fix(gitea-mcp): set command so args don't replace the image CMD

docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server has CMD ["/app/gitea-mcp"] and no ENTRYPOINT, so a Pod with only args runs "-t" as the executable: the container failed with 'exec: "-t": executable file not found in $PATH' and crash-looped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/alert-monitor.yml

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ steps:
         bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
 
   - name: alert-triage-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
         from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token

.woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml

@@ -408,3 +408,28 @@ steps:
           --dockerfile Containerfile \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:$TAG \
           --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:latest
+
+  # Orchestrator for the monthly backup-verify CronJob (velero ns).
+  - name: build-backup-verify
+    image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
+    directory: ci/images/backup-verify
+    depends_on: []
+    when:
+      - event: deployment
+      - event: push
+        path: ["ci/images/backup-verify/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
+    environment:
+      GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: ci_images_token
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
+      - printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
+      - |
+        /kaniko/executor \
+          --context . \
+          --dockerfile Containerfile \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:$TAG \
+          --destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:latest

.woodpecker/ci-scripts-test.yml

@@ -35,18 +35,24 @@ when:
 steps:
   - name: model-selection-tests
     depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     commands:
       - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
 
   - name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
     depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     commands:
       - sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh
 
   - name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
     depends_on: []
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     commands:
       - sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh
+
+  - name: backup-verify-tests
+    depends_on: []
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-10-10
+    commands:
+      - bash kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/run.sh

.woodpecker/e2e.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ steps:
     # fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
     # ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
     # test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     commands:
       - sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
 

.woodpecker/issue-fix.yml

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ steps:
       - bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
 
   - name: issue-fix-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
         from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token

.woodpecker/pr-review.yml

@@ -1,301 +1,41 @@
-# PR review bot — event-driven. Woodpecker fires this on `pull_request` (which
-# covers BOTH "PR opened" and "new commits pushed to an open PR"), so a review
-# is produced the moment a PR appears or is updated — no polling, no cron.
+# PR review bot — per-repo STUB. All logic lives centrally in
+# k.renner/homelab: ci/agents/pr-review/run.sh (plus prompt.md,
+# settings.json and scripts/ci/). This file is deployed byte-identical into every
+# reviewed repo (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager, authentik-samba-bridge,
+# homeassistant) and holds NO logic, so the copies cannot drift apart: change the
+# review in homelab and every repo picks it up on its next PR event. Only edit this
+# stub if the trigger, the image or the secrets change — then change all copies in
+# one go.
 #
-# This file is deployed UNCHANGED into every repo the fleet wants reviewed
-# (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager, authentik-samba-bridge, homeassistant).
-# Woodpecker events are per-repo, so each repo triggers a review of ITS OWN PR
-# only; the triggering PR is identified from the CI event (CI_REPO +
-# CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST) instead of the old hourly cross-repo discovery loop.
-# Because it runs on the PR event, Woodpecker's built-in clone hands the step
-# THIS repo already checked out at the PR head — so, unlike the old cron model,
-# there is no manual clone of the target repo (the source of an earlier token
-# leak); the agents read the checkout in the workspace directly.
+# Triggers on pull_request: PR opened AND new commits pushed to an open PR.
+# Approves only when the review found nothing red/yellow (see run.sh); humans merge.
 #
-# Prompts: the two agent prompts live once, in k.renner/homelab under
-# ci/agents/pr-review/. The homelab checkout already has them; the other repos
-# don't, so the step falls back to a shallow clone of public homelab@master.
-# One source of truth for the review rubric across all repos.
+# The central code is cloned from public homelab@master on every run, never taken
+# from the PR checkout, so a PR cannot alter the rubric or helper scripts it is
+# reviewed with.
 #
-# Model selection: no model id — and no model family — is baked into this file.
-# scripts/ci/fetch-models.sh pulls the LIVE catalog (Anthropic /v1/models, via
-# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN), and a triage agent reads the PR diff + stats and
-# picks whichever currently-available model best fits the review, judged on the
-# catalog's own capability metadata. A model released tomorrow is eligible the
-# day it appears. The shell validates the pick against the catalog snapshot taken
-# BEFORE the triage runs; if the fetch fails, the pick is rejected, or the review
-# is complex/security-sensitive (where the injectable pick is deliberately
-# ignored), it leaves the model unset and the review runs on the CLI's default
-# model. A wrong-way miss only over/under-spends one review.
+# Image: ci-claude:latest — the refresh pipeline keeps it on current Claude Code,
+# and a pinned tag would be the one thing in this file that diverges per repo.
 #
-# Posture: posted as a Gitea PR review, event COMMENT normally or
-# REQUEST_CHANGES on a serious defect. It NEVER approves — a bot must not
-# satisfy branch protection. Humans still merge.
+# Secrets (both must be granted the pull_request event):
+#   claude_code_oauth_token -> CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
+#   review_bot_token        -> REVIEW_TOKEN (review-bot PAT, write:repository)
 #
-# Dedup (guards pipeline retries/restarts, not cron re-runs anymore): the PR is
-# skipped when review-bot already left a review carrying the marker
-# "<!-- pr-review:sha=<head_sha> -->" for the PR's CURRENT head commit. A pushed
-# commit changes the head sha and fires a fresh pull_request event -> fresh
-# review.
-#
-# Tokens:
-#   CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (claude_code_oauth_token) — Claude subscription
-#     OAuth, how the `claude` CLI authenticates (same as the other agents).
-#   REVIEW_TOKEN (review_bot_token) — a dedicated `review-bot` Gitea account's
-#     PAT, scope write:repository. Reads the PR + diff and POSTs the review, all
-#     over the Gitea API (ephemeral curl Authorization headers — the token is
-#     never written to disk; the repo is NOT cloned). review-bot must be a
-#     collaborator (read) on every reviewed repo.
-#   Both secrets MUST be granted the `pull_request` event, or Woodpecker will
-#     withhold them from this pipeline. Because homelab is PUBLIC, it is also set
-#     to require approval for forked-PR pipelines, so an untrusted fork cannot
-#     rewrite this file to exfiltrate the tokens.
-#
-# Triggering: pull_request only — automatic on PR open + push-to-open-PR. To
-# re-review a PR, push a commit (the new head sha clears the dedup marker below
-# and earns a fresh review). There is deliberately no on-demand trigger for a
-# specific PR: Woodpecker exposes injected variables to YAML substitution and
-# `when` filters, NOT to a step's shell environment, so a PR=<n> re-review would
-# silently no-op (the step would find no PR number and exit green).
-# (Note: keep literal dollar-brace out of THIS file entirely, even in comments —
-# Woodpecker runs its variable substitution over the whole YAML text, comments
-# included, and an unparseable one errors the pipeline before any step runs.)
+# (Note: keep literal dollar-brace out of THIS file, even in comments — Woodpecker
+# runs its variable substitution over the whole YAML text.)
 when:
   - event: pull_request
 
 steps:
   - name: pr-review-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:latest
+    pull: true
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
         from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
       REVIEW_TOKEN:
         from_secret: review_bot_token
     commands:
-      - |
-        # ---- Resolve the single triggering PR --------------------------------
-        # Woodpecker hands us the repo (CI_REPO, canonical owner/repo) and the PR
-        # number (CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST, a pull_request-event built-in). Build
-        # /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl with 0 or 1 entries; an empty file makes
-        # the next block a no-op (the agent never starts).
-        set -eu
-        API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
-        AUTH="Authorization: token $$REVIEW_TOKEN"
-        SLUG="$$CI_REPO"
-        NUM="$${CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST:-}"
-        REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN="review-bot"
-        mkdir -p /tmp/pr-review
-        : > /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
-
-        if [ -z "$$NUM" ]; then
-          echo "No PR number in CI env (event=$${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?}) — nothing to review."
-          exit 0
-        fi
-        echo "Triggered for $$SLUG#$$NUM (event $${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?})."
-
-        if ! curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM" > /tmp/pr-review/pr.json; then
-          echo "Cannot fetch $$SLUG#$$NUM (review-bot not a collaborator / PR gone?) — skipping."
-          exit 0
-        fi
-        STATE=$$(jq -r '.state'        /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
-        DRAFT=$$(jq -r '.draft // false' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
-        TITLE=$$(jq -r '.title'        /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
-        HEAD=$$(jq -r '.head.sha'      /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
-        SHORT=$$(printf '%s' "$$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
-
-        # Skip closed/merged, drafts, and WIP-titled PRs — not ready for review.
-        case "$$STATE" in open) ;; *) echo "#$$NUM is $$STATE — skip."; exit 0;; esac
-        case "$$DRAFT" in true) echo "#$$NUM draft — skip."; exit 0;; esac
-        case "$$TITLE" in [Ww][Ii][Pp]:*|[Ww][Ii][Pp]\ *) echo "#$$NUM WIP — skip."; exit 0;; esac
-
-        # Dedup: already reviewed at THIS head sha? (guards re-runs / restarts)
-        REVIEWED=$$(curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM/reviews?limit=50" \
-          | jq -r --arg u "$$REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN" --arg m "pr-review:sha=$$HEAD" \
-              '[.[] | select(.user.login == $$u) | select(.body | contains($$m))] | length' \
-          || echo 0)
-        if [ "$${REVIEWED:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
-          echo "#$$NUM already reviewed at $$SHORT — skip."
-          exit 0
-        fi
-
-        jq -c --arg slug "$$SLUG" \
-          '{slug: $$slug, number: .number, head: .head.sha, base: .base.sha,
-            title: .title, author: .user.login}' \
-          /tmp/pr-review/pr.json >> /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
-        echo "#$$NUM enqueued (head $$SHORT)."
-      - |
-        # ---- Clone, pick model, review, post ---------------------------------
-        set -eu
-        [ -s /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl ] || { echo "Nothing to review."; exit 0; }
-        API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
-        AUTH="Authorization: token $$REVIEW_TOKEN"
-        WS="$$PWD"                     # workspace = this repo, checked out at the PR head by Woodpecker
-        MAX_DIFF_LINES=20000
-
-        # Agent prompts: use the local homelab checkout if present, else clone
-        # public homelab@master for them (one source of truth for the rubric).
-        PROMPTS="$$WS/ci/agents/pr-review"
-        HOMELAB="$$WS"                 # repo root holding ci/ AND scripts/ci/
-        # NB: for a homelab PR, HOMELAB is the PR head checkout, so the
-        # fetch-models.sh run below executes branch-supplied shell. It is wrapped
-        # in `env -u REVIEW_TOKEN`, so the only credential it can see is
-        # CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN. This is not a new exposure regardless: on
-        # pull_request Woodpecker already takes .woodpecker/*.yml itself from the
-        # PR branch, so a branch can run arbitrary commands in this step anyway.
-        if [ ! -f "$$PROMPTS/prompt.md" ]; then
-          rm -rf /tmp/pr-review/homelab
-          git clone --quiet --depth 1 https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab \
-            /tmp/pr-review/homelab
-          PROMPTS=/tmp/pr-review/homelab/ci/agents/pr-review
-          HOMELAB=/tmp/pr-review/homelab
-        fi
-        echo "Using prompts from $$PROMPTS"
-
-        gitea_post() {                 # method url datafile ; echoes+checks HTTP
-          code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-review/resp.json -w '%{http_code}' \
-            -X "$$1" -H "$$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-            --data @"$$3" "$$2")
-          echo "$$1 $$2 -> HTTP $$code"
-          if [ "$$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$$code" -ge 300 ]; then
-            echo "Gitea API error body:"; cat /tmp/pr-review/resp.json; echo; return 1
-          fi
-        }
-
-        while IFS= read -r ITEM; do
-          SLUG=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM"  | jq -r '.slug')
-          NUM=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM"   | jq -r '.number')
-          HEAD=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM"  | jq -r '.head')
-          TITLE=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM" | jq -r '.title')
-          SHORT=$$(printf '%s' "$$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
-          echo "=== Reviewing $$SLUG#$$NUM ($$SHORT) ==="
-          D="/tmp/pr-review/$$NUM"
-          rm -rf "$$D"; mkdir -p "$$D"
-
-          # PR metadata + unified diff (authenticated; private repos need it).
-          curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM" > "$$D/pr.json"
-          curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM.diff" > "$$D/diff.full.patch" \
-            || { echo "Could not fetch diff for $$SLUG#$$NUM — skipping."; continue; }
-          FILES=$$(grep -c '^diff --git ' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
-          ADDED=$$(grep -c '^+[^+]' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
-          DELETED=$$(grep -c '^-[^-]' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
-          TOTAL=$$(wc -l < "$$D/diff.full.patch")
-          if [ "$$TOTAL" -gt "$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" ]; then
-            head -n "$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$$D/diff.full.patch" > "$$D/diff.patch"
-            printf '\n... [diff truncated at %s of %s lines] ...\n' \
-              "$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$$TOTAL" >> "$$D/diff.patch"
-          else
-            cp "$$D/diff.full.patch" "$$D/diff.patch"
-          fi
-          printf 'repo: %s\nPR: #%s\nfiles_changed: %s\nlines_added: %s\nlines_deleted: %s\ndiff_total_lines: %s\n' \
-            "$$SLUG" "$$NUM" "$$FILES" "$$ADDED" "$$DELETED" "$$TOTAL" > "$$D/stats.txt"
-
-          # Cheaper inputs for the TRIAGE agent (which now runs on a capable
-          # default model): the COMPLETE changed-file list, plus a diff capped far
-          # smaller than the review's. Triage only gauges size/shape/sensitivity,
-          # so it never needs the full (up to 20k-line) review diff — this keeps
-          # "triage is cheap" true now that its model is no longer pinned to Haiku.
-          grep '^diff --git ' "$$D/diff.full.patch" | sed 's|^diff --git a/||; s| b/.*$$||' \
-            | sort -u > "$$D/files.txt"
-          head -n 4000 "$$D/diff.patch" > "$$D/diff.triage.patch"
-
-          # No manual clone of the target repo: this runs on a pull_request
-          # event, so Woodpecker's built-in clone already checked THIS repo out
-          # at the PR head in $$WS — the agents (which cd into $$WS) read it
-          # directly for context. The old cron model had to clone each target
-          # repo by hand (its workspace was homelab@master), and that clone
-          # embedded REVIEW_TOKEN in the URL, persisting a write-scoped PAT in
-          # work/target/.git/config — readable by the review agent whose report
-          # is posted publicly. Per-repo pull_request triggering makes the manual
-          # clone redundant AND keeps the token off disk (it now lives only in
-          # the ephemeral curl Authorization headers used for the API calls).
-
-          # Inputs the agents read live at ./.pr-review (symlink into $$D).
-          rm -f "$$WS/.pr-review"; ln -s "$$D" "$$WS/.pr-review"
-
-          # --- Triage: an agent picks the model from the LIVE catalog, so no
-          #     model id and no model family is baked into this file.
-          #     fetch-models.sh asks the Anthropic /v1/models list (via the same
-          #     CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) and we hand the triage the result at
-          #     ./.pr-review/models.txt. If the fetch fails the file is empty and
-          #     MODEL stays empty below, so the review runs on the CLI default.
-          if MODELS_TABLE=$$(env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/fetch-models.sh" --table); then
-            printf '%s\n' "$$MODELS_TABLE" > "$$D/models.txt"
-            echo "Live model catalog ($$(wc -l < "$$D/models.txt") models) written for triage."
-          else
-            : > "$$D/models.txt"
-            echo "Model catalog fetch failed — triage/review will use the CLI default model."
-          fi
-          # env -u REVIEW_TOKEN: the agents never call Gitea (the shell does, via
-          # $$AUTH), so the write:repository PAT must not sit in the agent's env
-          # where a prompt-injected diff could read /proc/self/environ. Defence in
-          # depth alongside the settings.json Read-sandbox. Triage itself runs on
-          # the CLI default model (no --model) — we don't name a family even to
-          # bootstrap the pick.
-          cat "$$PROMPTS/triage-prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude \
-            --permission-mode acceptEdits \
-            --allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write" \
-            --settings "$$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
-            -p || echo "(triage agent exited non-zero)"
-          # Use the triage's pick only if it is a currently-available id;
-          # otherwise (hallucinated id, or empty catalog) leave MODEL empty so
-          # the review runs on the CLI default — a run never dies on selection.
-          MODEL=$$(jq -r '.model // empty' "$$D/triage.json" 2>/dev/null || true)
-          CPLX=$$(jq -r '.complexity // "unknown"' "$$D/triage.json" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
-          # triage.json is UNTRUSTED (the triage reads the attacker-controlled
-          # diff and its Write is not path-scoped). valid-model.sh is the single,
-          # unit-tested gate (scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh): it echoes the id
-          # only if it is a safe [A-Za-z0-9._-] token present in the catalog, else
-          # nothing — so a value like "claude-x\n--dangerously-skip-permissions"
-          # can never reach the unquoted --model expansion below. Empty -> default.
-          # CRITICAL: validate against $$MODELS_TABLE — the catalog captured in a
-          # shell variable BEFORE the triage ran — NOT the on-disk ./.pr-review/
-          # models.txt, which the triage's unscoped Write could overwrite to smuggle
-          # an attacker-chosen token past the membership check (the triage reads the
-          # file, but only $$MODELS_TABLE is trusted). This mirrors pick-model.sh,
-          # which validates its pick against its in-memory table for the same reason.
-          # env -u REVIEW_TOKEN: like fetch-models.sh above, this runs a script from
-          # $$HOMELAB (branch-supplied for a homelab PR) — it must not see the PAT.
-          # `|| true`: keep the "a run never dies on selection" invariant even if
-          # the script is absent (e.g. a PR that moves scripts/ci/).
-          MODEL=$$(printf '%s\n' "$$MODELS_TABLE" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/valid-model.sh" "$$MODEL" || true)
-          [ -n "$$MODEL" ] || echo "Triage model rejected or not in live catalog — using the CLI default model."
-          # Defence in depth: for a complex / security-sensitive review, do NOT
-          # trust the triage's pick (it read the attacker-controlled diff and could
-          # be injected into naming the weakest catalog entry to get a shallow
-          # review). Fall back to the CLI default — the strongest configured model.
-          if [ "$$CPLX" = complex ] && [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then
-            echo "complex review — ignoring triage pick '$$MODEL', using the CLI default (strongest) model."
-            MODEL=
-          fi
-          if [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then echo "Triage: complexity=$$CPLX -> model=$$MODEL"; else echo "Triage: complexity=$$CPLX -> CLI default model"; fi
-
-          # --- Review with the chosen model ---
-          ( cd "$$WS" && cat "$$PROMPTS/prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude $${MODEL:+--model $$MODEL} \
-              --permission-mode acceptEdits \
-              --allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write" \
-              --settings "$$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
-              -p ) || echo "(review agent exited non-zero)"
-
-          if [ ! -s "$$D/report.md" ]; then
-            echo "Agent wrote no report for $$SLUG#$$NUM — skipping post."
-            continue
-          fi
-          EVENT=$$(jq -r '.event // "COMMENT"' "$$D/verdict.json" 2>/dev/null || echo COMMENT)
-          case "$$EVENT" in REQUEST_CHANGES|COMMENT) ;; *) EVENT=COMMENT;; esac   # never APPROVE
-
-          # Assemble the review body: header + report + marker footer.
-          {
-            printf '🤖 **Automated review** — model `%s` (complexity: %s), commit `%s`.\n\n' \
-              "$${MODEL:-CLI default}" "$$CPLX" "$${HEAD}"
-            printf '> Advisory review by the `review-bot` pipeline. It never approves; a human merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review.\n\n---\n\n'
-            cat "$$D/report.md"
-            printf '\n\n<!-- pr-review:sha=%s -->\n' "$$HEAD"
-          } > "$$D/body.md"
-          jq -n --rawfile b "$$D/body.md" --arg e "$$EVENT" --arg c "$$HEAD" \
-            '{body: $$b, event: $$e, commit_id: $$c}' > "$$D/review.json"
-          gitea_post POST "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM/reviews" "$$D/review.json" \
-            && echo "Posted $$EVENT review on $$SLUG#$$NUM." \
-            || echo "FAILED to post review on $$SLUG#$$NUM (continuing)."
-          rm -f "$$WS/.pr-review"
-        done < /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
-        echo "PR review run complete."
+      - rm -rf /tmp/pr-review-central
+      - git clone --quiet --depth 1 https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab /tmp/pr-review-central
+      - sh /tmp/pr-review-central/ci/agents/pr-review/run.sh

