Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
75e713d230 |
@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@
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||||
# mechanism as update-audit.yml):
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# woodpecker repo cron add --repo k.renner/homelab \
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# --name alert-monitor --branch master --schedule '*/15 * * * *'
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# - deploy : woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> alert-monitor
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# where <n> is an existing pipeline to promote.
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# - manual : woodpecker pipeline create --branch master \
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# --var PIPELINE=alert-monitor k.renner/homelab
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when:
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- event: cron
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cron: alert-monitor
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- event: deployment
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evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "alert-monitor"'
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- event: manual
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evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "alert-monitor"'
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steps:
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- name: fetch-alerts
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image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
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image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
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environment:
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SOPS_AGE_KEY:
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from_secret: sops_age_key
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@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ steps:
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bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
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- name: alert-triage-agent
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image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
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image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
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environment:
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CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
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from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
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@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
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# Paperclip agent runtime images (REN-284 / REN-286): the stock
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# agent-runtime-claude plus a tool set, one image per sandbox environment.
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# Built with kaniko like build-ci-images.yml and pushed with the same
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# ci_images_token (package read+write only, see the header there).
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#
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# Own workflow, not a step in build-ci-images.yml. A change to that file
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# rebuilds all of its images at once and fills the 24-CPU woodpecker-ci-quota;
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# on the REN-286 merge (pipeline 11306) this step then got no pod
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# ("exceeded quota") and the go image was never built. Here it runs only when
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# its own sources change, and it can be re-run alone with a deployment to
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# target `build-agent-runtime`, without rebuilding the other images.
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#
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# The name looks odd on purpose. The kubernetes sandbox plugin keeps the image
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# name and tag `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only the registry prefix
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# (`imageRegistry`), replacing host + org. So each variant needs its own
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# prefix with the same name under it:
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# imageRegistry gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go
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# -> gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1
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# `v1` is what the plugin pulls and moves on every build; the date tag is the
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# rollback point. konairius/ because the ci_images_token can push there and
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# it is the target of the gitea_admin/* migration (#330).
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when:
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- event: push
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branch: master
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path:
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- "ci/images/agent-runtime-*/**"
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- ".woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml"
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- event: deployment
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evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-agent-runtime"'
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steps:
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- name: build-agent-runtime
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image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
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directory: ci/images
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# Context is ci/images (not the variant dir) so both Containerfiles can
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# COPY the shared agent-runtime-common/ files.
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# One pod, both images one after the other (kaniko --cleanup between
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# builds), at 1 CPU so it still fits if it overlaps another pipeline.
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backend_options:
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kubernetes:
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 256Mi
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limits:
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cpu: "1"
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memory: 4Gi
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environment:
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GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
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GITEA_TOKEN:
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from_secret: ci_images_token
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commands:
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- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
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- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
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- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
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- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
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- |
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for VARIANT in go ops; do
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/kaniko/executor \
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--cleanup \
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--context . \
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--dockerfile "agent-runtime-$VARIANT/Containerfile" \
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--destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:$TAG" \
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--destination "gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-$VARIANT/agent-runtime-claude:v1" \
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|| exit 1
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done
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+30
-181
@@ -19,31 +19,24 @@
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# the admin account could (#330).
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#
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# The token is still OWNED by gitea_admin, because Gitea scopes packages to
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# a user or org namespace and most of these images live under `gitea_admin/*`.
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# The rebuild-critical ones additionally publish to `konairius/` — an org
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# created for the ghcr mirror path, with gitea_admin as a member so this same
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# token can push there. The full gitea_admin/* -> org migration is a
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# 38-reference change tracked separately in #330 rather than bundled here.
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# Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that motivated the
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# other cutovers does not apply to it.
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#
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# Push builds run on master only. Without the branch filter a feature branch
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# that touches this file started all steps at once: it pushed unreviewed
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# images and used the whole woodpecker-ci-quota, so the PR checks could not
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# get a pod (REN-286).
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# a user or org namespace and these images live under `gitea_admin/*` — a
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# different account cannot publish there. Moving them to a dedicated org is
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# the remaining cleanup; it is a 38-reference migration across pipelines and
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# Flux-deployed CronJobs, so it is tracked separately in #330 rather than
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# bundled here. Note this pipeline runs no LLM agent, so the exfil path that
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# motivated the other cutovers does not apply to it.
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when:
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- event: push
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branch: master
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path:
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- "ci/images/**"
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- "secret-rotator/**"
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- ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"
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- event: deployment
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evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-ci-images"'
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- event: manual
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evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "build-ci-images"'
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steps:
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- name: build-ansible
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image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
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||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
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directory: ci/images/ansible
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depends_on: []
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# Only rebuild when THIS image's source (or the pipeline file) changed, or
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@@ -51,7 +44,7 @@ steps:
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# secret-rotator commit needlessly rebuilt all four ~1.3G ci-* images and
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# orphaned ~5G of registry layers per run — a main driver of #336.
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when:
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- event: deployment
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- event: manual
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- event: push
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path: ["ci/images/ansible/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
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environment:
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@@ -71,11 +64,11 @@ steps:
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--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:latest
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- name: build-k8s
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||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
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||||
directory: ci/images/k8s
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depends_on: []
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when:
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||||
- event: deployment
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||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
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||||
path: ["ci/images/k8s/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
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||||
environment:
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@@ -94,36 +87,12 @@ steps:
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--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:$TAG \
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--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:latest
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||||
- name: build-vmtest
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||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
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||||
directory: ci/images/vmtest
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depends_on: []
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when:
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- event: deployment
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||||
- event: push
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path: ["ci/images/vmtest/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
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environment:
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GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
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GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
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||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
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- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
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||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
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- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
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- |
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/kaniko/executor \
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--context . \
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--dockerfile Containerfile \
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--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:$TAG \
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--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-vmtest:latest
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||||
|
||||
- name: build-tofu
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/tofu
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||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
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||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
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||||
path: ["ci/images/tofu/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
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||||
@@ -150,11 +119,11 @@ steps:
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||||
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: a static musl binary in a FROM-scratch image,
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||||
# used as the base for secret-rotation CronJobs. Replaces per-job inline Python.
|
||||
- name: build-secret-rotator
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: secret-rotator
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["secret-rotator/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
@@ -178,154 +147,87 @@ steps:
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||||
# not for who uses it — its first consumer is the zigbee2mqtt seed-data init
|
||||
# container, but nothing about it is zigbee-specific. Exists so tools come from
|
||||
# the image rather than an `apk add` on every container start.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Published THREE times, and the third one is not a typo. Its consumers — the
|
||||
# zigbee2mqtt seed-data init container and the trmnl renderer — start while
|
||||
# the cluster is still being rebuilt, and at that moment gitea.renner.uno does
|
||||
# not exist, because Gitea runs inside the cluster being built. A cold-rebuild
|
||||
# rehearsal caught both in ImagePullBackOff.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# So there is a copy on ghcr.io. But the manifests must NOT point at it:
|
||||
# normal operation pulls from the local registry, and an external reference
|
||||
# would make every steady-state pull leave the network. The recovery source
|
||||
# and the everyday source are different things, exactly as they are for Flux's
|
||||
# git source.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Talos resolves that with machine.registries.mirrors, which takes an ordered
|
||||
# endpoint list — gitea first, ghcr second (bootstrap.sh). Containerd keeps
|
||||
# the repository path when it falls through, so the two registries have to
|
||||
# agree on it: `gitea_admin/alpine-jq` cannot be served by ghcr, where the
|
||||
# namespace is fixed to the account name. Hence the second Gitea destination
|
||||
# under konairius/, which the manifests reference and which matches the ghcr
|
||||
# path exactly.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The gitea_admin/ copy stays until nothing references it any more.
|
||||
- name: build-alpine-jq
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/alpine-jq
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/alpine-jq/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
GHCR_USER: konairius
|
||||
GHCR_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-jq:latest \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-jq:latest
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-jq:latest
|
||||
|
||||
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: upstream containernetworking/plugins binaries
|
||||
# baked in, consumed by the multus cni-plugins-installer DaemonSet. Replaces a
|
||||
# node-side fetch from GitHub that had NO checksum verification and sat on the
|
||||
# critical path of every node rebuild. The download now happens here, once,
|
||||
# where the sha256 is checked — see the Containerfile for the full rationale.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This one ALSO publishes to ghcr.io. A cold-rebuild rehearsal proved why: the
|
||||
# DaemonSet could not pull from gitea.renner.uno, because Gitea runs inside the
|
||||
# very cluster being rebuilt. Without the plugins there is no macvlan, so
|
||||
# Multus cannot attach ceph-san, so Rook's network canary never starts, so the
|
||||
# CephCluster sits at "Configuring Ceph Mons" — and OpenBao waits forever for a
|
||||
# PVC that will never bind. Moving the download here fixed the integrity gap
|
||||
# but quietly swapped github.com on the critical path for something strictly
|
||||
# worse: a registry that by definition does not exist during a recovery. The
|
||||
# GHCR copy is public, so a bare node can pull it with no credential and no
|
||||
# Gitea.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The test that proved this also proved the rule is not specific to this
|
||||
# image. alpine-jq and alpine-openssl mirror for the same reason — see the
|
||||
# note on build-alpine-jq. Anything an app needs while the cluster is still
|
||||
# being built cannot live only in that cluster's own registry.
|
||||
- name: build-cni-plugins
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/cni-plugins
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/cni-plugins/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
GHCR_USER: konairius
|
||||
GHCR_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/cni-plugins:latest \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/cni-plugins:latest
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/cni-plugins:latest
|
||||
|
||||
# Runtime image, not CI tooling: alpine + the openssl CLI, for shell scripts
|
||||
# needing s_client/x509. Named for what it is; first consumer is the paperless
|
||||
# fetch-bridge-cert init container. Replaces an `apk add openssl` that ran on
|
||||
# every paperless pod start. The openssl CLI is genuinely absent from the alpine
|
||||
# base, so this one needs an image rather than a busybox substitute.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Mirrored to ghcr.io for the reason given on build-alpine-jq: it is an init
|
||||
# container, so paperless does not start without it, and during a rebuild
|
||||
# gitea.renner.uno is not there to serve it. A cold-rebuild rehearsal left
|
||||
# paperless in Init:ErrImagePull on exactly this image.
|
||||
- name: build-alpine-openssl
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/alpine-openssl
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/alpine-openssl/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
GHCR_USER: konairius
|
||||
GHCR_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ghcr_mirror_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- GH_AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GHCR_USER" "$GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"},"ghcr.io":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" "$GH_AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination ghcr.io/konairius/alpine-openssl:latest
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/alpine-openssl:latest
|
||||
|
||||
# Heating CAN readers: open3e (Vitocal/VX3) + E3onCAN (E380 meter), one image
|
||||
# run as two services on edge-1. Replaces pip-into-venv on the host, where an
|
||||
@@ -333,11 +235,11 @@ steps:
|
||||
# Ansible converge. Not a ci-* image -- it is a runtime artifact -- but it
|
||||
# builds the same way and lands in the same registry so the audit sees it.
|
||||
- name: build-heating-can
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/heating-can
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/heating-can/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
@@ -355,56 +257,3 @@ steps:
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/heating-can:latest
|
||||
|
||||
# netbird-service-sync: the controller that reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy
|
||||
# services (public Ingress hosts -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP).
|
||||
# Runtime artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
|
||||
- name: build-netbird-service-sync
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
directory: ci/images/netbird-service-sync
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/netbird-service-sync/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-service-sync:latest
|
||||
|
||||
# bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0 (#576). Runtime
|
||||
# artifact like heating-can; same registry so the audit tracks it.
|
||||
- name: build-bird
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
directory: ci/images/bird
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
path: ["ci/images/bird/**", ".woodpecker/build-ci-images.yml"]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Containerfile \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:$TAG \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/bird:latest
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Paperclip server image (REN-401): upstream paperclipai/paperclip at a pinned
|
||||
# master commit plus the patches in ci/images/paperclip/. Needed while the k8s
|
||||
# sandbox fix (upstream PR #13733) is not merged; see the README there for how
|
||||
# to go back to upstream nightly.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Own workflow for the reason given in build-agent-runtime.yml: a step in
|
||||
# build-ci-images.yml runs on every change to that file and competes for the
|
||||
# woodpecker-ci-quota. Re-run alone with a deployment to target
|
||||
# `build-paperclip`.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Tag `build.<unix-ts>` is what the Flux ImagePolicy `paperclip` sorts on
|
||||
# (image-automation/paperclip.yaml); image automation then rolls it out.
|
||||
# konairius/ and ci_images_token as for the agent-runtime images.
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
branch: master
|
||||
path:
|
||||
- "ci/images/paperclip/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "build-paperclip"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: prepare-source
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh ci/images/paperclip/prepare.sh build/paperclip-src
|
||||
|
||||
- name: build-paperclip
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
directory: build/paperclip-src
|
||||
depends_on: [prepare-source]
|
||||
# Rust runner + UI + server build in one pod. The server build alone sets
|
||||
# a 4 GiB Node heap, so the memory limit is the LimitRange max (8Gi).
|
||||
backend_options:
|
||||
kubernetes:
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests:
|
||||
cpu: "1"
|
||||
memory: 2Gi
|
||||
limits:
|
||||
cpu: "4"
|
||||
memory: 8Gi
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GITEA_USER: gitea_admin
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: ci_images_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- . ../../ci/images/paperclip/upstream.env
|
||||
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
|
||||
- AUTH=$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
- printf '{"auths":{"gitea.renner.uno":{"auth":"%s"}}}' "$AUTH" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
|
||||
- TAG=build.$(date +%s)
|
||||
# Same target and build args as upstream's docker.yml for nightly.
|
||||
# --compressed-caching=false: pipeline 11717 was killed at the 8Gi limit
|
||||
# (exit 137) in the server build; kaniko otherwise holds compressed
|
||||
# layer tarballs in memory next to the 4 GiB Node heap.
|
||||
- |
|
||||
/kaniko/executor \
|
||||
--context . \
|
||||
--dockerfile Dockerfile.kaniko \
|
||||
--target production \
|
||||
--skip-unused-stages \
|
||||
--snapshot-mode=redo \
|
||||
--compressed-caching=false \
|
||||
--build-arg PAPERCLIP_BUILD_COMMIT=$PAPERCLIP_COMMIT \
|
||||
--build-arg PAPERCLIP_BUILD_VERSION=$PAPERCLIP_VERSION \
|
||||
--build-arg CLI_TOOLS_CACHE_EPOCH=$(date -u +%G-W%V) \
|
||||
--destination gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:$TAG
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
|
||||
# and ci-claude:latest. The Containerfile makes this layer
|
||||
# byte-reproducible, so rebuilding an unchanged version dedups
|
||||
# in the registry instead of orphaning a fresh ~260 MB copy.
|
||||
# 3. bump-pr — (only when any pin is off the latest version) rewrite every
|
||||
# consumer pin to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
|
||||
# 3. bump-pr — (only when the version actually changed) rewrite the 5
|
||||
# consumer pins to ci-claude:<version> and open a PR. A human
|
||||
# reviews and merges it; nothing auto-merges.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# TAG SCHEME — deliberately version tags (ci-claude:<claude-version>), NOT the dated
|
||||
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggering:
|
||||
# - cron : the cron NAMED exactly "ci-claude-refresh" (see above).
|
||||
# - deploy : woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> ci-claude-refresh
|
||||
# where <n> is an existing pipeline to promote.
|
||||
# - manual : woodpecker pipeline create --branch master \
|
||||
# --var PIPELINE=ci-claude-refresh k.renner/homelab
|
||||
# - push : a change to the Containerfile (or this file) ON master forces a
|
||||
# rebuild of the current latest version so Containerfile fixes ship
|
||||
# promptly. Restricted to master ON PURPOSE — a feature branch must
|
||||
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: ci-claude-refresh
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "ci-claude-refresh"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "ci-claude-refresh"'
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
branch: master
|
||||
path:
|
||||
@@ -107,22 +107,31 @@ steps:
|
||||
[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*) : ;;
|
||||
*) echo "npm returned an implausible version '$$NEW' — aborting."; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
# Distinct tags the consumers currently reference. Divergent pins are
|
||||
# normal (a pipeline bumped on its own); the bump rewrites all of them.
|
||||
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ' | sed 's/ $$//')
|
||||
[ -n "$$CUR" ] || { echo "No ci-claude pin found in the consumers — aborting."; exit 1; }
|
||||
echo "latest=$$NEW current=[$$CUR] event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
|
||||
# The tag every consumer currently references. They are kept identical,
|
||||
# so this must resolve to EXACTLY ONE non-empty tag; anything else
|
||||
# (no match, or a partial/disagreeing set) aborts rather than risk a
|
||||
# corrupting sed later. Counting with `grep -c .` (non-empty lines)
|
||||
# instead of `wc -l` is deliberate: an empty result yields 0 here but
|
||||
# 1 under wc -l, which would slip past the guard.
|
||||
CUR=$$(grep -hoE 'ci-claude:[0-9A-Za-z._-]+' $$CONSUMERS | sed 's/^ci-claude://' | sort -u)
|
||||
NTAGS=$$(printf '%s' "$$CUR" | grep -c . || true)
|
||||
if [ -z "$$CUR" ] || [ "$$NTAGS" -ne 1 ]; then
|
||||
echo "Expected exactly one ci-claude tag across the consumers, got [$$CUR]."
|
||||
echo "Refusing to guess — fix the pins by hand."; exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "latest=$$NEW current=$$CUR event=$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT"
|
||||
printf '%s' "$$NEW" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version"
|
||||
printf '%s' "$$CUR" > "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current"
|
||||
# Build when any pin is off latest, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
|
||||
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump when any pin is off latest.
|
||||
# Build when the version changed, or on a push (Containerfile edit must
|
||||
# ship even if the version is unchanged). Bump the pins only when the
|
||||
# version the consumers reference is not the latest.
|
||||
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ] || [ "$$CI_PIPELINE_EVENT" = "push" ]; then
|
||||
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-build"; echo "will build $$NEW"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "already on $$NEW — nothing to build"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$$CUR" != "$$NEW" ]; then
|
||||
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR [$$CUR] -> $$NEW"
|
||||
touch "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump"; echo "will open bump PR $$CUR -> $$NEW"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "consumers already pin $$NEW — no PR"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +140,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# --build-arg to the resolved version (not "latest") guarantees the tag and
|
||||
# the image content agree even if a new release lands mid-run.
|
||||
- name: build
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.19-debug@sha256:7795cec509a50a71378cc2c365f55c555ee3a05834d8eb1cd2552df5e66d44d8
|
||||
image: registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-ci-utils/container-images/kaniko:v1.25.18-debug
|
||||
directory: ci/images/claude
|
||||
depends_on: [decide]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
@@ -166,9 +175,6 @@ steps:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
[ -f "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/do-bump" ] || { echo "no version change — no PR"; exit 0; }
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
# Secret values can carry a trailing newline; it breaks the push URL and the auth header.
|
||||
PUSH_TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$PUSH_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
|
||||
[ -n "$$PUSH_TOKEN" ] || { echo "PUSH_TOKEN is empty — aborting"; exit 1; }
|
||||
NEW=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/version")
|
||||
CUR=$$(cat "$$CI_WORKSPACE/.ci-refresh/current")
|
||||
# Both were validated non-empty by the decide step; re-assert before a
|
||||
@@ -184,11 +190,9 @@ steps:
|
||||
# is not a maintained list.
|
||||
CONSUMERS=$$(grep -rlE 'ci-claude:[0-9]' .woodpecker)
|
||||
[ -n "$$CONSUMERS" ] || { echo "No ci-claude consumers found — refusing to continue."; exit 1; }
|
||||
# NEW goes into a sed replacement: allow only a plain x.y.z version.
|
||||
printf '%s' "$$NEW" | grep -qE '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$$' || { echo "refusing non-x.y.z version '$$NEW'"; exit 1; }
|
||||
# Every version-pinned tag becomes NEW, whatever it was; consumers only.
|
||||
# Exact-string swap of the current tag for the new one, consumers only.
|
||||
for f in $$CONSUMERS; do
|
||||
sed -i "s#ci-claude:[0-9][0-9A-Za-z._-]*#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
|
||||
sed -i "s#ci-claude:$$CUR#ci-claude:$$NEW#g" "$$f"
|
||||
done
|
||||
# Author is claude-bot (the PAT's account); the commit subject makes
|
||||
# the automated-bump nature clear.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,44 +17,30 @@
|
||||
# here is a static check that either passes or fails on the checkout alone, so it
|
||||
# can gate PRs without becoming a bottleneck or a flake source.
|
||||
when:
|
||||
# Path-filtered on purpose, unlike ci-scripts-test.yml. That pipeline is two
|
||||
# steps on already-cached images, so running it everywhere is free; this one
|
||||
# pulls four images and builds every kustomization in the tree, which is real
|
||||
# Path-filtered on purpose, unlike ci-scripts-test.yml. That pipeline is one
|
||||
# step on one already-cached image, so running it everywhere is free; this one
|
||||
# pulls three images and builds every kustomization in the tree, which is real
|
||||
# cost to put on a docs-only PR. The filter covers everything the steps actually read:
|
||||
# kubernetes/** for the manifests, scripts and promtool suites, .woodpecker/**
|
||||
# for the lint (and so an edit to this file re-runs its own checks), and the
|
||||
# promtool driver script by name.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# That last entry is NOT covered by kubernetes/**: promtool-rules.sh lives
|
||||
# under scripts/, so without it a PR that only edits the script would never run
|
||||
# the check it drives. It is listed as one file rather than scripts/ci/**
|
||||
# because the rest of that directory is CI-agent helpers with nothing to do
|
||||
# with this pipeline, and pulling four images for them is the cost this filter
|
||||
# exists to avoid. Their own tests run in ci-scripts-test.yml on every PR.
|
||||
# kubernetes/** for the manifests and scripts, .woodpecker/** for the lint (and
|
||||
# so an edit to this file re-runs its own checks).
|
||||
- event: pull_request
|
||||
path:
|
||||
- "kubernetes/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/**"
|
||||
- "scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh"
|
||||
- "scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh"
|
||||
|
||||
# THE THIRD DISCOVERY CHECK WENT TO A SCRIPT. kustomize-build and shellcheck
|
||||
# both hand-roll the same shape — `find`, a floor guard against empty discovery,
|
||||
# then a file-fed `while read`. Two copies was deliberate: the two traps being
|
||||
# commented around (BusyBox find lacking `-printf`, and a piped loop running in
|
||||
# a subshell where `fail` cannot propagate) are different, and both are worth
|
||||
# spelling out where they bite. An earlier revision of this comment said a third
|
||||
# instance would be the point to stop copying and factor it into `scripts/ci/`,
|
||||
# where it would gain unit tests — and that is what `promtool` below does. Its
|
||||
# discovery, floors and guards live in scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh and are
|
||||
# tested by scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh on every PR via
|
||||
# ci-scripts-test.yml. A FOURTH inline copy should go the same way; do not add
|
||||
# one here.
|
||||
# ADDING A THIRD DISCOVERY CHECK: kustomize-build and shellcheck both hand-roll
|
||||
# the same shape — `find`, a floor guard against empty discovery, then a
|
||||
# file-fed `while read`. Two copies is deliberate: the two traps being commented
|
||||
# around (BusyBox find lacking `-printf`, and a piped loop running in a subshell
|
||||
# where `fail` cannot propagate) are different, and both are worth spelling out
|
||||
# where they bite. A third instance is the point to stop copying and factor it
|
||||
# into a shared script under `scripts/ci/` — which is already covered by
|
||||
# ci-scripts-test.yml, so it would gain unit tests in the process.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Every step carries `depends_on: []` so all six run in PARALLEL and every
|
||||
# Every step carries `depends_on: []` so all four run in PARALLEL and every
|
||||
# failure shows in one run. Woodpecker's default is sequential, which would stop
|
||||
# at the first failure and make a contributor fix-and-repush to discover the
|
||||
# next — and these six are independent, cheap, offline checks with no ordering
|
||||
# next — and these four are independent, cheap, offline checks with no ordering
|
||||
# between them. Keep it on every step: `depends_on` is per-step, so dropping it
|
||||
# from one silently re-serialises that step behind the others.
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +60,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# run that never touched them. Tracked in #461.
|
||||
- name: kustomize-build
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +158,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# whenever it trails the deployed server. If you bump the server, bump here.
|
||||
- name: woodpecker-lint
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.18.1-alpine@sha256:7eac3c4254befc1ba1e65269c3304c370b6032530b7386fc0c7648378fdd0516
|
||||
image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-cli:v3.17.0-alpine
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
@@ -199,7 +185,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# separately rather than one this step quietly implies is covered.
|
||||
- name: shellcheck
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: koalaman/shellcheck-alpine:v0.11.0@sha256:9955be09ea7f0dbf7ae942ac1f2094355bb30d96fffba0ec09f5432207544002
|
||||
image: koalaman/shellcheck-alpine:v0.11.0
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
@@ -260,7 +246,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# this step fails permanently on its own documentation.
