Compare commits
8
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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da1482e33f | ||
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c6b1aa109b | ||
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2f3d952656 | ||
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0a87f91116 | ||
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c59f0050b3 | ||
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48c46610a6 | ||
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53887dd88f | ||
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c9a10ab015 |
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
|
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apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
|
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kind: ExternalSecret
|
||||
metadata:
|
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name: barman-cloud-creds
|
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namespace: authentik
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
# Prune-disabled — a standing guard kept from the seed->authentik-KS handoff (barman creds).
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kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
|
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spec:
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refreshInterval: 1h
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secretStoreRef:
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kind: ClusterSecretStore
|
||||
name: openbao
|
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target:
|
||||
name: barman-cloud-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
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- extract:
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key: seed/authentik/barman-creds
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||||
@@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ spec:
|
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name: hetzner-s3-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
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dataFrom:
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||||
- extract:
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key: seed/authentik/hetzner-creds
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key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
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||||
|
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@@ -27,5 +27,4 @@ resources:
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- cluster.yaml
|
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- objectstore.yaml
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- scheduled-backup.yaml
|
||||
- barman-creds-externalsecret.yaml
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- hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
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@@ -1,21 +1,8 @@
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---
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# Barman S3 credentials for ha-pg.
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#
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# FOLLOW-UP (#397): sourced from seed/paperless/hetzner-creds, which is not where
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# they belong. woodpecker/hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml has the identical
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# problem and the same note. The values are the same today, so this is correct
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# but coupled: rotating paperless's Hetzner credentials would silently change
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# the backup credentials for Home Assistant and Woodpecker too.
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#
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||||
# The fix is one dedicated path per consumer (seed/home-assistant/hetzner-creds)
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# and a one-line change to the `key:` below. Creating it needs an OpenBao write:
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#
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# bao kv put homelab/seed/home-assistant/hetzner-creds \
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# @<(bao kv get -format=json homelab/seed/paperless/hetzner-creds | jq '.data.data')
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#
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# Note the mount is `homelab`, so the path is homelab/seed/... — #397 records a
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# 403 on `bao kv list seed`, which was a wrong-path error rather than a
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# permissions problem.
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# One shared path for one shared credential — see the note in
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# ../paperless/hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml.
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#
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# The namespace allowlist on the openbao ClusterSecretStore
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# (infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml) must include this
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@@ -35,4 +22,4 @@ spec:
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name: hetzner-s3-creds
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dataFrom:
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- extract:
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key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
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key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
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apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
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kind: ExternalSecret
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metadata:
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name: barman-cloud-creds
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namespace: immich
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annotations:
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# Prune-disabled — a standing guard kept from the seed->immich-KS handoff (barman creds).
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kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
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spec:
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refreshInterval: 1h
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secretStoreRef:
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kind: ClusterSecretStore
|
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name: openbao
|
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target:
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name: barman-cloud-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
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dataFrom:
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- extract:
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key: seed/immich/barman-creds
|
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@@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ spec:
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name: hetzner-s3-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
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dataFrom:
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- extract:
|
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key: seed/immich/hetzner-creds
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key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
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@@ -13,6 +13,5 @@ resources:
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- cluster.yaml
|
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- objectstore.yaml
|
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- scheduled-backup.yaml
|
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- barman-creds-externalsecret.yaml
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- hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
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- pvcs.yaml
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@@ -11,25 +11,10 @@ spec:
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groups:
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- name: disk-wear.rules
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rules:
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# THE GAP THESE RULES CLOSE
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#
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# Drive wear is invisible in every other signal this cluster has.
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# `ceph -s` reads active+clean at any wear level, no Ceph health check
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# fires until a device actually fails, and the block-layer metrics show
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# throughput and latency but never endurance. That blind spot is how a
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# set of OSD drives reached 81-87% before anyone looked (#549, #434).
