chore(image-automation): bump gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-10-25 gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/review-bot:2026-10-25-1455 gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-10-25

Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
chore(image-automation): bump gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-10-25-1459
2026-10-25 15:23:41 +00:00 · 2026-10-25 15:23:40 +00:00 · 2026-10-25 15:17:02 +00:00 · 2026-10-25 15:06:45 +00:00 · 2026-10-25 15:06:43 +00:00 · 2026-10-25 14:56:41 +00:00
151 changed files with 1843 additions and 1622 deletions
@@ -35,25 +35,25 @@ when:
 steps:
  - name: model-selection-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

  - name: pr-review-mistral-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-pr-review-mistral.sh

  - name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh

  - name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
    depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ steps:
    # fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
    # ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
    # test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    commands:
      - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
    # this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
    when:
      - branch: main
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:

 steps:
  - name: update-audit-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.306
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.310
    environment:
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
        from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
@@ -72,14 +72,14 @@ none of these commands.

 ## Secrets (before first play run)

-Create `inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml` with ansible-vault; the
-current live values come straight out of the cluster:
+Create `inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml` with ansible-vault. The
+cluster broker has no `open3e` user: edge-1 logs in only as the register
+account `edge-1` (see "MQTT bridge" below), so
+`vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` reaches only the loopback broker, which
+allows anonymous clients; any random value works (`openssl rand -hex 24`).
+The zwave-js value comes out of the cluster:

 ```
-# sml2mqtt broker password
-kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
-# open3e broker password
-kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-open3e-credentials -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
 # zwave-js session secret
 kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.session-secret}' | base64 -d
 ```
@@ -230,15 +230,14 @@ They connect to a **local mosquitto on loopback** (`127.0.0.1:1883`,
  broker is briefly unreachable, and flushes on reconnect — edge-1 no longer
  hard-depends on cluster/network uptime for every publish.

-Two bridge `connection`s preserve the existing cluster identities, so **no
-cluster-side change was needed**: one authenticates as the `open3e` user
-(carries `open3e/#` out + `open3e/cmnd` back), one as `sml2mqtt` (`sml2mqtt/#`
-out). The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary
-is the host; nothing off-host can reach it.
+The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary is the
+host; nothing off-host can reach it.

-**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** The two vault-password bridges are being
-replaced by one bridge as the register account `edge-1`
-(`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`). Its password is pushed
+**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** One bridge `connection` logs in as the
+register account `edge-1` (`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`)
+and carries `open3e/#` out and `open3e/cmnd` back. The cluster broker does not
+accept the vault-password bridges in `bridge.d/legacy.conf`, which exists only
+until the first push. Its password is pushed
 by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
 esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
 the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
@@ -95,9 +95,8 @@ the VM enrolled as `claude-ws-190-112.nb.renner.uno` / `100.96.190.112` (+ IPv6)
 > inventory targets the tunnel DHCP IP.

 > **DNS trap.** `claude-ws.obg.renner.uno` resolves to the VM's lease **only at
-> the off-site DNS** (`@10.3.40.1`). The home resolver catch-alls `*.renner.uno`
-> to the public proxy (`162.55.50.97`, the Netbird VPS) — so from home the FQDN
-> lands on `root@netbird`, **not** the VM. Never use it as `ansible_host`.
+> the off-site DNS** (`@10.3.40.1`). From home this FQDN does not resolve (it
+> exists only at the off-site DNS @10.3.40.1). Never use it as `ansible_host`.

 **Optional — mesh route to the k8s API (redundant read path):** to reach the API
 over the mesh too, add a Netbird dashboard **network route** advertising the
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #
 # Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
 # where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
-# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
+# public renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
 # cluster.
 #
 # Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
@@ -157,6 +157,29 @@
  ansible.builtin.pause:
    seconds: 10

+# The host's mesh client must not manage DNS: containers here resolve through
+# the host stub, and the renner.uno nameserver group is unreachable from it.
+- name: Check for the host NetBird client
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: /usr/bin/netbird
+  register: _netbird_client
+
+- name: Read the host NetBird client config
+  ansible.builtin.command: netbird debug config
+  register: _netbird_client_config
+  changed_when: false
+  when: _netbird_client.stat.exists
+
+# disable-dns is only applied on a fresh `up`, not to a connected client.
+- name: Reconnect the host NetBird client with DNS management disabled
+  ansible.builtin.shell: |
+    set -eu
+    netbird down
+    netbird up --disable-dns
+  when:
+    - _netbird_client.stat.exists
+    - not (_netbird_client_config.stdout | from_json).disableDns
+
 - name: Display deployment status
  ansible.builtin.debug:
    msg: |
@@ -1,34 +1,26 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""authentik-gate-sync: an ingress class that puts an Authentik proxy gate in front of an app.
+"""authentik-gate-sync: the Authentik side of the gate Middleware.

-Source of truth: every Ingress with spec.ingressClassName "authentik-gate". Traefik
-ignores that class (its IngressClass names another controller), so a source
-Ingress is never served directly. For each one this controller builds:
+An Ingress is gated when its traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares
+annotation names the gate Middleware (authentik/gate, a ForwardAuth against the
+embedded outpost in authentik-server; kubernetes/apps/authentik/gate.yaml). The
+gate's configuration lives on that Ingress; for each one this controller builds:

-  Authentik   proxy provider + application + outpost (+ group-membership
-              expression policy bound to the application).
-              Authentik's own Kubernetes integration then runs the outpost as
-              ak-outpost-<gate> in the authentik namespace.
-  app ns      ExternalName Service <ingress>-gate -> the outpost Service,
-              Traefik Ingress <ingress>-gate: the source's hosts, paths, TLS,
-              labels and annotations, backend swapped for the gate,
-              CNP <ingress>-gate: the backend pods admit this outpost.
-  authentik   CNP gate-<gate>: the outpost may reach only those backend pods.
+  Authentik   forward_single proxy provider for the Ingress's host +
+              application (+ group-membership expression policy bound to it),
+              the provider attached to the embedded outpost.
+  app ns      CNP <ingress>-gate: the backend pods admit Traefik.

-Like any ingress controller it publishes the source's status.loadBalancer: the
-address Traefik reports for the route, or none while the gate has no route.
-
-The source Ingress's backend is the real upstream; it becomes the provider's
-internal host and its host the external host. Annotations (all optional):
+Annotations (all optional):

  auth.renner.uno/group               group whose members may pass; none = any user
  auth.renner.uno/login-flow          authentication flow slug; none = the brand's
  auth.renner.uno/authorization-flow  authorization flow slug (default below)
  auth.renner.uno/skip-path           provider skip_path_regex

-Fail closed: the Traefik Ingress is applied last and only after the Authentik
-side reconciled, and is removed when that fails (e.g. the named group is gone),
-so there is never a route to an unguarded backend.
+Fail closed: until the provider exists, or after it is removed (e.g. the named
+group is gone), the embedded outpost has no provider for the host and rejects
+the request; Traefik answers 500 when the outpost is unreachable.

 Ownership: Kubernetes objects carry app.kubernetes.io/managed-by; Authentik
 applications carry meta_publisher. Anything without the marker is never touched.
@@ -48,10 +40,8 @@ LOG = logging.getLogger("authentik-gate-sync")

 AK_URL = os.environ.get("AK_URL", "http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local").rstrip("/")
 AK_TOKEN_FILE = os.environ.get("AK_TOKEN_FILE", "/var/run/secrets/authentik-gate-sync/token")
-INGRESS_CLASS = os.environ.get("INGRESS_CLASS", "authentik-gate")
-TARGET_CLASS = os.environ.get("TARGET_INGRESS_CLASS", "traefik")
-OUTPOST_NS = os.environ.get("OUTPOST_NAMESPACE", "authentik")
-SERVICE_CONNECTION = os.environ.get("SERVICE_CONNECTION", "Local Kubernetes Cluster")
+GATE_MIDDLEWARE = os.environ.get("GATE_MIDDLEWARE", "authentik-gate@kubernetescrd")
+INGRESS_NS = os.environ.get("INGRESS_NAMESPACE", "ingress")
 DEFAULT_AUTHZ_FLOW = os.environ.get("DEFAULT_AUTHORIZATION_FLOW", "default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent")
 INVALIDATION_FLOW = os.environ.get("INVALIDATION_FLOW", "default-provider-invalidation-flow")
 COOKIE_DOMAIN = os.environ.get("COOKIE_DOMAIN", "renner.uno")
@@ -63,14 +53,9 @@ ANN = "auth.renner.uno/"
 MANAGER = "authentik-gate-sync"
 MANAGED_BY = {"app.kubernetes.io/managed-by": MANAGER}
 GATE_LABEL = "auth.renner.uno/gate"
-OUTPOST_PORT = 9000
-
-# Never copied from the source onto the generated Ingress: cert-manager would
-# issue a second Certificate for the same secret, Flux would treat it as its own,
-# and the gate annotations mean nothing to Traefik.
-DROP_LABEL_PREFIXES = ("kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/", "app.kubernetes.io/managed-by")
-DROP_ANNOTATION_PREFIXES = (ANN, "cert-manager.io/", "acme.cert-manager.io/",
-                            "kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration")
+EMBEDDED_OUTPOST = "goauthentik.io/outposts/embedded"
+TRAEFIK = {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": INGRESS_NS, "app.kubernetes.io/name": "traefik"}
+MIDDLEWARES_ANN = "traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares"

 K8S_API = "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
 K8S_TOKEN_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
@@ -114,7 +99,7 @@ def http(method, url, body=None, headers=None, cafile=None, content_type="applic

 def gate_name(ing):
    """<ns>-<ingress>, truncated, plus a hash of both: unambiguous (a-b/c vs a/b-c)
-    and short enough for label values and ak-outpost-<name> (63)."""
+    and short enough for label values (63)."""
    ns, name = ing["metadata"]["namespace"], ing["metadata"]["name"]
    digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{ns}/{name}".encode()).hexdigest()[:6]
    return f"{ns}-{name}"[:45].rstrip("-") + "-" + digest
@@ -126,6 +111,24 @@ def group_expression(group):
    return f"return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name={group!r})"


+def is_gated(ing):
+    chain = ((ing.get("metadata") or {}).get("annotations") or {}).get(MIDDLEWARES_ANN, "")
+    return GATE_MIDDLEWARE in (m.strip() for m in chain.split(","))
+
+
+def shared_hosts(sources):
+    """Hosts named by more than one gated Ingress. The outpost finds the provider
+    by host, so such a host would get one gate for several Ingresses."""
+    seen, shared = set(), set()
+    for ing in sources:
+        for r in ing.get("spec", {}).get("rules") or []:
+            host = r.get("host")
+            if host in seen:
+                shared.add(host)
+            seen.add(host)
+    return shared
+
+
 def gate_spec(ing):
    """Translate a source Ingress into the gate it asks for. Raises GateError."""
    meta = ing["metadata"]
@@ -174,63 +177,15 @@ def gate_labels(gate):
    return {**MANAGED_BY, GATE_LABEL: gate["name"]}


-def outpost_service(gate):
-    return f"ak-outpost-{gate['name']}"
-
-
-def external_name_service(gate):
-    return {"apiVersion": "v1", "kind": "Service",
-            "metadata": {"name": f"{gate['ingress']}-gate", "namespace": gate["namespace"],
-                         "labels": gate_labels(gate), "ownerReferences": owner_ref(gate)},
-            "spec": {"type": "ExternalName",
-                     "externalName": f"{outpost_service(gate)}.{OUTPOST_NS}.svc.cluster.local",
-                     "ports": [{"name": "http", "port": OUTPOST_PORT, "targetPort": OUTPOST_PORT}]}}
-
-
-def route_ingress(ing, gate):
-    """The Traefik Ingress: the source with its backend swapped for the gate."""
-    meta = ing["metadata"]
-    labels = {k: v for k, v in (meta.get("labels") or {}).items() if not k.startswith(DROP_LABEL_PREFIXES)}
-    annotations = {k: v for k, v in (meta.get("annotations") or {}).items()
-                   if not k.startswith(DROP_ANNOTATION_PREFIXES)}
-    backend = {"service": {"name": f"{gate['ingress']}-gate", "port": {"number": OUTPOST_PORT}}}
-    rules = []
-    for r in ing["spec"]["rules"]:
-        paths = [{"path": p.get("path", "/"), "pathType": p.get("pathType", "Prefix"), "backend": backend}
-                 for p in r["http"]["paths"]]
-        rules.append({"host": r["host"], "http": {"paths": paths}})
-    spec = {"ingressClassName": TARGET_CLASS, "rules": rules}
-    if ing["spec"].get("tls"):
-        spec["tls"] = ing["spec"]["tls"]
-    return {"apiVersion": "networking.k8s.io/v1", "kind": "Ingress",
-            "metadata": {"name": f"{gate['ingress']}-gate", "namespace": gate["namespace"],
-                         "labels": {**labels, **gate_labels(gate)}, "annotations": annotations,
-                         "ownerReferences": owner_ref(gate)},
-            "spec": spec}
-
-
-def outpost_selector(gate):
-    return {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": OUTPOST_NS, "goauthentik.io/outpost-name": gate["name"]}
-
-
 def backend_ingress_cnp(gate, pod_selector, target_port):
    return {"apiVersion": "cilium.io/v2", "kind": "CiliumNetworkPolicy",
            "metadata": {"name": f"{gate['ingress']}-gate", "namespace": gate["namespace"],
                         "labels": gate_labels(gate), "ownerReferences": owner_ref(gate)},
            "spec": {"endpointSelector": {"matchLabels": pod_selector},
-                     "ingress": [{"fromEndpoints": [{"matchLabels": outpost_selector(gate)}],
+                     "ingress": [{"fromEndpoints": [{"matchLabels": TRAEFIK}],
                                  "toPorts": [{"ports": [{"port": str(target_port), "protocol": "TCP"}]}]}]}}


-def outpost_egress_cnp(gate, pod_selector, target_port):
-    peer = {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gate["namespace"], **pod_selector}
-    return {"apiVersion": "cilium.io/v2", "kind": "CiliumNetworkPolicy",
-            "metadata": {"name": f"gate-{gate['name']}", "namespace": OUTPOST_NS, "labels": gate_labels(gate)},
-            "spec": {"endpointSelector": {"matchLabels": {"goauthentik.io/outpost-name": gate["name"]}},
-                     "egress": [{"toEndpoints": [{"matchLabels": peer}],
-                                 "toPorts": [{"ports": [{"port": str(target_port), "protocol": "TCP"}]}]}]}}
-
-
 def resolve_backend(gate, service):
    """(service port number, pod selector, target port) for the gate's backend.
    A named targetPort stays a name: Cilium resolves named ports against the
@@ -254,34 +209,20 @@ def resolve_backend(gate, service):
    return sp["port"], selector, target


-def outpost_config():
-    return {
-        "log_level": "info",
-        "authentik_host": AK_URL,
-        "authentik_host_insecure": False,
-        "authentik_host_browser": AK_BROWSER_URL,
-        "refresh_interval": "minutes=5",
-        "container_image": None,
-        "object_naming_template": "ak-outpost-%(name)s",
-        "kubernetes_namespace": OUTPOST_NS,
-        "kubernetes_replicas": 1,
-        "kubernetes_service_type": "ClusterIP",
-        "kubernetes_disabled_components": ["ingress"],
-        "kubernetes_image_pull_secrets": [],
-        "kubernetes_ingress_annotations": {},
-        "kubernetes_ingress_class_name": None,
-        "kubernetes_ingress_secret_name": "authentik-outpost-tls",
-        "kubernetes_json_patches": None,
-    }
+def embedded_config(config):
+    """The embedded outpost's config with the host the gates depend on. The
+    embedded outpost builds the sign-in redirect from authentik_host, so it is
+    the public URL, which is also Authentik's default for it."""
+    return {**(config or {}), "authentik_host": AK_BROWSER_URL, "authentik_host_insecure": False,
+            "authentik_host_browser": AK_BROWSER_URL}


