Draining k8s-1 for the jupiter conversion left three pods unschedulable:
k8s-2 and k8s-3 both sat at 100% of requested CPU while actually using 21-23%.
Cluster-wide the gap is 19,680m requested against 7,957m used.
crowdsec is the clearest single contributor. The chart defaults reserve 500m
for each agent and for the LAPI; measured draw is 1-2m. As a DaemonSet the
agent alone parks half a core on every node. Nothing here had ever set
resources, so this was an inherited default rather than a decision.
Only the request changes. Limits stay at the chart default, so a log flood can
still burst to 500m; what shrinks is the reservation the scheduler subtracts
from every node whether or not the process uses it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jupiter's Crucial P3 Plus OSD is at 87% endurance used, and reaching the
MS-01's only U.2-capable slot means moving the boot drive anyway. Doing the
bare-metal conversion in the same window avoids opening the machine twice and
throws away no work: the osd-ssd PCI mapping that a Proxmox-side swap would
need to be re-pointed at ceases to exist.
Networking uses the v1.12 multi-document config rather than the deprecated
machine.network.interfaces. The docs do not define what happens when one link
is configured by both schemas, so k8s-1 keeps every link in one of them. This
also buys VLANConfig.name, which is free-form: naming the VLAN 30 link ens19
keeps the four v30iot macvlan NADs working unchanged across VM and bare-metal
nodes, so the cluster can stay mixed without pinning those workloads.
Physical NICs are matched by permanent MAC, not driver — both X710 ports bind
i40e here, unlike the single passed-through port k8s-2/k8s-3 see.
cephfs-metadata drops to size 2 / min_size 1 for the duration. At size 3 on
two remaining hosts every PG sits undersized with min_size 2, so one further
OSD loss would block IO on every CephFS mount cluster-wide. This must go back
to size 3 once k8s-1 rejoins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sweep restores every discovered Velero schedule, immich's ~180 GiB
library included. At size 2 that is ~360 GiB raw, ~120 GiB per OSD, and
measured on 2026-08-25 it was ~350 of the ~740 GB each drive wrote per
week — ~47% of the endurance budget, against a ~65 GB/day weekday
baseline.
That baseline is itself the result of the 2026-08-18..21 write-reduction
work (#518, #519, #520, CNPG checkpoint tuning, RAM-backed emptyDirs,
paperless data to RBD, CI workspaces to cephfs-ci), which cut per-drive
writes ~70% from ~195 GB/day. With the application tier down, the restore
test is now the single largest consumer of remaining QLC endurance; the
three OSD drives are at 81/82/87% used.
Monthly still exercises every restore path and cuts the sweep's share of
drive wear ~4x, moving per-drive weekly writes from ~740 GB to ~530 GB.
Cadence-only change:
- 0 8 * * 0 -> 0 8 1 * *, keeping the 08:00 UTC slot that clears the
03:15-07:15 daily backup window (see the comment in the manifest).
- ttlSecondsAfterFinished 14 d -> 40 d, so the previous run is still
inspectable when the next one fires.
- Comments and docs that state the cadence updated to match, including
the BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT runbook text, which tells the reader to
check whether a stall fell inside the restore-test window.
No day-of-week form is available: Kubernetes parses cron with
robfig/cron's standard parser, whose day-of-week field allows only
`* / , - ?` (no Quartz `#` nth-weekday), and restricting both day fields
ORs them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Wetterstation now carries a non-default reporting configuration: min
interval 5s on all ten reportable attributes, and tighter reportable-change
deadbands on temperature, humidity and pressure. None of it is expressible
in configuration.yaml - Zigbee2MQTT has no settings-schema field for
reporting configuration - so it lives only on the device and in Z2M's
database.db. This documents it and how to restore it.
min was 10s against an 8.8s transmit interval. Since min is a hold-off, every
change-triggered report was held past a transmit cycle and landed on the
next, so attributes reported at best every 17.6s and drifted out of phase.
The published stream showed no 8.8s periodicity at all. At min 5 each
attribute reports on its own transmit and the stream carries one publish per
cycle, measured at a mean gap of 8.69s. Publish volume fell from ~631/h to
~445/h because each publish is now a whole cycle rather than a fragment.
