fix(rotation): make the documented guard actually pass

Second attempt, and the first one was wrong for a subtler reason than I
fixed. Anchoring on `image:` did not help: this file documents the
pattern, so the comment text `image:.*@sha256` matches the regex
`image:.*@sha256`. The guard kept reporting its own documentation.

Added the `| grep -v kustomization.yaml` filter and this time ran the
command exactly as written rather than a paraphrase of it. Verified both
directions: no output across this directory as it stands, and it still
reports a file carrying a real `image: ...@sha256:` pin.

Lesson worth the two commits: a documented check has to be executed in the
form it is documented in. I had verified a variant twice and shipped a
guard whose only hit was itself — which trains people to ignore it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml

@@ -131,19 +131,19 @@ steps:
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:$TAG \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:latest
 
-  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + jq, the base for the zigbee2mqtt
-  # `seed-data` init container. Replaces an `apk add --no-cache jq` that ran on
-  # every pod start — tools belong in the image, not installed at runtime.
-  # Consumers pin it by DIGEST (as the secret-rotator CronJobs do), so this must
-  # be built and pushed before the Deployment can reference it.
-  - name: build-z2m-seed
+  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: a general-purpose alpine + jq base for
+  # workloads that need to read JSON from a shell script. Named for what it IS,
+  # not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
+  # container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
+  # the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
+  - name: build-alpine-jq
     image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
-    directory: ci/images/z2m-seed
+    directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
     depends_on: []
     when:
       - event: manual
       - event: push
-        path: ["ci/images/z2m-seed/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+        path: ["ci/images/alpine-jq/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
     environment:
       GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
       GITEA_TOKEN:
@@ -157,23 +157,63 @@ steps:
         /kaniko/executor \
           --context . \
           --dockerfile Containerfile \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/z2m-seed:$TAG \
-          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/z2m-seed:latest \
-          --image-name-with-digest-file /kaniko/z2m-seed.digest
-      # Print the digest-pinned reference so the follow-up commit that pins the
-      # Deployment can copy it straight from this build log, with no separate
-      # registry query.
-      #
-      # kaniko writes ONE LINE PER --destination to that file, so it holds two
-      # entries (:$TAG and :latest) carrying the same digest. Reduce to the bare
-      # digest and dedupe, so exactly one unambiguous line is emitted rather than
-      # two near-identical ones for whoever does step 2 to choose between.
-      - DIGEST=$(cut -d@ -f2 /kaniko/z2m-seed.digest | sort -u | head -1)
-      # MUST stay single-quoted as one YAML scalar. Unquoted, the ": " inside
-      # makes YAML parse the whole command as a MAP rather than a string, and the
-      # pipeline fails to compile with
-      #   cannot unmarshal 'map[echo "PIN THIS:...' into a string value
-      # which errors EVERY pipeline in the repo, not just this one. Note `yq`
-      # accepts the unquoted form because it is valid YAML — just a map, not a
-      # string — so validate with `woodpecker lint`, not a YAML parser.
-      - 'echo "PIN THIS: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/z2m-seed@$DIGEST"'
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
+
+  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
+  # baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
+  # node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
+  # critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
+  # where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
+  - name: build-cni-plugins
+    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
+    directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
+    depends_on: []
+    when:
+      - event: manual
+      - event: push
+        path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Containerfile \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
+
+  # Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
+  # needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
+  # fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
+  # every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
+  # base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
+  - name: build-alpine-openssl
+    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
+    directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
+    depends_on: []
+    when:
+      - event: manual
+      - event: push
+        path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Containerfile \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest

ci/images/alpine-jq/Containerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+
+# Alpine plus jq. Nothing application-specific — a general-purpose base for any
+# workload that needs to read JSON from a shell script.
+#
+# It exists because installing tools at container start is not acceptable here:
+# `apk add` makes every start depend on network and package-index availability,
+# and the resolved version can drift between restarts of an otherwise pinned
+# image. Tools belong in the image.
+#
+# Everything else such a script typically needs (sh, sed, cp, cat, tr, awk) comes
+# from busybox in the base, so jq is the only addition.
+#
+# Runs as root like the other ci/images entries. Consumers that can drop
+# privilege should set runAsNonRoot/runAsUser themselves — what the workload
+# needs to read is workload-specific, so it does not belong baked in here.
+#
+# First consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init container. Worth recording why
+# a real JSON parser is justified there rather than a sed/awk match: "key" occurs
+# 12 times in that document (once per device with an APS link_key) and the FIRST
+# occurrence is a DEVICE key, because "devices" sorts before "network_key". An
+# unanchored extraction therefore yields a device link key, and herdsman then
+# forms a NEW Zigbee network and drops every device.
+RUN apk add --no-cache jq

ci/images/alpine-openssl/Containerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+
+# Alpine plus the openssl CLI. Nothing application-specific — named for what it
+# is, so anything needing `openssl s_client` / `x509` from a shell script can use
+# it.
+#
+# It exists because installing tools at container start is not acceptable here:
+# `apk add` makes every start depend on network and package-index availability,
+# and the resolved version can drift between restarts of an otherwise pinned
+# image.
+#
+# Note the openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine base — verified, the
+# base carries the libraries but not the command — so unlike the multus CNI
+# installer (where busybox wget/tar already covered the need) this one really
+# does require an image rather than just dropping the apk add.
+#
+# First consumer: the paperless fetch-bridge-cert init container, which captures
+# the Proton Mail Bridge's self-signed IMAP certificate via STARTTLS and pins it
+# for paperless to trust. busybox has no s_client equivalent, so openssl is not
+# substitutable there.
+RUN apk add --no-cache openssl