.woodpecker/security-scan.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ steps:
     # this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
     when:
       - branch: master
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
         from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token

.woodpecker/update-audit.yml

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ when:
 
 steps:
   - name: update-audit-agent
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
         from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token

.woodpecker/wiki-maintenance.yml

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ when:
 
 steps:
   - name: checkout-notes
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     pull: true
     environment:
       WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ steps:
       - bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
 
   - name: distill
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     pull: true
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
@@ -89,14 +89,14 @@ steps:
           -p
 
   - name: audit
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     pull: true
     commands:
       # Findings are report lines in output/, not a pipeline failure.
       - python3 -B notes/bin/wiki_audit.py --vault "$$PWD/notes"
 
   - name: consolidate
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     pull: true
     environment:
       CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ steps:
         exit $$rc
 
   - name: push-notes
-    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.296
     pull: true
     environment:
       WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:

ci/agents/pr-review/prompt.md

@@ -54,16 +54,35 @@ Look for, in priority order:
 
 Ground every finding in a specific location: `path:line` (or a hunk) from the
 diff or the checkout. **Do not invent** bugs, file paths, or behavior you have
-not confirmed by reading the code. The whole repo is on disk in your working
-directory, so verify: if a judgement depends on a caller, the rest of a
-function, or config elsewhere, open it. If after checking you still cannot
-confirm a suspicion, say so explicitly and give the one check that would settle
-it — do not state a hypothesis as fact. A concern you could have checked by
-reading the checkout but did not is a weakness in your review.
+not confirmed.
+
+**Verify every claim yourself before you write it down. Never hand the
+verification to the author.** "I could not find X", "X may not exist", "this is
+unverified" is not a finding — it is unfinished work. For each suspicion:
+
+1. Check the checkout: callers, the rest of the function, config elsewhere,
+   existing uses of the same construct, the repo's `CLAUDE.md`/`README`.
+   Shallow read-only clones of the other fleet repos that are publicly
+   readable (at least `homelab`) are under `./.pr-review/context/<name>/` —
+   look there when the change depends on how a sibling repo does something.
+   A repo missing there simply was not readable; do not treat that as a finding.
+2. If it depends on an external API, syntax, device behavior or product
+   version (a Home Assistant trigger/action, a Shelly generation, a Kubernetes
+   field, a library call), read the authoritative documentation or source with
+   WebFetch/WebSearch (official docs, the project's own repo or README). Your
+   training data is NOT evidence: this repo targets current releases that may
+   postdate it, and "I have not seen this syntax" says nothing about whether
+   it exists.
+3. Only after both: state what you found, with the source (`path:line` or URL).
+
+If after a real attempt you still cannot settle it, list it under
+"Unverified" with what you checked and why that was not enough. An unverified
+suspicion is never Blocking.
 
 Distinguish severity honestly. A blocking issue is a concrete defect — a bug
-that will misbehave, a security hole, or a breaking change — that you can point
-at. Style preferences and optional improvements are not blocking.
+that will misbehave, a security hole, or a breaking change — that you
+**verified** and can point at. Style preferences, optional improvements and
+anything unverified are not blocking.
 
 ## Output
 
@@ -84,6 +103,11 @@ Structure it as:
 why it is wrong. Omit this whole section if there are none — and say so in the
 Summary.>
 
+## ⚪ Unverified
+
+<Suspicions you could not settle after checking the checkout and the docs, each
+with what you checked. Omit if none.>
+
 ## 🟡 Suggestions
 
 <Non-blocking improvements worth considering, each anchored to a location.>
@@ -110,17 +134,21 @@ even if the PR added one; refer to it by location and flag it as blocking.
 
 ```json
 {
-  "event": "COMMENT | REQUEST_CHANGES",
+  "event": "APPROVE | COMMENT | REQUEST_CHANGES",
   "headline": "<short one-line summary of the outcome>"
 }
 ```
 
 - Use **`REQUEST_CHANGES`** only when your report lists at least one real
   **Blocking** issue.
-- Use **`COMMENT`** otherwise (including when you have only suggestions/nits, or
-  the PR looks good).
-- You cannot approve — there is no APPROVE option, by design. A clean PR gets a
-  `COMMENT` review saying so.
+- Use **`APPROVE`** when the report has no 🔴 Blocking, no 🟡 Suggestions and no
+  ⚪ Unverified section — i.e. you checked the change and found nothing to
+  raise. Nits (🟢) alone do not prevent it.
+- Use **`COMMENT`** otherwise.
+- The pipeline sets the final review event from the sections present in your
+  report, so keep the section headings exactly as above and omit a section
+  entirely when it is empty. Do not add a 🟡/🔴/⚪ heading unless you have a
+  finding under it.
 
 If `pr.json` or `diff.patch` is missing or empty, write a `report.md` stating
 you had no diff to review and a `verdict.json` with `event: "COMMENT"`, then

ci/agents/pr-review/run.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# PR review bot — the ONE implementation, run by every reviewed repo's
+# .woodpecker/pr-review.yml stub (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager,
+# authentik-samba-bridge, homeassistant). Edit it here only; the stubs hold no
+# logic. Design notes (event-driven trigger, dedup marker, tokens, model
+# selection, posture) are in the stub and in prompt.md.
+#
+# ---- Resolve the single triggering PR --------------------------------
+# Woodpecker hands us the repo (CI_REPO, canonical owner/repo) and the PR
+# number (CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST, a pull_request-event built-in). Build
+# /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl with 0 or 1 entries; an empty file makes
+# the next block a no-op (the agent never starts).
+set -eu
+API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
+AUTH="Authorization: token $REVIEW_TOKEN"
+SLUG="$CI_REPO"
+NUM="${CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST:-}"
+REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN="review-bot"
+mkdir -p /tmp/pr-review
+: > /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
+
+if [ -z "$NUM" ]; then
+  echo "No PR number in CI env (event=${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?}) — nothing to review."
+  exit 0
+fi
+echo "Triggered for $SLUG#$NUM (event ${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?})."
+
+if ! curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM" > /tmp/pr-review/pr.json; then
+  echo "Cannot fetch $SLUG#$NUM (review-bot not a collaborator / PR gone?) — skipping."
+  exit 0
+fi
+STATE=$(jq -r '.state'        /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
+DRAFT=$(jq -r '.draft // false' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
+TITLE=$(jq -r '.title'        /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
+HEAD=$(jq -r '.head.sha'      /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
+SHORT=$(printf '%s' "$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
+
+# Skip closed/merged, drafts, and WIP-titled PRs — not ready for review.
+case "$STATE" in open) ;; *) echo "#$NUM is $STATE — skip."; exit 0;; esac
+case "$DRAFT" in true) echo "#$NUM draft — skip."; exit 0;; esac
+case "$TITLE" in [Ww][Ii][Pp]:*|[Ww][Ii][Pp]\ *) echo "#$NUM WIP — skip."; exit 0;; esac
+
+# Dedup: already reviewed at THIS head sha? (guards re-runs / restarts)
+REVIEWED=$(curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM/reviews?limit=50" \
+  | jq -r --arg u "$REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN" --arg m "pr-review:sha=$HEAD" \
+      '[.[] | select(.user.login == $u) | select(.body | contains($m))] | length' \
+  || echo 0)
+if [ "${REVIEWED:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
+  echo "#$NUM already reviewed at $SHORT — skip."
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+jq -c --arg slug "$SLUG" \
+  '{slug: $slug, number: .number, head: .head.sha, base: .base.sha,
+    title: .title, author: .user.login}' \
+  /tmp/pr-review/pr.json >> /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
+echo "#$NUM enqueued (head $SHORT)."
+# ---- Clone, pick model, review, post ---------------------------------
+set -eu
+[ -s /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl ] || { echo "Nothing to review."; exit 0; }
+API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
+AUTH="Authorization: token $REVIEW_TOKEN"
+WS="$PWD"                     # workspace = this repo, checked out at the PR head by Woodpecker
+MAX_DIFF_LINES=20000
+
+# This script, the prompts and scripts/ci/ all come from the homelab@master
+# clone the per-repo stub made (see .woodpecker/pr-review.yml) — never from the
+# PR checkout, so a PR cannot change the rubric or the helper scripts it is
+# reviewed with.
+PROMPTS="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+HOMELAB="$(cd "$PROMPTS/../../.." && pwd)"   # repo root holding ci/ AND scripts/ci/
+echo "Using prompts from $PROMPTS"
+
+gitea_post() {                 # method url datafile ; echoes+checks HTTP
+  code=$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-review/resp.json -w '%{http_code}' \
+    -X "$1" -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+    --data @"$3" "$2")
+  echo "$1 $2 -> HTTP $code"
+  if [ "$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$code" -ge 300 ]; then
+    echo "Gitea API error body:"; cat /tmp/pr-review/resp.json; echo; return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+while IFS= read -r ITEM; do
+  SLUG=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM"  | jq -r '.slug')
+  NUM=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM"   | jq -r '.number')
+  HEAD=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM"  | jq -r '.head')
+  TITLE=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM" | jq -r '.title')
+  SHORT=$(printf '%s' "$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
+  echo "=== Reviewing $SLUG#$NUM ($SHORT) ==="
+  D="/tmp/pr-review/$NUM"
+  rm -rf "$D"; mkdir -p "$D"
+
+  # PR metadata + unified diff (authenticated; private repos need it).
+  curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM" > "$D/pr.json"
+  curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM.diff" > "$D/diff.full.patch" \
+    || { echo "Could not fetch diff for $SLUG#$NUM — skipping."; continue; }
+  FILES=$(grep -c '^diff --git ' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
+  ADDED=$(grep -c '^+[^+]' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
+  DELETED=$(grep -c '^-[^-]' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
+  TOTAL=$(wc -l < "$D/diff.full.patch")
+  if [ "$TOTAL" -gt "$MAX_DIFF_LINES" ]; then
+    head -n "$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$D/diff.full.patch" > "$D/diff.patch"
+    printf '\n... [diff truncated at %s of %s lines] ...\n' \
+      "$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$TOTAL" >> "$D/diff.patch"
+  else
+    cp "$D/diff.full.patch" "$D/diff.patch"
+  fi
+  printf 'repo: %s\nPR: #%s\nfiles_changed: %s\nlines_added: %s\nlines_deleted: %s\ndiff_total_lines: %s\n' \
+    "$SLUG" "$NUM" "$FILES" "$ADDED" "$DELETED" "$TOTAL" > "$D/stats.txt"
+
+  # No manual clone of the target repo: this runs on a pull_request
+  # event, so Woodpecker's built-in clone already checked THIS repo out
+  # at the PR head in $WS — the agents (which cd into $WS) read it
+  # directly for context. The old cron model had to clone each target
+  # repo by hand (its workspace was homelab@master), and that clone
+  # embedded REVIEW_TOKEN in the URL, persisting a write-scoped PAT in
+  # work/target/.git/config — readable by the review agent whose report
+  # is posted publicly. Per-repo pull_request triggering makes the manual
+  # clone redundant AND keeps the token off disk (it now lives only in
+  # the ephemeral curl Authorization headers used for the API calls).
+
+  # Inputs the agents read live at ./.pr-review (symlink into $D).
+  rm -f "$WS/.pr-review"; ln -s "$D" "$WS/.pr-review"
+
+  # Cross-repo context for the review agent: shallow, UNAUTHENTICATED clones of
+  # the other fleet repos at ./.pr-review/context/<name> (a change here often
+  # depends on how a sibling repo does it). No credential is involved, so only
+  # publicly readable repos come through; a repo that needs auth fails fast
+  # (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0) and is skipped, never fatal.
+  CTX="$D/context"; mkdir -p "$CTX"
+  for REPO in k.renner/homelab k.renner/homeassistant konairius/shelly-manager k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge; do
+    [ "$REPO" = "$SLUG" ] && continue
+    GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 git clone --quiet --depth 1 "https://gitea.renner.uno/$REPO" "$CTX/${REPO#*/}" 2>/dev/null \
+      || echo "No public context clone of $REPO (skipped)."
+  done
+
+  # --- Model: always the most capable CURRENT one, from the live catalog. ---
+  # No model id, no family name and no complexity triage is baked in here: a
+  # triage that downgrades "trivial" PRs to a small model is exactly what made
+  # reviews shallow, and reviews are rare enough that the strongest model is the
+  # right default. pick-model.sh reads the live catalog (Anthropic /v1/models via
+  # CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN), prefers the newest of comparable models, validates
+  # its pick against that catalog and echoes nothing on any failure — then the
+  # review runs on the CLI's own default model. A model released tomorrow is
+  # eligible the day the API lists it. REVIEW_TOKEN is stripped: the picker never
+  # needs the write-scoped PAT.
+  MODEL=$(env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/pick-model.sh" \
+    "careful, high-stakes code review of a pull request: verify claims against the code and external documentation, find real defects, avoid false positives; always pick the most capable and newest model available, regardless of PR size" || true)
+  if [ -n "$MODEL" ]; then echo "Review model: $MODEL"; else echo "Review model: CLI default (catalog/picker unavailable)"; fi
+
+  # --- Review with the chosen model ---
+  ( cd "$WS" && cat "$PROMPTS/prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude ${MODEL:+--model $MODEL} \
+      --permission-mode acceptEdits \
+      --allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write,WebFetch,WebSearch" \
+      --settings "$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
+      -p ) || echo "(review agent exited non-zero)"
+
+  if [ ! -s "$D/report.md" ]; then
+    echo "Agent wrote no report for $SLUG#$NUM — skipping post."
+    continue
+  fi
+  # Review event, derived from the report's own severity sections (not trusted
+  # from verdict.json): any red (Blocking) -> REQUEST_CHANGES; no red, yellow
+  # (Suggestions) or Unverified section on a non-empty diff -> APPROVE; else
+  # COMMENT. An empty diff or a report that names no section never approves.
+  if grep -q '^## 🔴' "$D/report.md"; then
+    EVENT=REQUEST_CHANGES
+  elif [ "$TOTAL" -gt 0 ] && ! grep -q -e '^## 🟡' -e '^## ⚪' "$D/report.md" \
+       && grep -q '^## Recommendation' "$D/report.md"; then
+    EVENT=APPROVE
+  else
+    EVENT=COMMENT
+  fi
+
+  # Assemble the review body: header + report + marker footer.
+  {
+    printf '🤖 **Automated review** — model `%s`, commit `%s`.\n\n' \
+      "${MODEL:-CLI default}" "${HEAD}"
+    printf '> Automated review by the `review-bot` pipeline: it approves only when it found nothing red or yellow, and a human still merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review.\n\n---\n\n'
+    cat "$D/report.md"
+    printf '\n\n<!-- pr-review:sha=%s -->\n' "$HEAD"
+  } > "$D/body.md"
+  jq -n --rawfile b "$D/body.md" --arg e "$EVENT" --arg c "$HEAD" \
+    '{body: $b, event: $e, commit_id: $c}' > "$D/review.json"
+  gitea_post POST "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM/reviews" "$D/review.json" \
+    && echo "Posted $EVENT review on $SLUG#$NUM." \
+    || echo "FAILED to post review on $SLUG#$NUM (continuing)."
+  rm -f "$WS/.pr-review"
+done < /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
+echo "PR review run complete."