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#
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# The numbers below are wear percentages reported by the drive itself:
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# 100 means the manufacturer's rated endurance is used up. Drives do
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# not stop at 100 — they typically keep working and start consuming
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# spare blocks — so treat these as planning thresholds, not failure
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# predictions.
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# Wear percentages are self-reported: 100 means the rated endurance is
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# spent, not that the drive stops. Planning thresholds, not predictions.
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- alert: NvmeDriveWearHigh
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# 80% with months of runway left is the point where ordering a
|
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# replacement is still a calm decision rather than an outage.
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# `for` is long because wear is monotonic and slow: it cannot
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# flap, and a short window would only make the alert noisier
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# after a restart.
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# Long `for` because wear is monotonic and cannot flap.
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expr: smartctl_device_percentage_used >= 80
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for: 1h
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labels:
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@@ -37,12 +22,11 @@ spec:
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annotations:
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summary: "NVMe {{ $labels.device }} on {{ $labels.instance }} is at {{ $value }}% rated wear"
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description: >-
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The drive has used {{ $value }}% of its rated write endurance.
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Nothing is failing and no data is at risk yet. Check what the
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drive is carrying before deciding urgency: an OSD is replaceable
|
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with a rebalance, whereas the EPHEMERAL volume has no such
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escape — a node simply stops when it goes. The Disk Health
|
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dashboard resolves which drive holds which role.
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{{ $value }}% of rated write endurance used. Nothing is failing
|
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yet. Urgency depends on what the drive carries — the Disk Health
|
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dashboard shows the role. Losing an OSD costs a rebalance;
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EPHEMERAL is /var and rebuilds, apart from the node's etcd member
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data, which has to be removed and re-added.
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- alert: NvmeDriveWearCritical
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expr: smartctl_device_percentage_used >= 95
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||||
for: 1h
|
||||
@@ -55,9 +39,7 @@ spec:
|
||||
likely keep working for a while, but it is now operating outside
|
||||
what the manufacturer stands behind, and replacement should be
|
||||
scheduled rather than considered.
|
||||
# A drive that has consumed its spare area is no longer masking media
|
||||
# defects, which is a materially different state from being worn:
|
||||
# wear is a budget, spare exhaustion is damage.
|
||||
# Wear is a budget; spare exhaustion is damage.
|
||||
- alert: NvmeDriveSpareExhausted
|
||||
expr: smartctl_device_available_spare <= smartctl_device_available_spare_threshold
|
||||
for: 15m
|
||||
@@ -70,10 +52,6 @@ spec:
|
||||
drive has run out of reserve blocks to remap failures into.
|
||||
Replace it.
|
||||
- alert: NvmeDriveCriticalWarning
|
||||
# The NVMe critical warning byte is a bitfield: spare below
|
||||
# threshold, temperature out of range, degraded reliability,
|
||||
# read-only mode, volatile-memory backup failed. Any non-zero value
|
||||
# is the drive itself asking for attention.
|
||||
expr: smartctl_device_critical_warning > 0
|
||||
for: 5m
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
@@ -85,10 +63,8 @@ spec:
|
||||
detail with `smartctl -a` on the node; the value is a bitfield,
|
||||
not a count.
|
||||
- alert: NvmeDriveMediaErrors
|
||||
# Unlike wear, this counter should never move. Alert on the increase
|
||||
# rather than the absolute value, so a drive that recorded errors
|
||||
# long ago does not alert forever while a drive that starts failing
|
||||
# today does.
|
||||
# On the increase, not the total: pre-existing errors would otherwise
|
||||
# alert forever. Standing counts are visible on the dashboard only.
|
||||
expr: increase(smartctl_device_media_errors[6h]) > 0
|
||||
for: 5m
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
@@ -99,14 +75,9 @@ spec:
|
||||
The drive reported unrecoverable data-integrity errors in the
|
||||
last six hours. A healthy drive never increments this. Check
|
||||
whether Ceph has logged scrub errors on the same node.