|
||||
- name: no-digest-pins
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
@@ -272,72 +258,3 @@ steps:
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "ok no digest pins under openbao/rotation/"
|
||||
|
||||
# Machine-check the alert rules: parse every PrometheusRule, run the committed
|
||||
# promtool unit suites, then damage the rules on purpose and require the suites
|
||||
# to notice. Everything it does lives in scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh; read
|
||||
# that file and kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/tests/README.md for the why.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The gap it closes: the other four steps prove a PrometheusRule assembles into
|
||||
# valid YAML and nothing more — not that an expression parses, not that a label
|
||||
# join matches anything, not that a `for` window does what its comment claims.
|
||||
# On REN-129 the CNPG surge rule was written `for: 2m`, which fires on six of
|
||||
# seven measured nights and would have mailed the owner twice a night at 04:16
|
||||
# and 04:22 local for a backlog that clears itself. Nothing here would have
|
||||
# caught it, and the arithmetic that did catch it was hand-written from scratch
|
||||
# twice, in two runs, and thrown away both times because there was nowhere in
|
||||
# the repo to commit it. REN-152 retired that rule; its `for` margin is now
|
||||
# guarded by mutations.txt:backlog-for-12m.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Offline, like the rest of this pipeline: no cluster, no registry, no secrets,
|
||||
# no network. promtool reads files and exits.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# IMAGE — prom/prometheus, not a registry-local ci-* image, and pinned to an
|
||||
# exact upstream version rather than a dated tag. The dated-tag convention
|
||||
# guarded by no-digest-pins above is about OUR images, whose digests are
|
||||
# garbage-collected out from under a pin; this is upstream and immutable.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The version must be 3.x, and that is not a preference. The cluster runs
|
||||
# whatever kube-prometheus-stack >= 72.0.0 ships, which is Prometheus 3, and
|
||||
# alert `for` evaluation is version-sensitive — a 2.x promtool would be
|
||||
# checking a different evaluator than production, so the margins the suites
|
||||
# assert would be claims about the wrong program. promtool-rules.sh asserts the
|
||||
# major version it was handed and fails on 2.x, so a careless bump here is a
|
||||
# red step rather than a quietly wrong check. Keep this at the latest stable
|
||||
# 3.x, per the standing rule that any software uses the latest stable version.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This image is NOT covered by image-automation (same reason as
|
||||
# woodpecker-lint above: a Woodpecker pipeline file has no apiVersion/kind, so
|
||||
# an $imagepolicy marker here is silently ignored — fluxcd/flux2#2826). The
|
||||
# bump is manual.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `prom/prometheus` is busybox-based and ships /bin/sh, so it can run a
|
||||
# `commands:` block — unlike the plain woodpecker-cli tag, which cannot. Its
|
||||
# find/grep/awk/sed are BusyBox, which is why promtool-rules.sh avoids
|
||||
# `find -printf` and `grep -r --include`; it was verified against BusyBox
|
||||
# 1.35.0 as well as GNU. The image also declares `USER nobody`, so the script
|
||||
# writes its stripped mirror under mktemp and never into the workspace.
|
||||
- name: promtool
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: prom/prometheus:v3.15.0@sha256:efd719c99d83b060d9daefdcf00360461adf279f45ef5391f8d111892118753e
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/promtool-rules.sh
|
||||
|
||||
# Comments cite other YAML blocks by anchor name, never by line number
|
||||
# (REN-183; the exact syntax is in CONTRIBUTING.md, not repeated here because
|
||||
# an example written in this comment would itself be checked). Line numbers drift on any edit
|
||||
# above them and nothing noticed: three drift fixes were merged by hand
|
||||
# before this step existed. This fails on a new line-number citation and on
|
||||
# a citation whose file or anchor marker does not exist.
|
||||
# Existence only — it never judges whether the anchored block still says
|
||||
# what the citing comment claims, so ordinary edits cannot turn it red.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It scans every YAML file in the checkout, but this pipeline only runs on
|
||||
# the paths in `when:` above, so an edit confined to ansible/ or esphome/ is
|
||||
# checked on the next PR that does touch kubernetes/ or .woodpecker/.
|
||||
# Self-test: scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh, in ci-scripts-test.yml.
|
||||
- name: yaml-citations
|
||||
depends_on: [] # see note above `steps:`
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,45 +8,15 @@
|
||||
# against adversarial PR input. Running it here fails the offending PR's checks
|
||||
# before it can merge.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh is the same idea for the alert-rule gate.
|
||||
# What it tests is not whether promtool evaluates PromQL — ci-manifests-test.yml
|
||||
# does that with the real binary against the real rules — but whether
|
||||
# promtool-rules.sh REFUSES TO REPORT SUCCESS when it has checked nothing: zero
|
||||
# manifests discovered, zero suites discovered, a `rule_files` path that does not
|
||||
# resolve (promtool warns, loads zero rules, and passes every assertion), a
|
||||
# mutation the suites no longer catch. Those are the states a green pipeline
|
||||
# cannot tell apart from real coverage, so they need a test that asserts the
|
||||
# failure. It stubs promtool, so it needs neither the binary nor the heavy image.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Both are unfiltered by path on purpose: this pipeline is two steps on one
|
||||
# already-cached image, so running it everywhere is free, and a guard whose test
|
||||
# only runs when someone remembers to touch the right directory is not a guard.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Only in homelab (scripts/ci/ lives here); the file is not deployed to the
|
||||
# mirrored repos, so it does not run on their PRs. All tests here are offline (no
|
||||
# token, no network, no cluster) — the ci-claude image just provides sh + jq, and
|
||||
# it is already pulled by pr-review.yml on the same event, so the runner has it
|
||||
# cached.
|
||||
# mirrored repos, so it does not run on their PRs. The test is offline (no token,
|
||||
# no network, no cluster) — the ci-claude image just provides sh + jq, and it is
|
||||
# already pulled by pr-review.yml on the same event, so the runner has it cached.
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: pull_request
|
||||
|
||||
# `depends_on: []` on every step so they run in parallel and one failure does not hide
|
||||
# the other. Same reasoning as the note above `steps:` in ci-manifests-test.yml.
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: model-selection-tests
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: promtool-rules-guard-tests
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/test-promtool-rules.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: yaml-citations-guard-tests
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/test-yaml-citations.sh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ when:
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/claude-workstation/**"
|
||||
- "ansible/plays/install-claude-workstation.yml"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-claude-workstation.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-claude-workstation"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "deploy-claude-workstation"'
|
||||
|
||||
timeout: 30
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
||||
when:
|
||||
# Deploy only on master (merge) + manual — never auto-deploy from a branch.
|
||||
- event: push
|
||||
branch: master
|
||||
path:
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/**"
|
||||
- "ansible/plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
|
||||
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/edge_host/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge"'
|
||||
|
||||
timeout: 30
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
ANSIBLE_FORCE_COLOR: "true"
|
||||
ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING: "false"
|
||||
ANSIBLE_ROLES_PATH: "../roles:./roles"
|
||||
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: ssh_private_key
|
||||
VAULT_PASS:
|
||||
from_secret: vault_pass
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p ~/.ssh
|
||||
- echo "$SSH_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
|
||||
- chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
|
||||
- printf "Host *\n\tStrictHostKeyChecking no\n\tUserKnownHostsFile /dev/null\n" > ~/.ssh/config
|
||||
- cd ansible
|
||||
- echo "$VAULT_PASS" > .vault_pass && chmod 600 .vault_pass
|
||||
- export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=.vault_pass
|
||||
# Local MQTT bridge on the edge hosts only (REN-1307); restarts only the
|
||||
# local mosquitto on edge-1, never the cluster broker.
|
||||
- ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml -v
|
||||
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ when:
|
||||
path:
|
||||
- "opentofu/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-infrastructure.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-infrastructure"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "deploy-infrastructure"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: validate-secrets
|
||||
image: alpine:3.24.2@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
image: alpine:3.24.1
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
TF_VAR_proxmox_api_url:
|
||||
from_secret: proxmox_api_url
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-tofu:2026-04-29
|
||||
directory: opentofu
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'TOFU_APPLY == "true"'
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
TF_IN_AUTOMATION: "true"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ when:
|
||||
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-client.yml"
|
||||
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/claude_workstation/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-client.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-client"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "deploy-netbird-client"'
|
||||
|
||||
timeout: 30
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,24 +7,10 @@ when:
|
||||
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
|
||||
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
|
||||
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
|
||||
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
|
||||
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
|
||||
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
|
||||
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
|
||||
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
|
||||
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
|
||||
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
|
||||
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
|
||||
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
|
||||
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
|
||||
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
|
||||
|
||||
timeout: 30
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ when:
|
||||
branch: master
|
||||
path:
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/netbird-server/**"
|
||||
# install-netbird-server.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
|
||||
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
|
||||
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
|
||||
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-server.yml"
|
||||
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-server.yml"
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-server"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "deploy-netbird-server"'
|
||||
|
||||
timeout: 30
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "e2e-test"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "e2e-test"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: e2e
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: sops_age_key
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-6
@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@
|
||||
# was harmless at daily/weekly cadence — but alert-monitor.yml
|
||||
# fires every 15 minutes, so piggybacking must be opt-in now.
|
||||
# A new cron that SHOULD also run e2e gets its name added here.
|
||||
# - deploy : `woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> e2e`, where
|
||||
# <n> is an existing pipeline to promote.
|
||||
# - manual : `woodpecker pipeline create --branch master --var PIPELINE=e2e k.renner/homelab`
|
||||
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +16,8 @@ when:
|
||||
cron: update-audit
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: weekly-update
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "e2e"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "e2e"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: model-selection-tests
|
||||
@@ -26,12 +25,12 @@ steps:
|
||||
# fetch-models.sh response mapping. No cluster, no secrets, no network — the
|
||||
# ci-claude image just provides sh + jq. Keeps the flag-injection regression
|
||||
# test from rotting (it exercises the exact injection shapes).
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- sh scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: e2e-test
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: sops_age_key
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "install-garage-synology"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: run-playbook
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
ANSIBLE_FORCE_COLOR: "true"
|
||||
ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING: "false"
|
||||
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: ssh_private_key
|
||||
VAULT_PASS:
|
||||
from_secret: vault_pass
|
||||
PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID:
|
||||
from_secret: proxmox_token_id
|
||||
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET:
|
||||
from_secret: proxmox_token_secret
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- mkdir -p ~/.ssh
|
||||
- echo "$SSH_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
|
||||
- chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
|
||||
- 'printf "Host *\n\tStrictHostKeyChecking no\n\tUserKnownHostsFile /dev/null\n" > ~/.ssh/config'
|
||||
- cd ansible
|
||||
- echo "$$VAULT_PASS" > .vault_pass && chmod 600 .vault_pass
|
||||
- export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=.vault_pass
|
||||
- ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-garage-synology.yml -v
|
||||
@@ -34,13 +34,13 @@
|
||||
# - cron : a cron NAMED exactly "issue-fix":
|
||||
# woodpecker repo cron add --repo k.renner/homelab \
|
||||
# --name issue-fix --branch master --schedule '41 * * * *'
|
||||
# - deploy : woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> issue-fix
|
||||
# where <n> is an existing pipeline to promote.
|
||||
# - manual : woodpecker pipeline create --branch master \
|
||||
# --var PIPELINE=issue-fix k.renner/homelab
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: issue-fix
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "issue-fix"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "issue-fix"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: fetch-diag
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# (the issue-pick logic needs jq, which only the ci-claude image has);
|
||||
# minting a 1h read-only token per run is cheap. Degrades to
|
||||
# snapshot-only if the ci-diagnostics ServiceAccount isn't reconciled.
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-08-10
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: sops_age_key
|
||||
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: issue-fix-agent
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
|
||||
+285
-24
@@ -1,40 +1,301 @@
|
||||
# PR review bot — per-repo STUB. All logic lives centrally in
|
||||
# k.renner/homelab: ci/agents/pr-review/run.sh (plus prompt.md,
|
||||
# settings.json and scripts/ci/). This file is deployed byte-identical into every
|
||||
# reviewed repo (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager, authentik-samba-bridge,
|
||||
# homeassistant) and holds NO logic, so the copies cannot drift apart: change the
|
||||
# review in homelab and every repo picks it up on its next PR event. Only edit this
|
||||
# stub if the trigger, the image or the secrets change — then change all copies in
|
||||
# one go.
|
||||
# PR review bot — event-driven. Woodpecker fires this on `pull_request` (which
|
||||
# covers BOTH "PR opened" and "new commits pushed to an open PR"), so a review
|
||||
# is produced the moment a PR appears or is updated — no polling, no cron.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggers on pull_request: PR opened AND new commits pushed to an open PR.
|
||||
# Approves only when the review found nothing red/yellow (see run.sh); humans merge.
|
||||
# This file is deployed UNCHANGED into every repo the fleet wants reviewed
|
||||
# (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager, authentik-samba-bridge, homeassistant).
|
||||
# Woodpecker events are per-repo, so each repo triggers a review of ITS OWN PR
|
||||
# only; the triggering PR is identified from the CI event (CI_REPO +
|
||||
# CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST) instead of the old hourly cross-repo discovery loop.
|
||||
# Because it runs on the PR event, Woodpecker's built-in clone hands the step
|
||||
# THIS repo already checked out at the PR head — so, unlike the old cron model,
|
||||
# there is no manual clone of the target repo (the source of an earlier token
|
||||
# leak); the agents read the checkout in the workspace directly.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The central code is cloned from public homelab@master on every run, never taken
|
||||
# from the PR checkout, so a PR cannot alter the rubric or helper scripts it is
|
||||
# reviewed with.
|
||||
# Prompts: the two agent prompts live once, in k.renner/homelab under
|
||||
# ci/agents/pr-review/. The homelab checkout already has them; the other repos
|
||||
# don't, so the step falls back to a shallow clone of public homelab@master.
|
||||
# One source of truth for the review rubric across all repos.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Image: ci-claude:latest — the refresh pipeline keeps it on current Claude Code,
|
||||
# and a pinned tag would be the one thing in this file that diverges per repo.
|
||||
# Model selection: no model id — and no model family — is baked into this file.
|
||||
# scripts/ci/fetch-models.sh pulls the LIVE catalog (Anthropic /v1/models, via
|
||||
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN), and a triage agent reads the PR diff + stats and
|
||||
# picks whichever currently-available model best fits the review, judged on the
|
||||
# catalog's own capability metadata. A model released tomorrow is eligible the
|
||||
# day it appears. The shell validates the pick against the catalog snapshot taken
|
||||
# BEFORE the triage runs; if the fetch fails, the pick is rejected, or the review
|
||||
# is complex/security-sensitive (where the injectable pick is deliberately
|
||||
# ignored), it leaves the model unset and the review runs on the CLI's default
|
||||
# model. A wrong-way miss only over/under-spends one review.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Secrets (both must be granted the pull_request event):
|
||||
# claude_code_oauth_token -> CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
|
||||
# review_bot_token -> REVIEW_TOKEN (review-bot PAT, write:repository)
|
||||
# Posture: posted as a Gitea PR review, event COMMENT normally or
|
||||
# REQUEST_CHANGES on a serious defect. It NEVER approves — a bot must not
|
||||
# satisfy branch protection. Humans still merge.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# (Note: keep literal dollar-brace out of THIS file, even in comments — Woodpecker
|
||||
# runs its variable substitution over the whole YAML text.)
|
||||
# Dedup (guards pipeline retries/restarts, not cron re-runs anymore): the PR is
|
||||
# skipped when review-bot already left a review carrying the marker
|
||||
# "<!-- pr-review:sha=<head_sha> -->" for the PR's CURRENT head commit. A pushed
|
||||
# commit changes the head sha and fires a fresh pull_request event -> fresh
|
||||
# review.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Tokens:
|
||||
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (claude_code_oauth_token) — Claude subscription
|
||||
# OAuth, how the `claude` CLI authenticates (same as the other agents).
|
||||
# REVIEW_TOKEN (review_bot_token) — a dedicated `review-bot` Gitea account's
|
||||
# PAT, scope write:repository. Reads the PR + diff and POSTs the review, all
|
||||
# over the Gitea API (ephemeral curl Authorization headers — the token is
|
||||
# never written to disk; the repo is NOT cloned). review-bot must be a
|
||||
# collaborator (read) on every reviewed repo.
|
||||
# Both secrets MUST be granted the `pull_request` event, or Woodpecker will
|
||||
# withhold them from this pipeline. Because homelab is PUBLIC, it is also set
|
||||
# to require approval for forked-PR pipelines, so an untrusted fork cannot
|
||||
# rewrite this file to exfiltrate the tokens.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggering: pull_request only — automatic on PR open + push-to-open-PR. To
|
||||
# re-review a PR, push a commit (the new head sha clears the dedup marker below
|
||||
# and earns a fresh review). There is deliberately no manual PIPELINE trigger:
|
||||
# Woodpecker exposes a --var only to YAML variable substitution and `when`
|
||||
# filters, NOT to a step's shell environment, so a --var PR=<n> re-review would
|
||||
# silently no-op (the step would find no PR number and exit green).
|
||||
# (Note: keep literal dollar-brace out of THIS file entirely, even in comments —
|
||||
# Woodpecker runs its variable substitution over the whole YAML text, comments
|
||||
# included, and an unparseable one errors the pipeline before any step runs.)
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: pull_request
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: pr-review-agent
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:latest
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
REVIEW_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: review_bot_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- rm -rf /tmp/pr-review-central
|
||||
- git clone --quiet --depth 1 https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab /tmp/pr-review-central
|
||||
- sh /tmp/pr-review-central/ci/agents/pr-review/run.sh
|
||||
- |
|
||||
# ---- Resolve the single triggering PR --------------------------------
|
||||
# Woodpecker hands us the repo (CI_REPO, canonical owner/repo) and the PR
|
||||
# number (CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST, a pull_request-event built-in). Build
|
||||
# /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl with 0 or 1 entries; an empty file makes
|
||||
# the next block a no-op (the agent never starts).
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
|
||||
AUTH="Authorization: token $$REVIEW_TOKEN"
|
||||
SLUG="$$CI_REPO"
|
||||
NUM="$${CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST:-}"
|
||||
REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN="review-bot"
|
||||
mkdir -p /tmp/pr-review
|
||||
: > /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$$NUM" ]; then
|
||||
echo "No PR number in CI env (event=$${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?}) — nothing to review."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "Triggered for $$SLUG#$$NUM (event $${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?})."
|
||||
|
||||
if ! curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM" > /tmp/pr-review/pr.json; then
|
||||
echo "Cannot fetch $$SLUG#$$NUM (review-bot not a collaborator / PR gone?) — skipping."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
STATE=$$(jq -r '.state' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
DRAFT=$$(jq -r '.draft // false' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
TITLE=$$(jq -r '.title' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
HEAD=$$(jq -r '.head.sha' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
SHORT=$$(printf '%s' "$$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip closed/merged, drafts, and WIP-titled PRs — not ready for review.
|
||||
case "$$STATE" in open) ;; *) echo "#$$NUM is $$STATE — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
case "$$DRAFT" in true) echo "#$$NUM draft — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
case "$$TITLE" in [Ww][Ii][Pp]:*|[Ww][Ii][Pp]\ *) echo "#$$NUM WIP — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
|
||||
# Dedup: already reviewed at THIS head sha? (guards re-runs / restarts)
|
||||
REVIEWED=$$(curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM/reviews?limit=50" \
|
||||
| jq -r --arg u "$$REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN" --arg m "pr-review:sha=$$HEAD" \
|
||||
'[.[] | select(.user.login == $$u) | select(.body | contains($$m))] | length' \
|
||||
|| echo 0)
|
||||
if [ "$${REVIEWED:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "#$$NUM already reviewed at $$SHORT — skip."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
jq -c --arg slug "$$SLUG" \
|
||||
'{slug: $$slug, number: .number, head: .head.sha, base: .base.sha,
|
||||
title: .title, author: .user.login}' \
|
||||
/tmp/pr-review/pr.json >> /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
echo "#$$NUM enqueued (head $$SHORT)."
|
||||
- |
|
||||
# ---- Clone, pick model, review, post ---------------------------------
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
[ -s /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl ] || { echo "Nothing to review."; exit 0; }
|
||||
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
|
||||
AUTH="Authorization: token $$REVIEW_TOKEN"
|
||||
WS="$$PWD" # workspace = this repo, checked out at the PR head by Woodpecker
|
||||
MAX_DIFF_LINES=20000
|
||||
|
||||
# Agent prompts: use the local homelab checkout if present, else clone
|
||||
# public homelab@master for them (one source of truth for the rubric).
|
||||
PROMPTS="$$WS/ci/agents/pr-review"
|
||||
HOMELAB="$$WS" # repo root holding ci/ AND scripts/ci/
|
||||
# NB: for a homelab PR, HOMELAB is the PR head checkout, so the
|
||||
# fetch-models.sh run below executes branch-supplied shell. It is wrapped
|
||||
# in `env -u REVIEW_TOKEN`, so the only credential it can see is
|
||||
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN. This is not a new exposure regardless: on
|
||||
# pull_request Woodpecker already takes .woodpecker/*.yml itself from the
|
||||
# PR branch, so a branch can run arbitrary commands in this step anyway.
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$$PROMPTS/prompt.md" ]; then
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/pr-review/homelab
|
||||
git clone --quiet --depth 1 https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab \
|
||||
/tmp/pr-review/homelab
|
||||
PROMPTS=/tmp/pr-review/homelab/ci/agents/pr-review
|
||||
HOMELAB=/tmp/pr-review/homelab
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "Using prompts from $$PROMPTS"
|
||||
|
||||
gitea_post() { # method url datafile ; echoes+checks HTTP
|
||||
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-review/resp.json -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||||
-X "$$1" -H "$$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
--data @"$$3" "$$2")
|
||||
echo "$$1 $$2 -> HTTP $$code"
|
||||
if [ "$$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$$code" -ge 300 ]; then
|
||||
echo "Gitea API error body:"; cat /tmp/pr-review/resp.json; echo; return 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while IFS= read -r ITEM; do
|
||||
SLUG=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM" | jq -r '.slug')
|
||||
NUM=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM" | jq -r '.number')
|
||||
HEAD=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM" | jq -r '.head')
|
||||
TITLE=$$(printf '%s' "$$ITEM" | jq -r '.title')
|
||||
SHORT=$$(printf '%s' "$$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
|
||||
echo "=== Reviewing $$SLUG#$$NUM ($$SHORT) ==="
|
||||
D="/tmp/pr-review/$$NUM"
|
||||
rm -rf "$$D"; mkdir -p "$$D"
|
||||
|
||||
# PR metadata + unified diff (authenticated; private repos need it).
|
||||
curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM" > "$$D/pr.json"
|
||||
curl -sf -H "$$AUTH" "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM.diff" > "$$D/diff.full.patch" \
|
||||
|| { echo "Could not fetch diff for $$SLUG#$$NUM — skipping."; continue; }
|
||||
FILES=$$(grep -c '^diff --git ' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
ADDED=$$(grep -c '^+[^+]' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
DELETED=$$(grep -c '^-[^-]' "$$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
TOTAL=$$(wc -l < "$$D/diff.full.patch")
|
||||
if [ "$$TOTAL" -gt "$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" ]; then
|
||||
head -n "$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$$D/diff.full.patch" > "$$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
printf '\n... [diff truncated at %s of %s lines] ...\n' \
|
||||
"$$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$$TOTAL" >> "$$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
else
|
||||
cp "$$D/diff.full.patch" "$$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
printf 'repo: %s\nPR: #%s\nfiles_changed: %s\nlines_added: %s\nlines_deleted: %s\ndiff_total_lines: %s\n' \
|
||||
"$$SLUG" "$$NUM" "$$FILES" "$$ADDED" "$$DELETED" "$$TOTAL" > "$$D/stats.txt"
|
||||
|
||||
# Cheaper inputs for the TRIAGE agent (which now runs on a capable
|
||||
# default model): the COMPLETE changed-file list, plus a diff capped far
|
||||
# smaller than the review's. Triage only gauges size/shape/sensitivity,
|
||||
# so it never needs the full (up to 20k-line) review diff — this keeps
|
||||
# "triage is cheap" true now that its model is no longer pinned to Haiku.
|
||||
grep '^diff --git ' "$$D/diff.full.patch" | sed 's|^diff --git a/||; s| b/.*$$||' \
|
||||
| sort -u > "$$D/files.txt"
|
||||
head -n 4000 "$$D/diff.patch" > "$$D/diff.triage.patch"
|
||||
|
||||
# No manual clone of the target repo: this runs on a pull_request
|
||||
# event, so Woodpecker's built-in clone already checked THIS repo out
|
||||
# at the PR head in $$WS — the agents (which cd into $$WS) read it
|
||||
# directly for context. The old cron model had to clone each target
|
||||
# repo by hand (its workspace was homelab@master), and that clone
|
||||
# embedded REVIEW_TOKEN in the URL, persisting a write-scoped PAT in
|
||||
# work/target/.git/config — readable by the review agent whose report
|
||||
# is posted publicly. Per-repo pull_request triggering makes the manual
|
||||
# clone redundant AND keeps the token off disk (it now lives only in
|
||||
# the ephemeral curl Authorization headers used for the API calls).
|
||||
|
||||
# Inputs the agents read live at ./.pr-review (symlink into $$D).
|
||||
rm -f "$$WS/.pr-review"; ln -s "$$D" "$$WS/.pr-review"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Triage: an agent picks the model from the LIVE catalog, so no
|
||||
# model id and no model family is baked into this file.
|
||||
# fetch-models.sh asks the Anthropic /v1/models list (via the same
|
||||
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) and we hand the triage the result at
|
||||
# ./.pr-review/models.txt. If the fetch fails the file is empty and
|
||||
# MODEL stays empty below, so the review runs on the CLI default.
|
||||
if MODELS_TABLE=$$(env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/fetch-models.sh" --table); then
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$$MODELS_TABLE" > "$$D/models.txt"
|
||||
echo "Live model catalog ($$(wc -l < "$$D/models.txt") models) written for triage."