-def provider_body(gate, svc_port, flows):
+def provider_body(gate, flows):
    return {
        "name": gate["name"],
-        "mode": "proxy",
+        "mode": "forward_single",
        "external_host": f"{gate['scheme']}://{gate['host']}",
-        "internal_host": f"http://{gate['service']}.{gate['namespace']}.svc.cluster.local:{svc_port}",
-        "internal_host_ssl_validation": False,
+        "internal_host": "",
        "cookie_domain": COOKIE_DOMAIN,
        "access_token_validity": "hours=24",
        "refresh_token_validity": "days=30",
@@ -293,18 +234,6 @@ def provider_body(gate, svc_port, flows):
    }


-def lb_ingress(obj):
-    return ((obj or {}).get("status") or {}).get("loadBalancer", {}).get("ingress") or []
-
-
-def status_patch(source, addresses):
-    """Merge patch publishing `addresses` as the source Ingress's load-balancer
-    status, as an ingress controller does; None when it already matches."""
-    if lb_ingress(source) == addresses:
-        return None
-    return {"status": {"loadBalancer": {"ingress": addresses or None}}}
-
-
 def drift(current, desired):
    return {k: v for k, v in desired.items() if current.get(k) != v}

@@ -342,23 +271,9 @@ class K8s:
            if e.code != 404:
                raise

-    def patch_status(self, ns, name, patch):
-        path = f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/namespaces/{ns}/ingresses/{name}/status"
-        return http("PATCH", K8S_API + path, patch, headers=self._h(), cafile=K8S_CA_FILE,
-                    content_type="application/merge-patch+json")
-
-    def delete_managed(self, obj):
-        try:
-            live = self.get(object_path(obj))
-        except ApiError as e:
-            if e.code == 404:
-                return
-            raise
-        if (live["metadata"].get("labels") or {}).get("app.kubernetes.io/managed-by") == MANAGER:
-            self.delete(obj)
-            LOG.info("deleted %s %s/%s", obj["kind"], obj["metadata"]["namespace"], obj["metadata"]["name"])
-
-
+# Swept by label: any object of these kinds marked as this controller's that no
+# gate wants is deleted. It creates only CNPs; Ingresses and Services carrying
+# the label are routes a gate must not have besides its own Ingress.
 COLLECTIONS = {
    "Ingress": "/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/namespaces/{ns}/ingresses",
    "Service": "/api/v1/namespaces/{ns}/services",
@@ -425,7 +340,24 @@ def get_application(ak, slug):
    return ak.get(f"core/applications/{slug}/")


-def ensure_gate(ak, gate, svc_port, flows, connection):
+def embedded_outpost(ak):
+    # Matched again here: a filter the server ignored must not select another outpost.
+    found = [o for o in ak.list("outposts/instances/", managed__iexact=EMBEDDED_OUTPOST)
+             if o.get("managed") == EMBEDDED_OUTPOST]
+    if len(found) != 1:
+        raise ApiError(f"expected one embedded outpost, found {len(found)}")
+    return found[0]
+
+
+def ensure_embedded_config(ak):
+    outpost = embedded_outpost(ak)
+    want = embedded_config(outpost.get("config"))
+    if outpost.get("config") != want:
+        ak.req("PATCH", f"outposts/instances/{outpost['pk']}/", {"config": want})
+        LOG.info("embedded outpost: updated config")
+
+
+def ensure_gate(ak, gate, flows):
    name = gate["name"]
    if gate["group"] and ak.one("core/groups/", name=gate["group"]) is None:
        raise GateError(f"group {gate['group']!r} not found in Authentik")
@@ -434,7 +366,7 @@ def ensure_gate(ak, gate, svc_port, flows, connection):
    if app is not None and app.get("meta_publisher") != MANAGER:
        raise GateError(f"application {name} exists and is not managed by {MANAGER}")

-    want = provider_body(gate, svc_port, flows)
+    want = provider_body(gate, flows)
    provider = ak.one("providers/proxy/", name__iexact=name)
    if provider is None:
        provider = ak.req("POST", "providers/proxy/", want)
@@ -461,17 +393,22 @@ def ensure_gate(ak, gate, svc_port, flows, connection):

    ensure_access(ak, gate, app["pbm_uuid"])

-    want_outpost = {"name": name, "type": "proxy", "service_connection": connection,
-                    "providers": [provider["pk"]], "config": outpost_config()}
-    outpost = ak.one("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=name)
-    if outpost is None:
-        ak.req("POST", "outposts/instances/", want_outpost)
-        LOG.info("%s: created outpost", name)
-    elif set(outpost.get("providers") or []) - {provider["pk"]}:
-        raise GateError(f"outpost {name} serves providers this controller does not own")
-    elif drift(outpost, want_outpost):
-        ak.req("PATCH", f"outposts/instances/{outpost['pk']}/", drift(outpost, want_outpost))
-        LOG.info("%s: updated outpost %s", name, sorted(drift(outpost, want_outpost)))
+    # Re-read per gate: the providers list is replaced whole.
+    embedded = embedded_outpost(ak)
+    if provider["pk"] not in (embedded.get("providers") or []):
+        ak.req("PATCH", f"outposts/instances/{embedded['pk']}/",
+               {"providers": [*(embedded.get("providers") or []), provider["pk"]]})
+        LOG.info("%s: attached provider to the embedded outpost", name)
+    remove_dedicated_outposts(ak, name, provider["pk"])
+
+
+def remove_dedicated_outposts(ak, name, provider):
+    """Outposts named after the gate that serve only its provider: the embedded
+    outpost serves every gate, so Authentik tears these and their pods down."""
+    for o in ak.list("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=name):
+        if o.get("providers") == [provider] and not o.get("managed"):
+            ak.req("DELETE", f"outposts/instances/{o['pk']}/")
+            LOG.info("%s: removed dedicated outpost", name)


 def ensure_access(ak, gate, target):
@@ -511,15 +448,12 @@ def ensure_access(ak, gate, target):


 def remove_gate(ak, app):
-    """Delete an owned gate. The outpost serving only its provider goes first
-    (Authentik tears its pods down), then the application (bindings cascade; its
-    provider is PROTECTed while referenced), the provider, the policy. Ownership
-    is found through the application, so until it is gone a failed step is
-    retried on the next pass."""
+    """Delete an owned gate: the application (bindings cascade; its provider is
+    PROTECTed while referenced), then the provider (which leaves the embedded
+    outpost with it), the policy. Ownership is found through the application,
+    so until it is gone a failed step is retried on the next pass."""
    name, provider = app["slug"], app.get("provider")
-    for o in ak.list("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=name):
-        if o.get("providers") == [provider]:
-            ak.req("DELETE", f"outposts/instances/{o['pk']}/")
+    remove_dedicated_outposts(ak, name, provider)
    ak.req("DELETE", f"core/applications/{name}/")
    if provider:
        ak.req("DELETE", f"providers/proxy/{provider}/")
@@ -543,32 +477,15 @@ def owned_applications(ak):

 # --- reconcile --------------------------------------------------------------

-def publish_status(k8s, source, addresses):
-    """Status is cosmetic for the gate itself: a failure is logged, never fatal."""
-    patch = status_patch(source, addresses)
-    if patch is None:
-        return
-    m = source["metadata"]
-    try:
-        k8s.patch_status(m["namespace"], m["name"], patch)
-        LOG.info("%s/%s: status %s", m["namespace"], m["name"],
-                 [a.get("ip") or a.get("hostname") for a in addresses])
-    except Exception as e:
-        LOG.warning("%s/%s: publishing status: %s", m["namespace"], m["name"], e)
-
-
 def reconcile():
    k8s = K8s()
    with open(AK_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
        ak = Authentik(f.read().strip())

-    sources = [i for i in k8s.get("/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses").get("items", [])
-               if i.get("spec", {}).get("ingressClassName") == INGRESS_CLASS]
+    sources = [i for i in k8s.get("/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses").get("items", []) if is_gated(i)]
+    shared = shared_hosts(sources)
    flows = {f["slug"]: f["pk"] for f in ak.list("flows/instances/")}
-    connection = ak.one("outposts/service_connections/kubernetes/", name=SERVICE_CONNECTION)
-    if connection is None:
-        raise ApiError(f"Kubernetes service connection {SERVICE_CONNECTION!r} not found")
-    connection = connection["pk"]
+    ensure_embedded_config(ak)

    desired = set()  # (kind, ns, name) of every Kubernetes object some gate wants
    gates = set()    # gate names whose Authentik side should exist
@@ -578,6 +495,8 @@ def reconcile():
        ref = f'{ing["metadata"]["namespace"]}/{ing["metadata"]["name"]}'
        try:
            gate = gate_spec(ing)
+            if gate["host"] in shared:
+                raise GateError(f"host {gate['host']} is gated by more than one Ingress")
            for slug in filter(None, (gate["authorization_flow"], gate["login_flow"], INVALIDATION_FLOW)):
                if slug not in flows:
                    raise GateError(f"flow {slug!r} not found in Authentik")
@@ -588,28 +507,18 @@ def reconcile():
                if e.code == 404:
                    raise GateError(f"backend Service {gate['service']} does not exist") from None
                raise
-            svc_port, pods, target_port = resolve_backend(gate, service)
+            _, pods, target_port = resolve_backend(gate, service)
            gates.add(gate["name"])
-            ensure_gate(ak, gate, svc_port, flows, connection)
-            objs = [outpost_egress_cnp(gate, pods, target_port), backend_ingress_cnp(gate, pods, target_port),
-                    external_name_service(gate), route_ingress(ing, gate)]  # the route goes last
-            for obj in objs:
-                live = k8s.apply(obj)
-                desired.add((obj["kind"], obj["metadata"]["namespace"], obj["metadata"]["name"]))
-            publish_status(k8s, ing, lb_ingress(live))  # the route's address, from Traefik
+            ensure_gate(ak, gate, flows)
+            cnp = backend_ingress_cnp(gate, pods, target_port)
+            k8s.apply(cnp)
+            desired.add((cnp["kind"], cnp["metadata"]["namespace"], cnp["metadata"]["name"]))
        except GateError as e:
-            # The Ingress cannot be gated as written: its route goes now, the
-            # rest with the sweep below.
+            # The Ingress cannot be gated as written: its provider goes with the
+            # sweep below, after which the outpost rejects the host.
            LOG.error("%s: %s", ref, e)
            failed += 1
            gates.discard(gate_name(ing))
-            route = {"kind": "Ingress", "metadata": {"namespace": ing["metadata"]["namespace"],
-                                                     "name": f'{ing["metadata"]["name"]}-gate'}}
-            try:
-                k8s.delete_managed(route)
-            except Exception as e:  # the sweep retries
-                LOG.error("%s: removing route: %s", ref, e)
-            publish_status(k8s, ing, [])
        except Exception as e:
            # Transient: leave this gate exactly as the last good pass left it.
            LOG.error("%s: %s", ref, e)
@@ -11,11 +11,12 @@ LLAMA = {
            "cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer": "letsencrypt-cluster",
            "auth.renner.uno/login-flow": "sso-authentication",
            "auth.renner.uno/skip-path": r"^/(manifest\.webmanifest|sw\.js)$",
-            "traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares": "ingress-foo@kubernetescrd",
+            "traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares":
+                "authentik-gate@kubernetescrd, ingress-foo@kubernetescrd",
        },
    },
    "spec": {
-        "ingressClassName": "authentik-gate",
+        "ingressClassName": "traefik",
        "tls": [{"hosts": ["llm.renner.uno"], "secretName": "llama-server-tls"}],
        "rules": [{"host": "llm.renner.uno", "http": {"paths": [
            {"path": "/", "pathType": "Prefix",
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ class Names(unittest.TestCase):

    def test_bounded(self):
        n = c.gate_name(ing("n" * 63, "i" * 253))
-        self.assertLessEqual(len(c.outpost_service({"name": n})), 63)
+        self.assertLessEqual(len(n), 63)
        self.assertNotIn("--", n)

    def test_group_expression_is_a_literal(self):
@@ -90,6 +91,22 @@ class GateSpec(unittest.TestCase):
        with self.assertRaises(c.GateError):
            c.gate_spec(ing)

+    def test_shared_hosts(self):
+        other = copy.deepcopy(LLAMA)
+        other["metadata"]["name"] = "llama-admin"
+        self.assertEqual(c.shared_hosts([LLAMA, other]), {"llm.renner.uno"})
+        other["spec"]["rules"][0]["host"] = "admin.renner.uno"
+        self.assertEqual(c.shared_hosts([LLAMA, other]), set())
+
+    def test_gated_by_middleware_reference(self):
+        self.assertTrue(c.is_gated(LLAMA))
+        ing = copy.deepcopy(LLAMA)
+        ing["metadata"]["annotations"]["traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares"] = \
+            "ingress-foo@kubernetescrd,authentik-gate-other@kubernetescrd"
+        self.assertFalse(c.is_gated(ing))
+        del ing["metadata"]["annotations"]
+        self.assertFalse(c.is_gated(ing))
+

 class Backend(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_named_target_port_stays_named(self):
@@ -126,65 +143,34 @@ class Objects(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.g = c.gate_spec(LLAMA)

-    def test_route_ingress(self):
-        r = c.route_ingress(LLAMA, self.g)
-        self.assertEqual(r["metadata"]["name"], "llama-server-gate")
-        self.assertEqual(r["spec"]["ingressClassName"], "traefik")
-        self.assertEqual(r["spec"]["tls"], LLAMA["spec"]["tls"])
-        backend = r["spec"]["rules"][0]["http"]["paths"][0]["backend"]["service"]
-        self.assertEqual(backend, {"name": "llama-server-gate", "port": {"number": 9000}})
-        labels, ann = r["metadata"]["labels"], r["metadata"]["annotations"]
-        self.assertEqual(labels["dns.renner.uno/public"], "true")
-        self.assertNotIn("kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name", labels)
-        self.assertEqual(labels["app.kubernetes.io/managed-by"], c.MANAGER)
-        self.assertEqual(ann, {"traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares": "ingress-foo@kubernetescrd"})
-        self.assertEqual(r["metadata"]["ownerReferences"][0]["uid"], "u-1")
-
-    def test_external_name(self):
-        s = c.external_name_service(self.g)
-        self.assertEqual(s["spec"]["externalName"], f"ak-outpost-{self.g['name']}.authentik.svc.cluster.local")
-
-    def test_cnps(self):
+    def test_backend_admits_traefik_only(self):
        pods = {"app.kubernetes.io/name": "llama-server"}
-        e = c.outpost_egress_cnp(self.g, pods, 8080)
-        self.assertEqual(e["metadata"]["namespace"], "authentik")
-        self.assertEqual(e["spec"]["endpointSelector"]["matchLabels"],
-                         {"goauthentik.io/outpost-name": self.g["name"]})
-        self.assertEqual(e["spec"]["egress"][0]["toEndpoints"][0]["matchLabels"],
-                         {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": "ai", "app.kubernetes.io/name": "llama-server"})
        i = c.backend_ingress_cnp(self.g, pods, 8080)
        self.assertEqual(i["metadata"]["namespace"], "ai")
-        self.assertEqual(i["spec"]["ingress"][0]["fromEndpoints"][0]["matchLabels"],
-                         {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": "authentik",
-                          "goauthentik.io/outpost-name": self.g["name"]})
+        self.assertEqual(i["spec"]["ingress"][0]["fromEndpoints"],
+                         [{"matchLabels": {"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": "ingress",
+                                           "app.kubernetes.io/name": "traefik"}}])
        self.assertEqual(i["spec"]["ingress"][0]["toPorts"][0]["ports"][0]["port"], "8080")

    def test_provider_body(self):
        flows = {c.DEFAULT_AUTHZ_FLOW: "az", "sso-authentication": "au",
                 c.INVALIDATION_FLOW: "inv"}
-        p = c.provider_body(self.g, 8080, flows)
+        p = c.provider_body(self.g, flows)
+        self.assertEqual(p["mode"], "forward_single")
        self.assertEqual(p["external_host"], "https://llm.renner.uno")
-        self.assertEqual(p["internal_host"], "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080")
+        self.assertEqual(p["internal_host"], "")
        self.assertEqual((p["authorization_flow"], p["authentication_flow"], p["invalidation_flow"]),
                         ("az", "au", "inv"))
        self.assertEqual(p["skip_path_regex"], r"^/(manifest\.webmanifest|sw\.js)$")