ci/images/cni-plugins/Containerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries, baked in at build time.
+#
+# WHY THIS IMAGE EXISTS
+# The multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet used to fetch this tarball from
+# GitHub on the node itself, at node-provisioning time, and extract it straight
+# into /opt/cni/bin. Two problems with that:
+#
+#   1. Security. The download had NO integrity verification — wget, then tar,
+#      into a directory whose contents are executed as root in the CNI path on
+#      every node. A tampered or MITM'd artifact would have got privileged
+#      execution cluster-wide, with nothing to detect it.
+#   2. Node rebuild. It put a live dependency on github.com (and previously the
+#      Alpine package index too) on the critical path of bringing a node up, so
+#      a GitHub outage or slow transfer stalled or broke CNI installation
+#      exactly when a node was being rebuilt.
+#
+# Baking the binaries in fixes both: the fetch happens once, here, where the
+# checksum IS verified, and the installer becomes a local file copy with no
+# network at all.
+#
+# The version and digest are pinned literals, so bumping them is a reviewable
+# commit rather than a silent change in what runs on every node. The digest was
+# cross-checked against upstream's own published
+# cni-plugins-linux-amd64-<version>.tgz.sha256 asset rather than merely recorded
+# from a local download — a download can be tampered with; the point of the
+# check is to compare against what upstream states.
+#
+# amd64 only, matching the ARCH the installer already hardcoded and the cluster's
+# node architecture. Add a second stage if a different arch is ever needed.
+
+FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d AS fetch
+
+ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.5.1
+ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=77baa2f669980a82255ffa2f2717de823992480271ee778aa51a9c60ae89ff9b
+
+# busybox wget and tar are already in the base; nothing is installed here
+# either. sha256sum -c fails the BUILD if the artifact does not match, which is
+# the whole point — a bad download must never reach a node.
+RUN set -eu; \
+    F="cni-plugins-linux-amd64-${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}.tgz"; \
+    wget -q -O "/tmp/${F}" \
+      "https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION}/${F}"; \
+    echo "${CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256}  /tmp/${F}" | sha256sum -c -; \
+    mkdir -p /plugins; \
+    tar -xzf "/tmp/${F}" -C /plugins; \
+    rm -f "/tmp/${F}"; \
+    # Drop the non-executable payload: the tarball ships LICENSE and README.md,
+    # which the old installer extracted into /opt/cni/bin alongside the binaries.
+    rm -f /plugins/LICENSE /plugins/README.md; \
+    # Fail loudly here rather than shipping an image that silently installs
+    # nothing, if upstream ever restructures the archive.
+    #
+    # This list must cover every plugin the repo actually depends on, not just
+    # the ones the installer happens to log. `dhcp` is included because the
+    # sibling cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet runs that binary and documents that it
+    # ships from here (see kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml)
+    # — without it in the check, upstream dropping `dhcp` while keeping the
+    # others would build green and only surface later as a broken DHCP daemon on
+    # whichever node rolled first.
+    for p in macvlan static host-local dhcp; do \
+      [ -x "/plugins/$p" ] || { echo "FATAL: /plugins/$p missing or not executable" >&2; exit 1; }; \
+    done
+
+FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
+
+# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
+# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
+COPY --from=fetch /plugins/ /opt/cni-plugins/

ci/images/z2m-seed/Containerfile

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
-
-# Runtime image, not CI tooling: the base for the zigbee2mqtt `seed-data` init
-# container.
-#
-# It exists for exactly one reason — jq. That init container reads
-# `.network_key.key` out of the Open Coordinator Backup JSON to render
-# /app/data/secret.yaml; everything else it does (sh, sed, cp, cat) is already
-# in busybox. jq is baked in here rather than `apk add`ed when the container
-# starts, so the init container has no network dependency at start and no
-# package-index drift between pod restarts.
-#
-# Parsing this with busybox sed/awk instead was considered and rejected: "key"
-# occurs 12 times in the real backup (once per device with an APS link_key) and
-# the FIRST occurrence is a device key, because "devices" sorts before
-# "network_key". Hand-rolled extraction that isn't correctly anchored yields a
-# device link key, and herdsman then forms a NEW network and drops every
-# device — so a real JSON parser earns its keep here.
-#
-# Stays root: the init container writes to the root-owned zigbee2mqtt-data PVC.
-RUN apk add --no-cache jq

