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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-bot e15067a784 feat(monitoring): alert on any blackbox target without a rule of its own
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Nine of the thirteen blackbox-http targets were probed, graphed and completely
unalerted: gitea, immich, auth, home, prometheus, alerts and dash, plus the two
internal /-/healthy probes that exist specifically to catch a dead app behind a
live Authentik gate. That is the shape that let file.renner.uno serve 502 for
months.

BlackboxProbeFailing covers everything except the instances that already have a
dedicated rule. Measured against the running Prometheus before committing: the
selector returns exactly those nine and excludes the six with bespoke handling,
and the full expression as YAML delivers it evaluates to zero results today.

The exclusion list and the dedicated rules are one invariant, stated in the
file: an instance belongs in the list only while a rule elsewhere covers it,
and a new dedicated rule has to add its instance. Wrong in one direction the
alert fires twice, wrong in the other it never fires. Severity is warning
because a catch-all cannot know what any given target means — anything
deserving critical earns its own rule, which is also what puts it in the list.
That is what stops the list from being arbitrary.

BlackboxProbesAbsent is the check on the checks. Every endpoint alert reads
probe_success; if the job stops producing series none of them can fire, and
that silence is indistinguishable from health.

Also corrects the comment in prometheusrule-hetzner-backup.yaml claiming CNPG
pod metrics are not scraped and a granular archiving alert is a follow-up. Both
have existed for a while: cnpg-podmonitors.yaml scrapes the instances and
CNPGWalArchiveBacklog reads that collector.
2026-08-28 11:10:45 +02:00
k.renner 541f3fcfe9 Merge pull request 'feat(monitoring): probe and alert on Woodpecker and OpenBao' (#697) from probe-ci-openbao into master
ci/woodpecker/cron/alert-monitor Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#697
2026-08-28 08:59:10 +00:00
claude-bot 74b1bb242f feat(monitoring): probe and alert on Woodpecker and OpenBao
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
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Both were unmonitored. Neither is a leaf service: Woodpecker runs every cron
and deploy in this repo, and every ExternalSecret in the cluster resolves
through OpenBao.

OpenBao is probed at /v1/sys/health rather than at the root, because a sealed
instance still serves its UI. Root would answer 307 -> /ui/ -> 200 while every
secret lookup failed — the exact green-while-broken shape probes-blackbox.yaml
already warns about for the gated monitoring UIs.

standbyok=true is required, not cosmetic: the endpoint returns 200 only on the
active node and 429 on a standby, and the external route currently lands on a
standby. Measured — the bare path returns 429 right now, so an http_2xx probe
without the parameter would have been red from the first scrape. With it, 200
means initialized, unsealed and serving; 503 sealed and 501 uninitialized stay
red.

The alert matches OpenBao by instance prefix instead of the full target string,
because that target carries a query parameter and an exact match would fail
silently if the label ever encodes it differently.

Both alerts are new rules rather than additions to an existing file. Worth
noting while here: there is no generic blackbox-down rule. Only fsn1, netbird
and the two relays have alerts, so gitea, immich, auth, home, prometheus,
alerts and dash are probed and graphed but nothing fires if they go down. Not
addressed here — it needs a decision about whether to write one generic rule
and retire the per-instance ones.
2026-08-28 10:57:07 +02:00
k.renner 847664eaa3 Merge pull request 'chore: remove the nas-1 remnants and make incomplete scans visible' (#696) from cleanup-nas-1-remnants into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#696
2026-08-28 08:47:36 +00:00
k.renner 2ef9811b13 Merge pull request 'chore(ci): bump ci-claude image to 2.1.250' (#693) from ci-image/claude-2.1.250 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#693
2026-08-28 08:46:58 +00:00
claude-bot b8125e4669 fix(ci): make an incomplete image scan visible
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
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The scan loop swallowed every Trivy failure with `|| true`, so a step that
scanned 21 of 22 images reported exactly the same as one that scanned all 22.
The gap was found by the fix agent noticing a missing file in its own input,
not by the pipeline.

The loop still continues past a bad image — one unpullable reference should not
cost the scan of everything after it — but now counts what failed, names it,
and exits non-zero:

    --- scanned 21 of 22 images ---
    NOT SCANNED: proxmox/proxmox-backup-client:latest

`failure: ignore` stays, which per Woodpecker's semantics reports the step as
failed while letting the workflow continue. That is deliberate: coverage is
reported, not enforced. The step goes red and the fix agent still runs on what
was scanned. Making the whole pipeline fail would mean one unscannable image
blocks all remediation.

The image that prompted this is gone with the nas-1 removal in the previous
commit, so the next run should report 20 of 20. The accounting is what matters
— the next dead reference will announce itself instead of being absorbed.