-    def test_status_mirrors_route_address(self):
-        addrs = [{"ip": "10.2.99.86"}, {"ip": "fd99::86"}]
-        route = {"status": {"loadBalancer": {"ingress": addrs}}}
-        self.assertEqual(c.status_patch(LLAMA, c.lb_ingress(route)),
-                         {"status": {"loadBalancer": {"ingress": addrs}}})
-        synced = dict(LLAMA, status={"loadBalancer": {"ingress": addrs}})
-        self.assertIsNone(c.status_patch(synced, addrs))
-
-    def test_status_cleared_without_route(self):
-        stale = dict(LLAMA, status={"loadBalancer": {"ingress": [{"ip": "10.2.99.86"}]}})
-        self.assertEqual(c.status_patch(stale, []), {"status": {"loadBalancer": {"ingress": None}}})
-        self.assertIsNone(c.status_patch(LLAMA, []))
-
    def test_drift(self):
        self.assertEqual(c.drift({"a": 1, "b": 2}, {"a": 1, "b": 3}), {"b": 3})

+    def test_embedded_config_keeps_other_keys(self):
+        cfg = c.embedded_config({"log_level": "debug", "authentik_host": c.AK_URL})
+        self.assertEqual(cfg, {"log_level": "debug", "authentik_host": c.AK_BROWSER_URL,
+                               "authentik_host_insecure": False, "authentik_host_browser": c.AK_BROWSER_URL})
+

 class FakeAuthentik:
    """In-memory stand-in for the endpoints the controller uses; records calls."""
@@ -267,20 +253,69 @@ class Reconcile(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.ak = FakeAuthentik()
        self.g = c.gate_spec(LLAMA)
+        self.embedded = self.ak.add("outposts/instances/", {
+            "name": "authentik Embedded Outpost", "managed": c.EMBEDDED_OUTPOST,
+            "providers": [], "config": {"log_level": "info"}})

    def gate(self, group=None):
        g = dict(self.g, group=group)
-        c.ensure_gate(self.ak, g, 8080, FLOWS, "conn")
+        c.ensure_gate(self.ak, g, FLOWS)
        return g

+    def embedded_providers(self):
+        return self.ak.get(f"outposts/instances/{self.embedded['pk']}/")["providers"]
+
    def test_creates_owned_gate(self):
        self.gate()
        app = self.ak.get(f"core/applications/{self.g['name']}/")
        self.assertEqual(app["meta_publisher"], c.MANAGER)
-        outpost = self.ak.one("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=self.g["name"])
-        self.assertEqual(outpost["providers"], [app["provider"]])
+        self.assertEqual(self.embedded_providers(), [app["provider"]])
+        self.assertEqual(self.ak.list("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=self.g["name"]), [])
        self.assertEqual(self.ak.list("policies/bindings/"), [])

+    def test_keeps_other_providers_on_embedded_outpost(self):
+        self.ak.db["outposts/instances/"][self.embedded["pk"]]["providers"] = [999]
+        self.gate()
+        app = self.ak.get(f"core/applications/{self.g['name']}/")
+        self.assertEqual(self.embedded_providers(), [999, app["provider"]])
+
+    def test_removes_dedicated_outpost(self):
+        self.gate()
+        app = self.ak.get(f"core/applications/{self.g['name']}/")
+        self.ak.add("outposts/instances/", {"name": self.g["name"], "providers": [app["provider"]]})
+        shared = self.ak.add("outposts/instances/", {"name": self.g["name"].upper(),
+                                                     "providers": [app["provider"], 999]})
+        self.gate()
+        self.assertEqual([o["pk"] for o in self.ak.list("outposts/instances/", name__iexact=self.g["name"])],
+                         [shared["pk"]])
+
+    def test_embedded_lookup_ignores_unfiltered_results(self):
+        ldap = self.ak.add("outposts/instances/", {"name": "LDAP Outpost", "managed": None, "providers": [7]})
+        unfiltered = self.ak.list
+        self.ak.list = lambda path, **q: unfiltered(path)  # a server that ignores the filter
+        self.assertEqual(c.embedded_outpost(self.ak)["pk"], self.embedded["pk"])
+        del self.ak.db["outposts/instances/"][self.embedded["pk"]]
+        with self.assertRaises(c.ApiError):
+            c.embedded_outpost(self.ak)
+        self.assertEqual(self.ak.get(f"outposts/instances/{ldap['pk']}/")["providers"], [7])
+
+    def test_embedded_config(self):
+        c.ensure_embedded_config(self.ak)
+        cfg = self.ak.get(f"outposts/instances/{self.embedded['pk']}/")["config"]
+        self.assertEqual((cfg["log_level"], cfg["authentik_host"], cfg["authentik_host_browser"]),
+                         ("info", c.AK_BROWSER_URL, c.AK_BROWSER_URL))
+        before = len(self.ak.calls)
+        c.ensure_embedded_config(self.ak)
+        self.assertEqual(self.ak.calls[before:], [])
+
+    def test_provider_moves_from_proxy_mode(self):
+        self.ak.add("providers/proxy/", {"name": self.g["name"], "mode": "proxy",
+                                         "internal_host": "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080",
+                                         "assigned_application_slug": None})
+        self.gate()
+        provider = self.ak.one("providers/proxy/", name__iexact=self.g["name"])
+        self.assertEqual((provider["mode"], provider["internal_host"]), ("forward_single", ""))
+
    def test_second_pass_is_a_noop(self):
        self.gate()
        before = len(self.ak.calls)
@@ -329,15 +364,15 @@ class Reconcile(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIsNone(self.ak.one("policies/expression/", name=self.g["name"]))

    def test_remove_gate_and_ownership_scan(self):
-        self.ak.add("providers/proxy/", {"name": "foreign", "assigned_application_slug": "foreign"})
-        self.ak.add("core/applications/", {"slug": "foreign", "meta_publisher": "", "provider": 1})
+        foreign = self.ak.add("providers/proxy/", {"name": "foreign", "assigned_application_slug": "foreign"})
+        self.ak.add("core/applications/", {"slug": "foreign", "meta_publisher": "", "provider": foreign["pk"]})
        self.gate()
        owned = list(c.owned_applications(self.ak))
        self.assertEqual([a["slug"] for a in owned], [self.g["name"]])
        c.remove_gate(self.ak, owned[0])
        self.assertIsNone(self.ak.get(f"core/applications/{self.g['name']}/"))
        self.assertEqual([p["name"] for p in self.ak.list("providers/proxy/")], ["foreign"])
-        self.assertEqual(self.ak.list("outposts/instances/"), [])
+        self.assertEqual([o["pk"] for o in self.ak.list("outposts/instances/")], [self.embedded["pk"]])

    def test_adopts_provider_orphaned_by_interrupted_teardown(self):
        self.gate()
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """netbird-service-sync: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.

-Source of truth: every Ingress carrying one of the public labels.
-dns.renner.uno/public also takes the host out of the LAN DNS (external-dns-unifi
-skips it); netbird.renner.uno/public publishes on the proxy only and leaves the
-LAN record in place.
+Source of truth: every Ingress labeled netbird.renner.uno/public=true. DNS is
+independent of it: dns.renner.uno/internal (UDM) and dns.renner.uno/public
+(Cloudflare) are read by the two external-dns instances.
 For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
 service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
 subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
@@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ NETWORK_NAME = os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME", "k8s public ingress")
 ROUTER_GROUP = os.environ.get("ROUTER_GROUP_NAME", "k8s-ingress-router")
 SOURCE_GROUP = os.environ.get("SOURCE_GROUP_NAME", "All")
 TRAEFIK_NS, TRAEFIK_SVC = os.environ.get("TRAEFIK_SERVICE", "ingress/traefik").split("/", 1)
-PUBLIC_LABELS = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABELS", "dns.renner.uno/public,netbird.renner.uno/public").split(",")
+PUBLIC_LABELS = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABELS", "netbird.renner.uno/public").split(",")
 LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "443"))
 INTERVAL = int(os.environ.get("INTERVAL_SECONDS", "60"))
 HTTP_TIMEOUT = 20
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /ca
      containers:
        - name: audiobookshelf
-          image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.37.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
+          image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:2.37.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:audiobookshelf"}
          ports:
            - name: http
              containerPort: 80
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ metadata:
  name: audiobookshelf
  namespace: audiobookshelf
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: audiobooks.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -374,16 +374,10 @@ data:
          name: lidarr-gate
        state: absent

-      - model: authentik_outposts.outpost
-        identifiers:
-          name: authentik Embedded Outpost
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          type: proxy
-          service_connection: !KeyOf k8s-conn
-          # No providers attached — each gate outpost serves its own
-          # /outpost.goauthentik.io/* path on the app host.
-          providers: []
+      # The embedded outpost is not declared here: authentik-gate-sync owns its
+      # providers list (every gate) and the hosts in its config, and a
+      # blueprint entry must carry `providers`, which would detach the gates
+      # on every apply.

      # Shared LDAPS cert for the LDAP Outpost. Authentik's data model
      # owns the cert per-LDAPProvider (no outpost-level cert field), so
@@ -1040,9 +1034,19 @@ data:
          negate: false
          failure_result: false

+      # wiki.renner.uno signs in via OIDC application `wiki`; only this group may sign in.
+      # Members are managed in Authentik.
+      - id: wiki-readers-group
+        model: authentik_core.group
+        identifiers:
+          name: Wiki Readers
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          is_superuser: false
+
      # Wiki (apps/wiki): its own OIDC login. Public client + PKCE; RS256
-      # so the service verifies the ID token against the JWKS. No policy
-      # binding: every Authentik user may sign in.
+      # so the service verifies the ID token against the JWKS. Only the
+      # Wiki Readers group passes.
      - id: wiki-provider
        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
        identifiers:
@@ -1078,6 +1082,17 @@ data:
          meta_launch_url: https://wiki.renner.uno
          meta_description: "Homelab wiki"

+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, wiki]]
+          group: !KeyOf wiki-readers-group
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false
+
      # OpenProject, decommissioned. Application first: Application.provider
      # is on_delete=PROTECT. Its policy binding cascades with it.
      - model: authentik_core.application
@@ -1,15 +1,9 @@
-# The authentik-gate ingress class: an Ingress of this class becomes an
-# Authentik proxy gate (provider, application, outpost, group binding) plus the
-# Traefik Ingress, ExternalName Service and CiliumNetworkPolicies in front of
-# its backend. Traefik ignores the class (it only serves classes naming
-# traefik.io/ingress-controller). Controller: ci/images/authentik-gate-sync.
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: IngressClass
-metadata:
-  name: authentik-gate
-spec:
-  controller: renner.uno/authentik-gate
---
+# authentik-gate-sync: for every Ingress that names the gate Middleware
+# (gate.yaml) it builds the Authentik provider (on the embedded outpost),
+# application and group binding from the Ingress's auth.renner.uno/*
+# annotations, and a CiliumNetworkPolicy admitting Traefik to its backend.
+# Controller: ci/images/authentik-gate-sync.
+#
 # API token of the authentik-gate-sync service account. Generated once; the
 # blueprint (gate-sync.yaml key in blueprints-configmap.yaml) sets it as the
 # token's key via AUTHENTIK_GATE_SYNC_TOKEN, the controller reads the same Secret.
@@ -51,8 +45,9 @@ metadata:
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik-gate-sync
 ---
-# Cluster-wide: gated Ingresses live in any namespace, and so do the route
-# Ingress, ExternalName Service and backend CNP generated next to them.
+# Cluster-wide: gated Ingresses live in any namespace, and so do their backend
+# Services and the CNP generated next to them. Delete on Ingresses and Services
+# covers objects labelled as this controller's that no gate wants.
 apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
 kind: ClusterRole
 metadata:
@@ -60,14 +55,10 @@ metadata:
 rules:
  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
    resources: ["ingresses"]
-    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
-  # The source Ingress's load-balancer status mirrors its generated route.
-  - apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
-    resources: ["ingresses/status"]
-    verbs: ["get", "patch", "update"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "delete"]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["services"]
-    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "delete"]
  - apiGroups: ["cilium.io"]
    resources: ["ciliumnetworkpolicies"]
    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
@@ -114,7 +105,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-10-21-0755 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/authentik-gate-sync:2026-10-25-1458 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:authentik-gate-sync"}
          securityContext:
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
@@ -125,8 +116,6 @@ spec:
              value: http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local
            - name: AUTHENTIK_HOST_BROWSER
              value: https://auth.renner.uno/
-            - name: SERVICE_CONNECTION
-              value: Local Kubernetes Cluster
            - name: DEFAULT_AUTHORIZATION_FLOW
              value: default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent
            - name: INTERVAL_SECONDS
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# The Authentik gate. An Ingress opts in by naming this Middleware in
+# traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares (authentik-gate@kubernetescrd);
+# its auth.renner.uno/* annotations configure the gate, and authentik-gate-sync
+# (gate-sync.yaml) builds the Authentik provider and the backend CNP from them.
+# The embedded outpost picks the provider by Host and rejects hosts it has no
+# provider for.
+#
+# authResponseHeadersRegex makes Traefik delete every client-sent X-authentik-*
+# header before copying the outpost's, so a gated backend only sees identity
+# Authentik issued.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: gate
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  forwardAuth:
+    address: http://authentik-server.authentik.svc.cluster.local/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
+    authResponseHeadersRegex: "(?i)^x-authentik-"
+---
+# The outpost's own paths (sign-in callback, sign-out) on every host. Above the
+# app routes by priority; on hosts without a gate provider the outpost rejects.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: IngressRoute
+metadata:
+  name: gate-outpost
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  entryPoints:
+    - websecure
+  routes:
+    - kind: Rule
+      match: PathPrefix(`/outpost.goauthentik.io/`)
+      priority: 100000
+      services:
+        - name: authentik-server
+          port: 80
+  tls: {}
@@ -161,9 +161,10 @@ spec:
        enabled: true
        ingressClassName: traefik
        labels:
-          # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the
-          # UDM external-dns instance skips it, LAN uses the hairpin NAT.
+          # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+          # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
          dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+          netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
        annotations:
          cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
        hosts:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: auth.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ resources:
  - blueprints-configmap.yaml
  - helmrelease.yaml
  - gate-sync.yaml
+  - gate.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-cert.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-lb.yaml
  - ldap-outpost-cnp.yaml
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: authentik
  labels:
    lb-pool: bgp
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    # Pinned to .88 / fd99::88 (next free in the .80-.89 infra range
    # alongside traefik .86, ha .87, syslog .84, syncthing .85). Pinning
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-10-22-1904 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cloudflare-lb-sync:2026-10-25-1504 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:cloudflare-lb-sync"}
          env:
            - name: CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN
              valueFrom:
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: evcc
  namespace: evcc
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -43,16 +43,16 @@ spec:
            name: cloudflare-api-token
            key: api-token
    extraArgs:
-      - --cloudflare-proxied
      - --cloudflare-dns-records-per-page=5000
-      - --default-targets=d2386ccd-a665-41e7-8631-603fdafcb006.cfargotunnel.com
+      # Every public host is a DNS-only CNAME to the proxy load balancer (kubernetes/apps/cloudflare-lb-sync).
+      - --default-targets=proxy.renner.uno
      - --force-default-targets
    domainFilters:
      - renner.uno
    sources:
      - ingress
    txtOwnerId: k8s-homelab
-    policy: upsert-only
+    policy: sync
    # Filter by label, not annotation. external-dns translates annotations
    # in its prefix namespace into ProviderSpecific properties on desired
    # endpoints; the UniFi webhook does not implement AdjustEndpoints, so
@@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ spec:
    # records and cause every reconcile to delete-and-recreate the same
    # values. Labels are not translated, so they are safe to use as a
    # selector without leaking provider-specific state to the UniFi side.
-    labelFilter: external-dns/cloudflare=true
+    labelFilter: dns.renner.uno/public=true
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ data:
      # Paperless sits entirely behind the Authentik gate — every path,
      # including /api/, answers 302 to unauthenticated callers, so there is no
      # endpoint that proves the app rather than the gate. This check is
-      # therefore reachability only: DNS, TLS, Traefik and the outpost. It
+      # therefore reachability only: DNS, TLS, Traefik and forward auth. It
      # stays green if paperless itself is dead behind a live gate.
      #
      # Closing that blind spot needs an in-cluster probe of the paperless
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ metadata:
  name: gatus
  namespace: apps
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: status.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: gitea-mcp
-          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
+          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.11.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
          # Image has no ENTRYPOINT (binary is in CMD), so args alone would replace it.
          command:
            - /app/gitea-mcp
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
    # Published on the NetBird proxy; LAN DNS stays on the Traefik VIP.
    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: gitea-mcp.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ metadata:
    # Published on the NetBird proxy; LAN DNS stays on the Traefik VIP so
    # SSH (gitea-ssh) and node image pulls stay local.
    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    # Long-running git fetch/push and container-registry blob uploads:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: git.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: gitea.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
              type: RuntimeDefault
          containers:
            - name: sync
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
              command:
                - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python
                - /opt/hermes-skills/gitea-issues/scripts/sync_webhook.py
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ spec:
        # connects from the pod network. No env equivalent exists, so it is
        # set in config.yaml on every start (idempotent).
        - name: config
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          command:
            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes
            - config
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /opt/data
        # WebSocket keepalive ping interval in seconds (default 20).
        - name: config-ws-ping
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          command:
            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes
            - config
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ spec:
              mountPath: /opt/data
        # Skills from git (ConfigMap hermes-skills) beside the PVC's skills/.
        - name: skills-config
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          command:
            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes
            - config
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ spec:
        # - alert-monitor: hourly; the script wakes the agent only for
        #   untriaged alerts.
        - name: cron-jobs
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          # Non-fatal: a broken jobs.json or a changed cron CLI after an image
          # bump logs a warning instead of keeping Hermes from starting.
          command:
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
        # Home Assistant MCP server; token resolved from HA_TOKEN at connect, writes need approval.
        - name: config-mcp-homeassistant
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          command:
            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes
            - config
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ spec:
        # skills, the Home Assistant MCP and the tea login are re-applied on
        # every start. default gets the kanban toolset to hand cards to them.
        - name: experts
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          # Non-fatal like cron-jobs: a broken expert logs a warning.
          command:
            - sh
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ spec:
        # Gitea issues -> kanban (skills/gitea-issues): route script, webhook route on default,
        # completion shell hook plus its allowlist entry on every profile.
        - name: gitea-issues
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          # Non-fatal like cron-jobs: a failure logs a warning.
          command:
            - sh
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
        # Multiplexed default reads platform credentials only from .env (rationale: commit message).
        - name: default-env
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          # Fatal on a writer failure: without these Matrix and the API server stay down.
          command:
            - /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ spec:
        # tea login hermes-bot, written from the mounted token into an
        # emptyDir at the agent's ~/.config/tea.
        - name: tea-login
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          command:
            - sh
            - -ec
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
      containers:
        - name: hermes
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792569647 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/hermes:build.1792940452 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:hermes"}
          args: ["gateway", "run"]
          env:
            - name: HERMES_DASHBOARD
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: hermes
  namespace: hermes
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: hermes-api
  namespace: hermes
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ expert's PR goes back to the card that opened it, without a manual step.
   labels, PR reviews, PR comments, PR open/close) posts to
   `http://hermes.hermes.svc.cluster.local:8644/webhooks/gitea-issues`.
   The CronJob `gitea-webhook-sync` (namespace hermes, every 15 min) keeps that hook in
-   place, creates the domain labels and backfills, all only in repos where hermes-bot
-   has issue write (org labels for their orgs, repo labels for user-owned ones): open
+   place, creates the domain labels and backfills, all in every non-archived repo with
+   issues of the orgs hermes-bot belongs to, where an org team grants it issue write
+   (today: all repos of `konairius` through team `Bots`). Labels are org labels only.
+   User-owned repos and repos where hermes-bot is only a direct collaborator get neither
+   labels nor backfill; their new issues still become cards through the system hook. Backfill: open
   issues without a card comment are replayed to the route as signed `opened`
   deliveries, at most 10 per run, and the reviews of open hermes-bot PRs are replayed
   (step 8). Its site-admin PAT lives at OpenBao `apps/gitea-webhook-sync/admin`,
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@
   active system hook carries the desired name, a new one is created first and every
   other hook with the prefix is deleted afterwards.
 2. Domain labels. hestia/atlas/apollo/clio/daedalus are created only where Hermes
-   works issues: repos with an issue tracker in which BOT_LOGIN (hermes-bot) has
-   issue write. They become org labels in each org owning such a repo and repo labels
-   in such user-owned repos (org labels do not reach those). Existing labels are left
-   as they are; only missing ones are created.
+   works issues: the non-archived org repos with an issue tracker in which BOT_LOGIN
+   (hermes-bot) may write issues through an org team (it labels and comments). They
+   are org labels of those orgs, never repo labels; user-owned repos are out of scope.
+   Existing labels are left as they are; only missing ones are created.
 3. Backfill. Open issues of the same repos without the bridge's card comment are
   replayed to the Hermes webhook route as signed `opened` deliveries, at most
   BACKFILL_LIMIT per run and none started after RUN_BUDGET seconds, in random order
@@ -60,9 +60,10 @@ BACKFILL_SPACING = float(os.environ.get("BACKFILL_SPACING_SECONDS", "3"))
 RUN_BUDGET = float(os.environ.get("RUN_BUDGET_SECONDS", "900"))
 DELIVER_TIMEOUT = 60
 CARD_MARKER = "<!-- hermes-kanban-card:"
-# Labels and backfill only where this account may write issues (it labels and comments).
+# Labels and backfill only in org repos this account may write issues in (it labels and comments).
 BOT_LOGIN = os.environ.get("BOT_LOGIN", "hermes-bot")
 BOT_WRITE = ("write", "admin", "owner")
+ISSUES_UNIT = "repo.issues"
 STARTED = time.monotonic()
 # Review replay (step 4): reviews by these accounts on open BOT_LOGIN PRs.
 REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN = os.environ.get("REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN", "review-bot")
@@ -110,13 +111,11 @@ def api(method: str, path: str, token: str, body: dict | None = None):


 def paged(path: str, token: str) -> list[dict]:
-    """All pages of a list endpoint; /repos/search wraps its list in {"data": [...]}."""
+    """All pages of a list endpoint."""
    out, page = [], 1
    sep = "&" if "?" in path else "?"
    while True:
        batch = api("GET", f"{path}{sep}page={page}&limit=50", token) or []
-        if isinstance(batch, dict):
-            batch = batch.get("data") or []
        out.extend(batch)
        if len(batch) < 50:
            return out
@@ -160,25 +159,56 @@ def reconcile(token: str, secret: str) -> str:

 # --- 2. domain labels --------------------------------------------------------

+def team_writes_issues(team: dict) -> bool:
+    """Issue write from the team's unit map (Gitea >= 1.20), else its team-wide mode."""
+    if team.get("permission") in ("admin", "owner"):
+        return True
+    units = team.get("units_map") or {}
+    return (units.get(ISSUES_UNIT) if units else team.get("permission")) in BOT_WRITE
+
+
 def issue_repos(token: str, errors: list[str] | None = None) -> list[dict]:
-    """Repos whose issues Hermes works: issue tracker on, not archived, and hermes-bot may
-    write issues there (it sets the labels and comments). A site admin sees every repo.
-    A repo whose permission lookup fails is skipped and named in `errors`."""
-    out = []
-    for r in paged("/repos/search", token):
-        if not r.get("has_issues", True) or r.get("archived"):
+    """Repos whose issues Hermes works: in each org BOT_LOGIN belongs to, the repos of its
+    teams that grant issue write (every org repo for an includes_all_repositories team),
+    issue tracker on, not archived. Not /collaborators/{user}/permission: that reports
+    the repo-wide access mode, which stays "none" when the write comes from a unit-based
+    team. The admin route lists private orgs too and needs only the PAT's admin scope
+    (/users/{u}/orgs also requires read:user). An org or team whose lookup fails is
+    skipped and named in `errors`."""
+    def failed(what: str, exc: RuntimeError) -> None:
+        if errors is None:
+            raise exc
+        errors.append(f"{what}: {exc}")
+
+    found: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for org in paged(f"/admin/users/{q(BOT_LOGIN)}/orgs", token):
+        name = org.get("username") or org.get("name") or ""
+        if not name:
            continue
-        owner, _, name = r["full_name"].partition("/")
        try:
-            perm = api("GET", f"/repos/{q(owner)}/{q(name)}/collaborators/{q(BOT_LOGIN)}/permission", token)
+            teams = paged(f"/orgs/{q(name)}/teams", token)
        except RuntimeError as exc:
-            if errors is None:
-                raise
-            errors.append(f"{r['full_name']}: {exc}")
+            failed(name, exc)
            continue
-        if (perm or {}).get("permission") in BOT_WRITE:
-            out.append(r)
-    return out
+        for team in teams:
+            if not team_writes_issues(team):
+                continue
+            try:
+                try:
+                    api("GET", f"/teams/{team['id']}/members/{q(BOT_LOGIN)}", token)
+                except RuntimeError as exc:
+                    if str(exc).endswith("HTTP 404"):
+                        continue  # not a member of this team
+                    raise
+                repos = paged(f"/orgs/{q(name)}/repos" if team.get("includes_all_repositories")
+                              else f"/teams/{team['id']}/repos", token)
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                failed(f"{name} team {team.get('name')}", exc)
+                continue
+            for r in repos:
+                if r.get("has_issues", True) and not r.get("archived"):
+                    found.setdefault(r["full_name"], r)
+    return [found[k] for k in sorted(found)]


 def ensure_labels_at(path: str, token: str) -> list[str]:
@@ -192,18 +222,14 @@ def ensure_labels_at(path: str, token: str) -> list[str]:


 def ensure_labels(token: str, repos: list[dict]) -> str:
-    """Org labels in each org that owns one of `repos`, repo labels in the user-owned ones."""
-    orgs = {n for o in paged("/admin/orgs", token) if (n := o.get("username") or o.get("name"))}
-    owners = {(r.get("owner") or {}).get("login") for r in repos}
-    targets = [f"/orgs/{q(org)}/labels" for org in sorted(orgs & owners)]
-    targets += [f"/repos/{q(r['owner']['login'])}/{q(r['name'])}/labels" for r in repos
-                if (r.get("owner") or {}).get("login") not in orgs]
+    """Org labels in each org that owns one of `repos` (all org repos); never repo labels."""
+    orgs = sorted({o for r in repos if (o := (r.get("owner") or {}).get("login"))})
    actions = []
-    for path in targets:
-        created = ensure_labels_at(path, token)
+    for org in orgs:
+        created = ensure_labels_at(f"/orgs/{q(org)}/labels", token)
        if created:
-            actions.append(f"{path.rsplit('/labels', 1)[0]}: created {','.join(created)}")
-    return "; ".join(actions) or f"labels present in {len(targets)} orgs/repos"
+            actions.append(f"/orgs/{org}: created {','.join(created)}")
+    return "; ".join(actions) or f"labels present in {len(orgs)} orgs"


 # --- 3. backfill -------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -372,9 +398,9 @@ def main() -> int:
    def load_repos() -> str:
        errors: list[str] = []
        repos.extend(issue_repos(token, errors))
-        msg = f"{len(repos)} with issues writable by {BOT_LOGIN}"
+        msg = f"{len(repos)} org repos with issues writable by {BOT_LOGIN}"
        if errors:  # the other repos still get labels and backfill; the Job fails
-            raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}; permission lookup failed, skipped: {'; '.join(errors)}")
+            raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}; team lookup failed, skipped: {'; '.join(errors)}")
        return msg

    failures = 0
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
  is a TLS-passthrough service on :443 with a PROXY v2 header, going to Traefik `websecure`.
  There are no UDM port forwards and no other public L4 path. LB VIPs (`bgp-pool`,
  `fd99::/64`, `10.2.99.0/24`) are LAN/mesh-only.
+- DNS labels on an Ingress: `dns.renner.uno/internal` writes the UDM (LAN) record
+  (opt-in), `dns.renner.uno/public` writes the Cloudflare CNAME to `proxy.renner.uno`, and
+  `netbird.renner.uno/public` makes `netbird-service-sync` publish the proxy service. A
+  public host needs both public labels.
 - `netbird-service-sync` publishes **only hosts on Ingresses** labelled
-  `dns.renner.uno/public` (or `netbird.renner.uno/public`), and it reads no other kind.
+  `netbird.renner.uno/public`, and it reads no other kind.
  To publish a TLS host served by an `IngressRouteTCP` (TLS terminated by Traefik), put the
  host on its **own** labelled Ingress annotated
  `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.entrypoints: web` with **no** `tls:` section, and
@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@ monitor, and its history starts over.
  the KumaMonitor `healthCheckExprs` entry with `current: "true"` (see SKILL.md pitfalls).

 ## Which hosts are public
-The public set is exactly the hosts on Ingresses labelled `dns.renner.uno/public` or
-`netbird.renner.uno/public`. To confirm it, do a TLS handshake against the proxy-1 and
+A public host needs both labels on its Ingress: `netbird.renner.uno/public` for the proxy
+service and `dns.renner.uno/public` for the Cloudflare CNAME. To confirm it, do a TLS handshake against the proxy-1 and
 proxy-2 addresses (resolved via DoH) with each candidate hostname as the SNI. Only public hosts
 return a CA-verified certificate. The proxies do not answer for their own names, so a
 handshake with `proxy-N.renner.uno` as the SNI fails.