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+# Proposal: enrol the mosquitto broker credentials in Class-A rotation
+
+**Status:** proposal, nothing implemented.
+**Scope:** the 8 MQTT broker users and the credentials behind them.
+
+## Problem
+
+Every self-generated secret in this cluster rotates automatically except these.
+`kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/` holds 13 manifests defining 15
+rotator CronJobs (`home-assistant.yaml` alone defines three). Five are **Class-A**
+— authentik, crowdsec, paperless, shelly-manager and woodpecker — meaning
+"self-generated random secret", which is exactly what a broker password is.
+The mosquitto credentials are the only Class-A-shaped secrets not enrolled.
+
+They are currently minted once by seven near-identical bootstrap Jobs
+(`mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml`, 508 lines — the ServiceAccount, Role and RoleBinding
+are inside that same file) which generate a password, hand-build Secret JSON with
+`jq` and POST it to the Kubernetes API with `curl`. Once created they never
+change again.
+
+Three consequences:
+
+1. **They never rotate.** Not on a schedule, not on compromise, not ever.
+2. **They exist only in the Secret object** — not in OpenBao, so not covered by
+   the OpenBao snapshot CronJob, and unrecoverable if lost.
+3. **The Jobs cannot be modified.** A Job's `spec.template` is immutable, so
+   changing even the container image makes the whole `home-assistant`
+   Kustomization fail to reconcile with `field is immutable`. Any edit requires
+   deleting or renaming the Jobs.
+
+## Why the obvious fixes do not work
+
+Recorded because each was tried and rejected on evidence, and the reasons are
+not obvious from the code.
+
+| Approach | Why it fails |
+| --- | --- |
+| ExternalSecrets reading hand-seeded OpenBao paths | Depends on content copied in by hand. Git cannot recreate it; a fresh OpenBao leaves the paths empty and ESO then overwrites live broker credentials with nothing. |
+| ESO `Password` generator | **Overwrites pre-existing Secrets.** Verified: a Secret holding `KNOWN-PREEXISTING-VALUE` was replaced with a freshly generated password on first sync. Adopting it rotates the 7 Job-minted credentials at once, uncoordinated (`evcc` is already ESO-extract-backed and so unaffected). |
+| Keep the Jobs, fix only the image | Blocked by `spec.template` immutability. Renaming the Jobs works but is a hack that recurs on every future edit. |
+
+The common thread: each treats the credential as something to *place*, when the
+real requirement is a credential that can be *replaced*.
+
+## How rotation actually has to work here
+
+The broker rebuilds its password file from scratch on **every pod start**
+(`mosquitto-deployment.yaml`): `rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd` followed by
+`mosquitto_passwd -c -b …` for each of the 8 users, sourced from env vars backed
+by the 8 Secrets.
+
+Two things follow, and they shape the whole design:
+
+- **A Secret change has no effect until the broker restarts.** There is no
+  Reloader annotation on the mosquitto Deployment today, unlike the consumers of
+  the existing Class-A rotators.
+- **There is no make-before-break.** A mosquitto user has exactly one password.
+  The LLAT rotators can mint a second token and revoke the first afterwards; a
+  broker user cannot hold old and new simultaneously. Unless a transitional
+  second user is created, broker and client must cut over together.
+
+### Who holds each credential
+
+This is the part that determines cutover cost, and it is not visible from the
+manifests alone.
+
+| Broker user | Held by | Cutover |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `health` | the broker's own liveness/readiness probes | in-cluster, same pod restart |
+| `zigbee2mqtt` | zigbee2mqtt Deployment (`secretKeyRef`) | in-cluster, pod restart |
+| `evcc` | evcc app; already OpenBao-backed via ESO | in-cluster, pod restart |
+| `sml2mqtt` | edge host, from `vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
+| `open3e` | edge host, from `vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password` | re-run the edge-host play |
+| `homeassistant` | HA MQTT integration — a config entry created in the UI | needs an API/WebSocket update, or a manual re-entry |
+| `shellies` | Shelly device firmware | pushed per-device; `shelly-manager` is deployed and is the natural mechanism |
+| `admin` | a workstation client, held by a human | read the new value from OpenBao |
+
+Note `sml2mqtt` and `open3e` currently keep **the same password in two unlinked
+places** — the Kubernetes Secret for the broker, and `ansible-vault` for the
+client — synchronised by hand. That duplication, not any client limitation, is
+what makes rotation feel impossible today.
+
+## Proposed design
+
+Follow the existing Class-A pattern exactly (`rotation/paperless.yaml` is the
+closest model): *generate random bytes → merge-patch into OpenBao → ESO syncs the
+Secret → restart the consumer*.
+
+1. **One rotator CronJob per broker user**, running the existing `secret-rotator`
+   binary in random mode, writing `apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-<user>-credentials`
+   in OpenBao. Reuses the established policy/role/SA pattern; no new machinery.
+2. **ExternalSecrets** project each OpenBao entry to the existing Secret name and
+   key, so `mosquitto-deployment.yaml` and the in-cluster consumers are unchanged.
+   Key names stay as they are (`homeassistant-password` on one, `password` on the
+   rest) — consumers reference them, so normalising is a separate change.
+3. **Add a Reloader annotation to the mosquitto Deployment** so a Secret change
+   restarts the broker, instead of silently taking effect at some unrelated future
+   restart.
+4. **Move the edge host off `ansible-vault` for these two values**, reading the
+   same OpenBao entry instead, so there is one source of truth per credential.
+5. **Rotate one user at a time.** Each rotation then affects exactly one client,
+   not all eight.
+
+### The cutover window
+
+With no make-before-break, each rotation has a window where broker and client
+disagree. Two options:
+
+- **Accept a brief window** (recommended for most users). Order: rotator writes
+  OpenBao → client picks up the new value → broker restarts. MQTT clients
+  reconnect automatically; the window is seconds. Because rotation is per-user,
+  only that one client is affected.
+
+  One failure mode to expect rather than be alarmed by: the broker rolls with
+  `maxUnavailable: 0` / `maxSurge: 1`, so mid-rollout **two broker pods with
+  different passwd files sit behind the LB**. A client reconnecting during that
+  window can land on the old pod and fail auth until the rollout completes. It is
+  self-healing and lasts seconds to a minute, but it will look alarming in logs
+  during the first `health` / `zigbee2mqtt` rotation, so it is worth knowing in
+  advance.
+- **Transitional dual user** (`<user>` and `<user>-next` in the passwd file and
+  ACL) for any credential where even a brief outage is unacceptable. More moving
+  parts; probably only worth it for `homeassistant`, which carries everything.
+
+## Suggested phasing
+
+Ordered so the risky work happens after the pattern is proven, and so each phase
+is independently valuable.
+
+1. **`health` and `zigbee2mqtt` first.** Both are entirely in-cluster and pick up
+   a new password on pod restart with no external coordination. Proves rotator →
+   OpenBao → ESO → Reloader end to end with the smallest blast radius. `health`
+   is the safest possible start: only the broker's own probes consume it.
+2. **`evcc`.** Already OpenBao-backed via ESO; only the rotator is missing.
+3. **`sml2mqtt` and `open3e`**, together with switching the edge host to read from
+   OpenBao. This is where the duplicate-source-of-truth problem gets fixed.
+4. **`shellies`**, via shelly-manager pushing to devices. Needs investigation:
+   shelly-manager has its own Class-A rotator today, but that rotates
+   shelly-manager's own secret and does not touch device MQTT credentials.
+5. **`homeassistant`** last. Highest blast radius, and the config entry is UI-created,
+   so it needs an API/WebSocket update path — the HA LLAT rotators
+   (`rotation/home-assistant.yaml`) already talk to HA over WebSocket and are the
+   obvious precedent.
+6. **`admin`** whenever convenient; a human reads the new value from OpenBao.
+
+Only once a user is enrolled does its bootstrap Job become dead code. Delete the
+Jobs incrementally as their users migrate, rather than in one step — that also
+avoids the immutability problem entirely, since the Jobs are deleted, never
+patched.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- **Does `secret-rotator` random mode fit unchanged?** The existing rotators write
+  a field into an OpenBao entry; here the entry holds a single password field, so
+  it should, but this needs confirming against the binary rather than assumed.
+- **Can shelly-manager push MQTT credentials to devices**, and does it cover both
+  Gen1 (`/settings/mqtt`) and Gen2+ (`Mqtt.SetConfig`) firmwares? If not, the
+  `shellies` user may need a different mechanism or stay manual longest.
+- **How is the HA MQTT config entry updated programmatically?** Reusing the
+  WebSocket approach from the LLAT rotator is plausible but unverified.
+- **Rotation cadence.** The existing rotators' schedules should be the reference
+  rather than inventing a new one.
+- **ESO refresh latency.** Rotator-writes-OpenBao → Secret-updates →
+  Reloader-restarts is delayed by up to one `refreshInterval`; the `evcc`
+  ExternalSecret uses `1h`. That does not widen the outage window — broker and
+  client still move together — but it does stretch how long a rotation takes to
+  land, which matters for verifying one completed and for the cold-rebuild
+  ordering question above. Worth deciding whether these ExternalSecrets want a
+  shorter interval than 1h, or whether the rotator should trigger the sync
+  directly.
+- **Bootstrap on a cold rebuild.** On a fresh cluster the rotator must create the
+  OpenBao entry before ESO can sync it; check this against
+  `kubernetes/RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md` so broker bring-up is not blocked.
+
+## What this does not change
+
+- Secret names, key names and every `secretKeyRef` in `mosquitto-deployment.yaml`.
+- The ACL model and the per-user topic scoping.
+- The `evcc` ExternalSecret, which already follows the target pattern.