|
||||
else
|
||||
: > "$$D/models.txt"
|
||||
echo "Model catalog fetch failed — triage/review will use the CLI default model."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# env -u REVIEW_TOKEN: the agents never call Gitea (the shell does, via
|
||||
# $$AUTH), so the write:repository PAT must not sit in the agent's env
|
||||
# where a prompt-injected diff could read /proc/self/environ. Defence in
|
||||
# depth alongside the settings.json Read-sandbox. Triage itself runs on
|
||||
# the CLI default model (no --model) — we don't name a family even to
|
||||
# bootstrap the pick.
|
||||
cat "$$PROMPTS/triage-prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude \
|
||||
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
|
||||
--allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write" \
|
||||
--settings "$$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
|
||||
-p || echo "(triage agent exited non-zero)"
|
||||
# Use the triage's pick only if it is a currently-available id;
|
||||
# otherwise (hallucinated id, or empty catalog) leave MODEL empty so
|
||||
# the review runs on the CLI default — a run never dies on selection.
|
||||
MODEL=$$(jq -r '.model // empty' "$$D/triage.json" 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
CPLX=$$(jq -r '.complexity // "unknown"' "$$D/triage.json" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
|
||||
# triage.json is UNTRUSTED (the triage reads the attacker-controlled
|
||||
# diff and its Write is not path-scoped). valid-model.sh is the single,
|
||||
# unit-tested gate (scripts/ci/test-model-selection.sh): it echoes the id
|
||||
# only if it is a safe [A-Za-z0-9._-] token present in the catalog, else
|
||||
# nothing — so a value like "claude-x\n--dangerously-skip-permissions"
|
||||
# can never reach the unquoted --model expansion below. Empty -> default.
|
||||
# CRITICAL: validate against $$MODELS_TABLE — the catalog captured in a
|
||||
# shell variable BEFORE the triage ran — NOT the on-disk ./.pr-review/
|
||||
# models.txt, which the triage's unscoped Write could overwrite to smuggle
|
||||
# an attacker-chosen token past the membership check (the triage reads the
|
||||
# file, but only $$MODELS_TABLE is trusted). This mirrors pick-model.sh,
|
||||
# which validates its pick against its in-memory table for the same reason.
|
||||
# env -u REVIEW_TOKEN: like fetch-models.sh above, this runs a script from
|
||||
# $$HOMELAB (branch-supplied for a homelab PR) — it must not see the PAT.
|
||||
# `|| true`: keep the "a run never dies on selection" invariant even if
|
||||
# the script is absent (e.g. a PR that moves scripts/ci/).
|
||||
MODEL=$$(printf '%s\n' "$$MODELS_TABLE" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/valid-model.sh" "$$MODEL" || true)
|
||||
[ -n "$$MODEL" ] || echo "Triage model rejected or not in live catalog — using the CLI default model."
|
||||
# Defence in depth: for a complex / security-sensitive review, do NOT
|
||||
# trust the triage's pick (it read the attacker-controlled diff and could
|
||||
# be injected into naming the weakest catalog entry to get a shallow
|
||||
# review). Fall back to the CLI default — the strongest configured model.
|
||||
if [ "$$CPLX" = complex ] && [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then
|
||||
echo "complex review — ignoring triage pick '$$MODEL', using the CLI default (strongest) model."
|
||||
MODEL=
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then echo "Triage: complexity=$$CPLX -> model=$$MODEL"; else echo "Triage: complexity=$$CPLX -> CLI default model"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Review with the chosen model ---
|
||||
( cd "$$WS" && cat "$$PROMPTS/prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude $${MODEL:+--model $$MODEL} \
|
||||
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
|
||||
--allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write" \
|
||||
--settings "$$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
|
||||
-p ) || echo "(review agent exited non-zero)"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -s "$$D/report.md" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Agent wrote no report for $$SLUG#$$NUM — skipping post."
|
||||
continue
|
||||
fi
|
||||
EVENT=$$(jq -r '.event // "COMMENT"' "$$D/verdict.json" 2>/dev/null || echo COMMENT)
|
||||
case "$$EVENT" in REQUEST_CHANGES|COMMENT) ;; *) EVENT=COMMENT;; esac # never APPROVE
|
||||
|
||||
# Assemble the review body: header + report + marker footer.
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf '🤖 **Automated review** — model `%s` (complexity: %s), commit `%s`.\n\n' \
|
||||
"$${MODEL:-CLI default}" "$$CPLX" "$${HEAD}"
|
||||
printf '> Advisory review by the `review-bot` pipeline. It never approves; a human merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review.\n\n---\n\n'
|
||||
cat "$$D/report.md"
|
||||
printf '\n\n<!-- pr-review:sha=%s -->\n' "$$HEAD"
|
||||
} > "$$D/body.md"
|
||||
jq -n --rawfile b "$$D/body.md" --arg e "$$EVENT" --arg c "$$HEAD" \
|
||||
'{body: $$b, event: $$e, commit_id: $$c}' > "$$D/review.json"
|
||||
gitea_post POST "$$API/repos/$$SLUG/pulls/$$NUM/reviews" "$$D/review.json" \
|
||||
&& echo "Posted $$EVENT review on $$SLUG#$$NUM." \
|
||||
|| echo "FAILED to post review on $$SLUG#$$NUM (continuing)."
|
||||
rm -f "$$WS/.pr-review"
|
||||
done < /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
echo "PR review run complete."
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,29 +1,17 @@
|
||||
# Trivy scan of the IaC tree and every image referenced from ansible/, with an
|
||||
# agent pass that opens a PR for CRITICAL/HIGH findings.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggers:
|
||||
# - cron : the named `daily-security-scan` cron, matched by NAME.
|
||||
# Crons cannot carry variables — `woodpecker-cli repo cron add`
|
||||
# has no --var — so a variable gate can never match a cron.
|
||||
# - deployment : woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> security-scan
|
||||
# The target rides in pipeline metadata as
|
||||
# CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET, which the workflow-root filter
|
||||
# does see, unlike manual-run variables on Woodpecker 3.18
|
||||
# (#582).
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: daily-security-scan
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "security-scan"'
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "security-scan"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "security-scan"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: iac-scan
|
||||
image: aquasec/trivy:latest@sha256:af6acf9a6b85dfe389a1941505c0ce9efef52a4719635e1a962f022a3d855daa
|
||||
image: aquasec/trivy:latest
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- trivy fs --format json -o trivy-iac.json --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed .
|
||||
|
||||
- name: image-scans
|
||||
image: aquasec/trivy:latest@sha256:af6acf9a6b85dfe389a1941505c0ce9efef52a4719635e1a962f022a3d855daa
|
||||
image: aquasec/trivy:latest
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- trivy image --download-db-only
|
||||
- |
|
||||
@@ -40,28 +28,12 @@ steps:
|
||||
cat /tmp/images.txt
|
||||
echo "---"
|
||||
i=0
|
||||
failed=0
|
||||
failed_names=""
|
||||
while IFS= read -r img; do
|
||||
i=$$((i+1))
|
||||
out="trivy-image-$$i.json"
|
||||
echo "=== [$$i] $$img -> $$out ==="
|
||||
# Keep going on a bad image so one unpullable reference cannot cost
|
||||
# the scan of every image after it, but record that it happened.
|
||||
if ! trivy image --skip-db-update --scanners vuln --timeout 15m --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed --format json -o "$$out" "$$img"; then
|
||||
failed=$$((failed+1))
|
||||
failed_names="$$failed_names $$img"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
trivy image --skip-db-update --scanners vuln --timeout 15m --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --ignore-unfixed --format json -o "$$out" "$$img" || true
|
||||
done < /tmp/images.txt
|
||||
echo "--- scanned $$((i - failed)) of $$i images ---"
|
||||
if [ "$$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "NOT SCANNED:$$failed_names"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Non-zero above turns this step red without failing the workflow, so the
|
||||
# fix agent still runs on what was scanned. Coverage is reported, not
|
||||
# enforced: an incomplete scan is visible in the step status instead of
|
||||
# being indistinguishable from a clean one.
|
||||
failure: ignore
|
||||
|
||||
- name: security-fix-agent
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +42,7 @@ steps:
|
||||
# this step is skipped — otherwise we'd fork-bomb PRs.
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- branch: master
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,14 +10,14 @@
|
||||
# report; the pipeline posts it to a single persistent Gitea issue.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggering:
|
||||
# - cron : a cron NAMED exactly "update-audit". Crons carry no variables —
|
||||
# `repo cron add` takes name, branch, schedule and enabled — so the
|
||||
# name filter is the only thing that can select a workflow for a
|
||||
# scheduled run:
|
||||
# - cron : a cron NAMED exactly "update-audit". Unlike the other pipelines
|
||||
# here (which gate on an injected `PIPELINE` var set at cron-create
|
||||
# time in the UI), this uses Woodpecker's documented `cron:` name
|
||||
# filter so the schedule can be created entirely from the CLI:
|
||||
# woodpecker repo cron add --repo k.renner/homelab \
|
||||
# --name update-audit --branch master --schedule '@weekly'
|
||||
# - deploy : woodpecker-cli pipeline deploy k.renner/homelab <n> update-audit
|
||||
# where <n> is an existing pipeline to promote.
|
||||
# - manual : woodpecker pipeline create --branch master \
|
||||
# --var PIPELINE=update-audit k.renner/homelab
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NOTE: e2e.yml runs on an explicit list of cron names that includes this one,
|
||||
# so a weekly e2e run piggybacks on the audit (it was a bare `event: cron`
|
||||
@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: update-audit
|
||||
- event: deployment
|
||||
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "update-audit"'
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
evaluate: 'PIPELINE == "update-audit"'
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: update-audit-agent
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.247
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Nightly wiki maintenance for the Notes vault (k.renner/notes), replacing the
|
||||
# workstation's wiki-maintenance and wiki-consolidate timers: distill the raw/
|
||||
# backlog into wiki/ (wiki-distill agent), audit wiki/ with the vault's own
|
||||
# script (structural checks, no model), then consolidate (wiki-consolidate
|
||||
# agent: verifies a cohort of notes against sources, repos and the live
|
||||
# cluster and edits them). The pipeline commits and pushes as Claude Bot; the
|
||||
# push webhook then refreshes the wiki service.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The agents address the vault as ~/Notes and the repos as ~/source/<repo>, so
|
||||
# each agent step links those into the workspace instead of rewriting them.
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- event: cron
|
||||
cron: wiki-maintenance
|
||||
# Hand-started runs: `woodpecker pipeline create k.renner/homelab --branch master`.
|
||||
# The typesafe_api_key secret is scoped to cron and manual, not deployment.
|
||||
- event: manual
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: checkout-notes
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
pull: true
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
# Token only on the wire, never in .git/config. Secrets set from files carry
|
||||
# a trailing newline (run 10220: "could not read Username"); strip CR/LF.
|
||||
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
|
||||
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
|
||||
clone --depth 50 --branch main https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/notes.git notes
|
||||
echo "raw backlog: $$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l) file(s)"
|
||||
# Full history for the consolidate agent's `git log` checks; the
|
||||
# workspace clone is shallow and tree-filtered.
|
||||
mkdir -p sources
|
||||
git clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homelab.git sources/homelab
|
||||
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" \
|
||||
clone --quiet https://gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/homeassistant.git sources/homeassistant
|
||||
|
||||
- name: fetch-diag
|
||||
# Read-only live-cluster access for the consolidate agent, same mechanism
|
||||
# as issue-fix.yml: ./.ci-diag/kubectl plus a 1h ci-diagnostics token.
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-k8s:2026-09-08
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SOPS_AGE_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: sops_age_key
|
||||
S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID:
|
||||
from_secret: hetzner_s3_access_key
|
||||
S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: hetzner_s3_secret_key
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- bash scripts/ci/fetch-kubeconfig.sh
|
||||
- bash scripts/ci/make-diag-kubeconfig.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: distill
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
pull: true
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
|
||||
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
|
||||
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
# An empty queue must not start the agent: its startup context alone
|
||||
# costs more than the whole audit.
|
||||
BACKLOG=$$(ls notes/raw/*.md | grep -v _index.md | wc -l)
|
||||
if [ "$$BACKLOG" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "distill: raw/ is empty, skipping the agent"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
|
||||
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
|
||||
"$$HOME/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py" --probe-index
|
||||
MODEL=$$(sh scripts/ci/pick-model.sh "distill raw source notes into atomic wiki notes: read sources, check the wiki for existing coverage, write or merge notes; careful writing, moderate reasoning")
|
||||
if [ -n "$$MODEL" ]; then echo "distill: selected model $$MODEL"; else echo "distill: using the CLI default model"; fi
|
||||
cd notes
|
||||
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/distill.md | claude $${MODEL:+--model $$MODEL} \
|
||||
--agent wiki-distill \
|
||||
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
|
||||
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*),Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*),Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*),Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)" \
|
||||
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/settings.json \
|
||||
-p
|
||||
|
||||
- name: audit
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
pull: true
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
# Findings are report lines in output/, not a pipeline failure.
|
||||
- python3 -B notes/bin/wiki_audit.py --vault "$$PWD/notes"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: consolidate
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
pull: true
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: claude_code_oauth_token
|
||||
TYPESAFE_API_KEY:
|
||||
from_secret: typesafe_api_key
|
||||
WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH:
|
||||
from_secret: wiki_index_basic_auth
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
ln -sfn "$$PWD/notes" "$$HOME/Notes"
|
||||
ln -sfn "$$PWD/sources" "$$HOME/source"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index"
|
||||
printf '%s' "$$WIKI_INDEX_BASIC_AUTH" | tr -d '\r\n' > "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$$HOME/.config/wiki-index/basic-auth"
|
||||
if [ -f .ci-diag/kubeconfig ]; then
|
||||
ln -sf "$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubectl" /usr/local/bin/kubectl
|
||||
export KUBECONFIG="$$PWD/.ci-diag/kubeconfig"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "consolidate: no ci-diag kubeconfig, live cluster checks unavailable"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
cd notes
|
||||
# JSON output: the agent's report and the run's cost come out of one
|
||||
# record at the end instead of a 45-minute silent log.
|
||||
# One source for the Bash allowlist: the settings file (run 10608: the
|
||||
# agent writes ~/Notes, the rules carried only /root/Notes).
|
||||
BASH_RULES=$$(jq -r '[.permissions.allow[] | select(startswith("Bash("))] | join(",")' ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json)
|
||||
rc=0
|
||||
cat ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate.md | claude \
|
||||
--agent wiki-consolidate \
|
||||
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
|
||||
--allowedTools "Read,Edit,Write,Glob,Grep,Agent,$$BASH_RULES" \
|
||||
--settings ../ci/agents/wiki-maintenance/consolidate-settings.json \
|
||||
--output-format json \
|
||||
-p > /tmp/consolidate.json || rc=$$?
|
||||
# A killed or crashed claude leaves no valid JSON; report rc, not a jq error.
|
||||
if [ -s /tmp/consolidate.json ] && jq -e . /tmp/consolidate.json > /dev/null; then
|
||||
jq -r '.result // empty' /tmp/consolidate.json
|
||||
jq -c '{duration_ms, num_turns, total_cost_usd, is_error}' /tmp/consolidate.json
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "consolidate: no result record (exit $$rc)"; head -c 2000 /tmp/consolidate.json || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "consolidate: git log --oneline of the run:"
|
||||
git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD
|
||||
exit $$rc
|
||||
|
||||
- name: push-notes
|
||||
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-claude:2.1.289
|
||||
pull: true
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
WIKI_BOT_TOKEN:
|
||||
from_secret: wiki_bot_token
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
cd notes
|
||||
git config user.email "claude-bot@renner.uno"
|
||||
git config user.name "Claude Bot"
|
||||
# Only the vault content is committed; anything an agent leaves elsewhere
|
||||
# in the checkout (run 10362: scratch scripts in the root) stays behind.
|
||||
# The consolidate agent commits its own snapshots, so HEAD may already be
|
||||
# ahead of origin/main with a clean tree.
|
||||
git add -A -- wiki raw output .wiki-consolidation-state.json
|
||||
git diff --cached --quiet || git commit -q -m "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F): distill + audit + consolidate (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)"
|
||||
if [ "$$(git rev-list --count origin/main..HEAD)" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "wiki-maintenance: no changes"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# The workstation pushes main on its own (notes-push.path), so main moves
|
||||
# while the agents run (run 10241: non-fast-forward). The run's work goes
|
||||
# to a branch and a PR that this step merges through Gitea; a conflict
|
||||
# leaves the PR open for a human and fails the run.
|
||||
BRANCH="wiki-maintenance/$$(date -u +%F)-$$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER"
|
||||
git checkout -q -b "$$BRANCH"
|
||||
TOKEN=$$(printf '%s' "$$WIKI_BOT_TOKEN" | tr -d '\r\n')
|
||||
git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: token $$TOKEN" push origin "HEAD:$$BRANCH"
|
||||
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1/repos/k.renner/notes"
|
||||
jq -n --arg title "wiki maintenance $$(date -u +%F) (CI run $$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER)" \
|
||||
--arg body "Nightly distill + audit + consolidate. Merged by the pipeline; open only if the merge failed." \
|
||||
--arg head "$$BRANCH" '{title: $$title, body: $$body, head: $$head, base: "main"}' > /tmp/pr.json
|
||||
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @/tmp/pr.json "$$API/pulls")
|
||||
echo "POST pull -> HTTP $$code"
|
||||
[ "$$code" -ge 200 ] && [ "$$code" -lt 300 ] || { cat /tmp/pr-resp.json; exit 1; }
|
||||
NUM=$$(jq -r '.number' /tmp/pr-resp.json)
|
||||
# Merge without delete_branch_after_merge: run 10254 got HTTP 500 from that
|
||||
# call although the merge itself had landed. Verify the PR state instead of
|
||||
# trusting the status code, then drop the branch as a separate, best-effort step.
|
||||
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/merge-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
--data '{"Do":"merge"}' "$$API/pulls/$$NUM/merge")
|
||||
echo "POST merge #$$NUM -> HTTP $$code"
|
||||
MERGED=$$(curl -s -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" "$$API/pulls/$$NUM" | jq -r '.merged')
|
||||
echo "PR #$$NUM merged: $$MERGED"
|
||||
[ "$$MERGED" = "true" ] || { cat /tmp/merge-resp.json; echo "PR #$$NUM left open"; exit 1; }
|
||||
code=$$(curl -s -o /tmp/del-resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token $$TOKEN" \
|
||||
"$$API/branches/$$(printf '%s' "$$BRANCH" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')")
|
||||
echo "DELETE branch $$BRANCH -> HTTP $$code (best effort)"
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
## Citing other YAML from a comment
|
||||
|
||||
- Mark the block you cite with a comment line `# anchor: <name>` (kebab-case, unique in that file). If the block is inside a `|` block scalar, put the marker just above the key, never inside the scalar.
|
||||
- Cite it as `path.yaml#<name>`, with the path relative to the citing file's directory or to the repo root. Never cite `path.yaml:<line>`, because line numbers go stale on any edit above them.
|
||||
- `scripts/ci/yaml-citations.sh` enforces this in `ci-manifests-test.yml`: it fails on line-number citations and on citations whose file or anchor does not exist.
|
||||
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# homelab
|
||||
|
||||
GitOps source for the Renner homelab cluster. Flux applies `master` to
|
||||
production, so every merge is a production change. Changes go in by pull
|
||||
request only; see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for YAML conventions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Change rules that protect Home Assistant
|
||||
|
||||
Owner decision (REN-240, REN-243). Home Assistant runs the house, so it
|
||||
gets two rules on top of normal review.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Disruptive work runs only 02:00–05:00 Europe/Berlin
|
||||
|
||||
Planned work that can restart Home Assistant or disrupt the cluster is
|
||||
merged and applied only between **02:00 and 05:00 Europe/Berlin**. That
|
||||
covers:
|
||||
|
||||
- node drain, node reboot, Talos upgrade
|
||||
- CNI (Cilium, Multus) and cluster-wide network policy
|
||||
- storage (Rook/Ceph, CSI, snapshot controller, CNPG operator)
|
||||
- Flux core (`kubernetes/clusters/*/flux-system/`, Flux controllers)
|
||||
- Authentik
|
||||
- OpenBao, including secret rotation that restarts consumers
|
||||
- anything in `kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/`
|
||||
|
||||
A PR in this list states in its description that it waits for the window.
|
||||
Flux applies on merge, so "wait for the window" means **merge** in the
|
||||
window, not just apply. If unsure whether a change is disruptive, treat it
|
||||
as disruptive.
|
||||
|
||||
Not covered: Home Assistant image bumps by Flux image automation. They stay
|
||||
fully automatic by owner decision. If one breaks Home Assistant, roll it
|
||||
back with [RUNBOOK-home-assistant-image-rollback.md](kubernetes/RUNBOOK-home-assistant-image-rollback.md).
|
||||
An incident rollback is not planned work; the owner decides its timing.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. HA-impact review before merge
|
||||
|
||||
Every PR that touches `kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/`, or makes a
|
||||
cluster-wide disruptive change from the list above, needs an **HA-impact
|
||||
review** before merge: a named reviewer states in the PR what Home
|
||||
Assistant will notice (restart, lost integration, lost history, none) and
|
||||
approves.
|
||||
|
||||
- Reviewer: Hestia, the Home Assistant maintainer.
|
||||
- Until Hestia exists: the owner does the HA-impact review.
|
||||
|
||||
This is in addition to the normal review and merge by Argus. Argus does
|
||||
not merge such a PR without the HA-impact approval.
|
||||
|
||||
## Agent runtime images
|
||||
|
||||
Pod images for the Paperclip Kubernetes sandbox (REN-284). Each is the stock
|
||||
`ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude` (pinned by digest) plus a tool
|
||||
set. Base user (1000, non-root), entrypoint and cmd are unchanged; the
|
||||
images run with a read-only root FS. Source in `ci/images/agent-runtime-*`,
|
||||
built by `.woodpecker/build-agent-runtime.yml` (re-run alone: deployment to
|
||||
target `build-agent-runtime`), versions bumped by Renovate. Both also
|
||||
carry `claude-agent-acp` for the ACP engine, pinned and patched like
|
||||
Paperclip ships it, SDK override included
|
||||
(`ci/images/agent-runtime-common/`); bump it by hand
|
||||
together with Paperclip. All tools are on the default `PATH`. Both add
|
||||
`tzdata` (the base has no zoneinfo); the default zone stays UTC.
|
||||
|
||||
| Image | `imageRegistry` | Adds |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-go` | Go toolchain, golangci-lint, govulncheck |
|
||||
| `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops/agent-runtime-claude:v1` | `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/agent-runtime-ops` | kubectl, flux, kustomize, helm |
|
||||
|
||||
The plugin keeps the name `agent-runtime-claude:v1` and swaps only host and
|
||||
org, hence the nested path. Every build also pushes a date tag
|
||||
(`:YYYY-MM-DD`) as the rollback point. `konairius` is public: no pull secret.
|
||||
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ inventory change.
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Innomaker USB2CAN (Vitocal/VX3 + E380) | `heating_can` | `plays/install-heating-can.yml` |
|
||||
| Nabu Casa ZWA-2 Z-Wave radio | `zwave_gateway` | `plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` |
|
||||
| FTDI serial power-meter head | `power_meter` | `plays/install-power-meter.yml` |
|
||||
|
||||
Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. They depend on
|
||||
the base play having run: all three need the local MQTT bridge, and two of
|
||||
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.sessio
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# vault.yml
|
||||
vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "..."
|
||||
vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "..."
|
||||
vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "..."
|
||||
vault_edge_loki_password: "..." # dedicated edge-1 Loki push cred (see "Logging & eMMC")
|
||||
@@ -236,21 +238,6 @@ cluster-side change was needed**: one authenticates as the `open3e` user
|
||||
out). The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary
|
||||
is the host; nothing off-host can reach it.
|
||||
|
||||
**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** The two vault-password bridges are being
|
||||
replaced by one bridge as the register account `edge-1`
|
||||
(`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`). Its password is pushed
|
||||
by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
|
||||
esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
|
||||
the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
|
||||
its own server key, nothing else. On a push it writes
|
||||
`/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/edge-1.conf`, deletes `bridge.d/legacy.conf` and
|
||||
restarts the local mosquitto. The controller sets a new password whenever the
|
||||
bridge reports "not connected" (also after a reinstall), so no play run is
|
||||
needed for a rotation. `.woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` runs
|
||||
`plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` on merge. Diagnosis: `journalctl -u
|
||||
edge-mqtt-cred`, and `mosquitto_sub -t '$SYS/broker/connection/edge-1/state'`
|
||||
(retained `1` = connected).