The deadbands come from the shared modernExtend helpers, which the WS90
definition composes without overrides. They are anti-chatter values sized for
battery-powered indoor sensors. Temperature was 1.00 C, giving a staircase
that moved about twice an hour; it is now 0.1 C, matching the resolution the
device actually reports. Pressure was 5 kPa - 50 hPa, which real barometric
pressure never traverses, so it only ever updated on the hourly heartbeat
that pressure_trend and weather_condition derive from. Note the same library
configures the identical ZCL attribute with a 5 hPa deadband in its older
reporting.ts helper, so the two code paths disagree by 10x.
Anything that makes Z2M re-run configure on the device reverts all of it, and
a fresh PVC will not have it. The restore commands are written out literally
rather than generated by a shell helper, because the nested quoting through
`kubectl exec -- sh -c` is where this goes wrong; each was executed and
verified as written, including the read-back, and re-applying is a no-op.
No behaviour change from this commit itself - the device was reconfigured at
runtime, this only records it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#560 claimed a merged episode "surfaces as a single all-zero frame". It
does not, and the difference decides whether a downstream filter is even
possible.
The zeros propagate attribute by attribute through the burst, so the
merged frame carries whatever subset had zeroed when that burst ended.
Across three episodes captured at nanosecond resolution the propagation
happened to complete, which is where the wrong generalisation came from.
Nothing guarantees it. A burst ending mid-propagation publishes a frame
with temperature at zero while humidity and pressure still read normally,
which is a physically consistent measurement - Z2M recomputes dew_point
from the false temperature - and is not separable from a genuine winter
reading.
The zeros also begin inside an otherwise normal transmit cycle, roughly
20ms after a valid reading in the same burst (measured: 27.7ms, 19.8ms,
22.0ms). They occupy a regular reporting slot, so no timing property
distinguishes them either.
Since the merge is last-wins and the zeros arrive at the tail of the
burst, it resolves that burst to the zeros and discards the valid reading
that led it. So debounce trades six bad samples per episode for one, at
the cost of one good sample. That is a bound on the corruption, not a
filter, and the comment now says so.
No behaviour change; the debounce value and device stanza are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The value is unchanged and correct; the comment committed alongside it in
#559 was neither accurate nor the right place for most of what it said.
Accuracy. It cited the device's ZCL reporting configuration as the bound,
reading minRepIntval 10 as "the station updates every 10s". minRepIntval
is not a cadence: with maxRepIntval 3600 and a reportable change set, the
ZCL reporting model gives periodic reports at the MAXIMUM interval — once
an hour — plus change-driven reports each held back so it lands no sooner
than 10s after the previous. It is a hold-off on change-triggered reports
and says nothing about the gap between reports of different attributes,
which is what a debounce window sees.
The bound that applies is the documented transmit interval — readings
every 2s, transmitted every 8.8s — against Z2M's documented rule not to
set debounce above the sensor's update interval. Shelly's knowledge base
rounds the same figure to 9s.
It also claimed the window had to exceed 1s because "the recovery burst
straddles a second boundary", inferred from log lines stamped 11:42:11
and 11:42:12. Those are second-resolution timestamps and cannot
distinguish 10ms from 900ms. No lower bound was ever established.
Length. The rest was commit-message material sitting in a config file:
justification for the chosen value, gap-distribution and run-length
measurements, and notes reconciling my own earlier misreadings. Comments
state facts about the system, not the history of arriving at them. What
remains is what the device does, what debounce does to it, and the
constraint on the value — 41 lines down to 13.
Verified before writing: post-debounce frames arrive complete (all 22
fields, no partials) at a settled ~10s cadence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two changes to the Wetterstation (Ecowitt WS90, 0xc02cedfffe958f40), both
aimed at the station's recurring zero-drop glitch.
2.13.0 carries zigbee-herdsman-converters#12748, which discards the ZCL
non-value markers (0xffff / 0xff / 0xffffff) the WS90 emits when a reading
is unavailable. Without it those markers are scaled and published as
measurements — the 6553 m/s gust readings in Koenkk/zigbee2mqtt#31048. The
release also recovers the rain rate after a counter reset, which is the
same lifetime-counter dip that packages/wetterstation.yaml compensates for
on the Home Assistant side. Its only breaking change is dropping Node.js 20
for bare-metal installs; the container ships its own runtime. The amd64
manifest was verified pullable before this commit.
debounce: 2 addresses the part 2.13.0 does not fix. Koenkk/zigbee2mqtt#31048
is still open, and the author of #12748 states explicitly that it does not
cover the zero drops: "a zero can be a real reading for these attributes,
only the all-bits-set markers are provably invalid."
