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1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
d42862e2d8 |
+27
-28
@@ -4,31 +4,6 @@ FreeRADIUS terminates EAP-TTLS and proxies the inner PAP request to the
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authentik RADIUS outpost `802.1X Radius`. authentik checks the password and
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the access policy and returns the VLAN.
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## Routing by outer identity
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FreeRADIUS decides on the outer EAP identity (`User-Name`) of each request,
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before any local EAP processing:
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| Outer identity | Path |
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|---|---|
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| `anonymous` or `anonymous@<anything>` (any case) | EAP-TTLS terminated in FreeRADIUS, inner PAP to authentik |
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| anything else | whole EAP conversation (all rounds, `State` included) proxied to the UDM RADIUS for UniFi Endpoint accounts |
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UniFi Endpoint clients send their real account name as outer identity; their
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names look like ordinary usernames, so the rule cannot match on name patterns.
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The UDM's Access-Accept/Reject/Challenge goes to the NAS unchanged, including
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its Tunnel-* VLAN and MS-MPPE keys. The "Accept without VLAN is rejected" rule
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applies to the authentik path only. Accounting is answered locally on both
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paths.
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The anonymous outer identity is mandatory for authentik clients: without it
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the login goes to the UDM and fails.
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UDM target: home server `udm`, `10.2.47.1` UDP 1812 (the UDM on VLAN 47, same
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address as the BGP peer in `kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/cilium-bgp.yaml`),
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shared secret `UDM_RADIUS_SECRET` from OpenBao `apps/radius`. Egress is
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allowed by CNP `freeradius-udm-egress` in `freeradius-cnp.yaml`.
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## authentik objects
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Defined in `kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml`, key
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@@ -94,6 +69,32 @@ The FreeRADIUS clients `test` (10.2.50.0/24) and `test6` (fd02:50::/64) and
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their CIDRs in `freeradius-cnp.yaml` are for the test phase only and must be
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removed after the test.
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## UniFi objects
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Created through the UniFi Network API (site `default`):
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| Object | ID | Settings |
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|---|---|---|
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| Firewall policy "Allow APs RADIUS" | `62c21e63-8c15-4720-adf8-b2333c090e2f` | zone Isolated `10.2.10.0/24` → zone External `10.2.99.91`, UDP `1812-1813`, ALLOW, IPv4 |
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| RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" | `3e5fcfed-63dc-4e7d-ad51-17cbc074e4bb` | auth `10.2.99.91:1812`, acct `10.2.99.91:1813`, secret `DOT1X_NAS_SECRET`, VLAN assignment on (`vlan_wlan_mode: optional`) |
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| WLAN "Renner Test" | `3eba27e7-ddc2-41fb-ad3f-82add317847a` | copy of "Renner UniFi" (WPA2/WPA3 Enterprise transition, fast roaming, BSS transition, same AP group and bands), network (90) Guest as fallback, RADIUS profile "Cluster 802.1X" |
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## Live login check
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`tests/radius/live.sh` runs EAP-TTLS/PAP logins with `eapol_test` against the
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deployed FreeRADIUS from a test client range and prints result, duration and
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the VLAN attributes of the Access-Accept (hex) per login; secrets are read from
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files and never printed:
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```
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LIVE_PASSWORD_VAR=CLAUDE_BOT_PASSWORD tests/radius/live.sh 10.2.99.91 claude-bot \
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~/.config/claude-bot/authentik ~/.config/claude-bot/radius-secret 20
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```
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For IPv6 set `LIVE_SOURCE` to the workstation's `fd02:50::` address and use
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`fd99::91`. `group-id=[3530]` is VLAN `50`, `tunnel-type=[0000000d]` VLAN,
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`medium=[00000006]` IEEE-802.
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## Client setup (SSID "Renner Test")
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All clients use EAP-TTLS with inner PAP. The server certificate is a public
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@@ -108,8 +109,7 @@ inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.
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- CA certificate: Use system certificates
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- Domain: `radius.renner.uno`
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- Identity: authentik username
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- Anonymous identity: `anonymous` (mandatory; empty sends the login to the
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UDM, where it fails)
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- Anonymous identity: `anonymous`
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- Password: authentik password
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### Linux (NetworkManager)
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@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ inside the TLS tunnel to FreeRADIUS and is never sent in clear over the air.
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- Inner authentication: PAP
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- CA certificate: system bundle (e.g. `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`)
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- Domain: `radius.renner.uno`
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- Anonymous identity: `anonymous` (mandatory)
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- Username / password: authentik credentials
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### Windows 11
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@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ spec:
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# on an unclean shutdown is not an acceptable trade.