|
||||
|
||||
**eMMC:** the local broker writes **nothing** to flash — `persistence false`
|
||||
(retained/queued messages in RAM) and `log_dest stdout` (to the volatile
|
||||
journal → Loki). Do not add persistence or log-file settings to
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
# Secret indirection — real values live in vault.yml (ansible-vault) next
|
||||
# to this file; see docs/edge-host.md for how to populate it from
|
||||
# the cluster secrets.
|
||||
edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}"
|
||||
edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}"
|
||||
edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "{{ vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret }}"
|
||||
# Loki push credential (dedicated 'edge-1' user, Traefik basic-auth on the
|
||||
@@ -38,8 +39,8 @@ chrony_hwtimestamp: false
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Local MQTT contract -------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Shared between the broker and its clients, so it belongs to the inventory
|
||||
# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can
|
||||
# publishes here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
|
||||
# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can and
|
||||
# power-meter-sml publish here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
|
||||
# broker AS the open3e user, so it needs that identity too.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Keeping these in one role's defaults only worked while a single play loaded
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
|
||||
# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
|
||||
# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
|
||||
# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
|
||||
# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
|
||||
# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
|
||||
# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
|
||||
# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
|
||||
# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
|
||||
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
|
||||
vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
|
||||
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
|
||||
32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
|
||||
3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
|
||||
36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
|
||||
6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
|
||||
39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
|
||||
6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# PBS Client configuration for nas-1
|
||||
pbs_backup_paths:
|
||||
- /volume1/Documents
|
||||
- /volume1/homes
|
||||
- /volume1/Homeassistant Backup
|
||||
- /volume1/Games
|
||||
- /volume1/Media
|
||||
- /volume1/Music
|
||||
- /volume1/video
|
||||
- /volume2/Backup
|
||||
- /volume1/Movies
|
||||
|
||||
# Add more paths as needed:
|
||||
# - /volume1/photos
|
||||
# - /volume1/music
|
||||
|
||||
# PBS Server connection
|
||||
pbs_server_host: "pbs2.renner.uno"
|
||||
pbs_server_port: 8007
|
||||
pbs_datastore: "pool"
|
||||
pbs_backup_id: "nas-1"
|
||||
|
||||
# PBS Authentication - credentials in vault.yml
|
||||
pbs_username: "root@pam!nas-1"
|
||||
|
||||
# Garage S3 (K8s backup target)
|
||||
garage_image: "dxflrs/garage:v2.3.0"
|
||||
garage_zone: "dsm"
|
||||
garage_capacity: "2T"
|
||||
|
||||
# SSH connection - use password auth (key not supported by DSM)
|
||||
ansible_ssh_pass: "{{ nas_ssh_password }}"
|
||||
ansible_become_pass: "{{ nas_ssh_password }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Python 3.9+ from Synology package
|
||||
ansible_python_interpreter: /usr/local/bin/python3.9
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
|
||||
34663462636437633437613863366266306334666635643839313737343739643864613136613938
|
||||
3138393966306561656366396465383539303137333036300a376237376636356230343834386362
|
||||
36636535396330333732383233323263613132333166343739396137636538653435336662353138
|
||||
6565643866623235610a316266383933303830323936303735623338623165386339383733373435
|
||||
62366461363833616438373237383132366438326364363462333265366533323861376630643365
|
||||
39343036343838333639363432643738666630363063323636646661313539643465366532363438
|
||||
33303837623234613434633563666562346536346435353461373536323737376233386163326537
|
||||
61383963343737656438356136613537623538333163343466343739346135333439616432663763
|
||||
36663962633037376561326434303035333938646436663832303432346365353439666435613337
|
||||
34363636326530333233313231343566306432376532396666643761633136316333376337666135
|
||||
65363338623035663438323338663863366362653131336434323865326530326534623631336263
|
||||
36633063383031386161363131333636393364623436613331353733313235383062656131313164
|
||||
63393665633361313961363637663237616364643236383835393736643937393564656238376362
|
||||
31393465383361326264376133393233616264663636383337363962356532613438663637616536
|
||||
33653137656335323763313461323633616635346232303062323062333766383931313965346361
|
||||
66656461313239633366636463633465636463663937393932636337643861383937663662306466
|
||||
32353166643832303234643264633062616330393963333034623432613730366339306637613239
|
||||
34626161663666316339323762373639353335653663353635366664643063393432623039306237
|
||||
38363161343930363763393364663364353735343236313665313461626165636135303839363164
|
||||
37336638396564326166376233353730346563656266323535666265323062646232323938353732
|
||||
32636235333839623166633761376334316434613235333730353439343262393537363461333238
|
||||
32653435623362666662336532643832356163326332636436346132643237643030343761663332
|
||||
36663530356539303636663438646430363335353135323932613863666264363533326137353164
|
||||
31663032346236616263343637396439663334396166656364623637666535386530383535663435
|
||||
66303037303265616634373763616437333835333136336563323339666563663931396133633131
|
||||
3963653266633535303630653335666166313336653831623362
|
||||
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
|
||||
# pve_cluster (jupiter/neptune/saturn) run Talos on bare metal; no SSH at all
|
||||
# authentik_db / authentik_app authentik runs in-cluster (CNPG)
|
||||
# grafana runs in-cluster
|
||||
# synology_nas (nas-1) powered off; Garage and the PBS client
|
||||
# it hosted are gone with it
|
||||
# Their hosts no longer resolve, except the three that resolve to Talos nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
[netbird_server]
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +17,10 @@ netbird.renner.uno ansible_user=root
|
||||
proxy-1.renner.uno ansible_user=root
|
||||
proxy-2.renner.uno ansible_user=root
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[synology_nas]
|
||||
nas-1.renner.uno ansible_user=ladmin ansible_python_interpreter=/usr/bin/python3
|
||||
|
||||
# Every bare-metal edge thin client. Gets the host-generic roles only:
|
||||
# flash-wear handling, the log shipper, the MQTT bridge, the VLAN
|
||||
# sub-interface. Nothing here assumes any peripheral is attached.
|
||||
@@ -41,9 +43,13 @@ edge-1.iot.renner.uno
|
||||
[heating_can]
|
||||
edge-1.iot.renner.uno
|
||||
|
||||
[power_meter]
|
||||
edge-1.iot.renner.uno
|
||||
|
||||
[edge_host:children]
|
||||
zwave_gateway
|
||||
heating_can
|
||||
power_meter
|
||||
|
||||
# NTP servers. edge-1 was added here so the role would survive the PVE hosts
|
||||
# being retired for bare-metal Talos, which cannot run chrony or keepalived
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Local MQTT bridge and its credential receiver only (REN-1307). Run by
|
||||
# .woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml on merge, so a change to this role
|
||||
# reaches edge-1 without a play run by hand. The full base play
|
||||
# (install-edge-host.yml) carries the same role.
|
||||
- name: Converge the edge MQTT bridge
|
||||
hosts: edge_host
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
|
||||
# The SML power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) is retired for good: owner decision
|
||||
# 2026-09-19, grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus. Its role and
|
||||
# play are gone; this removes the leftover compose project from edge-1 on
|
||||
# the next pipeline run. Idempotent: a no-op once the directory is gone.
|
||||
pre_tasks:
|
||||
- name: Check for the retired sml2mqtt compose project
|
||||
ansible.builtin.stat:
|
||||
path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
register: edge_sml2mqtt_compose
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Stop the retired sml2mqtt container
|
||||
ansible.builtin.command:
|
||||
cmd: docker compose down --remove-orphans
|
||||
chdir: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
|
||||
when: edge_sml2mqtt_compose.stat.exists
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Remove the retired sml2mqtt directory
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
|
||||
state: absent
|
||||
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
- mqtt-bridge
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml [zwave_gateway] ZWA-2 radio
|
||||
# plays/install-heating-can.yml [heating_can] Innomaker USB2CAN
|
||||
# plays/install-power-meter.yml [power_meter] FTDI meter head
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Splitting the roles without splitting the plays would have kept the coupling:
|
||||
# one play applying every role to one group is the monolith again, a layer up.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Synology-specific playbook using raw module (Python 3.8 workaround)
|
||||
# Deploys Garage (https://garagehq.deuxfleurs.fr) as a single-node S3 target
|
||||
# for K8s backups (Velero + CNPG Barman Cloud Plugin).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Required secrets in host_vars/nas-1.renner.uno/vault.yml:
|
||||
# garage_rpc_secret: "<openssl rand -hex 32>"
|
||||
# garage_admin_token: "<openssl rand -base64 32>"
|
||||
# garage_metrics_token: "<openssl rand -base64 32>"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Post-install bootstrap (run once, record the returned secret keys):
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage status
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-velero
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-cnpg
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-secrets
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket create k8s-migration
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage key create velero-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage key create cnpg-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage key create secrets-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage key create migration-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-velero --key velero-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-cnpg --key cnpg-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-secrets --key secrets-key
|
||||
# docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow --read --write --owner k8s-migration --key migration-key
|
||||
- name: Install Garage S3 on Synology NAS
|
||||
hosts: synology_nas
|
||||
gather_facts: false
|
||||
|
||||
vars:
|
||||
garage_data_dir: "/volume1/docker/garage"
|
||||
|
||||
tasks:
|
||||
- name: Create Garage directory tree
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
mkdir -p {{ garage_data_dir }}/config \
|
||||
{{ garage_data_dir }}/meta \
|
||||
{{ garage_data_dir }}/data
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
# Secret writes use the same compare-then-write pattern as garage.toml so
|
||||
# rotation is idempotent AND a real change can drive force-recreate below.
|
||||
# Garage reads these files once at startup; without container restart, a
|
||||
# rotated token leaves the running process holding the previous value.
|
||||
- name: Write rpc_secret
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
|
||||
{{ garage_rpc_secret }}
|
||||
SECRET_EOF
|
||||
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new
|
||||
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret ] \
|
||||
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret; then
|
||||
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret
|
||||
echo RPC_SECRET_CHANGED
|
||||
else
|
||||
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret.new
|
||||
fi
|
||||
register: rpc_secret_write
|
||||
changed_when: "'RPC_SECRET_CHANGED' in rpc_secret_write.stdout"
|
||||
no_log: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Write admin_token
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
|
||||
{{ garage_admin_token }}
|
||||
SECRET_EOF
|
||||
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new
|
||||
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token ] \
|
||||
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token; then
|
||||
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token
|
||||
echo ADMIN_TOKEN_CHANGED
|
||||
else
|
||||
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token.new
|
||||
fi
|
||||
register: admin_token_write
|
||||
changed_when: "'ADMIN_TOKEN_CHANGED' in admin_token_write.stdout"
|
||||
no_log: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Write metrics_token
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new << 'SECRET_EOF'
|
||||
{{ garage_metrics_token }}
|
||||
SECRET_EOF
|
||||
chmod 600 {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new
|
||||
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token ] \
|
||||
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token; then
|
||||
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token
|
||||
echo METRICS_TOKEN_CHANGED
|
||||
else
|
||||
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token.new
|
||||
fi
|
||||
register: metrics_token_write
|
||||
changed_when: "'METRICS_TOKEN_CHANGED' in metrics_token_write.stdout"
|
||||
no_log: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Write garage.toml
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new << 'TOML_EOF'
|
||||
metadata_dir = "/var/lib/garage/meta"
|
||||
data_dir = "/var/lib/garage/data"
|
||||
|
||||
# SQLite chosen over LMDB: single-node deployment has no peers to
|
||||
# rebuild metadata from on unclean-shutdown corruption. SQLite is
|
||||
# slower but portable and has no LMDB corruption window.
|
||||
db_engine = "sqlite"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6-hour auto-snapshot of the metadata DB as a backstop against
|
||||
# corruption; last two snapshots retained.
|
||||
metadata_auto_snapshot_interval = "6h"
|
||||
|
||||
# Single-zone, single-node: only coherent replication factor.
|
||||
replication_factor = 1
|
||||
|
||||
rpc_bind_addr = "[::]:3901"
|
||||
rpc_secret_file = "/etc/garage/rpc_secret"
|
||||
|
||||
compression_level = 2
|
||||
|
||||
# 64 MB blocks (default 1 MB; previously 20 MB). On the 5 × 7 TB
|
||||
# Btrfs RAID 5 volume the per-block fixed cost (SQLite lookup,
|
||||
# dir traversal, hash verify, zstd decompress, nginx buffering)
|
||||
# is the dominant overhead per object; larger blocks amortize
|
||||
# it. block_size is a maximum, so 16 MiB CNPG WAL segments
|
||||
# still upload as one block each. Only applies to NEW uploads;
|
||||
# existing objects keep their original chunking until re-uploaded.
|
||||
block_size = "64M"
|
||||
|
||||
[s3_api]
|
||||
api_bind_addr = "[::]:3900"
|
||||
s3_region = "garage"
|
||||
root_domain = ".s3.{{ inventory_hostname }}"
|
||||
|
||||
[s3_web]
|
||||
bind_addr = "[::]:3902"
|
||||
root_domain = ".web.{{ inventory_hostname }}"
|
||||
|
||||
[admin]
|
||||
api_bind_addr = "[::]:3903"
|
||||
admin_token_file = "/etc/garage/admin_token"
|
||||
metrics_token_file = "/etc/garage/metrics_token"
|
||||
TOML_EOF
|
||||
if [ ! -f {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml ] \
|
||||
|| ! cmp -s {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml; then
|
||||
mv {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml
|
||||
echo GARAGE_TOML_CHANGED
|
||||
else
|
||||
rm {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml.new
|
||||
fi
|
||||
register: garage_toml_write
|
||||
changed_when: "'GARAGE_TOML_CHANGED' in garage_toml_write.stdout"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Write docker-compose.yml
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ garage_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml << 'COMPOSE_EOF'
|
||||
services:
|
||||
garage:
|
||||
image: {{ garage_image }}
|
||||
container_name: garaged
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
# HTTP services (3900/3902/3903) bind to loopback; DSM
|
||||
# reverse proxy fronts and TLS-terminates them. RPC 3901
|
||||
# is exposed directly — the Noise handshake is raw TCP,
|
||||
# so DSM RP cannot front it. rpc_secret gates auth.
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "3901:3901"
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1:3900:3900"
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1:3902:3902"
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1:3903:3903"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/garage.toml:/etc/garage.toml:ro
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/rpc_secret:/etc/garage/rpc_secret:ro
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/admin_token:/etc/garage/admin_token:ro
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/metrics_token:/etc/garage/metrics_token:ro
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/meta:/var/lib/garage/meta
|
||||
- {{ garage_data_dir }}/data:/var/lib/garage/data
|
||||
COMPOSE_EOF
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Pull image and start Garage container
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
cd {{ garage_data_dir }} && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
# Garage does not reload config on SIGHUP and compose does not notice
|
||||
# when a bind-mounted host file changes. Force-recreate the container
|
||||
# when garage.toml OR any of the three secret files changed so the new
|
||||
# config / rotated tokens are picked up.
|
||||
- name: Force-recreate garaged when garage.toml or secrets changed
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
cd {{ garage_data_dir }} && docker compose up -d --force-recreate garage
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
when: garage_toml_write.changed
|
||||
or rpc_secret_write.changed
|
||||
or admin_token_write.changed
|
||||
or metrics_token_write.changed
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Wait for Garage to accept CLI calls
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
|
||||
if docker exec garaged /garage status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
done
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Check whether cluster layout is already applied
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage status
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
register: garage_status
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Apply single-node layout (idempotent — only on first run)
|
||||
when: "'NO ROLE ASSIGNED' in garage_status.stdout"
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
NODE_ID=$(docker exec garaged /garage node id | head -n 1 | cut -d@ -f1)
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage layout assign "$NODE_ID" \
|
||||
-z {{ garage_zone }} \
|
||||
-c {{ garage_capacity }} \
|
||||
-t {{ inventory_hostname_short }}
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage layout apply --version 1
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Report Garage status
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage status
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
register: garage_status_final
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Show Garage status
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
var: garage_status_final.stdout_lines
|
||||
|
||||
# Bootstrap buckets + keys. Idempotent: bucket_info / key_info return
|
||||
# non-zero when missing, so we only create on first run. Access-key
|
||||
# secrets are captured at create time and persisted to chmod-600 files
|
||||
# under {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/<key>.creds on nas-1. These
|
||||
# files are the only post-install record of the secrets — Garage does
|
||||
# not expose them again.
|
||||
- name: Bootstrap Garage buckets, keys, and grants
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
KEYS_DIR={{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys
|
||||
mkdir -p "$KEYS_DIR"
|
||||
chmod 700 "$KEYS_DIR"
|
||||
|
||||
bootstrap_pair() {
|
||||
local BUCKET="$1"
|
||||
local KEY="$2"
|
||||
local CREDS_FILE="$KEYS_DIR/$KEY.creds"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! docker exec garaged /garage bucket info "$BUCKET" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage bucket create "$BUCKET"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! docker exec garaged /garage key info "$KEY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
CREATE_OUT=$(docker exec garaged /garage key create "$KEY")
|
||||
KEY_ID=$(echo "$CREATE_OUT" | awk '/^Key ID:/ {print $3}')
|
||||
SECRET=$(echo "$CREATE_OUT" | awk '/^Secret key:/ {print $3}')
|
||||
umask 177
|
||||
printf 'KEY_ID=%s\nSECRET_KEY=%s\n' "$KEY_ID" "$SECRET" > "$CREDS_FILE"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage bucket allow \
|
||||
--read --write --owner \
|
||||
"$BUCKET" --key "$KEY"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bootstrap_pair k8s-velero velero-key
|
||||
bootstrap_pair k8s-cnpg cnpg-key
|
||||
bootstrap_pair k8s-secrets secrets-key
|
||||
bootstrap_pair k8s-migration migration-key
|
||||
bootstrap_pair tfstate tfstate-key
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
no_log: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Report bucket + key state (no secrets)
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage bucket list
|
||||
echo "---"
|
||||
docker exec garaged /garage key list
|
||||
echo "---"
|
||||
ls -l {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/ 2>&1
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
register: garage_bootstrap_state
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Show bucket + key state
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
var: garage_bootstrap_state.stdout_lines
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Post-install note
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
msg:
|
||||
- "Buckets: k8s-velero, k8s-cnpg, k8s-secrets, k8s-migration, tfstate"
|
||||
- "Keys: velero-key, cnpg-key, secrets-key, migration-key, tfstate-key"
|
||||
- "Secrets are written to {{ garage_data_dir }}/config/keys/<key>.creds on nas-1 (chmod 600, root-owned)."
|
||||
- "SSH to nas-1 and `sudo cat` the file to retrieve KEY_ID + SECRET_KEY for Velero / CNPG / migration / tfstate config."
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Deploy the NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster members (the public edge).
|
||||
# Deploy a NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (a second proxy host).
|
||||
# Usage: ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Prerequisites:
|
||||
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
|
||||
# listed under [netbird_proxy] in inventory/pve_hosts.yml. Docker is
|
||||
# installed by the (Arch-aware) docker-install role.
|
||||
# - DNS A/AAAA for the host's own name (e.g. proxy-1.renner.uno) -> its IP.
|
||||
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared by every member) — no
|
||||
# new token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the
|
||||
# cluster.
|
||||
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's A/AAAA to proxy.renner.uno so
|
||||
# traffic round-robins across the cluster.
|
||||
# - Uses the existing vault_netbird_proxy_token (shared with VPS-1) — no new
|
||||
# token to generate; a shared token + same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN forms the cluster.
|
||||
# - AFTER deploy + verify: add this host's IP to the proxy domain so traffic
|
||||
# round-robins across the cluster. Repoint proxy.renner.uno away from its
|
||||
# CNAME to netbird.renner.uno (management host) to A/AAAA records listing
|
||||
# BOTH proxy IPs (VPS-1 + this host).
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy NetBird reverse-proxy cluster member
|
||||
hosts: netbird_proxy
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +26,3 @@
|
||||
- docker-install
|
||||
- netbird-proxy
|
||||
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
|
||||
# Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
|
||||
# enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
|
||||
# nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
|
||||
- crowdsec-edge-bouncer
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@
|
||||
- common
|
||||
- docker-install
|
||||
- netbird-server
|
||||
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Synology-specific playbook using raw module (Python 3.8 workaround)
|
||||
- name: Install PBS Client on Synology NAS
|
||||
hosts: synology_nas
|
||||
gather_facts: false
|
||||
|
||||
vars:
|
||||
pbs_client_data_dir: "/volume1/docker/pbs-client"
|
||||
|
||||
tasks:
|
||||
- name: Create PBS client directory
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
mkdir -p {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create docker-compose.yml
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml << 'COMPOSE_EOF'
|
||||
services:
|
||||
pbs-client:
|
||||
image: proxmox/proxmox-backup-client:latest
|
||||
container_name: pbs-client
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
hostname: {{ pbs_backup_id }}
|
||||
env_file:
|
||||
- .env
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state:/root/.proxmox-backup
|
||||
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
|
||||
- "{{ path }}:{{ path }}:ro"
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
mem_limit: 2g
|
||||
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
|
||||
COMPOSE_EOF
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create .env file
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env << 'ENV_EOF'
|
||||
PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
|
||||
PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
|
||||
ENV_EOF
|
||||
chmod 600 {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create backup script
|
||||
ansible.builtin.raw: |
|
||||
cat > {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh << 'SCRIPT_EOF'
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
source {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
|
||||
|
||||
BACKUP_SOURCES=""
|
||||
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
|
||||
BACKUP_SOURCES="$BACKUP_SOURCES {{ path | basename }}.pxar:{{ path }}"
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Starting backup for {{ pbs_backup_id }}"
|
||||
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client backup \
|
||||
$BACKUP_SOURCES \
|
||||
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
|
||||
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Backup completed, pruning..."
|
||||
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client prune \
|
||||
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}" \
|
||||
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
|
||||
--keep-last {{ pbs_keep_last | default(3) }} \
|
||||
--keep-daily {{ pbs_keep_daily | default(7) }} \
|
||||
--keep-weekly {{ pbs_keep_weekly | default(4) }} \
|
||||
--keep-monthly {{ pbs_keep_monthly | default(6) }}
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Done"
|
||||
SCRIPT_EOF
|
||||
chmod 755 {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Start PBS client container
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
cd {{ pbs_client_data_dir }} && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup cron job for daily backup at 2 AM (root crontab)
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
# Remove existing entry if present
|
||||
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "pbs-client/backup.sh" | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
# Add new entry
|
||||
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 2 * * * {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/backup.sh >> /var/log/pbs-backup.log 2>&1") | crontab -
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify container is running
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
|
||||
docker ps --filter name=pbs-client --format "{{ '{{' }}.Status{{ '}}' }}"
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
register: container_status
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Show container status
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
msg: "PBS client container status: {{ container_status.stdout }}"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
- name: Install PBS Client on Synology NAS
|
||||
hosts: synology_nas
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
# Variables are set in:
|
||||
# - Role defaults: ansible/roles/pbs-client/defaults/main.yml
|
||||
# - Host overrides: ansible/inventory/host_vars/<hostname>/vars.yml
|
||||
# - Secrets: ansible/inventory/host_vars/<hostname>/vault.yml
|
||||
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
- pbs-client
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) for hosts with the FTDI serial meter head
|
||||
# attached.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Targets [power_meter]: membership means the meter head is physically present.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Requires the base play (plays/install-edge-host.yml) to have run: it needs
|
||||
# docker and publishes to the local MQTT bridge.
|
||||
- name: Install power-meter reader
|
||||
hosts: power_meter
|
||||
become: true
|
||||
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
- power-meter-sml
|
||||
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHAT IS NOT, and must not be added:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on the