 ## Checks per host (owner's spec: DNS + HTTP reachability + response validation)
- **DNS.** A cluster host has no record of its own and resolves through the `*.renner.uno`
-  wildcard. Check `resolveType: CNAME` with `conditions: [{operator: equals, value:
+- **DNS.** A cluster host's public record is a CNAME to `proxy.renner.uno` created by
+  external-dns from `dns.renner.uno/public`. Check `resolveType: CNAME` with `conditions: [{operator: equals, value:
  proxy.renner.uno}]`. An external host checks its own AAAA record, or A when it has no
  AAAA. Use `resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"` so IPv6 comes first; Kuma
  fails over through the list in order.
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ reached Kuma.
  parent exists and is a group.
 - Emulate each http/keyword/json-query check the way Kuma does it: axios, Kuma's
  `evaluateJsonQuery` logic via `jsonata`, and a custom `lookup` that resolves through DoH,
-  because this pod's DNS is split-horizon. Run each wildcard host pinned to proxy-1 and to
+  because this pod's DNS is split-horizon. Run each public host pinned to proxy-1 and to
  proxy-2.
 - DNS monitors can't be checked from the cluster, because outbound :53 to external
  resolvers is blocked. After merge, read `monitor_status` from Prometheus instead
@@ -701,62 +701,120 @@ def repo(full, has_issues=True, archived=False):
            "has_issues": has_issues, "archived": archived}


+def team(tid, name, issues="write", all_repos=True, permission="write"):
+    return {"id": tid, "name": name, "includes_all_repositories": all_repos,
+            "permission": permission, "units_map": {"repo.issues": issues, "repo.code": "write"}}
+
+
+def fake_gitea(orgs, teams, members, repos, fail=()):
+    """api() stand-in: orgs of the bot, teams per org, bot's team ids, repos per org or team."""
+    seen = []
+
+    def fake(method, path, token, body=None):
+        p = path.split("?")[0]
+        seen.append(p)
+        if p in fail:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"GET {p}: HTTP 500")
+        if p == "/admin/users/hermes-bot/orgs":
+            return [{"username": o} for o in orgs]
+        if p.startswith("/orgs/") and p.endswith("/teams"):
+            return teams.get(p.split("/")[2], [])
+        if p.startswith("/teams/") and "/members/" in p:
+            if int(p.split("/")[2]) in members:
+                return {"login": "hermes-bot"}
+            raise RuntimeError(f"GET {p}: HTTP 404")
+        if p.endswith("/repos"):
+            return repos.get(p, [])
+        raise AssertionError(f"unexpected {method} {p}")
+
+    return fake, seen
+
+
 class DomainLabels(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_labels_only_for_orgs_and_user_repos_hermes_works(self):
+    def test_org_labels_only_never_repo_labels(self):
        calls = []

        def fake(method, path, token, body=None):
            calls.append((method, path, body))
-            if path.startswith("/admin/orgs"):
-                return [{"username": "konairius"}, {"username": "unrelated-org"}]
            if path.startswith("/orgs/konairius/labels"):
                return [{"name": "Atlas"}, {"name": "bug"}]
            return []

-        repos = [repo("konairius/homelab"), repo("k.renner/turm1388")]
+        repos = [repo("konairius/homelab"), repo("konairius/shelly-manager")]
        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake):
            msg = sync.ensure_labels("tok", repos)
        posts = [(p, b["name"]) for m, p, b in calls if m == "POST"]
        self.assertEqual(sorted(n for p, n in posts if p == "/orgs/konairius/labels"),
                         ["apollo", "clio", "daedalus", "hestia"])  # atlas exists (any case)
-        self.assertEqual(len([p for p, _ in posts if p == "/repos/k.renner/turm1388/labels"]), 5)
-        self.assertFalse([p for p, _ in posts if p.startswith("/repos/konairius/")])  # org labels reach it
-        self.assertFalse([c for c in calls if "unrelated-org" in c[1]])  # no repo of it is worked
+        self.assertFalse([c for c in calls if c[1].startswith("/repos/")])  # org labels reach them
+        self.assertFalse([c for c in calls if c[1].startswith("/admin/")])
        self.assertIn("created", msg)

-    def test_repos_without_issues_archived_or_bot_write_are_skipped(self):
-        perms = {"a/x": "write", "a/w": "admin", "gitea_admin/_cargo-index": "read", "a/n": "none"}
-        seen = []
-
-        def fake(method, path, token, body=None):
-            if path.startswith("/repos/search"):
-                return {"ok": True, "data": [
-                    repo("a/x"), repo("a/w"), repo("gitea_admin/_cargo-index"), repo("a/n"),
-                    repo("a/y", has_issues=False), repo("a/z", archived=True)]}
-            seen.append(path)
-            full = path.split("/repos/")[1].split("/collaborators/")[0]
-            return {"permission": perms[full]}
-
+    def test_team_write_covers_every_org_repo_without_collaborator(self):
+        # Live 2026-10-21: hermes-bot is only in team Bots (all repos, issues write);
+        # /collaborators/hermes-bot/permission says "none" for 9 of the 10 repos.
+        org_repos = [repo("konairius/homelab"), repo("konairius/shelly-manager"),
+                     repo("konairius/ical-proxy"), repo("konairius/off", has_issues=False),
+                     repo("konairius/old", archived=True)]
+        fake, seen = fake_gitea(
+            orgs=["konairius"],
+            teams={"konairius": [team(1, "Owners", "owner", permission="owner"), team(2, "Bots"),
+                                 team(5, "Reviewers", "read", permission="none")]},
+            members={2},
+            repos={"/orgs/konairius/repos": org_repos})
        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake):
            got = [r["full_name"] for r in sync.issue_repos("tok")]
-        self.assertEqual(got, ["a/x", "a/w"])
-        self.assertIn("/repos/a/x/collaborators/hermes-bot/permission", seen)
-        self.assertFalse([p for p in seen if p.startswith(("/repos/a/y/", "/repos/a/z/"))])
+        self.assertEqual(got, ["konairius/homelab", "konairius/ical-proxy", "konairius/shelly-manager"])
+        self.assertFalse([p for p in seen if "/collaborators/" in p or p.startswith("/repos/")])
+        self.assertNotIn("/teams/5/members/hermes-bot", seen)  # read-only team is not even checked

-    def test_failed_permission_lookup_skips_only_that_repo(self):
-        def fake(method, path, token, body=None):
-            if path.startswith("/repos/search"):
-                return {"data": [repo("a/x"), repo("a/broken"), repo("a/w")]}
-            if path.startswith("/repos/a/broken/"):
-                raise RuntimeError("GET /repos/a/broken/...: HTTP 500")
-            return {"permission": "write"}
+    def test_team_with_selected_repos_and_no_issue_write(self):
+        fake, seen = fake_gitea(
+            orgs=["a", "b"],
+            teams={"a": [team(3, "Some", all_repos=False)],
+                   "b": [team(4, "CodeOnly", issues="read")]},
+            members={3, 4},
+            repos={"/teams/3/repos": [repo("a/x"), repo("a/y")],
+                   "/orgs/a/repos": [repo("a/x"), repo("a/y"), repo("a/not-in-team")],
+                   "/orgs/b/repos": [repo("b/z")]})
+        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake):
+            got = [r["full_name"] for r in sync.issue_repos("tok")]
+        self.assertEqual(got, ["a/x", "a/y"])
+        self.assertNotIn("/orgs/b/repos", seen)

+    def test_team_issue_write_from_units_map_or_team_mode(self):
+        self.assertTrue(sync.team_writes_issues(team(2, "Bots")))
+        self.assertFalse(sync.team_writes_issues(team(5, "Reviewers", "read", permission="none")))
+        self.assertTrue(sync.team_writes_issues(team(1, "Owners", "read", permission="owner")))
+        self.assertTrue(sync.team_writes_issues({"permission": "write"}))  # no units_map
+        self.assertFalse(sync.team_writes_issues({"permission": "read", "units_map": {}}))
+
+    def test_user_repos_are_out_of_scope(self):
+        fake, seen = fake_gitea(orgs=[], teams={}, members=set(), repos={})
+        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake):
+            self.assertEqual(sync.issue_repos("tok"), [])
+        self.assertEqual(seen, ["/admin/users/hermes-bot/orgs"])  # no /repos/search over user repos
+
+    def test_failed_team_lookup_skips_only_that_team(self):
+        fake, _ = fake_gitea(
+            orgs=["a", "broken"],
+            teams={"a": [team(3, "Bots", all_repos=False), team(6, "More", all_repos=False)]},
+            members={3, 6},
+            repos={"/teams/3/repos": [repo("a/x")], "/teams/6/repos": [repo("a/w"), repo("a/x")]},
+            fail={"/orgs/broken/teams", "/teams/6/members/hermes-bot"})
        errors = []
        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake):
            got = [r["full_name"] for r in sync.issue_repos("tok", errors)]
-        self.assertEqual(got, ["a/x", "a/w"])
-        self.assertEqual(len(errors), 1)
-        self.assertIn("a/broken", errors[0])
+        self.assertEqual(got, ["a/x"])
+        self.assertEqual(len(errors), 2)
+        self.assertIn("a team More", errors[0])
+        self.assertTrue(errors[1].startswith("broken:"))
+
+    def test_failed_lookup_raises_without_error_list(self):
+        fake, _ = fake_gitea(orgs=["broken"], teams={}, members=set(), repos={},
+                             fail={"/orgs/broken/teams"})
+        with mock.patch.object(sync, "api", side_effect=fake), self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+            sync.issue_repos("tok")