|
||||
# Without this the whole group is silently useless: no series means no
|
||||
# alert fires, and a dashboard of empty panels reads much like a
|
||||
# healthy one. This is the check that the checks are running.
|
||||
# The check that the checks are running: no series fires no alert.
|
||||
# Counted against node-exporter's inventory, not a fixed fleet size.
|
||||
- alert: SmartctlExporterIncomplete
|
||||
# Compared against node-exporter's own NVMe inventory rather than a
|
||||
# written-down fleet size. Adding or removing a drive then moves both
|
||||
# sides together, so this cannot rot into a permanent false alarm the
|
||||
# way a hardcoded count would.
|
||||
expr: count(smartctl_device_percentage_used) < count(node_nvme_info) or absent(smartctl_device_percentage_used)
|
||||
for: 30m
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,16 +14,12 @@ spec:
|
||||
matchLabels:
|
||||
app.kubernetes.io/name: smartctl-exporter
|
||||
endpoints:
|
||||
# smartctl itself polls the drives every 60s, so scraping faster than that
|
||||
# returns the same numbers with a new timestamp. Wear moves on a scale of
|
||||
# weeks; 60s is already far finer than the signal.
|
||||
# smartctl polls the drives every 60s; scraping faster gains nothing.
|
||||
- port: http-metrics
|
||||
path: /metrics
|
||||
interval: 60s
|
||||
relabelings:
|
||||
# Without this every series is labelled with the exporter pod's IP and
|
||||
# nothing else. A DaemonSet pod's IP says nothing about which machine
|
||||
# the drive is in, and it changes on every reschedule — so the wear
|
||||
# figure would be unattributable, which is most of its value gone.
|
||||
# Without this a series carries only the exporter pod's IP, which does
|
||||
# not identify the machine the drive is in.
|
||||
- sourceLabels: [__meta_kubernetes_pod_node_name]
|
||||
targetLabel: node
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
|
||||
"description": "Fullest EPHEMERAL volume across the fleet — Talos's /var, holding container images, pod scratch space and kubelet state. A full /var takes the node down, and unlike Ceph nothing rebalances away from it.",
|
||||
"description": "Fullest EPHEMERAL volume across the fleet — Talos's /var. Its contents are meant to be disposable: container images, kubelet state and pod scratch all rebuild. Filling it is still a problem, because a node with no room to write stops being useful long before anything is lost, and nothing rebalances /var the way Ceph rebalances a full OSD.",
|
||||
"fieldConfig": {
|
||||
"defaults": {
|
||||
"color": {"mode": "thresholds"},
|
||||
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@
|
||||
"id": 8,
|
||||
"options": {
|
||||
"code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
|
||||
"content": "### What this dashboard cannot tell you\n\nThese notes are about mechanisms, not about the drives currently fitted. The inventory table above is the live answer to what is in the machines; nothing here restates it, because prose does not get re-read when hardware is swapped.\n\n**Wear is a budget, not a prediction.** The percentage is what the drive reports against its own rated endurance. Drives do not stop at 100 — they usually keep working and start consuming spare blocks — so read it for planning, and read available spare and media errors for whether something is failing now. Those are different questions and the alert rules treat them as such.\n\n**A green top row is not a healthy drive.** Endurance says nothing about the drive that dies of a controller fault tomorrow, and this dashboard cannot see one coming.\n\nCeph keeps its own wear figures for OSDs in the devicehealth module, which is a useful cross-check but covers OSDs only: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph device ls`. A drive removed from Ceph is purged from that registry and its history goes with it.\n\n**Roles are assigned in configuration, not by device name.** Talos selects the system disk and the EPHEMERAL volume by serial, Rook selects the OSD by `/dev/disk/by-id` path. Two consequences outlive any particular set of drives: a broad selector such as `disk.transport == 'nvme'` matches every drive in the box, with the installer taking the OSD as the failure mode — and a drive retired from Ceph is not necessarily out of service, so the drive with the least endurance left can be the one carrying container state.\n\n**A dying NVMe here hangs rather than errors.** Talos boots with `nvme_core.io_timeout=4294967295`, so NVMe commands never time out. Expect a stall, not an I/O error, and expect the latency panel to go flat rather than spike.\n\n**Kernel messages are not retained.** Talos kernel logs do not reach Loki — the only log jobs are Kubernetes pods and a systemd-journal from elsewhere. `talosctl -n <node> dmesg` is the only source, it is a ring buffer, and a reboot empties it. An NVMe error from before the last reboot left no trace anywhere.",