|
||||
# proxies, an Ansible template — but the
|
||||
# management server does not validate it from
|
||||
# any file. It is registered
|
||||
# vault_netbird_proxy_token LOOKS symmetric — it is in proxy.env on both
|
||||
# the server and the proxies, all Ansible
|
||||
# templates — but the management server does not
|
||||
# validate it from any of them. It is registered
|
||||
# in the management DATABASE. Rotating it changes
|
||||
# only what the proxies present, so every proxy
|
||||
# is locked out: "proxy auth failed: too many
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
|
||||
# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
|
||||
# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
|
||||
# cluster.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
|
||||
# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
|
||||
# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
|
||||
# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
|
||||
|
||||
# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
|
||||
# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
|
||||
|
||||
# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
|
||||
# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
|
||||
# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
|
||||
# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
|
||||
# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
|
||||
# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
|
||||
# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
|
||||
# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
|
||||
# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
|
||||
# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
|
||||
# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
|
||||
# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
|
||||
# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
|
||||
# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
|
||||
# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
|
||||
# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
|
||||
# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
|
||||
# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
|
||||
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
|
||||
|
||||
# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
|
||||
# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
|
||||
# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
|
||||
# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
|
||||
# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
|
||||
# retry_initial_connect matters.
|
||||
- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
|
||||
state: restarted
|
||||
daemon_reload: true
|
||||
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
|
||||
# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
|
||||
# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
|
||||
# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
|
||||
# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
|
||||
# package downloads.
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
|
||||
ansible.builtin.package:
|
||||
name: nftables
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
mode: "0755"
|
||||
|
||||
# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
|
||||
# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
|
||||
# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
|
||||
# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
|
||||
# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
|
||||
# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
|
||||
# it manipulates host netfilter.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
|
||||
# there, before anything is copied to a host.
|
||||
- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
|
||||
ansible.builtin.get_url:
|
||||
url: >-
|
||||
https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
|
||||
crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
|
||||
dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
|
||||
checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
delegate_to: localhost
|
||||
become: false
|
||||
run_once: true
|
||||
|
||||
# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
|
||||
# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
|
||||
# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
|
||||
# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
|
||||
# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
|
||||
# host.
|
||||
- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
|
||||
ansible.builtin.copy:
|
||||
src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
|
||||
dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
|
||||
# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
|
||||
# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
|
||||
# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
|
||||
- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
|
||||
ansible.builtin.unarchive:
|
||||
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
|
||||
dest: /opt
|
||||
remote_src: true
|
||||
include:
|
||||
- crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
|
||||
creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install the bouncer binary
|
||||
ansible.builtin.copy:
|
||||
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
|
||||
dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
|
||||
remote_src: true
|
||||
mode: "0755"
|
||||
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
|
||||
|
||||
# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
|
||||
- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
|
||||
dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
|
||||
mode: "0600"
|
||||
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
|
||||
dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Enable and start the bouncer
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
state: started
|
||||
daemon_reload: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Report how to read it
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
msg: |
|
||||
crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
|
||||
|
||||
What it would block: journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
|
||||
What it does block: nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
|
||||
Metrics: curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
|
||||
|
||||
Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
|
||||
both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
|
||||
removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
|
||||
# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
|
||||
# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
|
||||
# that has to resolve before the first connect.
|
||||
[Unit]
|
||||
Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
|
||||
After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
|
||||
Wants=network-online.target
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
Type=notify
|
||||
# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
|
||||
# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
|
||||
ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
|
||||
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
|
||||
Restart=always
|
||||
RestartSec=10
|
||||
LimitNOFILE=65536
|
||||
KillMode=mixed
|
||||
|
||||
[Install]
|
||||
WantedBy=multi-user.target
|
||||
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
|
||||
mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
|
||||
update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
|
||||
|
||||
# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
|
||||
# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
|
||||
# hosts without journald.
|
||||
log_mode: stdout
|
||||
log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
|
||||
|
||||
api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
|
||||
api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
|
||||
|
||||
# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
|
||||
# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
|
||||
# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
|
||||
# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
|
||||
# absent from the shipped example config.
|
||||
retry_initial_connect: true
|
||||
|
||||
disable_ipv4: false
|
||||
disable_ipv6: false
|
||||
deny_action: DROP
|
||||
|
||||
supported_decisions_types:
|
||||
- ban
|
||||
|
||||
# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
|
||||
# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
|
||||
# at the default filter priority.
|
||||
nftables:
|
||||
ipv4:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
set-only: false
|
||||
table: crowdsec
|
||||
chain: crowdsec-chain
|
||||
priority: -10
|
||||
ipv6:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
set-only: false
|
||||
table: crowdsec6
|
||||
chain: crowdsec6-chain
|
||||
priority: -10
|
||||
|
||||
# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
|
||||
# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
|
||||
# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
|
||||
nftables_hooks:
|
||||
- input
|
||||
- forward
|
||||
|
||||
prometheus:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
|
||||
listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}
|
||||
@@ -26,16 +26,8 @@ edge_open3e_poll_seconds: 30
|
||||
# entries when added), so the multi-frame read is cheap at a 30 s poll.
|
||||
# Records faults/info events only (NormalOperation, LagDeviceDtcReported,
|
||||
# LegionellaProtectionTemperatureReached) — NOT setpoint or program changes.
|
||||
# onebase.*: the 29 paired ZigBee slots on the One Base gateway (ECU 0x6c3) --
|
||||
# 8 radiator valves, 9 climate sensors, 9 underfloor actuators, 3 floor
|
||||
# thermostats. Per-device room temperature, active setpoint, humidity, valve
|
||||
# opening/demand, battery and RSSI; the local replacement for the ViCare cloud
|
||||
# room sensors. Needs the onebase overlay (files/open3e-onebase.py) -- the stock
|
||||
# codec declares 57 bytes and a paired slot answers with 68.
|
||||
# Only CurrentValues are polled. The room and device registries (1884.., 2084..)
|
||||
# are static configuration and are read on demand, not every 30 s.
|
||||
edge_open3e_datapoints: >-
|
||||
vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791,onebase.2086,onebase.2089,onebase.2092,onebase.2095,onebase.2098,onebase.2101,onebase.2104,onebase.2107,onebase.2110,onebase.2113,onebase.2116,onebase.2119,onebase.2122,onebase.2125,onebase.2128,onebase.2131,onebase.2134,onebase.2137,onebase.2140,onebase.2143,onebase.2262,onebase.2265,onebase.2268,onebase.2271,onebase.2274,onebase.2277,onebase.2280,onebase.2283,onebase.2286
|
||||
vitocal.259,vitocal.260,vitocal.268,vitocal.269,vitocal.271,vitocal.274,vitocal.286,vitocal.288,vitocal.318,vitocal.321,vitocal.324,vitocal.335,vitocal.336,vitocal.396,vitocal.402,vitocal.403,vitocal.476,vitocal.477,vitocal.543,vitocal.548,vitocal.565,vitocal.1007,vitocal.1043,vitocal.1190,vitocal.1211,vitocal.1391,vitocal.1416,vitocal.1417,vitocal.2320,vitocal.2346,vitocal.2350,vitocal.2351,vitocal.2352,vitocal.2369,vitocal.2370,vitocal.2486,vitocal.2487,vitocal.2488,vitocal.2543,vitocal.2560,vitocal.2622,vitocal.2624,vitocal.2625,vitocal.2735,vitocal.3016,vx3.266,vx3.378,vx3.379,vx3.380,vx3.535,vx3.1603,vx3.1664,vx3.1690,vx3.1801,vx3.1802,vx3.1810,vx3.1828,vx3.1830,vx3.1577,vx3.1578,vx3.1579,vx3.1580,vx3.1581,vx3.1582,vx3.1834,vx3.1836,vx3.2214,vx3.2240,vx3.3085,vx3.3086,vx3.3087,vx3.3088,vx3.3089,vx3.3090,vcmu.320,vcmu.322,vcmu.325,vcmu.355,vcmu.389,vcmu.391,vcmu.1772,vcmu.1773,vcmu.1775,vcmu.1776,vcmu.2256,vcmu.2259,vcmu.2333,vcmu.2334,vcmu.2569,vcmu.2571,vitocal.2791
|
||||
# ECU addresses; -dev selects codec set, tx selects the UDS address.
|
||||
# vcmu (refrigerant-circuit controller) has no dedicated codec set —
|
||||
# omitting dpList makes open3e fall back to the generic datapoint list,
|
||||
@@ -46,9 +38,6 @@ edge_open3e_devices:
|
||||
# files/open3e-vx3plus.py) — die Stock-vx3-Liste filtert sie sonst weg.
|
||||
vx3: { tx: "0x6a1", dpList: "/config/vx3plus.py" }
|
||||
vcmu: { tx: "0x68c" }
|
||||
# One Base ZigBee gateway. Overlay re-declares the paired ZigBee slots at
|
||||
# their real 68-byte length (see files/open3e-onebase.py).
|
||||
onebase: { tx: "0x6c3", dpList: "/config/onebase.py" }
|
||||
|
||||
edge_e3oncan_gap_seconds: 10
|
||||
edge_e3oncan_mqtt_format: "{device}_{didNumber:04d}_{didName}"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by ansible (roles/heating-can). Datapoint overlay for the One Base
|
||||
# ZigBee gateway on ECU 0x6c3 (BACKENDGATEWAY).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Upstream declares ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues as 57 bytes. A PAIRED device
|
||||
# slot on this gateway answers with 68: the 57 known bytes plus the parent
|
||||
# device serial and three trailing bytes. udsoncan reads only the declared
|
||||
# length and then treats the next two bytes -- the first half of that serial --
|
||||
# as a foreign data identifier, so every paired slot fails to decode with
|
||||
# "Server returned values for data identifier 0x.... that was not requested".
|
||||
# The bogus identifier differs per device because the serial does.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This overlay re-declares the 29 paired slots at 68 bytes, reusing upstream's
|
||||
# sub-type list so the per-device-type O3ESwitch (climate sensor / TRV / floor
|
||||
# thermostat / actuator, incl. DeviceTemperatureSetpoint) is inherited rather
|
||||
# than copied.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# EMPTY slots answer with 57 and decode against the stock codec, so they are
|
||||
# left alone and are not polled. A slot that is later unpaired therefore starts
|
||||
# reporting a decode error on its topic instead of a value.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Verified on ECU 0x6c3, 2026-09-17: 29 paired slots, all 68 bytes.
|
||||
from open3e.Open3Ecodecs import O3EComplexType, RawCodec
|
||||
from open3e.Open3Edatapoints import dataIdentifiers as _master
|
||||
|
||||
# ZigBee<N>DeviceCurrentValues of the paired slots: devices 1-20 run 2086..2143
|
||||
# in steps of 3, devices 21-29 continue at 2262..2286.
|
||||
_PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES = [2086 + 3 * n for n in range(20)] + [
|
||||
2262 + 3 * n for n in range(9)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _with_parent_serial(did):
|
||||
stock = _master["dids"][did]
|
||||
return O3EComplexType(
|
||||
68,
|
||||
stock.id,
|
||||
list(stock.subTypes)
|
||||
+ [
|
||||
RawCodec(8, "ParentDeviceSerialnumber"),
|
||||
RawCodec(2, "Unknown_65_66"),
|
||||
RawCodec(1, "Unknown_67"),
|
||||
],
|
||||
desc=stock.desc,
|
||||
info=stock.info,
|
||||
acc=stock.acc,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
dataIdentifiers = {
|
||||
"dids": {
|
||||
**_master["dids"],
|
||||
**{did: _with_parent_serial(did) for did in _PAIRED_CURRENT_VALUES},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -129,13 +129,6 @@
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart heating-can
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy open3e One Base datapoint overlay (68-byte ZigBee slots)
|
||||
ansible.builtin.copy:
|
||||
src: open3e-onebase.py
|
||||
dest: "{{ heating_can_base_dir }}/onebase.py"
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart heating-can
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Compose project ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: Deploy the broker credential env file
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ services:
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./devices.json:/config/devices.json:ro
|
||||
- ./vx3plus.py:/config/vx3plus.py:ro
|
||||
- ./onebase.py:/config/onebase.py:ro
|
||||
env_file:
|
||||
# Broker credential, 0600 -- see heating-can.env.j2.
|
||||
- heating-can.env
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,14 +10,3 @@
|
||||
edge_mqtt_cluster_host: mqtt.renner.uno
|
||||
edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port: 8883
|
||||
edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) ------------
|
||||
# The cluster account the bridge logs in as (register entry in
|
||||
# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml). The controller pushes
|
||||
# its password to edge-mqtt-cred and rotates it when the bridge reports
|
||||
# "not connected"; there is no copy in ansible-vault.
|
||||
edge_mqtt_bridge_account: edge-1
|
||||
# HTTPS port of edge-mqtt-cred (esp32 device API, mTLS). Only a client
|
||||
# certificate from the MQTT CA with this CN is accepted.
|
||||
edge_mqtt_cred_port: 8443
|
||||
edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn: mqtt-account-controller
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
# Managed by ansible (roles/mqtt-bridge). Receives the cluster bridge password
|
||||
# from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) so no plaintext copy lives in
|
||||
# ansible-vault and no play run is needed to rotate it.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Speaks the controller's esp32 device API over HTTPS:
|
||||
# GET /api/status -> {"mqtt": {"connected": bool}}
|
||||
# PUT /api/settings <- {"mqtt": {"user": "...", "pass": "..."}}
|
||||
# A client certificate from the MQTT CA with CN mqtt-account-controller is
|
||||
# required; nothing else may call it. The server key is generated on this
|
||||
# host and never leaves it (the controller pins it on first contact).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# PUT writes the bridge file (template + credentials), removes the legacy
|
||||
# vault-password bridges and restarts the local mosquitto. The password is
|
||||
# kept only in that 0640 root:mosquitto file.
|
||||
import grp
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
import ssl
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
|
||||
|
||||
CONF = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
|
||||
WRITE = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def connected():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
out = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["mosquitto_sub", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", str(CONF["local_port"]),
|
||||
"-t", CONF["state_topic"], "-C", "1", "-W", "3"],
|
||||
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdout
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return out.strip() == "1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_bridge(user, password):
|
||||
with open(CONF["template"]) as f:
|
||||
body = f.read()
|
||||
body += f"remote_username {user}\nremote_password {password}\n"
|
||||
d = os.path.dirname(CONF["bridge_file"])
|
||||
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=d, prefix=".edge-mqtt-cred.")
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
|
||||
f.write(body)
|
||||
os.chown(tmp, 0, grp.getgrnam("mosquitto").gr_gid)
|
||||
os.chmod(tmp, 0o640)
|
||||
os.replace(tmp, CONF["bridge_file"])
|
||||
for legacy in CONF["legacy_files"]:
|
||||
if os.path.exists(legacy):
|
||||
os.remove(legacy)
|
||||
subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "mosquitto"], check=True, timeout=60)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def valid(s):
|
||||
# Controller passwords are random URL-safe tokens; anything with
|
||||
# whitespace or a control character would break the config line.
|
||||
return isinstance(s, str) and 0 < len(s) <= 256 and s.isprintable() and not any(c.isspace() for c in s)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
|
||||
def authorized(self):
|
||||
cert = self.connection.getpeercert() or {}
|
||||
cns = [v for rdn in cert.get("subject", ()) for k, v in rdn if k == "commonName"]
|
||||
if cns != [CONF["allowed_cn"]]:
|
||||
self.send_error(403)
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
def reply(self, code, obj=None):
|
||||
data = b"" if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode()
|
||||
self.send_response(code)
|
||||
if data:
|
||||
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
|
||||
self.end_headers()
|
||||
self.wfile.write(data)
|
||||
|
||||
def do_GET(self):
|
||||
if not self.authorized():
|
||||
return
|
||||
if self.path != "/api/status":
|
||||
return self.send_error(404)
|
||||
self.reply(200, {"mqtt": {"connected": connected()}})
|
||||
|
||||
def do_PUT(self):
|
||||
if not self.authorized():
|
||||
return
|
||||
if self.path != "/api/settings":
|
||||
return self.send_error(404)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
|
||||
if not 0 < n <= 4096:
|
||||
raise ValueError("body size")
|
||||
m = json.loads(self.rfile.read(n))["mqtt"]
|
||||
user, password = m["user"], m["pass"]
|
||||
except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
|
||||
return self.send_error(400)
|
||||
if user != CONF["user"] or not valid(password):
|
||||
return self.send_error(400)
|
||||
with WRITE:
|
||||
write_bridge(user, password)
|
||||
self.log_message("bridge credentials for %s replaced, mosquitto restarted", user)
|
||||
self.reply(204)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
|
||||
sys.stderr.write("%s %s\n" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
|
||||
address_family = socket.AF_INET6
|
||||
|
||||
def server_bind(self):
|
||||
self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
|
||||
super().server_bind()
|
||||
|
||||
def get_request(self):
|
||||
# The TLS handshake runs in the request thread, with a timeout, so a
|
||||
# stalled peer cannot block the accept loop.
|
||||
sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
|
||||
sock.settimeout(10)
|
||||
return self.ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False), addr
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
|
||||
ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
|
||||
ctx.load_cert_chain(CONF["cert"], CONF["key"])
|
||||
ctx.load_verify_locations(CONF["ca"])
|
||||
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
|
||||
srv = Server(("::", CONF["port"]), Handler)
|
||||
srv.ctx = ctx
|
||||
srv.serve_forever()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIUN8ne4k4Wif9O83GDyKiBP0Ma7EIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
|
||||
GTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUmVubmVyIE1RVFQgQ0EwHhcNMjYxMDA2MTUzMDE1WhcNMzYx
|
||||
MDAzMTUzMDE1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5SZW5uZXIgTVFUVCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49
|
||||
AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOZhZF2JDoyvVg2oIXSbJAuAWDcoG22RxPA4oMKRMA/b
|
||||
XzIY566D2k6cVnWqbil9s/q4O2mj+Epo7plBw8NwuOOjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
|
||||
AwICpDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcqSDDiLZzhrvqq9f16Y08
|
||||
CO7QfzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiBFkxd9pXnqIcjReEcOTvCBZ3HxKu2jNQGL
|
||||
/le7gunTGgIgZapWAcu4awa+wmZcR/z2luOjD2GhIT15um14Z+sstJk=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
@@ -5,9 +5,3 @@
|
||||
ansible.builtin.service:
|
||||
name: mosquitto
|
||||
state: restarted
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
name: edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
state: restarted
|
||||
daemon_reload: true
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,39 +11,13 @@
|
||||
name: mosquitto
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create the bridge directory
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: mosquitto
|
||||
mode: "0750"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Check for the controller-managed bridge file
|
||||
ansible.builtin.stat:
|
||||
path: "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf"
|
||||
register: edge_mqtt_bridge_managed
|
||||
|
||||
# Until mqtt-account-controller has pushed the first password, keep the
|
||||
# vault-password bridges so the cluster never loses edge-1's data. Once the
|
||||
# managed file exists, never render them again (edge-mqtt-cred removed them).
|
||||
- name: Deploy legacy vault-password bridges
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2
|
||||
dest: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: mosquitto
|
||||
mode: "0640" # carries the legacy cluster bridge credentials
|
||||
when: not edge_mqtt_bridge_managed.stat.exists
|
||||
notify: Restart mosquitto
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy local mosquitto config
|
||||
- name: Deploy local mosquitto bridge config
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2
|
||||
dest: /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: mosquitto
|
||||
mode: "0640"
|
||||
mode: "0640" # carries the cluster bridge credentials
|
||||
notify: Restart mosquitto
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Enable local mosquitto bridge
|
||||
@@ -51,59 +25,3 @@
|
||||
name: mosquitto
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
state: started
|
||||
|
||||
# --- edge-mqtt-cred (REN-1307): receives the bridge password from
|
||||
# mqtt-account-controller. edge-1 holds only the public MQTT CA and its own
|
||||
# server key, generated here and never copied off the host.
|
||||
- name: Create edge-mqtt-cred config directory
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: root
|
||||
mode: "0700"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Generate edge-mqtt-cred server key and certificate
|
||||
ansible.builtin.command:
|
||||
cmd: >-
|
||||
openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1
|
||||
-nodes -days 36500 -subj "/CN={{ inventory_hostname }}"
|
||||
-keyout /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key -out /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt
|
||||
creates: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key
|
||||
notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred files
|
||||
ansible.builtin.copy:
|
||||
src: "{{ item.src }}"
|
||||
dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: root
|
||||
mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- {src: edge-mqtt-cred.py, dest: /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred, mode: "0755"}
|
||||
# Public CA of the cluster's MQTT client certificates
|
||||
# (kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/mqtt-ca.yaml), valid until 2036-10-03.
|
||||
- {src: mqtt-ca.crt, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt, mode: "0644"}
|
||||
notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred config and bridge template
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: "{{ item.src }}"
|
||||
dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: root
|
||||
mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- {src: edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json, mode: "0600"}
|
||||
# Read only on the controller's next push: a change here reaches the
|
||||
# running bridge when the password is next set.
|
||||
- {src: edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in, mode: "0600"}
|
||||
- {src: edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service, mode: "0644"}
|
||||
notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Enable edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
name: edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
state: started
|
||||
daemon_reload: true
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). edge-mqtt-cred appends
|
||||
# remote_username/remote_password to this and writes the result to
|
||||
# /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf. One bridge for
|
||||
# open3e, as the register account `{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}`
|
||||
# (ACL readwrite open3e/#). sml2mqtt is retired (SML reader, 2026-09-19).
|
||||
connection {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}
|
||||
address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
|
||||
bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
|
||||
bridge_insecure false
|
||||
remote_clientid edge1-bridge
|
||||
cleansession false
|
||||
try_private true
|
||||
restart_timeout 5 30
|
||||
queue_qos0_messages true
|
||||
# The bridge state goes to the LOCAL broker only (retained 1/0); edge-mqtt-cred
|
||||
# reads it to answer the controller's "connected?".
|
||||
notifications true
|
||||
notifications_local_only true
|
||||
notification_topic $SYS/broker/connection/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}/state
|
||||
topic open3e/# out 0
|
||||
topic open3e/cmnd in 0
|
||||
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Legacy vault-password bridges, rendered only
|
||||
# while /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf does not
|
||||
# exist; edge-mqtt-cred deletes this file on the controller's first push
|
||||
# (REN-1307). Remove with the vault keys once edge-1 is on the register account.
|
||||
# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
|
||||
# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
|
||||
# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
|
||||
connection edge1-open3e
|
||||
address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
|
||||
bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
|
||||
bridge_insecure false
|
||||
remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
|
||||
remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
|
||||
remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
|
||||
cleansession false
|
||||
try_private true
|
||||
notifications false
|
||||
restart_timeout 5 30
|
||||
queue_qos0_messages true
|
||||
topic open3e/# out 0
|
||||
topic open3e/cmnd in 0
|
||||
@@ -22,9 +22,36 @@ log_type notice
|
||||
listener 1883 127.0.0.1
|
||||
allow_anonymous true
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Bridges to the cluster broker (REN-1307). bridge.d holds either
|
||||
# {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf, written by edge-mqtt-cred with the password
|
||||
# mqtt-account-controller pushed, or, until that first push, legacy.conf with
|
||||
# the two vault-password bridges. edge-mqtt-cred deletes legacy.conf when it
|
||||
# writes the new file.
|
||||
include_dir /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
|
||||
# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
|
||||
# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
|
||||
# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
|
||||
connection edge1-open3e
|
||||
address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
|
||||
bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
|
||||
bridge_insecure false
|
||||
remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
|
||||
remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
|
||||
remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
|
||||
cleansession false
|
||||
try_private true
|
||||
notifications false
|
||||
restart_timeout 5 30
|
||||
queue_qos0_messages true
|
||||
topic open3e/# out 0
|
||||
topic open3e/cmnd in 0
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Bridge 2: power-meter topics, as the cluster `sml2mqtt` user (ACL
|
||||
# `write sml2mqtt/#`). Publish-only, so no `in` topics.
|
||||
connection edge1-sml2mqtt
|
||||
address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
|
||||
bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
|
||||
bridge_insecure false
|
||||
remote_username sml2mqtt
|
||||
remote_password {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
|
||||
remote_clientid edge1-bridge-sml2mqtt
|
||||
cleansession false
|
||||
try_private true
|
||||
notifications false
|
||||
restart_timeout 5 30
|
||||
queue_qos0_messages true
|
||||
topic sml2mqtt/# out 0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{{ {
|
||||
"port": edge_mqtt_cred_port,
|
||||
"allowed_cn": edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn,
|
||||
"user": edge_mqtt_bridge_account,
|
||||
"cert": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt",
|
||||
"key": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key",
|
||||
"ca": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt",
|
||||
"template": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in",
|
||||
"bridge_file": "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ ".conf",
|
||||
"legacy_files": ["/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf"],
|
||||
"local_port": edge_mqtt_port,
|
||||
"state_topic": "$SYS/broker/connection/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ "/state",
|
||||
} | to_nice_json }}
|
||||
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). See /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred.
|
||||
[Unit]
|
||||
Description=Receives the MQTT bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller
|
||||
After=network-online.target mosquitto.service
|
||||
Wants=network-online.target
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json
|
||||
Restart=always
|
||||
RestartSec=5
|
||||
# Root only to write the bridge file and restart mosquitto.
|
||||
ProtectSystem=strict
|
||||
ReadWritePaths=/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
|
||||
ProtectHome=true
|
||||
PrivateTmp=true
|
||||
NoNewPrivileges=true
|
||||
|
||||
[Install]
|
||||
WantedBy=multi-user.target
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy on the proxy hosts.
|
||||
# Self-healing watchdog for the NetBird reverse proxy (VPS-1 and proxy-1).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Why it exists: the proxy's embedded NetBird client pins each proxied
|
||||
# domain's route to a specific routing-peer identity. The netbird-ingress
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ netbird_watchdog_probe_hosts:
|
||||
- home.renner.uno
|
||||
- immich.renner.uno
|
||||
|
||||
# Address the probe connects to. The proxy binds :443 on the host directly.
|
||||
# Address the probe connects to. 127.0.0.1 reaches the local proxy on both
|
||||
# members: VPS-1 routes it via Traefik's HostSNI(*) TCP passthrough, proxy-1
|
||||
# binds :443 directly.
|
||||
netbird_watchdog_probe_address: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
|
||||
netbird_watchdog_container: netbird-proxy
|
||||
@@ -30,13 +32,8 @@ netbird_watchdog_fail_threshold: 3
|
||||
|
||||
# Minimum seconds between watchdog-issued restarts, so a genuinely broken
|
||||
# backend can't put the proxy into a restart loop. Shared by both the URL-probe
|
||||
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below. One minute: the route-manager wedge
|
||||
# recurs on every routing-peer loss, and rolling node reboots lose one peer
|
||||
# every few minutes; a suppressed restart there leaves the wedge standing
|
||||
# until the URL probe's three rounds fire (3.5 min of 000 on every domain,
|
||||
# measured 2026-09-07). A minute still caps a loop at one restart per
|
||||
# probe interval.
|
||||
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 60
|
||||
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below.
|
||||
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 600
|
||||
|
||||
# Log fingerprint of the reverse-proxy route-manager wedge, matched as a plain
|
||||
# substring in the proxy's docker logs by the flood watchdog. On this build the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Deploys the reverse-proxy watchdog (see defaults/main.yml for why).