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checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
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max_wal_size: "2GB"
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# authentik's subclass joins over empty tables get planner costs far above
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# jit_above_cost; LLVM compilation then takes ~420 ms for a query that
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# executes in 0.1 ms (every flow start, every RADIUS/LDAP login).
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jit: "off"
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# zstd, not "on": the boolean spelling resolves to pglz (2016-era, weaker
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# and slower than the lz4/zstd this build also accepts). Compresses the
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# full-page images that dominate WAL volume after each checkpoint.
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@@ -23,26 +23,6 @@ spec:
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- port: "1813"
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protocol: UDP
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---
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# FreeRADIUS proxies UniFi Endpoint logins to the UDM RADIUS on VLAN 47.
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# 10.2.47.1 is also the UDM BGP peer in
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# kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/cilium-bgp.yaml.
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apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
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kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: freeradius-udm-egress
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namespace: authentik
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spec:
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endpointSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: freeradius
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egress:
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- toCIDR:
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- 10.2.47.1/32
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toPorts:
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- ports:
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- port: "1812"
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protocol: UDP
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---
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# FreeRADIUS proxies inner PAP to the 802.1X outpost on its container port.
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# Additive: default-deny-ingress already admits the whole namespace.
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apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
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@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
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# FreeRADIUS 3.2 config for 802.1X: outer identity anonymous[@...] -> EAP-TTLS
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# terminated here, inner PAP proxied to the authentik outpost
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# ak-outpost-8021x-radius; any other outer identity -> whole EAP conversation
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# proxied to the UDM RADIUS (UniFi Endpoint). Replaces the image's raddb
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# completely. Functional test: tests/radius/run.sh.
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# FreeRADIUS 3.2 config for 802.1X: EAP-TTLS terminated here, inner PAP
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# proxied to the authentik outpost ak-outpost-8021x-radius. Replaces the
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# image's raddb completely. Functional test: tests/radius/run.sh.
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# VLAN contract: docs/radius/dot1x.md.
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: ConfigMap
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@@ -34,10 +32,9 @@ data:
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max_request_time = 30
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cleanup_delay = 5
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# Greater than every home server's response_window (proxy.conf): never
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# forward a NAS retransmit to a home server. A TTLS inner request sent
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# twice to the home server leaves a freed request in the proxy hash;
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# radiusd segfaults.
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# Greater than response_window (proxy.conf): never forward a NAS
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# retransmit to the outpost. A TTLS inner request sent twice to the home
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# server leaves a freed request in the proxy hash; radiusd segfaults.
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proxy_dedup_window = 10
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max_requests = 16384
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hostname_lookups = no
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@@ -155,41 +152,6 @@ data:
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nostrip
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}
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# UDM RADIUS (FreeRADIUS) for UniFi Endpoint accounts; gets the whole
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# outer EAP conversation. Address: UDM on VLAN 47, also the BGP peer in
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# kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/cilium-bgp.yaml.
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home_server udm {
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type = auth
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ipaddr = 10.2.47.1
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port = 1812
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proto = udp
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secret = $ENV{UDM_RADIUS_SECRET}
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# RFC 3579: every reply to an EAP request carries Message-Authenticator.
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require_message_authenticator = yes
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# Less than proxy_dedup_window (radiusd.conf).
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response_window = 5
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zombie_period = 20
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# Probe with an Access-Request for a user that cannot exist (no
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# EAP-Message, so no Endpoint login); the reject counts as an answer.
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# Sent only while zombie or dead.
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status_check = request
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username = "udm-status-probe.invalid"
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password = "not-a-secret"
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check_interval = 6
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check_timeout = 4
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num_answers_to_alive = 3
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}
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home_server_pool udm {
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type = fail-over
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home_server = udm
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}
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realm udm {
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auth_pool = udm
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nostrip
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}
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mods-enabled_always: |
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always ok {
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rcode = ok
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@@ -257,19 +219,10 @@ data:
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}
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authorize {
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# EAP only.
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# EAP-TTLS only.
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if (!&EAP-Message) {
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reject
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}
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# Outer identity anonymous[@realm]: authentik clients, EAP-TTLS here.
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# Any other: UniFi Endpoint account (real name as outer identity);
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# every round goes to the UDM unprocessed.
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if (&User-Name && &User-Name !~ /^anonymous(@.*)?$/i) {
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update control {
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&Proxy-To-Realm := udm
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}
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return
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}
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eap {
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ok = return
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updated = return
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@@ -292,23 +245,12 @@ data:
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ok
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}
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# UDM replies pass unchanged.