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/kustomization.yaml

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ resources:
   - prometheus-token-externalsecret.yaml
   - config-sync-token-externalsecret.yaml
   - mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
+  # health broker credential: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (first of the
+  # eight users to migrate off mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml).
+  - mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
   - mosquitto-config.yaml
   - mosquitto-certificate.yaml
   - mosquitto-service.yaml

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml

@@ -370,74 +370,6 @@ spec:
             limits:
               memory: 64Mi
 ---
-# Broker user `health`: a dedicated, least-privilege credential used ONLY by
-# mosquitto's own liveness/readiness probes (mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Its
-# ACL is `write health/#` and nothing else — it cannot read any topic or
-# write outside the throwaway probe subtree, so a leak is worthless (nothing
-# subscribes to health/#). Kept on its own Secret, like every other user, so
-# the probe never has to borrow the admin credential.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.21
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-health-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
----
 # Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
 # to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
 # publish HA MQTT-discovery configs, exactly like the `shellies` user) and

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-deployment.yaml

@@ -5,6 +5,18 @@ metadata:
   namespace: home-assistant
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
+  annotations:
+    # REQUIRED for credential rotation to take effect at all. The startup shim
+    # rebuilds /mosquitto/auth/passwd from these Secrets on every pod start, so
+    # a rotated Secret is inert until the pod restarts — without this the new
+    # password would sit unused until some unrelated restart, while the old one
+    # stayed valid indefinitely.
+    #
+    # Listed per-Secret rather than using the blanket `reloader.stakater.com/
+    # auto: "true"`, so that enrolling each remaining broker user in rotation is
+    # a visible, reviewable edit to this line rather than something that starts
+    # happening implicitly.
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-health-credentials
 spec:
   replicas: 1
   strategy:
@@ -177,7 +189,9 @@ spec:
                 secretKeyRef:
                   name: mosquitto-evcc-credentials
                   key: password
-            # Probe-only credential (mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap).
+            # Probe-only credential. Now OpenBao-backed and Class-A rotated (see
+            # mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml); its bootstrap Job
+            # is gone.
             # Present here for the same reason as the others — the startup
             # shim hashes it into the passwd file — and reused by the exec
             # probes below, which run inside this container.
@@ -230,7 +244,7 @@ spec:
           #
           # Uses the dedicated least-privilege `health` user (ACL: readwrite
           # health/# only — see the passwd/acl build above and the
-          # mosquitto-health-credentials-bootstrap Job). Its password is in
+          # mosquitto-health-credentials ExternalSecret). Its password is in
           # this container's env (HEALTH_PASSWORD) because the startup shim
           # hashes every user into the passwd file; the exec probes run
           # inside this container and read it directly. A leak of this