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency)
|
||||
- name: Ensure curl is installed (probe dependency; proxy-1 is Arch, VPS-1 Debian)
|
||||
ansible.builtin.package:
|
||||
name: curl
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# NetBird reverse-proxy HA cluster member (proxy-only host, e.g. proxy-1).
|
||||
# Every member uses the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN + token. NetBird load-balances/
|
||||
# fails the cluster over via DNS round-robin on the proxy domain (see
|
||||
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
|
||||
# Joins the same proxy cluster as the VPS-1 proxy: identical NB_PROXY_DOMAIN
|
||||
# + the same token. NetBird load-balances/fails the cluster over via DNS
|
||||
# round-robin on the proxy domain (see plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml).
|
||||
|
||||
# MUST match the netbird-server role's netbird_version — the reverse-proxy
|
||||
# release line has to track the management server it enrolls against.
|
||||
@@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ netbird_version: "0.73.2"
|
||||
# Management server this proxy enrolls against (public API, TLS).
|
||||
netbird_server_host: netbird.renner.uno
|
||||
|
||||
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member, and must NOT
|
||||
# be a subdomain of the management domain (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird
|
||||
# docs (TLS/routing conflicts).
|
||||
# Proxy domain — MUST be identical across every cluster member.
|
||||
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
|
||||
|
||||
# A shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a
|
||||
# valid HA cluster, so one token serves every member.
|
||||
# Reuse VPS-1's proxy token — a shared NB_PROXY_TOKEN across members with the
|
||||
# same NB_PROXY_DOMAIN is a valid HA cluster, so no separate token is needed.
|
||||
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Relay auth secret — MUST be identical across every relay instance and the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
|
||||
# NetBird reverse-proxy — HA cluster member on a proxy-only host.
|
||||
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik: the
|
||||
# proxy owns the port and terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME
|
||||
# challenges directly.
|
||||
# Just the reverse-proxy container, bound directly to :443. No Traefik:
|
||||
# unlike VPS-1 (where the proxy shares :443 with management/signal/relay via
|
||||
# SNI routing), this host runs nothing else, so the proxy owns the port and
|
||||
# terminates TLS + answers its own tls-alpn-01 ACME challenges directly.
|
||||
services:
|
||||
proxy:
|
||||
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,3 +23,9 @@ netbird_datastore_key: "{{ vault_netbird_datastore_key }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Relay secret for WebSocket relay authentication
|
||||
netbird_relay_secret: "{{ vault_netbird_relay_secret }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reverse proxy configuration
|
||||
# IMPORTANT: Proxy domain must NOT be a subdomain of the management domain
|
||||
# (netbird.renner.uno) per NetBird docs - causes TLS/routing conflicts
|
||||
netbird_proxy_domain: "proxy.renner.uno"
|
||||
netbird_proxy_token: "{{ vault_netbird_proxy_token }}"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# Forced-command target for the netbird-backup SSH key (see the
|
||||
# "Authorize the cluster backup key" task): takes a CONSISTENT snapshot
|
||||
# of the management SQLite store via the online-backup API (safe against
|
||||
# a live writer, unlike copying store.db) and streams a gzipped tar to
|
||||
# stdout. The key's authorized_keys entry is restricted to exactly this
|
||||
# script — the in-cluster puller cannot run anything else.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Deliberately store.db ONLY: /opt/netbird/config is fully regenerable
|
||||
# from the netbird-server role's templates + vault, and including it
|
||||
# would put the plaintext TURN secret (turnserver.conf) into every
|
||||
# nightly tarball. Restore = re-run the role (rebuilds config), then
|
||||
# untar this dump into /opt/netbird/management/.
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
tmp=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
|
||||
sqlite3 /opt/netbird/management/store.db ".backup '$tmp/store.db'"
|
||||
tar -C "$tmp" -czf - store.db
|
||||
@@ -16,3 +16,7 @@
|
||||
- name: Restart netbird coturn
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate coturn
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Restart netbird proxy
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --force-recreate proxy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/management
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/signal
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/letsencrypt
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/proxy/certs
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy docker-compose.yml
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
@@ -58,100 +59,47 @@
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart netbird coturn
|
||||
|
||||
# The public edge is the proxy hosts (plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml); this
|
||||
# host runs no reverse proxy. The tasks below remove the one it used to run,
|
||||
# its watchdogs first so they cannot restart it mid-removal, and can go once
|
||||
# the role has run against every host that ever carried it.
|
||||
- name: Check for reverse-proxy watchdog units
|
||||
ansible.builtin.stat:
|
||||
path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}"
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
|
||||
- netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
|
||||
register: _proxy_watchdog_units
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Stop and disable reverse-proxy watchdogs
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
name: "{{ item.item }}"
|
||||
state: stopped
|
||||
enabled: false
|
||||
loop: "{{ _proxy_watchdog_units.results }}"
|
||||
loop_control:
|
||||
label: "{{ item.item }}"
|
||||
when: item.stat.exists
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Remove reverse-proxy watchdog units and scripts
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: "{{ item }}"
|
||||
state: absent
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.timer
|
||||
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-watchdog.service
|
||||
- /etc/systemd/system/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog.service
|
||||
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-watchdog
|
||||
- /usr/local/bin/netbird-proxy-flood-watchdog
|
||||
- /run/netbird-proxy-watchdog
|
||||
register: _proxy_watchdog_files
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Reload systemd after removing the watchdog units
|
||||
ansible.builtin.systemd:
|
||||
daemon_reload: true
|
||||
when: _proxy_watchdog_files.changed
|
||||
- name: Deploy proxy.env
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: proxy.env.j2
|
||||
dest: /opt/netbird/proxy.env
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart netbird proxy
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Pull NetBird container images
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose pull
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
# --remove-orphans removes containers of services no longer in the compose
|
||||
# file (the reverse proxy).
|
||||
- name: Start NetBird containers
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
|
||||
cd /opt/netbird && docker compose up -d
|
||||
register: docker_compose_result
|
||||
changed_when: >-
|
||||
'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
|
||||
'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
|
||||
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stdout or
|
||||
'Removed' in docker_compose_result.stderr
|
||||
changed_when: "'Started' in docker_compose_result.stdout or 'Creating' in docker_compose_result.stdout"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Remove reverse-proxy volumes
|
||||
ansible.builtin.shell: |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
for v in netbird_netbird_proxy_certs netbird_netbird_proxy_data netbird_netbird_proxy_state; do
|
||||
if [ -n "$(docker volume ls -q --filter "name=^${v}$")" ]; then
|
||||
docker volume rm "$v"
|
||||
echo "removed $v"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
register: _proxy_volumes
|
||||
changed_when: "'removed' in _proxy_volumes.stdout"
|
||||
# Off-VPS backup of the management store (SPOF assessment 2026-07-25:
|
||||
# this SQLite DB — peers, setup keys, groups, routes — had zero backup
|
||||
# coverage; losing the VPS meant re-enrolling the entire mesh). The VPS
|
||||
# cannot reach any PBS (both PBS names resolve to the public proxy,
|
||||
# ports closed), so the CLUSTER pulls: a CronJob
|
||||
# (kubernetes/infrastructure/netbird-backup) ssh's in with a dedicated
|
||||
# key that is locked to the dump script below, and lands the tarball on
|
||||
# a Ceph PVC that Velero ships offsite. The dump is store.db ONLY —
|
||||
# /opt/netbird/config is regenerable from this role's templates + vault
|
||||
# and would otherwise leak the TURN secret into every tarball. Restore:
|
||||
# re-run this role (rebuilds config), then untar the dump into
|
||||
# /opt/netbird/management/.
|
||||
- name: Install the backup dump script
|
||||
ansible.builtin.copy:
|
||||
src: netbird-backup-dump
|
||||
dest: /usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump
|
||||
mode: "0755"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Remove reverse-proxy config and state
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: "{{ item }}"
|
||||
state: absent
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/proxy.env
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/proxy
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state
|
||||
|
||||
# The management store has no cluster-side backup. Pulling one put a root
|
||||
# key on this host that the cluster held, and this server's own state is
|
||||
# its own business to protect rather than the cluster's. Dropping the two
|
||||
# tasks that placed them would only stop ansible managing the key and the
|
||||
# script — the pair below revokes them instead, and can go once the role
|
||||
# has run against every host that ever carried them.
|
||||
- name: Remove the backup dump script
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: /usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump
|
||||
state: absent
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Revoke the cluster backup key
|
||||
- name: Authorize the cluster backup key (forced command, no shell)
|
||||
ansible.posix.authorized_key:
|
||||
user: root
|
||||
key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFeW/L9bHMTSa5/Qb0ClppCf4Z0hL39JwzI6tBmKd2FG netbird-backup@homelab-cluster"
|
||||
state: absent
|
||||
key_options: 'restrict,command="/usr/local/bin/netbird-backup-dump"'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Wait for management container to be ready
|
||||
ansible.builtin.pause:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -187,9 +187,10 @@ services:
|
||||
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-management.service=netbird-management"
|
||||
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.port=33073"
|
||||
- "traefik.http.services.netbird-management.loadbalancer.server.scheme=h2c"
|
||||
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — the proxy hosts (proxy-1, proxy-2)
|
||||
# connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443 and get
|
||||
# a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
|
||||
# gRPC reverse-proxy service — remote reverse-proxy instances (e.g.
|
||||
# proxy-1) connect here via NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=https://host:443.
|
||||
# The local proxy uses management:33073 directly, so it never needed
|
||||
# this route; remote ones get a 404 without it. Same backend (h2c 33073).
|
||||
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.rule=Host(`{{ netbird_server_host }}`) && PathPrefix(`/management.ProxyService/`)"
|
||||
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.entrypoints=websecure"
|
||||
- "traefik.http.routers.netbird-proxyservice.tls=true"
|
||||
@@ -220,6 +221,37 @@ services:
|
||||
max-size: "500m"
|
||||
max-file: "2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reverse Proxy Service (per docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/migration/enable-reverse-proxy)
|
||||
proxy:
|
||||
image: netbirdio/reverse-proxy:{{ netbird_version }}
|
||||
container_name: netbird-proxy
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- netbird
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
- management
|
||||
env_file:
|
||||
- ./proxy.env
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- netbird_proxy_certs:/certs
|
||||
- /opt/netbird/proxy-state:/var/lib/netbird
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
- "traefik.enable=true"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.entrypoints=websecure"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.rule=HostSNI(`*`)"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.tls.passthrough=true"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.service=proxy-tls"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.routers.proxy-passthrough.priority=1"
|
||||
- "traefik.tcp.services.proxy-tls.loadbalancer.server.port=8443"
|
||||
logging:
|
||||
driver: "json-file"
|
||||
options:
|
||||
max-size: "500m"
|
||||
max-file: "2"
|
||||
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
netbird:
|
||||
driver: bridge
|
||||
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
netbird_proxy_certs:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
NB_PROXY_DOMAIN={{ netbird_proxy_domain }}
|
||||
NB_PROXY_TOKEN={{ netbird_proxy_token }}
|
||||
NB_PROXY_MANAGEMENT_ADDRESS=http://management:33073
|
||||
NB_PROXY_ALLOW_INSECURE=true
|
||||
NB_PROXY_ADDRESS=:8443
|
||||
NB_PROXY_ACME_CERTIFICATES=true
|
||||
NB_PROXY_ACME_CHALLENGE_TYPE=tls-alpn-01
|
||||
NB_PROXY_CERTIFICATE_DIRECTORY=/certs
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# PBS Client configuration
|
||||
pbs_client_version: "latest"
|
||||
pbs_client_data_dir: "/opt/pbs-client"
|
||||
|
||||
# PBS Server connection (override in host_vars)
|
||||
pbs_server_host: "pbs.obg.renner.uno"
|
||||
pbs_server_port: 8007
|
||||
pbs_datastore: "backups"
|
||||
|
||||
# Authentication (override in vault!)
|
||||
pbs_username: "backup@pbs"
|
||||
pbs_password: ""
|
||||
# pbs_fingerprint: "" # Optional - omit for Let's Encrypt certs
|
||||
|
||||
# Backup configuration
|
||||
pbs_backup_id: "nas-1"
|
||||
pbs_backup_paths:
|
||||
- /volume1/docker
|
||||
- /volume1/homes
|
||||
|
||||
# Schedule (cron format)
|
||||
pbs_backup_schedule: "0 2 * * *" # 2 AM daily
|
||||
|
||||
# Retention policy (prune settings)
|
||||
pbs_keep_last: 3
|
||||
pbs_keep_daily: 7
|
||||
pbs_keep_weekly: 4
|
||||
pbs_keep_monthly: 6
|
||||
|
||||
# Container resource limits
|
||||
pbs_memory_limit: "2g"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
- name: Restart PBS client
|
||||
community.docker.docker_compose_v2:
|
||||
project_src: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
|
||||
state: restarted
|
||||
docker_cli: "{{ docker_cli | default('/usr/local/bin/docker') }}"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
- name: Create PBS client directories
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: "{{ item }}"
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
mode: '0755'
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
- "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
|
||||
- "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Copy PBS client docker-compose file
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: docker-compose.yml.j2
|
||||
dest: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
mode: '0644'
|
||||
notify: Restart PBS client
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Start PBS client via Docker Compose
|
||||
community.docker.docker_compose_v2:
|
||||
project_src: "{{ pbs_client_data_dir }}"
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
pull: always
|
||||
docker_cli: "{{ docker_cli | default('/usr/local/bin/docker') }}"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# PBS Client Environment Configuration
|
||||
PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
|
||||
PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
|
||||
{% if pbs_fingerprint | default('') != '' %}
|
||||
PBS_FINGERPRINT={{ pbs_fingerprint }}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
# PBS Backup Script for {{ pbs_backup_id }}
|
||||
# Managed by Ansible - do not edit manually
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
# Load environment
|
||||
source {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/.env
|
||||
|
||||
# Build backup command with all paths
|
||||
BACKUP_SOURCES=""
|
||||
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
|
||||
BACKUP_SOURCES="$BACKUP_SOURCES {{ path | basename }}.pxar:{{ path }}"
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Starting backup for {{ pbs_backup_id }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Run backup via Docker
|
||||
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client backup \
|
||||
$BACKUP_SOURCES \
|
||||
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
|
||||
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Backup completed"
|
||||
|
||||
# Prune old backups
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Pruning old backups"
|
||||
docker exec pbs-client proxmox-backup-client prune \
|
||||
--repository "${PBS_REPOSITORY}" \
|
||||
--backup-id {{ pbs_backup_id }} \
|
||||
--keep-last {{ pbs_keep_last }} \
|
||||
--keep-daily {{ pbs_keep_daily }} \
|
||||
--keep-weekly {{ pbs_keep_weekly }} \
|
||||
--keep-monthly {{ pbs_keep_monthly }}
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Prune completed"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
services:
|
||||
pbs-client:
|
||||
image: aterfax/pbs-client:{{ pbs_client_version }}
|
||||
container_name: pbs-client
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
hostname: {{ pbs_backup_id }}
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
- PBS_ENDPOINT={{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}
|
||||
- PBS_DATASTORE={{ pbs_datastore }}
|
||||
- PBS_API_KEY_NAME={{ pbs_username }}
|
||||
- PBS_API_KEY_SECRET={{ pbs_password }}
|
||||
- PBS_PASSWORD={{ pbs_password }}
|
||||
- PBS_ENCRYPTION_PASSWORD={{ pbs_encryption_password | default(pbs_password) }}
|
||||
- PBS_REPOSITORY={{ pbs_username }}@{{ pbs_server_host }}:{{ pbs_server_port }}:{{ pbs_datastore }}
|
||||
- PBS_BACKUP_ID={{ pbs_backup_id }}
|
||||
- CRON_SCHEDULE={{ pbs_backup_schedule }}
|
||||
- PBS_BACKUP_CMD_APPEND_EXTRA_OPTS=--crypt-mode=none
|
||||
- PRUNE_KEEP_LAST={{ pbs_keep_last | default(3) }}
|
||||
- PRUNE_KEEP_DAILY={{ pbs_keep_daily | default(7) }}
|
||||
- PRUNE_KEEP_WEEKLY={{ pbs_keep_weekly | default(4) }}
|
||||
- PRUNE_KEEP_MONTHLY={{ pbs_keep_monthly | default(6) }}
|
||||
- CRON_BACKUP_ONLY=1
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- {{ pbs_client_data_dir }}/state:/root/.config/proxmox-backup
|
||||
{% for path in pbs_backup_paths %}
|
||||
- "{{ path }}:/backups/{{ path | basename | replace(' ', '_') }}:ro"
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
tmpfs:
|
||||
- /tmp
|
||||
mem_limit: {{ pbs_memory_limit }}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
|
||||
|
||||
# Service root. Kept per-role so the role is usable on its own.
|
||||
edge_base_dir: /opt/edge-host
|
||||
|
||||
# Own compose project directory. Unchanged from the path used under the
|
||||
# previous shared project.
|
||||
sml_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/sml2mqtt"
|
||||
|
||||
# The compose file that used to hold both this service and zwave-js. Removed
|
||||
# once, so the fixed container_name is released for the new projects.
|
||||
edge_legacy_compose: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
|
||||
# Stable by-id symlink -- see the zwave-gateway role.
|
||||
edge_stromzaehler_device: /dev/serial/by-id/usb-FTDI_FT230X_Basic_UART_DK0E1GP5-if00-port0
|
||||
|
||||
# Hand-pinned on purpose: critical meter bridge, deliberately excluded from
|
||||
# image automation.
|
||||
edge_sml2mqtt_image: spacemanspiff2007/sml2mqtt:3.6.0
|
||||
|
||||
# Secret from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
|
||||
# edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
- name: Restart sml2mqtt
|
||||
ansible.builtin.command:
|
||||
cmd: docker compose up -d --force-recreate
|
||||
chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
|
||||
changed_when: true
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Its own compose project. It shared a compose file with the Z-Wave gateway,
|
||||
# which meant a change to either recreated both -- two unrelated services bound
|
||||
# to different USB devices. Data paths are unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create sml2mqtt directory
|
||||
ansible.builtin.file:
|
||||
path: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
mode: "0755"
|
||||
|
||||
# sml2mqtt reads only a config file and has no env override for the password,
|
||||
# so the rendered config carries it -- 0600, root-owned, same trust boundary as
|
||||
# the k8s init-container approach it replaced.
|
||||
- name: Deploy sml2mqtt config
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: sml2mqtt-config.yml.j2
|
||||
dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/config.yml"
|
||||
mode: "0600"
|
||||
notify: Restart sml2mqtt
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy sml2mqtt compose project
|
||||
ansible.builtin.template:
|
||||
src: docker-compose.yml.j2
|
||||
dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
mode: "0644"
|
||||
notify: Restart sml2mqtt
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Pull sml2mqtt image
|
||||
ansible.builtin.command:
|
||||
cmd: docker compose pull
|
||||
chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
|
||||
changed_when: false
|
||||
|
||||
# Tolerates a missing USB device, as for the Z-Wave gateway.
|
||||
- name: Start sml2mqtt
|
||||
ansible.builtin.command:
|
||||
cmd: docker compose up -d
|
||||
chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
|
||||
register: sml_compose_up
|
||||
failed_when: >-
|
||||
sml_compose_up.rc != 0
|
||||
and 'error gathering device information' not in sml_compose_up.stderr
|
||||
changed_when: >-
|
||||
'Started' in sml_compose_up.stderr or 'Created' in sml_compose_up.stderr
|
||||
or 'Started' in sml_compose_up.stdout or 'Creating' in sml_compose_up.stdout
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Warn if sml2mqtt is waiting for its USB device
|
||||
ansible.builtin.debug:
|
||||
msg: >-
|
||||
sml2mqtt could not start -- the FTDI meter head is not present:
|
||||
{{ sml_compose_up.stderr_lines | select('search', 'device') | list }}
|
||||
when: sml_compose_up.rc != 0
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
||||
# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Its own compose project -- see the role tasks for why it no longer shares a
|
||||
# file with the Z-Wave gateway.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Outbound-only (serial in, MQTT out). Host networking sidesteps the docker
|
||||
# NAT66 gap: the broker LB is IPv6-first and bridge-network v6 SYNs leave
|
||||
# unmasqueraded and die. The host stack reaches it fine (open3e proves it
|
||||
# continuously).
|
||||
services:
|
||||
sml2mqtt:
|
||||
image: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_image }}
|
||||
container_name: sml2mqtt
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
network_mode: host
|
||||
# Serial exclusivity: this is the ONLY reader of the meter port --
|
||||
# HA's edl21 integration stays disabled.
|
||||
devices:
|
||||
- "{{ edge_stromzaehler_device }}:/dev/stromzaehler"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./config.yml:/sml2mqtt/config.yml:ro
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml). Ported 1:1 from the k8s ConfigMap
|
||||
# sml2mqtt-config; only host and password delivery differ (broker is now
|
||||
# reached via its LoadBalancer hostname, password rendered by ansible
|
||||
# instead of an init container).
|
||||
logging:
|
||||
level: INFO
|
||||
file: stdout # 'stdout' -> docker logs (NOT '' — that opens the dir)
|
||||
|
||||
mqtt:
|
||||
connection:
|
||||
identifier: sml2mqtt-meter
|
||||
host: {{ edge_mqtt_host }}
|
||||
port: {{ edge_mqtt_port }}
|
||||
user: sml2mqtt
|
||||
password: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
|
||||
topic prefix: sml2mqtt
|
||||
defaults:
|
||||
qos: 0
|
||||
retain: false
|
||||
last will:
|
||||
topic: status
|
||||
|
||||
general:
|
||||
Wh in kWh: false # keep raw Wh to match edl21 history — HA long-term
|
||||
# stats continue with zero unit discontinuity
|
||||
republish after: 120 # re-emit unchanged values every 120 s
|
||||
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
- type: serial
|
||||
url: /dev/stromzaehler # FTDI FT230X, mapped by docker compose
|
||||
timeout: 3
|
||||
# 9600 8N1 are sml2mqtt defaults for SML/EDL21 — no override needed.
|
||||
@@ -54,35 +54,16 @@ Look for, in priority order:
|
||||
|
||||
Ground every finding in a specific location: `path:line` (or a hunk) from the
|
||||
diff or the checkout. **Do not invent** bugs, file paths, or behavior you have
|
||||
not confirmed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verify every claim yourself before you write it down. Never hand the
|
||||
verification to the author.** "I could not find X", "X may not exist", "this is
|
||||
unverified" is not a finding — it is unfinished work. For each suspicion:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Check the checkout: callers, the rest of the function, config elsewhere,
|
||||
existing uses of the same construct, the repo's `CLAUDE.md`/`README`.
|
||||
Shallow read-only clones of the other fleet repos that are publicly
|
||||
readable (at least `homelab`) are under `./.pr-review/context/<name>/` —
|
||||
look there when the change depends on how a sibling repo does something.
|
||||
A repo missing there simply was not readable; do not treat that as a finding.
|
||||
2. If it depends on an external API, syntax, device behavior or product
|
||||
version (a Home Assistant trigger/action, a Shelly generation, a Kubernetes
|
||||
field, a library call), read the authoritative documentation or source with
|
||||
WebFetch/WebSearch (official docs, the project's own repo or README). Your
|
||||
training data is NOT evidence: this repo targets current releases that may
|
||||
postdate it, and "I have not seen this syntax" says nothing about whether
|
||||
it exists.
|
||||
3. Only after both: state what you found, with the source (`path:line` or URL).
|
||||
|
||||
If after a real attempt you still cannot settle it, list it under
|
||||
"Unverified" with what you checked and why that was not enough. An unverified
|
||||
suspicion is never Blocking.
|
||||
not confirmed by reading the code. The whole repo is on disk in your working
|
||||
directory, so verify: if a judgement depends on a caller, the rest of a
|
||||
function, or config elsewhere, open it. If after checking you still cannot
|
||||
confirm a suspicion, say so explicitly and give the one check that would settle
|
||||
it — do not state a hypothesis as fact. A concern you could have checked by
|
||||
reading the checkout but did not is a weakness in your review.
|
||||
|
||||
Distinguish severity honestly. A blocking issue is a concrete defect — a bug
|
||||
that will misbehave, a security hole, or a breaking change — that you
|
||||
**verified** and can point at. Style preferences, optional improvements and
|
||||
anything unverified are not blocking.
|
||||
that will misbehave, a security hole, or a breaking change — that you can point
|
||||
at. Style preferences and optional improvements are not blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
## Output
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -103,11 +84,6 @@ Structure it as:
|
||||
why it is wrong. Omit this whole section if there are none — and say so in the
|
||||
Summary.>
|
||||
|
||||
## ⚪ Unverified
|
||||
|
||||
<Suspicions you could not settle after checking the checkout and the docs, each
|
||||
with what you checked. Omit if none.>
|
||||
|
||||
## 🟡 Suggestions
|
||||
|
||||
<Non-blocking improvements worth considering, each anchored to a location.>
|
||||
@@ -134,21 +110,17 @@ even if the PR added one; refer to it by location and flag it as blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"event": "APPROVE | COMMENT | REQUEST_CHANGES",
|
||||
"event": "COMMENT | REQUEST_CHANGES",
|
||||
"headline": "<short one-line summary of the outcome>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Use **`REQUEST_CHANGES`** only when your report lists at least one real
|
||||
**Blocking** issue.
|
||||
- Use **`APPROVE`** when the report has no 🔴 Blocking, no 🟡 Suggestions and no
|
||||
⚪ Unverified section — i.e. you checked the change and found nothing to
|
||||
raise. Nits (🟢) alone do not prevent it.
|
||||
- Use **`COMMENT`** otherwise.
|
||||
- The pipeline sets the final review event from the sections present in your
|
||||
report, so keep the section headings exactly as above and omit a section
|
||||
entirely when it is empty. Do not add a 🟡/🔴/⚪ heading unless you have a
|
||||
finding under it.
|
||||
- Use **`COMMENT`** otherwise (including when you have only suggestions/nits, or
|
||||
the PR looks good).
|
||||
- You cannot approve — there is no APPROVE option, by design. A clean PR gets a
|
||||
`COMMENT` review saying so.
|
||||
|
||||
If `pr.json` or `diff.patch` is missing or empty, write a `report.md` stating
|
||||
you had no diff to review and a `verdict.json` with `event: "COMMENT"`, then
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# PR review bot — the ONE implementation, run by every reviewed repo's
|
||||
# .woodpecker/pr-review.yml stub (k.renner/homelab, shelly-manager,
|
||||
# authentik-samba-bridge, homeassistant). Edit it here only; the stubs hold no
|
||||
# logic. Design notes (event-driven trigger, dedup marker, tokens, model
|
||||
# selection, posture) are in the stub and in prompt.md.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ---- Resolve the single triggering PR --------------------------------
|
||||
# Woodpecker hands us the repo (CI_REPO, canonical owner/repo) and the PR
|
||||
# number (CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST, a pull_request-event built-in). Build
|
||||
# /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl with 0 or 1 entries; an empty file makes
|
||||
# the next block a no-op (the agent never starts).
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
|
||||
AUTH="Authorization: token $REVIEW_TOKEN"
|
||||
SLUG="$CI_REPO"
|
||||
NUM="${CI_COMMIT_PULL_REQUEST:-}"
|
||||
REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN="review-bot"
|
||||
mkdir -p /tmp/pr-review
|
||||
: > /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$NUM" ]; then
|
||||
echo "No PR number in CI env (event=${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?}) — nothing to review."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "Triggered for $SLUG#$NUM (event ${CI_PIPELINE_EVENT:-?})."
|
||||
|
||||
if ! curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM" > /tmp/pr-review/pr.json; then
|
||||
echo "Cannot fetch $SLUG#$NUM (review-bot not a collaborator / PR gone?) — skipping."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
STATE=$(jq -r '.state' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
DRAFT=$(jq -r '.draft // false' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
TITLE=$(jq -r '.title' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
HEAD=$(jq -r '.head.sha' /tmp/pr-review/pr.json)
|
||||
SHORT=$(printf '%s' "$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip closed/merged, drafts, and WIP-titled PRs — not ready for review.
|
||||
case "$STATE" in open) ;; *) echo "#$NUM is $STATE — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
case "$DRAFT" in true) echo "#$NUM draft — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
case "$TITLE" in [Ww][Ii][Pp]:*|[Ww][Ii][Pp]\ *) echo "#$NUM WIP — skip."; exit 0;; esac
|
||||
|
||||
# Dedup: already reviewed at THIS head sha? (guards re-runs / restarts)
|
||||
REVIEWED=$(curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM/reviews?limit=50" \
|
||||
| jq -r --arg u "$REVIEW_BOT_LOGIN" --arg m "pr-review:sha=$HEAD" \
|
||||
'[.[] | select(.user.login == $u) | select(.body | contains($m))] | length' \
|
||||
|| echo 0)
|
||||
if [ "${REVIEWED:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "#$NUM already reviewed at $SHORT — skip."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
jq -c --arg slug "$SLUG" \
|
||||
'{slug: $slug, number: .number, head: .head.sha, base: .base.sha,
|
||||
title: .title, author: .user.login}' \
|
||||
/tmp/pr-review/pr.json >> /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
echo "#$NUM enqueued (head $SHORT)."