The station reports as a burst of seven per-cluster ZCL frames and Z2M
publishes its full cumulative state once per frame, so one device report
becomes seven MQTT messages. During a glitch the zeros appear progressively
across those seven, which is what makes the corruption unrecognisable
downstream: an intermediate frame carrying {"temperature":0,"humidity":92,
"pressure":96.9} is internally consistent (Z2M recomputes dew_point from the
false temperature) and cannot be told apart from a legitimate winter
reading. Merging the burst yields a single frame with the all-zero
signature, which a consumer can reject.
The window is bounded on both sides. Above: the device's own reporting
configuration sets minRepIntval 10 / maxRepIntval 3600 on all seven WS90
clusters (1024/1026/1027/1029 and 0xfc01/0xfc02/0xfc03), so no attribute
repeats inside 10s. Below: the recovery burst straddles a second boundary,
so 1s splits it and emits a partial frame.
Staggering was checked rather than assumed — the 10s floor is per attribute,
and nine attributes report across those clusters, so a trailing-edge timer
could in principle keep resetting and never flush. Over 6h the longest
unbroken chain of sub-2s gaps was 5, bounding worst-case deferral under
~10s.
The device is also absent from the seeded device list, which predates it
joining, so this adds the friendly_name too.
NOTE: this file is seed-only. A running Z2M owns its configuration.yaml on
the PVC, so this does not change the live instance — it only makes a fresh
PVC come up correctly. debounce is requiresRestart, so applying it live
needs the option set on the running instance and a restart; the image bump
supplies the restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the #426 audit. Tag verified present before bumping.
The kaniko bump that was originally in this branch is dropped. It would
have pinned a new `-debug` image, and debug variants are not to run in
the production cluster. kaniko is archived upstream, so the fix is
migration rather than a version bump; tracked in #552 along with the
`-debug` requirement.
Comments should say what the setting does and what constrains it. The
blocks added in #542, #544, #545 and #547 had grown into incident
write-ups: measurement runs, prior values, how a problem was found,
what a check used to be. That belongs in commit messages and the wiki,
both of which already carry it.
Trimmed, no behaviour change:
cephcluster.yaml 22 lines -> 6 (cephx rotation)
cephfs-ci.yaml 26 lines -> 7 (why size 2)
prometheusrule-ceph.yaml (CephHealthWarn, 43 -> 13;
CephPoolLostRedundancy, 15 -> 7)
The operative facts are kept: which checks are excluded and why they
cannot clear, that POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY reports blocked maintenance and
not only data risk, and that size 1 needs dedicated OSDs.
The unreplicated CI pools introduced in #542 make every OSD on the
cluster permanently un-restartable.
`ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while stopping an OSD would take PGs
offline. A size-1 pool puts every PG on exactly one OSD, so the check
fails for all three:
Error EBUSY: unsafe to stop osd(s) at this time
(20 PGs are or would become offline)
bad_become_inactive: 13.6 13.9 ... 14.1c 14.1d
Pools 13 and 14 are cephfs-ci-metadata and cephfs-ci-data0. The size-2
pools are not implicated — they run min_size 1 and appear under
ok_become_degraded, which is allowed.
Rook gates OSD restarts on that check, so this blocks CephX key
rotation, Ceph upgrades, node drains and reboots, and drive
replacement. It surfaced when #545 deadlocked: Rook retried
ok-to-stop against all three OSDs several times a second and could
never succeed, while `ceph -s` reported 217 pgs active+clean
throughout. Nothing is unhealthy; the restarts are simply refused.
The reasoning in #542 was that unreplicated CI data only risks
in-flight pipelines, since every byte is a fresh git clone. That part
holds. What it missed is that the cost is not scoped to the pool: one
unreplicated pool freezes maintenance for the entire cluster.
Most of #542's saving came from keeping CI churn off `cephfs`, whose
metadataPool is size 3 — that survives this change. Only the second-
order gain from dropping the replica is given up, and cephfs-ci-data0
stores 0 B with cephfs-ci-metadata at 182 MiB, so the backfill is
trivial.
size 1 becomes viable again once these pools sit on OSDs of their own,
where the permanently un-stoppable OSD holds nothing but throwaway
data. That is planned with the retired QLC drives.
