renner.uno
meta_description: "Paperclip agent orchestration"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, paperclip-gate]]
group: !KeyOf paperclip-users-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: paperclip-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf paperclip-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# navidrome-gate: the Navidrome web UI. Navidrome auto-creates the
# X-Authentik-Username user on first login; the first user is admin.
# /rest and /share bypass the gate at the Traefik router.
- id: navidrome-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://navidrome.navidrome.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://navidrome.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Navidrome
slug: navidrome-gate
provider: !KeyOf navidrome-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://navidrome.renner.uno
meta_description: "Music streaming (Subsonic)"
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: navidrome-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf navidrome-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
# lidarr-gate: Lidarr runs with AuthenticationMethod=External, so the gate
# is its only access control.
- id: music-librarians-group
model: authentik_core.group
identifiers:
name: Music Librarians
state: present
attrs:
is_superuser: false
# Membership is owned here; blueprint apply reverts UI edits.
users:
- !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
- id: lidarr-gate-provider
model: authentik_providers_proxy.proxyprovider
identifiers:
name: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
mode: proxy
internal_host: http://lidarr.navidrome.svc.cluster.local
internal_host_ssl_validation: false
external_host: https://lidarr.renner.uno
cookie_domain: renner.uno
access_token_validity: hours=24
refresh_token_validity: days=30
intercept_header_auth: true
- model: authentik_core.application
identifiers:
slug: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
name: Lidarr
slug: lidarr-gate
provider: !KeyOf lidarr-gate-provider
meta_launch_url: https://lidarr.renner.uno
meta_description: "Music library gaps: discographies, Spotify artists"
- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
identifiers:
target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, lidarr-gate]]
group: !KeyOf music-librarians-group
order: 0
state: present
attrs:
enabled: true
negate: false
failure_result: false
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: lidarr-gate
state: present
attrs:
type: proxy
service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
providers:
- !KeyOf lidarr-gate-provider
config:
log_level: info
authentik_host: "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local"
authentik_host_insecure: false
authentik_host_browser: "https://auth.renner.uno/"
refresh_interval: "minutes=5"
container_image: null
object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
kubernetes_namespace: authentik
kubernetes_replicas: 1
kubernetes_service_type: ClusterIP
kubernetes_disabled_components: ["ingress"]
kubernetes_image_pull_secrets: []
kubernetes_ingress_annotations: {}
kubernetes_ingress_class_name: null
kubernetes_ingress_secret_name: "authentik-outpost-tls"
kubernetes_json_patches: null
- model: authentik_outposts.outpost
identifiers:
name: authentik Embedded Outpost
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ resources:
- helmrelease.yaml
- paperless-gate-ingress.yaml
- paperless-gate-egress.yaml
- paperclip-gate-egress.yaml
- vscode-gate-egress.yaml
- shelly-manager-gate-egress.yaml
- esphome-gate-egress.yaml
@@ -17,9 +16,6 @@ resources:
- prometheus-gate-egress.yaml
- wordpress-gate-egress.yaml
- llama-gate-egress.yaml
- wiki-gate-egress.yaml
- navidrome-gate-egress.yaml
- lidarr-gate-egress.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
- ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
- ldap-outpost-cnp.yaml
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Lets the lidarr-gate outpost reach Lidarr; the matching ingress rule is in
# network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: lidarr-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: lidarr-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": navidrome
app.kubernetes.io/name: lidarr
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8686"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Lets the navidrome-gate outpost reach Navidrome; the matching ingress rule
# is in network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: navidrome-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: navidrome-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": navidrome
app.kubernetes.io/name: navidrome
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "4533"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Lets the paperclip-gate outpost reach the Paperclip server; scoped to this outpost's pods.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: paperclip-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: paperclip-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperclip
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperclip
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3100"
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Lets the wiki-gate outpost reach the wiki service. The authentik namespace
# baseline CNP otherwise stops any authentik pod from entering ai. Scoped to
# this outpost's pod label; the matching ingress rule is in ai-ns.yaml.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: wiki-gate-egress
namespace: authentik
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
goauthentik.io/outpost-name: wiki-gate
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: wiki
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
-32
View File
@@ -30,39 +30,7 @@ metadata:
# Web Service 9 = Music Assistant
# Web Service 10 = TRMNL
# Web Service 11 = Paperless (gate-level only, see its entry)
#
# CORRECTION (REN-21, 2026-09-25) to the Web Service 11 comment further down,
# which claims that an in-cluster probe of the paperless ClusterIP "needs a
# CiliumNetworkPolicy first — the monitoring probes get away without one only
# because their targets share a namespace with the prober".
#
# That is wrong, and it was wrong when written. It is stated here rather than
# fixed in place because the sentence lives inside the `config.yaml: |` block
# scalar below: any edit to it changes ConfigMap DATA, and
# `configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: gatus-config`
# (deployment.yaml#reloader) would then roll the gatus Deployment — a
# production restart for a comment. This header is outside `data:`, so it is
# inert; the served config is byte-identical.
#
# * When written, the paperless baseline admitted the whole monitoring
# namespace on every port, and monitoring is where blackbox-exporter runs.
# That admit is gone (REN-28); the probe is now admitted by the dedicated
# ../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#paperless-allow-blackbox,
# scoped to blackbox-exporter on the paperless pod's :8000. Cilium unions
# the allow rules of every CNP selecting an endpoint, so nothing else is
# required.
# * The in-cluster paperless probe therefore exists:
# ../monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml#paperless-app-health, target
# http://paperless.paperless.svc.cluster.local:80/accounts/login/
# * The claim does NOT generalise to gatus itself. Gatus runs in `apps`,
# which is a different source namespace; a gatus-sourced in-cluster check
# would need its own allow, exactly as
# cnp-cross-namespace-allow-apps-gatus-to-monitored-services describes.
#
# The Web Service 11 entry below stays a reachability-only check on purpose.
# The app-health half of the pair is the blackbox probe named above.
data:
# anchor: gatus-endpoints
config.yaml: |
storage:
type: sqlite
+1 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ metadata:
labels:
app: gatus
annotations:
# anchor: reloader
# Gatus reads its config once at startup and never re-reads the file, so
# without this a ConfigMap change reconciles cleanly and then does nothing:
# git and the running checks drift apart silently, with no failed resource
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: gatus
image: twinproduction/gatus:v5.37.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gatus"}
image: twinproduction/gatus:v5.36.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gatus"}
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
annotations:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRouteTCP
metadata:
name: gitea-ssh
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ kind: Kustomization
# and verified. See MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md.
resources:
- statefulset.yaml
- pdb.yaml
- service.yaml
- ingressroute-ssh.yaml
- ingress.yaml
+26 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,28 @@
# Prometheus scrape and Traefik are admitted by the namespace baseline in
# infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-ns.yaml.
#
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-metrics-scrape
namespace: apps
spec:
# Prometheus (monitoring ns) scrapes gitea's /metrics on :3000. The apps
# default-deny-ingress only allows same-ns / home-assistant / host, so the
# scrape is dropped (context deadline exceeded). This became necessary only
# after the LXC->in-cluster cutover — the old static target was external, so
# no in-cluster policy applied. Scoped to the gitea pod + :3000.
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "3000"
protocol: TCP
---
# Secret rotation: the flux-git rotator (openbao ns) reaches gitea to mint a new
# flux PAT. It uses the in-cluster Service (gitea.gitea.svc:3000) — the public
# flux PAT. It uses the in-cluster Service (gitea.apps.svc:3000) — the public
# gitea.renner.uno name hairpins off the ingress LB from a pod (same failure as
# pve.renner.uno). Scoped to the gitea pod :3000 and the rotator label; the
# egress half is rotator-gitea-flux-egress in network-policies/openbao-ns.yaml.
@@ -10,7 +30,7 @@ apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-flux-rotator
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
@@ -34,7 +54,7 @@ apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: gitea-allow-review-bot-rotator
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
---
# Eviction protection for the single-replica Gitea StatefulSet.
#
# Gitea runs on SQLite (single writer) and its repos + DB live on a single
# ReadWriteOnce PVC, so it is deliberately replicas:1 and cannot fail over.
# With no PDB, a node drain / maintenance evicts the pod abruptly, mid-write,
# with zero coordination. minAvailable:1 on a 1-replica workload makes the
# eviction API refuse *voluntary* evictions: `kubectl drain` blocks and
# surfaces this pod, forcing a conscious decision (drain with
# --disable-eviction, or scale down first) instead of yanking the live DB.
# It does NOT block involuntary disruptions (node crash, OOM).
apiVersion: policy/v1
kind: PodDisruptionBudget
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
minAvailable: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: gitea
namespace: gitea
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
spec:
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ spec:
# NOTE: volumeClaimTemplates is immutable on an existing StatefulSet,
# so bumping this value cannot be `kubectl apply`-ed in place — Flux
# will reject the whole object. Landing this size change requires a
# one-time `kubectl delete statefulset gitea -n gitea --cascade=orphan`
# one-time `kubectl delete statefulset gitea -n apps --cascade=orphan`
# (pod + PVC keep running) so Flux re-creates the STS from this
# template and re-adopts them. After the cleanup_packages GC reclaims
# the ~10G of orphaned blobs, real usage is ~9G, so 40Gi is headroom.
+1 -3
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ metadata:
name: gf-pg
namespace: monitoring
spec:
instances: 2
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -30,71 +30,16 @@ metadata:
name: ha-pg
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
instances: 2
# switchover, not CNPG's default `restart`: any change that rolls the pods
# (walStorage below did) then promotes the already-rolled replica instead of
# restarting the primary in place, so the recorder loses seconds of writes
# rather than stopDelay plus a pg_wal move plus startup (REN-176).
primaryUpdateMethod: switchover
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
storage:
storageClass: ceph-block
# Sized for WAL headroom during an archiving stall, not for table growth.
# The data itself needs far less: migrated statistics 10.8M rows +
# statistics_short_term 1.9M (~1.8 GB with indexes in Postgres) and ~18M
# states rows for the purge_keep_days:7 window (~4 GB).
#
# 20Gi left only 6.63 GiB free, and that is the number that matters here.
# WAL archiving stalled for 10 minutes and the un-archived backlog reached
# 1.84 GiB — 28% of that free space (REN-129).
#
# That stall was first blamed on Velero repository maintenance. It is not
# the cause: REN-136 measured seven nights and the archiver's sustained
# drain (~14 segments/min, its serial ceiling) is flat whether Kopia is
# running or not, and Kopia's nearest batch drifts across 02:03-02:24Z
# while the burst stays pinned to 02:13Z. What is real is a nightly
# producer burst — 56-119 segments queued at 02:13-02:15 UTC on all seven
# nights, against a steady-state queue of 0. Postgres cannot recycle a WAL
# segment until the archiver has shipped it, so a burst that arrives while
# archiving is stalled walks the volume toward full, and a full PGDATA
# stops the recorder outright.
#
# 32Gi takes free space to ~18.6 GiB, which puts the same 1.84 GiB backlog
# at 10% of headroom rather than 28%. In REN-136's terms: at 6.36 GiB free
# one stalled night survives and two fill the volume; ~18.6 GiB carries
# about four. Approved by the owner on REN-135.
# ceph-block has allowVolumeExpansion: true, so this grows in place.
#
# Since REN-176 WAL lives on walStorage below, so the stall headroom above
# now belongs to that volume. 32Gi stays because a PVC cannot shrink.
size: 32Gi
# WAL on its own volume (ha-pg-N-wal), approved by the owner on REN-176.
#
# PERMANENT. The CNPG webhook rejects removing walStorage once set ("walStorage
# cannot be disabled once configured"), so reverting this block fails
# admission and leaves the home-assistant Kustomization stuck. Undoing it
# means a new Cluster recovered from ha-pg-store. Adding it on 1.30.1 needs
# no re-clone: the operator creates the PVC, rolls each pod, and the instance
# manager moves pg_wal onto it before Postgres starts.
#
# This does NOT keep the recorder up when WAL fills: a full WAL disk still
# stops Postgres. What it does is keep WAL writable if PGDATA fills (a purge
# that stops running), and make WAL-volume usage a direct archiver-backlog
# signal.
#
# Sized so stall survival is no worse than the shared 32Gi gives today.
# Today: ~18.6 GiB free on PGDATA / 4.66 GiB/day of WAL = ~4.0 days.
# 1.86 GiB normal pg_wal footprint (max_wal_size 2GB)
# + 18.64 GiB four days of full archiver outage at 4.66 GiB/day
# (the nightly 56-119 segment burst, REN-136, is inside that rate)
# = 20.5 GiB -> 21Gi: (21 - 1.86) / 4.66 = ~4.1 days. 18Gi would give ~3.5,
# worse than today. RBD is thin, so the ceiling costs nothing until a stall
# fills it. The webhook requires min_wal_size < max_wal_size < this size.
walStorage:
storageClass: ceph-block
size: 21Gi
# Sized for the migrated statistics plus 7 days of states at the current
# rate: statistics 10.8M rows + statistics_short_term 1.9M (~1.8 GB with
# indexes in Postgres) and ~18M states rows for the purge_keep_days:7 window
# (~4 GB). 20Gi leaves room for autovacuum bloat and index churn.
# ceph-block has allowVolumeExpansion: true, so this can grow in place.
size: 20Gi
plugins:
- name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
isWALArchiver: true
@@ -179,7 +124,8 @@ spec:
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volumes are lost outright.
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Fewer checkpoints => fewer full-page writes, since a page is only
# fully-logged on its first modification after a checkpoint.
@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@ resources:
# health broker credential: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (first of the
# eight users to migrate off mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml).
- mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
# open3e-int broker credential: open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal
# CAN; OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated.
- mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
- mosquitto-config.yaml
- mosquitto-certificate.yaml
- mosquitto-service.yaml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ metadata:
#
# Listed per-Secret rather than with the blanket auto annotation, so that
# enrolling another broker user is a visible edit to this line.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials,mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ spec:
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd sml2mqtt "$SML2MQTT_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e "$OPEN3E_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e-int "$OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd evcc "$EVCC_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd health "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"
mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd zigbee2mqtt "$ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD"
@@ -125,12 +124,6 @@ spec:
user open3e
topic readwrite open3e/#
# open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal CAN: own subtree
# under open3e/ so edge-1's listener on open3e/cmnd never sees
# its commands.
user open3e-int
topic readwrite open3e/int/#
user evcc
topic read open3e/#
topic readwrite evcc/#
@@ -194,13 +187,6 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
key: password
# open3e-int: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (see
# mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml).
- name: OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
key: password
- name: EVCC_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Projects the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker credential (open3e-esp32 gateway
# on the Vitocal internal CAN) from OpenBao into the Secret the broker
# consumes. Rotator: kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml.
#
# creationPolicy is implicitly Owner: deleting this ExternalSecret deletes the
# live Secret. Set creationPolicy: Orphan first to detach without destroying.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
+8 -19
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ spec:
# unchanged, so Kubernetes has no reason to replace anything, and
# this image is deliberately NOT enrolled in Flux image automation
# — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md, which
# lists gitea.renner.uno/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest,
# lists ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy as having "only main, latest,
# and main-<sha> commit builds; no release tags", so there is no
# ImagePolicy watching it. The pods therefore sat on a 21-day-old
# image while :latest moved underneath them, and the only way to
@@ -35,26 +35,15 @@ spec:
# what is RUNNING recoverable from this repo rather than "whatever
# :latest meant the last time a pod happened to restart".
#
# The image comes from the Gitea package registry, built by
# Woodpecker (.woodpecker.yml in konairius/ical-proxy) on every
# push to main. It is amd64-only and pulls without credentials, so
# no imagePullSecret. main-4783abe adds two hardening changes on
# top of main-db90a59: an SSRF guard (upstreams and redirect hops
# resolving to private/loopback/link-local addresses are refused;
# public redirects are still followed, up to 5) and a cap of 20
# concurrent /proxy upstream fetches (over the cap: 429 +
# Retry-After). main-73b5d97 then raises the server WriteTimeout
# from 10s to 40s (the 30s upstream fetch timeout + 10s headroom),
# so a slow-but-legitimate upstream is no longer cut off before
# /proxy can answer. main-926ead0 caps the upstream response body
# at 2 MiB (larger feeds get 413 instead of being buffered whole,
# REN-230) and logs upstream fetch failures with the host,
# answering 502 instead of 500. The summary_match/summary_replace
# parameters this deployment needs are unchanged.
# main-99a912b is the merge of konairius/ical-proxy#12, which adds
# the summary_match/summary_replace parameters this deployment
# needs to strip "| Abfuhrkalender - Landkreis Amberg-Sulzbach"
# from every waste collection.
#
# Bumping this is a manual, reviewed edit. The tag format is
# main-<short-sha>, the first 7 characters of the main commit.
image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/ical-proxy:main-926ead0
# main-<short-sha> (docker/metadata-action type=sha with the branch
# as prefix).
image: ghcr.io/konairius/ical-proxy:main-99a912b
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
name: http
+2 -1
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ spec:
# padding rather than data.
#
# The cost is RPO: up to 30min of WAL is unrecoverable if this cluster and
# its volumes are lost outright.
# its volume are lost outright. This is a single-instance cluster, so the
# archive is the only off-node copy.
archive_timeout: "30min"
# Write-reduction tuning. These databases are largely idle, and the
# Postgres defaults favour throughput over storage that wears out.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: immich-machine-learning
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3003
-32
View File
@@ -28,38 +28,6 @@ spec:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
---
# Media root on the EC 2+1 bulk pool; thumbs mount separately below.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: immich-library-bulk
namespace: immich
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-bulk
resources:
requests:
storage: 300Gi
---
# Thumbnails stay replicated: read affinity serves them from the local OSD.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: immich-thumbs
namespace: immich
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 30Gi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
+2 -7
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /ca
containers:
- name: immich-server
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.2.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3001
@@ -110,8 +110,6 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- name: library
mountPath: /data
- name: thumbs
mountPath: /data/thumbs
- name: immich-config-file
mountPath: /config
readOnly: true
@@ -147,10 +145,7 @@ spec:
volumes:
- name: library
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: immich-library-bulk
- name: thumbs
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: immich-thumbs
claimName: immich-library
- name: immich-config-file
secret:
secretName: immich-secrets
@@ -61,9 +61,6 @@ spec:
enabled: true
storageClass: ceph-block
size: 50Gi
# A minAvailable:1 PDB on a single replica blocks every node drain.
pdb:
create: false
# Bootstrap admin/org/bucket on the fresh PVC. Admin password + token come
# from the influxdb-bootstrap Secret (OpenBao via ESO), deterministic across
# rebuilds so the bootstrap token is the live admin token. `influx setup`
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ kind: Kustomization
resources:
- gatus/
- external-dns/
- gitea/
- ical-proxy/
# gitea/ has its own `gitea` Kustomization (clusters/homelab/gitea.yaml, #878).
# woodpecker/ moved to its own dedicated `woodpecker` Kustomization
# (clusters/homelab/woodpecker.yaml) so its wp-pg CNPG cluster's barman
# dependency + Cluster health-gating don't contaminate this shared apps KS.
+2 -5
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# the entrypoint exit after one pass instead of looping internally —
# the CronJob handles scheduling.
#
# Books land in /audiobooks (the audiobookshelf-books-bulk PVC, shared
# Books land in /audiobooks (the audiobookshelf-books PVC, shared
# with the audiobookshelf Deployment). Config + DB live on
# libation-config (RWO ceph-block, seeded once from
# libation-bootstrap secret).
@@ -107,9 +107,6 @@ spec:
- |
trap 'cp /config-internal/AccountsSettings.json /libation-state/AccountsSettings.json' EXIT
set -e
# Strip the Audible intro/outro; re-liberated books replace their file instead of gaining a " (1)" copy.
jq '.StripAudibleBrandAudio = true | .OverwriteExisting = true' /config-internal/Settings.json > /config-internal/Settings.json.tmp
mv /config-internal/Settings.json.tmp /config-internal/Settings.json
/libation/LibationCli scan
/libation/LibationCli liberate
env:
@@ -138,7 +135,7 @@ spec:
claimName: libation-config
- name: books
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: audiobookshelf-books-bulk
claimName: audiobookshelf-books
- name: bootstrap
secret:
secretName: libation-bootstrap
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# SOPS-encrypted Secret on first boot (sentinel file gate); after that
# Libation reads and writes it directly so token rotation persists.
#
# Books are written to the audiobookshelf-books-bulk PVC (already provisioned
# Books are written to the audiobookshelf-books PVC (already provisioned
# by the audiobookshelf seed Kustomization, RWX ceph-filesystem). We
# share the same namespace so the PVC reference is direct — k8s PVCs
# are namespace-scoped.
@@ -1,75 +1,8 @@
---
# The agent metrics Service, declared here because the chart does not render
# one under our values (REN-147).
#
# cilium's templates/cilium-agent/service.yaml is gated twice:
#
# {{- if and .Values.agent (not .Values.preflight.enabled) .Values.prometheus.enabled }}
# {{- if (or .Values.prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled .Values.prometheus.metricsService) }}
#
# infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml sets `prometheus.enabled: true` and
# `prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled: false`, and leaves `metricsService` at its
# default of false. First gate passes, second does not. The chart's fallback
# branch is envoy-only and needs envoy in the agent pod, but envoy runs as its
# own DaemonSet here — so no `cilium-agent` Service was rendered at all.
#
# The consequence was silent: agents exported metrics on :9962 all along, the
# ServiceMonitor below selected a Service that did not exist, and the scrape
# pool sat at 0 active / 46 dropped targets. `cilium_*` had zero series, so
# CiliumBPFMapPressureHigh and CiliumBPFMapFull in prometheusrule-cilium.yaml
# evaluated an empty vector forever and could never fire.
#
# Why a Service here and not `prometheus.metricsService: true` in the
# HelmRelease: that flag is the chart-native fix and its rendered diff is
# exactly this one object (it appears in no other template — not the
# ConfigMap, not the DaemonSet). But setting it changes the HelmRelease values,
# which makes helm-controller run `helm upgrade` on the CNI release, and that
# three-way-merges against live objects. PROPOSAL-cilium-single-owner.md
# records that `cilium-config` has carried a `kubectl-patch` field manager; if
# any of that drift is still live, the upgrade reconciles it, and the
# `configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: cilium-config` annotation on the
# HelmRelease then rolls every agent node by node. A Service applied by the
# apps Kustomization cannot do that. If the drift is ever proven gone, delete
# this object and set `prometheus.metricsService: true` instead.
#
# Name and selector follow authentik-outpost-servicemonitors.yaml: a distinct
# name plus `app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: homelab`, so flipping either chart
# flag later renders the chart's own `cilium-agent` Service without an
# ownership conflict and without double-scraping the same endpoints.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: cilium-agent-metrics
namespace: kube-system
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: homelab
app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: cilium
# Copied onto every series by the ServiceMonitor's targetLabels below.
# The dashboard the chart ships queries
# cilium_bpf_map_pressure{k8s_app="cilium"}, so this label is load-bearing.
k8s-app: cilium
spec:
type: ClusterIP
# Headless on purpose: agent metrics are per-node and every endpoint has to
# be scraped. A ClusterIP would hand Prometheus one random agent per scrape.
clusterIP: None
# Agent pods only. cilium-envoy carries k8s-app: cilium-envoy and exposes
# 9964, so it cannot match.
selector:
k8s-app: cilium
ports:
# Named and numbered exactly as the chart's own Service, so the
# ServiceMonitor below stays a field-for-field copy of the chart's.
- name: metrics
port: 9962
targetPort: prometheus
protocol: TCP
---
# Cilium's agent ServiceMonitor, declared here rather than by the chart.
#
# Reproduces what cilium renders with prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled: same
# name, same namespace, same 10s interval and node relabeling.
# Reproduces what cilium 1.20.1 renders with prometheus.serviceMonitor.enabled,
# taken field for field off the live object so scraping is unchanged: same name,
# same namespace, same selector, same 10s interval and node relabeling.
#
# It lives here because the chart's template is gated on monitoring.coreos.com/v1
# existing at install time, and on an empty cluster it does not — those CRDs
@@ -89,14 +22,13 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: cilium
spec:
selector:
# Pinned to the Service above. Without managed-by this would also match a
# chart-rendered `cilium-agent` Service and scrape the same endpoints twice.
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: homelab
app.kubernetes.io/name: cilium-agent
namespaceSelector:
matchNames:
- kube-system
# The chart's Service keeps rendering (prometheus.enabled), so the target and
# its `metrics` port are there regardless of who declares the ServiceMonitor.
targetLabels:
- k8s-app
endpoints:
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
# Scrape the external-secrets (ESO) controller's own metrics. Until this
# existed, nothing in this cluster could see a failed ExternalSecret sync:
# `externalsecret_status_condition` held 0 series, so no rule could be written
# about a key that silently stops syncing (REN-100).
#
# This is the scrape only. The alert rule is deliberately NOT in this change —
# its `for:` window has to be tuned against real data, and that data does not
# exist until this has been live for a while. See REN-103.
#
# A PodMonitor, NOT the chart's `serviceMonitor.enabled`, and NOT a hand-written
# ServiceMonitor. Both alternatives were checked against chart 2.11.0:
#
# * A hand-written ServiceMonitor has nothing to select. `metrics.service.enabled`
# defaults to false and infrastructure/external-secrets/helmrelease.yaml
# overrides nothing, so templates/service.yaml renders no Service for the
# controller. The container port exists (`name: metrics`, containerPort 8080)
# but nothing fronts it — the same trap that forced a PodMonitor for the Flux
# controllers.
# * Setting `serviceMonitor.enabled: true` would work, but it triggers a Helm
# UPGRADE of ESO, which re-renders the Deployment and re-applies its CRDs
# (`crds: CreateReplace` in the HelmRelease). ESO is what all 54 ExternalSecret
# manifests in this repo depend on. A PodMonitor gets the same series while
# touching the release not at all, which is the trade this repo already made
# for Velero's node-agent (velero-podmonitor.yaml) and for Flux.
#
# THIS NEEDS A NETWORK POLICY CHANGE, unlike the Flux PodMonitor: the cluster is
# default-deny and external-secrets-ns.yaml admitted only intra-namespace traffic,
# host/remote-node and ICMP — no `monitoring` grant, so this scrape would have
# been dropped and the metric would have stayed absent. The matching ingress rule
# is added to infrastructure/network-policies/external-secrets-ns.yaml in the
# same pull request. Without it this file is decoration.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PodMonitor
metadata:
name: external-secrets
namespace: monitoring
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: external-secrets
# Not required for discovery — podMonitorSelector is empty, see
# apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml — but set for consistency with
# the other monitors in this directory.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
# Lives in `monitoring` rather than in `external-secrets`, matching
# external-dns-servicemonitor.yaml and the Flux PodMonitor. Every object in
# the external-secrets namespace is owned by the ESO HelmRelease; keeping this
# out of that namespace means this change cannot interact with the release.
namespaceSelector:
matchNames:
- external-secrets
selector:
matchLabels:
# The CONTROLLER only. The webhook and cert-controller carry
# `app.kubernetes.io/name: external-secrets-webhook` and
# `-cert-controller` respectively (see the chart's
# external-secrets-webhook.selectorLabels / -cert-controller.selectorLabels
# helpers), so an exact match on the unsuffixed name excludes both. That is
# intended: the `externalsecret_*` series are emitted by the controller, and
# the other two would only add idle targets.
app.kubernetes.io/name: external-secrets
app.kubernetes.io/instance: external-secrets
podMetricsEndpoints:
# Named container port, not a hardcoded 8080, so this follows
# `metrics.listen.port` if it is ever overridden in the HelmRelease.
- port: metrics
# 60s, not the chart's 30s default: `externalsecret_status_condition` is a
# slow-moving gauge over ~54 ExternalSecrets, and the alert built on it in
# REN-103 will use a multi-minute `for:` window. 30s would double the
# samples for no gain in detection time.
interval: 60s
scrapeTimeout: 10s
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
# Scrape the Flux controllers' own metrics. Until this existed Prometheus held
# no `gotk_*` series at all, so nothing about Flux's own behaviour was
# queryable and no rule could be written about it (REN-97).
#
# THIS IS THE SCRAPE ONLY, and the readiness alert is not merely deferred —
# it cannot be written from this endpoint. `gotk_reconcile_condition` and
# `gotk_suspend_status` are still DECLARED by fluxcd/pkg/runtime (v0.110.3,
# runtime/metrics/recorder.go), but at the tags pinned in gotk-components.yaml
# no controller calls the recorder that populates them: grepping the six
# tagged source trees for RecordReadiness / RecordCondition / RecordSuspend
# returns zero call sites, and an unpopulated GaugeVec exports no series. So
# the readiness metrics would stay empty however this file is written. Flux
# moved per-object readiness to kube-state-metrics custom-resource-state
# (`gotk_resource_info{ready=...}`); that is REN-102, and it is a prerequisite
# for the not-Ready alert rather than a follow-up to it.
#
# What this scrape does yield, and why it is still worth merging on its own:
# * `gotk_reconcile_duration_seconds` per kind/name/namespace — reconcile
# latency and, by its absence, an object that has stopped being reconciled
# at all. RecordDuration IS called, but by FIVE of the six controllers, not
# all six: measured post-merge, 170 series from kustomize (33), source (43),
# image-reflector (68), image-automation (1) and helm (25), and ZERO from
# notification-controller. That is not a gap waiting to fill in — its three
# reconcilers are registered but never walked (controller_runtime_reconcile_
# total for controller=alert/provider/receiver is 0 over 56 h of uptime with
# 2 Alerts and 1 Provider live), so the family is absent from that pod's
# /metrics entirely and five is the permanent value. DO NOT write a rule of
# the form `count(... gotk_reconcile_duration_seconds ...) < 6`, or an
# absent() per pod: it fires forever on notification-controller. Liveness for
# all six pods is `up{job="monitoring/flux-controllers"}` (below); that pod's
# reconcile health is `controller_runtime_reconcile_errors_total`. REN-127.
# * controller-runtime's own series: reconcile totals and errors per
# controller, workqueue depth and retry counts, leader election.
# * the target itself, so `up{job="monitoring/flux-controllers"}` and the
# chart's default TargetDown rule start covering the Flux control plane.
# * the scrape REN-102 needs in place anyway.
#
# A PodMonitor, NOT a ServiceMonitor, and that is forced rather than preferred:
# gotk-components.yaml creates Services for only two of the six controllers
# (source-controller, notification-controller), and both publish port 80 ->
# targetPort `http`, which is the artifact/webhook server on :9090 — not the
# metrics port. kustomize-, helm-, image-reflector- and image-automation-
# controller have no Service at all, so there is nothing for a ServiceMonitor to
# select. All six pods do carry the same two labels and the same `http-prom`
# (:8080) container port, so one PodMonitor covers the set.
#
# NO NETWORK POLICY CHANGE IS NEEDED, verified rather than assumed, and unlike
# external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml which did need one: flux-system has no
# CiliumNetworkPolicy of its own (infrastructure/network-policies/ has no
# flux-system file), and gotk-components.yaml ships an `allow-scraping`
# NetworkPolicy admitting every namespace to :8080 (`from: [namespaceSelector:
# {}]`, port 8080). So `monitoring` is already admitted, as it was for REN-21.
# Nothing in the Flux install is touched.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PodMonitor
metadata:
name: flux-controllers
namespace: monitoring
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: flux
# Not required for discovery — podMonitorSelector is empty, see
# apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml — but set for consistency
# with the other monitors in this directory.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
# Lives in `monitoring` with a namespaceSelector rather than in flux-system,
# matching external-dns-servicemonitor.yaml and external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml.
# Flux owns every object in flux-system via gotk-components.yaml; keeping this
# out of that namespace means this change cannot interact with the Flux install
# itself.
namespaceSelector:
matchNames:
- flux-system
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: flux
app.kubernetes.io/instance: flux-system
podMetricsEndpoints:
# Matches the controllers' `http-prom` port (containerPort 8080). Present on
# all six Deployments in gotk-components.yaml; a future controller without
# it simply yields no target rather than a broken scrape config.
- port: http-prom
path: /metrics
# 60s, not the 30s used elsewhere here, matching the ESO PodMonitor: the
# useful series are slow-moving per-object gauges and histograms over a
# few hundred Flux objects, and any rule built on them (REN-102) will use
# a multi-minute `for:`. 30s would double the samples for no gain in
# detection time — and Prometheus is already near its retention cap
# (REN-107).
interval: 60s
scrapeTimeout: 10s
@@ -15,20 +15,12 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
- prometheusrule-openbao.yaml
# Prometheus's own retention. Until REN-107 `retention: 90d` and
# `retentionSize: 30GB` were both set, the size cap bound first, and the
# effective window was a 20.5-27.2 day saw-tooth with nothing reporting it.
# Fires if the size cap binds before the time retention again.
- prometheusrule-prometheus-retention.yaml
- prometheusrule-velero.yaml
- prometheusrule-woodpecker-rotation.yaml
# CNPG backup health. Seven Postgres clusters ship to Hetzner and nothing
# alerted if that stopped — HetznerBackupEndpointDown only probes the S3
# endpoint, which proves reachability, not that anything was written.
- prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
# Home Assistant, its recorder DB, Mosquitto and Zigbee2MQTT (REN-244). The
# only signal for them before was the generic 15m KubePodNotReady warning.
- prometheusrule-home-assistant.yaml
# DNS publication. Nothing scraped external-dns, so it deleted six LAN
# records on 2026-09-12 and stayed silent for five days.
- prometheusrule-external-dns.yaml
@@ -38,9 +30,6 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-dns-resolution.yaml
- probes-dns.yaml
- alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
# Agent metrics. Ships the metrics Service as well as the ServiceMonitor:
# the chart renders neither under our values, so this scraped nothing and
# the two CiliumBPFMapPressure alerts could never fire. See the file.
- cilium-servicemonitor.yaml
- cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
- crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
@@ -59,22 +48,4 @@ resources:
- loki-servicemonitor.yaml
- smartctl-exporter-servicemonitor.yaml
- intel-gpu-exporter-servicemonitor.yaml
# ESO's controller metrics. Needs the `monitoring` ingress grant added to
# infrastructure/network-policies/external-secrets-ns.yaml in the same change,
# or it scrapes nothing. See the file.
- external-secrets-podmonitor.yaml
# The alert built on what that PodMonitor collects. Split from it on purpose:
# the `for:` window had to be chosen against real series, and Prometheus held
# none for this metric until the scrape landed.
- prometheusrule-external-secrets.yaml
# Flux's own control plane. The controllers were never scraped, so nothing
# about Flux's behaviour was queryable. Scrape only: per-object readiness is
# not on this endpoint at the pinned controller versions and needs
# kube-state-metrics instead. See the file.
- flux-podmonitor.yaml
# The readiness half the PodMonitor above cannot provide. Reads
# `gotk_resource_info`, which comes from the kube-state-metrics
# customResourceState block in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml —
# these two files must land and be reverted together.
- prometheusrule-flux.yaml
- probes-blackbox.yaml
@@ -88,179 +88,6 @@ spec:
# /ready answers 200 unauthenticated and is in this namespace, so the
# same intra-namespace allowance the two above rely on covers it.
- http://loki.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:3100/ready
# APP-HEALTH probes for the two gated navidrome-namespace apps. Same
# rule as the block above (monitoring-vantage-point-rule), but these
# are the first targets here that leave the monitoring namespace.
#
# Both sit entirely behind an Authentik outpost — navidrome.renner.uno
# on ak-outpost-navidrome-gate
# (../navidrome/ingress.yaml#navidrome-gate), lidarr.renner.uno on
# ak-outpost-lidarr-gate (../navidrome/lidarr.yaml#lidarr-gate) — so an
# EXTERNAL probe of either name measures the gate, not the app, and
# stays green while the app behind
# a live gate is dead. That external signal is still wanted, and REN-2
# adds it from UptimeRobot; these are the other half of the pair.
#
# NO CiliumNetworkPolicy change is needed — but NOT because
# cnp-cross-namespace-allow-apps-gatus-to-monitored-services fails to
# apply here. It applies: its Generalization section names
# blackbox-exporter by hand. The reason we are safe is that the allow
# that note demands is PRESENT AND DEDICATED — the navidrome baseline
# CNP (infrastructure/network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml) admits
# blackbox-exporter by pod label on exactly the two listeners these
# two probes reach, :4533 and :8686. It used to admit the whole
# monitoring namespace on every port; REN-28 narrowed it, and the
# ports in that rule are the ones these probes depend on, so a probe
# added here against a THIRD listener in that namespace would need
# that rule widened first. Run that check for the next namespace you
# add; do not skip it on the grounds that the note "is about gatus".
#
# EGRESS — the half the wiki note is silent on, and the half that is
# actually load-bearing here. Cilium enforces at BOTH ends, so the
# destination ingress allow above is worthless if the prober itself
# is in egress enforcement without a matching rule. It is not: an
# endpoint only enters egress enforcement once some policy selecting
# it declares an `egress:` block, and none does for monitoring. The
# namespace has exactly two Cilium policies and both are ingress-only:
# infrastructure/network-policies/monitoring-ns.yaml
# (default-deny-ingress) and monitoring-alloy-syslog.yaml
# (allow-syslog-world-ingress). blackbox-exporter runs in that same
# namespace (../monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml#namespace).
# Re-verified at 2b71dda1 across all 635 yaml files in the repo — 73
# Cilium objects, 38 carrying an egress or egressDeny block, none of
# them in the monitoring namespace, and the single
# CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy is scoped to `reserved.health` so it
# cannot select a pod. 17 other namespaces here already have an egress
# block. If a routine hardening pass ever adds one to monitoring, it
# MUST list the navidrome and paperless namespaces or these three
# cross-namespace targets go red while the *.monitoring.svc ones above
# keep working — a failure mode nobody will connect back to the
# hardening commit. The cnp-cross-namespace-* notes document only the
# ingress half; that silence is what makes this the trap.
#
# BLAST RADIUS if that egress dependency is ever broken. Nothing
# user-facing breaks: these are Prometheus-side Probe targets, not
# gatus checks, so status.renner.uno is unaffected and no workload is
# restarted. What breaks is the signal, and it breaks misleadingly.
# All three targets start failing BlackboxProbeFailing
# (prometheusrule-blackbox.yaml#blackbox-probe-failing — severity
# warning, for: 10m); none of the three is in that rule's exclusion
# list. BlackboxProbesAbsent does NOT fire, because the other 17
# targets keep producing
# probe_success — so it reads as three apps going down, not as a
# policy change. WHO NOTICES: warning routes to the default `email`
# receiver, admin@renner.uno (helmrelease-prometheus.yaml alertmanager
# route, group_wait 30s, grouped by alertname), so the owner gets one
# email roughly 10-11 minutes after the policy lands. HOW FAST UNDONE:
# the REVERT recipe below is a one-line deletion; from merge it is
# live within ~11 minutes (GitRepository interval 1m0s,
# monitoring-rules Kustomization interval 10m), or immediately with
# `flux reconcile kustomization monitoring-rules --with-source`.
#
# /ping on both: unauthenticated, and already the pods' own kubelet
# probe path (../navidrome/deployment.yaml#kubelet-probes,
# ../navidrome/lidarr.yaml#kubelet-probes). For lidarr that it is
# ungated is proven independently of the gate — its reconcile script
# (../navidrome/lidarr.yaml#reconcile-script) curls /ping in a
# loop BEFORE it has read the API key out of config.xml.
#
# STATUS CODE, unproven for all three of the new targets: module
# http_2xx follows redirects and passes only on a FINAL 2xx, while
# every piece of repo evidence behind these paths establishes only
# `< 400` — a kubelet httpGet accepts 200-399, and that reconcile
# script's `curl -f` without -L exits 0 on a 302. That evidence proves the
# paths are UNGATED, not that they answer 200. Check
# probe_http_status_code on the first scrapes; a target that settles
# on a 3xx gets REVERTED, not widened to accept 3xx.
#
# REVERT — an executed recipe, not a claim. Every command below was
# actually run against master 2b71dda1 on 2026-09-25; the results are
# what is recorded here.
#
# NO `git revert` works. All four candidates conflict in THIS file at
# 2b71dda1, because the comment blocks around these targets were
# rewritten after the probes landed (#979):
#
# git revert -m 1 0a82d61f merge of #977, paperless CONFLICT
# git revert -m 1 16238d39 merge of #976, nav + lidarr CONFLICT
# git revert cb9e73bd the paperless commit CONFLICT
# git revert 2219c928 the nav + lidarr commit CONFLICT
#
# Hand-resolving any of them is the trap: the natural --theirs
# resolution of the 16238d39 conflict also drops the paperless target
# below, leaving NO app-health probes and no signal that it happened.
#
# Delete the target lines forward instead. Only the target lines are
# part of the object; the comments are inert. Both of these were run
# and verified:
#
# # all three app-health targets — blackbox-http 20 -> 17
# sed -i '/svc\.cluster\.local:80\/ping$/d;/paperless\.paperless\.svc\.cluster\.local:80\/accounts\/login\/$/d' \
# kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml
#
# # the paperless target alone — blackbox-http 20 -> 19
# sed -i '/paperless\.paperless\.svc\.cluster\.local:80\/accounts\/login\/$/d' \
# kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml
#
# Verified after each run: the file still parses, blackbox-http drops
# to 17 and to 19 respectively, blackbox-edge-wan (3) and
# blackbox-tcp-relays (2) are untouched, and `git diff` contains
# nothing but the deleted target lines. Then drop whichever comment
# block is left orphaned, open a PR, and merge — timing as in the
# BLAST RADIUS paragraph above.
- http://navidrome.navidrome.svc.cluster.local:80/ping
- http://lidarr.navidrome.svc.cluster.local:80/ping
# anchor: paperless-app-health
# APP-HEALTH probe for paperless. Same rule as the block above
# (monitoring-vantage-point-rule); the blind spot it closes is the one
# gatus already documents in its Web Service 11 comment
# (../gatus/configmap.yaml#gatus-endpoints) — through the
# paperless-gate outpost EVERY path, /api/ included,
# answers 302 to an unauthenticated caller, so no external probe of
# paperless.renner.uno can tell a live app from a live gate. That
# external signal is still wanted, and REN-2 adds it from UptimeRobot;
# this is the other half of the pair.
#
# That gatus comment says the in-cluster probe "needs a
# CiliumNetworkPolicy first". That sentence was WRONG when written,
# and still is, on different grounds. The probe is admitted by the
# dedicated policy
# ../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#paperless-allow-blackbox,
# scoped to blackbox-exporter on the paperless pod's :8000 (REN-28);
# the namespace-wide `monitoring` admit this probe used to rely on is
# gone. Cilium unions the allow rules of every CNP selecting an
# endpoint (the mechanism ../paperless/network-policy.yaml#cnp-union
# relies on), so that policy is all the probe needs. The EGRESS
# paragraph in the block above applies here identically.
#
# The stale sentence is deliberately left in place in
# apps/gatus/configmap.yaml: it sits INSIDE the `config.yaml: |`
# block scalar, so editing it changes ConfigMap data and
# `configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload`
# (../gatus/deployment.yaml#reloader) rolls the gatus Deployment. The
# correction is written at the top of
# that file instead, outside `data:`, where it costs no restart.
#
# /accounts/login/ because paperless-ngx has no unauthenticated health
# endpoint at all. It is the app's own established "the webserver
# answers" signal — the same path its startup, liveness and readiness
# probes use (../paperless/paperless.yaml#http-probes) — and it
# renders a Django view
# rather than a static file. It does NOT cover the consumer/celery
# workers: see process-liveness-vs-protocol-liveness.
#
# The cluster-local Host header is accepted only because
# PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS is "*"
# (../paperless/paperless.yaml#allowed-hosts). Narrow that and
# Django answers 400 here and this probe goes permanently red.
#
# This is the target most likely to fail the STATUS CODE check in the
# block above — a Django login view can answer 302 — so check it
# first, and revert rather than widen if it does. Use the REVERT
# recipe in that block: `git revert -m 1 0a82d61f` conflicts here too
# at 2b71dda1, and the tested one-line deletion for this target alone
# is the second command listed there (20 -> 19 targets).
- http://paperless.paperless.svc.cluster.local:80/accounts/login/
# WAN-path probes of the public edge BY PROXY IP. The name-based
# home.renner.uno probe above resolves in-cluster (CoreDNS/k8s_gateway)
# and never leaves the LAN — the vantage-point blind spot that let the
@@ -323,103 +150,3 @@ spec:
static:
- proxy-1.renner.uno:33080
- proxy-2.renner.uno:33080
---
# anchor: negative-control-paperless
# NEGATIVE CONTROLS for the paperless ingress scoping (REN-28 PR 2a).
#
# These four targets are here TO BE REFUSED. They are not availability
# monitoring: every one of them is a workload in the `paperless` namespace that
# blackbox-exporter has no business reaching, and each must read
# `probe_success == 1` before REN-28's PR 2b and `0` after it. That flip is the
# test. Without them, "the whole-namespace admit is gone" is an assertion about
# a CNP diff rather than a measured property of the cluster, and a later
# re-widening of the grant would be silent.
#
# Why this can only be the ingress policy under test: blackbox-exporter runs in
# `monitoring`, whose baseline CNP (infrastructure/network-policies/
# monitoring-ns.yaml) is ingress-only — it declares no `egress:` at all — and
# the cluster's default-deny.yaml is scoped `namespace: apps`, which covers
# neither `monitoring` nor `paperless`. So the only thing that can turn these
# red is paperless's own ingress policy, which is exactly the variable. Nothing
# else can make the test pass or fail.
#
# WHY A SEPARATE jobName, and why these must NEVER be folded into the
# blackbox-http Probe above: after PR 2b these targets fail permanently and BY
# DESIGN. BlackboxProbeFailing and BlackboxProbesAbsent
# (prometheusrule-blackbox.yaml#blackbox-probe-failing and
# prometheusrule-blackbox.yaml#blackbox-probes-absent) are both scoped to
# job="blackbox-http", so a distinct job is outside both and stays silent — and
# the hand-maintained instance!~ exclusion regex in the first of them, whose
# fragility that file warns about, does not have to grow a fifth entry. Adding
# these to blackbox-http instead would
# page the on-call forever.
#
# The inverted alert that gives these targets teeth — CNPNegativeControlReachable
# (prometheusrule-blackbox.yaml#cnp-negative-control-reachable),
# `probe_success{job="blackbox-negative-control"} == 1` — landed with PR 2b,
# together with the policy change, not before: until then these controls were
# SUPPOSED to read 1, so the alert would have fired on the correct state.
#
# TWO WAYS A BROKEN HARNESS READS AS A PASSING TEST. The inverted alert fires
# only on `1`, so anything that forces `0` for a reason other than the policy
# disarms it silently. Both of these are load-bearing:
#
# * The IPv4 fallback. The shared tcp_connect module
# (monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml) prefers ip6 with
# ip_protocol_fallback: true. All four Services are SingleStack IPv4, so
# ip6 never resolves and every `1` these controls ever read came through
# the fallback (probe_ip_protocol == 4). Set the fallback to false and all
# four drop to `0` with the policy wide open. Do not change the module for
# these targets — blackbox-tcp-relays pins ip6-first on purpose; give this
# job its own module instead.
# * scrapeTimeout: 10s below. Cilium drops the SYN, so a refused connect runs
# to the module's own 5s timeout. 5s < 10s is what keeps the SCRAPE
# succeeding, so `up` stays 1 and probe_success reads 0 instead of going
# absent. Do not trim scrapeTimeout toward 5s: a scrape that times out
# leaves no probe_success series for the inverted alert to read, and sets
# `up` to 0, which the chart's job-agnostic TargetDown (defaultRules are on
# in monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml) can page on.
#
# A bare TCP connect is the right probe: it completes or it times out, with no
# application-layer ambiguity about whether a 403 meant the policy or the app.
# Known, accepted side effect: the pprl-pg-rw connect opens and closes without a
# startup packet, so Postgres logs "incomplete startup packet" at LOG level once
# a minute until PR 2b lands and the connect stops arriving.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: Probe
metadata:
name: blackbox-negative-control-paperless
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# Load-bearing, as noted at the top of this file: probeSelector matches on
# it. Without it this Probe is never discovered and the control reads
# `absent`, not `1` — which would look like a passing negative test.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
jobName: blackbox-negative-control
prober:
url: blackbox-exporter-prometheus-blackbox-exporter.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:9115
module: tcp_connect
interval: 60s
scrapeTimeout: 10s
targets:
staticConfig:
static:
# Proves BOTH halves of the pprl-pg scoping PR 2b will introduce: the
# source (blackbox is not Prometheus, and the pprl-pg-allow-prometheus
# rule 2b adds admits only Prometheus) and the port (5432 is not the
# exporter's 9187). Both that rule and paperless-allow-blackbox
# (../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#pprl-pg-allow-prometheus,
# ...#paperless-allow-blackbox) now exist, which is why this target
# must read 0. Service is CNPG-generated from Cluster `pprl-pg`
# (../paperless/cluster.yaml#pprl-pg) and is the name paperless itself
# dials (../paperless/paperless.yaml#db-host).
- pprl-pg-rw.paperless.svc.cluster.local:5432
# Three witnesses that the whole-namespace `monitoring` admit is gone
# for workloads no new rule selects. Ports from the Services themselves:
# ../paperless/redis.yaml#service-port,
# ../paperless/tika.yaml#service-port,
# ../paperless/gotenberg.yaml#service-port.
- redis.paperless.svc.cluster.local:6379
- tika.paperless.svc.cluster.local:9998
- gotenberg.paperless.svc.cluster.local:3000
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ spec:
# target means. A target whose loss deserves a critical page gets its
# own rule — and lands in the list above. That is what keeps the
# exclusion list from being arbitrary.
# anchor: blackbox-probe-failing
- alert: BlackboxProbeFailing
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-http", instance!~"https://fsn1\\.your-objectstorage\\.com|https://netbird\\.renner\\.uno|http://proxy-[12]\\.renner\\.uno:9000/health|https://ci\\.renner\\.uno|https://openbao\\.renner\\.uno/v1/sys/health.*"} == 0
for: 10m
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ spec:
# The check that the checks are running. Every rule above reads
# probe_success; if the series stop being produced at all, none of them
# can fire and the silence looks exactly like health.
# anchor: blackbox-probes-absent
- alert: BlackboxProbesAbsent
expr: absent(probe_success{job="blackbox-http"})
for: 15m
@@ -59,42 +57,3 @@ spec:
they are all blind until it returns.
labels:
severity: critical
# The inverted alert for the paperless negative controls (REN-28 §5.6).
# A separate group so nothing above can grow a matcher for it by accident.
- name: blackbox-negative-control.rules
rules:
# The four targets in probes-blackbox.yaml#negative-control-paperless are
# paperless-namespace workloads that blackbox-exporter must NOT reach
# since REN-28 PR 2b scoped the paperless ingress to per-workload
# policies. `0` is healthy here and `1` is the failure: a control that
# connects means the grant was re-widened — a namespace-wide
# `monitoring` admit back on the paperless baseline, or a per-workload
# policy whose selector grew — and blackbox, a pod with no business
# there, can open TCP into the namespace whose paperless pod trusts
# X-Authentik-Username from anything that connects.
#
# Scoped to job="blackbox-negative-control" ONLY. Never blackbox-http,
# whose targets are meant to read 1.
#
# This rule reads 0 as silence, so anything that forces 0 for another
# reason disarms it without a sound. The two known ways are commented
# on the Probe: the IPv4 fallback of the shared tcp_connect module, and
# scrapeTimeout staying above the module's 5s timeout.
#
# for: 15m rides out a short policy churn during a Cilium restart or a
# CNP re-apply; a real re-widening is permanent and fires regardless.
# anchor: cnp-negative-control-reachable
- alert: CNPNegativeControlReachable
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-negative-control"} == 1
for: 15m
annotations:
summary: "Negative control {{ $labels.instance }} is reachable from blackbox-exporter"
description: >-
blackbox-exporter in `monitoring` completed a TCP connect to
{{ $labels.instance }}, which the paperless ingress policy must
refuse (REN-28). The paperless ingress grant has been re-widened.
Check infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml for a
namespace-wide `monitoring` admit on default-deny-ingress, or a
per-workload policy whose selector now matches this workload.
labels:
severity: warning
@@ -52,123 +52,19 @@ spec:
- alert: CephPoolLostRedundancy
# Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.
#
# There is no pool-size metric, but for a REPLICATED pool
# bytes_used/stored IS the replication factor. The >1e6 floor drops
# pools too small to measure meaningfully, empty ones included.
# There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
# replication factor. The >1e6 floor drops pools too small to measure
# meaningfully, empty ones included.
#
# ERASURE-CODED POOLS ARE EXCLUDED, AND MUST STAY EXCLUDED (REN-88).
#
# That ratio is not a replication factor for an EC pool, it is the
# coding overhead: k+m shards over k data shards. For the two ec:2+1
# pools here that is 3/2 = exactly 1.5 — sitting precisely on this
# rule's own threshold, on the wrong side of it half the time.
# Measured on `cephfs-bulk` (pool 15): used 480042086400 / stored
# 320028049408 = 1.5000000384, a margin of 12 KiB in 480 GB, so which
# way the comparison lands is decided by the last bits of a float
# division. It paged critical for 199 minutes on 2026-09-25 (12:37 to
# 15:56 UTC, two emails) with the cluster HEALTH_OK, zero degraded
# PGs and every OSD up, then cleared on its own. 50 of the 210
# samples in the preceding 30h were below 1.5; only that run held the
# 30m `for`. `migration.rgw.buckets.data` (pool 12) is the same ec:2+1
# shape and was one drift away from doing the same thing.
#
# The premise fails for EC too, not just the arithmetic: the old
# description claimed a single OSD loss destroys data, but 2+1 carries
# a parity shard and survives one OSD loss, same as replica-2.
#
# Do NOT "fix" this by nudging the threshold to 1.4 or 1.49. That
# keeps a knife-edge, just a quieter one, and it also narrows the real
# replica-2 -> replica-1 signal this rule exists to catch (1.0).
#
# EC pools keep full redundancy coverage without this rule: a real
# loss raises POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY, which is a live series in
# `ceph_health_detail` and is deliberately in scope for
# CephHealthWarn above. That check reads Ceph's own verdict instead of
# inferring one from a byte ratio, which is the right instrument here
# — an EC pool that loses a shard does not change its stored/used
# ratio at all, because Ceph does not delete the surviving shards.
# So there is no gap to reopen, and no second EC-specific threshold
# worth inventing.
#
# `on(pool_id)` is deliberately the whole matcher. ceph_pool_metadata
# carries labels ceph_pool_bytes_used does not (name, type,
# description, application, compression_mode), so default all-label
# matching would never join. Adding `cluster` would be defensive
# against a second Ceph cluster that does not exist, at the cost of
# the rule silently matching nothing if that label is ever dropped —
# an alert that fails open invisibly is the worse trade.
# No pool is exempt.
expr: |
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5
and on(pool_id) ceph_pool_metadata{type="replicated"} == 1
and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5 and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6
for: 30m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Ceph replicated pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} is running unreplicated"
description: "Replicated pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning it is down to a single copy and one OSD loss destroys data. No replicated pool is meant to be unreplicated — it also blocks OSD maintenance for as long as it lasts, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Erasure-coded pools are out of scope for this rule and are covered by POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY via CephHealthWarn (REN-88). Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- alert: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
# Canary for the rule directly above. Keep the two adjacent.
#
# CephPoolLostRedundancy is `critical` and it fails CLOSED and
# SILENTLY. Its expression joins three metrics on one label and
# filters on one specific label VALUE, and if any of those stops
# matching the expression returns nothing, which is indistinguishable
# from "every pool is fine". Health stays ok, no email is sent, and
# nothing anywhere reports that a critical storage alert has gone
# dark. Measured at REN-88 review time: `type` carried exactly two
# values, `replicated` and `erasure`, across 15 series — so the
# dependency is real, and a Rook or Ceph upgrade that renames the
# label, renames the value, or drops it in a relabel rule is enough.
#
# This expression is CephPoolLostRedundancy's with both thresholds
# removed, wrapped in absent(): "can that rule produce any series at
# all". It goes to 1 if either metric disappears, if `pool_id` is
# dropped from either side of the join, if the `type` label is
# renamed, or if `replicated` stops being its value.
#
# The one deliberate difference is that `ceph_pool_stored > 1e6` is
# NOT mirrored here. That floor is about data volume, not structure —
# replicated pools that are all legitimately tiny is a quiet state,
# not a broken dependency, and copying it in would make this fire for
# a benign reason.
#
# ONE CANARY PER FRAGILE JOIN, NOT ONE PER RULE GROUP. Judged on
# drift: a group-level canary has to enumerate every metric the group
# reads, and adding a rule to the group does not update it. Six months
# on it silently under-covers while LOOKING comprehensive, which is the
# same failure shape as a discovery step that passes having checked
# nothing. This one's scope is exactly one rule sitting six lines
# above it, so "is it still true" is answerable by reading the two
# blocks together. It can still drift — someone edits the expr above
# and not this — but that drift shows up in the same diff hunk, and
# when it does bite it FIRES rather than going quiet. For a guard,
# loud and wrong beats silent and wrong.
#
# 1h, not the 30m above. The exporter moved through 17 distinct mgr
# instances in 30d, and every one of those failovers makes all ceph_*
# metrics absent for as long as it takes the new mgr to be scraped;
# anything under ~15m would page on routine failover, and noise is
# what REN-88 was about. A long `for` costs nothing in detection value
# because the failure this catches is a schema change — permanent, not
# transient — and a blindness that self-heals inside an hour is not
# worth an email. Transient exporter loss is already covered by the
# chart's own TargetDown.
#
# `warning`, not `critical`: an alert stopped being able to fire.
# Storage is not broken.
expr: |
absent(
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored
and on(pool_id) ceph_pool_metadata{type="replicated"} == 1
)
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "CephPoolLostRedundancy cannot fire — its metrics no longer join"
description: "The CephPoolLostRedundancy alert has been unable to produce any series for an hour, so a `critical` storage alert is silently dark. It joins ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored against ceph_pool_metadata{type=\"replicated\"} on `pool_id`; one of those metrics, the `pool_id` label, the `type` label, or the `replicated` value has stopped matching — most likely a Rook or Ceph upgrade, or a relabel rule. Check what the exporter emits now with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail` and by querying `ceph_pool_metadata` directly, then fix the join in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml — do not delete this canary (REN-93)."
summary: "Ceph pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} is running unreplicated"
description: "Pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning a single OSD loss destroys data. No pool is meant to be unreplicated — an unreplicated pool also blocks ALL OSD maintenance cluster-wide, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- alert: CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
@@ -199,116 +95,3 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} /var below 30% free — Ceph mon will warn"
description: "/var on {{ $labels.instance }} is under 30% free, which is Ceph's mon_data_avail_warn threshold, so the mon on this node will report MON_DISK_LOW. Find the actual consumer with `talosctl -n <node> usage /var/lib --depth 1` and then `/var/lib/containerd --depth 1` — note that overlayfs snapshots belong to running containers and are not reclaimable by image GC."
- alert: CephOSDNearfullApproaching
# Warns BEFORE Ceph's own nearfull check, which is the incident and
# not a warning. mon_osd_nearfull_ratio is 0.85 and is not
# overridden here.
#
# There is no rebalance to hide behind: failureDomain is host with
# size 3 on exactly three OSDs, so every OSD holds a copy of every
# replicated object and all three cross 0.85 within seconds of each
# other. Measured 2026-09-26: 81.86 / 81.87 / 81.83%.
#
# 0.75 is 0.85 minus the largest bulk-tier burst on record. Measured
# at 30s resolution over the 14d to 2026-09-26: the fullest OSD went
# 71.63% -> 81.87% between 05:18 and 05:43Z (+10.24 pp, ~275 GiB raw)
# and reclaimed within the hour. At a SUSTAINED 75%, one more burst of
# that size reaches nearfull, which is the point at which the level
# itself is the finding.
#
# `for: 30m` is the shortest wait that outlives a self-reclaiming
# burst. That same burst held >= 75% for 19.0 min, so 30m clears it by
# 11 min; a permanent step holds it indefinitely. Do NOT shorten this
# to 15m — the 09-26 burst then pages, with the cluster reclaiming on
# its own while someone reads the mail.
#
# Nor should it be lengthened to 1h. The fastest observed SUSTAINED
# climb was +11.44 pp in one hour (2026-09-25 08:02-09:02Z, a real
# ingest that never reclaimed). From 75% that reaches 0.85 in ~53 min,
# so a 1h pending window would fire after nearfull, not before it.
# 30m fires at ~80.7% in that worst case — about 22 min of lead — and
# at 2.24 pp/h (the worst 6h-sustained rate) it fires at ~76.1%, about
# 4h of lead. The 30m/1h choice is the whole trade: a burst reclaims
# in ~20 min and a step does not, so ~30m is the earliest honest
# verdict. REN-162 is measuring the burst envelope; if a burst is ever
# seen holding >= 75% for more than ~25 min, this `for` moves out, not
# the threshold.
#
# Replay over the 14d to 2026-09-26 08:00Z: the worst 30m-sustained
# floor on any OSD was 71.632% (09-26 04:31Z), so this rule fires ZERO
# times on the observed normal shape, including the 09-26 excursion to
# 81.87% and the 09-25 step from 59% to 71%. Margin 3.37 pp.
#
# `max by (ceph_daemon)` is not cosmetic. rook-ceph-exporter pods are
# replaced often — 32 distinct series for three OSDs in 14 days — and
# the raw expression carries `pod` and `instance`, so every restart
# would change the alert identity and reset a pending window.
expr: |
max by (ceph_daemon) (
ceph_osd_stat_bytes_used / ceph_osd_stat_bytes
) >= 0.75
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph {{ $labels.ceph_daemon }} sustained above 75% — one bulk burst from nearfull"
description: "{{ $labels.ceph_daemon }} has been at or above 75% utilisation for 30 minutes ({{ $value | humanizePercentage }} now). That is 0.85 nearfull minus the largest bulk-tier burst measured here (+10.24 pp in 25 minutes), so a single repeat of that burst trips mon_osd_nearfull_ratio — and with failureDomain host, size 3 and three OSDs, it trips on all three at once with no rebalance available. This is sustained, not a spike: a burst clears in about 20 minutes and never holds this for 30. Find what grew with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph df` and `ceph osd df tree`; the bulk tier (cephfs-bulk, pool 15) is the usual mover."
- alert: CephReplicapoolHeadroomLow
# The `replicapool` counterpart to the OSD rule above, in the units a
# reader can act on: GiB that still fit.
#
# These two are NOT independent signals and must not be read as
# corroboration. `ceph_pool_max_avail` for a size-3 pool on three
# equal OSDs is exactly (full_ratio - fullest_OSD_utilisation) x
# osd_size; verified against live data, the identity holds at 0.95 to
# five decimals. So this rule is the OSD series rescaled — a second
# TIER, deliberately set to trip after the OSD rule, not a second
# opinion. Ceph's own nearfull line of 0.85 sits at 89.4 GiB here.
#
# 160 GiB is what must still fit, measured:
# 89 GiB max_avail at the 0.85 nearfull line, i.e. the part of
# max_avail that is not ours to spend
# 38 GiB ha-pg's unconsumed allocation after the approved 20Gi ->
# 32Gi expansion: 2 instances x (31.33 GiB provisioned -
# 12.4 GiB used) as of 2026-09-26
# 35 GiB replicapool churn allowance — the worst observed single
# day (+14.3 GiB, 09-23) plus eleven days at the 14d mean
# of 1.9 GiB/day
# = 162 GiB, rounded DOWN to 160 so the rounding costs quiet, not
# headroom.
#
# Selecting on the pool NAME through ceph_pool_metadata, not on a
# hardcoded pool_id: ids are assignable and replicapool is only id 1
# by history. `on(pool_id)` is the whole matcher for the same reason
# given on CephPoolLostRedundancy above — ceph_pool_metadata carries
# labels ceph_pool_max_avail does not, so default matching never
# joins.
#
# `max by (pool_id)` twice over: it collapses the churning mgr `pod`
# and `instance` labels (8 series in 14 days), and during an mgr
# failover it takes the live value rather than a stale low one.
#
# `for: 30m` also covers a real exporter artefact: ceph_pool_max_avail
# reads exactly 0 for a single 30s sample after an mgr restart, twice
# in the 14d window (e.g. 09-23 12:27Z), on every mgr series at once.
# A `for` shorter than a few minutes would page on that alone. Note
# the glitch is one-directional, so it cannot cancel a genuine breach
# — 0 is still below the floor.
#
# Replay over the 14d to 2026-09-26 08:00Z: the lowest 30m-sustained
# ceiling was 208.97 GiB (09-26 04:31Z), so ZERO fires on the observed
# normal shape. The 09-26 burst took max_avail to 117.4 GiB for about
# 10 minutes and did not come close to holding it.
expr: |
max by (pool_id) (
ceph_pool_max_avail
and on(pool_id) ceph_pool_metadata{name="replicapool"}
) < 160 * 1024^3
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "replicapool usable headroom below 160 GiB"
description: "replicapool has had under 160 GiB usable for 30 minutes ({{ $value | humanize1024 }}B now). 160 GiB is the 89 GiB that max_avail still holds above Ceph's 0.85 nearfull line, plus the 38 GiB ha-pg has not yet consumed of its 32Gi expansion, plus 35 GiB of observed replicapool churn — below this, what is already committed no longer fits before nearfull. This is the same series as CephOSDNearfullApproaching rescaled (max_avail = (0.95 - fullest OSD) x OSD size), so it is a second tier and not independent confirmation. Check `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph df`; growth here is usually the bulk tier on the shared OSDs, not replicapool itself."
@@ -34,20 +34,9 @@ spec:
# query parameter, and an exact match would break silently if the
# instance label ever encodes it differently.
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-http", instance=~"https://openbao\\.renner\\.uno/v1/sys/health.*"} == 0
# Five minutes of continuously failing probes — about ten consecutive
# samples, since the probe and the rule evaluation both run at 30s
# (probes-blackbox.yaml, helmrelease-prometheus.yaml). Matches
# WoodpeckerDown above.
#
# This was 1m, the tightest probe window in the cluster by 5x, and it
# went pending on a single 5s HTTPS timeout with OpenBao healthy
# (REN-131). Isolated blips are ambient on this probe fleet at roughly
# one per two hours, so a window that clears on three samples pages on
# jitter. The widening costs nothing real: per the description below
# nothing breaks the moment OpenBao goes away, and OpenBaoQuorumLost
# (prometheusrule-openbao.yaml, for: 2m) still covers the fast
# failure, which is quorum loss rather than a lost probe.
for: 5m
# Two consecutive failed probes: enough to skip a single lost probe
# through Traefik, not enough to sit on a sealed store.
for: 1m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ spec:
rules:
# The Postgres clusters back up to Hetzner. HetznerBackupEndpointDown
# probes that S3 endpoint, which proves the bucket is reachable and
# nothing more — these rules check that something is actually being
# nothing more — these two rules check that something is actually being
# written to it.
- alert: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
@@ -23,79 +23,22 @@ spec:
# that moment, and pg_wal keeps growing until it fills the PVC and
# takes Postgres down.
#
# This is the load-bearing alert of the group. It reads the
# This is the load-bearing alert of the two. It reads the
# instance-level collector directly, so unlike the backup-age metric
# discussed below it does not depend on Cluster status being
# populated.
#
# Threshold: >5 segments sustained for 20m. A segment is 16 MiB, so 5
# is roughly 80 MiB of un-archived WAL — well below anything that
# threatens the volume, but far above idle noise.
#
# WHAT THIS RULE KEYS ON: persistence, not depth. The failure that
# costs something is an archiver that has *stopped*, and a stopped
# archiver can sit at 60 segments indefinitely without ever reaching
# some larger number. A depth threshold tuned above the nightly
# envelope below would miss exactly that case, and would need raising
# again every time the recorder grows. So there is one rule here, and
# the tuning knob is `for` (REN-152).
#
# THE NIGHTLY BURST, which this rule must stay silent through.
# ha-pg-1 queues WAL every night on the same clock:
#
# flat 0 until 02:12Z; fill from 02:13Z; peak 02:14-02:15Z;
# drained by 02:26Z at the worst. 02:12Z is 04:12 local, which is
# when Home Assistant's recorder purge runs.
#
# It is a write burst, not IO contention. Drain is a flat
# 13-15 segments/min every night — including nights when Kopia's
# repository-maintenance batch was saturating the RBD devices, and
# nights when it did not start until after the burst had already
# drained. That batch drifts across 02:03-02:24Z while the peak stays
# pinned to 02:15Z, and a drifting cause cannot produce an effect
# fixed to the clock. What varies is the fill (19-40 segments/min),
# so the height of the backlog is set by how much WAL is produced
# against an archiver with a flat ~14 segments/min ceiling.
#
# WHY 20m. Measured against Prometheus' full 27-night retention
# (2026-08-30..2026-09-26), at the real 30s scrape resolution, across
# all 12 CNPG instances. Only ha-pg-1 ever exceeds 5 at all; every
# other instance peaks at 2. Longest contiguous excursion above 5 on
# any night: 13.0 minutes, on 2026-09-11, at a peak of 141 segments.
# Firing evaluations over those 27 nights: 0 at 20m, and also 0 at
# 15m — but 15m leaves only 2 minutes of margin against the worst
# night, and the nightly peak climbed from 116 to 141 inside the
# measured month as the recorder grew. 20m leaves 7 minutes and does
# not have to be re-derived every time the database gets bigger.
#
# The 5 minutes 20m costs in detection latency buy nothing back: a
# real stall lasts hours, and at 32Gi (REN-141) the volume holds
# roughly four nights of stalled WAL before free space is in danger.
#
# `for` was 30m before REN-129. Outside the nightly windows the
# metric is a hard 0 on all 12 instances, so there was never a noise
# floor that needed 30m to wait out — the extra 10m only delayed the
# page.
#
# WHEN IT FIRES, the fix is drain rate or headroom, never a higher
# threshold here. ObjectStore `wal.maxParallel`
# (kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/ha-pg-objectstore.yaml) is unset,
# which the barman-cloud plugin reads as one WAL segment at a time;
# that is where the ~14 segments/min ceiling comes from. Headroom is
# `spec.storage.size` in ha-pg-cluster.yaml. Both are REN-135.
#
# `max by (namespace, pod)` is not cosmetic. The raw series carries
# `role`, which flips on failover; a changed label is a new series,
# and a new series restarts the `for` timer. Aggregating `role` away
# means a backlog that persists across a failover still pages 20m
# after the backlog started rather than 20m after the failover.
expr: max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{value="ready"}) > 5
for: 20m
# Threshold: >5 segments sustained for 30m. Brief non-zero values are
# normal under write bursts — a segment is 16 MiB, so 5 is roughly
# 80 MiB of un-archived WAL, well below anything that threatens the
# volume but far above idle noise.
expr: cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{value="ready"} > 5
for: 30m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }}"
description: "{{ $value }} WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 20 minutes. NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local) is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n {{ $labels.namespace }} logs {{ $labels.pod }} -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
description: "{{ $value }} WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 30 minutes. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n {{ $labels.namespace }} logs {{ $labels.pod }} -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
- alert: CNPGBackupFailed
# cnpg_collector_last_failed_backup_timestamp is a unix timestamp, 0
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
# Alert when an ExternalSecret stops syncing.
#
# This is the second half of REN-103. The first half (#994) added the PodMonitor
# and the `monitoring` ingress grant that make the series exist at all; before
# that, `externalsecret_status_condition` held 0 series and a key that silently
# stopped refreshing was invisible to Prometheus, to Alertmanager and to anyone
# looking at a dashboard. The alert is split out because its `for:` window had to
# be chosen against real data rather than guessed.
#
# `exported_namespace`, NOT `namespace`. The metric carries its own `namespace`
# label (the ExternalSecret's), and the PodMonitor attaches a target label of the
# same name (the controller pod's, always `external-secrets`). Prometheus resolves
# that collision by renaming the metric's label to `exported_namespace`, so on
# every one of the ~105 live series `namespace="external-secrets"`. Grouping by
# `namespace` would therefore still fire correctly and still be useless: every
# failing ExternalSecret in the cluster would be reported as living in
# `external-secrets`. ESO's own shipped Grafana dashboard does group by
# `namespace` — that is right for the chart's ServiceMonitor, which scrapes ESO
# through its own Service and injects no conflicting target label, and wrong here.
# This is a general trap for the PodMonitor-instead-of-ServiceMonitor trade this
# repo keeps making: any metric carrying its own `namespace`, `pod` or `container`
# label gets it shadowed.
#
# `honorLabels: true` on the PodMonitor endpoint would keep the clean label name
# instead, and is deliberately not used: it drops the target labels, so nothing
# records which controller replica reported, and it would make this the only
# monitor in the directory doing so.
#
# A consequence worth knowing rather than fixing: aggregating by
# `exported_namespace` leaves these alerts with no `namespace` label at all, and
# Alertmanager's route groups on ['alertname', 'cluster', 'namespace']. So every
# failing ExternalSecret arrives in ONE email listing all of them, each named by
# its own annotation, instead of one email per namespace. For a fleet this size
# that is the better shape.
#
# The obvious worry about that shape — that a SECOND ExternalSecret failing while
# the first alert is already firing gets swallowed by the open group — does not
# hold, and the setting that decides it is `group_interval: 5m` on the root route
# in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml. `group_interval` governs
# notification of a group whose alert SET has changed, which is a different thing
# from `repeat_interval: 12h`, which governs re-sending an unchanged group. A
# second failure therefore produces a fresh email naming both within 5 minutes.
# This rule routes to the root `email` receiver: it is `severity: warning` and
# carries no `source = "flux"`, so it matches none of the four child routes.
#
# The inhibit rules are also checked and do not touch these alerts. All three key
# on `equal: ['namespace', 'alertname']` (or `['namespace']`), and no critical or
# warning alert in the cluster shares this `alertname`. In particular
# OpenBaoQuorumLost does NOT inhibit this rule — different alertname — so an
# OpenBao outage can surface both. That is the intended order rather than a
# problem: OpenBaoQuorumLost is critical at 2m and arrives first, well before
# this rule's 15m.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: external-secrets
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's ruleSelector matches on this label; without it the
# rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: external-secrets.rules
rules:
# Measured against the live Prometheus before this rule was proposed for
# merge, through the apiserver services/proxy read path:
#
# count(externalsecret_status_condition) = 105
# count(count by (exported_namespace,name) (...)) = 53
# count(count by (exported_namespace,name) (...{condition="Ready"})) = 52
# count(count by (exported_namespace) (...)) = 20
# count(...{condition="Ready",status="False"}) = 52
# the ExternalSecretSyncFailing expression below = EMPTY
#
# So 105 = 52 ExternalSecrets x 2 Ready polarities + 1 Deleted tombstone,
# across 20 namespaces, and THIS RULE ARRIVES SILENT: it matches nothing
# in the cluster as it stands, which is what makes it safe to load. The
# 52 on the line below is a count, not an estimate.
#
# `== 1` IS LOAD-BEARING, not defensive. ESO writes BOTH polarities of the
# Ready condition on every reconcile — the true one at 1 and the opposite
# at 0 (esmetrics.UpdateExternalSecretCondition) — so
# `{condition="Ready",status="False"}` is present with value 0 for every
# healthy ExternalSecret. A bare selector would match all 52 of them.
#
# `max`, not the `sum` the vendor dashboard uses. Both give 1 today,
# because ESO runs a single controller replica. During a Deployment
# rollout Prometheus can briefly scrape the old and the new pod at once,
# and `sum(...) == 1` would then evaluate to 2 and silently STOP matching
# — the alert would resolve itself in the middle of a failure. `max` is 0
# or 1 whatever the replica count.
#
# The gauge, not `externalsecret_sync_calls_error`. The counter was the
# other candidate, on the theory that a counter cannot flap the way a
# condition gauge might. Reading the controller says the opposite on both
# halves: the counter increments on strictly MORE paths than the condition
# does — a failed Get of the ExternalSecret itself, a failed Get or label
# Patch of the target Secret, an unresolvable SecretStore — and none of
# those call markAsFailed(), so none of them set Ready=False. A cache blip
# or an apiserver hiccup moves the counter and nothing else. It is the
# noisier signal, not the quieter one. And the gauge does
# not flap, because it is set to 1 only by markAsFailed() and cleared by
# the next successful reconcile. There is no unset state in between.
#
# The live numbers say the same thing, measured after #994 landed:
# `externalsecret_sync_calls_error` has exactly one series in the whole
# cluster, `ai/wiki-anthropic`, at 8 errors over 47 calls — and that
# ExternalSecret is Ready=True and has never been otherwise in the
# observation window. So on today's data the counter carries 8 events that
# correspond to no sync failure at all, and the gauge carries none.
#
# That observation window is now long enough to mean something, and it is
# the answer to the only open question this rule was held back for — how
# much the gauge flaps in ordinary operation. Measured 2026-09-26T08:02Z,
# over the 464 consecutive scrapes since #994 started collecting at
# 00:18Z:
#
# min_over_time(up{job="monitoring/external-secrets"}[8h]) = 1
# sum(increase(externalsecret_sync_calls_total[8h])) = 959
# count(increase(externalsecret_sync_calls_total[8h]) > 0) = 52
# count(max_over_time(
# externalsecret_status_condition{
# condition="Ready",status="False"}[8h]) == 1) = EMPTY
# sum(increase(externalsecret_sync_calls_error[8h])) = 0
#
# Every one of the 52 ExternalSecrets reconciled at least once in that
# window — 959 syncs, so the 1h and 10m refreshInterval cycles both turned
# over repeatedly — and across all of them the Ready gauge never reached 1
# in a single scrape. Zero flap amplitude, against real reconcile traffic
# rather than against silence. The counter was flat over the same window
# too, which is why 8 stays 8 above. `for: 15m` is therefore not damping
# anything measurable; it is derived from the failure modes below, and the
# data says no shorter window would have been noisy either.
#
# The 2026-09-20 `ai/wiki-embed-basic-auth` incident is evidence FOR this
# rule, not against it, though it reads the other way at first. That key
# sat in ESO retry backoff through ~10 failures and NEEDED A MANUAL
# force-sync (the incident is written up in
# clusters/homelab/uptime-monitor.yaml, as the in-repo proof for REN-100).
# Because it never self-healed, Ready=False was continuous from the first
# failure until a human intervened — hours, not minutes. `for: 15m` catches
# that with a wide margin. It was a stuck condition, not a flap; the flap
# reading would only hold if the retries had eventually succeeded on their
# own, and they did not.
- alert: ExternalSecretSyncFailing
expr: >-
max by (exported_namespace, name) (
externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False"}
) == 1
# 15m, and the reason it can be this relaxed is that a failed sync is
# not an outage: consumers keep using the last Secret ESO wrote, so what
# degrades is freshness, not availability. Nothing here needs catching
# inside a minute.
#
# It needs to be at least this long because the provider-error path
# returns the error to controller-runtime, which retries with
# exponential backoff rather than waiting out `refreshInterval`. A
# momentary OpenBao blip is therefore cleared within seconds and never
# reaches 15m, while a rolling restart of the 3-replica OpenBao
# StatefulSet is ridden out entirely — and that outage has its own
# alert (OpenBaoQuorumLost, critical at 2m), so nothing is hidden by
# waiting. 15m of continuous Ready=False means repeated failure.
for: 15m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "ExternalSecret {{ $labels.exported_namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} is not syncing"
description: >-
ESO has been unable to sync this ExternalSecret for 15 minutes. The
Secret it manages still holds its last successfully synced value, so
consumers keep working — what breaks is that a rotation at the
provider no longer propagates, which surfaces much later as a
credential that stopped being accepted. Get the reason with
`kubectl -n {{ $labels.exported_namespace }} get externalsecret
{{ $labels.name }} -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'`; the common
causes are a key that was renamed or removed in OpenBao, a
ClusterSecretStore that cannot authenticate, and a target Secret
owned by something else.
# Dead-man's-switch, mirroring ExternalDNSMetricsMissing and
# OpenBaoMetricsMissing. The alert above can only fire on series that
# exist, so deleting the PodMonitor, reverting the `monitoring` ingress
# grant in infrastructure/network-policies/external-secrets-ns.yaml, or
# bumping the ESO chart onto a metrics port that no longer matches would
# all disarm it silently — which is the exact failure mode REN-103 exists
# to end. TargetDown does not cover this: it reports a target that exists
# and is failing, not the absence of a target.
- alert: ExternalSecretMetricsMissing
expr: absent(externalsecret_status_condition)
for: 15m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "No ExternalSecret metrics are reaching Prometheus"
description: >-
`externalsecret_status_condition` has no series. Either the ESO
controller is gone or its scrape stopped being collected, and
ExternalSecretSyncFailing is blind for as long as this is true.
Check the PodMonitor `monitoring/external-secrets` still selects the
controller pods, and that external-secrets-ns.yaml still admits
`monitoring` on TCP/8080.
# NOT covered here, deliberately, so nobody assumes it is:
#
# * `condition="Deleted"`. In chart 2.11.0 the only writer of that
# condition is the NotFound branch of Reconcile, which fabricates
# `Deleted=False` purely to make UpdateExternalSecretCondition drop
# the object's Ready series. It is a tombstone for an ExternalSecret
# that no longer exists, not a health state, and `Deleted=True` is
# never emitted at all — a rule on it would be dead code. The one such
# series in the cluster today (`ai/wiki-index-basic-auth`) is leftover
# process state for an ExternalSecret that moved namespace; it clears
# when the controller next restarts.
# * An ExternalSecret that exists in the cluster but was never
# reconciled emits no series at all, so nothing above can see it. That
# needs object-existence data — kube-state-metrics custom resource
# state — rather than ESO's own metrics, and is not in this change.
# * A sync that fails and then succeeds on its own inside 15m. This is a
# choice, not an oversight: the retry left the Secret holding a freshly
# synced value, so nothing degraded and there is nothing for a human to
# do. Alerting on it would mean paging for a self-healed event. The case
# that would justify revisiting is the same failure recurring for days
# without any single occurrence lasting 15m, which would show up as a
# climbing `externalsecret_sync_calls_error` on an ExternalSecret that
# is Ready=True. Nothing in the cluster shows that shape today, and the
# rule for it needs a measured recurrence rate rather than a guess.
@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
# Per-object Flux readiness, and the groundwork for the Ready-but-frozen
# ImagePolicy signal (REN-102, closing REN-97).
#
# EVERYTHING HERE READS `gotk_resource_info`, WHICH IS A kube-state-metrics
# SERIES, NOT A FLUX CONTROLLER SERIES. apps/monitoring-rules/flux-podmonitor.yaml
# scrapes the controllers and yields reconcile durations and controller-runtime
# counters, but readiness is not on that endpoint at the pinned controller
# versions: `gotk_reconcile_condition` and `gotk_suspend_status` are declared by
# fluxcd/pkg/runtime and populated by nothing. The series these rules read are
# created by the `customResourceState` block in
# apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml. If that block is removed, every
# rule below goes blind — which is what FluxImagePolicyMetricsMissing exists to
# say out loud.
#
# THE STALENESS HALF DELIBERATELY SHIPS WITHOUT AN ALERT. See the second group.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: flux
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# ruleSelector matches on this label; without it the rule is created but
# never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: flux.rules
rules:
# Why `max by (...)` and not the bare selector: it collapses the KSM
# target labels (`pod`, `instance`, `endpoint`, ...). Without it, a
# kube-state-metrics rollout changes `pod`, which resolves the alert on
# the old series and re-fires it on the new one — a fresh mail for an
# unchanged failure. KSM rolled 11 times in the last 30 days, so this is
# routine, not hypothetical.
#
# Why `ready=~"False|Unknown"` and not `ready="False"`: Flux sets Ready
# False on failure but Unknown while a reconcile is in flight, and an
# object wedged in Unknown is stuck just as hard as one that is False —
# this repo has already had a Progressing CephCluster deadlock the whole
# apps layer (see rook-servicemonitors.yaml). Matching the two values
# explicitly, rather than `ready!="True"`, keeps an object whose `ready`
# label is absent entirely (freshly created, condition not yet written)
# out of the alert.
#
# Why `suspended!="true"` and not an `unless` join: `suspended` is a
# label on the same Info series, so one matcher does what the withdrawn
# draft needed a second vector for. The `!=` form also covers kinds where
# the label is absent. There is no deleted-object guard because KSM stops
# emitting the series when the object goes away — under `gotk_*` that
# guard had to be written, here it is structural.
#
# for: 2h — 31 of the 34 ImageRepositories scan at `interval: 1h`
# (2 at 30m: shelly-manager, vsftpd; 1 at 10m: wiki), so 91% of the
# population cannot recover from a transient registry failure faster
# than one hour whatever this value says. Anything under 1h mails about
# a single self-healing missed scan. 2h means two consecutive failed
# scans. Detection latency added by going through KSM is one 30s scrape.
- alert: FluxImageAutomationNotReady
expr: >-
max by (customresource_kind, name, exported_namespace) (
gotk_resource_info{
customresource_kind=~"ImageRepository|ImagePolicy|ImageUpdateAutomation",
ready=~"False|Unknown",
suspended!="true"
}
)
for: 2h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Flux {{ $labels.customresource_kind }}/{{ $labels.name }} has not been Ready for 2h"
description: >-
An image-automation object has been not-Ready for two reconcile
intervals. Nothing is broken in the running cluster, but the image
it governs has stopped moving, security rebuilds included.
`flux get image all -n {{ $labels.exported_namespace }}` gives the
reason; the usual causes are registry credentials, a rate limit, or
a tag format the policy's `pattern`/`extract` no longer matches.
flux-notifications/alerts.yaml already mailed once at the moment of
transition — this is the "still broken two hours later" signal that
edge-triggered mail cannot give.
# The exact negation of the matcher above, so a kind added to
# helmrelease-prometheus.yaml's customResourceState config is covered by
# one of these two rules without anyone remembering to widen a list.
#
# for: 1h, derived from the intervals actually in this repo: all 33
# Kustomizations are at 10m (six retries inside the hour), all 25
# HelmReleases at 30m (two), and the flux-system GitRepository at 1m0s
# (sixty). The dominant non-failure source of ready="False" is a
# `dependsOn` wait, whose `reason` is not a label and so cannot be
# filtered out; an hour clears a whole-cluster reconcile chain.
#
# KNOWN TRADE, stated rather than hidden: this matcher also picks up the
# 17 HelmRepository and 4 OCIRepository objects, and every one of those is
# at `interval: 24h`. A failed index or manifest fetch there cannot
# self-heal inside an hour, so a transient failure yields up to two mails
# (repeat_interval is 12h) before the next scheduled reconcile. That is
# accepted as correct — a chart source stale for an hour is worth knowing
# — and it is real information rather than a blip. If it turns out to be
# the noisy one, the fix is a third rule for the 24h-interval kinds, not
# a global bump of this value, which would make Kustomization alerts
# useless.
- alert: FluxResourceNotReady
expr: >-
max by (customresource_kind, name, exported_namespace) (
gotk_resource_info{
customresource_kind!~"ImageRepository|ImagePolicy|ImageUpdateAutomation",
ready=~"False|Unknown",
suspended!="true"
}
)
for: 1h
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Flux {{ $labels.customresource_kind }}/{{ $labels.name }} has not been Ready for 1h"
description: >-
A Flux object outside image automation has been not-Ready for an
hour, so the desired state in git is not reaching the cluster.
`flux get all -A --status-selector ready=false` lists them with a
reason. For a Kustomization or HelmRelease this means a rollout is
stuck; for a HelmRepository or OCIRepository it means the chart or
artifact index is stale and dependent releases will not upgrade.
# THE DEAD MAN'S SWITCH, and the reason it is safe here and was not in
# #992. This asserts that the 34 ImagePolicy series exist — and they
# exist only because this change created them. Merged against `gotk_*`
# alone, as the withdrawn draft had it, this rule would have been
# permanently true and mailed admin@renner.uno every 12h forever.
#
# Its value is catching the removal of the customResourceState block, or
# a malformed edit to it, which would otherwise take all three rules
# above silently blind. `KubeStateMetricsDown` and `TargetDown` overlap it
# when the whole pod is down; neither notices a config that parses but
# emits nothing.
#
# for: 30m rides out the kube-state-metrics pod roll that applying this
# change itself causes, and any later roll.
- alert: FluxImagePolicyMetricsMissing
expr: absent(gotk_resource_info{customresource_kind="ImagePolicy"})
for: 30m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Flux per-object readiness metrics have stopped being exported"
description: >-
kube-state-metrics is exporting no ImagePolicy series, so
FluxImageAutomationNotReady and FluxResourceNotReady cannot fire and
Flux readiness is unmonitored. Check the `customResourceState` block
in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml, then the
kube-state-metrics pod log — a custom-resource-state config that
fails to parse is logged there and yields no series.
# The Ready-but-frozen ImagePolicy signal: a policy whose `filterTags` or
# semver range excludes everything new keeps resolving the tag it resolved
# months ago, holds Ready=True the whole time, and no readiness rule can see
# it. `tika.yaml`'s own comment names the case.
#
# THIS GROUP DELIBERATELY CONTAINS NO ALERT, AND THAT IS A MEASURED DECISION,
# NOT AN OMISSION. Every candidate threshold was tested against the real
# release history and the real registries on 2026-09-26:
#
# * A flat "frozen for N days" duration does not exist. Over the 191
# automated bump commits in the 147 days to 2026-09-25, gatus went 127
# days between bumps and paperless-ngx 126, both provably healthy — they
# bumped. Six policies have never bumped at all. Any N below 127 fires on
# the healthy pair; any N above 147 is longer than the whole observation
# window.
#
# * The "tag count grew >= 10%" comparator from this card's first design is
# wrong, and the registries say so. Of the 18 policies frozen 14 days or
# more, a 10% threshold fires on exactly three — gotenberg (+87 tags/14d
# on 526), valkey (+68 on 301), eclipse-mosquitto (+13 on 90) — and all
# three churn variant tags their filters reject on purpose. It does NOT
# fire on tika (+4 on 136 = 3.0%), which is the canonical case this card
# was opened for.
#
# * Relaxing to "grew by >= 1 tag" does catch tika, but then also fires on
# those same three plus velero-plugin-for-aws, whose `1.13.x` pin is
# deliberate. Alertmanager routes every severity to the same email
# receiver with repeat_interval: 12h, so that is four standing mails
# every twelve hours, indefinitely, for four non-faults.
#
# * `.status.lastScanResult.latestTags` looks like the way out and is not:
# the CRD defines it as "the first 10 tags when sorting all the tags in
# descending ALPHABETICAL order", which is not newest-first for any tag
# scheme in this repo.
#
# So the recorded series below materialise the candidate set and, more to the
# point, START THE HISTORY that a threshold has to be derived from — a real
# time series of tagCount per repository, which has never existed here. The
# alert is deferred to a follow-up card that reads 14+ days of it. Recording
# rules cannot mail anyone, so this costs nothing while it warms up.
#
# interval: 15m is LOAD-BEARING and is declared here rather than inherited.
# Global evaluationInterval is 30s and no other rule group in this directory
# sets one (45 of the 46 loaded groups run at 30s). The `>= 1250` warm-up
# guard below counts samples, so at 30s it would be satisfied in 10.4 hours
# instead of 13 days and the frozen series would read true for policies that
# had not been observed frozen at all.
- name: flux-image-policy-staleness.rules
interval: 15m
rules:
# Stage one exists only to strip the KSM target labels. Counting distinct
# tags means counting distinct series, and `gotk_resource_info` carries
# `pod` and `instance` — there were 11 distinct kube-state-metrics pod
# identities in the last 30 days, so counting the raw series would report
# "several tags seen" after every roll, including the roll this change
# itself causes, and would keep reporting it for the whole window.
- record: flux:image_policy_tag:info
expr: >-
max by (name, exported_namespace, source_name, tag) (
gotk_resource_info{customresource_kind="ImagePolicy"}
)
# Distinct resolved tags seen in a trailing day. A tag change retires one
# series and starts another, so `count by (...)` over `count_over_time`
# is a count of tag values, and `== 1` means the tag did not move.
- record: flux:image_policy_tags_seen:1d
expr: >-
count by (name, exported_namespace, source_name) (
count_over_time(flux:image_policy_tag:info[1d])
)
# The repository side, keyed by `source_name` so it joins on the actual
# `spec.imageRepositoryRef.name` reference rather than on the convention
# that a policy is named after its repository. All 34 pairs match by name
# today, so this is drift insurance, not a bug fix.
- record: flux:image_repository_tag_count:1d
expr: >-
max by (source_name, exported_namespace) (
label_replace(
max_over_time(gotk_image_repository_tag_count[1d]),
"source_name", "$1", "name", "(.+)"
)
)
# The candidate set: resolved tag unmoved for 14 days while the
# repository's tag count is genuinely higher than it was.
#
# 14d, not the 30d this card was first designed around, because 30d does
# not fit. `retentionSize: 30GB` binds long before `retention: 90d`:
# (time() - prometheus_tsdb_lowest_timestamp/1000)/86400 measured 26.63
# days on 2026-09-26, at 84.5% of the size cap and growing ~1.09 GB/day
# (REN-107). A 30d window can never be satisfied. 14d uses 53% of that
# floor.
#
# >= 1250 is the warm-up guard and its arithmetic is: at interval 15m a
# full 14d window holds 14*24*4 = 1344 samples, so 1250 is 93% of a full
# window = 13.02 days of history, leaving ~23h of slack for Prometheus
# restarts and KSM rolls. Without it the series would read true on day
# one, when "unmoved for 14 days" is simply not yet knowable. 13.02 days
# against a 26.63-day floor is 2.0x margin; re-check it with the
# lowest_timestamp query above if retention is ever cut.
#
# `last_over_time - min_over_time >= 1` and not a max/min ratio: a ratio
# is direction-agnostic and is satisfied by a tag count that DROPPED
# (registry pruning, an edited exclusionList, a partial scan) exactly as
# by one that grew. Comparing the current value against the window
# minimum only counts net growth.
- record: flux:image_policy_tag_frozen:14d
expr: >-
(
max_over_time(flux:image_policy_tags_seen:1d[14d]) == 1
and
count_over_time(flux:image_policy_tags_seen:1d[14d]) >= 1250
)
and on (source_name, exported_namespace) (
(
last_over_time(flux:image_repository_tag_count:1d[1h])
- min_over_time(flux:image_repository_tag_count:1d[14d])
) >= 1
)
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: home-assistant
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: home-assistant.rules
rules:
# The four services the house stops working without (REN-244). Before
# this group the only signal for any of them was the cluster-wide
# KubePodNotReady: 15m, severity warning, and not named per service.
#
# SHAPE. One alert per service, with `or` joining the ways it can be
# down, so one outage is one alert and not one per symptom. All four are
# `for: 5m`, severity critical. Alertmanager has one receiver today
# (email to the owner, apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml), so
# "critical" does not change where these go today. It does keep them
# out of reach of the inhibit rules, which only silence warning/info.
#
# 5m IS SHORTER THAN A SLOW HA UPGRADE. Home Assistant can take up to
# 10 min to come back after an automatic image bump. REN-244 asks for
# detection in 5 min on purpose; a HomeAssistantDown that resolves on
# its own a few minutes later, right after an upgrade, is that case.
#
# Tests: tests/home-assistant_test.yaml.
- alert: HomeAssistantDown
# `absent` covers the target vanishing entirely (pod gone, Service
# has no endpoints during a Recreate rollout); `== 0` covers a target
# that exists but does not answer /api/prometheus.
#
# `max by (job, namespace)` gives both branches the same label set.
# Without it the alert changes identity when a pod that was gone
# comes back failing, and the new identity restarts the `for` timer.
expr: |
max by (job, namespace) (up{job="home-assistant", namespace="home-assistant"}) == 0
or absent(up{job="home-assistant", namespace="home-assistant"})
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Home Assistant has been down for 5 minutes"
description: "The home-assistant scrape target in namespace home-assistant is down or missing. A restart after an automatic image upgrade can take up to 10 minutes, so if an upgrade just rolled out, give it until then before acting. Rollback: kubernetes/RUNBOOK-home-assistant-image-rollback.md."
- alert: HomeAssistantRecorderDBUnhealthy
# ha-pg, the recorder's CNPG cluster. Fires when no instance is the
# primary, or when fewer than all instances have Postgres up.
#
# cnpg_collector_up, not `up`: the exporter lives in the instance
# manager, which keeps serving /metrics while Postgres itself is down.
# `up` would read 1 through exactly the outage this rule is for.
#
# `role` comes from podTargetLabels on the cnpg-ha-pg PodMonitor
# (cnpg-podmonitors.yaml). It flips on failover, so the instance count
# is taken across roles. Both branches come out as {} (`absent` of a
# comparison carries no labels), so it is one alert whichever of them
# is true, and a failover does not start a second one.
#
# THE 2 IS `spec.instances` in
# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/ha-pg-cluster.yaml. Change both
# together, or this pages forever (more instances is fine; fewer is
# not).
expr: |
count(cnpg_collector_up{job="home-assistant/cnpg-ha-pg"} == 1) < 2
or absent(cnpg_collector_up{job="home-assistant/cnpg-ha-pg", role="primary"} == 1)
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
namespace: home-assistant
annotations:
summary: "Recorder database ha-pg has no primary or is missing an instance"
description: "In CNPG cluster home-assistant/ha-pg either no instance reports role=primary with Postgres up, or fewer than 2 instances have Postgres up. Without a primary the Home Assistant recorder cannot write history. Check `kubectl -n home-assistant get cluster ha-pg` and the pods' logs."
- alert: MosquittoDown
# Pod readiness only: there is no broker exporter, and no mosquitto_*
# or mqtt_* series in Prometheus.
#
# The pod regex is the Deployment's name shape
# (mosquitto-<replicaset hash>-<suffix>) and not `mosquitto-.*` on
# purpose: mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml runs six Jobs named
# mosquitto-*-credentials-bootstrap, and a bootstrap pod that is
# briefly Ready must not hide a broker that is down.
expr: |
absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant", pod=~"mosquitto-[a-z0-9]{6,10}-[a-z0-9]{5}", condition="true"} == 1)
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
# `absent` of a comparison carries no labels; set it for routing.
namespace: home-assistant
annotations:
summary: "Mosquitto (MQTT broker) has not been ready for 5 minutes"
description: "No mosquitto pod in namespace home-assistant is Ready. Zigbee2MQTT, Shelly and every other MQTT device lose their link to Home Assistant while this lasts, so Zigbee2MQTTDownOrCoordinatorOffline may fire alongside it for the same cause."
- alert: Zigbee2MQTTDownOrCoordinatorOffline
# Two ways Zigbee stops working: the pod is not Ready, or it runs but
# has lost the coordinator / MQTT bridge. The second is read from
# Home Assistant's own bridge sensor, so it disappears when HA is down;
# HomeAssistantDown covers that case and this rule stays silent
# instead of paging twice.
#
# Both branches come out as {} (`absent` of a comparison carries no
# labels; the sensor branch is reduced with `max`), for the same
# reason as in HomeAssistantDown: pod-not-ready turning into
# bridge-offline is one outage and keeps one `for` timer.
expr: |
absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant", pod=~"zigbee2mqtt-[a-z0-9]{6,10}-[a-z0-9]{5}", condition="true"} == 1)
or max(homeassistant_binary_sensor_state{entity="binary_sensor.zigbee2mqtt_bridge_connection_state"}) == 0
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
namespace: home-assistant
annotations:
summary: "Zigbee2MQTT is down or its coordinator/bridge is offline"
description: "Either the zigbee2mqtt pod in namespace home-assistant is not Ready, or Home Assistant's binary_sensor.zigbee2mqtt_bridge_connection_state reads off. If MosquittoDown is firing too, fix the broker first; the bridge sensor goes off whenever MQTT is gone."
@@ -57,14 +57,10 @@ spec:
# the ClusterSecretStore goes InvalidProviderConfig and no
# ExternalSecret can refresh.
#
# Short window: readiness is only a proxy for quorum. A one-second
# node NotReady flap makes the node lifecycle controller mark that
# node's pods not-ready for ~30s while raft keeps its leader and
# serves (issue #920, during a rolling reboot with one replica
# already evicted). A really sealed or crashed majority persists,
# and existing Secrets keep their last values, so 2m costs little.
# No window: below quorum the secret store is down and every
# ExternalSecret stalls with it, so waiting only delays the page.
expr: max by (namespace, statefulset) (kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"}) < 2
for: 2m
for: 0m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
# Catches a Prometheus retention setting that is configured but NOT IN FORCE.
#
# kube-prometheus-stack takes both `retention` (time) and `retentionSize`
# (bytes) and passes both to Prometheus, which honours WHICHEVER BINDS FIRST.
# When the size cap binds first, the time setting silently becomes decoration:
# Prometheus drops its oldest blocks, every query still succeeds, and the only
# symptom is that a range longer than the real window quietly returns less data
# than asked for. Nothing in the 182 alert rules this cluster already loads
# reports that — verified against the live rule set when this was written.
#
# That is not hypothetical here. Measured through the read-only proxy on
# 2026-09-26 with `retention: 90d` and `retentionSize: 30GB` in
# apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml (REN-107):
#
# storage.tsdb.retention.size = 30GiB -> 32,212,254,720 bytes
# storage.tsdb.retention.time = 90d -> 7,776,000 s
# actual window held -> 2,291,239 s (26.5 days, 29% of 90d)
#
# and size eviction has been firing on a ~7-day cycle for at least as long as
# the TSDB retains history. At 2026-09-19 23:00->23:30 the store went 28.16 GB
# -> 21.14 GB, `prometheus_tsdb_size_retentions_total` went 0 -> 1, and the
# window held collapsed 27.21 -> 20.48 days. The effective retention is a
# 20.5-27.2 day saw-tooth, not 90 days and not any single number.
#
# WHY NOT JUST ALERT ON prometheus_tsdb_size_retentions_total > 0
#
# Because that is a PROCESS-LIFETIME counter and it lies by omission. It resets
# to 0 on every Prometheus restart, and this Prometheus restarts every few days
# (seven distinct pod IPs in the 26 days of history the TSDB holds — the chart
# is pinned `>=72.0.0`, so Flux upgrades it whenever upstream releases). Each
# fresh pod reads 0 for the first ~6 days of its life even though the cluster
# has been evicting data continuously for a month. REN-107 was originally filed
# as "the cap will bind in ~3 days" on exactly that reading, taken on a pod that
# had started 5 days earlier. A spot read of this counter cannot distinguish
# "never evicted" from "evicted, then restarted".
#
# So this rule does not read the counter at all. It compares the two things
# that are true regardless of process age: the window actually on disk, and the
# limits the running process reports.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: prometheus-retention
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: prometheus-retention.rules
rules:
- alert: PrometheusRetentionNotInForce
# NO HARDCODED 90d / 30GB. Both limits are read from the running
# process via `prometheus_tsdb_retention_limit_seconds` and
# `prometheus_tsdb_retention_limit_bytes`, which Prometheus exports
# from the flags it actually started with. Edit the HelmRelease and
# this rule follows; it cannot drift out of sync with the config the
# way a literal threshold would. That matters because a literal here
# would be a second copy of the very setting whose accuracy this rule
# exists to police.
#
# TWO CLAUSES, AND THE SECOND IS THE GUARD
#
# Clause 1 — the window on disk is materially shorter than the
# configured time retention (<90% of it).
#
# Clause 2 — the store has reached 80% of the configured SIZE cap at
# some point in the last 7 days.
#
# Clause 1 alone would fire on a legitimately young TSDB: a freshly
# provisioned PVC holds one day of data against a 90d setting and
# nothing is wrong. Clause 2 is what distinguishes "not full yet" from
# "full, and the size cap is what is actually in force" — the store can
# only be near the byte cap AND short of the time window if bytes are
# the binding constraint. Dropping either clause breaks the rule in a
# different direction; verified both ways against the live TSDB before
# merge (see the PR).
#
# max_over_time(...[7d:1h]) rather than the instantaneous ratio,
# because size eviction is a SAW-TOOTH: the store climbs to ~87% of
# the cap, sheds a compacted block, and drops back to ~66%. An instant
# ratio would resolve and re-fire on that ~7-day cycle and email twice
# a week about an unchanging condition. The 7d window spans a full
# tooth, so the alert is continuous while the condition is.
#
# The 7d PEAK IS DIVIDED BY THE CAP IN FORCE NOW, not by the cap in
# force when the peak was recorded. The difference is the day the
# config is fixed: REN-107 moves 90d/30GiB to 30d/40GiB, the window
# on disk is still ~21 days (so clause 1 stays true until it grows
# past 27), and last week's 28 GB peak was 87% of the OLD cap. A
# per-step ratio would keep this firing for up to 7 days after the
# fix that resolves it; against the new cap the same peak is 66% and
# it clears at once. tests/prometheus-retention_test.yaml holds both.
#
# Everything is aggregated (min/sum/max) so the expression carries NO
# instance or pod label. That is deliberate and load-bearing: it makes
# the 7d lookback survive the pod restarts described in the header,
# which would otherwise start a new series and reset the window.
# Confirmed on the live TSDB — the 0.874 peak this returns today was
# recorded by a pod that no longer exists. There is exactly one
# Prometheus here, so losing the per-instance breakdown costs nothing.
expr: |
(
min(time() - prometheus_tsdb_lowest_timestamp_seconds{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"})
< 0.9 * min(prometheus_tsdb_retention_limit_seconds{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"})
)
and
(
max_over_time(
sum(
prometheus_tsdb_storage_blocks_bytes{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"}
+ prometheus_tsdb_wal_storage_size_bytes{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"}
+ prometheus_tsdb_head_chunks_storage_size_bytes{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"}
)[7d:1h]
)
/ max(prometheus_tsdb_retention_limit_bytes{job="kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus"})
> 0.8
)
# Long, because this is a configuration fact rather than an incident.
# Nothing degrades at the moment it becomes true and nothing is fixed
# by waiting, so there is no value in a fast signal — only in not
# paging during the minutes after a restart while the aggregation
# settles. It clears within one evaluation once the config is honest.
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
# Static, and true: the Prometheus this describes runs in
# `monitoring`. The expression aggregates the real label away (see
# above), and the chart's inhibit rules plus Alertmanager's
# `group_by` both key on `namespace` — without it this alert groups
# under the empty namespace, unlike every other alert here.
namespace: monitoring
annotations:
summary: "Prometheus retention setting is not in force — size cap binds first"
# $value is clause 1's left-hand side: the window actually on disk,
# in seconds. The configured pair is deliberately NOT templated in
# via `query` — that runs on every evaluation and can fail the rule
# itself. `runtimeinfo.storageRetention` reports both as one string
# ("90d or 30GiB"), which is the cheaper and more direct read.
description: >-
Prometheus is holding only {{ $value | humanizeDuration }} of history while its
configured time retention is longer, and the store has been within 20% of its
configured size cap in the last 7 days. The size cap is therefore what is actually
in force and the `retention` value in
kubernetes/apps/monitoring/helmrelease-prometheus.yaml is not being honoured —
queries over a longer range return less data than requested, silently and
successfully. Confirm the running pair with
`GET /api/v1/status/runtimeinfo` -> `storageRetention`, then either raise
`retentionSize` (and the PVC, which must stay ahead of it) or lower `retention`
to a figure the storage budget can actually hold. Do not read
`prometheus_tsdb_size_retentions_total` to decide whether this is real — it resets
on every restart. Background: REN-107.
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
# promtool unit suites for the PrometheusRules in this directory
`promtool test rules` suites, run on every pull request that touches
`kubernetes/**` by the `promtool` step in
[`.woodpecker/ci-manifests-test.yml`](../../../../.woodpecker/ci-manifests-test.yml)
via [`scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh`](../../../../scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh).
## Why this exists
Before this, CI proved that every `PrometheusRule` in the tree assembled into
valid YAML and nothing else. It did not check that an expression parses, that a
label join matches anything, or that a `for` window behaves the way its comment
claims.
That was not theoretical. On [REN-129](/REN/issues/REN-129) the surge rule in
`prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml` was written `for: 2m` and reviewed at that
value. Against Iris's seven measured nights it fires on six of them — two owner
emails a night, 04:16 and 04:22 local, for a WAL backlog that clears itself in
under ten minutes. It was caught by a human writing the arithmetic out by hand,
twice, in two separate runs, and throwing the work away both times because
there was nowhere in the repo to put it. [REN-152](/REN/issues/REN-152) then
retired the depth rule in favour of one persistence rule (`> 5` for `20m`).
## Layout
| File | What it is |
| --- | --- |
| `cnpg-backup_test.yaml` | The suite. **Generated** — see below. |
| `generate-cnpg-backup-test.py` | Regenerates it from the REN-129 measurement table. |
| `external-secrets_test.yaml` | Hand-written suite for `prometheusrule-external-secrets.yaml` (REN-103). |
| `home-assistant_test.yaml` | Hand-written suite for `prometheusrule-home-assistant.yaml` (REN-245). |
| `ceph_test.yaml` | Hand-written suite for the `CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind` canary in `prometheusrule-ceph.yaml` (REN-93). |
| `mutations.txt` | Negative controls. Each must make the suite fail. |
## Adding a suite
Name it `<something>_test.yaml` in this directory. Discovery is by that suffix,
and `promtool-rules.sh` fails if it finds none, so a suite in the wrong place
is a red pipeline rather than a silent gap.
**`rule_files` entries are relative to this directory, not the repo root.**
promtool joins `dirname(suite)` onto each entry, so a manifest in the parent
directory is `../name.yaml`. Getting this wrong is not a test failure: promtool
prints `WARNING: no file match pattern …`, loads **zero rules**, and every
`exp_alerts: []` assertion then passes against an empty rule set. The first
draft of the suite here shipped exactly that way — ninety silence assertions,
green, testing nothing. `promtool-rules.sh` resolves every entry itself before
running promtool and fails on a miss, because promtool has no flag that makes
it fatal.
`promtool` cannot read a `PrometheusRule` directly: it wants a bare `groups:`
document, and a `PrometheusRule` carries that under `spec:`. The script strips
`spec:` into a temporary mirrored tree with the same relative layout and runs
there, so `../name.yaml` resolves in the mirror exactly as it reads here.
Nothing is written back into the checkout.
## Regenerating `cnpg-backup_test.yaml`
```sh
python3 kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/generate-cnpg-backup-test.py \
> kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/cnpg-backup_test.yaml
```
and commit the result. `--report` prints the reconstruction self-check table
instead of the suite.
The generator exists so the numbers in the suite are auditable: the seven
measured nights are rebuilt from the `(peak, peak minute, fill, drain)` tuples
Iris published on REN-129, not hand-typed, so a reader can check them against
the measurement rather than taking them on trust. It is not a hermetic
artifact, and **CI does not regenerate and diff it** — the promtool image has
no Python, and byte-equality with a generator is not what stops a suite from
being weakened. The mutation phase is.
Two things the generator refuses to emit, both because they happened:
- a window that does not cover the bursts. An earlier revision had `T0` at
`8 * 60 + 8` (08:08Z) instead of `2 * 60 + 8`, seven hours after every burst,
so all seven nights rebuilt as forty zeroes and their silence assertions
passed without touching a threshold. `assert_window_covers_bursts()` now
fails instead.
- a night that clears the threshold *sooner* than the measured one, which would
be a weaker silence test than the night it claims to stand for. Longer is
fine and expected — a linear decay at the published mean drain rate holds the
tail above 5 a minute or two longer than the real trace on four of the seven
nights, which makes the suite harder to pass, not easier.
## Negative controls
A suite that passes proves the rules match the assertions. It does not prove
the assertions reach the rules — both failure modes above were green. So
`promtool-rules.sh` runs a second phase: for each entry in `mutations.txt` it
breaks one value the rules depend on and requires the suites to **fail**. A
mutation nothing notices is reported as a hole in the suite.
This is also the answer to "why is that case in there". `backlog-for-12m` is
silent on all seven reconstructed nights and fires only on the raw 2026-09-11
worst-night case, so deleting that case makes `for: 20m` reducible to `12m`
with the suite still green. The control is what makes the case load-bearing.
Mutations are `name|manifest-path|sed-program`, applied to the stripped copy in
the mirror (two spaces shallower than the manifest on disk — anchor on
`^[[:space:]]*`). A program that matches nothing is a failure, not a skip:
otherwise renaming a rule quietly turns its control into a no-op.
## Reading `for` margins
Margin is **pending** time, which is one minute less than the run length. An
alert goes pending at the first evaluation where the expression is true and
fires when `now - activeAt >= for`, so N consecutive one-minute samples above a
threshold accumulate N-1 minutes. A trace with 5 samples above 5 does not fire
`for: 5m`; it fires `for: 4m`. The `>5 pend` column in `--report` is the number
to compare a `for` against — not the sample count next to it.
## Running it locally
```sh
# promtool must be 3.x: the cluster runs kube-prometheus-stack >= 72.0.0, and
# alert `for` evaluation is version-sensitive, so a 2.x promtool would be
# checking a different evaluator than production. The script enforces this.
sh scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh
```
The script's own guards — the discovery floors, the `rule_files` resolution, the
mutation phase — are tested offline and without promtool by
`scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh`, which runs on every pull request via
`.woodpecker/ci-scripts-test.yml`.
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
# promtool test rules for the CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind canary in
# prometheusrule-ceph.yaml (REN-93).
#
# Run by the `promtool` step of .woodpecker/ci-manifests-test.yml through
# scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh, which strips `spec:` from the manifest into a
# mirrored tree — hence `../` below, resolved from this file's directory. See
# README.md here. The negative controls for this suite are the `ceph-*` entries
# in mutations.txt.
#
# WHAT IT IS FOR. `promtool check rules` proves the canary parses. It cannot
# prove the canary fires when the join breaks, or stays quiet when the join is
# fine — every scenario below is well-formed PromQL in both the passing and the
# failing case; only the synthetic data changes, and only evaluation sees it.
#
# `exp_annotations` must match the RENDERED annotations exactly, so the strings
# below are the rule's with `{{ $labels.pool_id }}` substituted. Tedious to keep
# in sync, and that is the point: an annotation edited into nonsense fails here
# instead of in an email.
rule_files:
- ../prometheusrule-ceph.yaml
evaluation_interval: 1m
tests:
# A. Healthy replicated pool, metadata intact. Neither alert may fire.
# used/stored = 3.0, so well clear of the 1.5 threshold, and the join
# resolves — so the canary has nothing to report either. This is the
# scenario that fails if someone inverts a comparison.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '6000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool_id="1",type="replicated",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x200'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancy
exp_alerts: []
# B. Real redundancy loss, metadata intact: used/stored = 1.0.
# The critical alert must fire AND the canary must stay quiet. The second
# half is the load-bearing one — a canary that also fires on a real
# redundancy loss would mask the alert it exists to protect, and
# `absent()` over an expression that IS producing series is the only thing
# stopping that. Also pins the `for: 30m`: 120m is well past it.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool_id="1",type="replicated",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x200'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancy
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: critical
pool_id: "1"
exp_annotations:
summary: "Ceph replicated pool 1 is running unreplicated"
description: "Replicated pool 1 has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning it is down to a single copy and one OSD loss destroys data. No replicated pool is meant to be unreplicated — it also blocks OSD maintenance for as long as it lasts, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Erasure-coded pools are out of scope for this rule and are covered by POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY via CephHealthWarn (REN-88). Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts: []
# C, D and E are the same failure seen three ways: the pool is genuinely at
# replication 1.0, and CephPoolLostRedundancy produces NOTHING. Each asserts
# `exp_alerts: []` for the critical alert — that empty list is the silent
# failure being surfaced, not an absence of interest — and asserts the canary
# fires instead. Remove the canary from the rule file and all three fail.
#
# C. `type` renamed to `pool_type` by a Rook or Ceph upgrade.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool_id="1",pool_type="replicated",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x200'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancy
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exp_annotations:
summary: "CephPoolLostRedundancy cannot fire — its metrics no longer join"
description: "The CephPoolLostRedundancy alert has been unable to produce any series for an hour, so a `critical` storage alert is silently dark. It joins ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored against ceph_pool_metadata{type=\"replicated\"} on `pool_id`; one of those metrics, the `pool_id` label, the `type` label, or the `replicated` value has stopped matching — most likely a Rook or Ceph upgrade, or a relabel rule. Check what the exporter emits now with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail` and by querying `ceph_pool_metadata` directly, then fix the join in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml — do not delete this canary (REN-93)."
# D. Label VALUE changed rather than the label name: `replicated` ->
# `replica`. Every label the rule names still exists, which is why a check
# on label presence alone would not catch this.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool_id="1",type="replica",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x200'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancy
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exp_annotations:
summary: "CephPoolLostRedundancy cannot fire — its metrics no longer join"
description: "The CephPoolLostRedundancy alert has been unable to produce any series for an hour, so a `critical` storage alert is silently dark. It joins ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored against ceph_pool_metadata{type=\"replicated\"} on `pool_id`; one of those metrics, the `pool_id` label, the `type` label, or the `replicated` value has stopped matching — most likely a Rook or Ceph upgrade, or a relabel rule. Check what the exporter emits now with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail` and by querying `ceph_pool_metadata` directly, then fix the join in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml — do not delete this canary (REN-93)."
# E. `pool_id` renamed to `pool` on the METADATA side only. Both metrics
# exist, both label values are unchanged, and `type="replicated"` still
# matches — only the `on(pool_id)` join key is gone from one side, so the
# join matches nothing. The subtlest of the three, and the one a human
# reading the expression is least likely to spot.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x200'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool="1",type="replicated",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x200'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancy
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 120m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exp_annotations:
summary: "CephPoolLostRedundancy cannot fire — its metrics no longer join"
description: "The CephPoolLostRedundancy alert has been unable to produce any series for an hour, so a `critical` storage alert is silently dark. It joins ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored against ceph_pool_metadata{type=\"replicated\"} on `pool_id`; one of those metrics, the `pool_id` label, the `type` label, or the `replicated` value has stopped matching — most likely a Rook or Ceph upgrade, or a relabel rule. Check what the exporter emits now with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail` and by querying `ceph_pool_metadata` directly, then fix the join in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml — do not delete this canary (REN-93)."
# F. mgr FAILOVER, which is the noise case the canary's `for: 1h` exists for.
# All ceph_* metrics stop at t=30m and never return; with the 5m lookback
# they read as present until t=35m, so the canary goes pending at ~t=36m.
# It must NOT be firing at 75m (a failover-length gap — the exporter moved
# through 17 mgr instances in 30d) and MUST be firing by 95m. Shorten the
# `for:` and the 75m assertion fails; lengthen it and the 95m one does.
# Both eval_times were checked against promtool 3.15.0 rather than derived,
# because the exact ActiveAt depends on lookback and evaluation alignment.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'ceph_pool_bytes_used{pool_id="1"}'
values: '6000000+0x30'
- series: 'ceph_pool_stored{pool_id="1"}'
values: '2000000+0x30'
- series: 'ceph_pool_metadata{pool_id="1",type="replicated",name="rbd"}'
values: '1+0x30'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 75m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 95m
alertname: CephPoolLostRedundancyBlind
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exp_annotations:
summary: "CephPoolLostRedundancy cannot fire — its metrics no longer join"
description: "The CephPoolLostRedundancy alert has been unable to produce any series for an hour, so a `critical` storage alert is silently dark. It joins ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored against ceph_pool_metadata{type=\"replicated\"} on `pool_id`; one of those metrics, the `pool_id` label, the `type` label, or the `replicated` value has stopped matching — most likely a Rook or Ceph upgrade, or a relabel rule. Check what the exporter emits now with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail` and by querying `ceph_pool_metadata` directly, then fix the join in kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml — do not delete this canary (REN-93)."
@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
# GENERATED by generate-cnpg-backup-test.py — see README.md in this
# directory before editing by hand.
#
# Unit tests for kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml.
# Every assertion below is either one of Iris's seven measured nights
# (REN-129) rebuilt from its published (peak, fill, drain) numbers, the
# worst night in Prometheus' retention as raw samples (REN-152), an
# adversarial combination of the extremes of those numbers, or a failure
# this cluster has not had but the rule exists to catch.
#
# `rule_files` entries are resolved RELATIVE TO THIS FILE'S DIRECTORY, not
# to the working directory promtool was invoked from — promtool joins
# dirname(testfile) onto each entry. So this is `../`, and it resolves in
# the mirrored tree scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh builds, where the
# `spec:`-stripped manifests sit in the same layout as the real ones.
#
# A path that does NOT resolve is only a WARNING to promtool: it loads zero
# rules, every exp_alerts: [] assertion passes against nothing, and the
# suite exits 0. promtool-rules.sh resolves every entry itself before
# running and fails on a miss; that check is the only thing standing
# between a typo here and a green pipeline that tests nothing.
rule_files:
- ../prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
evaluation_interval: 1m
tests:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 1-7. THE SEVEN MEASURED NIGHTS. The rule must stay silent through
# every one of them. The retired depth rule (`> 64`) shipped for review
# at `for: 2m` and fired on 6 of these 7 nights; REN-152 removed it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2026-09-20: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 106 at 02:15Z, fill 35.3/min, drain 13.2/min -> 10 samples above 5 (9m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-20 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 0 35 71 106 93 80 66 53 40 27 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 106
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:22Z, backlog 14
- eval_time: 14m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:24Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 16m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-21: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 100 at 02:15Z, fill 33.3/min, drain 14.3/min -> 9 samples above 5 (8m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-21 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 0 33 67 100 86 71 57 43 28 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 100
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:21Z, backlog 14
- eval_time: 13m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:23Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 15m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-22: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 101 at 02:15Z, fill 33.7/min, drain 14.4/min -> 9 samples above 5 (8m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-22 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 0 34 67 101 87 72 58 43 29 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 101
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:21Z, backlog 15
- eval_time: 13m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:23Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 15m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-23: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 119 at 02:15Z, fill 39.7/min, drain 14.9/min -> 10 samples above 5 (9m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-23 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 0 40 79 119 104 89 74 59 44 30 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 119
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:22Z, backlog 15
- eval_time: 14m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:24Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 16m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-24: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 56 at 02:14Z, fill 18.7/min, drain 14.0/min -> 6 samples above 5 (5m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-24 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 19 37 56 42 28 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:14Z, backlog 56
- eval_time: 6m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:17Z, backlog 14
- eval_time: 9m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:19Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 11m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-25: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 91 at 02:15Z, fill 22.8/min, drain 13.0/min -> 10 samples above 5 (9m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-25 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 23 46 68 91 78 65 52 39 26 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 91
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:21Z, backlog 13
- eval_time: 13m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:23Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 15m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 2026-09-26: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.
# peak 113 at 02:15Z, fill 28.5/min, drain 14.1/min -> 11 samples above 5 (10m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: nightly burst 2026-09-26 — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 28 57 86 113 99 85 71 57 42 28 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 113
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:22Z, backlog 14
- eval_time: 14m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:24Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 16m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. THE ADVERSARIAL ENVELOPE. A night that did not happen, built from
# the worst fill (39.7/min, 09-23), the highest peak (119, 09-23) and
# the slowest drain (13.0/min, 09-25) in the week. 11 samples above 5,
# 10m pending against `for: 20m`.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# Synthetic: max fill 39.7 + max peak 119 + min drain 13.0.
# peak 119 at 02:15Z, fill 39.7/min, drain 13.0/min -> 11 samples above 5 (10m pending vs for: 20m).
- name: adversarial envelope — worst measured fill and peak, slowest drain
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08Z .. 02:47Z, one sample per minute
values: '0 0 0 0 0 40 79 119 106 93 80 67 54 41 28 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The
# rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:15Z, backlog 119
- eval_time: 7m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:23Z, backlog 15
- eval_time: 15m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:26Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 18m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 9. THE WORST NIGHT ON RECORD, 2026-09-11, as raw 30s samples (see
# WORST_NIGHT in the generator). Peak 141, 26 samples above 5 = 12.5m
# of true expression. At `evaluation_interval: 1m` the rule sees it
# true from 02:13Z to 02:25Z: 12m pending against `for: 20m`,
# 8m of margin. This is the case that makes the margin
# load-bearing: at `for: 12m` it fires at 02:25Z, and nothing else in
# the suite notices (mutations.txt:backlog-for-12m).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: worst night on record 2026-09-11 — peak 141, raw samples
interval: 30s
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# 02:08:00Z .. 02:47:00Z, one sample per 30s
values: '0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 53 80 110 141 136 133 130 125 117 117 115 112 102 91 81 75 68 60 52 45 37 29 22 15 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
values: '148000 148007 148014 148021 148028 148035 148042 148049 148056 148063 148070 148077 148084 148091 148098 148105 148112 148119 148126 148133 148140 148147 148154 148161 148168 148175 148182 148189 148196 148203 148210 148217 148224 148231 148238 148245 148252 148259 148266 148273 148280 148287 148294 148301 148308 148315 148322 148329 148336 148343 148350 148357 148364 148371 148378 148385 148392 148399 148406 148413 148420 148427 148434 148441 148448 148455 148462 148469 148476 148483 148490 148497 148504 148511 148518 148525 148532 148539 148546'
alert_rule_test:
# 02:14Z, backlog 110
- eval_time: 6m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:25Z, backlog 8
- eval_time: 17m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# 02:47Z, backlog 0
- eval_time: 39m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 10. THE FAILURE THE RULE EXISTS FOR: an archiver that stopped with
# 70 segments (1.1 GiB) queued. Not a burst — it does not drain. The
# backlog crosses 5 at t=5m, so `for: 20m` elapses at t=25m.
# The assertions bracket the transition: one minute early nothing is
# firing, on the minute it is.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: stalled archiver at 70 segments — must fire
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
# Flat, because a stalled archiver archives nothing. The rule does
# not read this; it is here so the input stays realistic.
values: '148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000 148000'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 24m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 25m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts:
# No `role` label: proof that `max by (namespace, pod)` aggregated it away. See mutations.txt:no-max-by.
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
namespace: home-assistant
pod: ha-pg-1
exp_annotations:
summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on home-assistant/ha-pg-1"
description: "70 WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 20 minutes. NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local) is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n home-assistant logs ha-pg-1 -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 11. THE STALL A DEPTH THRESHOLD CANNOT SEE: 8 segments, stuck. It
# would never reach any number tuned above the nightly envelope, and
# point-in-time recovery is just as broken at 8 segments as at 70. This
# is why REN-152 keyed the rule on persistence and retired the depth rule.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: low stall at 8 segments — must fire
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 24m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 25m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
namespace: home-assistant
pod: ha-pg-1
exp_annotations:
summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on home-assistant/ha-pg-1"
description: "8 WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 20 minutes. NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local) is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n home-assistant logs ha-pg-1 -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 12. PINNED AT EXACTLY 5 for the whole window. `> 5` is strict, so
# this is silence. A rule written `>= 5` would page on it, and a rule
# that had lost its `value="ready"` selector would page on the `done`
# counter regardless of what `ready` does — which is what the second
# series here is for.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: pinned at exactly 5 — strict > means silence
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
values: '5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="done"}'
values: '148000 148014 148028 148042 148056 148070 148084 148098 148112 148126 148140 148154 148168 148182 148196 148210 148224 148238 148252 148266 148280 148294 148308 148322 148336 148350 148364 148378 148392 148406 148420 148434 148448 148462 148476 148490 148504 148518 148532 148546'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 39m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 13. FAILOVER DURING A STALL — the case `max by (namespace, pod)` was
# added for. The backlog starts at t=5m on the primary; at t=11m the
# instance is promoted and `role` changes, which is a NEW SERIES to
# Prometheus and restarts the `for` timer on the raw expression.
# Aggregating `role` away keeps one continuous series, so the page
# still lands 20m after the backlog started (t=25m) rather
# than 20m after the failover. Without `max by` this case is
# silent at t=25m — see mutations.txt:no-max-by.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: role flip mid-stall — for timer must not restart
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
# t=0..10m, then this series ends.
values: '0 0 0 0 0 70 70 70 70 70 70'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="replica",value="ready"}'
# Starts at t=11m. `_` is a gap, not a zero.
values: '_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 24m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 25m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
namespace: home-assistant
pod: ha-pg-1
exp_annotations:
summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on home-assistant/ha-pg-1"
description: "70 WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 20 minutes. NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local) is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n home-assistant logs ha-pg-1 -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 14. ONE STALLED INSTANCE AMONG HEALTHY ONES. There are 12 CNPG
# instances in this cluster. `by (namespace, pod)` has to keep them
# apart: exactly one alert, naming the pod that is actually stuck, so
# the 04:00 reader is not sent to look at the wrong Postgres.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: one stalled pod among healthy ones — exactly one alert
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-2",container="postgres",role="replica",value="ready"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
- series: 'cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{namespace="immich",pod="immich-pg-1",container="postgres",role="primary",value="ready"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 25m
alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
namespace: home-assistant
pod: ha-pg-1
exp_annotations:
summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on home-assistant/ha-pg-1"
description: "70 WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over 20 minutes. NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local) is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore credentials: `kubectl -n home-assistant logs ha-pg-1 -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# 15. THE EPOCH-ZERO GUARD on CNPGBackupFailed. The metric is a unix
# timestamp and reads 0 when no failure was ever recorded, so the rule
# carries a `> 0` guard to stop that default being read as "failed in
# 1970". Held at 0 for the whole window: silence. Nothing else in this
# suite exercises that rule, and a dropped guard would page on every
# instance in the cluster forever.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: never-failed backup reads timestamp 0 — must not fire
interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'cnpg_collector_last_failed_backup_timestamp{namespace="home-assistant",pod="ha-pg-1"}'
values: '0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 39m
alertname: CNPGBackupFailed
exp_alerts: []
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
# promtool test rules for prometheusrule-external-secrets.yaml.
#
# Run by the `promtool` step of .woodpecker/ci-manifests-test.yml through
# scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh, which strips `spec:` from the manifest into a
# mirrored tree — hence `../` below, resolved from this file's directory. See
# README.md here. The negative controls for this suite are the `eso-*` entries
# in mutations.txt.
#
# WHAT IT IS FOR. Every claim in the rule file that a reviewer would otherwise
# have to take on trust is asserted here instead: that the tombstone series does
# not alert, that `for: 15m` really is 15m, that the annotation names the
# ExternalSecret's own namespace and not the controller's, and that `max`
# survives a two-pod scrape where `sum` does not.
#
# THE REJECTED FORM, for the record. REN-100 and ESO's shipped dashboard both
# use `sum(...) by (namespace, name) == 1`. Run against the identical input
# series below, that expression produces exactly one alert,
# {namespace="external-secrets", name="gitea-db"} — the wrong namespace on the
# one it catches, and nothing at all for monitoring/loki-basic-auth, whose two
# scraped pods sum to 2 and stop matching `== 1`. Both defects, one expression.
rule_files:
- ../prometheusrule-external-secrets.yaml
evaluation_interval: 1m
tests:
# Series shapes copied from the live cluster after #994 landed: the metric's
# own `namespace` has already been shadowed to `exported_namespace` by the
# PodMonitor's target label, and `namespace` is the controller pod's.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
# A healthy ExternalSecret. ESO writes BOTH polarities of the Ready
# condition on every reconcile, the inactive one at 0 — which is why the
# rule needs `== 1` and not a bare selector.
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="True",name="uptime-robot-api-key",exported_namespace="uptime-monitor",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '1+0x60'
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False",name="uptime-robot-api-key",exported_namespace="uptime-monitor",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '0+0x60'
# Starts failing at t=10m and stays failed.
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False",name="gitea-db",exported_namespace="gitea",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '0+0x9 1+0x50'
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="True",name="gitea-db",exported_namespace="gitea",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '1+0x9 0+0x50'
# Tombstone left behind for an ExternalSecret that no longer exists. Held
# at 1 forever until the controller restarts, so a rule that matched
# `condition!="Ready"` or ignored `status` would page on it every day.
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Deleted",status="False",name="wiki-index-basic-auth",exported_namespace="ai",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '1+0x60'
# The same failing ExternalSecret reported by TWO controller pods, as
# happens for the seconds of a Deployment rollout when Prometheus still
# has the old target and already has the new one.
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False",name="loki-basic-auth",exported_namespace="monitoring",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-56c649799b-t65gf"}'
values: '0+0x9 1+0x50'
- series: 'externalsecret_status_condition{condition="Ready",status="False",name="loki-basic-auth",exported_namespace="monitoring",namespace="external-secrets",job="monitoring/external-secrets",pod="external-secrets-7d4f9c6b88-qq2xv"}'
values: '0+0x9 1+0x50'
alert_rule_test:
# 5m into the failure: pending, not firing. Asserts the window is real —
# a `for:` accidentally set to 0 passes every other case here and fails
# only this one.
- eval_time: 15m
alertname: ExternalSecretSyncFailing
exp_alerts: []
# 20m into the failure. Both failing ExternalSecrets fire, ONCE each; the
# healthy one and the tombstone stay silent. The annotations are asserted
# in full because the whole point of REN-103's label finding is that the
# text names `gitea`, not `external-secrets`.
- eval_time: 30m
alertname: ExternalSecretSyncFailing
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exported_namespace: gitea
name: gitea-db
exp_annotations:
summary: "ExternalSecret gitea/gitea-db is not syncing"
description: "ESO has been unable to sync this ExternalSecret for 15 minutes. The Secret it manages still holds its last successfully synced value, so consumers keep working — what breaks is that a rotation at the provider no longer propagates, which surfaces much later as a credential that stopped being accepted. Get the reason with `kubectl -n gitea get externalsecret gitea-db -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'`; the common causes are a key that was renamed or removed in OpenBao, a ClusterSecretStore that cannot authenticate, and a target Secret owned by something else."
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exported_namespace: monitoring
name: loki-basic-auth
exp_annotations:
summary: "ExternalSecret monitoring/loki-basic-auth is not syncing"
description: "ESO has been unable to sync this ExternalSecret for 15 minutes. The Secret it manages still holds its last successfully synced value, so consumers keep working — what breaks is that a rotation at the provider no longer propagates, which surfaces much later as a credential that stopped being accepted. Get the reason with `kubectl -n monitoring get externalsecret loki-basic-auth -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'`; the common causes are a key that was renamed or removed in OpenBao, a ClusterSecretStore that cannot authenticate, and a target Secret owned by something else."
# Metrics are present, so the dead-man's-switch stays quiet.
- eval_time: 30m
alertname: ExternalSecretMetricsMissing
exp_alerts: []
# The scrape disappears entirely: PodMonitor deleted, selector broken by a
# chart bump, or the `monitoring` ingress grant reverted out of
# external-secrets-ns.yaml. ExternalSecretSyncFailing cannot fire on series
# that do not exist — this is the case that made REN-103 necessary, so it is
# the one the dead-man's-switch has to cover.
- interval: 1m
input_series:
- series: 'up{job="monitoring/external-secrets"}'
values: '0+0x60'
alert_rule_test:
- eval_time: 30m
alertname: ExternalSecretSyncFailing
exp_alerts: []
- eval_time: 30m
alertname: ExternalSecretMetricsMissing
exp_alerts:
- exp_labels:
severity: warning
exp_annotations:
summary: "No ExternalSecret metrics are reaching Prometheus"
description: "`externalsecret_status_condition` has no series. Either the ESO controller is gone or its scrape stopped being collected, and ExternalSecretSyncFailing is blind for as long as this is true. Check the PodMonitor `monitoring/external-secrets` still selects the controller pods, and that external-secrets-ns.yaml still admits `monitoring` on TCP/8080."
@@ -1,555 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Regenerate cnpg-backup_test.yaml from the REN-129 measurements.
The committed YAML is what CI runs; this script exists so the numbers in it are
auditable and reproducible from the measurement table rather than being a
hand-typed artifact nobody can re-derive. Run it from the repo root:
python3 kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/generate-cnpg-backup-test.py \
> kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/cnpg-backup_test.yaml
Nothing in CI regenerates and diffs this — the promtool image has no Python, and
the defence against a hand-weakened suite is the mutation phase of
scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh, not byte-equality with a generator. See README.md.
THE TRACE MODEL. Iris measured seven consecutive nights of
`cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{value="ready",pod="ha-pg-1"}` at 1-minute
steps and published, per night, a (peak, peak minute, fill seg/min, drain
seg/min) tuple. Those four numbers are consistent with one shape, which is the
shape every night has: flat 0, a linear ramp at `fill` per minute to `peak`,
then a linear decay at `drain` per minute back to 0. So a night is rebuilt as
ramp length = round(peak / fill) minutes
ramp start = peak minute - ramp length (value 0 at that minute)
during ramp = round(fill * minutes since ramp start)
at peak = peak (exact, not rounded from fill)
during decay = max(0, round(peak - drain * minutes since peak))
FIDELITY. The reconstruction reproduces Iris's published `Duration >5` column
exactly on 2026-09-20, -21 and -22, and runs one minute long on -23 and -24 and
two minutes long on -25 and -26. Every discrepancy is in the same direction:
the rebuild is never SHORTER above the threshold than the measurement. A linear
decay at the published mean drain rate holds the tail above 5 for slightly
longer than the real trace did, so each night is a marginally harder silence
test than the night it stands for. That is the safe direction for this suite,
whose whole job is to catch a rule that fires on a benign night. `--report`
prints the comparison; do not "fix" it toward the published column without
checking which way each night moves.
These are reconstructions, not the raw samples. They are faithful in the only
dimensions the rules read: how high the backlog goes, and how many consecutive
minutes it spends above each threshold. Do not read them as a recording.
"""
import argparse
import sys
# Iris's 7-night measurement, REN-129. `dur_gt5` is her published "Duration >5"
# column and is an INPUT TO THE SELF-CHECK ONLY — the traces are built from
# peak/fill/drain/peak_min, and dur_gt5 is what the result is compared against.
NIGHTS = [
# date peak peak_min fill drain dur_gt5
("2026-09-20", 106, "02:15", 35.3, 13.2, 10),
("2026-09-21", 100, "02:15", 33.3, 14.3, 9),
("2026-09-22", 101, "02:15", 33.7, 14.4, 9),
("2026-09-23", 119, "02:15", 39.7, 14.9, 9),
("2026-09-24", 56, "02:14", 18.7, 14.0, 5),
("2026-09-25", 91, "02:15", 22.8, 13.0, 8),
("2026-09-26", 113, "02:15", 28.5, 14.1, 9),
]
# The adversarial envelope: worst fill, worst peak, slowest drain observed in the
# week, combined into a night that did not happen but is inside what the cluster
# has demonstrated it can do. Nothing here is extrapolated past the measurements.
ENVELOPE = ("envelope", 119, "02:15", 39.7, 13.0, None)
# The worst night in Prometheus' 27-night retention (2026-08-30..09-26):
# 2026-09-11, peak 141, the longest excursion above 5 on record. Not rebuilt
# from a model like NIGHTS — these are the raw samples, read back through the
# API server's services/proxy with
# max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{
# value="ready", pod="ha-pg-1"})
# over 02:08:00Z..02:47:00Z at the real 30s scrape step (REN-152). 26
# consecutive samples above 5 = 12.5 minutes pending, which is the number the
# `for: 20m` margin is measured against, and why mutations.txt:backlog-for-12m
# is caught here and nowhere else.
WORST_NIGHT = ("2026-09-11", [
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 28, 53, 80, 110, 141, 136, 133, 130, 125, 117,
117, 115, 112, 102, 91, 81, 75, 68, 60, 52, 45, 37, 29, 22, 15, 8, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0,
])
FOR_MIN = 20 # `for:` on CNPGWalArchiveBacklog, in minutes
# Series labels. `container`, `role` and `instance` are on the real series and
# are carried here on purpose: they are what `max by (namespace, pod)` has to
# aggregate away, and a test whose input is already aggregated cannot see whether
# the rule does that. `value="done"` is the cumulative counter that sits on the
# same metric name — it is in the input so that dropping the `value="ready"`
# selector from the rules is a detectable mutation and not a silent no-op.
NS = "home-assistant"
POD = "ha-pg-1"
def labels(pod=POD, value="ready", role="primary", ns=NS):
return (
"cnpg_collector_pg_wal_archive_status{"
f'namespace="{ns}",pod="{pod}",container="postgres",'
f'role="{role}",value="{value}"'
"}"
)
# Test window: t=0 is 02:08Z, 40 one-minute samples, so every night's burst sits
# inside it with lead-in and tail. promtool eval_times are relative to t=0, so
# every assertion below carries its UTC clock time in a comment.
#
# This MUST stay aligned with the peak minutes in NIGHTS. An earlier revision
# had `8 * 60 + 8` here (08:08Z), which put the whole window seven hours after
# every burst: all seven nights rebuilt as 40 zeroes and their ~90 silence
# assertions passed without exercising a single threshold. The
# assert_window_covers_bursts() call in main() exists so that cannot recur
# silently.
T0 = 2 * 60 + 8 # 02:08Z in minutes since midnight
SAMPLES = 40
def hhmm(minute):
return f"{minute // 60:02d}:{minute % 60:02d}"
def parse_hhmm(s):
h, m = s.split(":")
return int(h) * 60 + int(m)
def trace(peak, peak_min, fill, drain, n=SAMPLES, t0=T0):
"""Rebuild one night. See THE TRACE MODEL in the module docstring."""
ramp_len = max(1, round(peak / fill))
ramp_start = peak_min - ramp_len
out = []
for m in range(t0, t0 + n):
if m <= ramp_start:
v = 0
elif m < peak_min:
v = round(fill * (m - ramp_start))
elif m == peak_min:
v = peak
else:
v = max(0, round(peak - drain * (m - peak_min)))
out.append(v)
return out
def longest_run_above(vals, thr):
"""(length, index of last sample) of the longest run of vals > thr."""
best = (0, None)
run = 0
for i, v in enumerate(vals):
if v > thr:
run += 1
if run > best[0]:
best = (run, i)
else:
run = 0
return best
def pending_minutes(vals, thr):
"""Max minutes a `for` timer accumulates on `> thr` over this trace.
This is NOT the run length, and the difference is the whole margin
argument. Prometheus makes an alert pending at the first evaluation where
the expression is true and fires it when `now - activeAt >= for`, so a run
of N consecutive 1-minute samples above the threshold accumulates N-1
minutes of pending time, not N. A trace that spends 5 samples above 64
therefore does NOT fire `for: 5m`; it fires `for: 4m`. Quote this number,
not the run length, when arguing about a `for` window.
"""
n, _ = longest_run_above(vals, thr)
return max(0, n - 1)
def assert_window_covers_bursts():
"""Refuse to emit a suite whose trace window misses the bursts.
Guards the T0 bug described above T0: if the window and the peak minutes
ever drift apart again, every measured night rebuilds as flat zero and the
suite passes while testing nothing. A night that is flat 0 cannot be a
silence test for a burst, so treat it as a generator fault, not a result.
"""
for date, peak, pm, fill, drain, _dur in NIGHTS + [ENVELOPE]:
vals = trace(peak, parse_hhmm(pm), fill, drain)
if max(vals) != peak:
raise SystemExit(
f"generator fault: {date} rebuilt with max {max(vals)}, expected "
f"peak {peak}. The T0={T0} window ({hhmm(T0)}Z.."
f"{hhmm(T0 + SAMPLES - 1)}Z) does not cover peak minute {pm}Z. "
"Fix T0 or SAMPLES; do not emit a suite of flat-zero nights."
)
def counter(start, step, n=SAMPLES):
return [start + step * i for i in range(n)]
def fmt(vals):
return " ".join(str(v) for v in vals)
def eval_minutes(vals):
"""The minutes where a `for` window is closest to elapsing, so the tightest
places to assert silence. For each threshold: the last sample of the longest
run above it (the moment maximum pending time has accumulated). Plus the
peak, plus two minutes after the backlog has settled back to 0."""
picks = set()
_, last = longest_run_above(vals, 5)
if last is not None:
picks.add(last)
picks.add(max(range(len(vals)), key=lambda i: vals[i]))
settled = next(
(i for i in range(len(vals) - 1, -1, -1) if vals[i] > 0),
len(vals) - 1,
)
picks.add(min(settled + 2, len(vals) - 1))
return sorted(picks)
L = []
def w(line=""):
L.append(line)
def burst_case(name, date, peak, peak_min_s, fill, drain, why):
peak_min = parse_hhmm(peak_min_s)
vals = trace(peak, peak_min, fill, drain)
n5, _ = longest_run_above(vals, 5)
w(f" # {why}")
w(
f" # peak {peak} at {peak_min_s}Z, fill {fill}/min, drain {drain}/min"
f" -> {n5} samples above 5 ({pending_minutes(vals, 5)}m pending vs"
f" for: {FOR_MIN}m)."
)
w(f" - name: {name}")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels()}'")
w(f" # {hhmm(T0)}Z .. {hhmm(T0 + SAMPLES - 1)}Z, one sample per minute")
w(f" values: '{fmt(vals)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(value='done')}'")
w(" # The cumulative archived counter on the same metric name. The")
w(" # rules must never read it; see mutations.txt:no-value-selector.")
w(f" values: '{fmt(counter(148_000, 14))}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
for i in eval_minutes(vals):
clock = hhmm(T0 + i)
w(f" # {clock}Z, backlog {vals[i]}")
w(f" - eval_time: {i}m")
w(" alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog")
w(" exp_alerts: []")
w("")
return vals, n5
def desc(n, pod=POD, ns=NS):
"""The rule's `description` as promtool renders it for `n` segments."""
return (
f"{n} WAL segments have been waiting to archive for over {FOR_MIN} minutes."
" NOTE ON TIMING: a nightly write burst on ha-pg-1 at 02:14Z (04:14 local)"
" is normal and drains itself within about 13 minutes, and this rule is"
" tuned to stay silent through it — so if this fired, the backlog did NOT"
" clear and the archiver is stuck. Point-in-time recovery is broken for"
" anything after the last archived segment, and pg_wal will grow until the"
" PVC fills. Check the barman-cloud sidecar logs and the ObjectStore"
f" credentials: `kubectl -n {ns} logs {pod} -c plugin-barman-cloud`."
)
def firing(eval_time, n, pod=POD, ns=NS, note=None):
w(f" - eval_time: {eval_time}")
w(" alertname: CNPGWalArchiveBacklog")
w(" exp_alerts:")
if note:
w(f" # {note}")
w(" - exp_labels:")
w(" severity: warning")
w(f" namespace: {ns}")
w(f" pod: {pod}")
w(" exp_annotations:")
w(f' summary: "CNPG WAL archiving is falling behind on {ns}/{pod}"')
w(f' description: "{desc(n, pod, ns)}"')
def silent(eval_time, alert="CNPGWalArchiveBacklog"):
w(f" - eval_time: {eval_time}")
w(f" alertname: {alert}")
w(" exp_alerts: []")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument(
"--report",
action="store_true",
help="print the reconstruction self-check table instead of the suite",
)
args = ap.parse_args()
assert_window_covers_bursts()
if args.report:
# `pend` is what the `for` window is actually compared against; see
# pending_minutes(). `>5 pub` is Iris's published column and is the
# only number here that is not derived by this script.
print(f"{'night':12} {'peak':>5} {'fill':>6} {'drain':>6} "
f"{'>5 pub':>7} {'>5 n':>6} {'>5 pend':>8}")
for date, peak, pm, fill, drain, dur in NIGHTS + [ENVELOPE]:
vals = trace(peak, parse_hhmm(pm), fill, drain)
n5, _ = longest_run_above(vals, 5)
print(f"{date:12} {peak:5} {fill:6} {drain:6} "
f"{('-' if dur is None else dur):>7} {n5:>6} "
f"{pending_minutes(vals, 5):>8}")
wn, _ = longest_run_above(WORST_NIGHT[1], 5)
print(f"{WORST_NIGHT[0]:12} {max(WORST_NIGHT[1]):5} {'raw':>6} {'30s':>6} "
f"{'-':>7} {wn:>6} {max(0, wn - 1) / 2:>8}")
print()
print(f"for: {FOR_MIN}m on >5 must exceed every '>5 pend' above.")
return 0
w("# GENERATED by generate-cnpg-backup-test.py — see README.md in this")
w("# directory before editing by hand.")
w("#")
w("# Unit tests for kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml.")
w("# Every assertion below is either one of Iris's seven measured nights")
w("# (REN-129) rebuilt from its published (peak, fill, drain) numbers, the")
w("# worst night in Prometheus' retention as raw samples (REN-152), an")
w("# adversarial combination of the extremes of those numbers, or a failure")
w("# this cluster has not had but the rule exists to catch.")
w("#")
w("# `rule_files` entries are resolved RELATIVE TO THIS FILE'S DIRECTORY, not")
w("# to the working directory promtool was invoked from — promtool joins")
w("# dirname(testfile) onto each entry. So this is `../`, and it resolves in")
w("# the mirrored tree scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh builds, where the")
w("# `spec:`-stripped manifests sit in the same layout as the real ones.")
w("#")
w("# A path that does NOT resolve is only a WARNING to promtool: it loads zero")
w("# rules, every exp_alerts: [] assertion passes against nothing, and the")
w("# suite exits 0. promtool-rules.sh resolves every entry itself before")
w("# running and fails on a miss; that check is the only thing standing")
w("# between a typo here and a green pipeline that tests nothing.")
w("rule_files:")
w(" - ../prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml")
w("evaluation_interval: 1m")
w("")
w("tests:")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 1-7. THE SEVEN MEASURED NIGHTS. The rule must stay silent through")
w(" # every one of them. The retired depth rule (`> 64`) shipped for review")
w(" # at `for: 2m` and fired on 6 of these 7 nights; REN-152 removed it.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
checks = []
for date, peak, pm, fill, drain, dur in NIGHTS:
vals, n5 = burst_case(
f"nightly burst {date} — recorder purge, benign, self-clearing",
date, peak, pm, fill, drain,
f"{date}: the nightly Home Assistant recorder purge at 04:12 local.",
)
checks.append((date, dur, n5))
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 8. THE ADVERSARIAL ENVELOPE. A night that did not happen, built from")
w(" # the worst fill (39.7/min, 09-23), the highest peak (119, 09-23) and")
w(" # the slowest drain (13.0/min, 09-25) in the week. 11 samples above 5,")
w(" # 10m pending against `for: 20m`.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
burst_case(
"adversarial envelope — worst measured fill and peak, slowest drain",
*ENVELOPE[:5],
why="Synthetic: max fill 39.7 + max peak 119 + min drain 13.0.",
)
date, raw = WORST_NIGHT
wn, wlast = longest_run_above(raw, 5)
peak_i = max(range(len(raw)), key=lambda i: raw[i])
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(f" # 9. THE WORST NIGHT ON RECORD, {date}, as raw 30s samples (see")
w(" # WORST_NIGHT in the generator). Peak 141, 26 samples above 5 = 12.5m")
w(" # of true expression. At `evaluation_interval: 1m` the rule sees it")
w(f" # true from 02:13Z to 02:25Z: 12m pending against `for: {FOR_MIN}m`,")
w(f" # {FOR_MIN - 12}m of margin. This is the case that makes the margin")
w(" # load-bearing: at `for: 12m` it fires at 02:25Z, and nothing else in")
w(" # the suite notices (mutations.txt:backlog-for-12m).")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(f" - name: worst night on record {date} — peak 141, raw samples")
w(" interval: 30s")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels()}'")
w(f" # {hhmm(T0)}:00Z .. {hhmm(T0 + 39)}:00Z, one sample per 30s")
w(f" values: '{fmt(raw)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(value='done')}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt(counter(148_000, 7, len(raw)))}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
for i in (peak_i, wlast, len(raw) - 1):
# eval times in whole minutes: the group evaluates on the minute.
m = (i // 2)
w(f" # {hhmm(T0 + m)}Z, backlog {raw[m * 2]}")
silent(f"{m}m")
w("")
# ---- 10. stalled archiver, well above threshold ------------------------
stalled = [0] * 5 + [70] * 35
fire_at = 5 + FOR_MIN
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 10. THE FAILURE THE RULE EXISTS FOR: an archiver that stopped with")
w(" # 70 segments (1.1 GiB) queued. Not a burst — it does not drain. The")
w(f" # backlog crosses 5 at t=5m, so `for: {FOR_MIN}m` elapses at t={fire_at}m.")
w(" # The assertions bracket the transition: one minute early nothing is")
w(" # firing, on the minute it is.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: stalled archiver at 70 segments — must fire")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels()}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt(stalled)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(value='done')}'")
w(" # Flat, because a stalled archiver archives nothing. The rule does")
w(" # not read this; it is here so the input stays realistic.")
w(f" values: '{fmt([148_000] * SAMPLES)}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
silent(f"{fire_at - 1}m")
firing(f"{fire_at}m", 70, note="No `role` label: proof that `max by (namespace, pod)` "
"aggregated it away. See mutations.txt:no-max-by.")
w("")
# ---- 11. low stall ------------------------------------------------------
low = [0] * 5 + [8] * 35
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 11. THE STALL A DEPTH THRESHOLD CANNOT SEE: 8 segments, stuck. It")
w(" # would never reach any number tuned above the nightly envelope, and")
w(" # point-in-time recovery is just as broken at 8 segments as at 70. This")
w(" # is why REN-152 keyed the rule on persistence and retired the depth rule.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: low stall at 8 segments — must fire")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels()}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt(low)}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
silent(f"{fire_at - 1}m")
firing(f"{fire_at}m", 8)
w("")
# ---- 12. exactly at the threshold ------------------------------------
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 12. PINNED AT EXACTLY 5 for the whole window. `> 5` is strict, so")
w(" # this is silence. A rule written `>= 5` would page on it, and a rule")
w(" # that had lost its `value=\"ready\"` selector would page on the `done`")
w(" # counter regardless of what `ready` does — which is what the second")
w(" # series here is for.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: pinned at exactly 5 — strict > means silence")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels()}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt([5] * SAMPLES)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(value='done')}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt(counter(148_000, 14))}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
silent("39m")
w("")
# ---- 13. role flip ---------------------------------------------------
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 13. FAILOVER DURING A STALL — the case `max by (namespace, pod)` was")
w(" # added for. The backlog starts at t=5m on the primary; at t=11m the")
w(" # instance is promoted and `role` changes, which is a NEW SERIES to")
w(" # Prometheus and restarts the `for` timer on the raw expression.")
w(" # Aggregating `role` away keeps one continuous series, so the page")
w(f" # still lands {FOR_MIN}m after the backlog started (t={fire_at}m) rather")
w(f" # than {FOR_MIN}m after the failover. Without `max by` this case is")
w(f" # silent at t={fire_at}m — see mutations.txt:no-max-by.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: role flip mid-stall — for timer must not restart")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels(role='primary')}'")
w(" # t=0..10m, then this series ends.")
w(f" values: '{fmt([0] * 5 + [70] * 6)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(role='replica')}'")
w(" # Starts at t=11m. `_` is a gap, not a zero.")
w(f" values: '{'_ ' * 11}{fmt([70] * 29)}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
silent(f"{fire_at - 1}m")
firing(f"{fire_at}m", 70)
w("")
# ---- 14. one stalled pod among healthy ones --------------------------
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 14. ONE STALLED INSTANCE AMONG HEALTHY ONES. There are 12 CNPG")
w(" # instances in this cluster. `by (namespace, pod)` has to keep them")
w(" # apart: exactly one alert, naming the pod that is actually stuck, so")
w(" # the 04:00 reader is not sent to look at the wrong Postgres.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: one stalled pod among healthy ones — exactly one alert")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: '{labels(pod='ha-pg-1')}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt([0] * 5 + [70] * 35)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(pod='ha-pg-2', role='replica')}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt([0] * SAMPLES)}'")
w(f" - series: '{labels(pod='immich-pg-1', ns='immich')}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt([0] * SAMPLES)}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
firing(f"{fire_at}m", 70, pod="ha-pg-1")
w("")
# ---- 15. CNPGBackupFailed --------------------------------------------
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" # 15. THE EPOCH-ZERO GUARD on CNPGBackupFailed. The metric is a unix")
w(" # timestamp and reads 0 when no failure was ever recorded, so the rule")
w(" # carries a `> 0` guard to stop that default being read as \"failed in")
w(" # 1970\". Held at 0 for the whole window: silence. Nothing else in this")
w(" # suite exercises that rule, and a dropped guard would page on every")
w(" # instance in the cluster forever.")
w(" # ---------------------------------------------------------------------")
w(" - name: never-failed backup reads timestamp 0 — must not fire")
w(" interval: 1m")
w(" input_series:")
w(f" - series: 'cnpg_collector_last_failed_backup_timestamp{{namespace=\"{NS}\",pod=\"{POD}\"}}'")
w(f" values: '{fmt([0] * SAMPLES)}'")
w(" alert_rule_test:")
silent("39m", "CNPGBackupFailed")
print("\n".join(L))
# Fidelity self-check on stderr so it is visible when regenerating but does
# not contaminate the suite on stdout. Longer than measured is tolerated and
# expected (see FIDELITY in the module docstring); SHORTER is not, because a
# night that clears the threshold sooner than the real one is a weaker
# silence test than the night it claims to stand for.
short = [(d, m, r) for d, m, r in checks if r < m]
if short:
print(
"FAIL: reconstruction is SHORTER above 5 than the measurement on "
+ ", ".join(f"{d} measured {m} rebuilt {r}" for d, m, r in short)
+ " — these nights are weaker silence tests than the real ones. "
"Refusing to vouch for the suite.",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 1
long_ = [(d, m, r) for d, m, r in checks if r > m]
if long_:
print(
f"NOTE: {len(long_)} of {len(checks)} nights rebuild LONGER above 5 "
"than the published column (conservative direction): "
+ ", ".join(f"{d} {m}->{r}" for d, m, r in long_),
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More