|
||||
# ---- Clone, pick model, review, post ---------------------------------
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
[ -s /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl ] || { echo "Nothing to review."; exit 0; }
|
||||
API="https://gitea.renner.uno/api/v1"
|
||||
AUTH="Authorization: token $REVIEW_TOKEN"
|
||||
WS="$PWD" # workspace = this repo, checked out at the PR head by Woodpecker
|
||||
MAX_DIFF_LINES=20000
|
||||
|
||||
# This script, the prompts and scripts/ci/ all come from the homelab@master
|
||||
# clone the per-repo stub made (see .woodpecker/pr-review.yml) — never from the
|
||||
# PR checkout, so a PR cannot change the rubric or the helper scripts it is
|
||||
# reviewed with.
|
||||
PROMPTS="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
|
||||
HOMELAB="$(cd "$PROMPTS/../../.." && pwd)" # repo root holding ci/ AND scripts/ci/
|
||||
echo "Using prompts from $PROMPTS"
|
||||
|
||||
gitea_post() { # method url datafile ; echoes+checks HTTP
|
||||
code=$(curl -s -o /tmp/pr-review/resp.json -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||||
-X "$1" -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
--data @"$3" "$2")
|
||||
echo "$1 $2 -> HTTP $code"
|
||||
if [ "$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$code" -ge 300 ]; then
|
||||
echo "Gitea API error body:"; cat /tmp/pr-review/resp.json; echo; return 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while IFS= read -r ITEM; do
|
||||
SLUG=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM" | jq -r '.slug')
|
||||
NUM=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM" | jq -r '.number')
|
||||
HEAD=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM" | jq -r '.head')
|
||||
TITLE=$(printf '%s' "$ITEM" | jq -r '.title')
|
||||
SHORT=$(printf '%s' "$HEAD" | cut -c1-8)
|
||||
echo "=== Reviewing $SLUG#$NUM ($SHORT) ==="
|
||||
D="/tmp/pr-review/$NUM"
|
||||
rm -rf "$D"; mkdir -p "$D"
|
||||
|
||||
# PR metadata + unified diff (authenticated; private repos need it).
|
||||
curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM" > "$D/pr.json"
|
||||
curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM.diff" > "$D/diff.full.patch" \
|
||||
|| { echo "Could not fetch diff for $SLUG#$NUM — skipping."; continue; }
|
||||
FILES=$(grep -c '^diff --git ' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
ADDED=$(grep -c '^+[^+]' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
DELETED=$(grep -c '^-[^-]' "$D/diff.full.patch" || true)
|
||||
TOTAL=$(wc -l < "$D/diff.full.patch")
|
||||
if [ "$TOTAL" -gt "$MAX_DIFF_LINES" ]; then
|
||||
head -n "$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$D/diff.full.patch" > "$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
printf '\n... [diff truncated at %s of %s lines] ...\n' \
|
||||
"$MAX_DIFF_LINES" "$TOTAL" >> "$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
else
|
||||
cp "$D/diff.full.patch" "$D/diff.patch"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
printf 'repo: %s\nPR: #%s\nfiles_changed: %s\nlines_added: %s\nlines_deleted: %s\ndiff_total_lines: %s\n' \
|
||||
"$SLUG" "$NUM" "$FILES" "$ADDED" "$DELETED" "$TOTAL" > "$D/stats.txt"
|
||||
|
||||
# No manual clone of the target repo: this runs on a pull_request
|
||||
# event, so Woodpecker's built-in clone already checked THIS repo out
|
||||
# at the PR head in $WS — the agents (which cd into $WS) read it
|
||||
# directly for context. The old cron model had to clone each target
|
||||
# repo by hand (its workspace was homelab@master), and that clone
|
||||
# embedded REVIEW_TOKEN in the URL, persisting a write-scoped PAT in
|
||||
# work/target/.git/config — readable by the review agent whose report
|
||||
# is posted publicly. Per-repo pull_request triggering makes the manual
|
||||
# clone redundant AND keeps the token off disk (it now lives only in
|
||||
# the ephemeral curl Authorization headers used for the API calls).
|
||||
|
||||
# Inputs the agents read live at ./.pr-review (symlink into $D).
|
||||
rm -f "$WS/.pr-review"; ln -s "$D" "$WS/.pr-review"
|
||||
|
||||
# Cross-repo context for the review agent: shallow, UNAUTHENTICATED clones of
|
||||
# the other fleet repos at ./.pr-review/context/<name> (a change here often
|
||||
# depends on how a sibling repo does it). No credential is involved, so only
|
||||
# publicly readable repos come through; a repo that needs auth fails fast
|
||||
# (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0) and is skipped, never fatal.
|
||||
CTX="$D/context"; mkdir -p "$CTX"
|
||||
for REPO in k.renner/homelab k.renner/homeassistant k.renner/shelly-manager k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge; do
|
||||
[ "$REPO" = "$SLUG" ] && continue
|
||||
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 git clone --quiet --depth 1 "https://gitea.renner.uno/$REPO" "$CTX/${REPO#*/}" 2>/dev/null \
|
||||
|| echo "No public context clone of $REPO (skipped)."
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Model: always the most capable CURRENT one, from the live catalog. ---
|
||||
# No model id, no family name and no complexity triage is baked in here: a
|
||||
# triage that downgrades "trivial" PRs to a small model is exactly what made
|
||||
# reviews shallow, and reviews are rare enough that the strongest model is the
|
||||
# right default. pick-model.sh reads the live catalog (Anthropic /v1/models via
|
||||
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN), prefers the newest of comparable models, validates
|
||||
# its pick against that catalog and echoes nothing on any failure — then the
|
||||
# review runs on the CLI's own default model. A model released tomorrow is
|
||||
# eligible the day the API lists it. REVIEW_TOKEN is stripped: the picker never
|
||||
# needs the write-scoped PAT.
|
||||
MODEL=$(env -u REVIEW_TOKEN sh "$HOMELAB/scripts/ci/pick-model.sh" \
|
||||
"careful, high-stakes code review of a pull request: verify claims against the code and external documentation, find real defects, avoid false positives; always pick the most capable and newest model available, regardless of PR size" || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$MODEL" ]; then echo "Review model: $MODEL"; else echo "Review model: CLI default (catalog/picker unavailable)"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Review with the chosen model ---
|
||||
( cd "$WS" && cat "$PROMPTS/prompt.md" | env -u REVIEW_TOKEN claude ${MODEL:+--model $MODEL} \
|
||||
--permission-mode acceptEdits \
|
||||
--allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,Write,WebFetch,WebSearch" \
|
||||
--settings "$PROMPTS/settings.json" \
|
||||
-p ) || echo "(review agent exited non-zero)"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -s "$D/report.md" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Agent wrote no report for $SLUG#$NUM — skipping post."
|
||||
continue
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Review event, derived from the report's own severity sections (not trusted
|
||||
# from verdict.json): any red (Blocking) -> REQUEST_CHANGES; no red, yellow
|
||||
# (Suggestions) or Unverified section on a non-empty diff -> APPROVE; else
|
||||
# COMMENT. An empty diff or a report that names no section never approves.
|
||||
if grep -q '^## 🔴' "$D/report.md"; then
|
||||
EVENT=REQUEST_CHANGES
|
||||
elif [ "$TOTAL" -gt 0 ] && ! grep -q -e '^## 🟡' -e '^## ⚪' "$D/report.md" \
|
||||
&& grep -q '^## Recommendation' "$D/report.md"; then
|
||||
EVENT=APPROVE
|
||||
else
|
||||
EVENT=COMMENT
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Assemble the review body: header + report + marker footer.
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf '🤖 **Automated review** — model `%s`, commit `%s`.\n\n' \
|
||||
"${MODEL:-CLI default}" "${HEAD}"
|
||||
printf '> Automated review by the `review-bot` pipeline: it approves only when it found nothing red or yellow, and a human still merges. Push new commits to get a fresh review.\n\n---\n\n'
|
||||
cat "$D/report.md"
|
||||
printf '\n\n<!-- pr-review:sha=%s -->\n' "$HEAD"
|
||||
} > "$D/body.md"
|
||||
jq -n --rawfile b "$D/body.md" --arg e "$EVENT" --arg c "$HEAD" \
|
||||
'{body: $b, event: $e, commit_id: $c}' > "$D/review.json"
|
||||
gitea_post POST "$API/repos/$SLUG/pulls/$NUM/reviews" "$D/review.json" \
|
||||
&& echo "Posted $EVENT review on $SLUG#$NUM." \
|
||||
|| echo "FAILED to post review on $SLUG#$NUM (continuing)."
|
||||
rm -f "$WS/.pr-review"
|
||||
done < /tmp/pr-review/worklist.jsonl
|
||||
echo "PR review run complete."
|
||||
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-consolidate agent in CI: read the vault and the",
|
||||
"//2": "source repos cloned under /root/source, read the live cluster through the",
|
||||
"//3": "ci-diagnostics kubeconfig, edit wiki/, output/ and the rotation state only.",
|
||||
"//4": "Deny rules win; git and kubectl are read-only subcommands, no network tools.",
|
||||
"permissions": {
|
||||
"allow": [
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/source/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/.wiki-consolidation-state.json)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-snapshot.sh:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl get:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl describe:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl version:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl api-resources:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl explain:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant log:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant show:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant diff:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant status:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant rev-parse:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant ls-files:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki-delete.sh:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(ls:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(date:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(wc:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(stat:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(head:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(tail:*)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"deny": [
|
||||
"Read(//proc/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//etc/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/.kube/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//woodpecker/**/.ci-diag/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/source/*/.git/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/source/**)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl apply:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl delete:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl patch:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl edit:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl scale:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl rollout:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl exec:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl cp:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl drain:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl cordon:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl label:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(kubectl annotate:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git push:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git reset:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git checkout:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git clean:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git rebase:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/Notes config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/Notes config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homelab config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C /root/source/homeassistant config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homelab config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git -C ~/source/homeassistant config:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(rm:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(rm -rf:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(curl:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(wget:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(ssh:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(tea:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(woodpecker:*)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes); the homelab and homeassistant repositories are checked out under ~/source/. `kubectl` reads the live cluster with a read-only identity.
|
||||
|
||||
Run the wiki-consolidate agent now for today's scheduled consolidation pass. Follow its instructions exactly: snapshot the vault to git first, abort if that fails, select today's rotating cohort of 20 from the state file, verify claims against both their sources and the live systems, act on the verdicts, write the dated report to ~/Notes/output/, update the state file, and snapshot again at the end. Do not push; the pipeline pushes the run's commits.
|
||||
|
||||
Report the counts and the coverage progress when you are done.
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
You are running as the scheduled wiki-maintenance job in CI. The Notes vault is checked out at ~/Notes (the repository k.renner/notes). Do exactly this, nothing else:
|
||||
|
||||
Glob ~/Notes/raw/*.md (top level only, never ~/Notes/raw/_processed/). Distill every file you find into ~/Notes/wiki/ following your process, including the ranker check for every concept. Move each fully processed source to ~/Notes/raw/_processed/. If raw/ has no top-level files besides _index.md, say so and stop.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not commit or push; the pipeline does that after you finish. Do not touch anything outside ~/Notes/wiki/ and ~/Notes/raw/.
|
||||
|
||||
End with one line per file: which wiki notes it produced or merged into, or "nothing distillable".
|
||||
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"//": "Permission scope for the wiki-maintenance agent (wiki-distill) in CI.",
|
||||
"//2": "The step's environment holds a Gitea push token, a TypeSafe key and the wiki-index",
|
||||
"//3": "client credential, so the Read tool is kept away from /proc (env dumps), /root outside",
|
||||
"//4": "the vault symlink target, /etc and the checkout's .git/. The vault itself is the work.",
|
||||
"//5": "Mirrors ci/agents/issue-fix/settings.json; absolute globs because the vault is reached",
|
||||
"//6": "through the ~/Notes symlink the pipeline creates.",
|
||||
"permissions": {
|
||||
"allow": [
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/wiki/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/output/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/raw/**)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(/root/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(mv /root/Notes/raw/:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(mkdir -p /root/Notes/:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_rank.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(~/Notes/bin/wiki_ask.py:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(mv ~/Notes/raw/:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(mkdir -p ~/Notes/:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(ls:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(date:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(wc:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(head:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(tail:*)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"deny": [
|
||||
"Read(//proc/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//etc/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/.config/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/.git/**)",
|
||||
"Read(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
|
||||
"Edit(//root/Notes/_archive/**)",
|
||||
"Bash(rm:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(git:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(curl:*)",
|
||||
"Bash(wget:*)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/dist/acp-agent.js b/dist/acp-agent.js
|
||||
index 0214a509eb5e7b777a69e4e34637941c275d27b1..403be02df66e25eee29e7d5bef14627011e02b30 100644
|
||||
--- a/dist/acp-agent.js
|
||||
+++ b/dist/acp-agent.js
|
||||
@@ -2922,9 +2922,19 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
|
||||
amount: message.total_cost_usd,
|
||||
currency: "USD",
|
||||
},
|
||||
- ...(message.origin && {
|
||||
- _meta: { "_claude/origin": message.origin },
|
||||
- }),
|
||||
+ _meta: {
|
||||
+ ...(message.origin && { "_claude/origin": message.origin }),
|
||||
+ // ACP's core Usage shape exposes context occupancy and
|
||||
+ // cost, but not the billable input/output split. Keep the
|
||||
+ // SDK's bounded aggregate in extension metadata so ACPX can
|
||||
+ // normalize it without persisting a raw provider message.
|
||||
+ usage: {
|
||||
+ input_tokens: message.usage.input_tokens,
|
||||
+ output_tokens: message.usage.output_tokens,
|
||||
+ cache_read_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_read_input_tokens,
|
||||
+ cache_creation_input_tokens: message.usage.cache_creation_input_tokens,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5311,6 +5321,10 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
|
||||
settingSources: ["user", "project", "local"],
|
||||
...(thinking !== undefined && { thinking }),
|
||||
...userProvidedOptions,
|
||||
+ // Paperclip Runner owns the complete session context. Its isolated
|
||||
+ // user root contains only assigned skills; project/local settings
|
||||
+ // would reintroduce host prompts, plugins, skills, and MCP servers.
|
||||
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && { settingSources: ["user"] }),
|
||||
...(settings && { settings }),
|
||||
env,
|
||||
// Override certain fields that must be controlled by ACP
|
||||
@@ -5318,7 +5332,9 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
|
||||
includePartialMessages: true,
|
||||
forwardSubagentText,
|
||||
mcpServers: {
|
||||
- ...(userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {}),
|
||||
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1"
|
||||
+ ? {}
|
||||
+ : (userProvidedOptions?.mcpServers || {})),
|
||||
...mcpServers,
|
||||
...(fileChangeAuditSupport
|
||||
? { [FILE_CHANGE_AUDIT_SERVER_NAME]: fileChangeAuditSupport.mcpServer }
|
||||
@@ -5329,6 +5345,16 @@ export class ClaudeAcpAgent {
|
||||
allowDangerouslySkipPermissions: ALLOW_BYPASS,
|
||||
permissionMode: initialPermissionMode,
|
||||
canUseTool: this.canUseTool(sessionId),
|
||||
+ // The runner pins this actual MCP endpoint before provider launch.
|
||||
+ // Exempt only task delivery/control tools at the SDK dispatch boundary,
|
||||
+ // not arbitrary provider permission metadata or MCP name prefixes.
|
||||
+ ...(process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_ISOLATED_CONTEXT === "1" && {
|
||||
+ allowedTools: mcpServers.paperclip?.type === "http"
|
||||
+ && mcpServers.paperclip.url === process.env.PAPERCLIP_ACPX_TASK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL
|
||||
+ ? ["paperclip_finish", "paperclip_block", "read_current_wake_comments", "request_human_input"]
|
||||
+ .map((tool) => `mcp__paperclip__${tool}`)
|
||||
+ : [],
|
||||
+ }),
|
||||
// Forward MCP elicitation requests onto ACP elicitation. Only attached
|
||||
// when the client advertised support, so non-supporting clients keep the
|
||||
// SDK's default (auto-decline) behavior. (AskUserQuestion is handled in
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"private": true,
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp": "0.73.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"overrides": {
|
||||
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "0.3.280"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Paperclip agent runtime + Go toolchain (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
|
||||
# image of the `k8s-go` sandbox environment.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
|
||||
# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
|
||||
# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Both binaries are static; they run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
|
||||
FROM golang:1.27.1-bookworm@sha256:69a7b9788769bec032d238959b61854e9ae87f57be9029ec04e9885fabf99195 AS go
|
||||
|
||||
# govulncheck (REN-488) has no upstream image: build it in the go stage, static.
|
||||
# The version pins the module; go verifies it against sum.golang.org. Renovate
|
||||
# does not track it (no regex manager here): bump by hand.
|
||||
FROM go AS govulncheck
|
||||
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOBIN=/out go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.8.0
|
||||
|
||||
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS golangci-lint
|
||||
|
||||
# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
|
||||
# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
|
||||
FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
|
||||
|
||||
COPY --from=go /usr/local/go /usr/local/go
|
||||
COPY --from=golangci-lint /usr/bin/golangci-lint /usr/local/bin/golangci-lint
|
||||
COPY --from=govulncheck /out/govulncheck /usr/local/bin/govulncheck
|
||||
# go and gofmt also in /usr/local/bin: a process started with the default PATH
|
||||
# (not the image ENV) still finds them.
|
||||
USER root
|
||||
RUN ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go \
|
||||
&& ln -s /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
|
||||
USER 1000:1000
|
||||
|
||||
# Time zones (REN-1196): the base has no /usr/share/zoneinfo, so
|
||||
# TZ=Europe/Berlin silently prints UTC and Python ZoneInfo() raises. The
|
||||
# default zone stays UTC; agents set TZ where they need local time.
|
||||
USER root
|
||||
RUN apt-get update \
|
||||
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata \
|
||||
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
|
||||
USER 1000:1000
|
||||
|
||||
# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
|
||||
# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
|
||||
# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
|
||||
# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
|
||||
# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
|
||||
# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
|
||||
# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
|
||||
# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
|
||||
# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
|
||||
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
|
||||
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
|
||||
USER root
|
||||
RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
|
||||
&& npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
|
||||
&& git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
|
||||
&& npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
|
||||
&& ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
|
||||
&& rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
|
||||
&& npm cache clean --force
|
||||
USER 1000:1000
|
||||
|
||||
# The sandbox pod has a read-only root FS. Writable mounts: $HOME
|
||||
# (/home/paperclip, 1Gi), $HOME/.cache (1Gi), /tmp (2Gi), /workspace.
|
||||
# - GOPATH (module cache) goes to /tmp, the biggest one.
|
||||
# - GOCACHE and the golangci-lint cache keep their default under $HOME/.cache.
|
||||
# - GOTOOLCHAIN=local: a go.mod asking for a newer Go fails clearly instead of
|
||||
# downloading a toolchain through the egress allow-list.
|
||||
ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH \
|
||||
GOPATH=/tmp/go \
|
||||
GOTOOLCHAIN=local
|
||||
|
||||
# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
|
||||
# The PATH check uses the base image's default PATH, not the ENV above.
|
||||
RUN TZ=Europe/Berlin date +%Z | grep -Eq '^CES?T$' \
|
||||
&& python3 -c "from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo; ZoneInfo('Europe/Berlin')" \
|
||||
&& go version && golangci-lint version \
|
||||
&& env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
|
||||
sh -ec 'for t in go gofmt golangci-lint govulncheck claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
|
||||
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Paperclip agent runtime + cluster tools (REN-284 / REN-286). Runs as the pod
|
||||
# image of the `k8s-ops` sandbox environment.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Every tool comes from its upstream image, pinned by tag AND digest, so the
|
||||
# dockerfile manager in Renovate bumps version and digest together. A curl +
|
||||
# sha256 pin (as in ci/images/k8s) would break on every Renovate bump.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# kubectl and flux match the ci-k8s image. All four binaries are static; they
|
||||
# run on the Ubuntu 22.04 base unchanged.
|
||||
FROM registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.37.1@sha256:b7cab618e281b1ee7484e7b706a96e2135fbb6e072c2a573a7dab4e87d7f2385 AS kubectl
|
||||
FROM ghcr.io/fluxcd/flux-cli:v2.9.6@sha256:b1ac18156f227af9a524b842a96f2c20986c7a779ef721df3ba4e4540f449d76 AS flux
|
||||
FROM registry.k8s.io/kustomize/kustomize:v5.8.1@sha256:899fcd3bc898160e62bcaf82932b0cb29ba38d16272353db2e7acbba82129429 AS kustomize
|
||||
FROM alpine/helm:4.3.0@sha256:a6cf54599ccb99d90cf0712b30f03fdb3cab062e6b94e0418cc4db7e8a1464b2 AS helm
|
||||
|
||||
# upstream publishes no `v1` tag, only git-<sha> tags. Renovate keeps the
|
||||
# digest current but cannot order commit tags; a newer base is a manual bump.
|
||||
FROM ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:git-38d8f371722b315d2fb3bbaa512518742e33ce2f@sha256:33ad285f9476b8637d6d940c08d577797030125675bdf4f497a8ed1f79261c8b
|
||||
|
||||
COPY --from=kubectl /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
|
||||
COPY --from=flux /usr/local/bin/flux /usr/local/bin/flux
|
||||
COPY --from=kustomize /app/kustomize /usr/local/bin/kustomize
|
||||
COPY --from=helm /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
|
||||
|
||||
# Time zones (REN-1196): the base has no /usr/share/zoneinfo, so
|
||||
# TZ=Europe/Berlin silently prints UTC and Python ZoneInfo() raises. The
|
||||
# default zone stays UTC; agents set TZ where they need local time.
|
||||
# jq (REN-1345): the agents' duty lists and the Paperclip skill use it.
|
||||
USER root
|
||||
RUN apt-get update \
|
||||
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata jq \
|
||||
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
|
||||
USER 1000:1000
|
||||
|
||||
# ACP server the Paperclip ACP engine starts in the pod (REN-302). Version and
|
||||
# patch match what Paperclip ships: packages/adapters/claude-local/package.json
|
||||
# pins 0.73.0 and applies patches/@agentclientprotocol__claude-agent-acp@0.73.0.patch
|
||||
# (isolated context, task-tool allow-list, usage metadata). Not bumped by
|
||||
# Renovate on purpose: bump only together with Paperclip, and replace the patch.
|
||||
# Paperclip also overrides the SDK (package.json pnpm overrides:
|
||||
# claude-agent-sdk 0.3.280); a plain `npm install -g` ignores that and pulls an
|
||||
# older SDK. So install from a package.json with the same override into a
|
||||
# fixed prefix, and link the binary into /usr/local/bin.
|
||||
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp.package.json /opt/claude-agent-acp/package.json
|
||||
COPY agent-runtime-common/claude-agent-acp-0.73.0.patch /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch
|
||||
USER root
|
||||
RUN cd /opt/claude-agent-acp \
|
||||
&& npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund \
|
||||
&& git -C node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp apply /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
|
||||
&& npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | grep -q 'claude-agent-sdk@0.3.280' \
|
||||
&& ln -s /opt/claude-agent-acp/node_modules/.bin/claude-agent-acp /usr/local/bin/claude-agent-acp \
|
||||
&& rm /tmp/claude-agent-acp.patch \
|
||||
&& npm cache clean --force
|
||||
USER 1000:1000
|
||||
|
||||
# Read-only root FS: kubectl (~/.kube/cache) and helm (~/.cache, ~/.config)
|
||||
# write only under $HOME, which the sandbox pod mounts writable. No ENV needed.
|
||||
|
||||
# Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
|
||||
RUN TZ=Europe/Berlin date +%Z | grep -Eq '^CES?T$' \
|
||||
&& python3 -c "from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo; ZoneInfo('Europe/Berlin')" \
|
||||
&& kubectl version --client && flux version --client && kustomize version && helm version && jq --version \
|
||||
&& env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
|
||||
sh -ec 'for t in kubectl flux kustomize helm jq claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
|
||||
|
||||
# Alpine plus jq. Nothing application-specific — a general-purpose base for any
|
||||
# workload that needs to read JSON from a shell script.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
|
||||
|
||||
# Alpine plus the openssl CLI. Nothing application-specific — named for what it
|
||||
# is, so anything needing `openssl s_client` / `x509` from a shell script can use
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk add --no-cache \
|
||||
ansible \
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
|
||||
# bird: BGP daemon for the pod-network mesh over pod0. Distro package, no build
|
||||
# step — the image is the binary plus its runtime.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 3.22 rather than the 3.21 the other images here pin: bird2 first appears in
|
||||
# 3.22/community.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Config is read from /etc/bird/bird.conf, not the package default
|
||||
# /etc/bird.conf, so the mount cannot shadow what the package ships.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# kubectl renders the init container's per-node config: go-template-file for
|
||||
# the templating, a field selector for excluding the node itself, in-cluster
|
||||
# config for the auth. From the distro, so there is no version literal to drift
|
||||
# and no download to trust. It is only ever used to read core/v1 Nodes.
|
||||
RUN apk add --no-cache bird2 kubectl
|
||||
|
||||
# Fails the build rather than the first pod if a binary or its path is wrong.
|
||||
RUN /usr/sbin/bird --version \
|
||||
&& kubectl version --client > /dev/null
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/sbin/bird", "-f", "-c", "/etc/bird/bird.conf"]
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
FROM node:24-alpine@sha256:ebfe2f90462722a7a4de65e91990e97fe0d401c70e0e762c5b53302f905ec1c1