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post-auth {
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if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
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noop
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}
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else {
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update reply {
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&Cisco-AVPair !* ANY
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}
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update reply {
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&Cisco-AVPair !* ANY
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}
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Post-Auth-Type REJECT {
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if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
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noop
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}
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else {
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eap
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}
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eap
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}
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}
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@@ -317,12 +259,7 @@ data:
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# Runs the TTLS callback that hands the outpost reply back into the tunnel.
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post-proxy {
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if (&control:Proxy-To-Realm == "udm") {
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noop
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}
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else {
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eap
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}
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eap
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}
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}
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@@ -89,11 +89,6 @@ spec:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: radius-secrets
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key: DOT1X_OUTPOST_SECRET
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- name: UDM_RADIUS_SECRET
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: radius-secrets
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key: UDM_RADIUS_SECRET
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ports:
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- name: radius
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containerPort: 1812
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@@ -69,11 +69,6 @@ spec:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: ak-pg-app
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key: password
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# Default 0 opens a new Postgres connection per request.
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- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__CONN_MAX_AGE
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value: "60"
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- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__CONN_HEALTH_CHECKS
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value: "true"
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- name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__PASSWORD
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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+7
-16
@@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ tests/radius/run.sh
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Runs the production FreeRADIUS config from
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`kubernetes/apps/authentik/freeradius-config.yaml` (rendered through the
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projected volume in `freeradius.yaml`, same image, args and secret env names)
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in Docker against a mock authentik outpost and a mock UDM RADIUS, and drives
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it with `eapol_test` (EAP-TTLS, inner PAP) as a NAS in the test client ranges
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`10.2.50.0/24` and `fd02:50::/64`. The v6 cases (`v6-*`) hit the IPv6
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listeners and client `test6`. Cases use outer identity `anonymous` unless
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noted.
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in Docker against a mock authentik outpost, and drives it with `eapol_test`
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(EAP-TTLS, inner PAP) as a NAS in the test client ranges `10.2.50.0/24` and
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`fd02:50::/64`. The v6 cases (`v6-*`) hit the IPv6 listeners and client `test6`.
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| Case | Expected |
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|---|---|
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@@ -19,22 +17,12 @@ noted.
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| `vlan-avpair` (outpost sends only `Cisco-AV-Pair = "dot1x-vlan=50"`) | SUCCESS, Tunnel-* VLAN 50, no Cisco-AV-Pair |
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| `novlan` (Accept without VLAN) | FAILURE (Access-Reject) |
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| wrong password / unknown user (Reject without Message-Authenticator) | FAILURE (Access-Reject) within 1 s |
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| Accounting-Request | answered locally, nothing sent to the outpost or the UDM |
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| `anon-realm` (outer identity `Anonymous@Example.Org`) | local TTLS, as `vlan-tunnel` |
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| `udm-accept`, `v6-udm-accept` (outer identity = account name) | both EAP rounds reach the mock UDM (second with its `State`); its Access-Accept reaches the NAS with Tunnel-* VLAN 200 and MS-MPPE keys unchanged |
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| `udm-reject` | the mock UDM's Access-Reject reaches the NAS within 1 s |
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| all `anonymous` cases | never reach the mock UDM |
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| `recovery` | outpost stalls until marked dead, then returns: login succeeds within 20 s |
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| Accounting-Request | answered locally, nothing sent to the outpost |
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Pieces:
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- `mock_outpost.py`: stand-in outpost on UDP 1812, reachable under the
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outpost Service FQDN through a Docker network alias.
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- `mock_udm.py`: stand-in UDM RADIUS at the `udm` home server address from
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`proxy.conf`, on a second internal bridge `radtest-udm` (that address's
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/24, no host address). Answers round 1 with Challenge + `State` +
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EAP-TTLS Start (or Reject for `endpoint-reject`), round 2 with Accept +
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EAP-Success; terminates no EAP.
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- `eapol.Dockerfile`: `eapol_test` from Debian `eapoltest`.
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- Docker network `radtest`: internal bridge on `10.2.50.0/24` and
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`fd02:50::/64` with no host address (`inhibit_ipv4`,
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@@ -43,3 +31,6 @@ Pieces:
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Requires Docker, `openssl` and `yq` (the jq wrapper). Secrets, password and
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certificates are generated dummies. `RADTEST_DEBUG=1` runs radiusd with `-xx`
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and prints all logs. Containers, network and temp files are removed on exit.