Refs #694
2026-08-28 10:45:11 +02:00
claude-bot 9c9e45d17d chore(ansible): drop the nas-1 inventory, roles and plays
nas-1 has been off for months. Everything scoped to it went with it:

  inventory/host_vars/nas-1.renner.uno/   vars and vault
  [synology_nas] in pve_hosts.yml         the group's only member
  roles/pbs-client/                       PBS backup client
  plays/install-pbs-client.yml            role-based, hosts: synology_nas
  plays/install-pbs-client-synology.yml   raw-module variant, same host
  plays/install-garage-synology.yml       Garage S3, replaced by Hetzner
  .woodpecker/install-garage-synology.yml the pipeline that ran it

The two PBS plays were already inconsistent with each other before the host
went away: the role pulled aterfax/pbs-client, while the standalone play
pulled proxmox/proxmox-backup-client, which has never existed on Docker Hub
(404). Nothing referenced the standalone play at all. Both are moot now.

pve_hosts.yml keeps its "gone from this file, and why" list, so synology_nas is
recorded there alongside pve_cluster and the in-cluster migrations rather than
vanishing without trace.

Checked: `ansible-inventory --graph` resolves, and grep finds no remaining
reference to synology_nas, nas-1, pbs-client or the garage play outside that
one note. plays/archived/ is left alone — it is history, not live config.
2026-08-28 10:43:59 +02:00
claude-bot b68ef964d9 fix(apps): remove the file ingress pointing at a powered-off NAS
file.renner.uno served HTTP 502. The Service is an ExternalName to
nas.renner.uno:7001, a CNAME to nas-1, and nas-1 has been off for months. The
Ingress and Service had been in the cluster for 110 days pointing at nothing.

Nothing caught it because file.renner.uno is not in the blackbox probe list, so
a publicly resolvable hostname returned 502 for months without a single alert.