|
||||
"content": "### What this dashboard cannot tell you\n\nThese notes are about mechanisms, not about the drives currently fitted. The inventory table above is the live answer to what is in the machines; nothing here restates it, because prose does not get re-read when hardware is swapped.\n\n**Wear is a budget, not a prediction.** The percentage is what the drive reports against its own rated endurance. Drives do not stop at 100 — they usually keep working and start consuming spare blocks — so read it for planning, and read available spare and media errors for whether something is failing now. Those are different questions and the alert rules treat them as such.\n\n**A green top row is not a healthy drive.** Endurance says nothing about the drive that dies of a controller fault tomorrow, and this dashboard cannot see one coming.\n\nCeph keeps its own wear figures for OSDs in the devicehealth module, which is a useful cross-check but covers OSDs only: `kubectl -n rook-ceph exec deploy/rook-ceph-tools -- ceph device ls`. A drive removed from Ceph is purged from that registry and its history goes with it.\n\n**Roles are assigned in configuration, not by device name.** Talos selects the system disk and the EPHEMERAL volume by serial, Rook selects the OSD by `/dev/disk/by-id` path. Two consequences outlive any particular set of drives: a broad selector such as `disk.transport == 'nvme'` matches every drive in the box, with the installer taking the OSD as the failure mode — and a drive retired from Ceph is not necessarily out of service, and putting a worn one on EPHEMERAL is a sensible destination rather than a hazard — that volume is built to be rebuilt. Check the inventory table for what a given drive holds before reading its wear as urgent.\n\n**A dying NVMe here hangs rather than errors.** Talos boots with `nvme_core.io_timeout=4294967295`, so NVMe commands never time out. Expect a stall, not an I/O error, and expect the latency panel to go flat rather than spike.\n\n**Kernel messages are not retained.** Talos kernel logs do not reach Loki — the only log jobs are Kubernetes pods and a systemd-journal from elsewhere. `talosctl -n <node> dmesg` is the only source, it is a ring buffer, and a reboot empties it. An NVMe error from before the last reboot left no trace anywhere.",
|
||||
"mode": "markdown"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"title": "Gaps and caveats",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,37 +1,8 @@
|
||||
# SMART/endurance metrics for every NVMe drive in the fleet (#549).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHY THIS HOLDS ELEVATED CAPABILITIES, and why that is a deliberate exception
|
||||
# rather than an oversight:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NVMe reports health over an admin ioctl on the character device
|
||||
# (NVME_IOCTL_ADMIN_CMD), which the kernel gates on CAP_SYS_ADMIN. There is no
|
||||
# sysfs path for wear, media errors or written-bytes totals — hwmon publishes
|
||||
# the controller temperature and nothing else. Upstream smartctl_exporter
|
||||
# documents `privileged: true` and `user: root` for exactly this reason.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The alternative that needs no privileges — reading Ceph's devicehealth
|
||||
# archive, which does hold full smartctl output — covers OSD drives only. In
|
||||
# this cluster that is three of nine, and the six it misses include the drives
|
||||
# that were retired from Ceph for wear and now carry EPHEMERAL. Covering the
|
||||
# healthy drives and not the worn ones was judged not worth a new service; the
|
||||
# owner chose fleet-wide coverage with the privilege exception instead.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The exception is `privileged: true`, and narrower settings were tried and
|
||||
# measured to fail — see the securityContext below for what was ruled out and
|
||||
# how. It is still bounded: no host namespaces, no hostPID, no hostNetwork,
|
||||
# read-only root filesystem, and /dev as the only host mount.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If this ever needs revisiting, there are exactly two things worth checking,
|
||||
# and neither is "does another exporter ask for less":
|
||||
# - whether the kernel has grown a sysfs interface for NVMe health, which
|
||||
# would remove the need for device access altogether
|
||||
# - whether enough workloads need raw device access to justify a device
|
||||
# plugin, which is the only way Kubernetes grants individual devices
|
||||
# The requirement comes from the device cgroup and the ioctl gate, not from
|
||||
# the choice of tool.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Upstream had no release between 2025-04-22 (v0.14.0) and this deployment.