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`live.sh` logs in against the deployed FreeRADIUS instead; usage in
|
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`docs/radius/dot1x.md` ("Live login check").
|
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Executable
+77
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Live EAP-TTLS/PAP login against the deployed FreeRADIUS from a test client
|
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# (10.2.50.0/24 / fd02:50::/64, client "test"/"test6").
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#
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# Usage: tests/radius/live.sh <server-ip> <identity> <password-file> <secret-file> [count]
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# password-file: the password on the first line, or `export NAME=value` lines
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# (LIVE_PASSWORD_VAR selects the variable, default CLAUDE_BOT_TOKEN)
|
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# secret-file: `bao kv get` output of apps/radius, or the bare
|
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# DOT1X_TEST_SECRET on the first line
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# count: number of logins (default 1)
|
||||
# LIVE_SOURCE: optional local address for eapol_test -A (must be in a
|
||||
# test client range)
|
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# Prints one line per login: result, duration, VLAN. Secrets are never printed.
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set -euo pipefail
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server="$1"
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identity="$2"
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password_file="$3"
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secret_file="$4"
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count="${5:-1}"
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password_var="${LIVE_PASSWORD_VAR:-CLAUDE_BOT_TOKEN}"
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||||
|
||||
read_password() {
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local line
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||||
line=$(grep -m1 -E "^export ${password_var}=" "$password_file" || true)
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||||
if [ -n "$line" ]; then
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||||
line="${line#*=}"
|
||||
line="${line#\"}"; line="${line%\"}"
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||||
line="${line#\'}"; line="${line%\'}"
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||||
printf '%s' "$line"
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||||
else
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||||
head -n1 "$password_file"
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||||
fi
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
read_secret() {
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||||
local s
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||||
s=$(sed -n 's/.*DOT1X_TEST_SECRET:\([^] ]*\).*/\1/p' "$secret_file")
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||||
if [ -n "$s" ]; then printf '%s' "$s"; else head -n1 "$secret_file"; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
work=$(mktemp -d)
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||||
trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
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||||
chmod 700 "$work"
|
||||
|
||||
password=$(read_password)
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||||
secret=$(read_secret)
|
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[ -n "$password" ] || { echo "no password found in $password_file" >&2; exit 2; }
|
||||
[ -n "$secret" ] || { echo "no DOT1X_TEST_SECRET found in $secret_file" >&2; exit 2; }
|
||||
|
||||
umask 077
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||||
cat > "$work/eapol.conf" <<EOF
|
||||
network={
|
||||
ssid="Renner Test"
|
||||
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
|
||||
eap=TTLS
|
||||
identity="${identity}"
|
||||
anonymous_identity="anonymous"
|
||||
ca_cert="/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
|
||||
domain_suffix_match="radius.renner.uno"
|
||||
phase2="auth=PAP"
|
||||
password="${password}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
for i in $(seq 1 "$count"); do
|
||||
start=$(date +%s%N)
|
||||
out=$(eapol_test -c "$work/eapol.conf" -a "$server" ${LIVE_SOURCE:+-A "$LIVE_SOURCE"} -s "$secret" -t 10 2>&1 || true)
|
||||
end=$(date +%s%N)
|
||||
ms=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
|
||||
result=$(tail -n1 <<<"$out")
|
||||
case "$result" in SUCCESS|FAILURE) ;; *) result="NO-RESULT" ;; esac
|
||||
# Attribute lines of the Access-Accept as the NAS received it (hex values).
|
||||
attrs=$(awk '/RADIUS message: code=2 /{f=1; next} f && /^ /{print; next} f{f=0}' <<<"$out")
|
||||
attr() { awk -v a="Attribute $1 " 'index($0, a){getline; sub(/^ *Value: /, ""); print; exit}' <<<"$attrs"; }
|
||||
echo "login $i: $result ${ms}ms tunnel-type=[$(attr 64)] medium=[$(attr 65)] group-id=[$(attr 81)]"
|
||||
done
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import socket
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET = os.environ["MOCK_SECRET"].encode()
|
||||
PASSWORD = os.environ["MOCK_PASSWORD"].encode()
|
||||
|
||||
ACCESS_REQUEST, ACCESS_ACCEPT, ACCESS_REJECT = 1, 2, 3
|
||||
ATTR_USER_NAME, ATTR_USER_PASSWORD, ATTR_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR = 1, 2, 80
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +85,6 @@ def build_reply(code, ident, req_auth, attrs, with_ma):
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
password = os.environ["MOCK_PASSWORD"].encode()
|
||||
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
|
||||
sock.bind(("0.0.0.0", 1812))
|
||||
print("mock outpost listening on udp/1812", flush=True)
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ def main():
|
||||
attrs = parse_attrs(packet[20:])
|
||||
user = next((v for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_USER_NAME), b"")
|
||||
enc = next((v for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_USER_PASSWORD), b"")
|
||||
password_ok = decrypt_password(enc, req_auth) == password
|
||||
password_ok = decrypt_password(enc, req_auth) == PASSWORD
|
||||
ma = request_ma_ok(packet, attrs)
|
||||
if password_ok and user in REPLIES:
|
||||
out = build_reply(ACCESS_ACCEPT, ident, req_auth, REPLIES[user], True)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Stand-in for the UDM RADIUS (UDP 1812) that UniFi Endpoint logins go to.
|
||||
|
||||
Terminates nothing; logs what arrives and answers just enough EAP to prove
|
||||
that FreeRADIUS proxies the whole conversation:
|
||||
round 1 (EAP-Response/Identity, no State)
|
||||
identity endpoint-reject Access-Reject + EAP-Failure
|
||||
any other identity Access-Challenge + State + EAP-Request/TTLS-Start
|
||||
round 2 (State from round 1)
|
||||
Access-Accept + EAP-Success, Tunnel-* VLAN 200, MS-MPPE-Recv-Key 0x11 * 32,
|
||||
MS-MPPE-Send-Key 0x22 * 32
|
||||
no EAP-Message (status probe), unknown State Access-Reject
|
||||
All replies carry Message-Authenticator and echo Proxy-State.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
|
||||
from mock_outpost import ATTR_USER_NAME, attr, build_reply, parse_attrs, request_ma_ok, vsa
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET = os.environ["MOCK_SECRET"].encode()
|
||||
|
||||
ACCESS_REQUEST, ACCESS_ACCEPT, ACCESS_REJECT, ACCESS_CHALLENGE = 1, 2, 3, 11
|
||||
ATTR_STATE, ATTR_PROXY_STATE, ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE = 24, 33, 79
|
||||
EAP_REQUEST, EAP_RESPONSE, EAP_SUCCESS, EAP_FAILURE = 1, 2, 3, 4
|
||||
EAP_IDENTITY, EAP_TTLS = 1, 21
|
||||
|
||||
STATE = b"udm-mock-state-1"
|
||||
RECV_KEY = b"\x11" * 32
|
||||
SEND_KEY = b"\x22" * 32
|
||||
TUNNEL_VLAN_200 = (
|
||||
attr(64, b"\x00\x00\x00\x0d") # Tunnel-Type = VLAN
|
||||
+ attr(65, b"\x00\x00\x00\x06") # Tunnel-Medium-Type = IEEE-802
|
||||
+ attr(81, b"200") # Tunnel-Private-Group-Id = "200"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mppe_key(key, req_auth, salt):
|
||||
"""RFC 2548 2.4.2 encryption of an MS-MPPE key."""
|
||||
plain = bytes([len(key)]) + key
|
||||
plain += b"\x00" * (-len(plain) % 16)
|
||||
out, last = b"", req_auth + salt
|
||||
for i in range(0, len(plain), 16):
|
||||
b = hashlib.md5(SECRET + last).digest()
|
||||
chunk = bytes(p ^ k for p, k in zip(plain[i : i + 16], b))
|
||||
out += chunk
|
||||
last = chunk
|
||||
return salt + out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def eap(code, ident, payload=b""):
|
||||
return struct.pack("!BBH", code, ident, 4 + len(payload)) + payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
|
||||
sock.bind(("0.0.0.0", 1812))
|
||||
print("mock udm listening on udp/1812", flush=True)
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
packet, peer = sock.recvfrom(4096)
|
||||
if len(packet) < 20:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
code, ident, _length = struct.unpack("!BBH", packet[:4])
|
||||
req_auth = packet[4:20]
|
||||
if code != ACCESS_REQUEST:
|
||||
print(f"peer={peer[0]} code={code} ignored", flush=True)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
attrs = parse_attrs(packet[20:])
|
||||
user = next((v for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_USER_NAME), b"").decode(errors="replace")
|
||||
state = next((v for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_STATE), None)
|
||||
eap_msg = b"".join(v for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE)
|
||||
echo = b"".join(attr(ATTR_PROXY_STATE, v) for t, _, v in attrs if t == ATTR_PROXY_STATE)
|
||||
ma = request_ma_ok(packet, attrs)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(eap_msg) < 5:
|
||||
reply = build_reply(ACCESS_REJECT, ident, req_auth, echo, True)
|
||||
print(f"peer={peer[0]} probe user={user} request_ma={ma} -> reject", flush=True)
|
||||
elif state is None:
|
||||
eap_id = eap_msg[1]
|
||||
eap_ok = eap_msg[0] == EAP_RESPONSE and eap_msg[4] == EAP_IDENTITY
|
||||
identity = eap_msg[5:].decode(errors="replace")
|
||||
if identity == "endpoint-reject":
|
||||
body = attr(ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE, eap(EAP_FAILURE, eap_id))
|
||||
reply = build_reply(ACCESS_REJECT, ident, req_auth, echo + body, True)
|
||||
result = "reject"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
body = attr(ATTR_STATE, STATE) + attr(
|
||||
ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE, eap(EAP_REQUEST, (eap_id + 1) & 0xFF, bytes([EAP_TTLS, 0x20]))
|
||||
)
|
||||
reply = build_reply(ACCESS_CHALLENGE, ident, req_auth, echo + body, True)
|
||||
result = "challenge"
|
||||
print(
|
||||
f"peer={peer[0]} round=1 user={user} eap_identity_response={eap_ok} "
|
||||
f"eap_identity={identity} request_ma={ma} -> {result}",
|
||||
flush=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif state == STATE:
|
||||
eap_id = eap_msg[1]
|
||||
eap_type = eap_msg[4]
|
||||
body = (
|
||||
TUNNEL_VLAN_200
|
||||
+ vsa(311, 17, mppe_key(RECV_KEY, req_auth, b"\x80\x01"))
|
||||
+ vsa(311, 16, mppe_key(SEND_KEY, req_auth, b"\x80\x02"))
|
||||
+ attr(ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE, eap(EAP_SUCCESS, eap_id))
|
||||
)
|
||||
reply = build_reply(ACCESS_ACCEPT, ident, req_auth, echo + body, True)
|
||||
print(
|
||||
f"peer={peer[0]} round=2 user={user} state_ok=True eap_type={eap_type} "
|
||||
f"request_ma={ma} -> accept",
|
||||
flush=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reply = build_reply(ACCESS_REJECT, ident, req_auth, echo, True)
|
||||
print(f"peer={peer[0]} user={user} state={state.hex()} unknown -> reject", flush=True)
|
||||
sock.sendto(reply, peer)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
+16
-82
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ deploy="$app/freeradius.yaml"
|
||||
config="$app/freeradius-config.yaml"
|
||||
|
||||
net=radtest
|
||||
net_udm=radtest-udm
|
||||
# test client ranges from clients.conf
|
||||
subnet=10.2.50.0/24
|
||||
subnet6=fd02:50::/64
|
||||
@@ -33,10 +32,7 @@ cleanup() {
|
||||
local ids=()
|
||||
mapfile -t ids < <(docker ps -aq --filter name='^radtest-')
|
||||
if ((${#ids[@]} > 0)); then docker rm -f "${ids[@]}" >/dev/null; fi
|
||||
local n
|
||||
for n in "$net" "$net_udm"; do
|
||||
if [[ -n "$(docker network ls -q --filter name="^${n}\$")" ]]; then docker network rm "$n" >/dev/null; fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
if [[ -n "$(docker network ls -q --filter name="^${net}\$")" ]]; then docker network rm "$net" >/dev/null; fi
|
||||
local vols=()
|
||||
mapfile -t vols < <(docker volume ls -q --filter name='^radtest-')
