paperless-data is declared ReadWriteMany on ceph-filesystem, but only ONE pod
mounts it -- the paperless Deployment itself. Its contents are all single-writer
state: the 50 MB Whoosh index, classification_model.pickle,
celerybeat-schedule.db, log/, migration_lock. 75 files, nothing shared. Only
`consume` and `media` genuinely need RWX, because the ftp-scanner writes to those
from another node.
It is on CephFS by default, not by requirement, and every access goes through the
MDS. Measured 2026-08-20 with ZERO CI pipelines running:
paperless-data client request_load_avg 22 (all other sessions 0-1)
MDS over 180s 4,052 client requests = 22.5/s
2,718 journal events = 15/s
2 dir commits <- not file writes
Cap and inode churn from repeated access, not data being written. That accounts
for most of the constant 7-8 GB/day on cephfs-metadata, and since that pool is
size 3, roughly 21-24 GB/day reaches the drives.
cephfs-metadata deliberately STAYS at size 3. Losing it destroys the whole
filesystem rather than the objects on one OSD, and the 275 GiB in cephfs-data0
rides on it. Cutting writes at source is the fix; cutting replication is not.
PHASE 1 ONLY, and inert: the PVC is created empty and nothing mounts it. The data
copy and the deployment repoint are separate steps, documented in
MIGRATION-data-to-block.md along with why the copy needs paperless stopped (the
Whoosh index and celerybeat schedule are both live-written, so copying under an
active writer gives a torn read).
Honest sizing: ~21-24 GB/day off the drives against ~432 GB/day cluster-wide, so
about 5%. This is a correctness fix -- a single-writer volume does not belong on
a shared filesystem -- more than a large win. It also removes 22 req/sec of MDS
load, which benefits Woodpecker CI workspaces sharing the same MDS.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the trmnl renderer finding. An `emptyDir` without `medium: Memory`
is NODE STORAGE, which is easy to read as "ephemeral, therefore free" -- it is
ephemeral, but every byte still hits the node's disk.
Survey of the repo: 23 emptyDir declarations, only 2 RAM-backed. This converts
12 of the remaining ones.
HONEST SCOPE: this buys almost no write reduction. Ranking every pod by OS-disk
writes over 6h shows trmnl-renderer at 67 GB/day (fixed separately) and then
nothing emptyDir-driven -- the rest of the top of that list is Ceph mons
(hostPath, not emptyDir), kube-apiserver, and container logs from databases.
Every volume converted here measured 8.0K in the running pod:
/var/lib/code-server 8.0K
/mosquitto/auth 8.0K
/state (z2m guards) 8.0K
So the value is correctness and, for mosquitto, keeping credential material off
the node's filesystem: that volume holds the generated passwd/acl files.
Each converted volume gets an explicit sizeLimit (16Mi where none existed), so
tmpfs cannot silently consume a container's memory limit. All are orders of
magnitude above measured usage.
Behaviour is unchanged otherwise: an emptyDir persists for the pod's lifetime on
either medium, so the mosquitto shim's assumption that the passwd file survives
a container restart still holds.
DELIBERATELY NOT CONVERTED:
- kubernetes/talos/cilium.yaml and talos/patches/cilium-cni.yaml -- vendored
and generated from the chart; a hand edit would be lost on upgrade.
- trmnl/renderer.yaml -- converted separately, where the actual 34 GB/day was.
Cost: this rolls the affected pods once.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The renderer was the single largest writer in the cluster -- more than every
Ceph OSD and every database combined -- and none of it needed to touch disk.
Measured 2026-08-20 from the container's own cgroup io.stat:
253:0 (node /dev/vda5) 249,092,697,088 bytes over 7.3 days = ~34 GB/day
252:48 (its own PVC) 340 MB total = negligible
So the writes were not going to its volume at all; they were going to the
node's filesystem via a disk-backed emptyDir. `emptyDir: {}` without
`medium: Memory` is node storage, which is easy to read as "ephemeral, so
free".
The cause is cadence rather than volume. schedules.template.json renders on
"* * * * *", so Chrome is launched 1440 times a day and each launch creates,
fills and deletes a /tmp/puppeteer_dev_chrome_profile-* directory. At rest /tmp
holds under 8 MB -- it is pure churn for data that never outlives the render.
tmpfs pages count against the container's memory limit, so the 512Mi cap is
kept deliberately: measured usage is 129Mi against a 2Gi limit, leaving ample
headroom even if the cap were fully consumed.
Expected effect: ~34 GB/day off the OS disks, which measured 215 GB/day over a
4h window. This is a bigger cluster-wide reduction than the Home Assistant
recorder migration achieved, for a one-line change.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Net -44 lines. The previous version assembled the connection URI from
username/password/dbname, which forced percent-encoding, YAML-safe quoting via
json.dumps, a YAML round-trip validation, and python3 from HA's image.
None of that was necessary: CNPG already publishes a finished, percent-encoded
connection string in the app secret as `uri` / `fqdn-uri`. Reading that key
removes the whole class of problem the earlier review correctly flagged --
rather than solving it more carefully.
Verified against the live secret before simplifying: fqdn-uri contains only
[A-Za-z0-9:/@._%-], so naive double-quoting is provably safe and the YAML
validation was guarding against an input that cannot occur.
What is kept, because it is the part that actually matters: secrets.yaml is PVC
state holding every other HA secret (influxdb_token and friends), so the file is
filtered-and-appended rather than rewritten, moved atomically, and guarded
against shrinking. Tested in HA's own busybox shell -- comment and pre-existing
keys preserved, idempotent across runs, no duplicate key.
Also records why an env var cannot be used at all: HA removed `!env_var` from
its YAML loader, so `!secret` is the only mechanism for recorder.db_url, and
config-sync deliberately does not manage secrets.yaml.
Back to busybox; HA's image is no longer needed for this.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2b is done: 12.77M statistics rows copied SQLite -> Postgres with HA
running and no downtime (read-only mount; SQLite WAL gives readers a consistent
snapshot).
statistics_meta 1449 OK
statistics 10799904 OK 153.9s
statistics_short_term 1969804 OK 27.0s
span in Postgres: 2024-03-13 -> 2026-08-19
1449 entities with long-term history, 2627859 rows carrying sum
database size 2252 MB against a 20Gi PVC
Records the high-water marks the cutover top-up must resume from, and two schema
details that cost a failed first attempt:
- has_mean/has_sum are INTEGER in SQLite, BOOLEAN in Postgres, and Postgres
will not coerce them.
- the legacy created/start/last_reset DATETIME columns are 100% NULL in both
bulk tables, which is what makes a tab-separated COPY safe.
Also documents why the schema was built from HA's own models with schema_changes
left EMPTY: HA's _initialize_database detects a new database via the
events.time_fired_ts index and writes SCHEMA_VERSION itself, so pre-stamping that
row would bypass HA's own initialisation.
ANALYZE was run on all three tables. After a bulk COPY the planner has no
statistics and HA seq-scans 10.8M rows on every history/energy view.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review catch on #524, and it was a genuine blocker.
The first version built "postgresql://${PGUSER}:${PGPASSWORD}@host/db" in
busybox sh with no encoding. Two defects:
1. The CNPG-generated password is random and may contain @ : / ? #, each of
which changes how the URL parses. This repo already hit this exact issue
with the same CNPG password-generation mechanism -- see
kubernetes/apps/woodpecker/server.yaml, which switched to a lib/pq
keyword DSN specifically to avoid escaping generated passwords. That
option does not exist here: HA's recorder.db_url must be a SQLAlchemy URL.
So the fix is percent-encoding.
2. Worse, and the reason this was worth blocking: a quote in the password
makes the YAML line malformed, so secrets.yaml stops parsing entirely and
HA loses EVERY secret, not just this one. The line-count guard could never
catch that -- the count is unchanged; the file is simply invalid.
Rewritten to run python3 from HA's own image (already pulled for the main
container, so no extra image) instead of busybox:
- urllib.parse.quote(..., safe="") on user, password and dbname.
- json.dumps for the YAML value: YAML is a JSON superset, so this emits a
correctly escaped double-quoted scalar even with quotes or backslashes.
- The file is still rewritten LINE-WISE rather than round-tripped through the
YAML parser, so hand-maintained comments and key order survive.
- The guard now validates the RESULT: parse the new content, assert no key
from the old file disappeared, and assert recorder_db_url round-trips to
exactly the URL that was built. That catches corruption the line count
cannot.
Verified in HA's image against a deliberately hostile password
(p@ss:w/o"rd#?&\x=1) before commit:
new version -> parses, comment preserved, idempotent, password decodes back
byte-exact, host and dbname parse correctly
naive version -> yaml.safe_load raises ParserError
i.e. the approach this replaces would have produced an unparseable
secrets.yaml.
Also updates MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for this step landing, including
why the ordering (init container before the configuration.yaml change) is
mandatory.
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2a of the recorder move off SQLite (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
Adds an init container that writes `recorder_db_url` into /config/secrets.yaml
from the CNPG-generated ha-pg-app Secret.
INERT until the recorder is repointed. It only adds a key to secrets.yaml;
nothing reads it until `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in
configuration.yaml in the homeassistant repo. That ordering is REQUIRED in this
direction — HA refuses to start when a referenced secret is missing, so the
config change must not go first.
Why an init container rather than a hand-added line: the password is generated
by CNPG and can be rotated, so a hand-written entry goes stale silently and HA
then fails to start on a bad password. Re-rendering on every pod start is also
what makes a rotation take effect.
secrets.yaml is PVC runtime state that config-sync deliberately does not manage
(it holds influxdb_token and others), so this must EDIT the existing file, never
replace it. The script filters out any existing recorder_db_url line, appends
the current one, and guards the result: if the rewrite would drop any
non-recorder line it aborts rather than truncating the file holding every other
secret HA needs. Written to a temp path and moved atomically, chmod 600.
Verified in HA's own Alpine/busybox shell against a fixed sample before commit
-- pre-existing keys preserved, guard reports old=3 new=3, and a second run
produces a byte-identical 4-line file (idempotent, no duplicate key).
Refs #434
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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