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Projects the mosquitto `health` broker credential from OpenBao into the Secret
+# the broker already consumes. FIRST of the eight broker users to move off the
+# bootstrap Jobs and onto Class-A rotation (see
+# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
+# file lands with it)); the rotator lives at
+# kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-health.yaml.
+#
+# Secret name and key are UNCHANGED (`password`), so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
+# secretKeyRef and the exec probes that read $HEALTH_PASSWORD need no edit.
+#
+# refreshInterval is 10m rather than the 1h used by mosquitto-evcc-credentials:
+# a rotation only lands once ESO re-reads, so 1h would mean up to an hour between
+# the rotator running and the broker actually using the new password, with the
+# old one still valid in the meantime. 10m keeps that window short without
+# polling OpenBao pointlessly hard.
+#
+# ⚠️ OWNERSHIP: creationPolicy is implicitly Owner, so ESO sets an ownerReference
+# on the Secret. Deleting this ExternalSecret therefore DELETES the live Secret
+# and with it the broker's probe credential — the bootstrap Job it replaces had
+# no such coupling. To detach without destroying, set creationPolicy: Orphan
+# before removing it.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-health-credentials
+  namespace: home-assistant
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 10m
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: mosquitto-health-credentials
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/zigbee2mqtt-deployment.yaml

@@ -39,16 +39,80 @@ spec:
         # network_key, the latter extracted from the OpenBao coordinator backup
         # as a natural-byte-order int array.
         - name: seed-data
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          # alpine + jq, built by .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml from
+          # ci/images/alpine-jq/. Replaces `apk add --no-cache jq` on every pod
+          # start: tools belong in the image, not installed at runtime.
+          # Referenced by tag rather than digest — these are our own images.
+          # DATED tag, not :latest, matching the ci-ansible:2026-04-29 precedent
+          # in kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup/cronjob.yaml. With
+          # :latest, rebuilding this base for some unrelated consumer would
+          # silently change what this init container runs on its next pod
+          # restart, with no diff here to review — and this is the container that
+          # renders the Zigbee network key. Bumping the tag is a deliberate,
+          # reviewable act; the cost is remembering to bump it.
+          #
+          # This tag ALREADY EXISTS and was verified pullable before merge — the
+          # build step also fires on branch pushes, so it was published when this
+          # branch was pushed. That matters because Flux reconciles this directory
+          # on a 10m poll with no ordering against the kaniko pipeline, and with
+          # replicas: 1 + strategy: Recreate an unpullable init image would leave
+          # the sole Zigbee coordinator in ImagePullBackOff.
+          #
+          # Caveat when bumping: the build derives TAG from `date` AT RUN TIME, so
+          # never write a date here that a build has not already produced. If a
+          # later master build runs on a different day it publishes that day's tag
+          # and leaves this one untouched (tags are not deleted), so this keeps
+          # resolving — but the image then came from the branch build rather than
+          # master. Re-point it at a master-built tag when convenient.
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c
             - |
               set -eu
               umask 077
-              apk add --no-cache jq >/dev/null
+              # Read the network key with a real JSON parser. NOT a hand-rolled
+              # sed/awk match: "key" occurs 12 times in the real backup (once per
+              # device with an APS link_key) and the FIRST occurrence is a DEVICE
+              # key, because "devices" sorts before "network_key". An unanchored
+              # extraction yields a device link key, and herdsman then forms a
+              # NEW network and drops every device.
+              # `?` on BOTH selectors, plus the `// ""` fallback, so every
+              # malformed shape reaches the checks below with a readable message
+              # instead of aborting on jq's raw error under `set -e`.
+              #
+              # Measured against jq 1.7.1 in this image. The expression AS WRITTEN
+              # returns an EMPTY string at rc=0 for every one of:
+              #   {}  {"devices":[]}  {"network_key":{}}  {"network_key":null}
+              #   {"network_key":"abc"}  {"network_key":123}   (parent not an object)
+              #   []  "a string"                               (top level not an object)
+              # and the key itself for a well-formed backup.
+              #
+              # The guards are what make that true. Bare `.network_key.key` exits
+              # 5 with `Cannot index ... with string "key"` on the last four
+              # shapes, and `set -e` would abort right here, surfacing jq's error
+              # instead of the FATAL lines below.
+              KEY=$(jq -r '(.network_key?.key? // "")' /backup/coordinator_backup.json)
+              # Fail LOUDLY rather than render a wrong key, for the same reason.
+              # `-z` is the arm that actually fires today: `// ""` maps a null
+              # result to empty, so KEY is never the literal text "null" with the
+              # expression above. The "null" arm is belt-and-braces for a future
+              # edit that drops the fallback, where jq WOULD print `null`. Both
+              # mean "absent" — reporting them as merely "non-hex" would send you
+              # looking at the key instead of at the missing field.
+              if [ "$KEY" = "null" ] || [ -z "$KEY" ]; then
+                echo "FATAL: .network_key.key absent from coordinator_backup.json" >&2
+                exit 1
+              fi
+              case "$KEY" in
+                *[!0-9a-fA-F]*) echo "FATAL: network_key contains non-hex characters" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+              esac
+              if [ "${#KEY}" -ne 32 ]; then
+                echo "FATAL: network_key length ${#KEY}, expected 32 hex chars" >&2
+                exit 1
+              fi
               # hex key "fe0b..2d" -> "0xfe,0x0b,..,0x2d" (natural order)
-              NK=$(jq -r '.network_key.key' /backup/coordinator_backup.json | sed 's/../0x&,/g; s/,$//')
+              NK=$(printf '%s' "$KEY" | sed 's/../0x&,/g; s/,$//')
               cat > /app/data/secret.yaml <<EOF
               mqtt_password: "${MQTT_PASSWORD}"
               network_key: [${NK}]

kubernetes/apps/music-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ spec:
         # stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
         # policy) — no extra dependency.
         - name: reconcile-publish-ip
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.9 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.10 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
           command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
           volumeMounts:
             - name: data
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
               readOnly: true
       containers:
         - name: music-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.9 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.10 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: LOG_LEVEL
               value: info

