Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
issue-fix-bot 93ba61bf70 fix: [alert] CephHealthError (rook-ceph) (#525)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline is pending
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline is pending
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline is pending
2026-08-19 16:46:25 +00:00
15 changed files with 56 additions and 306 deletions
@@ -121,9 +121,7 @@ spec:
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: audiobookshelf-books
- name: le-ca
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
@@ -66,52 +66,7 @@ Confirm the backup actually landed in the bucket rather than trusting the CR
status — the WordPress backup failed nightly for three days against a bucket
that was declared but never created (see `opentofu/object_storage.tf`).
## Phase 2b — bulk statistics copy: DONE 2026-08-19
Completed with **HA running** — the SQLite file was read through a read-only
mount, and SQLite's WAL mode gives readers a consistent snapshot, so no downtime
was needed for the bulk copy.
```
statistics_meta: sqlite=1449 pg=1449 OK
statistics: sqlite=10799904 pg=10799904 OK (153.9s)
statistics_short_term: sqlite=1969804 pg=1969804 OK ( 27.0s)
statistics span in Postgres: 2024-03-13 -> 2026-08-19
entities with long-term history: 1449
rows carrying sum (energy dashboard): 2627859
database size: 2252 MB (PVC is 20Gi)
```
`ANALYZE` was run on all three tables. That is not housekeeping: after a bulk
`COPY` the planner has no statistics, and HA queries these tables constantly for
history and energy views, so without it every view seq-scans 10.8M rows.
Two schema details that cost a failed first attempt, recorded so the top-up does
not repeat them:
- `has_mean` / `has_sum` are INTEGER in SQLite and BOOLEAN in Postgres. Postgres
will not coerce; convert explicitly and preserve NULL.
- The legacy `created` / `start` / `last_reset` DATETIME columns are 100% NULL in
both bulk tables (superseded by the `_ts` variants), which is what makes a
tab-separated `COPY` safe — nothing in those tables needs escaping.
The schema itself was created with HA's own models
(`Base.metadata.create_all`), **not** hand-written DDL, and `schema_changes` was
left EMPTY on purpose. HA's `_initialize_database` detects a new database by
looking for an index on `events.time_fired_ts`, then writes `SCHEMA_VERSION`
itself. Pre-stamping that row would skip HA's own initialisation path.
### High-water marks for the cutover top-up
Rows written after the bulk copy are not yet in Postgres. Resume from:
```
statistics max_id=13323904 max_start_ts=1787162400.0
statistics_short_term max_id=159205762 max_start_ts=1787166000.0
```
## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
## Phase 2 — migrate the data (NOT in this PR)
Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
@@ -135,18 +90,7 @@ HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.
SELECT setval('statistics_short_term_id_seq', (SELECT MAX(id) FROM statistics_short_term));
```
5. **Repoint** `recorder.db_url` in the `homeassistant` repo — that change lives
there, not here. The `recorder_db_url` secret it references is already
rendered into `secrets.yaml` by the `render-db-url` init container in
`deployment.yaml` (phase 2a), so this order is mandatory: **the init
container must be deployed first**, or HA refuses to start on a missing
secret.
The init container percent-encodes the credentials and validates the
resulting YAML rather than counting lines. That is not incidental — the CNPG
password is random, and a naive `"postgresql://user:pass@host/db"` string
makes `secrets.yaml` unparseable the moment the password contains a quote,
which takes out *every* secret HA loads, not just this one. Verified against
a deliberately hostile password before merge.
there, not here:
```yaml
recorder:
db_url: !secret recorder_db_url # postgresql://homeassistant:<pw>@ha-pg-rw.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local/homeassistant
+2 -64
View File
@@ -36,64 +36,6 @@ spec:
# (sml2mqtt bridge owns the USB device on edge), so it no longer needs
# the edge USB device and schedules on the general cluster pool. This
# gets the heavy HA pod (8Gi) off the soon-to-be-tiny edge box.
initContainers:
# Puts CNPG's connection URI into /config/secrets.yaml as
# `recorder_db_url`, for the recorder's move off SQLite
# (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
#
# HA has no way to read a db_url from the environment — `!env_var` was
# removed from its YAML loader — so `!secret` is the only mechanism, and
# secrets.yaml is PVC state that config-sync deliberately does not
# manage. Hence a small init container rather than a env: entry.
#
# The URI comes STRAIGHT from the ha-pg-app Secret. CNPG builds and
# percent-encodes it, so there is nothing to escape here: the value is
# restricted to [A-Za-z0-9:/@._%-], verified against the live secret.
# An earlier version of this assembled the URI from user/password/dbname
# and needed percent-encoding plus YAML round-trip validation to be
# safe. That was solving a problem CNPG had already solved.
#
# Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
# effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
#
# INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
# `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
# homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
# when a referenced secret is missing.
- name: render-db-url
image: busybox:1.36
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
S=/config/secrets.yaml
T=/config/.secrets.render.tmp
[ -f "$S" ] || : > "$S"
# Filter-then-append, never rewrite in place: this file holds
# every other HA secret (influxdb_token and friends).
grep -v '^recorder_db_url:' "$S" > "$T" || true
printf 'recorder_db_url: "%s"\n' "$DB_URI" >> "$T"
# Refuse to shrink the file. Cheap guard against the one failure
# that would actually hurt: losing the other keys.
[ "$(wc -l < "$T")" -ge "$(wc -l < "$S")" ] || {
echo "FATAL: rewrite would shrink secrets.yaml; aborting" >&2; exit 1; }
chmod 600 "$T"
mv "$T" "$S"
echo "recorder_db_url rendered"
env:
- name: DB_URI
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: ha-pg-app, key: fqdn-uri }
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /config
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 16Mi
limits:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.2 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
@@ -279,13 +221,9 @@ spec:
# Writable emptyDir for the nginx entrypoint's envsubst output
# (/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf rendered from the .template).
- name: proxy-conf-d
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
# code-server's settings/extensions cache. Not on the config PVC
# so installed extensions don't pollute HA's /config listing.
# Trade-off: extensions reset across pod restarts.
- name: vscode-state
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
@@ -313,9 +313,7 @@ spec:
configMap:
name: mosquitto-config
- name: auth
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
- name: tls
secret:
secretName: mosquitto-tls
@@ -344,13 +344,9 @@ spec:
configMap:
name: zigbee2mqtt-interview-watch-script
- name: interview-watch-state
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
- name: discovery-guard-script
configMap:
name: zigbee2mqtt-discovery-guard-script
- name: discovery-guard-state
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -147,9 +147,7 @@ spec:
- key: immich-config.json
path: immich-config.json
- name: le-ca
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
@@ -26,8 +26,32 @@ spec:
description: "The Ceph cluster has held HEALTH_WARN for six hours, so it is not a self-clearing blip. Get the detail with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail`."
- alert: CephHealthError
# HEALTH_ERR means data availability or redundancy is at risk.
expr: ceph_health_status == 2
# HEALTH_ERR used to mean "data availability or redundancy is at
# risk". Ceph 19.2.6 broke that assumption: it added the
# AUTH_INSECURE_* cephx checks, two of them ERR-severity, which flag
# the legacy `aes` key type every keyring in this cluster still uses.
# That is a security-posture finding, not a durability one — see
# CephAuthInsecureKeys below, which is what actually tracks it.
#
# The problem with leaving `ceph_health_status == 2` alone is not
# noise, it is blindness: while the auth checks hold the cluster at
# HEALTH_ERR, a genuine PG_AVAILABILITY or OSD_FULL is
# indistinguishable from them, because the aggregate is already
# saturated. So page on the ERR checks that are *not* auth ones.
#
# Written as "unless every active ERR check is an AUTH_INSECURE_ one"
# rather than a direct match so that it fails open: if
# ceph_health_detail goes missing or Ceph renames a check, both counts
# come back empty, the `unless` removes nothing, and this still pages.
# The `> 0` matters — the mgr exports all 31 known checks, the
# inactive ones at 0, so an unfiltered count would compare constants.
expr: |
ceph_health_status == 2
unless on (cluster) (
count by (cluster) (ceph_health_detail{severity="HEALTH_ERR"} > 0)
==
count by (cluster) (ceph_health_detail{severity="HEALTH_ERR", name=~"AUTH_INSECURE_.*"} > 0)
)
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
@@ -35,6 +59,22 @@ spec:
summary: "Ceph is HEALTH_ERR"
description: "The Ceph cluster is in HEALTH_ERR — availability or redundancy is at risk. Inspect immediately with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail` and `ceph osd df tree`."