|
||||
# The repository is not archived; the pin is simply its newest tag.
|
||||
# Runs privileged: host device access is gated by the container device cgroup,
|
||||
# and Kubernetes offers no per-device allowlist. Narrower settings do not work;
|
||||
# the alternatives that were tried are in the commit history.
|
||||
apiVersion: apps/v1
|
||||
kind: DaemonSet
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
@@ -57,10 +28,8 @@ spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: smartctl-exporter
|
||||
image: quay.io/prometheuscommunity/smartctl-exporter:v0.14.0
|
||||
# No --smartctl.device on purpose: the exporter scans for devices
|
||||
# itself and rescans every 10m by default. Device names are not
|
||||
# stable across these machines, so a hardcoded list would quietly
|
||||
# stop covering a drive the next time one is replaced.
|
||||
# No --smartctl.device: the exporter scans and rescans on its own.
|
||||
# Device names are not stable across these machines.
|
||||
args:
|
||||
- --web.listen-address=:9633
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
@@ -68,56 +37,18 @@ spec:
|
||||
containerPort: 9633
|
||||
protocol: TCP
|
||||
securityContext:
|
||||
# PRIVILEGED, and there is no narrower setting that works. This
|
||||
# was established by measurement after two narrower attempts
|
||||
# failed, so the reasoning is recorded here rather than rediscovered:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Attempt 1 — CAP_SYS_ADMIN + CAP_SYS_RAWIO, everything else
|
||||
# dropped. The exporter found all three drives per node and
|
||||
# could open none: "Smartctl open device: /dev/nvme0 failed:
|
||||
# Operation not permitted".
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Attempt 2 — the same plus seccompProfile: Unconfined, on the
|
||||
# theory that EPERM is the default seccomp action for an
|
||||
# unlisted syscall and the kubelet runs seccompDefault: true.
|
||||
# /proc/1/status showed CapEff 0x220000 and Seccomp 2, so both
|
||||
# capabilities were effective and a filter was loaded. Removing
|
||||
# the filter changed nothing.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What actually settled it: `head -c 512 /dev/nvme0n1` inside
|
||||
# the container fails with EPERM too. A plain read of a block
|
||||
# device involves no ioctl, no capability and no syscall a
|
||||
# seccomp profile would filter. The block is the device cgroup —
|
||||
# containerd denies non-privileged containers access to host
|
||||
# device nodes whether or not /dev is mounted.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Kubernetes exposes no per-device allowlist in a Pod spec; there