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -88,13 +88,17 @@ spec:
       # trust without disabling verification.
       initContainers:
         - name: fetch-bridge-cert
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          # alpine + the openssl CLI, built by .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml
+          # from ci/images/alpine-openssl/. Replaces `apk add --no-cache openssl`
+          # on every paperless pod start: tools belong in the image, not
+          # installed at runtime. Dated tag so a change is a reviewable diff
+          # here, matching the ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c
             - |
               set -e
-              apk add --no-cache openssl
               # Wait until the bridge presents a cert via STARTTLS.
               # Re-fetched on every paperless restart so a bridge cert
               # rotation only requires a paperless rollout to pick up.

kubernetes/infrastructure/cilium/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@ spec:
     kubeProxyReplacement: true
     socketLB:
       enabled: true
+    prometheus:
+      # The agent exported no metrics at all, so BPF map utilisation was
+      # invisible: when per-endpoint policy maps (cilium_policy_v3_*) run out
+      # of space the agent only says "no space left on device" in its log and
+      # pod sandbox creation fails (issue #452). cilium_bpf_map_pressure makes
+      # that observable — and alertable — before it stalls a rollout.
+      enabled: true
+      serviceMonitor:
+        enabled: true
     bpf:
       # Let pods reach the cluster's own LoadBalancer external IPs; Cilium
       # redirects the socket directly to the backend pod instead of sending

kubernetes/infrastructure/multus/cni-plugins-installer.yaml

@@ -38,41 +38,57 @@ spec:
           effect: NoExecute
       initContainers:
         - name: install
-          image: alpine:3.21
+          # Plugin binaries are baked into this image, checksum-verified at build
+          # time (ci/images/cni-plugins/Containerfile). This replaces fetching the
+          # release tarball from GitHub on the node, which had NO integrity check
+          # at all and put github.com on the critical path of every node rebuild.
+          # Dated tag so a version change is a reviewable diff here, matching the
+          # ci-ansible / alpine-jq convention.
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:2026-07-30
           command:
             - sh
             - -c
             - |
               set -eu
-              VERSION=v1.5.1
-              ARCH=amd64
-              URL="https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins/releases/download/${VERSION}/cni-plugins-linux-${ARCH}-${VERSION}.tgz"
-              cd /host/opt/cni/bin
-              if [ -x ./macvlan ] && [ -x ./static ] && [ -x ./host-local ]; then
-                installed=$(./macvlan 2>&1 | head -1 || true)
-                echo "CNI plugins already installed (${installed})"
-              else
-                echo "Fetching ${URL}"
-                apk add --no-cache curl tar
-                curl -fsSL "${URL}" -o /tmp/plugins.tgz
-                # Extract everything: the tarball entries are stored with a
-                # `./` prefix, so selective extraction by bare name fails.
-                # All standard plugins are tiny (~5-10MB total) and harmless
-                # to keep alongside Cilium's CNI binaries.
-                tar -xzf /tmp/plugins.tgz -C .
-                echo "Installed: $(ls -la macvlan static host-local)"
-              fi
-              # Always restore root ownership of /opt/cni/bin. The cni-plugins
-              # tarball includes a `./` directory entry whose uid/gid (1001/127
-              # — the github-actions runner that built the release) gets
-              # applied to the destination during extract. After that, Cilium's
-              # apply-sysctl-overwrites init container fails with "Permission
-              # denied" trying to `cp` cilium-sysctlfix into /hostbin, because
-              # the init runs root without DAC_OVERRIDE and the directory is
-              # no longer owned by root. The previous cluster only worked
-              # because the original Cilium pods initialised before the chown
-              # happened and were never re-rolled; on rebuild, the rolling
-              # daemonset replacement bites.
+              SRC=/opt/cni-plugins
+              DST=/host/opt/cni/bin
+
+              # No network, no download, no "already installed?" guard. The old
+              # guard existed to avoid re-fetching; a local copy is cheap, so
+              # copying unconditionally is better — the node then always matches
+              # the version pinned in this manifest instead of keeping whatever
+              # it happened to install first.
+              for src in "$SRC"/*; do
+                name=${src##*/}
+                # Copy to a temp name in the SAME directory and rename over the
+                # target. A plain `cp` onto a plugin the kubelet is currently
+                # executing can fail with ETXTBSY; rename(2) never does, and is
+                # atomic, so a concurrent CNI invocation sees either the old or
+                # the new binary and never a partial one.
+                cp "$src" "$DST/.$name.tmp"
+                chmod 0755 "$DST/.$name.tmp"
+                mv -f "$DST/.$name.tmp" "$DST/$name"
+              done
+
+              echo "Installed from $(basename "$SRC") image:"
+              ls -la "$DST/macvlan" "$DST/static" "$DST/host-local"
+              echo "Version: $("$DST/macvlan" 2>&1 | head -1 || true)"
+              # Kept, but now as a REPAIR rather than a workaround. The original
+              # cause is gone: extracting the tarball on the node applied the
+              # archive's `./` entry uid/gid (1001/127 — the github-actions runner
+              # that built the release) to the destination directory, and `cp`
+              # into an existing directory does not touch its ownership, so that
+              # can no longer happen.
+              #
+              # It still runs because nodes provisioned by the old installer may
+              # ALREADY carry the wrong ownership, and this is what fixes them.
+              # Why it matters: Cilium's apply-sysctl-overwrites init container
+              # runs as root without DAC_OVERRIDE, so with /opt/cni/bin not owned
+              # by root it fails with "Permission denied" copying cilium-sysctlfix
+              # into /hostbin. The old cluster only survived because the original
+              # Cilium pods initialised before the chown and were never re-rolled;
+              # a rolling daemonset replacement on rebuild is what exposed it.
+              # Safe to drop once every node has been through this version.
               chown 0:0 /host/opt/cni/bin
           securityContext:
             privileged: true