Alerting follows the same change:
- POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is no longer excluded from CephHealthWarn. It was
excluded because cephfs-ci was expected to keep it permanently
active; no pool is unreplicated now, so the exclusion would only
hide a real one losing its replicas.
- CephPoolLostRedundancy drops its cephfs-ci exemption for the same
reason, and its description now states the maintenance consequence,
not just the data-loss one.
- The AUTH_INSECURE_* exclusion is reworded. Calling it
"known-accepted" reads as a decision that the risk is fine; it is a
kernel-blocked remediation (aes256k over the CSI mount path needs
kernel 7.0+, nodes run 6.18).
Refs #542, #545, #527
Ceph v19.2.6 ships the fix for CVE-2025-30156, a CephX authentication
bypass: AES-128-CBC service tickets carry no HMAC and use a hard-coded
IV, so a holder of any low-privilege key can bit-flip a ticket into
cluster-admin in linear time. Upgrading the binaries does not resolve
it — the keys themselves must be rotated to the aes256k cipher.
The cluster is mid-procedure. auth_allowed_ciphers (aes, aes256k),
auth_preferred_cipher (aes256k) and auth_service_cipher (aes256k) are
already set, and the rotating service keys were wiped, but no actual
key rotation has happened: every entity in status.cephx is still
keyGeneration 1 with keyType aes, created under 19.2.3.
Rook automates daemon-key rotation but it is opt-in and defaults to
Disabled, so spec.security.cephx was left empty and nothing rotated.
Rook v1.20.6 and Ceph v19.2.6 are both past the version floor the
feature requires.
Rotating daemon keys clears AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE, the only
one of the six new checks at ERR severity. That is the operationally
urgent part: Rook skips CephFS and RGW reconciliation entirely while
health is HEALTH_ERR — which is what deadlocked the mds/rgw rollout in
issue #527 — and the check is presently held down only by a mon-side
mute with a finite TTL. When that mute lapses the cluster returns to
HEALTH_ERR and the reconcile freeze comes back.
CSI keys are deliberately left on aes. aes256k over the CSI mount path
requires a host kernel of 7.0 or newer and these nodes run 6.18, so
`aes` must stay in auth_allowed_ciphers for CSI to authenticate at all.
AUTH_INSECURE_CLIENT_KEY_TYPE, AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_ALLOWED and
AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_CREATABLE therefore stay raised at WARN until the
nodes run a kernel that supports it.
Rotation restarts most Ceph daemons. With size 2 pools across 3 OSDs
this should be applied deliberately rather than alongside other churn,
and Ceph should reach HEALTH_OK before anything else touches the
cluster.
Refs #527, #528
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CephHealthWarn alerted on `ceph_health_status == 1`. It has been FIRING since
at least 2026-08-21T00:26Z and cannot clear: four AUTH_INSECURE_* checks are
permanently active from CVE-2025-30156 (#527) and stay that way until Rook
>=1.20.5 lands. A permanently-firing alert reports nothing -- every Ceph
warning since then has been invisible behind it.
This is a pre-existing gap, not a consequence of the cephfs-ci work, though
that work would have added a second permanent cause (POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY, since
the CI pools are size 1 on purpose).
ceph_health_detail exposes each check as its own series, so the alert now fires
on any check that is NOT known-accepted, and names it. Verified against live
data: 5 checks active, 0 unexpected, so it is quiet now and fires the moment
something genuinely new appears.
Excluding POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY wholesale would give something up: that check is
cluster-wide and does not say WHICH pool, so accepting it for cephfs-ci would
equally hide a production pool dropping to one replica. CephPoolLostRedundancy
restores that. There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
replication factor -- verified live as replicapool 2, cephfs-data0 2,
cephfs-metadata 3, cephfs-ci-metadata 1.
Both alerts were tested against live data before committing, in BOTH
directions. The positive control matters as much as the negative one: an early
draft used a >1e9 floor which silently excluded the CI pools entirely, so the
expression could not have matched anything. It looked correct precisely because
it returned no results. The control caught it; the floor is now 1e6.
The floor is not what suppresses the near-empty rgw pools. Their ratios are
9-36 because per-object overhead dominates, so they never match `< 1.5`.
6h on CephHealthWarn is unchanged -- Ceph warns for self-clearing conditions
and paging on those trains people to ignore the alert.
Repoints WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_CLASS at ceph-filesystem-ci, the
dedicated filesystem added in #542 whose pools are both size 1.
Measured 2026-08-21, polling both CephFS pools every 15s:
CI active 1.5 min (6 intervals): data0 143.2 MB metadata 17.2 MB
CI idle 16.0 min (63 intervals): data0 0.0 MB metadata 11.0 MB
CI share of writes: data0 100%, metadata 61%
data0 takes zero bytes across 16 minutes without a pipeline, so its entire
write volume is CI. The 15s cadence is what made this visible: a pipeline
creates, uses and deletes its PVC inside ~2 minutes, so a 5-minute sample
reported no CI pods during bursts CI was causing.
Per pipeline this moves the drive cost from 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB to
~80 MB, since neither pool is replicated on the new filesystem.
RWX is unchanged and still required: pipeline steps share the workspace PVC
and the k8s backend can schedule them on different nodes, so an RWO volume
fails to mount on the second node. Only the filesystem underneath changes.
Also corrects the justification written into #542 for leaving
ceph-filesystem-ephemeral alone. That commit claimed restore-test.sh handles
"REAL data which must not land on unreplicated pools". That is wrong: its
probe PVCs are as throwaway as a CI workspace -- the authoritative copy is the
backup on Hetzner, and losing a probe just means re-running the test.
The actual reason it cannot move is technical: those probes are snapshot
CLONES, and `ceph fs subvolume snapshot clone` operates within a single
filesystem, so a snapshot taken in `cephfs` cannot be cloned into `cephfs-ci`.
Landing them unreplicated would require a second size-1 data pool inside
`cephfs`; restore-test runs weekly against CI's ~96 pipelines/day, so that is
not worth the complexity.
cephfs-ci verified healthy before this change: PHASE Ready, MDS Running, both
pools reporting size 1.
Woodpecker's Kubernetes backend creates a PVC per pipeline, fills it with a
checkout plus build output, and deletes it when the pipeline ends. Those
workspaces currently live on the shared `cephfs`, so throwaway data is
replicated as if it mattered: 2x in cephfs-data0 and 3x in cephfs-metadata.
Measured 2026-08-21 by polling both pools every 15s. The interval matters --
at 5 minutes a whole pipeline is invisible, because its PVC is created, used
and deleted inside ~2 minutes. Sampling that slowly reported zero CI pods
during bursts CI was causing, which sent this investigation down three wrong
paths before the cadence was fixed.
one pipeline, a single 15s interval: data0 +71.6 MB metadata +8.2 MB
every interval with no CI pod: data0 ~0 metadata ~0
So CI accounts for essentially all CephFS write volume; between pipelines the
metadata pool is quiet at ~4 MB/day. On the shared filesystem one pipeline
costs 71.6x2 + 8.2x3 = ~168 MB of drive writes. On this one it costs ~80 MB.
size 1 is correct here even though it was rejected for `cephfs`. There,
metadataPool stays at 3 because losing it destroys the entire filesystem
rather than the objects on one OSD, and 550 GiB of real data depends on it.
Here every byte is a fresh git clone: total loss means in-flight pipelines
fail and get re-run. Replicating throwaway data was the cost, so it is what
gets removed.
`ceph-filesystem-ephemeral` is deliberately NOT repointed. It has a second
consumer -- velero/restore-test.sh restores REAL data through it for
verification, which must not land on unreplicated pools. A new class also
sidesteps StorageClass.parameters being immutable.
Nothing uses ceph-filesystem-ci yet, so this commit is inert: it provisions
the filesystem and its MDS and changes no existing workload. Repointing the
Woodpecker agent is a separate change, once this is confirmed healthy.
Known consequence: size 1 raises POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY, so cluster health will
warn until that is addressed. Silencing it via mon_warn_on_pool_no_redundancy
is cluster-wide and would also hide a production pool dropping to 1, so it
wants a targeted alert instead -- deliberately left out of this commit rather
than switching the warning off blind.