|
||||
# is no equivalent of `docker --device`. The alternatives are
|
||||
# `privileged: true` or a device plugin advertising the NVMe
|
||||
# drives as a resource. A device plugin is the genuinely narrower
|
||||
# answer and is worth building if more workloads ever need raw
|
||||
# device access; for a single read-only metrics exporter it is a
|
||||
# component to write, deploy and maintain in exchange for the same
|
||||
# access.
|
||||
runAsUser: 0
|
||||
runAsNonRoot: false
|
||||
privileged: true
|
||||
# Stated rather than omitted: the API rejects `privileged: true`
|
||||
# together with `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`, so leaving it
|
||||
# out would only hide that privileged already implies it.
|
||||
# The API rejects privileged together with
|
||||
# allowPrivilegeEscalation: false.
|
||||
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
|
||||
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
|
||||
volumeMounts:
|
||||
# Not read-only. smartmontools opens NVMe devices read-write on
|
||||
# some paths, and once the container is privileged a read-only
|
||||
# flag on this mount is not a boundary anyone should rely on —
|
||||
# keeping it would suggest a protection that is not there.
|
||||
# Not read-only: smartmontools opens NVMe devices read-write.
|
||||
- name: dev
|
||||
mountPath: /dev
|
||||
# smartctl is not known to need scratch space, but the root
|
||||
# filesystem is read-only and a tool that turns out to want /tmp
|
||||
# would crashloop instead of degrading. Cheaper to provide it than
|
||||
# to find out from a restart counter.
|
||||
# Scratch space, because the root filesystem is read-only.
|
||||
- name: tmp
|
||||
mountPath: /tmp
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
|
||||
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
|
||||
kind: ExternalSecret
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: barman-cloud-creds
|
||||
namespace: paperless
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
# Prune-disabled — a standing guard kept from the seed->paperless-KS handoff (barman creds).
|
||||
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
refreshInterval: 1h
|
||||
secretStoreRef:
|
||||
kind: ClusterSecretStore
|
||||
name: openbao
|
||||
target:
|
||||
name: barman-cloud-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
||||
- extract:
|
||||
key: seed/paperless/barman-creds
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
|
||||
# One Hetzner S3 key, one path, shared by every barman ObjectStore. Separate
|
||||
# per-app paths would not make rotation independent — that needs one Hetzner
|
||||
# key per consumer (#397).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# velero reads the same key from infrastructure/velero-hetzner, which holds it
|
||||
# as a credentials file rather than these three fields.
|
||||
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
|
||||
kind: ExternalSecret
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +21,4 @@ spec:
|
||||
name: hetzner-s3-creds # keeps the old Secret's name — consumers unchanged
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
||||
- extract:
|
||||
key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
|
||||
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ resources:
|
||||
- cluster.yaml
|
||||
- objectstore.yaml
|
||||
- scheduled-backup.yaml
|
||||
- barman-creds-externalsecret.yaml
|
||||
- hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
|
||||
- pvcs.yaml
|
||||
configMapGenerator:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ spec:
|
||||
name: hetzner-s3-creds
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
||||
- extract:
|
||||
key: seed/trmnl/hetzner-creds
|
||||
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Barman S3 credentials for wp-pg.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Sourced from seed/paperless/hetzner-creds, which is not where they belong.
|
||||
# Issue #397 wants woodpecker to own seed/woodpecker/hetzner-creds; creating
|
||||
# that path needs OpenBao write access (`bao kv list seed` → 403 for the
|
||||
# identities available here), so it stays open. The values are identical, so it
|
||||
# is a one-line swap of the `key:` below once the path exists.
|
||||
# One shared path for one shared credential — see the note in
|
||||
# ../paperless/hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The namespace allowlist on the openbao ClusterSecretStore
|
||||
# (infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml) must include this
|
||||
@@ -24,4 +21,4 @@ spec:
|
||||
name: hetzner-s3-creds
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
||||
- extract:
|
||||
key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
|
||||
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,11 +36,9 @@ spec:
|
||||
target:
|
||||
name: hetzner-s3-creds
|
||||
dataFrom:
|
||||
# Reuses the paperless copy of the shared Hetzner S3 credentials (identical
|
||||
# ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY / REGION) to avoid seeding a new OpenBao
|
||||
# path for this migration — same approach woodpecker took. FOLLOW-UP: give
|
||||
# wordpress its own seed/wordpress/hetzner-creds path once OpenBao can be
|
||||
# written, and repoint this here (the value is the same, so it's a drop-in
|
||||
# swap).
|
||||
# One shared path for one shared credential. There is a single Hetzner S3
|
||||
# key behind all of these — see the note in
|
||||
# ../paperless/hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml for why per-app paths were
|
||||
# the wrong shape and what would have to change for them to be right.
|
||||
- extract:
|
||||
key: seed/paperless/hetzner-creds
|
||||
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user