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# OpenBao policy: rotator-mosquitto-health
+#
+# Least-privilege policy for the mosquitto `health` broker-credential rotation
+# CronJob (kubernetes auth role `rotator-mosquitto-health`). PER-SECRET
+# isolation, same template as rotator-paperless: one policy + one role per
+# rotated secret, so a compromised rotation Job cannot touch any other secret.
+#
+# Scoped to the `health` credential ALONE, deliberately not to a wildcard over
+# apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-*. The broker has eight users and they are being
+# enrolled one at a time; a wildcard would silently grant the first rotator write
+# access to the other seven before they are ready, which is exactly the blast
+# radius this per-secret pattern exists to avoid.
+#
+# Plan and phasing: kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/
+# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md — added by PR #453, which is not yet
+# merged, so that path does not resolve until it lands.
+#
+# NOT applied by Flux — OpenBao policies/roles are not Kubernetes resources
+# (same convention as eso-read.hcl and every other rotator policy). Apply ONCE
+# with an admin token:
+#
+#   bao policy write rotator-mosquitto-health \
+#     kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl
+#
+#   bao write auth/kubernetes/role/rotator-mosquitto-health \
+#     bound_service_account_names=mosquitto-health-secret-rotator \
+#     bound_service_account_namespaces=openbao \
+#     policies=rotator-mosquitto-health ttl=15m
+#
+# Do NOT set token_no_default_policy=true — the `bao kv patch` kv-v2 preflight
+# needs the default policy (see rotator.hcl). The rotator writes via patch, so
+# hardening the role that way would break rotation rather than tighten it.
+#
+# BOOTSTRAP: `random` mode calls assert_fields_exist BEFORE patching, so it
+# ROTATES an existing field and never creates one. The path must already hold a
+# `password` field or the Job fails safe without writing. Seed it once:
+#
+#   bao kv put homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials \
+#     password="$(kubectl -n home-assistant get secret mosquitto-health-credentials \
+#                 -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d)"
+#
+# (Reads are already covered by eso-read.hcl's `homelab/data/*`, so the
+# ExternalSecret needs no policy change.)
+path "homelab/data/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials" {
+  capabilities = ["read", "patch"]
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/authentik.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["random"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/claude-oauth.yaml

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: sync-woodpecker
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["woodpecker-secret"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/cloudflare.yaml

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:978fe53cad83a8d55319f6201ecd171775a101b21aaa21b7ec3c7b14304c6a42
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["cloudflare-roll"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["random"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/external-dns.yaml

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:978fe53cad83a8d55319f6201ecd171775a101b21aaa21b7ec3c7b14304c6a42
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["cloudflare-roll"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/flux-git.yaml

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:b41cc3645f144179dddaa5ab1d32282c57c257432a613c15a6e15634fd0c4b81
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["gitea-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/home-assistant.yaml

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["ha-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["ha-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["ha-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/kustomization.yaml