The MDS is 512Mi/1Gi with no standby, not the 4Gi active+standby that `cephfs`
runs. That figure is driven by immich's cached inode count; a CI workspace is
a few thousand files that vanish with the pipeline, and a second daemon to
protect throwaway work is not worth its memory.
A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file. archive_timeout forces a switch on a
timer, and the switched-out segment is written and archived at its full size
no matter how little real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults to 5min, permitting
288 segments/day per cluster of largely padding.
gf-pg went first as a staged rollout and is now verified: 211 -> 41 MB/hour,
an 81% cut, with archived segments falling from ~12/hour to ~1.5/hour in
step. Two independent signals moving together is what confirms the volume
was padding rather than data, and the measured result matched the ~35
MB/hour predicted beforehand.
Fleet-wide this is worth roughly 18 GB/day of logical writes, which at
size=2 with ~1.27x BlueStore overhead is ~45 GB/day at the drives -- about
14% of the 328 GB/day the three OSD NVMes currently take.
ak-pg gets 15min rather than 30min. It holds credentials, sessions and
enrolment state, and the extra 15min would save only a further 0.3 GB/day,
which does not justify doubling the worst-case loss window on that data.
ha-pg saves least in relative terms: its segments are already 63% full of
real WAL (4.9 GB/day), so the timer is not what drives most of its switches.
Also corrects two comments in ha-pg-cluster.yaml that this work falsified.
wal_compression: the claim that these clusters "were not getting compression"
was wrong -- "on" is pglz, which was already compressing. Switching to zstd
moved the WAL rate not at all (4911/4976 -> 5002 MB/day, by LSN advance over
20min windows). Full-page images genuinely are ~62% of WAL here (61.9%
measured as a steady-state delta, against 62.4% lifetime -- so the migration
did not skew it, which was my first guess and it was wrong). There was simply
no headroom between pglz and zstd on this data. zstd is kept because it is
not worse and costs nothing, but it is not a lever.
checkpoint_timeout: 15min -> 30min likewise did not move WAL. Probable reason
is that a recorder is append-mostly -- a page is dirtied while it fills and
then not touched again, so it pays its full-page image once whatever the
checkpoint interval. Kept, but flagged as unjustified pending a data-file
measurement: this volume takes ~11 GB/day against 4.9 GB/day of WAL, so most
of its traffic is outside what a WAL measurement can see.
Context: drive-endurance work on three QLC NVMe OSDs at 81-87% wear.
A WAL segment is a fixed 16 MiB file. archive_timeout forces a segment
switch on a timer so the archive never trails reality by more than that
interval, and the switched-out segment is written and archived at its full
16 MiB no matter how few bytes of real WAL it holds. CNPG defaults this to
5min, which permits up to 288 segments/day = 4.6 GB/day per cluster.
Measured on gf-pg: the database is 21 MB and generates 4.5 MB/day of actual
WAL, while its RBD volume takes 211 MB/hour -- against 192 MB/hour predicted
from 12 switches of 16 MiB. Essentially every byte written to this volume is
padding, roughly 1100x amplification.
This resolves an anomaly that has been open since the start of the endurance
work: gf-pg appeared to write gigabytes per day for a 21 MB database, and
neither WAL volume nor data changes could account for it. Segment padding
does, exactly.
Applied to gf-pg alone as a staged rollout. It is the lowest-risk cluster
and gives the cleanest signal -- its real WAL is small enough that any change
in volume is unambiguously attributable to this parameter. The same default
affects all seven clusters and is worth an estimated ~24 GB/day of logical
writes fleet-wide, but that only goes ahead once this one is verified.
The cost is RPO. On total loss of the cluster, up to 30min of Grafana state
becomes unrecoverable instead of 5min. That state is dashboards, annotations
and preferences, changing at ~4.5 MB/day, so the window is nearly always
empty. Clusters holding credentials or job state get evaluated separately
rather than inheriting this value by default.
archive_timeout is in CNPG's GlobalDefaultSettings, not its
FixedConfigurationParameters, so it is user-overridable -- verified against
pkg/postgres/configuration.go rather than assumed.
Context: drive-endurance work on three QLC NVMe OSDs at 81-87% wear.
`wal_compression: "on"` resolves to pglz, PostgreSQL's original 2016-era
algorithm. Every CNPG cluster here was set that way, so none of them were
getting the compression actually available to them: all seven builds accept
lz4 and zstd (verified via pg_settings.enumvals on each, including immich's
custom pgvector image and trmnl's PostgreSQL 18).