ci/images/backup-verify/Containerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+FROM hetznercloud/cli:v1.69.0@sha256:febb8898949b31a2249384aa9728f2254dfb752ff2f69be709178c4a3285b05f AS hcloud
+
+FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
+
+RUN apk add --no-cache \
+      bash \
+      ca-certificates \
+      curl \
+      jq \
+      kubectl \
+      openssh-client \
+      openssh-keygen \
+      tar
+
+COPY --from=hcloud /ko-app/hcloud /usr/local/bin/hcloud
+
+RUN adduser -D -u 65532 -h /work verify
+
+RUN hcloud version && kubectl version --client && jq --version && ssh -V && ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -q -f /tmp/k && rm -f /tmp/k /tmp/k.pub

ci/images/netbird-service-sync/controller.py

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """netbird-service-sync: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
 
-Source of truth: every Ingress carrying the public label (dns.renner.uno/public).
+Source of truth: every Ingress carrying one of the public labels.
+dns.renner.uno/public also takes the host out of the LAN DNS (external-dns-unifi
+skips it); netbird.renner.uno/public publishes on the proxy only and leaves the
+LAN record in place.
 For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
 service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
 subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
@@ -42,7 +45,7 @@ NETWORK_NAME = os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME", "k8s public ingress")
 ROUTER_GROUP = os.environ.get("ROUTER_GROUP_NAME", "k8s-ingress-router")
 SOURCE_GROUP = os.environ.get("SOURCE_GROUP_NAME", "All")
 TRAEFIK_NS, TRAEFIK_SVC = os.environ.get("TRAEFIK_SERVICE", "ingress/traefik").split("/", 1)
-PUBLIC_LABEL = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABEL", "dns.renner.uno/public")
+PUBLIC_LABELS = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABELS", "dns.renner.uno/public,netbird.renner.uno/public").split(",")
 LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "443"))
 INTERVAL = int(os.environ.get("INTERVAL_SECONDS", "60"))
 HTTP_TIMEOUT = 20
@@ -86,10 +89,12 @@ def k8s(path):
 
 
 def desired_hosts():
-    sel = urllib.parse.quote(f"{PUBLIC_LABEL}=true")
-    ingresses = k8s(f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses?labelSelector={sel}")
+    items = []
+    for label in PUBLIC_LABELS:
+        sel = urllib.parse.quote(f"{label}=true")
+        items += k8s(f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses?labelSelector={sel}").get("items", [])
     hosts = {}
-    for ing in ingresses.get("items", []):
+    for ing in items:
         ref = f'{ing["metadata"]["namespace"]}/{ing["metadata"]["name"]}'
         for rule in ing.get("spec", {}).get("rules", []):
             host = rule.get("host")

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-10-11-gitea-mcp.md

@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+# Gitea MCP Server Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Deploy the official Gitea MCP server in-cluster at `https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno/mcp`, published on the NetBird proxy, authenticating every request with the caller's own Gitea PAT and rejecting tokenless requests.
+
+**Architecture:** One stateless Deployment in a new `gitea-mcp` namespace, Flux-managed through its own Kustomization. Traefik Ingress with the proxy-only public label; netbird-service-sync publishes it. gitea-mcp runs in `-oauth` mode purely to get the 401-on-missing-token gate; it talks to Gitea via the in-cluster Service.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Kubernetes manifests, Flux (Kustomization, image automation), Cilium CiliumNetworkPolicy, Traefik Ingress, cert-manager.
+
+**Spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-11-gitea-mcp-design.md`
+
+## Global Constraints
+
+- Image `docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server`, initial tag `1.8.1`, ImagePolicy semver `>=1.8.1`, marker `# {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}`.
+- Args exactly: `-t http -p 8080 -oauth -oauth-public-url https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno -H http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000`. No `-T`/`GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN`, no `-d`.
+- Host `gitea-mcp.renner.uno`; Ingress label `netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"` (not `dns.renner.uno/public`); cert issuer `letsencrypt-cluster`; TLS secret `gitea-mcp-tls`.
+- Pod label `app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp`; namespace `gitea-mcp`; Service `gitea-mcp:8080`.
+- No `world` egress from `gitea-mcp`.
+- Manifest comments: one terse factual line at most; rationale goes in commit/PR text.
+- Commits as claude-bot: `git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit …`; each git command its own Bash call.
+
+## Review Focus
+
+1. Tokenless `POST /mcp` from the internet → must be 401, never anonymous Gitea data (Task 4 step 4).
+2. Request with an invalid/revoked PAT → 401 `invalid_token` (Task 4 step 5).
+3. Kubelet probes with `Host: <podIP>` → `/healthz` must stay 200 despite the oauth Host check (Task 3 readiness, Task 4 step 2).
+4. LAN client resolving `gitea-mcp.renner.uno` → must reach Traefik VIP directly, not the proxy (Task 4 step 3).
+5. Gitea refusing gitea-mcp's connection (missing CNP half) → MCP calls fail; authenticated `list_my_repos` must succeed (Task 4 step 6).
+
+---
+
+### Task 1: Namespace and network policies
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml` (append after the `gitea` Namespace)
+- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml`
+- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml` (add entry after `gitea-ns.yaml`)
+- Modify: `kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml` (append CNP)
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Produces: namespace `gitea-mcp`; ingress to pods labelled `app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp` on 8080 from Traefik; egress from `gitea-mcp` to `gitea` pod :3000; Gitea-side ingress allowance from namespace `gitea-mcp` on :3000.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add the Namespace** — insert after the `name: gitea` Namespace document in `namespaces.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+---
+# Gitea MCP server. Declared here so it exists before infrastructure-crds applies its CNPs.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Create `gitea-mcp-ns.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+---
+# Baseline policy for the `gitea-mcp` namespace.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  endpointSelector: {}
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
+    - fromEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+  egress:
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: TCP
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "3000"
+              protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp-allow-traefik
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Register it** — in `network-policies/kustomization.yaml` add `  - gitea-mcp-ns.yaml` directly after `  - gitea-ns.yaml`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Gitea-side allowance** — append to `kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+---
+# gitea-mcp reaches the in-cluster Service; egress half is in network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-allow-gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "3000"
+              protocol: TCP
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Validate builds**
+
+Run each separately:
+`kubectl kustomize kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces` → output contains `name: gitea-mcp`
+`kubectl kustomize kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies` → output contains `gitea-mcp-allow-traefik`
+`kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/gitea` → output contains `gitea-allow-gitea-mcp`
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Server-side dry-run of the Gitea-side CNP** (namespace already exists):
+`kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml`
+Expected: every CNP `configured (server dry run)` or `unchanged`, `gitea-allow-gitea-mcp created (server dry run)`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+`git add kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml`
+`git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit -m "feat(gitea-mcp): namespace and network policies" -m "Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>"`
+
+### Task 2: Image automation
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/gitea-mcp.yaml`
+- Modify: `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/kustomization.yaml` (insert `  - gitea-mcp.yaml` alphabetically after `  - gatus.yaml`)
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Produces: ImagePolicy `flux-system:gitea-mcp`, referenced by the marker in Task 3.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Create `gitea-mcp.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImageRepository
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server
+  interval: 1h
+---
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImagePolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  imageRepositoryRef:
+    name: gitea-mcp
+  policy:
+    semver:
+      range: ">=1.8.1"
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Register it** in `image-automation/kustomization.yaml` after `  - gatus.yaml`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Validate**
+`kubectl kustomize kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation` → contains `docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server`
+`kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/gitea-mcp.yaml` → both objects `created (server dry run)`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
+
+`git add kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/gitea-mcp.yaml kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/kustomization.yaml`
+`git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit -m "feat(gitea-mcp): track docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server via image automation" -m "Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>"`
+
+### Task 3: App manifests and Flux Kustomization
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp/deployment.yaml`, `service.yaml`, `ingress.yaml`, `kustomization.yaml`
+- Create: `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Consumes: namespace + CNPs (Task 1), ImagePolicy `flux-system:gitea-mcp` (Task 2).
+- Produces: `https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno/mcp` and `/healthz`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: `deployment.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65532
+        runAsGroup: 65532
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: gitea-mcp
+          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.8.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
+          args:
+            - -t
+            - http
+            - -p
+            - "8080"
+            # Only for the 401 on tokenless requests; clients send their own Gitea PAT.
+            - -oauth
+            - -oauth-public-url
+            - https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+            - -H
+            - http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 8080
+              name: http
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 2
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 10m
+              memory: 32Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 128Mi
+      volumes:
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            medium: Memory
+            sizeLimit: 16Mi
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: `service.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8080
+      targetPort: http
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: `ingress.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+    # Published on the NetBird proxy; LAN DNS stays on the Traefik VIP.
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: gitea-mcp
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+  tls:
+    - secretName: gitea-mcp-tls
+      hosts:
+        - gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: `kustomization.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml`**
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  timeout: 5m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Validate**
+`kubectl kustomize kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp` → renders Deployment, Service, Ingress, all in namespace `gitea-mcp`.
+`kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f kubernetes/clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml` → `created (server dry run)`.
+Confirm `kubernetes/clusters/homelab/` is picked up without a listing file: `ls kubernetes/clusters/homelab/flux-system` and read its `kustomization.yaml`; if it lists files explicitly, add `gitea-mcp.yaml` where `gitea.yaml` is listed.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+`git add kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp kubernetes/clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml`
+`git -c user.name='Claude Bot' -c user.email='claude-bot@renner.uno' commit -m "feat(gitea-mcp): deploy the Gitea MCP server at gitea-mcp.renner.uno" -m "Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>"`
+
+### Task 4: PR, rollout and live verification
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Push and open the PR**
+
+`git -c credential.helper='store --file=/home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/creds' push -u origin feat/gitea-mcp`
+`tea pr create --login claude-bot --repo k.renner/homelab --base master --head feat/gitea-mcp --title "feat(gitea-mcp): in-cluster Gitea MCP server on the NetBird proxy" --description "<summary of spec + verification plan; ends with 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)>"`
+Wait for `ci-manifests-test` green (`woodpecker` CLI). Owner merges; never self-merge.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: After merge — rollout**
+`flux get kustomization gitea-mcp` → Ready True. `kubectl -n gitea-mcp get pods` → 1/1 Running, 0 restarts.
+`curl -sS -o /dev/stdout -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}\n" https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno/healthz` → `ok`, HTTP 200.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: DNS paths**
+`getent ahosts gitea-mcp.renner.uno` from the LAN → Traefik VIP (fd99::86 / 10.2.99.86).
+Public answer: query Cloudflare's authoritative NS directly (UDM intercepts `@1.1.1.1`) → NetBird proxy address. NetBird management lists a reverse-proxy service for `gitea-mcp.renner.uno` (netbird-service-sync logs via `logcli`).
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Tokenless request is rejected**
+
+```
+curl -sS -i https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"curl","version":"0"}}}'
+```
+Expected: `HTTP/2 401` with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=…`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Invalid token is rejected** — same request plus `-H 'Authorization: Bearer invalid'` → 401 with `error="invalid_token"`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Authenticated calls work** — same `initialize` request with `--oauth2-bearer "$(cat /home/krenner/.config/claude-bot/gitea-token)"` → 200 with `serverInfo`. Then `tools/call` `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"list_my_repos","arguments":{}}}` with the same token → non-empty repo list; `list_my_repos` resolves the caller from the token, so a result proves the PAT was used. If the server demands `Mcp-Protocol-Version`/`Mcp-Method` headers, take the required values from the error and resend.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Image policy** — `flux get image policy gitea-mcp` → latest image `docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.8.1` or newer.
+
+- [ ] **Step 8: Wiki** — route through `wiki-ingest` → `wiki-distill`: netbird-service-sync label mechanism (`dns.renner.uno/public` vs `netbird.renner.uno/public`), and gitea-mcp deployment facts (oauth-mode-as-auth-gate, PAT passthrough, `/healthz` outside the Host check).

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-10-backup-verify-cloud-vm-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+# Backup verification on an ephemeral Hetzner Cloud VM — design
+
+Date: 2026-10-10
+Status: draft, awaiting review
+
+## Goal
+
+Replace the monthly Velero `restore-test` with a check that proves every PVC
+backup is readable and complete, **without writing restored data to the
+homelab Ceph OSDs**. The work runs on a throwaway Hetzner Cloud VM next to the
+backup bucket; the cluster only orchestrates.
+
+Full disaster-recovery rehearsals (Velero restores of manifests into a fresh
+cluster) are a later, separate project. This spec only covers data
+verifiability.
+
+## Why
+
+- `restore-test` restores every schedule into the production Ceph pools. On
+  2026-10-01 the immich restore took the fullest OSD from 74% to 95% and Ceph
+  went `OSD_FULL` (REN-451). The test is a large share of the OSD write budget.
+- Its file-count parity compares the restored PVC against the *live* volume.
+  That needs a source-side snapshot probe per StorageClass (it broke for
+  `ceph-filesystem-bulk`, see PR #1224) and volatile-path exclusions.
+- The restore only covers `persistentvolumeclaims`/`persistentvolumes`, so a
+  data-level check loses no coverage that the current test has.
+
+## Decisions
+
+| Topic | Decision |
+|---|---|
+| What is verified | Data only (option A): `kopia snapshot verify --verify-files-percent=100` on the latest Kopia snapshot of every DataUpload of the latest `Completed` backup per schedule, plus a size check against Velero's own `DataUpload.status.progress.totalBytes`. No restore, no Kubernetes on the VM. |
+| Where it runs | Ephemeral Hetzner Cloud VM in `fsn1` (same location as bucket `renner-uno-k8s-velero`). Bucket traffic stays inside Hetzner's eu-central zone. |
+| Orchestrator | In-cluster CronJob `backup-verify` (namespace `velero`), monthly `0 8 1 * *` UTC. It reads Kubernetes, drives the VM via the Hetzner API and SSH, and writes nothing but logs. |
+| Alerting | Exit 1 on any `FAIL` → existing `KubeJobFailed`. Results in the Job log (Loki). |
+| Coverage | All DataUploads, including CNPG volumes (read-only, no cost). Schedules discovered by label `app.kubernetes.io/part-of=homelab-backup`. |
+| SSH source restriction | None. Key-only auth with a per-run key, pinned host key, password auth off, VM lives ~1 h. |
+| Kopia version | CLI pinned to **0.16.0**, the version Velero 1.18.2 vendors (`project-velero/kopia` fork of 0.16.0). sha256 pinned per arch. |
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+CronJob backup-verify (velero ns)            Hetzner project homelab-backup-verify
+  image ci-backup-verify                       ┌──────────────────────────────┐
+  ├─ 1 sweep stale resources by label ───────▶ │ servers / ssh-keys / firewalls│
+  ├─ 2 build plan from Backups+DataUploads     │   label managed-by=backup-verify
+  ├─ 3 create ssh-key, firewall, server ─────▶ │ VM cx23 (fallback cax11),     │
+  ├─ 4 ssh: run vm-verify.sh, creds on stdin ▶ │ debian-12, fsn1               │
+  │      ◀─ OK/FAIL lines ─────────────────────│  kopia 0.16.0 --readonly ─────┼─▶ S3 renner-uno-k8s-velero
+  ├─ 5 summary, exit code                      └──────────────────────────────┘     kopia/<ns>/
+  └─ 6 trap: delete server, key, firewall
+```
+
+### 1. Sweep
+
+Delete every server, SSH key and firewall in the project labelled
+`managed-by=backup-verify`. `concurrencyPolicy: Forbid` guarantees no other run
+is live, so everything carrying the label is residue.
+
+### 2. Plan
+
+For each Schedule labelled `app.kubernetes.io/part-of=homelab-backup`:
+
+- newest Backup with `status.phase == Completed` for that schedule
+  (`PartiallyFailed` → the schedule is reported `FAIL` without verifying);
+- its DataUploads (`velero.io/backup-name` label): `spec.sourceNamespace`,
+  `spec.sourcePVC`, `status.snapshotID`, `status.progress.totalBytes`,
+  `status.phase` (anything but `Completed` → `FAIL`);
+- a schedule with no DataUploads (e.g. `authentik`) is `SKIP` (nothing to verify).
+
+`ONLY_NAMESPACES` (comma list, optional) limits the plan for test runs.
+An empty plan is `FAIL`.
+
+### 3. VM
+
+- Per-run ed25519 client key → `hcloud ssh-key create`.
+- Per-run ed25519 **host** key, injected via cloud-init `ssh_keys`; the
+  orchestrator writes the matching `known_hosts` entry and connects with
+  `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes`.
+- `hcloud firewall create` + inbound rule `tcp/22` from `0.0.0.0/0, ::/0`.
+- `hcloud server create --type cx23 --image debian-12 --location fsn1`
+  with labels; if `cx23` is not orderable in `fsn1`, retry once with `cax11`
+  (ARM). The chosen arch selects the Kopia download.
+- cloud-init: disable password auth, mount a tmpfs at `/run/verify`,
+  `shutdown -h +240` as a backstop (a halted server is still billed; the next
+  run's sweep deletes it).
+- No credentials in user-data.
+
+### 4. Verify (on the VM, `vm-verify.sh`)
+
+- Download Kopia 0.16.0 release tarball for the arch, check sha256, install.
+- Credentials arrive on SSH stdin (S3 access/secret key, repository password)
+  and live only in `/run/verify` (tmpfs).
+- Per namespace in the plan:
+  - `kopia repository connect s3 --readonly --bucket renner-uno-k8s-velero
+    --prefix kopia/<ns>/ --endpoint fsn1.your-objectstorage.com --region fsn1`,
+    config and cache under `/run/verify`, cache hard limits set small.
+  - `kopia snapshot list --all --json` once; per planned `snapshotID`, find the
+    manifest by `id` and take its root object ID and `TotalFileSize`.
+  - `kopia snapshot verify --directory-id <root> --verify-files-percent=100`.
+  - Emit one line per PVC: `OK|FAIL <ns>/<pvc> snapshot=<id> bytes=<kopia>/<velero> <reason>`.
+  - `kopia repository disconnect`.
+- Size check: Kopia `TotalFileSize` must equal DataUpload `totalBytes` (both
+  come from the same upload; Velero reports `manifest.Stats.TotalFileSize`).
+  `incrementalBytes` is not used (observed negative values).
+
+Unverified details the first test run must confirm before the check is
+trusted: the JSON field names in `snapshot list --json`, that `--directory-id`
+verifies exactly that snapshot, and the exit code of `verify` on error.
+
+### 5. Summary
+
+PASS/FAIL/SKIP counts, the list of failures and skips, wall time, server type
+used. Exit 1 on any `FAIL`.
+
+### 6. Teardown
+
+A `trap` on EXIT and TERM deletes the server, SSH key and firewall by label.
+`activeDeadlineSeconds` 4 h, `terminationGracePeriodSeconds` 120 s (enough for
+the hcloud deletes).
+
+## Security
+
+- **Hetzner Cloud token**: dedicated project `homelab-backup-verify`
+  (Read & Write; tokens cannot be scoped finer, so the project is the
+  boundary) with a budget alert. OpenBao `homelab/infrastructure/hcloud-backup-verify`,
+  key `token`, synced by an ExternalSecret into `velero`.
+- **S3 + repository password**: existing Secrets `cloud-credentials-hetzner`
+  and `velero-repo-credentials` mounted into the pod. Hetzner S3 keys are
+  project-wide and not read-only; mitigated by `--readonly`, tmpfs-only
+  storage on the VM, and the VM's ~1 h lifetime.
+- **RBAC**: ServiceAccount `backup-verify`: `get/list` on `schedules`,
+  `backups`, `datauploads` (`velero.io`). No access to Secrets via the API.
+- **Network**: CiliumNetworkPolicy for the pod: egress to the kube-apiserver,
+  DNS, `api.hetzner.cloud:443` (FQDN), and `tcp/22` to world (VM address is
+  not known in advance).
+
+## Image
+
+`ci/images/backup-verify/Containerfile`: Alpine with `bash`, `kubectl`, `jq`,
+`openssh-client`; `hcloud` copied from `hetznercloud/cli:v1.69.0`. Built by
+`.woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml`, published as
+`gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify`, with ImageRepository,
+ImagePolicy and setter marker in the first PR.
+
+Scripts `backup-verify.sh` and `vm-verify.sh` in
+`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`, packaged into a ConfigMap by
+`configMapGenerator` like `restore-test.sh`.
+
+## Testing
+
+1. `ONLY_NAMESPACES=apps` manual run (`kubectl create job --from=cronjob/backup-verify`):
+   confirms the unverified Kopia details above.
+2. Negative test: a forged `snapshotID` must end `FAIL` with exit 1.
+3. Abort test: delete the Job mid-run; afterwards no labelled resource may
+   remain in the Hetzner project.
+4. Full run: record wall time and cost.
+
+## Rollout
+
+- **PR 1**: image + image automation, scripts, CronJob `backup-verify` with
+  `suspend: true`, RBAC, ExternalSecret, CiliumNetworkPolicy. `restore-test`
+  unchanged. Tests 1–4 run manually after merge.
+- **PR 2** (after tests pass, before 2026-11-01): unsuspend `backup-verify`;
+  remove `restore-test` (CronJob, RBAC, script, its rule in
+  `network-policies/monitoring-ns.yaml`); rewrite the restore-test section of
+  `kubernetes/RECOVERY.md`. The failed `restore-test-29847360` Job goes with
+  the CronJob, clearing the open `KubeJobFailed` (velero) alert.
+- Close PR #1224 as superseded.
+- The `*-snapshot-readonly` StorageClasses stay (the node-agent uses them for
+  backups).
+- After the first green full run: ingest the run facts into the wiki.
+
+## Out of scope
+
+- Disaster-recovery rehearsal (manifests, Velero restore into a fresh
+  cluster) — separate project.
+- CNPG logical restore checks (`RECOVERY.md` "CNPG restore-test").
+- Whether the Velero repository password is still the upstream default
+  `static-passw0rd` — noted for a separate review.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-11-gitea-mcp-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+# Gitea MCP server — design
+
+Date: 2026-10-11
+Status: draft, awaiting review
+
+## Goal
+
+Run the official Gitea MCP server (`gitea.com/gitea/gitea-mcp`) in the cluster
+and publish it on the NetBird proxy, so MCP clients anywhere (Claude Code on
+the workstation, Paperclip agents, other machines) can use Gitea through MCP
+with their own Gitea personal access token.
+
+## Decisions
+
+| Topic | Decision |
+|---|---|
+| Hosting | In-cluster HTTP service, own namespace `gitea-mcp`, one stateless replica. |
+| Exposure | Public via NetBird proxy, host `gitea-mcp.renner.uno`, label `netbird.renner.uno/public` (proxy-only; the LAN record on the Traefik VIP stays, so LAN clients don't hairpin). |
+| Client auth | Bearer PAT per request (`Authorization: Bearer <pat>` or `token <pat>`). The server holds no token. Every call runs with exactly the caller's Gitea permissions. |
+| Anonymous access | Rejected with 401. Achieved by running with `-oauth`: in that mode a missing token is refused, a present token is passed through unchanged and checked with one `GET /api/v1/user`. No OAuth app or client secret is needed server-side. |
+| Gitea backend | `http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000` (in-cluster Service, no hairpin via the ingress LB). |
+| Image | `docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server`, starting at `1.8.1`, tracked by Flux image automation (semver). |
+| Read-only mode | Off; write tools exposed. Write access is bounded by each caller's token. |
+
+## Why the `-oauth` flag with PATs
+
+Gitea answers anonymous API calls: `GET /api/v1/repos/search` without
+credentials returns `k.renner/homelab`, `konairius/Wiki` and
+`gitea_admin/_cargo-index`. In plain HTTP mode (no `-oauth`, no server token)
+gitea-mcp forwards tokenless requests as an anonymous Gitea client, so the MCP
+endpoint would serve those repos to anyone. Upstream has no "require token"
+flag outside OAuth mode.
+
+With `-oauth -oauth-public-url https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno` (upstream
+`pkg/oauth/oauth.go`):
+
+- `/mcp` without a token → 401 with an RFC 9728 `WWW-Authenticate` challenge.
+- `/mcp` with a token → `TokenRejected` calls Gitea `GET /user` with it; only a
+  401 there rejects. The token is then used as-is for the API calls, so a plain
+  PAT works. There is no JWT/introspection/audience check.
+- The server only publishes `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` metadata;
+  config is the public URL and the Gitea URL, nothing else.
+- `/mcp` additionally checks `Host` against the public URL's host (or
+  loopback) and returns 421 otherwise. `/healthz` is outside both checks.
+
+Costs: one extra `/user` call per MCP request. The metadata document advertises
+the in-cluster Gitea URL as authorization server; this only matters for
+OAuth-flow clients (claude.ai connectors), which are out of scope.
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+client ──HTTPS, Authorization: Bearer <pat>──▶ gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+  ├─ internet: NetBird proxy (TLS passthrough, PROXY v2) ─▶ Traefik
+  └─ LAN:      Traefik VIP (LAN DNS record)                ─▶ Traefik
+Traefik (TLS termination, letsencrypt-cluster cert) ──HTTP :8080──▶ gitea-mcp pod
+gitea-mcp ──HTTP :3000, same token──▶ gitea.gitea.svc (Gitea API)
+```
+
+Traefik forwards `Host` and the `Mcp-*` headers unchanged by default, which the
+Host check and the MCP transport need. `/mcp` is stateless POST only, so no
+sticky sessions or long-lived streams.
+
+## Components
+
+All paths under `kubernetes/`.
+
+- `infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml` — Namespace `gitea-mcp`.
+- `clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml` — Flux Kustomization, path
+  `./kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp`, `prune: true`, `wait: true`, dependsOn
+  `infrastructure`, `infrastructure-crds`.
+- `apps/gitea-mcp/`
+  - `deployment.yaml` — 1 replica; label `app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp`;
+    args `-t http -p 8080 -oauth -oauth-public-url https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+    -H http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000`; no `GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN`, no
+    `-d` (debug may log tokens via the SDK); pod/container securityContext as in
+    gatus (non-root 65532, drop ALL, no privilege escalation, RuntimeDefault
+    seccomp) plus `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` with a disk-backed `emptyDir`
+    (`sizeLimit: 2Gi`) at `/tmp` for the app's own rotated log file; liveness/readiness `httpGet /healthz` on `http`;
+    requests `cpu: 10m, memory: 32Mi`, limit `memory: 128Mi`; image line
+    carries the `$imagepolicy` marker.
+  - `service.yaml` — ClusterIP `gitea-mcp`, port 8080 → `http`.
+  - `ingress.yaml` — host `gitea-mcp.renner.uno`, `ingressClassName: traefik`,
+    `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster`, TLS secret
+    `gitea-mcp-tls`, label `netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"`.
+  - `kustomization.yaml`.
+- `infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml` (+ entry in that
+  directory's `kustomization.yaml`) — default-deny CNP following
+  `gitea-ns.yaml`: ingress from same namespace, `monitoring`, `host`/
+  `remote-node`, ICMP; ingress from Traefik (`ingress` ns,
+  `app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik`) on 8080; egress to kube-dns and to
+  `gitea` ns `app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea` on 3000. No `world` egress.
+- `apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml` — new CNP `gitea-allow-gitea-mcp`, modelled on
+  `gitea-allow-flux-rotator`: ingress to Gitea on 3000 from the `gitea-mcp`
+  namespace.
+- `infrastructure/image-automation/gitea-mcp.yaml` (+ kustomization entry) —
+  ImageRepository `docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server`, ImagePolicy semver
+  `>=1.8.1`.
+
+## Error handling
+
+- Invalid/expired token → Gitea `/user` 401 → gitea-mcp returns 401
+  `invalid_token`.
+- Gitea unreachable → upstream's token check fails open (transport errors are
+  not treated as rejection), but the subsequent API call fails, so the client
+  gets a tool error, never data.
+- Pod down → Traefik 503; Flux `wait` surfaces a failed rollout as
+  `FluxResourceNotReady`.
+
+## Verification (after Flux reconciles)
+
+1. `gitea-mcp` Kustomization Ready; pod Ready.
+2. `https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno/healthz` → 200, from the LAN and through the
+   NetBird proxy (public resolution).
+3. `POST /mcp` `initialize` without a token → 401.
+4. `POST /mcp` with the `claude-bot` PAT: `initialize`, then `tools/call`
+   `list_my_repos` → returns repos.
+5. NetBird management lists a reverse-proxy service for
+   `gitea-mcp.renner.uno`.
+6. ImagePolicy `gitea-mcp` resolves `1.8.1` (or newer).
+
+## Out of scope
+
+- Registering the server in Claude Code / other clients.
+- OAuth browser flow for claude.ai connectors (would need a Gitea OAuth2 app
+  and `-H https://gitea.renner.uno`).
+- Read-only mode, tool filtering (`-O`/`-S`).

kubernetes/RECOVERY.md

@@ -165,26 +165,33 @@ permanent recovery.
 
 ---
 
-## Velero restore-test: 80% OSD capacity gate
+## Velero backup verification (backup-verify)
 
-The monthly Velero restore-test restores into the production Ceph pools. Before
-each schedule's restore it projects the restore's raw size (DataUpload
-`totalBytes` x the pool's replication/EC factor, spread over all OSDs) onto
-current OSD usage from Prometheus. If the fullest OSD would go above **80%**
-(`OSD_MAX_PCT` in `restore-test-cronjob.yaml`), that schedule is not restored:
-the Job log shows it as **SKIP** with the projected %, and the summary lists it
-under "Skipped (backup NOT restore-tested)". A SKIP does not fail the Job, so
-read the summary each month. If the projection cannot be made (Prometheus
-down, unsized DataUpload), the schedule is not restored and counts as FAIL.
-Background: REN-441, REN-442.
+Monthly (1st, 08:00 UTC) CronJob `velero/backup-verify`. It creates a throwaway
+Hetzner Cloud VM in fsn1 (project `homelab-backup-verify`) and runs
+`kopia snapshot verify --verify-files-percent=100` read-only against the latest
+snapshot of every DataUpload of each schedule's newest finished backup. Snapshot
+sizes are checked against `DataUpload.status.progress.totalBytes`. Nothing is
+restored into the cluster. A full run takes about an hour (2026-10-10: 39 PVCs,
+~410 GB, 61 min, cx23).
+
+- Results: `kubectl -n velero logs job/<backup-verify-...>`; `FAIL` lines name the
+  backup, PVC, snapshot and cause.
+- A failed run fires `KubeJobFailed` (velero).
+- Manual run: `kubectl -n velero create job bv-manual --from=cronjob/backup-verify`;
+  limit it with env `ONLY_NAMESPACES=apps,gitea`.
+- Every run first deletes everything labelled `managed-by=backup-verify` in the
+  Hetzner project, so a leftover VM is cleaned up by the next run. Do not start a
+  manual run while another one is running: its sweep deletes the other run's VM.
+- This checks data readability, not a full restore. Disaster-recovery rehearsal is separate.
 
 ---
 
 ## CNPG restore-test (verify backups are restorable — non-destructive)
 
-The monthly Velero restore-test (`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`) exercises
-PVC restores but **explicitly does not touch CNPG** (barman-cloud is a separate
-code path). Run this drill periodically to prove the CNPG backups are actually
+The monthly Velero backup verification (`kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/`)
+checks the Velero PVC backups but **does not cover CNPG** (barman-cloud is a
+separate code path). Run this drill periodically to prove the CNPG backups are actually
 restorable, **without touching the live clusters**. It restores into a throwaway
 cluster in the *same* namespace (so it can reference the existing namespaced
 `ObjectStore` and creds) and declares the barman plugin with

kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml

@@ -2189,65 +2189,22 @@ data:
           negate: false
           failure_result: false
 
-      # OpenProject: confidential client, secret from OpenBao via !Env.
-      # Git owns the provider, its application and the member list.
-      - id: openproject-users-group
-        model: authentik_core.group
-        identifiers:
-          name: OpenProject Users
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          is_superuser: false
-          users:
-            - !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
-
-      - id: openproject-provider
-        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
-        identifiers:
-          name: Provider for OpenProject
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          authentication_flow: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
-          authorization_flow: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
-          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
-          client_type: confidential
-          client_id: openproject
-          client_secret: !Env OPENPROJECT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
-          grant_types:
-            - authorization_code
-            - refresh_token
-          signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, authentik Self-signed Certificate]]
-          property_mappings:
-            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid]]
-            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile]]
-            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-email]]
-          redirect_uris:
-            - url: https://openproject.renner.uno/auth/authentik/callback
-              matching_mode: strict
-            - url: https://openproject.renner.uno/auth/oidc-authentik/callback
-              matching_mode: strict
-
+      # OpenProject, decommissioned. Application first: Application.provider
+      # is on_delete=PROTECT. Its policy binding cascades with it.
       - model: authentik_core.application
         identifiers:
           slug: openproject
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          name: OpenProject
-          slug: openproject
-          provider: !KeyOf openproject-provider
-          meta_launch_url: https://openproject.renner.uno
-          meta_description: "Project board (OpenProject)"
+        state: absent
 
-      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+      - model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
         identifiers:
-          target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, openproject]]
-          group: !KeyOf openproject-users-group
-          order: 0
-        state: present
-        attrs:
-          enabled: true
-          negate: false
-          failure_result: false
+          name: Provider for OpenProject
+        state: absent
+
+      - model: authentik_core.group
+        identifiers:
+          name: OpenProject Users
+        state: absent
 
       # Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
       # Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the

kubernetes/apps/authentik/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -100,14 +100,6 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: ldap-outpost-tls
               key: tls.key
-        # Client secret of the OpenProject OIDC provider, read via `!Env`
-        # in the blueprint; OpenProject gets the same value from OpenBao
-        # apps/openproject.
-        - name: OPENPROJECT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
-          valueFrom:
-            secretKeyRef:
-              name: openproject-oidc
-              key: client-secret
         # 2026.8 honours X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host/-For only from these
         # networks. Traefik reaches authentik-server (IPv4 single-stack
         # Service) from a pod IP; same ranges Traefik itself trusts for

kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ resources:
   - externalsecret.yaml
   - samba-bridge-externalsecret.yaml
   - blueprints-configmap.yaml
-  - openproject-oidc-externalsecret.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml
   - paperless-gate-ingress.yaml
   - paperless-gate-egress.yaml

kubernetes/apps/authentik/openproject-oidc-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-oidc
-  namespace: authentik
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 1h
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: openproject-oidc
-  data:
-    - secretKey: client-secret
-      remoteRef:
-        key: apps/openproject
-        property: oidc-client-secret

kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65532
+        runAsGroup: 65532
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: gitea-mcp
+          image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server:1.8.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:gitea-mcp"}
+          # The image has no ENTRYPOINT; args alone would replace its CMD.
+          command:
+            - /app/gitea-mcp
+          args:
+            - -t
+            - http
+            - -p
+            - "8080"
+            # Only for the 401 on tokenless requests; clients send their own Gitea PAT.
+            - -oauth
+            - -oauth-public-url
+            - https://gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+            - -H
+            - http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 8080
+              name: http
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 2
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 10m
+              memory: 32Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 128Mi
+      volumes:
+        # Holds the app's own rotated log file (100MB x 11 max); stdout carries the same lines.
+        - name: tmp
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 2Gi

kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp/ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+    # Published on the NetBird proxy; LAN DNS stays on the Traefik VIP.
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  rules:
+    - host: gitea-mcp.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: gitea-mcp
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+  tls:
+    - secretName: gitea-mcp-tls
+      hosts:
+        - gitea-mcp.renner.uno

kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml

kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8080
+      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/gitea/ingress.yaml

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ metadata:
   namespace: gitea
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+    # Published on the NetBird proxy; LAN DNS stays on the Traefik VIP so
+    # SSH (gitea-ssh) and node image pulls stay local.
+    netbird.renner.uno/public: "true"
   annotations:
     cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
     # Long-running git fetch/push and container-registry blob uploads:

kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -72,3 +72,23 @@ spec:
         - ports:
             - port: "6443"
               protocol: TCP
+---
+# gitea-mcp reaches the in-cluster Service; egress half is in network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-allow-gitea-mcp
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "3000"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/apps/gitea/statefulset.yaml

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ spec:
           # both handled as explicit steps in MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md. No
           # imagepolicy marker: a minor bump migrates the live SQLite database and
           # needs a snapshot first (volumesnapshot-pre-upgrade.yaml). 1.21.4 ->
-          # 1.27.3 in REN-1367 (OpenProject needs the 1.22+ webhook fields); the
+          # 1.27.3 in REN-1367; the
           # next step, 28.x, changes the outgoing-request (webhook) host lists.
           image: gitea/gitea:1.27.3-rootless@sha256:1c17ecaead42eb3b5391553d8708103a4beb0e86edf5b9ebc1eb269c318845f2
           env:
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ spec:
             # Nothing here authenticates via query tokens (CI uses webhooks/OAuth).
             - name: GITEA__security__DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN
               value: "true"
+            # Webhook targets Gitea may call; every configured webhook host.
+            - name: GITEA__security__ALLOWED_HOST_LIST
+              value: "ci.renner.uno,paperclip-api.renner.uno,wiki.ai.svc.cluster.local"
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 3000

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
               memory: 32Mi
       containers:
         - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: TZ
               value: Europe/Berlin

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/cnpg-podmonitors.yaml

@@ -123,23 +123,3 @@ spec:
       interval: 30s
   podTargetLabels:
     - role
----
-# op-pg (OpenProject, REN-1363). Added with the cluster, like ha-pg, so the
-# CNPG backup/WAL rules see it from the first moment.
-apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
-kind: PodMonitor
-metadata:
-  name: cnpg-op-pg
-  namespace: openproject
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudnative-pg
-    release: kube-prometheus-stack
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      cnpg.io/cluster: op-pg
-  podMetricsEndpoints:
-    - port: metrics
-      interval: 30s
-  podTargetLabels:
-    - role

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml

@@ -71,11 +71,6 @@ spec:
         # health, not reachability — the root path returns 404 by design, since
         # the service only answers on calendar paths.
         - https://ical-proxy.renner.uno/health
-        # OpenProject (REN-1363). Ungated (the app has its own login), so the
-        # public name reaches the app: /health_checks/default answers 200 only
-        # when the web process and op-pg are up. App health and the public
-        # edge path in one target.
-        - https://openproject.renner.uno/health_checks/default
         # APP-HEALTH probes for the gated monitoring UIs, from the correct
         # in-cluster vantage (monitoring-vantage-point-rule): the gate is
         # only on the ingress, so the ClusterIP /-/healthy endpoints are

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/prometheusrule-ceph.yaml

@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ spec:
           # Per-check rather than ceph_health_status, so one permanently-active
           # check cannot mask every other Ceph warning.
           #
-          # AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded: it cannot clear until the nodes run a
-          # kernel supporting aes256k over the CSI mount path (#527).
-          #
           # POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY is in scope. An unreplicated pool makes
           # `ceph osd ok-to-stop` refuse for every OSD, so it reports blocked
           # maintenance and not just data risk — do not exclude it for a pool
@@ -34,20 +31,14 @@ spec:
           # both episodes in the 30d to 2026-08-23 ran ~26h and cleared
           # untouched, the first ~24h after the last stall.
           #
-          # Both began inside the Velero restore-test sweep — a ~5h sustained
-          # restore that outruns the SLC cache on these QLC NVMe. The sweep
-          # runs monthly, 08:00-14:00Z on the 1st.
-          #
-          # Expected for the hardware, but not excludable:
-          # this is also the earliest signal of a genuinely failing drive, and
-          # all three are at 80-87% endurance used (see cephcluster.yaml).
-          expr: ceph_health_detail{name!~"AUTH_INSECURE_.+"} == 1
+          # Not excludable: it is also the earliest signal of a failing drive.
+          expr: ceph_health_detail == 1
           for: 6h
           labels:
             severity: warning
           annotations:
             summary: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} active for 6h"
-            description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours. Only AUTH_INSECURE_* is excluded (kernel-blocked, see #527). BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT is sticky for 24h after the last stall and clears itself: check whether the stall fell inside the monthly Velero restore-test window (08:00-14:00Z on the 1st), which is expected on these QLC drives — one outside that window, or a repeat on the same OSD, means check that drive (#557). Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
+            description: "Ceph health check {{ $labels.name }} has been active for six hours. BLUESTORE_SLOW_OP_ALERT stays for 24h after the last stall even when latency is back to normal; find the OSD in the detail output and check that drive's SMART data (#557). Detail: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
 
         - alert: CephPoolLostRedundancy
           # Names the pool, which POOL_NO_REDUNDANCY does not.

kubernetes/apps/music-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ spec:
         # stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
         # policy) — no extra dependency.
         - name: reconcile-publish-ip
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.5 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
           command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
           volumeMounts:
             - name: data
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ spec:
               readOnly: true
       containers:
         - name: music-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.5 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: LOG_LEVEL
               value: info

kubernetes/apps/openproject/README.md

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# openproject
-
-OpenProject Community Edition, the owner's project board (REN-1346,
-REN-1363). <https://openproject.renner.uno>, public through the NetBird
-proxy like immich and matrix; OpenProject's own login guards it.
-
-## Layout
-
-- `openproject` Deployment, one pod: init `seeder` (schema load or
-  migrations, then seed), then `web` (puma, :8080) and
-  `worker` (GoodJob). One pod because both need the RWO attachments PVC.
-- `op-pg` CNPG cluster (PostgreSQL 17, 2 instances), WAL archive and daily
-  base backup to Hetzner `s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/op-pg`, 30 days.
-- `openproject-assets` PVC (attachments), Velero `openproject-daily` at
-  10:15 local, 30 days.
-- `openproject-secrets` is generated once in-cluster by ESO:
-  `SECRET_KEY_BASE` and `OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD` (login
-  `admin`). The password only seeds the first start; a change in the UI is
-  not reverted.
-
-## Image updates
-
-The image is pinned by tag and digest (`openproject/openproject:<x.y.z>-slim`)
-and Renovate opens the bump. The `seeder` init container migrates the schema
-before the new web container starts. A major bump (17 -> 18) gets its own
-card and a check of the upstream upgrade notes.
-
-## Monitoring
-
-- Blackbox `https://openproject.renner.uno/health_checks/default`: public
-  edge, Traefik, web and database in one target (catch-all
-  `BlackboxProbeFailed`).
-- `cnpg-op-pg` PodMonitor: the CNPG backup and WAL-archive rules cover op-pg.
-- Velero schedule rules cover `openproject-daily`.
-
-## Restore
-
-Database (physical restore of the latest base backup plus WAL):
-
-1. Check a backup exists: `kubectl -n openproject get backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`
-   and the bucket path `op-pg/`.
-2. Follow `kubernetes/RECOVERY.md` (cold rebuild) with this stanza in
-   `cluster.yaml` in place of `bootstrap.initdb`:
-
-   ```yaml
-   bootstrap:
-     recovery:
-       source: op-pg-store
-       database: openproject
-       owner: openproject
-   externalClusters:
-     - name: op-pg-store
-       plugin:
-         name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
-         parameters:
-           barmanObjectName: op-pg-store
-           serverName: op-pg
-   ```
-
-   Scale the `openproject` Deployment to 0 first, so nothing writes to an
-   empty database while the cluster rebuilds. Revert to `initdb` afterwards.
-3. A non-destructive test restore into a side cluster: "CNPG restore-test"
-   in `kubernetes/RECOVERY.md`.
-
-Attachments: scale the Deployment to 0, delete the `openproject-assets` PVC,
-then `velero restore create --from-backup <openproject-daily-...>
---include-namespaces openproject`. Restore database and attachments from the
-same day, so attachment rows and files match.
-
-`openproject-secrets`: if lost, ESO generates a new one. Sessions end; the
-admin password in the database stays what it was.

kubernetes/apps/openproject/cluster.yaml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
-kind: Cluster
-metadata:
-  name: op-pg
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  instances: 2
-  smartShutdownTimeout: 10
-  stopDelay: 60
-  # PG 17, not the repo-standard 16: OpenProject 17 ships its all-in-one
-  # image and packages on 17 and its system requirements point there. Bare
-  # major tag like the other clusters (minor bumps flow, majors stay an
-  # explicit decision).
-  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17
-  storage:
-    storageClass: ceph-block
-    size: 5Gi
-  plugins:
-    - name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
-      isWALArchiver: true
-      parameters:
-        barmanObjectName: op-pg-store
-  bootstrap:
-    initdb:
-      database: openproject
-      owner: openproject
-  postgresql:
-    parameters:
-      shared_buffers: "128MB"
-      max_connections: "100"
-      # Same write-reduction settings as the other clusters; see
-      # apps/trmnl/cluster.yaml for the reasoning and the RPO trade.
-      wal_compression: "zstd"
-      archive_timeout: "30min"
-      checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
-      max_wal_size: "2GB"
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      cpu: 100m
-      memory: 256Mi
-    limits:
-      memory: 512Mi

kubernetes/apps/openproject/ingress.yaml

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Public, same edge path as immich and matrix: the dns.renner.uno/public
-# label makes netbird-service-sync publish the host through the NetBird proxy
-# (Cloudflare wildcard -> proxy.renner.uno -> TLS passthrough to Traefik) and
-# external-dns-unifi skip it; LAN clients follow the public answer and the UDM
-# hairpins back in. OpenProject's own login guards it.
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Ingress
-metadata:
-  name: openproject
-  namespace: openproject
-  labels:
-    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
-  annotations:
-    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
-spec:
-  ingressClassName: traefik
-  tls:
-    - hosts:
-        - openproject.renner.uno
-      secretName: openproject-tls
-  rules:
-    - host: openproject.renner.uno
-      http:
-        paths:
-          - path: /
-            pathType: Prefix
-            backend:
-              service:
-                name: openproject
-                port:
-                  number: 80

kubernetes/apps/openproject/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
-kind: Kustomization
-resources:
-  - secrets.yaml
-  - pvcs.yaml
-  - openproject.yaml
-  - ingress.yaml
-  # op-pg CNPG Postgres + offsite Barman backup (PostgreSQL 17, the version
-  # OpenProject 17 targets — see cluster.yaml).
-  - cluster.yaml
-  - objectstore.yaml
-  - scheduled-backup.yaml
-  - hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
-  - oidc-externalsecret.yaml

kubernetes/apps/openproject/objectstore.yaml

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
----
-apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
-kind: ObjectStore
-metadata:
-  name: op-pg-store
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  configuration:
-    # Offsite Hetzner Object Storage (fsn1), same bucket as the other CNPG
-    # clusters. No SSE: Hetzner supports only SSE-C, unusable by barman-cloud
-    # (plugin #646), so at-rest encryption is unavailable; transit is TLS.
-    destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/op-pg
-    endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
-    s3Credentials:
-      accessKeyId:
-        name: hetzner-s3-creds
-        key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
-      secretAccessKey:
-        name: hetzner-s3-creds
-        key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
-      # Region is required (REGION=fsn1) — without it boto3's HeadBucket
-      # (barman-cloud-check-wal-archive during bootstrap.recovery) 400s.
-      region:
-        name: hetzner-s3-creds
-        key: REGION
-    wal:
-      compression: gzip
-    data:
-      compression: gzip
-  retentionPolicy: "30d"

kubernetes/apps/openproject/oidc-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-oidc
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 1h
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: openproject-oidc
-    template:
-      data:
-        OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_IDENTIFIER: "{{ .clientId }}"
-        OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_SECRET: "{{ .clientSecret }}"
-  data:
-    - secretKey: clientId
-      remoteRef:
-        key: apps/openproject
-        property: oidc-client-id
-    - secretKey: clientSecret
-      remoteRef:
-        key: apps/openproject
-        property: oidc-client-secret

kubernetes/apps/openproject/openproject.yaml

@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ConfigMap
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-config
-  namespace: openproject
-data:
-  OPENPROJECT_HOST__NAME: "openproject.renner.uno"
-  # TLS ends at Traefik; this makes OpenProject build https:// links and set
-  # secure cookies.
-  OPENPROJECT_HTTPS: "true"
-  # Log in with the generated password directly instead of being forced to
-  # change it on first login (see secrets.yaml).
-  OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RESET: "false"
-  # One user base and a small team: two puma workers instead of the
-  # per-CPU default keep the pod inside its memory limit.
-  OPENPROJECT_WEB_WORKERS: "2"
-  # Authentik OIDC provider, seeded on every pod start; client id and
-  # secret come from openproject-oidc.
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_DISPLAY__NAME: "Authentik"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ISSUER: "https://auth.renner.uno/application/o/openproject/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_HOST: "auth.renner.uno"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_PORT: "443"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_SCHEME: "https"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_AUTHORIZATION__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/authorize/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_TOKEN__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/token/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_USERINFO__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/userinfo/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_END__SESSION__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/openproject/end-session/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_JWKS__URI: "/application/o/openproject/jwks/"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_LOGIN: "preferred_username"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_FIRST__NAME: "given_name"
-  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_LAST__NAME: "family_name"
----
-apiVersion: apps/v1
-kind: Deployment
-metadata:
-  name: openproject
-  namespace: openproject
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-  annotations:
-    # Env vars are read once at container start; roll the pod when the
-    # ConfigMap or the generated Secret changes.
-    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: openproject-config
-    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: openproject-secrets,openproject-oidc
-spec:
-  replicas: 1
-  # Web and worker share the RWO attachments PVC, and the seeder init
-  # container migrates the schema; two pods would race on both.
-  strategy:
-    type: Recreate
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-    spec:
-      enableServiceLinks: false
-      automountServiceAccountToken: false
-      securityContext:
-        runAsNonRoot: true
-        # `app` in the official image.
-        runAsUser: 1000
-        runAsGroup: 1000
-        fsGroup: 1000
-        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
-        seccompProfile:
-          type: RuntimeDefault
-      initContainers:
-        # Loads the schema on an empty database, else runs pending
-        # migrations, then seeds (idempotent; creates `admin` on first run).
-        # Runs on every pod start, so an image bump migrates before the new
-        # web container serves. Restarted by the kubelet until op-pg accepts
-        # connections.
-        - name: seeder
-          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
-          args: ["/app/docker/prod/seeder"]
-          envFrom:
-            - configMapRef:
-                name: openproject-config
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-secrets
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-oidc
-          env:
-            # CNPG generates this Secret; `uri` carries the rotated password
-            # and points at op-pg-rw.
-            - name: DATABASE_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: op-pg-app
-                  key: uri
-          volumeMounts:
-            - name: assets
-              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 250m
-              memory: 512Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 2Gi
-          securityContext:
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-            capabilities:
-              drop: ["ALL"]
-      containers:
-        - name: web
-          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
-          args: ["/app/docker/prod/web"]
-          ports:
-            - name: http
-              containerPort: 8080
-          envFrom:
-            - configMapRef:
-                name: openproject-config
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-secrets
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-oidc
-          env:
-            - name: DATABASE_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: op-pg-app
-                  key: uri
-          volumeMounts:
-            - name: assets
-              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
-          # /health_checks/default checks the database and the web process.
-          # The Host header is required: the request goes to the pod IP,
-          # which OpenProject's host check would answer with 404.
-          startupProbe:
-            httpGet:
-              path: /health_checks/default
-              port: http
-              httpHeaders:
-                - name: Host
-                  value: localhost
-            periodSeconds: 10
-            # ~5 min for puma to boot and preload the app.
-            failureThreshold: 30
-          livenessProbe:
-            httpGet:
-              path: /health_checks/default
-              port: http
-              httpHeaders:
-                - name: Host
-                  value: localhost
-            periodSeconds: 30
-            timeoutSeconds: 5
-          readinessProbe:
-            httpGet:
-              path: /health_checks/default
-              port: http
-              httpHeaders:
-                - name: Host
-                  value: localhost
-            periodSeconds: 10
-            timeoutSeconds: 5
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 250m
-              memory: 1Gi
-            limits:
-              memory: 2Gi
-          securityContext:
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-            capabilities:
-              drop: ["ALL"]
-        # Background jobs (GoodJob): mails, notifications, exports, and the
-        # cron-like jobs. Needs the attachments volume for exports/imports.
-        - name: worker
-          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
-          args: ["/app/docker/prod/worker"]
-          envFrom:
-            - configMapRef:
-                name: openproject-config
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-secrets
-            - secretRef:
-                name: openproject-oidc
-          env:
-            - name: DATABASE_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: op-pg-app
-                  key: uri
-          volumeMounts:
-            - name: assets
-              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 100m
-              memory: 512Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 1536Mi
-          securityContext:
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-            capabilities:
-              drop: ["ALL"]
-      volumes:
-        - name: assets
-          persistentVolumeClaim:
-            claimName: openproject-assets
----
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Service
-metadata:
-  name: openproject
-  namespace: openproject
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-spec:
-  selector:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-  ports:
-    - name: http
-      port: 80
-      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/openproject/pvcs.yaml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Attachments (OPENPROJECT_ATTACHMENTS__STORAGE__PATH defaults to
-# $APP_DATA_PATH/files = /var/openproject/assets/files). Web and worker share
-# one pod, so RWO is enough and the Deployment uses `Recreate`. Backed up by
-# the Velero schedule openproject-daily (selected by these labels).
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-assets
-  namespace: openproject
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-    app.kubernetes.io/component: assets
-spec:
-  accessModes:
-    - ReadWriteOnce
-  storageClassName: ceph-block
-  resources:
-    requests:
-      storage: 10Gi

kubernetes/apps/openproject/scheduled-backup.yaml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
-kind: ScheduledBackup
-metadata:
-  name: op-pg-daily
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  # 03:00 local, same slot as the other CNPG clusters. `immediate` takes the
-  # first base backup as soon as the cluster is up. The attachments PVC is
-  # covered by the Velero schedule openproject-daily.
-  schedule: "0 0 3 * * *"
-  immediate: true
-  backupOwnerReference: self
-  cluster:
-    name: op-pg
-  method: plugin
-  pluginConfiguration:
-    name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io

kubernetes/apps/openproject/secrets.yaml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Generated once in-cluster by ESO; nothing here is seeded by hand.
-#
-#   SECRET_KEY_BASE                       Rails session/cookie key.
-#   OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD  Password of the `admin` account the
-#                                         seeder creates on the first start.
-#                                         Only read at seed time: changing the
-#                                         password in the UI later is not
-#                                         reverted, and this value goes stale.
-#
-# Deleting the Secret regenerates both; that logs everyone out and does NOT
-# change an existing admin password.
-apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
-kind: Password
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-secrets
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  length: 64
-  digits: 16
-  symbols: 0
-  allowRepeat: true
-  noUpper: false
-  secretKeys:
-    - SECRET_KEY_BASE
-    - OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD
----
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-secrets
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  # Generate once; Periodic would rotate the key every refresh.
-  refreshPolicy: CreatedOnce
-  target:
-    name: openproject-secrets
-  dataFrom:
-    - sourceRef:
-        generatorRef:
-          apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
-          kind: Password
-          name: openproject-secrets

kubernetes/apps/paperless/paperless.yaml

@@ -50,11 +50,9 @@ data:
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENABLED: "1"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT: "http://tika:9998"
   PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT: "http://gotenberg:3000"
-  # AI suggestions against the cluster's own LLM (kubernetes/apps/llama-server).
-  # Nothing leaves the cluster: both endpoints are ClusterIP Services, so
-  # document text is never sent to a third party and there is no API key to
-  # rotate — llama-server has no authentication, and the ai namespace's network
-  # policy is what restricts who may reach it.
+  # AI suggestions against Mistral AI's hosted API (OpenAI-compatible). Document
+  # text is sent to Mistral. The key is PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_API_KEY, from the
+  # paperless-secrets Secret (OpenBao apps/paperless, field minstral-token).
   #
   # CAVEAT, and it is a real one: paperless reads these from an
   # ApplicationConfiguration row in the database and falls back to the
@@ -63,20 +61,14 @@ data:
   # here — and leave those fields untouched in the UI.
   PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-server.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
-  # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/deployment.yaml. The
-  # server ignores the field on the wire, but paperless sends it and the value
-  # is what appears in its logs.
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
-  # ClusterIP addresses are private, and paperless blocks non-public endpoints
-  # unless this is set. Default is already true; explicit because the whole
-  # integration silently stops working if it ever flips.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "https://api.mistral.ai/v1"
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "mistral-small-2603"
+  # The embedding endpoint is the in-cluster llama-embed, a ClusterIP address,
+  # and paperless blocks non-public endpoints unless this is set. Default is
+  # already true; explicit because the embedding integration silently stops
+  # working if it ever flips.
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
-  # Under llama-server's own 16384, leaving room for the response.
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
-  # The 120s default is too tight at ~11 tok/s: a classification is roughly
-  # 2-4k prompt tokens plus a second round trip for localisation.
-  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "300"
   # Matched against Django's settings.LANGUAGES, so the region is required —
   # "de" alone does not resolve. Without it the model returns German tags but
   # English document types, which was reproducible against this endpoint.
@@ -86,6 +78,9 @@ data:
   # primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
   PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
+  # The embedding key falls back to PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_API_KEY when unset, which
+  # would send the Mistral token to llama-embed. llama-embed has no auth.
+  PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_API_KEY: "unused"
   # Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
   # embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
   # index has to be rebuilt.
@@ -200,6 +195,11 @@ spec:
                 secretKeyRef:
                   name: paperless-secrets
                   key: secret-key
+            - name: PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_API_KEY
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: paperless-secrets
+                  key: minstral-token
             - name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
               valueFrom:
                 secretKeyRef:

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/gitea-mcp.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  timeout: 5m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/gitea-mcp
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/openproject.yaml

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: Kustomization
-metadata:
-  name: openproject
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  # OpenProject Community (REN-1363): web + worker, the op-pg CNPG Cluster +
-  # ObjectStore + ScheduledBackup and the attachments PVC. Own KS so a
-  # failure here never holds up the shared apps KS.
-  interval: 10m
-  retryInterval: 1m
-  timeout: 30m
-  sourceRef:
-    kind: GitRepository
-    name: flux-system
-  path: ./kubernetes/apps/openproject
-  prune: true
-  wait: true
-  dependsOn:
-    - name: infrastructure
-    - name: infrastructure-crds
-    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
-    - name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
-  healthCheckExprs:
-    - apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
-      kind: Cluster
-      failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
-      current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"

kubernetes/infrastructure/flux-notifications/provider.yaml

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ metadata:
   name: alertmanager
   namespace: flux-system
 spec:
-  # The notification controller appends `/api/v2/alerts/` itself, so
-  # spec.address is the bare base URL with trailing slash.
+  # The notification controller POSTs to spec.address verbatim (it does
+  # not append a path), so the address must be the full Alertmanager v2
+  # alerts endpoint. The bare base URL is answered with 405 Method Not
+  # Allowed and every Flux notification is dropped.
   type: alertmanager
-  address: http://kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:9093/
+  address: http://kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:9093/api/v2/alerts/

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/backup-verify.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImageRepository
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify
+  interval: 30m
+---
+# build-ci-images.yml tags each build YYYY-MM-DD; newest date wins.
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImagePolicy
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  imageRepositoryRef:
+    name: backup-verify
+  filterTags:
+    pattern: '^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$'
+  policy:
+    alphabetical:
+      order: asc

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/gitea-mcp.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImageRepository
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  image: docker.gitea.com/gitea-mcp-server
+  interval: 1h
+---
+apiVersion: image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: ImagePolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  imageRepositoryRef:
+    name: gitea-mcp
+  policy:
+    semver:
+      range: ">=1.8.1"

kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/kustomization.yaml

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ kind: Kustomization
 resources:
   - update-automation.yaml
   - audiobookshelf.yaml
+  - backup-verify.yaml
   - ceph.yaml
   - cnpg-barman-plugin.yaml
   - gatus.yaml
+  - gitea-mcp.yaml
   - gotenberg.yaml
   - home-assistant.yaml
   - immich.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml

@@ -152,12 +152,6 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: matrix
 ---
-# OpenProject Community, the owner's project board (REN-1363).
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Namespace
-metadata:
-  name: openproject
----
 # Terminus (TRMNL BYOS server) driving the entrance-way e-ink panel.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
@@ -204,6 +198,12 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: gitea
 ---
+# Gitea MCP server. Declared here so it exists before infrastructure-crds applies its CNPs.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp
+---
 # netbird-service-sync, moving out of `openbao` (issue #876). Declared here like
 # `woodpecker` above, so it exists before infrastructure-crds applies its
 # CiliumNetworkPolicies. No pod-security labels: the cluster default applies.

kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-service-sync/deployment.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 # Reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses that carry
-# dns.renner.uno/public: one TLS-passthrough service per host on :443,
+# dns.renner.uno/public or netbird.renner.uno/public (proxy only, LAN DNS
+# untouched): one TLS-passthrough service per host on :443,
 # targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a subnet resource over the service
 # CIDR (ci/images/netbird-service-sync/controller.py).
 #
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ spec:
           # image directory (branch and master alike) and the registry keeps
           # only the newest manifest per tag, so the digest must come from
           # the MASTER build of the code change.
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:2026-09-23@sha256:64f6057c508640e1dbc50457dc26e9b2de058a111fd46ca096021d7444b5bbff
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:2026-10-11@sha256:2e8c5e45cffd515cc93e04dc9fd47403a7910368fc7516e94c78d8f53dcd5272
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             readOnlyRootFilesystem: true

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/gitea-mcp-ns.yaml

@@ -1,38 +1,22 @@
+---
+# Baseline policy for the `gitea-mcp` namespace.
 apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
 metadata:
-  name: default-deny-ingress
-  namespace: openproject
+  name: default-deny
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
 spec:
   endpointSelector: {}
   ingress:
-    # Intra-namespace — openproject → op-pg.
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": openproject
-    # openproject.renner.uno via Traefik.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
-    # Prometheus scrape.
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
-    # Velero backups via PVC mount.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": velero
-    # CNPG operator (in `database` ns) reconciles op-pg — needs to reach
-    # the postgres pods for health, failover, role checks.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
     - fromEntities:
         - host
         - remote-node
-    # ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
-    # home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale. INGRESS ONLY.
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchExpressions:
             - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
@@ -55,40 +39,10 @@ spec:
             - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
             - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
             - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
-
----
-# Egress for the OpenProject pod only, so the op-pg CNPG pods keep
-# unrestricted egress for the barman-cloud WAL archive to Hetzner (same trade
-# as trmnl-ns.yaml).
-#
-# Outside the namespace OpenProject reaches only Authentik (OIDC), via
-# Traefik. No SMTP, no file-storage integration; adding one needs a rule
-# here, or it fails closed.
-apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
-kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-egress
-  namespace: openproject
-spec:
-  endpointSelector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
   egress:
-    # Intra-namespace — op-pg-rw.
     - toEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": openproject
-    # auth.renner.uno resolves to the Traefik VIP; Cilium DNATs before
-    # egress policy, so the rule matches Traefik's container port (as in
-    # matrix-ns.yaml mas-authentik-egress).
-    - toEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "8443"
-              protocol: TCP
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea-mcp
     - toEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
@@ -99,3 +53,30 @@ spec:
               protocol: UDP
             - port: "53"
               protocol: TCP
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": gitea
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "3000"
+              protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-mcp-allow-traefik
+  namespace: gitea-mcp
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-mcp
+  ingress:
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8080"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml

@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ resources:
   - woodpecker-ci-ns.yaml
   - woodpecker-ns.yaml
   - gitea-ns.yaml
+  - gitea-mcp-ns.yaml
   - netbird-service-sync-ns.yaml
   - trmnl-ns.yaml
-  - openproject-ns.yaml
   - matrix-ns.yaml
   - wordpress-ns.yaml
   - ai-ns.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/monitoring-ns.yaml

@@ -50,17 +50,6 @@ spec:
         - ports:
             - port: "9090"
               protocol: TCP
-    # velero restore-test Job: its capacity gate reads OSD usage from
-    # Prometheus :9090 (restore-test.sh, preflight_capacity). Scoped to the
-    # Job's pod label; the velero namespace has no egress policy.
-    - fromEndpoints:
-        - matchLabels:
-            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": velero
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: restore-test
-      toPorts:
-        - ports:
-            - port: "9090"
-              protocol: TCP
     # Kubelet probes + control-plane (PrometheusRule/ServiceMonitor admission
     # webhooks via kube-prometheus-stack-operator are called by kube-apiserver).
     # Also covers external alloy-syslog traffic — ETP=Cluster on the LB SNATs

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/velero-ns.yaml

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ metadata:
 spec:
   endpointSelector: {}
   ingress:
-    # Intra-namespace — velero server ↔ node-agent ↔ restore-test job.
+    # Intra-namespace — velero server ↔ node-agent.
     - fromEndpoints:
         - matchLabels:
             "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": velero
@@ -42,3 +42,44 @@ spec:
             - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
             - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
             - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+---
+# backup-verify CronJob: kube-apiserver, DNS, Hetzner Cloud API, SSH to its VM.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify-egress
+  namespace: velero
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: backup-verify
+  egress:
+    - toEntities:
+        - kube-apiserver
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: TCP
+          rules:
+            dns:
+              - matchPattern: "*"
+    - toFQDNs:
+        - matchName: "api.hetzner.cloud"
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "443"
+              protocol: TCP
+    - toEntities:
+        - world
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "22"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/hcloud-backup-verify-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
 kind: ExternalSecret
 metadata:
-  name: hetzner-s3-creds
-  namespace: openproject
+  name: hcloud-backup-verify
+  namespace: velero
 spec:
   refreshInterval: 1h
   secretStoreRef:
     kind: ClusterSecretStore
     name: openbao
   target:
-    name: hetzner-s3-creds
+    name: hcloud-backup-verify
   dataFrom:
     - extract:
-        key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
+        key: infrastructure/hcloud-backup-verify

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/kustomization.yaml

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ resources:
   - netbird-ingress-externalsecret.yaml
   - velero-externalsecret.yaml
   - velero-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
+  - hcloud-backup-verify-externalsecret.yaml
   # traefik.io CRDs, same reasoning — installed by the Traefik HelmRelease in
   # infrastructure. Traefik is deliberately absent from that Kustomization's
   # healthChecks, so this KS may dry-run before the chart lands; it retries on

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ spec:
         - ingress
         - matrix # synapse-secrets, mx-pg barman creds (apps/matrix)
         - monitoring
-        - openproject # op-pg barman creds (apps/openproject)
         - paperclip
         - paperless
         - renovate # renovate-bot token (apps/renovate/externalsecret.yaml)

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/velero-schedules.yaml

@@ -368,30 +368,3 @@ spec:
     labelSelector:
       matchLabels:
         app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse
----
-apiVersion: velero.io/v1
-kind: Schedule
-metadata:
-  name: openproject-daily
-  namespace: velero
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
-spec:
-  # Daily at 10:15 local (next free stagger slot after matrix-daily at
-  # 09:45). openproject-assets only: the attachments. Selected by the label
-  # this repo sets, like wordpress-daily; the op-pg database is covered by
-  # Barman.
-  schedule: "15 10 * * *"
-  useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
-  template:
-    includedNamespaces:
-      - openproject
-    includedResources:
-      - persistentvolumeclaims
-    storageLocation: default
-    ttl: 720h0m0s
-    snapshotMoveData: true
-    labelSelector:
-      matchLabels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
-        app.kubernetes.io/component: assets

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify-cronjob.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: velero
+spec:
+  schedule: "0 8 1 * *"
+  timeZone: Etc/UTC
+  suspend: false
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
+  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      backoffLimit: 0
+      activeDeadlineSeconds: 14400
+      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 3456000
+      template:
+        metadata:
+          labels:
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: backup-verify
+        spec:
+          serviceAccountName: backup-verify
+          restartPolicy: Never
+          terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 120
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65532
+            runAsGroup: 65532
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          containers:
+            - name: backup-verify
+              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-backup-verify:2026-10-10 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:backup-verify"}
+              command: ["bash", "/script/backup-verify.sh"]
+              env:
+                - name: HOME
+                  value: /work
+              securityContext:
+                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+                capabilities:
+                  drop: ["ALL"]
+              volumeMounts:
+                - { name: script, mountPath: /script, readOnly: true }
+                - { name: work, mountPath: /work }
+                - { name: hcloud, mountPath: /secrets/hcloud, readOnly: true }
+                - { name: s3, mountPath: /secrets/s3, readOnly: true }
+                - { name: repo, mountPath: /secrets/repo, readOnly: true }
+              resources:
+                requests:
+                  cpu: 20m
+                  memory: 64Mi
+                limits:
+                  memory: 384Mi
+          volumes:
+            - name: script
+              configMap:
+                name: backup-verify-scripts
+                defaultMode: 0755
+            - name: work
+              emptyDir:
+                medium: Memory
+                sizeLimit: 128Mi
+            - name: hcloud
+              secret:
+                secretName: hcloud-backup-verify
+            - name: s3
+              secret:
+                secretName: cloud-credentials-hetzner
+            - name: repo
+              secret:
+                secretName: velero-repo-credentials

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify-rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: velero
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: velero
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: ["velero.io"]
+    resources: ["schedules", "backups", "datauploads"]
+    verbs: ["get", "list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: backup-verify
+  namespace: velero
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: backup-verify
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: backup-verify
+    namespace: velero

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/backup-verify.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Monthly backup verification: plan from Velero, verify on a throwaway
+# Hetzner Cloud VM, summarize, always delete the VM.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR=${SCRIPT_DIR:-/script}
+WORK=${WORK:-/work}
+LABEL=managed-by=backup-verify
+LOCATION=${LOCATION:-fsn1}
+SERVER_IMAGE=${SERVER_IMAGE:-debian-12}
+SERVER_TYPES=${SERVER_TYPES:-cx23 cax11}
+ONLY_NAMESPACES=${ONLY_NAMESPACES:-}
+SSH_WAIT_S=${SSH_WAIT_S:-600}
+HCLOUD_TOKEN_FILE=${HCLOUD_TOKEN_FILE:-/secrets/hcloud/token}
+S3_CREDENTIALS_FILE=${S3_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-/secrets/s3/cloud}
+REPO_PASSWORD_FILE=${REPO_PASSWORD_FILE:-/secrets/repo/repository-password}
+RUN_ID=${RUN_ID:-$(date +%s)}
+NAME="backup-verify-$RUN_ID"
+SSH_OPTS=()
+VM_ADDR=""
+SERVER_TYPE=none
+START_S=$(date +%s)
+
+log() { printf '[%s] %s\n' "$(date -u +%H:%M:%S)" "$*" >&2; }
+
+delete_kind() {
+  local id
+  for id in $(hcloud "$1" list -l "$LABEL" -o noheader -o columns=id); do
+    log "deleting $1 $id"
+    hcloud "$1" delete "$id" >&2 || log "WARN: could not delete $1 $id"
+  done
+}
+
+sweep() {
+  local kind
+  for kind in server firewall ssh-key; do delete_kind "$kind"; done
+}
+
+build_plan() {
+  local only
+  only=$(jq -cn --arg s "$ONLY_NAMESPACES" '$s | split(",") | map(select(. != ""))')
+  kubectl -n velero get schedules.velero.io -l app.kubernetes.io/part-of=homelab-backup -o json > "$WORK/schedules.json"
+  kubectl -n velero get backups.velero.io -o json > "$WORK/backups.json"
+  kubectl -n velero get datauploads.velero.io -o json > "$WORK/datauploads.json"
+  jq -n --slurpfile s "$WORK/schedules.json" --slurpfile b "$WORK/backups.json" --slurpfile d "$WORK/datauploads.json" \
+     '{schedules: $s[0].items, backups: $b[0].items, datauploads: $d[0].items}' \
+    | jq --argjson only "$only" -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/plan.jq" \
+    | jq --arg f "${FORGE_SNAPSHOT_ID:-}" \
+         'if $f == "" then . else map(if .status == "VERIFY" then .snapshotID = $f else . end) end' \
+    > "$WORK/plan.json"
+  if [ -n "${FORGE_SNAPSHOT_ID:-}" ]; then log "NEGATIVE TEST: every snapshotID replaced by $FORGE_SNAPSHOT_ID"; fi
+  log "plan: $(jq -r 'group_by(.status) | map("\(.[0].status)=\(length)") | join(" ")' "$WORK/plan.json")"
+}
+
+# cloud-config as JSON (a YAML subset), so jq does the escaping.
+render_user_data() {
+  printf '#cloud-config\n'
+  jq -n --rawfile priv "$WORK/host_key" --arg pub "$(cat "$WORK/host_key.pub")" '{
+    ssh_pwauth: false,
+    ssh_deletekeys: true,
+    ssh_genkeytypes: [],
+    ssh_keys: {ed25519_private: $priv, ed25519_public: $pub},
+    packages: ["jq", "curl", "ca-certificates"],
+    runcmd: [
+      "mkdir -p /run/verify && mount -t tmpfs -o size=1500m,mode=0700 tmpfs /run/verify",
+      ["shutdown", "-h", "+240"]
+    ]
+  }'
+}
+
+create_vm() {
+  local type
+  ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C "$NAME" -f "$WORK/client_key"
+  ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C "$NAME-host" -f "$WORK/host_key"
+  render_user_data > "$WORK/user-data.yaml"
+  hcloud ssh-key create --name "$NAME" --public-key-from-file "$WORK/client_key.pub" --label "$LABEL" >&2
+  hcloud firewall create --name "$NAME" --label "$LABEL" >&2
+  hcloud firewall add-rule "$NAME" --direction in --protocol tcp --port 22 --source-ips 0.0.0.0/0 --source-ips ::/0 >&2
+  for type in $SERVER_TYPES; do
+    if hcloud server create --name "$NAME" --type "$type" --image "$SERVER_IMAGE" --location "$LOCATION" \
+         --ssh-key "$NAME" --firewall "$NAME" --label "$LABEL" \
+         --user-data-from-file "$WORK/user-data.yaml" -o json > "$WORK/server.json"; then
+      log "server $NAME created (type $type)"
+      SERVER_TYPE=$type
+      return 0
+    fi
+    log "server type $type not available"
+    # A create that timed out may still have left the server behind under $NAME.
+    delete_kind server
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+wait_ssh() {
+  local v4 v6 hostkey addr deadline rc
+  v6=$(hcloud server ip -6 "$NAME")
+  v4=$(hcloud server ip "$NAME")
+  hostkey=$(cut -d' ' -f1,2 "$WORK/host_key.pub")
+  printf '%s %s\n%s %s\n' "$v6" "$hostkey" "$v4" "$hostkey" > "$WORK/known_hosts"
+  SSH_OPTS=(-i "$WORK/client_key" -o "UserKnownHostsFile=$WORK/known_hosts" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes
+            -o ConnectTimeout=10 -o BatchMode=yes -o ServerAliveInterval=30)
+  deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + SSH_WAIT_S ))
+  while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
+    for addr in "$v6" "$v4"; do
+      # Background + wait so a TERM is handled while cloud-init is still running.
+      ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "root@$addr" 'cloud-init status --wait > /run/cloud-init-wait.log' < /dev/null &
+      if wait $!; then
+        VM_ADDR=$addr
+        log "ssh ready via $addr"
+        return 0
+      else
+        rc=$?
+      fi
+      # 255 is an ssh connection error; anything else is cloud-init itself failing.
+      if [ "$rc" -ne 255 ]; then
+        log "cloud-init failed on $addr (exit $rc):"
+        ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "root@$addr" 'cloud-init status --long' < /dev/null >&2 || true
+        return 1
+      fi
+    done
+    sleep 10
+  done
+  log "ssh not reachable within ${SSH_WAIT_S}s"
+  return 1
+}
+
+secrets() {
+  awk -F' *= *' '/^aws_access_key_id/ {print "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=" $2} /^aws_secret_access_key/ {print "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=" $2}' "$S3_CREDENTIALS_FILE"
+  printf 'KOPIA_PASSWORD=%s\n' "$(cat "$REPO_PASSWORD_FILE")"
+}
+
+push() { ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "root@$VM_ADDR" "cat > /run/verify/$2" < "$1"; }
+
+run_vm() {
+  jq '[.[] | select(.status == "VERIFY")]' "$WORK/plan.json" > "$WORK/vm-plan.json"
+  if ! { ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "root@$VM_ADDR" 'mkdir -p /run/verify' < /dev/null \
+         && push "$WORK/vm-plan.json" plan.json \
+         && push "$SCRIPT_DIR/check.jq" check.jq \
+         && push "$SCRIPT_DIR/vm-verify.sh" vm-verify.sh; }; then
+    log "could not stage files on the VM; every VERIFY entry will report no result"
+    return 0
+  fi
+  # Background + wait: bash runs the TERM trap during `wait`, not during a foreground child.
+  ( secrets | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "root@$VM_ADDR" 'bash /run/verify/vm-verify.sh /run/verify/plan.json' \
+      | tee "$WORK/vm.out" >&2 ) &
+  wait $! || log "vm-verify exited non-zero"
+}
+
+summarize() {
+  { grep $'^RESULT\t' "$WORK/vm.out" || true; } \
+    | jq -R 'split("\t") | {status: .[1], namespace: .[2], pvc: .[3], snapshotID: .[4], reason: .[5]}' \
+    | jq -s . > "$WORK/results.json"
+  jq -n --slurpfile p "$WORK/plan.json" --slurpfile r "$WORK/results.json" '{plan: $p[0], results: $r[0]}' \
+    | jq -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/summary.jq" > "$WORK/summary.json"
+  jq -r '.entries[] | "\(.status)\t\(.schedule // "-")\t\(.backup // "-")\t\(.namespace // "-")/\(.pvc // "-")\tsnapshot=\(.snapshotID // "-")\t\(.reason // "")"' "$WORK/summary.json"
+  jq -r '"PASS=\(.pass) FAIL=\(.fail) SKIP=\(.skip)"' "$WORK/summary.json"
+  printf 'elapsed=%ss server_type=%s\n' "$(( $(date +%s) - START_S ))" "$SERVER_TYPE"
+  [ "$(jq .fail "$WORK/summary.json")" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+main() {
+  mkdir -p "$WORK"
+  : > "$WORK/vm.out"
+  HCLOUD_TOKEN=$(cat "$HCLOUD_TOKEN_FILE")
+  export HCLOUD_TOKEN
+  trap sweep EXIT
+  trap 'log "TERM received, tearing down"; exit 143' TERM INT
+  sweep
+  build_plan
+  if [ "$(jq '[.[] | select(.status == "VERIFY")] | length' "$WORK/plan.json")" -gt 0 ]; then
+    if create_vm && wait_ssh; then
+      run_vm
+    else
+      log "VM setup failed; every VERIFY entry will report no result"
+    fi
+  fi
+  summarize
+}
+
+if [ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" = "$0" ]; then main "$@"; fi

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/check.jq

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# kopia `snapshot list --json` -> verdict per $plan entry (one namespace).
+(map({key: .id, value: .}) | from_entries) as $m
+| [ $plan[] as $e
+    | $m[$e.snapshotID] as $s
+    | if $s == null then
+        $e + {status: "FAIL", reason: "snapshot not in repository"}
+      else
+        ($s.stats.totalSize // $s.rootEntry.summ.size) as $kb
+        | $e + {rootID: ($s.rootEntry.obj // ""), kopiaBytes: $kb}
+        | if ($s.incomplete // "") != "" then
+            . + {status: "FAIL", reason: "snapshot incomplete: \($s.incomplete)"}
+          elif ($s.rootEntry.summ.numFailed // 0) > 0 then
+            . + {status: "FAIL", reason: "\($s.rootEntry.summ.numFailed) entries failed at backup time"}
+          elif .rootID == "" then
+            . + {status: "FAIL", reason: "snapshot has no root object"}
+          elif $kb != $e.totalBytes then
+            . + {status: "FAIL", reason: "size mismatch kopia=\($kb) velero=\($e.totalBytes)"}
+          else
+            . + {status: "VERIFY"}
+          end
+      end ]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/plan.jq

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Velero objects -> plan entries. Input: {schedules, backups, datauploads}
+# (kubectl .items). $only: namespaces to keep; [] keeps all.
+def finished: . as $p | ["Completed", "PartiallyFailed", "Failed", "FailedValidation"] | index($p) != null;
+
+.backups as $backups
+| .datauploads as $dus
+| [ .schedules | sort_by(.metadata.name)[]
+    | .metadata.name as $s
+    | ([ $backups[]
+         | select(.metadata.labels["velero.io/schedule-name"] == $s)
+         | select((.status.phase // "") | finished) ]
+       | sort_by(.metadata.creationTimestamp) | last) as $b
+    | if $b == null then
+        {schedule: $s, status: "FAIL", reason: "no finished backup"}
+      elif $b.status.phase != "Completed" then
+        {schedule: $s, backup: $b.metadata.name, status: "FAIL",
+         reason: "latest finished backup phase=\($b.status.phase)"}
+      else
+        [ $dus[] | select(.metadata.labels["velero.io/backup-name"] == $b.metadata.name) ] as $mine
+        | if ($mine | length) == 0 then
+            {schedule: $s, backup: $b.metadata.name, status: "SKIP", reason: "no DataUploads"}
+          else
+            $mine | sort_by(.spec.sourceNamespace, .spec.sourcePVC)[]
+            | {schedule: $s, backup: $b.metadata.name,
+               namespace: .spec.sourceNamespace, pvc: .spec.sourcePVC,
+               snapshotID: (.status.snapshotID // ""),
+               totalBytes: (.status.progress.totalBytes // 0)}
+              + if .status.phase != "Completed" then
+                  {status: "FAIL", reason: "DataUpload phase=\(.status.phase)"}
+                elif (.status.snapshotID // "") == "" then
+                  {status: "FAIL", reason: "DataUpload has no snapshotID"}
+                else
+                  {status: "VERIFY"}
+                end
+          end
+      end ]
+| if ($only | length) > 0 then map(select(.namespace as $n | $only | index($n) != null)) else . end

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/summary.jq

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# {plan, results} -> {entries, pass, fail, skip}.
+(.results | map({key: "\(.namespace)/\(.pvc)/\(.snapshotID)", value: .}) | from_entries) as $r
+| [ .plan[]
+    | if .status == "VERIFY" then
+        $r["\(.namespace)/\(.pvc)/\(.snapshotID)"] as $x
+        | if $x == null then . + {status: "FAIL", reason: "no result from VM"}
+          else . + {status: $x.status, reason: $x.reason} end
+      else . end ] as $e
+| {entries: $e,
+   pass: ([$e[] | select(.status == "OK")] | length),
+   fail: ([$e[] | select(.status == "FAIL")] | length),
+   skip: ([$e[] | select(.status == "SKIP")] | length)}
+| if (.pass + .fail) == 0 then
+    .fail += 1 | .entries += [{status: "FAIL", reason: "nothing verified"}]
+  else . end

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/failed-entries/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "rootID": "k1234", "kopiaBytes": 5005752, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "2 entries failed at backup time"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/failed-entries/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"id": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "stats": {"totalSize": 5005752}, "rootEntry": {"obj": "k1234", "summ": {"size": 5005752, "numFailed": 2}}}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/failed-entries/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/incomplete/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "rootID": "k1234", "kopiaBytes": 5005752, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "snapshot incomplete: checkpoint"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/incomplete/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"id": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "incomplete": "checkpoint", "stats": {"totalSize": 5005752}, "rootEntry": {"obj": "k1234", "summ": {"size": 5005752}}}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/incomplete/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/missing/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "snapshot not in repository"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/missing/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"id": "ffff", "rootEntry": {"obj": "kold", "summ": {"size": 1}}}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/missing/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/ok/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "rootID": "k1234", "kopiaBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/ok/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[
+  {"id": "ffff", "rootEntry": {"obj": "kold", "summ": {"size": 1, "numFailed": 0}}},
+  {"id": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "stats": {"totalSize": 5005752}, "rootEntry": {"obj": "k1234", "summ": {"size": 5005752, "numFailed": 0}}}
+]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/ok/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/size-mismatch/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "rootID": "k1234", "kopiaBytes": 5000000, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "size mismatch kopia=5000000 velero=5005752"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/size-mismatch/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"id": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "stats": {"totalSize": 5000000}, "rootEntry": {"obj": "k1234", "summ": {"size": 5000000, "numFailed": 0}}}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/size-mismatch/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/summ-fallback/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "rootID": "k1234", "kopiaBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/summ-fallback/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"id": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "rootEntry": {"obj": "k1234", "summ": {"size": 5005752, "numFailed": 0}}}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/check/summ-fallback/plan.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "b", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan-only/two-namespaces/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "apps-daily-2", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "s1", "totalBytes": 5, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan-only/two-namespaces/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "apps-daily"}}, {"metadata": {"name": "gitea-daily"}}],
+  "backups": [
+    {"metadata": {"name": "apps-daily-2", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T07:15:23Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "apps-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}},
+    {"metadata": {"name": "g-1", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T07:45:00Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "gitea-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}}
+  ],
+  "datauploads": [
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "apps-daily-2"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "apps", "sourcePVC": "gatus-data"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "snapshotID": "s1", "progress": {"totalBytes": 5}}},
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "g-1"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "gitea", "sourcePVC": "data-gitea-0"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "snapshotID": "s2", "progress": {"totalBytes": 6}}}
+  ]
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/bad-dataupload/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[
+  {"schedule": "gitea-daily", "backup": "g-1", "namespace": "gitea", "pvc": "data-gitea-0", "snapshotID": "", "totalBytes": 0, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "DataUpload phase=Failed"},
+  {"schedule": "gitea-daily", "backup": "g-1", "namespace": "gitea", "pvc": "data-gitea-1", "snapshotID": "", "totalBytes": 3, "status": "FAIL", "reason": "DataUpload has no snapshotID"}
+]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/bad-dataupload/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "gitea-daily"}}],
+  "backups": [{"metadata": {"name": "g-1", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T07:45:00Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "gitea-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}}],
+  "datauploads": [
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "g-1"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "gitea", "sourcePVC": "data-gitea-0"}, "status": {"phase": "Failed", "progress": {}}},
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "g-1"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "gitea", "sourcePVC": "data-gitea-1"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "progress": {"totalBytes": 3}}}
+  ]
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/empty/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/empty/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schedules": [], "backups": [], "datauploads": []}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/happy/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "apps-daily", "backup": "apps-daily-2", "namespace": "apps", "pvc": "gatus-data", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "totalBytes": 5005752, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/happy/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "apps-daily"}}],
+  "backups": [
+    {"metadata": {"name": "apps-daily-1", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-09T07:15:23Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "apps-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}},
+    {"metadata": {"name": "apps-daily-2", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T07:15:23Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "apps-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}}
+  ],
+  "datauploads": [
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "apps-daily-1"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "apps", "sourcePVC": "gatus-data"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "snapshotID": "old", "progress": {"totalBytes": 1}}},
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "apps-daily-2"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "apps", "sourcePVC": "gatus-data"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "snapshotID": "57d5999303c1bf59e9f8b984d7e71f83", "progress": {"totalBytes": 5005752}}}
+  ]
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/in-flight/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "wordpress-daily", "backup": "wp-1", "namespace": "wordpress", "pvc": "wordpress-content", "snapshotID": "aaa", "totalBytes": 10, "status": "VERIFY"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/in-flight/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "wordpress-daily"}}],
+  "backups": [
+    {"metadata": {"name": "wp-1", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-09T08:45:00Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "wordpress-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}},
+    {"metadata": {"name": "wp-2", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T08:45:00Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "wordpress-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "InProgress"}}
+  ],
+  "datauploads": [
+    {"metadata": {"labels": {"velero.io/backup-name": "wp-1"}}, "spec": {"sourceNamespace": "wordpress", "sourcePVC": "wordpress-content"}, "status": {"phase": "Completed", "snapshotID": "aaa", "progress": {"totalBytes": 10}}}
+  ]
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/no-backup/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "new-daily", "status": "FAIL", "reason": "no finished backup"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/no-backup/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "new-daily"}}], "backups": [], "datauploads": []}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/no-datauploads/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "authentik-daily", "backup": "ak-1", "status": "SKIP", "reason": "no DataUploads"}]

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/no-datauploads/input.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "schedules": [{"metadata": {"name": "authentik-daily"}}],
+  "backups": [{"metadata": {"name": "ak-1", "creationTimestamp": "2026-10-10T04:15:00Z", "labels": {"velero.io/schedule-name": "authentik-daily"}}, "status": {"phase": "Completed"}}],
+  "datauploads": []
+}

kubernetes/infrastructure/velero/backup-verify/tests/fixtures/plan/partially-failed/expected.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[{"schedule": "immich-daily", "backup": "im-1", "status": "FAIL", "reason": "latest finished backup phase=PartiallyFailed"}]