The insecure-backend ServersTransport goes with it. It existed to let Traefik
re-encrypt to the NAS web UI's self-signed certificate and apps/file was its
only consumer, which its own header comment documents.
2026-08-28 10:42:52 +02:00
24 changed files with 150 additions and 738 deletions
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
when:
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "install-garage-synology"'
steps:
- name: run-playbook
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
environment:
ANSIBLE_FORCE_COLOR: "true"
ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING: "false"
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY:
from_secret: ssh_private_key
VAULT_PASS:
from_secret: vault_pass
PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID:
from_secret: proxmox_token_id
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET:
from_secret: proxmox_token_secret
commands:
- mkdir -p ~/.ssh
- echo "$SSH_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- 'printf "Host *\n\tStrictHostKeyChecking no\n\tUserKnownHostsFile /dev/null\n" > ~/.ssh/config'
- cd ansible
- echo "$$VAULT_PASS" > .vault_pass && chmod 600 .vault_pass
- export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=.vault_pass
- ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-garage-synology.yml -v
+17 -1
View File
@@ -40,12 +40,28 @@ steps:
cat /tmp/images.txt
echo "---"
i=0
failed=0
failed_names=""
while IFS= read -r img; do
i=$$((i+1))
out="trivy-image-$$i.json"
echo "=== [$$i] $$img -> $$out ==="
trivy image --skip-db-update --scanners vuln --timeout 15m --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed --format json -o "$$out" "$$img" || true
# Keep going on a bad image so one unpullable reference cannot cost
# the scan of every image after it, but record that it happened.
if ! trivy image --skip-db-update --scanners vuln --timeout 15m --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed --format json -o "$$out" "$$img"; then
failed=$$((failed+1))
failed_names="$$failed_names $$img"
fi
done < /tmp/images.txt
echo "--- scanned $$((i - failed)) of $$i images ---"
if [ "$$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "NOT SCANNED:$$failed_names"
exit 1
fi
# Non-zero above turns this step red without failing the workflow, so the
# fix agent still runs on what was scanned. Coverage is reported, not
# enforced: an incomplete scan is visible in the step status instead of
# being indistinguishable from a clean one.
failure: ignore
- name: security-fix-agent
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
---
# PBS Client configuration for nas-1
pbs_backup_paths:
- /volume1/Documents
- /volume1/homes
- /volume1/Homeassistant Backup
- /volume1/Games
- /volume1/Media
- /volume1/Music
- /volume1/video
- /volume2/Backup
- /volume1/Movies
# Add more paths as needed:
# - /volume1/photos
# - /volume1/music
# PBS Server connection
pbs_server_host: "pbs2.renner.uno"
pbs_server_port: 8007
pbs_datastore: "pool"
pbs_backup_id: "nas-1"
# PBS Authentication - credentials in vault.yml
pbs_username: "root@pam!nas-1"
# Garage S3 (K8s backup target)
garage_image: "dxflrs/garage:v2.3.0"
garage_zone: "dsm"
garage_capacity: "2T"
# SSH connection - use password auth (key not supported by DSM)
ansible_ssh_pass: "{{ nas_ssh_password }}"
ansible_become_pass: "{{ nas_ssh_password }}"
# Python 3.9+ from Synology package
ansible_python_interpreter: /usr/local/bin/python3.9
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
34663462636437633437613863366266306334666635643839313737343739643864613136613938
3138393966306561656366396465383539303137333036300a376237376636356230343834386362
36636535396330333732383233323263613132333166343739396137636538653435336662353138
6565643866623235610a316266383933303830323936303735623338623165386339383733373435
62366461363833616438373237383132366438326364363462333265366533323861376630643365
39343036343838333639363432643738666630363063323636646661313539643465366532363438
33303837623234613434633563666562346536346435353461373536323737376233386163326537
61383963343737656438356136613537623538333163343466343739346135333439616432663763
36663962633037376561326434303035333938646436663832303432346365353439666435613337
34363636326530333233313231343566306432376532396666643761633136316333376337666135
65363338623035663438323338663863366362653131336434323865326530326534623631336263
36633063383031386161363131333636393364623436613331353733313235383062656131313164
63393665633361313961363637663237616364643236383835393736643937393564656238376362
31393465383361326264376133393233616264663636383337363962356532613438663637616536
33653137656335323763313461323633616635346232303062323062333766383931313965346361
66656461313239633366636463633465636463663937393932636337643861383937663662306466
32353166643832303234643264633062616330393963333034623432613730366339306637613239
34626161663666316339323762373639353335653663353635366664643063393432623039306237
38363161343930363763393364663364353735343236313665313461626165636135303839363164
37336638396564326166376233353730346563656266323535666265323062646232323938353732
32636235333839623166633761376334316434613235333730353439343262393537363461333238
32653435623362666662336532643832356163326332636436346132643237643030343761663332
36663530356539303636663438646430363335353135323932613863666264363533326137353164
31663032346236616263343637396439663334396166656364623637666535386530383535663435
66303037303265616634373763616437333835333136336563323339666563663931396133633131
3963653266633535303630653335666166313336653831623362
+2 -4
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