@@ -4,6 +4,46 @@ kind: Kustomization
 # (intra-namespace OpenBao access → no NetworkPolicy needed). One file per rotated
 # secret. The matching OpenBao policy/role for each lives in ../policies/ and is
 # bootstrapped manually (not GitOps-managed).
+#
+# IMAGE PINNING: every rotator here uses a DATED TAG of secret-rotator
+# (`:YYYY-MM-DD`), never a digest and never `:latest`. This is a registry-local
+# image, so it does not need digest pinning, and a dated tag makes "what actually
+# runs" a reviewable diff.
+#
+# Digests were tried and actively broke: untagged manifests are garbage-collected
+# once :latest and the dated tags move past them, so a digest pinned today stops
+# resolving after a few rebuilds. That decay is driven by edits to
+# .woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml — a shared file — so adding an UNRELATED image
+# republishes secret-rotator and orphans the manifest every rotator here was
+# pinned to. 11 of these were pinned to digests that no longer existed and would
+# have ImagePullBackOff'd on their first scheduled run (issue #458); because they
+# are quarterly, that would have looked like nothing happening rather than like a
+# failure.
+#
+# Keep them all on one tag: it is a single binary containing every mode
+# (random | ha-token | cloudflare-roll | netbird-key | proxmox-token |
+# gitea-token | woodpecker-secret), so a split serves no purpose and just makes
+# the next bump partial.
+#
+# ADDING A ROTATOR: copy an existing file, and check you did not inherit a
+# digest pin from an older example — nothing enforces this automatically, so it
+# is easy to reintroduce silently and the failure only shows up months later on
+# the first scheduled run:
+#
+#   grep -l 'image:.*@sha256' \
+#     kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/*.yaml | grep -v kustomization.yaml
+#
+# (want: no output. The trailing filter is not padding — this file documents the
+# pattern, so it necessarily matches its own grep. Verified both directions:
+# silent across this directory as it stands, and it still reports a file that
+# actually carries an `image: …@sha256:` pin.)
+#
+# BUMPING the tag: verify the new one exists BEFORE committing — a tag that was
+# never built fails exactly like the digests did, and just as quietly:
+#
+#   kubectl run tagcheck --rm -i --restart=Never \
+#     --image=gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:<DATE> \
+#     --command -- /secret-rotator          # prints the usage/mode list if the tag resolves
 resources:
   - paperless.yaml
   - woodpecker.yaml
@@ -18,3 +58,4 @@ resources:
   - home-assistant.yaml
   - review-bot.yaml
   - claude-oauth.yaml
+  - mosquitto-health.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-health.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+# Class-A automated rotation of the mosquitto `health` broker credential — a
+# self-generated random secret.
+#
+# FIRST of the eight mosquitto broker users to be enrolled. The credentials were
+# previously minted once by bootstrap Jobs and then never changed at all: no
+# schedule, no compromise response, and they existed only in the Secret object,
+# outside the OpenBao snapshot. See kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/
+# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
+# file lands with it) for the full plan and phasing.
+#
+# `health` deliberately goes first: it is the broker's OWN liveness/readiness
+# probe credential, consumed by exec probes inside the mosquitto container via
+# the same Secret that seeds the passwd file. Nothing outside the pod holds it,
+# so a rotation needs no coordination with any client — the smallest possible
+# blast radius for proving rotator -> OpenBao -> ESO -> Reloader end to end.
+#
+# Runs the secret-rotator binary (random mode): generate 32 random bytes,
+# standard-base64 encode, and merge-patch into OpenBao. assert_fields_exist runs
+# FIRST, so a misconfigured path fails safe (no rotation) rather than adding a
+# stray field — which also means this ROTATES an existing value and never
+# bootstraps one. Seeding is a one-time out-of-band step, documented in
+# policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl.
+#
+# Base64 output is safe for this credential specifically: the probes pass it as
+# `-P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"` to mosquitto_pub/sub inside the container, so the `+`,
+# `/` and `=` characters are never parsed by a URL or a config file. That is NOT
+# automatically true of the other seven users (sml2mqtt and open3e templates on
+# the edge host, Shelly device firmware, the HA config entry), so the charset
+# must be re-checked per user before enrolling each one — the old bootstrap Jobs
+# generated alphanumeric-only passwords with `tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9'`.
+#
+# openbao-ns pattern: the Job runs in the openbao namespace, reaching the
+# OpenBao API intra-namespace — no NetworkPolicy needed. It writes OpenBao only;
+# ESO syncs mosquitto-health-credentials (ns home-assistant) and Reloader
+# restarts the broker so the passwd file is rebuilt from the new value.
+#
+# Rotation is not instant: it completes only after the ExternalSecret's
+# refreshInterval elapses and the broker rolls. During that roll two broker pods
+# with different passwd files sit behind the LB (maxUnavailable: 0/maxSurge: 1),
+# so a probe against the outgoing pod can fail auth briefly. Self-healing.
+#
+# ON-DEMAND: kubectl -n openbao create job --from=cronjob/mosquitto-health-secret-rotate mosquitto-health-secret-rotate-now
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
+  namespace: openbao
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
+    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
+---
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotate
+  namespace: openbao
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
+    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
+spec:
+  # Quarterly, offset one month from paperless (which runs Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct) so
+  # unrelated rotations do not land in the same window and complicate diagnosis.
+  schedule: "0 4 1 2,5,8,11 *"
+  timeZone: Europe/Berlin
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 5
+  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      backoffLimit: 2
+      activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
+      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
+      template:
+        metadata:
+          labels:
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
+            app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
+        spec:
+          serviceAccountName: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
+          restartPolicy: Never
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          containers:
+            - name: rotate
+              # Dated tag, per the convention documented in kustomization.yaml —
+              # every rotator here now uses the same one. Verified for this tag:
+              # it pulls, `random` is among its modes, and it carries the
+              # RANDOM_BYTES>=16 floor documented below (RANDOM_BYTES=8 exits
+              # "refusing to generate a weak secret").
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
+              args: ["random"]
+              securityContext:
+                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+                capabilities:
+                  drop: ["ALL"]
+              env:
+                - name: BAO_ADDR
+                  value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
+                - name: BAO_ROLE
+                  value: rotator-mosquitto-health
+                - name: BAO_PATH
+                  value: homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
+                # Matches the key the ExternalSecret projects and the key the
+                # Secret already carries, so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
+                # secretKeyRef is unchanged.
+                - name: BAO_FIELDS
+                  value: "password"
+                # 32 bytes -> 44 base64 chars. The binary refuses anything below
+                # 16 bytes outright.
+                - name: RANDOM_BYTES
+                  value: "32"
+              resources:
+                requests:
+                  cpu: 25m
+                  memory: 16Mi
+                limits:
+                  memory: 48Mi

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/netbird-ingress.yaml

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:49bfddd8eeb5fd871cbeb05bc3b4e2fcaaab7d9e24cc3007caae6084b4634c18
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["netbird-key"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/paperless.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["random"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/pve-exporter.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:97c22bcff324a93d2bb7bf3adb2894b405ed1a8035d02ad1ff6baced3813cefe
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["proxmox-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/review-bot.yaml

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           initContainers:
             - name: rotate-mint
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["gitea-token"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ spec:
                   memory: 48Mi
           containers:
             - name: sync-woodpecker
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:828bf4863286411bfd7ef9fdff617586588050c814743bec601a9222692162e4
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["woodpecker-secret"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/shelly-manager.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["random"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/woodpecker.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ spec:
               type: RuntimeDefault
           containers:
             - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator@sha256:159e5888ff4e23f5fe7fb1284711d81591635f840888e61402af311b0a76ba92
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
               args: ["random"]
               securityContext:
                 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false