This matters because of what dominates recorder-style write volume. A page
is written to WAL in full -- all 8 KiB -- on its first modification after a
checkpoint, for torn-page protection. Measured on ha-pg, those full-page
images are 62.4% of WAL bytes. Compressing them is therefore the single
largest lever available on WAL volume, and pglz was the weakest option for
the job.
ha-pg additionally moves checkpoint_timeout 15min -> 30min. Full-page images
are emitted once per page per checkpoint interval, so doubling the interval
roughly halves how often each hot page pays the 8 KiB toll. max_wal_size
stays at 2GB deliberately: it must remain well above what one interval
generates, or checkpoints would trigger on size and the interval change
would do nothing. Recovery replays at most one interval of WAL -- under
200MB at the measured rate, i.e. seconds.
The other six clusters keep checkpoint_timeout at 15min. Their measured
write rates do not justify trading recovery time: gf-pg generates 4.5 MB/day
of WAL and wp-pg 62 MB/day, against ak-pg's 604 MB/day.
full_page_writes stays on everywhere. Disabling it would remove the
overhead entirely but RBD can tear a page across an object boundary, and
the trade is write volume against an unrecoverable database.
Both parameters are sighup-reloadable, so this does not restart any cluster.
Context: drive-endurance work on three QLC NVMe OSDs at 81-87% wear.
description:"The Ceph cluster has held HEALTH_WARN for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Get the detail with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
summary:"Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} active for 6h"
description:"Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527). BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT is sticky for 24h after the last stall and clears itself: check whether the stall fell inside the monthly Velero restore-test window (08:00-14:00Z on the 1st), which is expected on these QLC drives — one outside that window, or a repeat on the same OSD, means check that drive (#557). Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
- alert:CephPoolLostRedundancy
# Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.
#
# There is no pool-size metric, but bytes_used/stored IS the
# replication factor. The >1e6 floor drops pools too small to measure
# meaningfully, empty ones included.
#
# No pool is exempt.
expr:|
ceph_pool_bytes_used / ceph_pool_stored < 1.5 and ceph_pool_stored > 1e6
for:30m
labels:
severity:critical
annotations:
summary:"Ceph pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} is running unreplicated"
description:"Pool {{ $labels.pool_id }} has a replication factor below 1.5, meaning a single OSD loss destroys data. No pool is meant to be unreplicated — an unreplicated pool also blocks ALL OSD maintenance cluster-wide, since `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuses while its PGs would go offline. Check with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph osd pool ls detail`."
- alert:CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
summary:"WordPress MariaDB backup has not succeeded in 26h+"
description:"The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob's last successful run is over 26 hours old. Check the newest Job's pod logs in the wordpress namespace: `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs`. The 2026-08-19 failure was `The specified bucket does not exist.` against renner-uno-k8s-mariadb while the endpoint itself probed healthy, so a green HetznerBackupEndpointDown does not clear this."
- alert:WordpressMariadbBackupNeverRan
# The staleness expression above goes blind when the metric is
# absent, which is what happens once the operator recreates the
# CronJob. Without this guard "never backed up" is quieter than
summary:"WordPress MariaDB backup has no recorded successful run"
description:"The wordpress-mariadb-backup CronJob exists but has no lastSuccessfulTime: either it has not completed once since the Backup CR was recreated, or every run since has failed. Check `kubectl -n wordpress get jobs` and that the hetzner-s3-creds ExternalSecret is synced."
# Second NIC on v30iot so Cilium L2 announce can win ARP on the IoT
# VLAN from this node (previously only k8s-edge had v30iot, so any
# IoT-pool LB lease landing here was unreachable from devices).
extra_network_bridges=["v30iot"]
disks=[
{
storage="local-zfs"
size="64G"
format="raw"
slot="virtio0"
file_id=local.talos_image
}
]
hostpci=[
{
mapping="osd-ssd"
},
{
mapping="x710-port1"
}
]
tags="kubernetes;talos;controlplane"
ssh_public_keys=local.common_ssh_keys
vm_state="running"
# Rebuild pipeline issues `-replace`; skip graceful shutdown so a
# non-responsive Talos guest can't hang the destroy for 30 minutes.
stop_on_destroy=true
}
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