# pve_cluster (jupiter/neptune/saturn) run Talos on bare metal; no SSH at all
# authentik_db / authentik_app authentik runs in-cluster (CNPG)
# grafana runs in-cluster
# synology_nas (nas-1) powered off; Garage and the PBS client
# it hosted are gone with it
# Their hosts no longer resolve, except the three that resolve to Talos nodes.
[netbird_server]
@@ -17,10 +19,6 @@ netbird.renner.uno ansible_user=root
proxy-1.renner.uno ansible_user=root
proxy-2.renner.uno ansible_user=root
[synology_nas]
nas-1.renner.uno ansible_user=ladmin ansible_python_interpreter=/usr/bin/python3
# Every bare-metal edge thin client. Gets the host-generic roles only:
# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the MQTT bridge, the VLAN
# sub-interface. Nothing here assumes any peripheral is attached.
-313
View File
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
---
# Synology-specific playbook using raw module (Python 3.8 workaround)
# Deploys Garage (https://garagehq.deuxfleurs.fr) as a single-node S3 target
# for K8s backups (Velero + CNPG Barman Cloud Plugin).
#
# Required secrets in host_vars/nas-1.renner.uno/vault.yml:
# garage_rpc_secret: "<openssl rand -hex 32>"
# garage_admin_token: "<openssl rand -base64 32>"
# garage_metrics_token: "<openssl rand -base64 32>"
#
# Post-install bootstrap (run once, record the returned secret keys):
# docker exec garaged /garage status
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-velero
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-cnpg
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-secrets
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-migration
# docker exec garaged /garage key create velero-key
# docker exec garaged /garage key create cnpg-key
# docker exec garaged /garage key create secrets-key
# docker exec garaged /garage key create migration-key
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-velero --key velero-key
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-cnpg --key cnpg-key
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-secrets --key secrets-key
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-migration --key migration-key
- name: Install Garage S3 on Synology NAS
hosts: synology_nas
gather_facts: false
vars:
garage_data_dir: "/volume1/docker/garage"
tasks:
- name: Create Garage directory tree
ansible.builtin.raw: |
mkdir -p {{ garage_data_dir }}/config \
{{ garage_data_dir }}/meta \
{{ garage_data_dir }}/data
changed_when: true
# Secret writes use the same compare-then-write pattern as garage.toml so
# rotation is idempotent AND a real change can drive force-recreate below.
# Garage reads these files once at startup; without container restart, a
# rotated token leaves the running process holding the previous value.
- name: Write rpc_secret
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
{{ garage_rpc_secret }}
SECRET_EOF
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret ] \
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret; then
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret
echo RPC_SECRET_CHANGED
else
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new
fi
register: rpc_secret_write
changed_when: "'RPC_SECRET_CHANGED' in rpc_secret_write.stdout"
no_log: true
- name: Write admin_token
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
{{ garage_admin_token }}
SECRET_EOF
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token ] \
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token; then
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token
echo ADMIN_TOKEN_CHANGED
else
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new
fi
register: admin_token_write
changed_when: "'ADMIN_TOKEN_CHANGED' in admin_token_write.stdout"
no_log: true
- name: Write metrics_token
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
{{ garage_metrics_token }}
SECRET_EOF
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token ] \
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token; then
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token
echo METRICS_TOKEN_CHANGED
else
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new
fi
register: metrics_token_write
changed_when: "'METRICS_TOKEN_CHANGED' in metrics_token_write.stdout"
no_log: true
- name: Write garage.toml
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new << 'TOML_EOF'
metadata_dir = "/var/lib/garage/meta"
data_dir = "/var/lib/garage/data"
# SQLite chosen over LMDB: single-node deployment has no peers to
# rebuild metadata from on unclean-shutdown corruption. SQLite is
# slower but portable and has no LMDB corruption window.
db_engine = "sqlite"
# 6-hour auto-snapshot of the metadata DB as a backstop against
# corruption; last two snapshots retained.
metadata_auto_snapshot_interval = "6h"
# Single-zone, single-node: only coherent replication factor.
replication_factor = 1
rpc_bind_addr = "[::]:3901"
rpc_secret_file = "/etc/garage/rpc_secret"
compression_level = 2
# 64 MB blocks (default 1 MB; previously 20 MB). On the 5 × 7 TB
# Btrfs RAID 5 volume the per-block fixed cost (SQLite lookup,
# dir traversal, hash verify, zstd decompress, nginx buffering)
# is the dominant overhead per object; larger blocks amortize
# it. block_size is a maximum, so 16 MiB CNPG WAL segments
# still upload as one block each. Only applies to NEW uploads;
# existing objects keep their original chunking until re-uploaded.
block_size = "64M"
[s3_api]
api_bind_addr = "[::]:3900"
s3_region = "garage"
root_domain = ".s3.{{ inventory_hostname }}"
[s3_web]
bind_addr = "[::]:3902"
root_domain = ".web.{{ inventory_hostname }}"
[admin]
api_bind_addr = "[::]:3903"
admin_token_file = "/etc/garage/admin_token"
metrics_token_file = "/etc/garage/metrics_token"
TOML_EOF
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml ] \
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml; then
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml
echo GARAGE_TOML_CHANGED
else
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new
fi
register: garage_toml_write
changed_when: "'GARAGE_TOML_CHANGED' in garage_toml_write.stdout"
- name: Write docker-compose.yml
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml << 'COMPOSE_EOF'
services:
garage:
image: {{ garage_image }}
container_name: garaged
restart: unless-stopped
# HTTP services (3900/3902/3903) bind to loopback; DSM
# reverse proxy fronts and TLS-terminates them. RPC 3901
# is exposed directly — the Noise handshake is raw TCP,
# so DSM RP cannot front it. rpc_secret gates auth.
ports:
- "3901:3901"
- "127.0.0.1:3900:3900"
- "127.0.0.1:3902:3902"
- "127.0.0.1:3903:3903"
volumes:
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml:/etc/garage.toml:ro
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret:/etc/garage/rpc_secret:ro
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token:/etc/garage/admin_token:ro
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token:/etc/garage/metrics_token:ro
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/meta:/var/lib/garage/meta
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/data:/var/lib/garage/data
COMPOSE_EOF
changed_when: true
- name: Pull image and start Garage container
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
cd {{ garage_data_dir }} && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
become: true
changed_when: true
# Garage does not reload config on SIGHUP and compose does not notice
# when a bind-mounted host file changes. Force-recreate the container
# when garage.toml OR any of the three secret files changed so the new
# config / rotated tokens are picked up.
- name: Force-recreate garaged when garage.toml or secrets changed
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
cd {{ garage_data_dir }} && docker compose up -d --force-recreate garage
become: true
when: garage_toml_write.changed
or rpc_secret_write.changed
or admin_token_write.changed
or metrics_token_write.changed
changed_when: true
- name: Wait for Garage to accept CLI calls
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if docker exec garaged /garage status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
exit 0
fi
sleep 2
done
exit 1
become: true
changed_when: false
- name: Check whether cluster layout is already applied
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
docker exec garaged /garage status
become: true
register: garage_status
changed_when: false
- name: Apply single-node layout (idempotent — only on first run)
when: "'NO ROLE ASSIGNED' in garage_status.stdout"
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
NODE_ID=$(docker exec garaged /garage node id | head -n 1 | cut -d@ -f1)
docker exec garaged /garage layout assign "$NODE_ID" \
-z {{ garage_zone }} \
-c {{ garage_capacity }} \
-t {{ inventory_hostname_short }}
docker exec garaged /garage layout apply --version 1
become: true
changed_when: true
- name: Report Garage status
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
docker exec garaged /garage status
become: true
register: garage_status_final
changed_when: false
- name: Show Garage status
ansible.builtin.debug:
var: garage_status_final.stdout_lines
# Bootstrap buckets + keys. Idempotent: bucket_info / key_info return
# non-zero when missing, so we only create on first run. Access-key
# secrets are captured at create time and persisted to chmod-600 files
# under {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/<key>.creds on nas-1. These
# files are the only post-install record of the secrets — Garage does
# not expose them again.
- name: Bootstrap Garage buckets, keys, and grants
ansible.builtin.shell: |
set -e
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
KEYS_DIR={{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys
mkdir -p "$KEYS_DIR"
chmod 700 "$KEYS_DIR"
bootstrap_pair() {
local BUCKET="$1"
local KEY="$2"
local CREDS_FILE="$KEYS_DIR/$KEY.creds"
if ! docker exec garaged /garage bucket info "$BUCKET" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
docker exec garaged /garage bucket create "$BUCKET"
fi
if ! docker exec garaged /garage key info "$KEY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
CREATE_OUT=$(docker exec garaged /garage key create "$KEY")
KEY_ID=$(echo "$CREATE_OUT" | awk '/^Key ID:/ {print $3}')
SECRET=$(echo "$CREATE_OUT" | awk '/^Secret key:/ {print $3}')
umask 177
printf 'KEY_ID=%s\nSECRET_KEY=%s\n' "$KEY_ID" "$SECRET" > "$CREDS_FILE"
fi
docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow \
--read --write --owner \
"$BUCKET" --key "$KEY"
}
bootstrap_pair k8s-velero velero-key
bootstrap_pair k8s-cnpg cnpg-key
bootstrap_pair k8s-secrets secrets-key
bootstrap_pair k8s-migration migration-key
bootstrap_pair tfstate tfstate-key
become: true
changed_when: true
no_log: true
- name: Report bucket + key state (no secrets)
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
docker exec garaged /garage bucket list
echo "---"
docker exec garaged /garage key list
echo "---"
ls -l {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/ 2>&1
become: true
register: garage_bootstrap_state
changed_when: false
- name: Show bucket + key state
ansible.builtin.debug:
var: garage_bootstrap_state.stdout_lines
- name: Post-install note
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg:
- "Buckets: k8s-velero, k8s-cnpg, k8s-secrets, k8s-migration, tfstate"
- "Keys: velero-key, cnpg-key, secrets-key, migration-key, tfstate-key"
- "Secrets are written to {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/<key>.creds on nas-1 (chmod 600, root-owned)."
- "SSH to nas-1 and `sudo cat` the file to retrieve KEY_ID + SECRET_KEY for Velero / CNPG / migration / tfstate config."
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