|
||||
if ((${#vols[@]} > 0)); then docker volume rm "${vols[@]}" >/dev/null; fi
|
||||
@@ -151,26 +147,14 @@ start() {
|
||||
docker network create --internal --subnet "$subnet" --ipv6 --subnet "$subnet6" \
|
||||
-o com.docker.network.bridge.inhibit_ipv4=true \
|
||||
-o com.docker.network.bridge.gateway_mode_ipv6=isolated "$net" >/dev/null
|
||||
# UDM home server address from proxy.conf; its /24 is a second internal
|
||||
# bridge (gateway address moved off the UDM's).
|
||||
ip_udm="$(awk '$1 == "home_server" && $2 == "udm" {f=1} f && $1 == "ipaddr" {print $3; exit}' "$work/raddb/proxy.conf")"
|
||||
docker network create --internal --subnet "${ip_udm%.*}.0/24" --gateway "${ip_udm%.*}.254" \
|
||||
-o com.docker.network.bridge.inhibit_ipv4=true "$net_udm" >/dev/null
|
||||
local bridge n
|
||||
for n in "$net" "$net_udm"; do
|
||||
bridge="br-$(docker network inspect -f '{{printf "%.12s" .Id}}' "$n")"
|
||||
if [[ -n "$(ip -4 -o addr show dev "$bridge")" ]] \
|
||||
|| [[ -n "$(ip -6 -o addr show dev "$bridge" scope global)" ]] \
|
||||
|| [[ -n "$(ip -6 route show dev "$bridge" "$subnet6")" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "bridge $bridge got a host address or route in a test range; aborting" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
docker run -d --name radtest-udm --network "$net_udm" --ip "$ip_udm" \
|
||||
-e MOCK_SECRET=dummy-udm_radius_secret \
|
||||
-v "$here/mock_outpost.py:/mock/mock_outpost.py:ro" -v "$here/mock_udm.py:/mock/mock_udm.py:ro" \
|
||||
"$mock_image" python3 -u /mock/mock_udm.py >/dev/null
|
||||
local bridge
|
||||
bridge="br-$(docker network inspect -f '{{printf "%.12s" .Id}}' "$net")"
|
||||
if [[ -n "$(ip -4 -o addr show dev "$bridge")" ]] \
|
||||
|| [[ -n "$(ip -6 -o addr show dev "$bridge" scope global)" ]] \
|
||||
|| [[ -n "$(ip -6 route show dev "$bridge" "$subnet6")" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "bridge $bridge got a host address or route in a test range; aborting" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
docker run -d --name radtest-mock --network "$net" --ip "$ip_mock" \
|
||||
--network-alias "$outpost_fqdn" \
|
||||
@@ -199,9 +183,7 @@ start() {
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
docker create --name radtest-freeradius --ip "$ip_radius" --ip6 "$ip6_radius" "${run_opts[@]}" "$image" "${args[@]}" >/dev/null
|
||||
docker network connect "$net_udm" radtest-freeradius
|
||||
docker start radtest-freeradius >/dev/null
|
||||
docker run -d --name radtest-freeradius --ip "$ip_radius" --ip6 "$ip6_radius" "${run_opts[@]}" "$image" "${args[@]}" >/dev/null
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
if [[ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' radtest-freeradius)" != true ]]; then
|
||||
docker logs radtest-freeradius
|
||||
@@ -221,13 +203,13 @@ start() {
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
eapol_conf() { # case user password [outer-identity]
|
||||
eapol_conf() { # case user password
|
||||
cat >"$work/eapol/$1.conf" <<EOF
|
||||
network={
|
||||
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
|
||||
eap=TTLS
|
||||
identity="$2"
|
||||
anonymous_identity="${4:-anonymous}"
|
||||
anonymous_identity="anonymous"
|
||||
password="$3"
|
||||
phase2="auth=PAP"
|
||||
ca_cert="/eapol/ca.pem"
|
||||
@@ -251,9 +233,9 @@ attr_value() { # case attr-number
|
||||
accept_attrs "$1" | awk -v a="Attribute $2 " 'index($0, a){getline; sub(/^ *Value: /, ""); print; exit}'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_accept() { # case user server [outer-identity]
|
||||
check_accept() { # case user server
|
||||
local c="$1"
|
||||
eapol_conf "$c" "$2" "$password" "${4:-}"
|
||||
eapol_conf "$c" "$2" "$password"
|
||||
eapol "$c" 5 "$3"
|
||||
if [[ "$(tail -n 1 "$work/$c.out")" == SUCCESS ]]; then pass "$c: SUCCESS"; else fail "$c: SUCCESS"; fi
|
||||
[[ "$(attr_value "$c" 81)" =~ ^(00)?3530$ ]] && pass "$c: Tunnel-Private-Group-Id 50" \
|
||||
@@ -270,9 +252,9 @@ check_accept() { # case user server [outer-identity]
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_reject() { # case user password timeout server [outer-identity]
|
||||
check_reject() { # case user password timeout server
|
||||
local c="$1"
|
||||
eapol_conf "$c" "$2" "$3" "${6:-}"
|
||||
eapol_conf "$c" "$2" "$3"
|
||||
eapol "$c" "$4" "$5"
|
||||
if [[ "$(tail -n 1 "$work/$c.out")" == FAILURE ]] && grep -q "RADIUS message: code=3 (Access-Reject)" "$work/$c.out" \
|
||||
&& ! grep -q "EAPOL test timed out" "$work/$c.out"; then
|
||||
@@ -282,40 +264,6 @@ check_reject() { # case user password timeout server [outer-identity]
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
udm_log() { docker logs radtest-udm 2>&1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# Non-anonymous outer identity: the whole EAP conversation goes to the mock
|
||||
# UDM, its Access-Accept reaches the NAS unchanged.
|
||||
check_udm_accept() { # case user server
|
||||
local c="$1" u="$2"
|
||||
eapol_conf "$c" "$u" "$password" "$u"
|
||||
eapol "$c" 3 "$3"
|
||||
udm_log | grep -q "round=1 user=$u eap_identity_response=True eap_identity=$u request_ma=True -> challenge" \
|
||||
&& pass "$c: EAP-Response/Identity forwarded to the UDM" || fail "$c: EAP-Response/Identity forwarded to the UDM"
|
||||
udm_log | grep -q "round=2 user=$u state_ok=True eap_type=21 request_ma=True -> accept" \
|
||||
&& pass "$c: second round forwarded with the UDM's State" || fail "$c: second round forwarded with the UDM's State"
|
||||
grep -q "RADIUS message: code=2 (Access-Accept)" "$work/$c.out" \
|
||||
&& pass "$c: UDM Access-Accept reaches the NAS" || fail "$c: UDM Access-Accept reaches the NAS"
|
||||
[[ "$(attr_value "$c" 81)" =~ ^(00)?323030$ ]] && pass "$c: Tunnel-Private-Group-Id 200" \
|
||||
|| fail "$c: Tunnel-Private-Group-Id 200 (got '$(attr_value "$c" 81)')"
|
||||
[[ "$(attr_value "$c" 64)" == 0000000d ]] && pass "$c: Tunnel-Type VLAN" \
|
||||
|| fail "$c: Tunnel-Type VLAN (got '$(attr_value "$c" 64)')"
|
||||
[[ "$(attr_value "$c" 65)" == 00000006 ]] && pass "$c: Tunnel-Medium-Type IEEE-802" \
|
||||
|| fail "$c: Tunnel-Medium-Type IEEE-802 (got '$(attr_value "$c" 65)')"
|
||||
local k
|
||||
for k in "Recv-Key (crypt)|11" "Send-Key (sign)|22"; do
|
||||
grep -qF "MS-MPPE-${k%|*} - hexdump(len=32): $(printf "${k#*|} %.0s" {1..31})${k#*|}" "$work/$c.out" \
|
||||
&& pass "$c: MS-MPPE-${k%% *} unchanged" || fail "$c: MS-MPPE-${k%% *} unchanged"
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_udm_reject() { # case user server
|
||||
local c="$1" u="$2"
|
||||
check_reject "$c" "$u" "$password" 1 "$3" "$u"
|
||||
udm_log | grep -q "round=1 user=$u eap_identity_response=True eap_identity=$u request_ma=True -> reject" \
|
||||
&& pass "$c: decided by the UDM" || fail "$c: decided by the UDM"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_accounting() { # case server
|
||||
printf 'Acct-Status-Type = Start\nUser-Name = "acct-test"\nAcct-Session-Id = "%s"\n' \
|
||||
"$1" >"$work/eapol/$1.txt"
|
||||
@@ -390,13 +338,6 @@ main() {
|
||||
check_reject unknown-user bad "$password" 1 "$ip_radius"
|
||||
check_accounting acct "$ip_radius"
|
||||
|
||||
# Outer identity routing: anonymous[@realm] (any case) -> local TTLS,
|
||||
# anything else -> UDM.
|
||||
check_accept anon-realm vlan-tunnel "$ip_radius" "Anonymous@Example.Org"
|
||||
check_udm_accept udm-accept endpoint-accept "$ip_radius"
|
||||
check_udm_reject udm-reject endpoint-reject "$ip_radius"
|
||||
check_udm_accept v6-udm-accept v6-endpoint-accept "$ip6_radius"
|
||||
|
||||
# IPv6 listeners and clients
|
||||
check_accept v6-vlan-avpair vlan-avpair "$ip6_radius"
|
||||
check_reject v6-novlan novlan "$password" 5 "$ip6_radius"
|
||||
@@ -412,16 +353,9 @@ main() {
|
||||
pass "no accounting forwarded to the outpost"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if udm_log | grep -Eiq "eap_identity=anonymous|user=(vlan-|novlan|bad|anonymous)|code=4"; then
|
||||
fail "anonymous logins and accounting never reach the UDM"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pass "anonymous logins and accounting never reach the UDM"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ((fails > 0)) || [[ "${RADTEST_DEBUG:-0}" == 1 ]]; then
|
||||
echo "--- freeradius log"; docker logs radtest-freeradius 2>&1
|
||||
echo "--- mock outpost log"; docker logs radtest-mock 2>&1
|
||||
echo "--- mock udm log"; udm_log
|
||||
for o in "$work"/*.out; do echo "--- $(basename "$o")"; cat "$o"; done
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user