|
||||
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2
|
||||
|
||||
# Default to the latest Claude Code. Pinning a fixed version is the wrong
|
||||
# default here: old releases eventually stop working against the API, so a
|
||||
@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
|
||||
git \
|
||||
jq \
|
||||
openssh-client \
|
||||
openssl \
|
||||
python3 \
|
||||
py3-yaml
|
||||
openssl
|
||||
|
||||
# Install Claude Code, then make the resulting layer byte-stable so that a
|
||||
# rebuild of the SAME version DEDUPS in the Gitea registry instead of orphaning
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
|
||||
# amd64 only, matching the ARCH the installer already hardcoded and the cluster's
|
||||
# node architecture. Add a second stage if a different arch is ever needed.
|
||||
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6 AS fetch
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d AS fetch
|
||||
|
||||
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.9.1
|
||||
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=b98f74a0f8522f0a83867178729c1aa70f2158f90c45a2ca8fa791db1c76b303
|
||||
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_VERSION=v1.5.1
|
||||
ARG CNI_PLUGINS_SHA256=77baa2f669980a82255ffa2f2717de823992480271ee778aa51a9c60ae89ff9b
|
||||
|
||||
# busybox wget and tar are already in the base; nothing is installed here
|
||||
# either. sha256sum -c fails the BUILD if the artifact does not match, which is
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ RUN set -eu; \
|
||||
[ -x "/plugins/$p" ] || { echo "FATAL: /plugins/$p missing or not executable" >&2; exit 1; }; \
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
|
||||
|
||||
# Alpine rather than scratch: the installer needs a shell to copy the binaries
|
||||
# onto the host. busybox covers cp/mv/chown/ls, so nothing is added.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
|
||||
# namespace, so can0 is only reachable with network_mode: host. That is also
|
||||
# how the local MQTT broker on 127.0.0.1:1883 is reached. CAN_RAW sockets need
|
||||
# no capabilities, so both run unprivileged.
|
||||
FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151 AS build
|
||||
FROM python:3.13-slim AS build
|
||||
|
||||
# Pins live here, in the artifact, rather than in Ansible variables.
|
||||
#
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ RUN git clone --quiet https://github.com/MyHomeMyData/E3onCAN.git /opt/e3oncan \
|
||||
&& rm -rf /opt/e3oncan/.git
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151
|
||||
FROM python:3.13-slim
|
||||
|
||||
ARG OPEN3E_REF=6553c10453a6bae1210908f38a5af2481a46a3e5
|
||||
ARG E3ONCAN_REF=461dcbdf97e8d72d2edb9929c63b39382af6c3a1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
|
||||
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d
|
||||
|
||||
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.13.10
|
||||
ARG TALOS_VERSION=v1.12.6
|
||||
ARG VELERO_VERSION=v1.16.0
|
||||
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.3
|
||||
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.5
|
||||
ARG KUBECTL_VERSION=v1.36.2
|
||||
ARG FLUX_VERSION=2.9.2
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk add --no-cache \
|
||||
aws-cli \
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
|
||||
|
||||
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/talosctl \
|
||||
"https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/${TALOS_VERSION}/talosctl-linux-amd64" \
|
||||
&& echo "28e9ccd9aebd690fa03d8cf2582221d87ea38b2a1704f411d75a03589c58f2aa /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
|
||||
&& echo "4c41a3b10b075292e64b182283d558e9d8e935f43239de1ed4e4b14359593efb /usr/local/bin/talosctl" | sha256sum -c - \
|
||||
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/talosctl
|
||||
|
||||
RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ RUN curl -sfL -o /usr/local/bin/kubectl \
|
||||
|
||||
RUN curl -sfL -o /tmp/flux.tar.gz \
|
||||
"https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/releases/download/v${FLUX_VERSION}/flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" \
|
||||
&& echo "b853df82adfd7736f580692f9f734473d571606307139f8fd20c2a80dd1ff473 /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
|
||||
&& echo "4092b367fd060097976fb7261601f79420ecf7266328417dfd8dfee27de0e6a3 /tmp/flux.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
|
||||
&& tar -xzf /tmp/flux.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin flux \
|
||||
&& chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flux \
|
||||
&& rm -f /tmp/flux.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# netbird-service-sync: reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services (public
|
||||
# domains -> TLS passthrough -> Traefik ClusterIP) from Ingresses carrying the
|
||||
# public label. Standard library only, so the image is the interpreter plus one
|
||||
# file; runs unprivileged as its own user.
|
||||
FROM python:3.14-slim@sha256:c3e521df8b2b498a7a682e7e18676771cb80c6b75b8699af886b2d554ce40151
|
||||
|
||||
RUN useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin controller
|
||||
COPY controller.py /opt/controller.py
|
||||
|
||||
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
|
||||
USER controller
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/opt/controller.py"]
|
||||
@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""netbird-service-sync: reconcile NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses.
|
||||
|
||||
Source of truth: every Ingress carrying the public label (dns.renner.uno/public).
|
||||
For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
|
||||
service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
|
||||
subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
|
||||
Traefik untouched, the proxy terminates nothing, and no domain resource is
|
||||
involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers. The target sends a
|
||||
PROXY protocol v2 header so Traefik (and CrowdSec behind its access log) sees
|
||||
the WAN client address instead of the routing peer's pod IP.
|
||||
|
||||
Ownership is derived from NetBird itself, not from local state: a service is
|
||||
managed iff its mode is "tls" and its target is this controller's subnet
|
||||
resource. Services that do not match (the hand-made HTTP/domain ones) are never
|
||||
touched; a desired host held by such a service is reported and skipped until
|
||||
that service is removed by hand.
|
||||
|
||||
Credentials: the NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
|
||||
Kubernetes auth role, exactly like the setup-key rotator; it never lands in a
|
||||
Kubernetes Secret or in a log line.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
import urllib.request
|
||||
|
||||
LOG = logging.getLogger("netbird-service-sync")
|
||||
|
||||
NB = os.environ.get("NB_MANAGEMENT_URL", "https://netbird.renner.uno").rstrip("/")
|
||||
BAO_ADDR = os.environ.get("BAO_ADDR", "http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200").rstrip("/")
|
||||
BAO_ROLE = os.environ.get("BAO_ROLE", "netbird-service-sync")
|
||||
BAO_PAT_PATH = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_PATH", "homelab/data/infrastructure/secret-rotators-bootstrap/netbird")
|
||||
BAO_PAT_KEY = os.environ.get("BAO_PAT_KEY", "pat")
|
||||
SERVICE_CIDR = os.environ.get("SERVICE_CIDR", "10.96.0.0/12")
|
||||
NETWORK_NAME = os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME", "k8s public ingress")
|
||||
ROUTER_GROUP = os.environ.get("ROUTER_GROUP_NAME", "k8s-ingress-router")
|
||||
SOURCE_GROUP = os.environ.get("SOURCE_GROUP_NAME", "All")
|
||||
TRAEFIK_NS, TRAEFIK_SVC = os.environ.get("TRAEFIK_SERVICE", "ingress/traefik").split("/", 1)
|
||||
PUBLIC_LABEL = os.environ.get("PUBLIC_LABEL", "dns.renner.uno/public")
|
||||
LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("LISTEN_PORT", "443"))
|
||||
INTERVAL = int(os.environ.get("INTERVAL_SECONDS", "60"))
|
||||
HTTP_TIMEOUT = 20
|
||||
|
||||
K8S_API = "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
|
||||
K8S_TOKEN_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
|
||||
K8S_CA_FILE = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ApiError(Exception):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def http(method, url, body=None, headers=None, cafile=None):
|
||||
data = None if body is None else json.dumps(body).encode()
|
||||
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
|
||||
req.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
|
||||
if data is not None:
|
||||
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
for k, v in (headers or {}).items():
|
||||
req.add_header(k, v)
|
||||
ctx = None
|
||||
if cafile:
|
||||
import ssl
|
||||
ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT, context=ctx) as resp:
|
||||
raw = resp.read()
|
||||
return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
|
||||
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
||||
detail = e.read().decode(errors="replace")[:300]
|
||||
raise ApiError(f"{method} {url} -> {e.code}: {detail}") from None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Kubernetes -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def k8s(path):
|
||||
with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
|
||||
token = f.read().strip()
|
||||
return http("GET", K8S_API + path, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}, cafile=K8S_CA_FILE)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def desired_hosts():
|
||||
sel = urllib.parse.quote(f"{PUBLIC_LABEL}=true")
|
||||
ingresses = k8s(f"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/ingresses?labelSelector={sel}")
|
||||
hosts = {}
|
||||
for ing in ingresses.get("items", []):
|
||||
ref = f'{ing["metadata"]["namespace"]}/{ing["metadata"]["name"]}'
|
||||
for rule in ing.get("spec", {}).get("rules", []):
|
||||
host = rule.get("host")
|
||||
if not host or host.startswith("*"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
hosts.setdefault(host, ref)
|
||||
return hosts
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def traefik_cluster_ip():
|
||||
svc = k8s(f"/api/v1/namespaces/{TRAEFIK_NS}/services/{TRAEFIK_SVC}")
|
||||
for ip in svc["spec"].get("clusterIPs", []):
|
||||
if ":" not in ip:
|
||||
return ip
|
||||
raise ApiError(f"{TRAEFIK_NS}/{TRAEFIK_SVC} has no IPv4 ClusterIP")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- OpenBao ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def netbird_pat():
|
||||
with open(K8S_TOKEN_FILE) as f:
|
||||
jwt = f.read().strip()
|
||||
login = http("POST", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/auth/kubernetes/login", {"role": BAO_ROLE, "jwt": jwt})
|
||||
bao_token = login["auth"]["client_token"]
|
||||
kv = http("GET", f"{BAO_ADDR}/v1/{BAO_PAT_PATH}", headers={"X-Vault-Token": bao_token})
|
||||
pat = kv["data"]["data"].get(BAO_PAT_KEY)
|
||||
if not pat:
|
||||
raise ApiError(f"OpenBao {BAO_PAT_PATH} has no key {BAO_PAT_KEY}")
|
||||
return pat
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- NetBird management -----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
class NetBird:
|
||||
def __init__(self, pat):
|
||||
self.h = {"Authorization": f"Token {pat}"}
|
||||
|
||||
def get(self, path):
|
||||
return http("GET", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
|
||||
|
||||
def list(self, path):
|
||||
# An empty collection comes back as an empty body / null, not [].
|
||||
return self.get(path) or []
|
||||
|
||||
def post(self, path, body):
|
||||
return http("POST", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
|
||||
|
||||
def put(self, path, body):
|
||||
return http("PUT", f"{NB}/api/{path}", body, headers=self.h)
|
||||
|
||||
def delete(self, path):
|
||||
return http("DELETE", f"{NB}/api/{path}", headers=self.h)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def group_id(nb, name):
|
||||
for g in nb.list("groups"):
|
||||
if g["name"] == name:
|
||||
return g["id"]
|
||||
raise ApiError(f"NetBird group {name!r} not found")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_network(nb):
|
||||
for n in nb.list("networks"):
|
||||
if n["name"] == NETWORK_NAME:
|
||||
return n["id"]
|
||||
n = nb.post("networks", {"name": NETWORK_NAME,
|
||||
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync; public ingress via TLS passthrough"})
|
||||
LOG.info("created network %s (%s)", NETWORK_NAME, n["id"])
|
||||
return n["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_resource(nb, net):
|
||||
for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/resources"):
|
||||
if r.get("address") == SERVICE_CIDR:
|
||||
return r["id"]
|
||||
r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/resources", {"name": "cluster service CIDR", "address": SERVICE_CIDR,
|
||||
"description": "managed by netbird-service-sync",
|
||||
"enabled": True, "groups": []})
|
||||
LOG.info("created subnet resource %s (%s)", SERVICE_CIDR, r["id"])
|
||||
return r["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_router(nb, net, router_group):
|
||||
for r in nb.list(f"networks/{net}/routers"):
|
||||
if router_group in (r.get("peer_groups") or []):
|
||||
return r["id"]
|
||||
r = nb.post(f"networks/{net}/routers", {"peer_groups": [router_group], "metric": 9999,
|
||||
"masquerade": True, "enabled": True})
|
||||
LOG.info("created router on group %s (%s)", ROUTER_GROUP, r["id"])
|
||||
return r["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group):
|
||||
name = f"{NETWORK_NAME} access"
|
||||
for p in nb.list("policies"):
|
||||
if p["name"] == name:
|
||||
return p["id"]
|
||||
p = nb.post("policies", {"name": name, "enabled": True, "rules": [{
|
||||
"name": name, "enabled": True, "action": "accept", "protocol": "tcp",
|
||||
"ports": [str(LISTEN_PORT)], "bidirectional": False, "sources": [source_group],
|
||||
"destinationResource": {"id": resource, "type": "subnet"}}]})
|
||||
LOG.info("created policy %s (%s)", name, p["id"])
|
||||
return p["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def service_body(host, resource, target_ip):
|
||||
# proxy_protocol: PROXY v2 header carries the WAN client address to
|
||||
# Traefik (proxyProtocol.trustedIPs on websecure); TCP/TLS modes only.
|
||||
return {"name": host, "domain": host, "mode": "tls", "listen_port": LISTEN_PORT, "enabled": True,
|
||||
"targets": [{"target_type": "subnet", "target_id": resource, "protocol": "tcp",
|
||||
"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True,
|
||||
"options": {"proxy_protocol": True}}]}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_managed(svc, resource):
|
||||
return svc.get("mode") == "tls" and any(t.get("target_id") == resource for t in svc.get("targets") or [])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def target_matches(svc, target_ip):
|
||||
if svc.get("listen_port") != LISTEN_PORT or not svc.get("enabled"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
ts = svc.get("targets") or []
|
||||
return len(ts) == 1 and ts[0].get("host") == target_ip and ts[0].get("port") == 443 \
|
||||
and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled") \
|
||||
and (ts[0].get("options") or {}).get("proxy_protocol") is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reconcile():
|
||||
hosts = desired_hosts()
|
||||
target_ip = traefik_cluster_ip()
|
||||
nb = NetBird(netbird_pat())
|
||||
|
||||
router_group = group_id(nb, ROUTER_GROUP)
|
||||
source_group = group_id(nb, SOURCE_GROUP)
|
||||
net = ensure_network(nb)
|
||||
resource = ensure_resource(nb, net)
|
||||
ensure_router(nb, net, router_group)
|
||||
ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group)
|
||||
|
||||
by_domain = {s["domain"]: s for s in nb.list("reverse-proxies/services")}
|
||||
created = updated = deleted = held = 0
|
||||
|
||||
for host, ref in sorted(hosts.items()):
|
||||
svc = by_domain.get(host)
|
||||
if svc is None:
|
||||
nb.post("reverse-proxies/services", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
|
||||
LOG.info("created %s (from %s) -> %s:443", host, ref, target_ip)
|
||||
created += 1
|
||||
elif not is_managed(svc, resource):
|
||||
LOG.warning("%s is held by unmanaged service %s (mode %s); remove it to migrate",
|
||||
host, svc["id"], svc.get("mode"))
|
||||
held += 1
|
||||
elif not target_matches(svc, target_ip):
|
||||
nb.put(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}", service_body(host, resource, target_ip))
|
||||
LOG.info("updated %s -> %s:443", host, target_ip)
|
||||
updated += 1
|
||||
|
||||
for domain, svc in by_domain.items():
|
||||
if is_managed(svc, resource) and domain not in hosts:
|
||||
nb.delete(f"reverse-proxies/services/{svc['id']}")
|
||||
LOG.info("deleted %s (no public Ingress carries it any more)", domain)
|
||||
deleted += 1
|
||||
|
||||
LOG.info("reconciled: %d hosts desired, %d created, %d updated, %d deleted, %d held by unmanaged services",
|
||||
len(hosts), created, updated, deleted, held)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
logging.basicConfig(level=os.environ.get("LOG_LEVEL", "INFO"), stream=sys.stdout,
|
||||
format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
|
||||
if os.environ.get("ONCE") == "1":
|
||||
reconcile()
|
||||
return
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reconcile()
|
||||
except Exception as e: # keep running; the next pass retries
|
||||
LOG.error("reconcile failed: %s", e)
|
||||
time.sleep(INTERVAL)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Paperclip server image (REN-401)
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream `paperclipai/paperclip` at the commit in `upstream.env`, plus every
|
||||
`*.patch` in this directory. Built by `.woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml`,
|
||||
pushed as `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:build.<unix-ts>`, rolled out
|
||||
by Flux image automation (`kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Why
|
||||
|
||||
k8s sandbox runs fail: the run path never sets the lease `remoteCwd`, so file
|
||||
sync into the pod fails (paperclipai/paperclip#13864). The fix is
|
||||
paperclipai/paperclip#13733, open and not merged.
|
||||
`pr-13733-lease-remote-cwd.patch` is that PR's diff (head `5f320bf6`).
|
||||
|
||||
#13733 covers only the run path. Adapter environment tests (binding an agent
|
||||
to a k8s environment) sync managed config before any workspace is realized,
|
||||
so the lease still has no `remoteCwd` and the Claude test fails with
|
||||
`claude_managed_config_dir_failed` (REN-409). The fix is
|
||||
paperclipai/paperclip#14769, also open: the plugin sets `remoteCwd:
|
||||
/workspace` when it acquires or resumes a lease.
|
||||
`pr-14769-probe-remote-cwd.patch` is that PR's diff (head `10dc7371`).
|
||||
|
||||
Claude auto memory is lost after every run (REN-541): it lives under
|
||||
`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, which Paperclip makes fresh per run and deletes.
|
||||
`ren-541-claude-auto-memory.patch` makes the ACPX engine write
|
||||
`autoMemoryDirectory: <AGENT_HOME>/memory` into the per-run
|
||||
`.claude/settings.local.json`. `AGENT_HOME` is restored before and saved after
|
||||
every run, local and in k8s pods. The value is not part of the session
|
||||
fingerprint, so resume is unchanged. No upstream PR yet; rename the patch to
|
||||
`pr-<n>-…` once there is one.
|
||||
|
||||
Claude sessions never resume with a managed AI connection (REN-563): the
|
||||
server gives every run a fresh temp home (`HOME`, `XDG_*`,
|
||||
`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, …) and deletes it after the run.
|
||||
`ren-563-acpx-claude-session-resume.patch` fixes both halves for local runs:
|
||||
the ACPX engine hashes a fixed placeholder for those paths in the session
|
||||
fingerprint (`adapterEnvHash`), as the server's own fingerprint already does,
|
||||
and links `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/projects` (the Claude transcripts) to
|
||||
`<stateDir>/claude-projects`, which persists. Both must ship together: a
|
||||
stable fingerprint without the transcript makes the resumed turn fail with
|
||||
"Resource not found" (homelab#1111, reverted in #1113). Remote runs are
|
||||
unchanged. No upstream PR yet.
|
||||
|
||||
A cancelled or failed k8s pod run blocks its card for good (REN-841). The
|
||||
owner's next comment waits on `remote_cleanup`, because the server continues
|
||||
only when every remote lease carries a provider termination receipt
|
||||
(`explicit-native-continuation.ts`), and the Kubernetes plugin's
|
||||
`onEnvironmentReleaseLease` / `onEnvironmentDestroyLease` returned `void`.
|
||||
`ren-841-k8s-termination-receipt.patch` makes both return
|
||||
`{ providerLeaseId, state: "destroyed" }`, but only after the Sandbox CR or
|
||||
Job (and, on destroy, the pod) reads 404, polling for up to 20 s, below the
|
||||
server's 30 s plugin RPC timeout. If that check times out or fails, the hook
|
||||
returns no receipt, as before. No upstream PR yet.
|
||||
|
||||
Agents in k8s pods cannot read their own secrets (REN-1345): the sandbox
|
||||
callback bridge answers `403 Route not allowed` for `/api/agents/me/secrets`,
|
||||
although upstream's own Paperclip skill documents those routes for runs.
|
||||
`ren-1345-bridge-agent-secrets.patch` adds the five `/api/agents/me` secret
|
||||
routes (list, read one value, list/create/withdraw proposals) to the bridge
|
||||
allowlist. The server still resolves the agent from the run JWT and checks
|
||||
the binding; company-wide secret routes stay denied. No upstream PR yet.
|
||||
|
||||
## Files
|
||||
|
||||
- `upstream.env` — pinned commit and the version string stamped into the
|
||||
image. Bump both together.
|
||||
- `prepare.sh` — fetches the commit, applies the patches, writes
|
||||
`Dockerfile.kaniko` (upstream's `COPY --parents` line split into plain
|
||||
`COPY` lines; kaniko does not support `--parents`), and adds the build of
|
||||
the Kubernetes sandbox provider plugin to the `build` stage (REN-405):
|
||||
upstream's `production` target ships only its source, so the plugin fails
|
||||
with "no longer exposes a Paperclip manifest". The build fails if
|
||||
`dist/manifest.js` is missing.
|
||||
- `*.patch` — applied in name order with `git apply`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Moving to a newer upstream commit
|
||||
|
||||
Set `PAPERCLIP_COMMIT` to the new master commit and `PAPERCLIP_VERSION` to
|
||||
`git describe --tags --match 'v*' --long <commit>`, then run
|
||||
`sh prepare.sh /tmp/src`: it fails if a patch no longer applies.
|
||||
|
||||
## Exit: when every patch here is merged upstream
|
||||
|
||||
Renovate cannot watch an upstream PR, so this is a manual step. Once
|
||||
upstream nightly contains all of them:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/paperclip.yaml`: back to
|
||||
`ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip` with `filterTags.pattern: '^nightly$'`
|
||||
(the version before REN-401 in git history).
|
||||
2. `renovate.json`: swap `gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip` back to
|
||||
`ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip` in the image-automation exclusion list.
|
||||
3. Delete this directory and `.woodpecker/build-paperclip.yml`.
|
||||
|
||||
Image automation then rewrites `kubernetes/apps/paperclip/paperclip.yaml`
|
||||
to the nightly digest by itself.
|
||||
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts b/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
|
||||
index f3d1fc659..812cae357 100644
|
||||
--- a/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
|
||||
+++ b/server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +430,51 @@ describe("environmentRunOrchestrator — realizeForRun", () => {
|
||||
expect(result.persistedExecutionWorkspace).toEqual(updatedEw);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
+ it("persists the realized cwd as remoteCwd when realization returns no workspaceRealization payload", async () => {
|
||||
+ const runtime = makeMockRuntime({
|
||||
+ realizeWorkspace: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
+ cwd: "/workspace",
|
||||
+ metadata: { provider: "kubernetes", remoteCwd: "/workspace" },
|
||||
+ }),
|
||||
+ } as Partial<EnvironmentRuntimeService>);
|
||||
+ mockResolveEnvironmentExecutionTarget.mockResolvedValue({ kind: "local", environmentId: "env-1", leaseId: "lease-1" });
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const orchestrator = environmentRunOrchestrator(mockDb, { environmentRuntime: runtime });
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ await orchestrator.realizeForRun(
|
||||
+ makeRealizeInput({ environment: makeEnvironment("sandbox") }),
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ expect(mockUpdateLeaseMetadata).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
||||
+ "lease-1",
|
||||
+ expect.objectContaining({ remoteCwd: "/workspace" }),
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ // Nothing to record about the realization shape, so the execution workspace
|
||||
+ // row is left untouched.
|
||||
+ expect(mockUpdateExecutionWorkspace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
+ });
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ it("does not rewrite lease metadata when the realized cwd already matches the lease", async () => {
|
||||
+ const runtime = makeMockRuntime({
|
||||
+ realizeWorkspace: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
+ cwd: "/workspace",
|
||||
+ metadata: { provider: "kubernetes", remoteCwd: "/workspace" },
|
||||
+ }),
|
||||
+ } as Partial<EnvironmentRuntimeService>);
|
||||
+ mockResolveEnvironmentExecutionTarget.mockResolvedValue({ kind: "local", environmentId: "env-1", leaseId: "lease-1" });
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const orchestrator = environmentRunOrchestrator(mockDb, { environmentRuntime: runtime });
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ await orchestrator.realizeForRun(
|
||||
+ makeRealizeInput({
|
||||
+ environment: makeEnvironment("sandbox"),
|
||||
+ lease: makeLease({ metadata: { remoteCwd: "/workspace" } }),
|
||||
+ }),
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ expect(mockUpdateLeaseMetadata).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
+ });
|
||||
+
|
||||
it("runs a remote provision command after workspace realization when configured", async () => {
|
||||
mockBuildWorkspaceRealizationRequest.mockReturnValue({
|
||||
version: 1,
|
||||
diff --git a/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts b/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
|
||||
index 97cca667e..e76f64913 100644
|
||||
--- a/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
|
||||
+++ b/server/src/services/environment-run-orchestrator.ts
|
||||
@@ -485,16 +485,29 @@ export function environmentRunOrchestrator(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 3: Persist realization metadata on lease and execution workspace
|
||||
- if (Object.keys(workspaceRealization).length > 0) {
|
||||
+ const hasWorkspaceRealization = Object.keys(workspaceRealization).length > 0;
|
||||
+ // A driver that realizes the workspace reports the directory it prepared
|
||||
+ // through the realization `cwd`. Persist it on the lease as `remoteCwd`, so
|
||||
+ // every later step that receives only the lease — native file sync, a
|
||||
+ // resumed lease, a second run against the same lease — confines itself to
|
||||
+ // the same root. Without it a driver whose realization returns no
|
||||
+ // `workspaceRealization` payload leaves the lease without a root at all,
|
||||
+ // and the sync step fails even though realization succeeded.
|
||||
+ const currentRemoteCwd =
|
||||
+ typeof lease.metadata?.remoteCwd === "string" ? lease.metadata.remoteCwd.trim() : "";
|
||||
+ const realizedRemoteCwd =
|
||||
+ realizedWorkspaceCwd && realizedWorkspaceCwd !== currentRemoteCwd ? realizedWorkspaceCwd : null;
|
||||
+ if (hasWorkspaceRealization || realizedRemoteCwd) {
|
||||
const nextLeaseMetadata = {
|
||||
...(lease.metadata ?? {}),
|
||||
- workspaceRealization,
|
||||
+ ...(hasWorkspaceRealization ? { workspaceRealization } : {}),
|
||||
+ ...(realizedRemoteCwd ? { remoteCwd: realizedRemoteCwd } : {}),
|
||||
};
|
||||
const updatedLease = await environmentsSvc.updateLeaseMetadata(lease.id, nextLeaseMetadata);
|
||||
if (updatedLease) {
|
||||
lease = updatedLease;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (persistedExecutionWorkspace) {
|
||||
+ if (hasWorkspaceRealization && persistedExecutionWorkspace) {
|
||||
const updatedEw = await executionWorkspacesSvc.update(persistedExecutionWorkspace.id, {
|
||||
metadata: {
|
||||
...(persistedExecutionWorkspace.metadata ?? {}),
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user