---
# Synology-specific playbook using raw module (Python 3.8 workaround)
- name: Install PBS Client on Synology NAS
hosts: synology_nas
gather_facts: false
vars:
pbs_client_data_dir: "/volume1/docker/pbs-client"
tasks:
- name: Create PBS client directory
ansible.builtin.raw: |
mkdir -p {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state
changed_when: true
- name: Create docker-compose.yml
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml << 'COMPOSE_EOF'
services:
pbs-client:
image: proxmox/proxmox-backup-client:latest
container_name: pbs-client
restart: unless-stopped
hostname: {{ pbs_backup_id }}
env_file:
- .env
volumes:
- {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state:/root/.proxmox-backup
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
- "{{ path }}:{{ path }}:ro"
{% endfor %}
mem_limit: 2g
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
COMPOSE_EOF
changed_when: true
- name: Create .env file
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env << 'ENV_EOF'
PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
ENV_EOF
chmod 600 {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
changed_when: true
- name: Create backup script
ansible.builtin.raw: |
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh << 'SCRIPT_EOF'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
source {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
BACKUP_SOURCES=""
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
BACKUP_SOURCES="$BACKUP_SOURCES {{ path | basename }}.pxar:{{ path }}"
{% endfor %}
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Starting backup for {{ pbs_backup_id }}"
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client backup \
$BACKUP_SOURCES \
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}"
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Backup completed, pruning..."
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client prune \
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}" \
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
--keep-last {{ pbs_keep_last | default(3) }} \
--keep-daily {{ pbs_keep_daily | default(7) }} \
--keep-weekly {{ pbs_keep_weekly | default(4) }} \
--keep-monthly {{ pbs_keep_monthly | default(6) }}
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Done"
SCRIPT_EOF
chmod 755 {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh
changed_when: true
- name: Start PBS client container
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
cd {{ pbs_client_data_dir }} && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
become: true
changed_when: true
- name: Setup cron job for daily backup at 2 AM (root crontab)
ansible.builtin.shell: |
# Remove existing entry if present
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "pbs-client/backup.sh" | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
# Add new entry
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 2 * * * {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh >> /var/log/pbs-backup.log 2>&1") | crontab -
become: true
changed_when: true
- name: Verify container is running
ansible.builtin.shell: |
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
docker ps --filter name=pbs-client --format "{{ '{{' }}.Status{{ '}}' }}"
become: true
register: container_status
changed_when: false
- name: Show container status
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "PBS client container status: {{ container_status.stdout }}"
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Install PBS Client on Synology NAS
hosts: synology_nas
become: true
# Variables are set in:
# - Role defaults: ansible/roles/pbs-client/defaults/main.yml
# - Host overrides: ansible/inventory/host_vars/<hostname>/vars.yml
# - Secrets: ansible/inventory/host_vars/<hostname>/vault.yml
roles:
- pbs-client
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
---
# PBS Client configuration
pbs_client_version: "latest"
pbs_client_data_dir: "/opt/pbs-client"
# PBS Server connection (override in host_vars)
pbs_server_host: "pbs.obg.renner.uno"
pbs_server_port: 8007
pbs_datastore: "backups"
# Authentication (override in vault!)
pbs_username: "backup@pbs"
pbs_password: ""
# pbs_fingerprint: "" # Optional - omit for Let's Encrypt certs
# Backup configuration
pbs_backup_id: "nas-1"
pbs_backup_paths:
- /volume1/docker
- /volume1/homes
# Schedule (cron format)
pbs_backup_schedule: "0 2 * * *" # 2 AM daily
# Retention policy (prune settings)
pbs_keep_last: 3
pbs_keep_daily: 7
pbs_keep_weekly: 4
pbs_keep_monthly: 6
# Container resource limits
pbs_memory_limit: "2g"
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Restart PBS client
community.docker.docker_compose_v2:
project_src: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
state: restarted
docker_cli: "{{ docker_cli | default('/usr/local/bin/docker') }}"
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Create PBS client directories
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ item }}"
state: directory
mode: '0755'
loop:
- "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
- "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state"
- name: Copy PBS client docker-compose file
ansible.builtin.template:
src: docker-compose.yml.j2
dest: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
mode: '0644'
notify: Restart PBS client
- name: Start PBS client via Docker Compose
community.docker.docker_compose_v2:
project_src: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
state: present
pull: always
docker_cli: "{{ docker_cli | default('/usr/local/bin/docker') }}"
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
# PBS Client Environment Configuration
PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