- alert: CephAuthInsecureKeys
# Carries the condition CephHealthError deliberately stops paging for,
# so excluding it there narrows the alert rather than silencing it.
# Warning, not critical: nothing is at risk of being lost, but this
# does not self-clear either — it needs a planned cephx key rotation
# across client.admin, the CSI provisioner/node keys and the RGW key.
# Rotating those carelessly breaks RBD/CephFS provisioning
# cluster-wide, so this stays a human decision, not a 3am one.
expr: count(ceph_health_detail{name=~"AUTH_INSECURE_.*"} > 0) > 0
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Ceph cephx keys use insecure key types"
description: "Ceph reports {{ $value }} active AUTH_INSECURE_* health checks — cephx entities still using the legacy `aes` key type, flagged since the 19.2.6 upgrade. No data is at risk. Enumerate with `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph health detail` and plan rotation against the 19.2.6 release notes; durable settings belong in `spec.cephConfig` in kubernetes/infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/cephcluster.yaml."
- alert: CephMonDiskLow
# Named explicitly rather than left to CephHealthWarn, because the
# mons sit on the node's /var alongside container storage: this
@@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ spec:
secret:
secretName: pve-exporter-config
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
# paperless-data: CephFS → RBD
## Why
`paperless-data` is `ReadWriteMany` on `ceph-filesystem`, but **only the paperless
Deployment mounts it**. Verified 2026-08-20:
```
$ pods mounting paperless-data
paperless-68cb8b8744-7hjb8 <- one, and only one
paperless-data ReadWriteMany ceph-filesystem
paperless-media ReadWriteMany ceph-filesystem <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
paperless-consume ReadWriteMany ceph-filesystem <- genuinely shared (ftp-scanner)
```
Its contents are single-writer state — the 50 MB Whoosh index,
`classification_model.pickle`, `celerybeat-schedule.db`, `log/`,
`migration_lock`, `protonmail.pem`. 75 files. Nothing else reads or writes them.
It is on CephFS by default, not by requirement.
## What it costs
Every access goes through the MDS. Measured with **zero CI pipelines running**:
```
paperless-data client request_load_avg 22 (all other sessions 0-1)
MDS over 180s 4,052 client requests = 22.5/s
2,718 journal events = 15/s
2 dir commits <- almost none: not file writes
```
So it is cap/inode churn from repeated access, not data being written. That is
most of the constant **7-8 GB/day** written to `cephfs-metadata`, and since that
pool is `size: 3`, roughly **21-24 GB/day** reaches the drives.
`cephfs-metadata` deliberately stays at size 3. Losing it destroys the entire
filesystem rather than the objects on one OSD, and the 275 GiB in `cephfs-data0`
depends on it. Cutting the writes at source is correct; cutting the replication
is not.
## Sequence
Staged deliberately: the PVC lands first and empty, so merging it changes
nothing. The copy and the repoint are separate.
### Phase 1 — provision (this PR)
`paperless-data-block` (RWO, `ceph-block`, 10Gi) is created and mounted by
nothing. Inert.
Verify: `kubectl -n paperless get pvc paperless-data-block` → Bound.
### Phase 2 — copy
The Whoosh index must come across intact. Paperless *can* rebuild it
(`document_index reindex`), but that reprocesses every document, so copying is
both faster and less disruptive.
1. Scale paperless to 0. The source must be quiescent — `celerybeat-schedule.db`
and the Whoosh index are both live-written, and copying them under an active
writer gives a torn read.
2. Run a one-off pod that mounts BOTH PVCs and copies:
```
cp -a /src/. /dst/
```
The RWO target pins the pod to one node; the RWX source will follow.
3. Verify file count and index size match:
```
find /src -type f | wc -l == find /dst -type f | wc -l
du -sh /src/index == du -sh /dst/index
```
### Phase 3 — repoint
Change the Deployment's `data` volume to `claimName: paperless-data-block`,
merge, let it roll.
Verify afterwards:
- paperless starts, search returns results (proves the Whoosh index survived)
- `ceph tell mds.cephfs-b session ls` no longer shows a busy `paperless-data`
client
- `rate(ceph_pool_wr_bytes{pool_id="3"})` drops from its 7-8 GB/day baseline
**Do not delete `paperless-data` until search has been confirmed working.** It is
the rollback, and it is `prune: disabled` so Flux will not remove it.
## Expected effect
~7-8 GB/day off `cephfs-metadata`, so ~21-24 GB/day off the drives once
replication is counted. Against ~432 GB/day cluster-wide that is roughly 5% —
worth doing, but it is a correctness fix (a single-writer volume does not belong
on a shared filesystem) more than a large win.
It also removes 22 req/sec of MDS load, which benefits the workloads that
genuinely need CephFS — Woodpecker CI workspaces share the same MDS.
+1 -3
View File
@@ -218,9 +218,7 @@ spec:
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-consume
- name: bridge-cert
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
-39
View File
@@ -18,45 +18,6 @@ spec:
requests:
storage: 10Gi
---
# Replacement for paperless-data, on RBD instead of CephFS.
#
# WHY: paperless-data is declared ReadWriteMany on ceph-filesystem, but only ONE
# pod ever mounts it — the paperless Deployment itself. Its contents are all
# single-writer state: the 50 MB Whoosh index, classification_model.pickle,
# celerybeat-schedule.db, logs, migration_lock. Nothing shares it. Only `consume`
# and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the FTP scanner writes to those from a
# different node.
#
# COST OF LEAVING IT: every access goes through the MDS. Measured 2026-08-20 with
# zero CI running, this volume's client was doing 22 MDS requests/sec sustained,
# and the MDS logged ~15 journal events/sec against only 2 directory commits per
# 180s — i.e. cap and inode churn from repeated access, not file writes. That is
# most of the constant 7-8 GB/day written to cephfs-metadata, which is a size 3
# pool, so ~21-24 GB/day actually hits the drives.
#
# cephfs-metadata deliberately STAYS at size 3 (see storageclass.yaml): losing
# the metadata pool destroys the whole filesystem, not just the objects on one
# OSD, so the 275 GiB in cephfs-data0 rides on it. Reducing the writes at source
# is the right fix; reducing the replication is not.
#
# MIGRATION: this PVC is created EMPTY and nothing mounts it yet. The data copy
# and the deployment repoint are a separate, staged step — see
# MIGRATION-data-to-block.md. Merging this alone is inert.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-data-block
namespace: paperless
annotations:
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block
resources:
requests:
storage: 10Gi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
-16
View File
@@ -362,22 +362,6 @@ spec:
name: trmnl-renderer-schedule
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
# RAM-backed, NOT disk. Without `medium: Memory` an emptyDir lands
# on the node's filesystem, and this one was the single largest
# writer in the cluster: 249 GB over 7.3 days = ~34 GB/day onto
# /dev/vda5, more than every Ceph OSD and every database combined
# (measured 2026-08-20 from the container's cgroup io.stat).
#
# The cause is cadence, not volume. schedules.template.json renders
# every 60 s, so Chrome is launched 1440 times a day and each launch
# creates, fills and deletes a /tmp/puppeteer_dev_chrome_profile-*
# directory. At rest /tmp holds under 8 MB; it is pure churn for
# data that never outlives the render.
#
# tmpfs pages count against the container's memory limit, which is
# why the cap stays at 512Mi: measured usage is 129Mi against a 2Gi
# limit, so even the full cap leaves ample headroom.
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 512Mi
---
apiVersion: v1
@@ -156,6 +156,4 @@ spec:
# each pod enrolls its own peer and a restart re-enrolls cleanly
# (the old peer is reaped).
- name: state
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
@@ -164,9 +164,7 @@ spec:
name: rook-config-override
optional: true
- name: ceph-config
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}
tolerations:
- key: "node.kubernetes.io/unreachable"
operator: "Exists"
@@ -85,6 +85,4 @@ spec:
name: restore-test-script
defaultMode: 0755
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 16Mi
emptyDir: {}