 class Backfill(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 # /etc/nginx/conf.d/ at start.
 #
 # shelly-manager signs in whoever X-authentik-username names when the peer is
-# in Auth__ReverseProxy__TrustedProxies (the pod CIDR). Only the Authentik
-# outpost may reach :8080 directly. Other clients reach this :8081 instead,
+# in Auth__ReverseProxy__TrustedProxies (the pod CIDR). Only Traefik may
+# reach :8080 directly. Other clients reach this :8081 instead,
 # which drops the identity header, so every request here falls through
 # to the API key (or the login cookie) and a forged header gets 401.
 #
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ spec:
            # macvlan net1 interface on the IoT VLAN — exposing the
            # unauthenticated UI to that untrusted segment past the
            # Authentik gate. POD_IP is the eth0 IPv4 (status.podIP); the
-            # Service, the Authentik outpost, and the kubelet httpGet
+            # Service, Traefik, and the kubelet httpGet
            # probes all reach the app on that address. mDNS discovery is
            # unaffected: ZeroconfResolver binds its own multicast sockets
            # on net1 independently of Kestrel.
@@ -90,8 +90,7 @@ spec:
            # BLE radios: ESP32 esphome bluetooth_proxy nodes (e.g. the M5 Atom
            # Echo) are AUTO-DISCOVERED on the IoT VLAN via mDNS
            # (_esphomelib._tcp) over the same net1 macvlan route as the Shellys —
-            # no static hostname/DNS (which the *.renner.uno wildcard would poison
-            # over IPv6). The shared fleet Noise key (= the dashboard's
+            # no static hostname/DNS. The shared fleet Noise key (= the dashboard's
            # shelly_ble_proxy_api_key) lets shelly-manager complete the encrypted
            # native-API handshake to each discovered proxy: DeviceInfo on
            # /ble-radios today, the BLE scan/GATT provisioning path next.
@@ -114,11 +113,11 @@ spec:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: shelly-manager-auth
                  key: api-key
-            # SSO: the Authentik proxy outpost (authentik-gate class,
-            # which the ingress routes through) injects X-authentik-username;
+            # SSO: Authentik forward auth (authentik-gate class,
+            # via Traefik ForwardAuth) sets X-authentik-username;
            # the app signs that identity in directly, so the gate login is the
            # only login. The header is only honored from TrustedProxies — the
-            # outpost pod's address is dynamic, so this trusts the cluster pod
+            # Traefik pod's address is dynamic, so this trusts the cluster pod
            # CIDR and leans on the namespace CNP to keep other pods off the
            # app port. ADMIN_PASSWORD (above) stays as break-glass, e.g. for
            # port-forward access when authentik is down. Never open :8080 to
@@ -170,13 +169,13 @@ spec:
              memory: 128Mi
            limits:
              memory: 512Mi
-        # API-key-only listener for clients other than the Authentik outpost
+        # API-key-only listener for clients other than Traefik
        # (REN-931). nginx on ${POD_IP}:8081 proxies to
        # :8080 and drops X-authentik-username, so the ProxyHeader sign-in
        # cannot be reached through it. Config and reasoning:
        # shelly-manager-api-proxy.conf. Service: shelly-manager-api.
        # No probes: it only serves the API-key path, and a probe failure would
-        # also pull the outpost's endpoint out of the shelly-manager Service.
+        # also pull the pod out of the shelly-manager Service.
        - name: api-proxy
          image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.31-alpine@sha256:b9241c6e7b8e9a862f129d8d4199ab64b10390949a78bdd5603379b32c844083
          env:
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # shelly-manager has no authentication of its own: anything reaching it can
 # rewrite Shelly config, push scripts and read stored device AdminPasswords, so
-# the Authentik gate (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only thing in front
+# the Authentik gate (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only thing in front
 # of it: Authentik SSO login, Shelly Managers only.
 #
 # SignalR/WebSocket: the websecure entrypoint idleTimeout (180s) is kept alive
@@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: shelly-manager
  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Shelly Managers
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: shelly-manager.home.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ spec:
 # API-key-only entry for in-cluster clients (REN-931, REN-935): the api-proxy
 # sidecar, which drops the X-authentik-username header. Clients call
 # http://shelly-manager-api.home-assistant.svc/api/v1/... with the API key.
-# :8080 stays outpost-only.
+# :8080 stays Traefik-only.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 metadata:
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-# Proposal: enrol the mosquitto broker credentials in Class-A rotation
-
-**Status:** proposal, nothing implemented.
-**Scope:** the 8 MQTT broker users and the credentials behind them.
-
-## Problem
-
-Every self-generated secret in this cluster rotates automatically except these.
-`kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/` holds 13 manifests defining 15
-rotator CronJobs (`home-assistant.yaml` alone defines three). Five are **Class-A**
-— authentik, crowdsec, paperless, shelly-manager and woodpecker — meaning
-"self-generated random secret", which is exactly what a broker password is.
-The mosquitto credentials are the only Class-A-shaped secrets not enrolled.
-
-They are currently minted once by seven near-identical bootstrap Jobs
-(`mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml`, 508 lines — the ServiceAccount, Role and RoleBinding
-are inside that same file) which generate a password, hand-build Secret JSON with
-`jq` and POST it to the Kubernetes API with `curl`. Once created they never
-change again.
-
-Three consequences:
-
-1. **They never rotate.** Not on a schedule, not on compromise, not ever.
-2. **They exist only in the Secret object** — not in OpenBao, so not covered by
-   the OpenBao snapshot CronJob, and unrecoverable if lost.
-3. **The Jobs cannot be modified.** A Job's `spec.template` is immutable, so
-   changing even the container image makes the whole `home-assistant`
-   Kustomization fail to reconcile with `field is immutable`. Any edit requires
-   deleting or renaming the Jobs.
-
-## Why the obvious fixes do not work
-
-Recorded because each was tried and rejected on evidence, and the reasons are
-not obvious from the code.
-
-| Approach | Why it fails |
-| --- | --- |
-| ExternalSecrets reading hand-seeded OpenBao paths | Depends on content copied in by hand. Git cannot recreate it; a fresh OpenBao leaves the paths empty and ESO then overwrites live broker credentials with nothing. |
-| ESO `Password` generator | **Overwrites pre-existing Secrets.** Verified: a Secret holding `KNOWN-PREEXISTING-VALUE` was replaced with a freshly generated password on first sync. Adopting it rotates the 7 Job-minted credentials at once, uncoordinated (`evcc` is already ESO-extract-backed and so unaffected). |
-| Keep the Jobs, fix only the image | Blocked by `spec.template` immutability. Renaming the Jobs works but is a hack that recurs on every future edit. |
-
-The common thread: each treats the credential as something to *place*, when the
-real requirement is a credential that can be *replaced*.
-
-## How rotation actually has to work here
-
-The broker rebuilds its password file from scratch on **every pod start**
-(`mosquitto-deployment.yaml`): `rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd` followed by
-`mosquitto_passwd -c -b …` for each of the 8 users, sourced from env vars backed
-by the 8 Secrets.
-
-Two things follow, and they shape the whole design:
-
- **A Secret change has no effect until the broker restarts.** There is no
-  Reloader annotation on the mosquitto Deployment today, unlike the consumers of
-  the existing Class-A rotators.
- **There is no make-before-break.** A mosquitto user has exactly one password.
-  The LLAT rotators can mint a second token and revoke the first afterwards; a
-  broker user cannot hold old and new simultaneously. Unless a transitional
-  second user is created, broker and client must cut over together.
-
-### Who holds each credential
-
-This is the part that determines cutover cost, and it is not visible from the
-manifests alone.
-
-| Broker user | Held by | Cutover |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `health` | the broker's own liveness/readiness probes | in-cluster, same pod restart |
-| `zigbee2mqtt` | zigbee2mqtt Deployment (`secretKeyRef`) | in-cluster, pod restart |
-| `evcc` | evcc app; already OpenBao-backed via ESO | in-cluster, pod restart |
-| `sml2mqtt` | edge host, from `vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
-| `open3e` | edge host, from `vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
-| `homeassistant` | HA MQTT integration — a config entry created in the UI | needs an API/WebSocket update, or a manual re-entry |
-| `shellies` | Shelly device firmware | pushed per-device; `shelly-manager` is deployed and is the natural mechanism |
-| `admin` | a workstation client, held by a human | read the new value from OpenBao |
-
-Note `sml2mqtt` and `open3e` currently keep **the same password in two unlinked
-places** — the Kubernetes Secret for the broker, and `ansible-vault` for the
-client — synchronised by hand. That duplication, not any client limitation, is
-what makes rotation feel impossible today.
-
-## Proposed design
-
-Follow the existing Class-A pattern exactly (`rotation/paperless.yaml` is the
-closest model): *generate random bytes → merge-patch into OpenBao → ESO syncs the
-Secret → restart the consumer*.
-
-1. **One rotator CronJob per broker user**, running the existing `secret-rotator`
-   binary in random mode, writing `apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-<user>-credentials`
-   in OpenBao. Reuses the established policy/role/SA pattern; no new machinery.
-2. **ExternalSecrets** project each OpenBao entry to the existing Secret name and
-   key, so `mosquitto-deployment.yaml` and the in-cluster consumers are unchanged.
-   Key names stay as they are (`homeassistant-password` on one, `password` on the
-   rest) — consumers reference them, so normalising is a separate change.
-3. **Add a Reloader annotation to the mosquitto Deployment** so a Secret change
-   restarts the broker, instead of silently taking effect at some unrelated future
-   restart.
-4. **Move the edge host off `ansible-vault` for these two values**, reading the
-   same OpenBao entry instead, so there is one source of truth per credential.
-5. **Rotate one user at a time.** Each rotation then affects exactly one client,
-   not all eight.
-
-### The cutover window
-
-With no make-before-break, each rotation has a window where broker and client
-disagree. Two options:
-
- **Accept a brief window** (recommended for most users). Order: rotator writes
-  OpenBao → client picks up the new value → broker restarts. MQTT clients
-  reconnect automatically; the window is seconds. Because rotation is per-user,
-  only that one client is affected.
-
-  One failure mode to expect rather than be alarmed by: the broker rolls with
-  `maxUnavailable: 0` / `maxSurge: 1`, so mid-rollout **two broker pods with
-  different passwd files sit behind the LB**. A client reconnecting during that
-  window can land on the old pod and fail auth until the rollout completes. It is
-  self-healing and lasts seconds to a minute, but it will look alarming in logs
-  during the first `health` / `zigbee2mqtt` rotation, so it is worth knowing in
-  advance.
- **Transitional dual user** (`<user>` and `<user>-next` in the passwd file and
-  ACL) for any credential where even a brief outage is unacceptable. More moving
-  parts; probably only worth it for `homeassistant`, which carries everything.
-
-## Suggested phasing
-
-Ordered so the risky work happens after the pattern is proven, and so each phase
-is independently valuable.
-
-1. **`health` and `zigbee2mqtt` first.** Both are entirely in-cluster and pick up
-   a new password on pod restart with no external coordination. Proves rotator →
-   OpenBao → ESO → Reloader end to end with the smallest blast radius. `health`
-   is the safest possible start: only the broker's own probes consume it.
-2. **`evcc`.** Already OpenBao-backed via ESO; only the rotator is missing.
-3. **`sml2mqtt` and `open3e`**, together with switching the edge host to read from
-   OpenBao. This is where the duplicate-source-of-truth problem gets fixed.
-4. **`shellies`**, via shelly-manager pushing to devices. Needs investigation:
-   shelly-manager has its own Class-A rotator today, but that rotates
-   shelly-manager's own secret and does not touch device MQTT credentials.
-5. **`homeassistant`** last. Highest blast radius, and the config entry is UI-created,
-   so it needs an API/WebSocket update path — the HA LLAT rotators
-   (`rotation/home-assistant.yaml`) already talk to HA over WebSocket and are the
-   obvious precedent.
-6. **`admin`** whenever convenient; a human reads the new value from OpenBao.
-
-Only once a user is enrolled does its bootstrap Job become dead code. Delete the
-Jobs incrementally as their users migrate, rather than in one step — that also
-avoids the immutability problem entirely, since the Jobs are deleted, never
-patched.
-
-## Open questions
-
- **Does `secret-rotator` random mode fit unchanged?** The existing rotators write
-  a field into an OpenBao entry; here the entry holds a single password field, so
-  it should, but this needs confirming against the binary rather than assumed.
- **Can shelly-manager push MQTT credentials to devices**, and does it cover both
-  Gen1 (`/settings/mqtt`) and Gen2+ (`Mqtt.SetConfig`) firmwares? If not, the
-  `shellies` user may need a different mechanism or stay manual longest.
- **How is the HA MQTT config entry updated programmatically?** Reusing the
-  WebSocket approach from the LLAT rotator is plausible but unverified.
- **Rotation cadence.** The existing rotators' schedules should be the reference
-  rather than inventing a new one.
- **ESO refresh latency.** Rotator-writes-OpenBao → Secret-updates →
-  Reloader-restarts is delayed by up to one `refreshInterval`; the `evcc`
-  ExternalSecret uses `1h`. That does not widen the outage window — broker and
-  client still move together — but it does stretch how long a rotation takes to
-  land, which matters for verifying one completed and for the cold-rebuild
-  ordering question above. Worth deciding whether these ExternalSecrets want a
-  shorter interval than 1h, or whether the rotator should trigger the sync
-  directly.
- **Bootstrap on a cold rebuild.** On a fresh cluster the rotator must create the
-  OpenBao entry before ESO can sync it; check this against
-  `kubernetes/RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md` so broker bring-up is not blocked.
-
-## What this does not change
-
- Secret names, key names and every `secretKeyRef` in `mosquitto-deployment.yaml`.
- The ACL model and the per-user topic scoping.
- The `evcc` ExternalSecret, which already follows the target pattern.
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ metadata:
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
    lb-pool: bgp
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "10.2.99.87,fd99::87"
    external-dns.kubernetes.io/hostname: ha.renner.uno
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ spec:
              memory: 32Mi
      containers:
        - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
      # flashing is done in the browser over USB (ESP Web Tools / Web Serial),
      # and building/compiling is offline. So the 0.0.0.0:6052 bind stays on the
      # Cilium-governed pod network only, where the home-assistant CNP admits
-      # ONLY the esphome gate outpost (generated CNP esphome-gate; see
+      # ONLY Traefik (generated CNP esphome-gate; see
      # esphome-ingress.yaml) — no unauthenticated IoT-VLAN exposure like the
      # macvlan-on-0.0.0.0 hole shelly-manager had to pin Kestrel around.
      #
@@ -3,20 +3,23 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: esphome
  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: ESPHome Managers
 spec:
  # ESPHome Device Builder has no auth of its own: anyone reaching it can edit
  # device YAML (incl. wifi/api secrets), compile, and flash/OTA firmware, so the
-  # Authentik gate (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only thing in front of
+  # Authentik gate (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only thing in front of
  # it: Authentik SSO login, ESPHome Managers only.
  #
  # WebSocket: the dashboard streams build/OTA logs over a websocket; Traefik's
  # websecure entrypoint passes it through. Browser USB flashing uses Web
  # Serial, which needs a secure context; the serial link never traverses the
  # proxy.
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: esphome.home.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ metadata:
    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -12,26 +12,20 @@ resources:
  - config-sync-token-externalsecret.yaml
  - config-sync-gitea-externalsecret.yaml
  - matrix-externalsecret.yaml
-  - mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
-  # Former `health` probe credential. The broker no longer reads it (the
-  # probes use the cert account mosquitto-probe, REN-953); removed with its
-  # rotator in the REN-802 cleanup step.
-  - mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
+  - mosquitto-admin-password.yaml
  - mosquitto-config.yaml
  - mosquitto-certificate.yaml
  - mosquitto-service.yaml
  - mosquitto-iot-service.yaml
  - mosquitto-deployment.yaml
-  - mosquitto-evcc-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
  # shelly-manager and the mDNS relay sit on the IoT VLAN: ../home-assistant-iot.
  - esphome-pvc.yaml
  - esphome-deployment.yaml
  - esphome-service.yaml
  - esphome-ingress.yaml
  # Zigbee2MQTT — ZHA replacement bridge. Ships scaled to 0; the cutover
-  # runbook (zigbee2mqtt-migration-runbook.md) scales it up. The MQTT
-  # `zigbee2mqtt` broker user is provisioned by mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
-  # (above) and wired into mosquitto-deployment.yaml (passwd + ACL).
+  # runbook (zigbee2mqtt-migration-runbook.md) scales it up. It logs in to
+  # the broker as register account `zigbee2mqtt-bridge` (mqtt-accounts.yaml).
  - zigbee2mqtt-coordinator-backup-externalsecret.yaml
  - zigbee2mqtt-config.yaml
  - zigbee2mqtt-pvc.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Password of the broker's `admin` workstation login (mosquitto-deployment.yaml).
+# Generated once in-cluster, nothing in OpenBao. Read it with
+#   kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-admin-password -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
+apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Password
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-admin-password
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  length: 32
+  digits: 8
+  symbols: 0
+  allowRepeat: true
+  noUpper: false
+  secretKeys:
+    - password
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-admin-password
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  refreshPolicy: CreatedOnce
+  target:
+    name: mosquitto-admin-password
+  dataFrom:
+    - sourceRef:
+        generatorRef:
+          apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+          kind: Password
+          name: mosquitto-admin-password
@@ -1,394 +0,0 @@
---
-# Generates mosquitto-credentials on first deploy. The password is created
-# in-cluster, lives only in the Secret object, and is never written to git
-# or seen by a human. The Mosquitto broker hashes it via mosquitto_passwd
-# -U at startup; HA reads the same value from this Secret (configured
-# manually in the HA MQTT integration UI).
-#
-# Idempotent: if the Secret already exists, the Job exits 0 without
-# regenerating, so subsequent Flux reconciles don't rotate the password.
-# To rotate, delete both the Secret and this Job; Flux will re-create
-# the Job and a fresh password.
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ServiceAccount
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
---
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Role
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-rules:
-  - apiGroups: [""]
-    resources: ["secrets"]
-    verbs: ["get", "create"]
---
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: RoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    namespace: home-assistant
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: Role
-  name: mosquitto-bootstrap
---
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {"homeassistant-password": $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
---
-# Third broker user: `admin`. Full readwrite (same as HA) but kept on
-# its own credential so a workstation client can hold a password the
-# in-cluster HA config never sees, and rotating one doesn't affect the
-# other. Retrieve with:
-#   kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-admin-credentials \
-#     -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-admin-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-admin-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
---
-# Fourth broker user: `sml2mqtt` — the power-meter bridge. Publish-only
-# under `sml2mqtt/#` (ACL in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so
-# its lifecycle is independent of the others. The sml2mqtt pod reads this
-# password via its init container and renders it into config.yml.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
---
-# Fifth broker user: `open3e` — the Viessmann E3 CAN bridge (Vitocal 250-A
-# + Vitocharge VX3 via open3e). Scoped to `open3e/#` (ACL in
-# mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is
-# independent of the others. Retrieve with:
-#   kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-open3e-credentials \
-#     -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-open3e-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
---
-# Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
-# to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
-# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs) and
-# `read homeassistant/status` (HA's birth/will topic; on `online` Z2M
-# republishes cached device states, NOT discovery configs — ACL and the full
-# reasoning in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is
-# independent of the others. The Z2M init container reads this password and
-# renders it into /app/data/secret.yaml.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
@@ -77,18 +77,15 @@ data:

    allow_anonymous false

-    # Two account sources side by side (REN-802 step 2, tested on 2.0.22 in
-    # REN-900, document `coexistence`):
-    #   Dynamic Security: accounts from the register mqtt-accounts.yaml,
-    #     managed live by mqtt-account-controller over $CONTROL.
-    #   password_file/acl_file: the legacy users, unchanged until each client
-    #     moves to the register (step 3).
+    # Accounts (tested on 2.0.22 in REN-900, document `coexistence`):
+    #   Dynamic Security: every client account, from the register
+    #     mqtt-accounts.yaml, managed live by mqtt-account-controller over
+    #     $CONTROL. Applies to all listeners (per_listener_settings false).
+    #   password_file/acl_file: the owner's workstation login `admin` only
+    #     (mosquitto-deployment.yaml).
    # Dynamic Security is asked first. For a username it does not know, and
    # for a request none of its roles match, it defers to the files. A
-    # register entry with the same name as a legacy user therefore replaces
-    # that user's password, while its acl_file block still applies to
-    # whatever the entry's roles do not cover. Delete the legacy user when
-    # its client moves.
+    # register entry named `admin` therefore replaces the file login.
    #
    # The acl_file check of 2.0 allows every SUBSCRIBE and checks only on
    # delivery, so the Dynamic Security default must deny publishClientReceive.
@@ -64,67 +64,15 @@ spec:
            - -c
            - |
              set -eu
+              # `admin` is the owner's workstation login over the LoadBalancer
+              # (1883/8883), full readwrite. The only password_file user: the
+              # controller cannot deliver a password account to a Secret, and
+              # the cert listener :8884 is in-cluster only.
              rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd
-              mosquitto_passwd -c -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd homeassistant "$HA_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd sml2mqtt "$SML2MQTT_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e "$OPEN3E_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd evcc "$EVCC_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd zigbee2mqtt "$ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD"
-              # ACL: HA keeps full access (subscribes to everything). Shellies
-              # are not legacy users any more: each has its own Dynamic Security
-              # account from mqtt-accounts.yaml (REN-802, REN-1017).
-              # `admin` is a workstation/debugging credential — full
-              # readwrite, kept on its own credential so its password can
-              # be rotated independently of the HA session.
-              # `sml2mqtt` is the power-meter bridge — WRITE-only under its own
-              # `sml2mqtt/#` subtree (it only publishes; HA reads it via the
-              # full-access homeassistant user).
-              # `open3e` is the Viessmann E3 CAN bridge (Vitocal/VX3) —
-              # scoped to its own `open3e/#` subtree: publishes datapoints
-              # and later subscribes to `open3e/cmnd` in listener mode (HA
-              # reads via the full-access homeassistant user).
-              # `evcc` is the (cross-namespace) EV charge controller — reads
-              # `open3e/#` (VX3 grid/PV/battery/SoC datapoints), publishes its
-              # own state under `evcc/#`, and reads the grid price from
-              # `energy/#` (HA republishes input_number.strompreis to
-              # energy/tariff/grid; kept OUTSIDE evcc/# so evcc's own retained-
-              # topic management can't wipe it).
+              mosquitto_passwd -c -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
              cat > /mosquitto/auth/acl <<'EOF'
-              user homeassistant
-              topic readwrite #
-
              user admin
              topic readwrite #
-
-              user sml2mqtt
-              topic write sml2mqtt/#
-
-              user open3e
-              topic readwrite open3e/#
-
-              user evcc
-              topic read open3e/#
-              topic readwrite evcc/#
-              topic read energy/#
-
-              # `zigbee2mqtt` is the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (the ZHA replacement).
-              # Owns its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree; may WRITE `homeassistant/#`
-              # to publish HA MQTT-discovery configs (write-only there, to deny
-              # discovery-tree recon from a compromised bridge); and READs `homeassistant/status`, HA's birth/will topic.
-              #
-              # That read grant does NOT buy a discovery re-publish: on
-              # `online`, Z2M 2.12.1 republishes bridge/state and cached device
-              # states only (lib/extension/homeassistant.ts onMQTTMessage) —
-              # discover() runs solely from start(). The grant is still correct,
-              # because the cached-state republish is what makes HA show current
-              # values right after an HA restart. Restoring discovery after a
-              # BROKER restart is handled by the discovery-guard sidecar in
-              # zigbee2mqtt-deployment.yaml.
-              user zigbee2mqtt
-              topic readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#
-              topic write homeassistant/#
-              topic read homeassistant/status
              EOF
              # Dynamic Security start file (REN-802): the controller's seed
              # if it exists, else the static base file. The seed carries
@@ -143,38 +91,11 @@ spec:
              chmod 0600 /mosquitto/auth/passwd /mosquitto/auth/acl /mosquitto/auth/dynamic-security.json
              exec mosquitto -c /mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf
          env:
-            - name: HA_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-credentials
-                  key: homeassistant-password
+            # mosquitto-admin-password.yaml
            - name: ADMIN_PASSWORD
              valueFrom:
                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-admin-credentials
-                  key: password
-            - name: SML2MQTT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-sml2mqtt-credentials
-                  key: password
-            - name: OPEN3E_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
-                  key: password
-            - name: EVCC_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials
-                  key: password
-            # Zigbee2MQTT bridge credential (mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials-
-            # bootstrap). Hashed into the passwd file here; Z2M reads the same
-            # Secret via its init container to authenticate to the broker.
-            - name: ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials
+                  name: mosquitto-admin-password
                  key: password
          ports:
            - name: mqtt
@@ -231,12 +152,12 @@ spec:
          # Service and the probe dials 127.0.0.1; the chain is still checked
          # against mqtt-ca.
          #
-          # mosquitto is a single-replica SPOF (HA, Shelly, sml2mqtt, open3e,
-          # evcc). Liveness is deliberately slow to fire — failureThreshold 6
-          # x 30s = 3 min of sustained failure before a restart — so a
-          # transient hiccup never bounces the broker every client depends
-          # on. The startupProbe (tcpSocket) suspends both while the
-          # container builds the passwd/acl files and mosquitto binds :1883.
+          # mosquitto is a single-replica SPOF (HA, Shelly, Zigbee2MQTT,
+          # edge-1, evcc). Liveness is deliberately slow to fire —
+          # failureThreshold 6 x 30s = 3 min of sustained failure before a
+          # restart — so a transient hiccup never bounces the broker every
+          # client depends on. The startupProbe (tcpSocket) suspends both while
+          # the container prepares /mosquitto/auth and mosquitto binds :1883.
          startupProbe:
            tcpSocket:
              port: mqtt
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 1h
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-evcc-credentials
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Projects the mosquitto `health` broker credential from OpenBao into the Secret
-# the broker already consumes. FIRST of the eight broker users to move off the
-# bootstrap Jobs and onto Class-A rotation (see
-# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
-# file lands with it)); the rotator lives at
-# kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-health.yaml.
-#
-# Secret name and key are UNCHANGED (`password`), so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
-# secretKeyRef and the exec probes that read $HEALTH_PASSWORD need no edit.
-#
-# refreshInterval is 10m rather than the 1h used by mosquitto-evcc-credentials:
-# a rotation only lands once ESO re-reads, so 1h would mean up to an hour between
-# the rotator running and the broker actually using the new password, with the
-# old one still valid in the meantime. 10m keeps that window short without
-# polling OpenBao pointlessly hard.
-#
-# ⚠️ OWNERSHIP: creationPolicy is implicitly Owner, so ESO sets an ownerReference
-# on the Secret. Deleting this ExternalSecret therefore DELETES the live Secret
-# and with it the broker's probe credential — the bootstrap Job it replaces had
-# no such coupling. To detach without destroying, set creationPolicy: Orphan
-# before removing it.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-health-credentials
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: mosquitto-health-credentials
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ metadata:
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
    lb-pool: bgp
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "10.2.99.81,fd99::81"
    # Publish an internal A record to UniFi DNS so workstations on the
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
 # mqtt-accounts.yaml, every INTERVAL (2m).
 #
 # Manages the production broker `mosquitto` over its mTLS listener :8884
-# (REN-802 step 2, REN-900). The legacy users in that broker's password_file
-# are not Dynamic Security clients, so the controller never sees or touches
-# them.
+# (REN-802 step 2, REN-900). The broker's one password_file login, `admin`
+# (mosquitto-deployment.yaml), is not a Dynamic Security client, so the
+# controller never sees or touches it.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ServiceAccount
 metadata:
@@ -7,10 +7,13 @@
 # configMapGenerator in kustomization.yaml). An empty list is refused, so it
 # never revokes everyone.
 #
-# The controller manages the production broker `mosquitto` (REN-900). Its
-# legacy users (password_file in mosquitto-deployment.yaml) are not listed
-# here; each moves here with its client (REN-802 step 3). `test-cert` is the
-# certificate test account from REN-888.
+# The controller manages the production broker `mosquitto` (REN-900). Every
+# client account is listed here except `admin`, the owner's workstation login
+# in the broker's password_file (mosquitto-deployment.yaml): a password
+# account can only be delivered to shelly-manager or an esp32 API, and a cert
+# account only works on the in-cluster listener :8884. An entry named `admin`
+# would replace that login. `test-cert` is the certificate test account from
+# REN-888.
 #
 # A cert account needs its Secret `mqtt-<name>-tls` added to the
 # `mqtt-account-controller-secrets-<namespace>` Role in
@@ -20,38 +23,31 @@
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite test/cert/#"]
 # The broker's own liveness/readiness probe (mosquitto-deployment.yaml).
-# Not named `health`: a Dynamic Security client of that name would shadow the
-# legacy password user while the old broker pod still probes with it.
 - name: mosquitto-probe
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite health/#"]
 # Zigbee2MQTT and its two sidecars (discovery-guard, interview-watch), one
-# certificate for the pod. Same ACL as the legacy user `zigbee2mqtt`; not
-# named like it, so this entry cannot shadow the password login of a running
-# Z2M (REN-953).
+# certificate for the pod (REN-953).
 - name: zigbee2mqtt-bridge
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite zigbee2mqtt/#", "write homeassistant/#", "read homeassistant/status"]
-# evcc (evcc namespace). Same ACL as the legacy user `evcc`, different name
-# so it cannot shadow the running password login (REN-953). evcc takes the
-# certificate PEMs by env (EVCC_MQTT_*), see apps/evcc/deployment.yaml.
+# evcc (evcc namespace, REN-953). evcc takes the certificate PEMs by env
+# (EVCC_MQTT_*), see apps/evcc/deployment.yaml.
 - name: evcc-client
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: evcc}
  acl: ["read open3e/#", "readwrite evcc/#", "read energy/#"]
 # Home Assistant, via the ghostunnel sidecar `mqtt-tls` in its pod (HA keeps
 # client certificates only as uploaded PEMs in its config entry, so a renewal
-# could not reach it without a reconfigure). Same ACL as the legacy user
-# `homeassistant`; not named like it, so it cannot shadow that login (REN-953).
+# could not reach it without a reconfigure, REN-953).
 - name: home-assistant
  auth: cert
  deliver: {namespace: home-assistant}
  acl: ["readwrite #"]
-# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan
-# and sml2mqtt, replacing the legacy password users `open3e` and `sml2mqtt`
-# (different name, so it cannot shadow their logins). The controller pushes
+# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan.
+# The controller pushes
 # the password to edge-mqtt-cred on edge-1 (ansible role mqtt-bridge) over
 # HTTPS with its own client certificate, and pins edge-1's self-generated
 # server certificate on first contact (key edge-1.pin in mqtt-account-hashes;
@@ -3,21 +3,24 @@
 #
 # code-server runs with --auth=none as root and mounts the entire /config
 # (plaintext secrets.yaml, .storage, the git PAT in the PVC remote URL), so the
-# Authentik gate (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only thing in front of
+# Authentik gate (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only thing in front of
 # it: Authentik SSO login, Home Assistant Config Editors only.
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: home-assistant-vscode
  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Home Assistant Config Editors
    # code-server's manifest and service worker are fetched without
    # credentials. Version-specific: re-check after a code-server bump.
    auth.renner.uno/skip-path: ^/(_static/|manifest\.json|.*\.webmanifest|.*serviceWorker\.js).*
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: vscode.home.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -3,18 +3,21 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: zigbee2mqtt
  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Zigbee2MQTT Managers
 spec:
  # The Z2M frontend has no auth of its own: anyone reaching it can rename
  # devices, toggle permit_join, trigger OTA, and control the whole Zigbee
-  # network, so the Authentik gate (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only
+  # network, so the Authentik gate (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only
  # thing in front of it: Authentik SSO login, Zigbee2MQTT Managers only.
  #
  # WebSocket: the frontend streams live device state / logs over a websocket;
  # Traefik's websecure entrypoint passes it through.
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: zigbee2mqtt.home.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@ release it before Z2M connects (step 3).
 Confirm the standing pieces are in place (nothing is running yet):

 ```
-kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-zigbee2mqtt-credentials       # exists (bootstrap Job ran)
+kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mqtt-zigbee2mqtt-bridge-tls             # exists (register account zigbee2mqtt-bridge)
 kubectl -n home-assistant get externalsecret zigbee2mqtt-coordinator-backup  # SecretSyncedError / NotReady — EXPECTED
 kubectl -n home-assistant get deploy zigbee2mqtt                             # 0/0 — EXPECTED
 ```

-The `mosquitto` pod will have rolled to pick up the new `zigbee2mqtt` passwd/ACL
-entry. Verify the broker still serves HA (it will — the change is additive).
+Z2M logs in to the broker by certificate on `:8884` as the register account
+`zigbee2mqtt-bridge` (`mqtt-accounts.yaml`).

 ## Step 1 — export the Open Coordinator Backup (non-disruptive)

@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: ical-proxy
  namespace: apps
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ metadata:
  name: immich
  namespace: immich
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -27,9 +28,8 @@ spec:
      hosts:
        - immich.renner.uno
 ---
-# photos.renner.uno is LAN-registered (no proxy tunnel), so it lives on its
-# own unlabeled Ingress: the dns.renner.uno/public label-filter is
-# per-resource, and this name must keep its UDM record. It was the LXC alias
+# photos.renner.uno is LAN-only (UDM record, no proxy), so it lives on its
+# own Ingress: DNS label filters are per-resource. It was the LXC alias
 # served by Caddy; preserved so external-dns-unifi can take over once the
 # tofu CNAME on lxc_225 is removed.
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: immich-photos
  namespace: immich
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: immich.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
        - name: controller
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-10-21-0756 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/kuma-sync:2026-10-25-1459 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:kuma-sync"}
          env:
            - name: KUMA_URL
              value: https://kuma.renner.uno
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 # llm.renner.uno — the chat WebUI, public and behind an Authentik gate
-# (ingress class authentik-gate, kubernetes/apps/authentik/gate-sync.yaml).
+# (the authentik-gate Middleware, kubernetes/apps/authentik/gate.yaml).
 #
 # The gate is the entire access control here: llama-server has no
 # authentication of its own and serves a full OpenAI-compatible API on the same
@@ -8,24 +8,25 @@
 #
 # In-cluster consumers — Home Assistant, Paperless, CI — address
 # llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080 directly and never pass through
-# Traefik or the outpost.
+# Traefik or Authentik.
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: llama-server
  namespace: ai
  labels:
-    # Public: Cloudflare wildcard → tunnel → NetBird proxy → Traefik. The UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips anything carrying this, and LAN clients reach
-    # the same hostname through the hairpin NAT.
+    # Public: Cloudflare CNAME → NetBird proxy → Traefik. No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    # Manifest and service worker are fetched without credentials; neither
    # serves authenticated content.
    auth.renner.uno/skip-path: ^/(manifest\.webmanifest|sw\.js)$
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  tls:
    - hosts:
        - llm.renner.uno
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: llm.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: wiki-embed
  namespace: ai
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: ai-wiki-embed-basic-auth@kubernetescrd
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 # Public (REN-663): each Ingress carries dns.renner.uno/public, so
 # netbird-service-sync publishes its host through the NetBird proxy
-# (Cloudflare wildcard -> proxy.renner.uno -> TLS passthrough to Traefik) and
-# external-dns-unifi skips it; LAN clients follow the public answer and the UDM
-# hairpins back in. Same path as audiobooks/immich. Federation stays off.
+# (explicit Cloudflare CNAME -> proxy.renner.uno -> TLS passthrough to Traefik)
+# and there is no dns.renner.uno/internal label, so external-dns-unifi writes
+# no UDM record; LAN clients follow the public answer and the UDM hairpins
+# back in. Same path as audiobooks/immich. Federation stays off.
 #
 # Synapse: only the client-facing paths. /_synapse/admin stays off the
 # Ingress (in-cluster only); /_matrix/federation and /_matrix/key are not
@@ -13,9 +14,10 @@ metadata:
  name: synapse
  namespace: matrix
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -122,9 +124,10 @@ metadata:
  name: element-web
  namespace: matrix
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -152,9 +155,10 @@ metadata:
  name: mas
  namespace: matrix
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: matrix.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: account.matrix.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: element.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: rtc.matrix.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: turn.matrix.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: matrix
  labels:
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: matrix-lk-jwt-strip@kubernetescrd
@@ -369,6 +370,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: matrix
  labels:
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.entrypoints: web
 spec:
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ spec:
        - https://home.renner.uno
        # prometheus.renner.uno and alerts.renner.uno are Authentik-gated
        # (PR #147 / #146). These EXTERNAL probes now measure the full
-        # gated path — DNS, TLS, Traefik, the gate outpost — following the
+        # gated path — DNS, TLS, Traefik, Authentik forward auth — following the
        # 302 to the Authentik login (200). They are REACHABILITY checks,
        # not app health: with the gate up, they stay green even if the app
        # behind it is dead (the probe never reaches the app). Real app
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ spec:
        # rule as the block above (monitoring-vantage-point-rule), but these
        # are the first targets here that leave the monitoring namespace.
        #
-        # Both sit entirely behind an Authentik gate outpost (ingress class
+        # Both sit entirely behind Authentik forward auth (ingress class
        # authentik-gate; ../navidrome/ingress.yaml, ../navidrome/lidarr.yaml) — so an
        # EXTERNAL probe of either name measures the gate, not the app, and
        # stays green while the app behind
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ spec:
        # (monitoring-vantage-point-rule); the blind spot it closes is the one
        # gatus already documents in its Web Service 11 comment
        # (../gatus/configmap.yaml#gatus-endpoints) — through the
-        # gate outpost EVERY path, /api/ included,
+        # gate EVERY path, /api/ included,
        # answers 302 to an unauthenticated caller, so no external probe of
        # paperless.renner.uno can tell a live app from a live gate. That
        # external signal is still wanted, and REN-2 adds it from UptimeRobot;
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ spec:
        # anchor: shelly-manager-app-health
        # APP-HEALTH probe for shelly-manager (REN-531/REN-533). Same rule as
        # the blocks above (monitoring-vantage-point-rule): shelly.renner.uno
-        # sits behind a gate outpost, so only the in-cluster
+        # sits behind an Authentik gate, so only the in-cluster
        # Service can tell a dead app from a live gate.
        #
        # /health is unauthenticated and answers a plain 200 — not a 3xx —
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ spec:
            description: >-
              The endpoint is not answering as expected. For the Authentik-gated
              hostnames this is a reachability check covering DNS, TLS, Traefik
-              and the gate outpost — it says nothing about the app behind the
+              and Authentik forward auth — it says nothing about the app behind the
              gate, which the internal /-/healthy probes cover separately.
          labels:
            severity: warning
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ spec:
            summary: "{{ $labels.dns_name }} no longer resolves to its LAN address"
            description: >-
              The UDM stopped answering for a name external-dns publishes from
-              a LoadBalancer Service, or answered with the public
-              *.renner.uno wildcard instead of the record. Clients that use
+              a LoadBalancer Service, or answered without the
+              record (no answer, or a public CNAME). Clients that use
              the name rather than the address lose the service while
              everything in the cluster stays healthy — nothing else in the
              stack reports this. Check the external-dns alerts first, then
@@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ spec:
          #
          # The pod regex is the Deployment's name shape
          # (mosquitto-<replicaset hash>-<suffix>) and not `mosquitto-.*` on
-          # purpose: mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml runs six Jobs named
-          # mosquitto-*-credentials-bootstrap, and a bootstrap pod that is
-          # briefly Ready must not hide a broker that is down.
+          # purpose: other pods in the namespace start with `mosquitto-`
+          # (mosquitto-dynsec-test), and a Ready one must not hide a broker
+          # that is down.
          expr: |
            absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant", pod=~"mosquitto-[a-z0-9]{6,10}-[a-z0-9]{5}", condition="true"} == 1)
          for: 5m
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ spec:
              {{ $value | humanizePercentage }} of probes in the last 10m got
              the Ingress address for {{ $labels.dns_name }} ({{ $labels.record }})
              from k8s-gateway. Pods then resolve Ingress names through the UDM
-              and the public wildcard (CNAME proxy.renner.uno) and leave the
-              cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the k8s-gateway ConfigMap
+              and the public zone (CNAME proxy.renner.uno for public hosts)
+              and leave the cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the
+              k8s-gateway ConfigMap
              (kube-system) for the renner.uno zone, the k8s-gateway logs, and
              whether the Traefik VIP in infrastructure/traefik/helmrelease.yaml
              still matches the dns_k8s_gateway_auth_* modules in
@@ -137,13 +137,13 @@ tests:
        exp_alerts: []

  # --- MosquittoDown ------------------------------------------------------
-  # The broker goes not-Ready at t=10m while a credentials-bootstrap Job pod is
-  # Ready. The Job pod must not mask the broker.
+  # The broker goes not-Ready at t=10m while the mosquitto-dynsec-test pod is
+  # Ready. That pod must not mask the broker.
  - interval: 1m
    input_series:
      - series: 'kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant",pod="mosquitto-7f8b9c6d5-x2k9q",condition="true"}'
        values: '1x9 0x20'
-      - series: 'kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant",pod="mosquitto-credentials-bootstrap-q7w2e",condition="true"}'
+      - series: 'kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="home-assistant",pod="mosquitto-dynsec-test-6d9f8b7c5-r4t8w",condition="true"}'
        values: '1x30'
    alert_rule_test:
      - eval_time: 14m
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ tests:
              record: A
            exp_annotations:
              summary: "k8s-gateway does not answer auth.renner.uno A with the Traefik VIP"
-              description: "20% of probes in the last 10m got the Ingress address for auth.renner.uno (A) from k8s-gateway. Pods then resolve Ingress names through the UDM and the public wildcard (CNAME proxy.renner.uno) and leave the cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the k8s-gateway ConfigMap (kube-system) for the renner.uno zone, the k8s-gateway logs, and whether the Traefik VIP in infrastructure/traefik/helmrelease.yaml still matches the dns_k8s_gateway_auth_* modules in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml. It also fails when the auth.renner.uno Ingress (authentik) is gone."
+              description: "20% of probes in the last 10m got the Ingress address for auth.renner.uno (A) from k8s-gateway. Pods then resolve Ingress names through the UDM and the public zone (CNAME proxy.renner.uno for public hosts) and leave the cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the k8s-gateway ConfigMap (kube-system) for the renner.uno zone, the k8s-gateway logs, and whether the Traefik VIP in infrastructure/traefik/helmrelease.yaml still matches the dns_k8s_gateway_auth_* modules in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml. It also fails when the auth.renner.uno Ingress (authentik) is gone."
      - eval_time: 17m
        alertname: K8sGatewayProbesAbsent
        exp_alerts: []
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tests:
              record: AAAA
            exp_annotations:
              summary: "k8s-gateway does not answer auth.renner.uno AAAA with the Traefik VIP"
-              description: "50% of probes in the last 10m got the Ingress address for auth.renner.uno (AAAA) from k8s-gateway. Pods then resolve Ingress names through the UDM and the public wildcard (CNAME proxy.renner.uno) and leave the cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the k8s-gateway ConfigMap (kube-system) for the renner.uno zone, the k8s-gateway logs, and whether the Traefik VIP in infrastructure/traefik/helmrelease.yaml still matches the dns_k8s_gateway_auth_* modules in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml. It also fails when the auth.renner.uno Ingress (authentik) is gone."
+              description: "50% of probes in the last 10m got the Ingress address for auth.renner.uno (AAAA) from k8s-gateway. Pods then resolve Ingress names through the UDM and the public zone (CNAME proxy.renner.uno for public hosts) and leave the cluster. Check the rendered Corefile in the k8s-gateway ConfigMap (kube-system) for the renner.uno zone, the k8s-gateway logs, and whether the Traefik VIP in infrastructure/traefik/helmrelease.yaml still matches the dns_k8s_gateway_auth_* modules in apps/monitoring/helmrelease-blackbox-exporter.yaml. It also fails when the auth.renner.uno Ingress (authentik) is gone."

  # Two consecutive failures in an otherwise healthy hour stay silent
  # (average exactly 0.8).
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ tests:
              instance: https://other.renner.uno
            exp_annotations:
              summary: "Blackbox probe of https://other.renner.uno has been failing for 10 minutes"
-              description: "The endpoint is not answering as expected. For the Authentik-gated hostnames this is a reachability check covering DNS, TLS, Traefik and the gate outpost — it says nothing about the app behind the gate, which the internal /-/healthy probes cover separately."
+              description: "The endpoint is not answering as expected. For the Authentik-gated hostnames this is a reachability check covering DNS, TLS, Traefik and Authentik forward auth — it says nothing about the app behind the gate, which the internal /-/healthy probes cover separately."

  # Healthy probe stays silent.
  - interval: 1m
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 # alerts.renner.uno — Alertmanager. Its v2 API is writable (POST
 # /api/v2/silences can suppress all alerting) and it has no auth of its own, so
-# the Authentik gate (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only thing in front
+# the Authentik gate (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only thing in front
 # of it: Monitoring Access only. Replaces the chart-generated Ingress
 # (alertmanager.ingress.enabled=false in helmrelease-prometheus.yaml).
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
@@ -9,11 +9,14 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: alertmanager
  namespace: monitoring
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Monitoring Access
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: alerts.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: monitoring
  labels:
    lb-pool: bgp
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    io.cilium/lb-ipam-ips: "10.2.99.84,fd99::84"
    external-dns.kubernetes.io/hostname: syslog.renner.uno
@@ -78,11 +78,10 @@ spec:
        # passed per scrape. The Probes in monitoring-rules/probes-dns.yaml
        # point these at the UDM.
        #
-        # Both answer checks are load-bearing. valid_rcodes alone passes a
-        # deleted record two labels deep (NOERROR, no answer), and the public
-        # *.renner.uno wildcard answers one label deep with a CNAME to
-        # proxy.renner.uno — NOERROR with the WAN proxy behind it. Requiring
-        # an A and rejecting a CNAME separates a real record from both.
+        # Both answer checks are load-bearing: valid_rcodes alone passes a
+        # deleted record (NOERROR, no answer, any depth). Requiring an A
+        # separates a real record from that; a CNAME means the UDM answered with a
+        # public-zone target instead of the LAN address.
        dns_lan_ha:
          prober: dns
          timeout: 5s
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ spec:
      ingress:
        enabled: true
        ingressClassName: traefik
+        labels:
+          dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
        annotations:
          cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
        hosts:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # target of the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # target of every public CNAME (NetBird proxy load balancer)
    hostname: proxy.renner.uno
    resolveType: AAAA
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # Cloudflare-proxied apex, not the wildcard
+    # Cloudflare-proxied apex
    hostname: renner.uno
    resolveType: AAAA
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: loki
  namespace: monitoring
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    # nginx's auth-type/auth-secret/auth-realm annotation triple becomes
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 # prometheus.renner.uno — Prometheus. It has no auth of its own and its metrics
 # DB exposes hostnames, IPs and service inventory, so the Authentik gate
-# (ingress class authentik-gate) is the only thing in front of it: Monitoring
+# (the authentik-gate Middleware) is the only thing in front of it: Monitoring
 # Access only. Replaces the chart-generated Ingress
 # (prometheus.ingress.enabled=false in helmrelease-prometheus.yaml).
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
@@ -9,11 +9,14 @@ kind: Ingress
 metadata:
  name: prometheus
  namespace: monitoring
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Monitoring Access
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: prometheus.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ spec:
        # stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
        # policy) — no extra dependency.
        - name: reconcile-publish-ip
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.7 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.8 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
          volumeMounts:
            - name: data
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
              readOnly: true
      containers:
        - name: music-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.7 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.8 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
          env:
            - name: LOG_LEVEL
              value: info
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ metadata:
  name: music-assistant
  namespace: music-assistant
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: music.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -8,14 +8,15 @@ data:
  ND_LOGLEVEL: "info"
  ND_SCANNER_SCHEDULE: "0 * * * *"
  ND_ENABLEINSIGHTSCOLLECTOR: "false"
-  # Identity from the gate outpost (ingress class authentik-gate). Traefik strips this header on
-  # the ungated /rest and /share routes.
+  # Identity from Authentik forward auth (ingress class authentik-gate),
+  # set by Traefik. Traefik strips this header on the ungated /rest and
+  # /share routes.
  #
  # ND_EXTAUTH_TRUSTEDSOURCES BELOW IS NOT A NARROWING. fd10:244::/48 plus
  # 10.244.0.0/16 is the entire cluster pod CIDR, so navidrome's own
  # reverse-proxy trust check accepts X-Authentik-Username from ANY pod.
  # The CiliumNetworkPolicy is the only real boundary, and it is wider than
-  # "the outpost and Traefik" — default-deny-ingress in
+  # Traefik alone — default-deny-ingress in
  # kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/navidrome-ns.yaml uses
  # `endpointSelector: {}` and admits, on every port:
  #   - the navidrome namespace, every port
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ data:
  # cited by what they admit, not by line number, so this list cannot go
  # stale the next time that file is edited.
  # The value stays at the pod CIDR ON PURPOSE - see REN-28. The address
-  # navidrome sees is the outpost's POD IP, which is not stable across
+  # navidrome sees is the Traefik POD IP, which is not stable across
  # reschedules, so a narrower literal here fails open-ended and silently
  # the next time that pod moves. Tightening the CNP is the control that
  # would actually do work.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Web UI gated by authentik-gate-sync (ingress class authentik-gate).
+# Web UI gated by authentik-gate-sync (the authentik-gate Middleware).
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ metadata:
  namespace: navidrome
  labels:
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: navidrome.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: navidrome
  labels:
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: navidrome-navidrome-strip-identity@kubernetescrd
 spec:
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: navidrome.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: lidarr.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ spec:
              value: "1000"
            - name: TZ
              value: Europe/Berlin
-            # Identity is enforced by the gate outpost (ingress class authentik-gate).
+            # Identity is enforced by Authentik forward auth (the authentik-gate Middleware).
            - name: LIDARR__AUTH__METHOD
              value: External
          ports:
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ spec:
      port: 80
      targetPort: http
 ---
-# Gated by authentik-gate-sync (ingress class authentik-gate).
+# Gated by authentik-gate-sync (the authentik-gate Middleware).
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
@@ -194,11 +194,13 @@ metadata:
  namespace: navidrome
  labels:
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
    auth.renner.uno/group: Music Librarians
 spec:
-  ingressClassName: authentik-gate
+  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
    - host: lidarr.renner.uno
      http:
@@ -2,11 +2,9 @@
 # Ingress so the alias-host redirect could be expressed as a Traefik
 # RedirectRegex Middleware instead of an nginx configuration-snippet.
 #
-# The Middleware short-circuits before the backend, so `paperless-gate` (the
-# ExternalName authentik-gate-sync generates for the paperless Ingress) is a
-# structural backend only — it is never reached. Even if the redirect
-# regex misses, the outpost rejects non-canonical Host headers with 404,
-# so there is no failure mode that leaks paperless access through this Ingress.
+# The redirect short-circuits before the backend. Should its regex miss, the
+# Authentik gate behind it admits Paperless Users only, as on
+# paperless.renner.uno, so nothing leaks paperless access through this Ingress.
 apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
 kind: Middleware
 metadata:
@@ -24,12 +22,14 @@ metadata:
  name: docs
  namespace: paperless
  labels:
-    # Registered publicly (Cloudflare wildcard -> NetBird proxy); the UDM
-    # external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
+    # Registered publicly (explicit CNAME -> NetBird proxy). No
+    # dns.renner.uno/internal label: external-dns-unifi writes no UDM record.
    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
-    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: paperless-docs-to-paperless-redirect@kubernetescrd
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: paperless-docs-to-paperless-redirect@kubernetescrd,authentik-gate@kubernetescrd
+    auth.renner.uno/group: Paperless Users
 spec:
  ingressClassName: traefik
  rules:
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ spec:
            pathType: Prefix
            backend:
              service:
-                name: paperless-gate
+                name: paperless
                port:
-                  number: 9000
+                  number: 80
  tls:
    - secretName: docs-renner-uno-tls
      hosts:
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ metadata:
  namespace: paperless
  labels:
    lb-pool: bgp
+    dns.renner.uno/internal: "true"
  annotations:
    io.cilium/lb-ipam-ips: "10.2.99.82,fd99::82"
    # LAN-only DNS via the UniFi external-dns instance. No cloudflare
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: docs.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ spec:
  retryInterval: 60
  maxRetries: 1
  dns:
-    # cluster services have no own record; they resolve through the *.renner.uno wildcard
+    # public CNAME to the NetBird proxy, created by external-dns (dns.renner.uno/public)
    hostname: paperless.renner.uno
    resolveType: CNAME
    resolveServer: "2606:4700:4700::1111,1.1.1.1"
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 ---
-# Ingress from the gate outpost is the CNP paperless-gate that
-# authentik-gate-sync generates next to the Ingress. Header-based remote-user
-# auth means paperless trusts X-Authentik-Username unconditionally, so any pod
-# that reaches its HTTP listener can claim any username.
+# Ingress from traefik is the CNP paperless-gate that authentik-gate-sync
+# generates next to the Ingress; traefik sets X-Authentik-Username from
+# Authentik forward auth. Header-based remote-user auth means paperless trusts
+# that header unconditionally, so any pod that reaches its HTTP listener can
+# claim any username.
 #
 # What is enforced is wider than that CNP: default-deny-ingress in
 # kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml uses
 # `endpointSelector: {}`, and Cilium unions the allow rules of every CNP
-# selecting an endpoint. Besides the outpost, the pod admits:
+# selecting an endpoint. Besides traefik, the pod admits:
 #   - the paperless namespace, every port
 #     ../../infrastructure/network-policies/paperless-ns.yaml#paperless-admit
 #   - host / remote-node, every port
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More