{% if pbs_fingerprint | default('') != '' %}
PBS_FINGERPRINT={{ pbs_fingerprint }}
{% endif %}
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# PBS Backup Script for {{ pbs_backup_id }}
# Managed by Ansible - do not edit manually
set -e
# Load environment
source {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
# Build backup command with all paths
BACKUP_SOURCES=""
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
BACKUP_SOURCES="$BACKUP_SOURCES {{ path | basename }}.pxar:{{ path }}"
{% endfor %}
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Starting backup for {{ pbs_backup_id }}"
# Run backup via Docker
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client backup \
$BACKUP_SOURCES \
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}"
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Backup completed"
# Prune old backups
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Pruning old backups"
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client prune \
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}" \
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
--keep-last {{ pbs_keep_last }} \
--keep-daily {{ pbs_keep_daily }} \
--keep-weekly {{ pbs_keep_weekly }} \
--keep-monthly {{ pbs_keep_monthly }}
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Prune completed"
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
services:
pbs-client:
image: aterfax/pbs-client:{{ pbs_client_version }}
container_name: pbs-client
restart: unless-stopped
hostname: {{ pbs_backup_id }}
environment:
- PBS_ENDPOINT={{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}
- PBS_DATASTORE={{ pbs_datastore }}
- PBS_API_KEY_NAME={{ pbs_username }}
- PBS_API_KEY_SECRET={{ pbs_password }}
- PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
- PBS_ENCRYPTION_PASSWORD={{ pbs_encryption_password | default(pbs_password) }}
- PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
- PBS_BACKUP_ID={{ pbs_backup_id }}
- CRON_SCHEDULE={{ pbs_backup_schedule }}
- PBS_BACKUP_CMD_APPEND_EXTRA_OPTS=--crypt-mode=none
- PRUNE_KEEP_LAST={{ pbs_keep_last | default(3) }}
- PRUNE_KEEP_DAILY={{ pbs_keep_daily | default(7) }}
- PRUNE_KEEP_WEEKLY={{ pbs_keep_weekly | default(4) }}
- PRUNE_KEEP_MONTHLY={{ pbs_keep_monthly | default(6) }}
- CRON_BACKUP_ONLY=1
volumes:
- {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state:/root/.config/proxmox-backup
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
- "{{ path }}:/backups/{{ path | basename | replace(' ', '_') }}:ro"
{% endfor %}
tmpfs:
- /tmp
mem_limit: {{ pbs_memory_limit }}
-31
View File
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: file
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: file
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
# Backend serves HTTPS with a self-signed cert; re-encrypt + skip
# verify via the shared insecure-backend ServersTransport (see
# apps/insecure-backend-serverstransport.yaml).
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: insecure-backend@kubernetescrd
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: file.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: file
port:
number: 7001
tls:
- secretName: file-tls
hosts:
- file.renner.uno
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: file
namespace: apps
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: file
spec:
# Caddy reverse-proxied https://nas.renner.uno:7001. nas.renner.uno
# is a CNAME -> nas-1.renner.uno owned by UniFi DNS, k8s-gateway
# forwards srv lookups so this resolves cluster-side.
type: ExternalName
externalName: nas.renner.uno
ports:
- name: https
port: 7001
targetPort: 7001
protocol: TCP
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Shared Traefik ServersTransport for ingresses that re-encrypt to a
# backend serving HTTPS with a self-signed / hostname-mismatched cert:
#
# apps/file — NAS web UI on a self-signed cert
#
# Replaces the nginx `backend-protocol: HTTPS` + `proxy-ssl-verify: off`
# annotation pair. Each Ingress that wants this behaviour sets
# traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
# traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: insecure-backend
#
# (bare name — kubernetesIngress provider resolves ServersTransport in
# the same namespace as the Ingress; the `<ns>-<name>@kubernetescrd`
# qualified form is for IngressRoute CRDs only).
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: ServersTransport
metadata:
name: insecure-backend
namespace: apps
spec:
insecureSkipVerify: true
-2
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- insecure-backend-serverstransport.yaml
- gatus/
- external-dns/
- file/
- gitea/
- ical-proxy/
# woodpecker/ moved to its own dedicated `woodpecker` Kustomization
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ kind: Kustomization
# come from the kube-prometheus-stack chart. Flux applies this Kustomization
# only after `monitoring` is Ready (chart installed → CRDs present).
resources:
- prometheusrule-blackbox.yaml
- prometheusrule-ceph.yaml
- prometheusrule-ci-openbao.yaml
- prometheusrule-cilium.yaml
- prometheusrule-disk-wear.yaml
- prometheusrule-hetzner-backup.yaml
@@ -49,6 +49,23 @@ spec:
# ports outside the hairpin's 80/443 — real WAN path.
- http://proxy-1.renner.uno:9000/health
- http://proxy-2.renner.uno:9000/health
# Woodpecker. Ungated, root returns 200 with no redirect. Every
# scheduled job in this repo runs here — the alert-monitor cron, the
# nightly scans, the deploy targets — so an outage here is silent by
# construction: the thing that would have told you is the thing that
# is down.
- https://ci.renner.uno
# OpenBao. Probes the health API rather than the UI on purpose: a
# SEALED instance still serves the UI (307 -> /ui/ -> 200) while every
# ExternalSecret in the cluster fails, which is exactly the
# green-while-broken shape this file warns about elsewhere.
#
# standbyok=true because the endpoint answers 200 only on the ACTIVE
# node and 429 on a standby — the external route currently lands on a
# standby, so the bare path would be permanently red. With the
# parameter, 200 means initialized, unsealed and serving, on whichever
# node answers; 503 sealed and 501 uninitialized both stay red.
- https://openbao.renner.uno/v1/sys/health?standbyok=true
# APP-HEALTH probes for the gated monitoring UIs, from the correct
# in-cluster vantage (monitoring-vantage-point-rule): the gate is
# only on the ingress, so the ClusterIP /-/healthy endpoints are
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: blackbox
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: blackbox.rules
rules:
# Catch-all for every blackbox-http target that has no rule of its own.
# Before this existed, a target could be probed, graphed and completely
# unalerted — which is how file.renner.uno served 502 for months.
#
# THE EXCLUSION LIST AND THE DEDICATED RULES ARE ONE INVARIANT: an
# instance belongs here only while a rule elsewhere covers it, and
# adding a dedicated rule means adding its instance here. Get it wrong
# in one direction and the alert fires twice; wrong in the other and it
# never fires at all. Currently excluded:
#
# fsn1.your-objectstorage.com HetznerBackupEndpointDown (critical)
# netbird.renner.uno prometheusrule-netbird-availability
# proxy-1/2:9000/health same file, relay redundancy
# ci.renner.uno WoodpeckerDown
# openbao .../sys/health OpenBaoUnavailable
#
# Warning, not critical, on purpose: this rule cannot know what a given
# target means. A target whose loss deserves a critical page gets its
# own rule — and lands in the list above. That is what keeps the
# exclusion list from being arbitrary.
- alert: BlackboxProbeFailing
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-http", instance!~"https://fsn1\\.your-objectstorage\\.com|https://netbird\\.renner\\.uno|http://proxy-[12]\\.renner\\.uno:9000/health|https://ci\\.renner\\.uno|https://openbao\\.renner\\.uno/v1/sys/health.*"} == 0
for: 10m
annotations:
summary: "Blackbox probe of {{ $labels.instance }} has been failing for 10 minutes"
description: >-
The endpoint is not answering as expected. For the Authentik-gated
hostnames this is a reachability check covering DNS, TLS, Traefik
and the gate outpost — it says nothing about the app behind the
gate, which the internal /-/healthy probes cover separately.
labels:
severity: warning
# The check that the checks are running. Every rule above reads
# probe_success; if the series stop being produced at all, none of them
# can fire and the silence looks exactly like health.
- alert: BlackboxProbesAbsent
expr: absent(probe_success{job="blackbox-http"})
for: 15m
annotations:
summary: "No blackbox-http probe results are reaching Prometheus"
description: >-
Either the blackbox exporter is down or the Probe objects stopped
being discovered. Every endpoint alert depends on this job, so
they are all blind until it returns.
labels:
severity: critical
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: ci-openbao
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: ci-openbao.rules
rules:
- alert: WoodpeckerDown
# Probe target defined in probes-blackbox.yaml. Root, ungated, 200.
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-http", instance="https://ci.renner.uno"} == 0
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Woodpecker is not answering on ci.renner.uno"
description: >-
Every scheduled job in this repo runs here: the alert-monitor
cron that files these issues, the nightly scans, and every deploy
target. Nothing else reports this outage, because the component
that would have reported it is the one that is down. Alertmanager
itself is unaffected, which is why this alert exists.
- alert: OpenBaoUnavailable
# Probes /v1/sys/health?standbyok=true — 200 on any unsealed node,
# 503 sealed, 501 uninitialized. The UI stays up when sealed, so a
# root probe would not catch this.
#
# Matched by prefix rather than the full string: the target carries a
# query parameter, and an exact match would break silently if the
# instance label ever encodes it differently.
expr: probe_success{job="blackbox-http", instance=~"https://openbao\\.renner\\.uno/v1/sys/health.*"} == 0
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "OpenBao is sealed, uninitialized or unreachable"
description: >-
Every ExternalSecret in the cluster resolves through OpenBao.
Existing Secrets keep working, so nothing breaks at once — the
damage shows up at the next refresh interval or the next pod that
needs a fresh credential. Check whether it is sealed before
assuming a network fault.
@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ spec:
# drains on recovery) and Velero backups fail. Replaces the old
# GarageDown alert now that backups live on Hetzner, not nas-1.
#
# CNPG has no metric-based archiving alert yet — its pod metrics
# are not scraped (enablePodMonitor=false). Enabling CNPG
# PodMonitors for a granular "archiving falling behind" alert is
# a follow-up. Velero's own VeleroBackupValidationFailure /
# VeleroBackupStale rules already cover backup-level failures.
# The granular counterpart is CNPGWalArchiveBacklog in
# prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml, reading the instance collector
# scraped by cnpg-podmonitors.yaml: this alert says the target is
# unreachable, that one says archiving is falling behind whatever the
# cause. Velero's VeleroBackupValidationFailure / VeleroBackupStale
# cover backup-level failures.
expr: probe_success{instance="https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com"} == 0
for: 10m
labels: