feat(openproject): sign in through Authentik OIDC

Authentik gets an OpenProject confidential OAuth2 provider, application and
OpenProject Users group in the blueprint; the client secret is read from
OpenBao apps/openproject through an ExternalSecret and !Env. OpenProject
seeds the matching provider from env, and its egress policy allows
Authentik via Traefik.

Refs: REN-1363

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+when:
+  # Deploy only on master (merge) + manual — never auto-deploy from a branch.
+  - event: push
+    branch: master
+    path:
+      - "ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/**"
+      - "ansible/plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
+      - "ansible/inventory/group_vars/edge_host/**"
+      - ".woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml"
+  - event: deployment
+    evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge"'
+
+timeout: 30
+
+steps:
+  - name: deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge
+    image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/ci-ansible:2026-04-29
+    environment:
+      ANSIBLE_FORCE_COLOR: "true"
+      ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING: "false"
+      ANSIBLE_ROLES_PATH: "../roles:./roles"
+      SSH_PRIVATE_KEY:
+        from_secret: ssh_private_key
+      VAULT_PASS:
+        from_secret: vault_pass
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p ~/.ssh
+      - echo "$SSH_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+      - chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+      - printf "Host *\n\tStrictHostKeyChecking no\n\tUserKnownHostsFile /dev/null\n" > ~/.ssh/config
+      - cd ansible
+      - echo "$VAULT_PASS" > .vault_pass && chmod 600 .vault_pass
+      - export ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=.vault_pass
+      # Local MQTT bridge on the edge hosts only (REN-1307); restarts only the
+      # local mosquitto on edge-1, never the cluster broker.
+      - ansible-playbook -i inventory/ plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml -v

ansible/docs/edge-host.md

@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ inventory change.
 |---|---|---|
 | Innomaker USB2CAN (Vitocal/VX3 + E380) | `heating_can` | `plays/install-heating-can.yml` |
 | Nabu Casa ZWA-2 Z-Wave radio | `zwave_gateway` | `plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml` |
-| FTDI serial power-meter head | `power_meter` | `plays/install-power-meter.yml` |
 
 Add the host to the matching group, then run that playbook. They depend on
 the base play having run: all three need the local MQTT bridge, and two of
@@ -87,7 +86,6 @@ kubectl -n home-assistant get secret zwave-js-session -o jsonpath='{.data.sessio
 
 ```yaml
 # vault.yml
-vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "..."
 vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "..."
 vault_edge_loki_password: "..."   # dedicated edge-1 Loki push cred (see "Logging & eMMC")
@@ -238,6 +236,21 @@ cluster-side change was needed**: one authenticates as the `open3e` user
 out). The local broker is `allow_anonymous` on loopback — the trust boundary
 is the host; nothing off-host can reach it.
 
+**Bridge credential (REN-1307).** The two vault-password bridges are being
+replaced by one bridge as the register account `edge-1`
+(`kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml`). Its password is pushed
+by mqtt-account-controller to `edge-mqtt-cred` (`:8443`, the controller's
+esp32 API over HTTPS). That endpoint accepts only a client certificate from
+the MQTT CA with CN `mqtt-account-controller`; edge-1 holds the public CA and
+its own server key, nothing else. On a push it writes
+`/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/edge-1.conf`, deletes `bridge.d/legacy.conf` and
+restarts the local mosquitto. The controller sets a new password whenever the
+bridge reports "not connected" (also after a reinstall), so no play run is
+needed for a rotation. `.woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` runs
+`plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml` on merge. Diagnosis: `journalctl -u
+edge-mqtt-cred`, and `mosquitto_sub -t '$SYS/broker/connection/edge-1/state'`
+(retained `1` = connected).
+
 **eMMC:** the local broker writes **nothing** to flash — `persistence false`
 (retained/queued messages in RAM) and `log_dest stdout` (to the volatile
 journal → Loki). Do not add persistence or log-file settings to

ansible/inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vars.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 # Secret indirection — real values live in vault.yml (ansible-vault) next
 # to this file; see docs/edge-host.md for how to populate it from
 # the cluster secrets.
-edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_open3e_mqtt_password: "{{ vault_edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}"
 edge_zwavejs_session_secret: "{{ vault_edge_zwavejs_session_secret }}"
 # Loki push credential (dedicated 'edge-1' user, Traefik basic-auth on the
@@ -39,8 +38,8 @@ chrony_hwtimestamp: false
 
 # --- Local MQTT contract -------------------------------------------------
 # Shared between the broker and its clients, so it belongs to the inventory
-# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can and
-# power-meter-sml publish here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
+# rather than to either side's role. mqtt-bridge listens here; heating-can
+# publishes here; and the bridge authenticates to the cluster
 # broker AS the open3e user, so it needs that identity too.
 #
 # Keeping these in one role's defaults only worked while a single play loaded

ansible/inventory/pve_hosts.yml

@@ -41,13 +41,9 @@ edge-1.iot.renner.uno
 [heating_can]
 edge-1.iot.renner.uno
 
-[power_meter]
-edge-1.iot.renner.uno
-
 [edge_host:children]
 zwave_gateway
 heating_can
-power_meter
 
 # NTP servers. edge-1 was added here so the role would survive the PVE hosts
 # being retired for bare-metal Talos, which cannot run chrony or keepalived

ansible/plays/edge-mqtt-bridge.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+# Local MQTT bridge and its credential receiver only (REN-1307). Run by
+# .woodpecker/deploy-edge-mqtt-bridge.yml on merge, so a change to this role
+# reaches edge-1 without a play run by hand. The full base play
+# (install-edge-host.yml) carries the same role.
+- name: Converge the edge MQTT bridge
+  hosts: edge_host
+  become: true
+
+  # The SML power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) is retired for good: owner decision
+  # 2026-09-19, grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus. Its role and
+  # play are gone; this removes the leftover compose project from edge-1 on
+  # the next pipeline run. Idempotent: a no-op once the directory is gone.
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: Check for the retired sml2mqtt compose project
+      ansible.builtin.stat:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt/docker-compose.yml
+      register: edge_sml2mqtt_compose
+
+    - name: Stop the retired sml2mqtt container
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: docker compose down --remove-orphans
+        chdir: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
+      when: edge_sml2mqtt_compose.stat.exists
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Remove the retired sml2mqtt directory
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /opt/edge-host/sml2mqtt
+        state: absent
+
+  roles:
+    - mqtt-bridge

ansible/plays/install-edge-host.yml

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #
 #   plays/install-zwave-gateway.yml   [zwave_gateway]   ZWA-2 radio
 #   plays/install-heating-can.yml     [heating_can]     Innomaker USB2CAN
-#   plays/install-power-meter.yml     [power_meter]     FTDI meter head
 #
 # Splitting the roles without splitting the plays would have kept the coupling:
 # one play applying every role to one group is the monolith again, a layer up.

ansible/plays/install-power-meter.yml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
----
-# Power-meter reader (sml2mqtt) for hosts with the FTDI serial meter head
-# attached.
-#
-# Targets [power_meter]: membership means the meter head is physically present.
-#
-# Requires the base play (plays/install-edge-host.yml) to have run: it needs
-# docker and publishes to the local MQTT bridge.
-- name: Install power-meter reader
-  hosts: power_meter
-  become: true
-
-  roles:
-    - power-meter-sml

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/defaults/main.yml

@@ -10,3 +10,14 @@
 edge_mqtt_cluster_host: mqtt.renner.uno
 edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port: 8883
 edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
+
+# --- Bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) ------------
+# The cluster account the bridge logs in as (register entry in
+# kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml). The controller pushes
+# its password to edge-mqtt-cred and rotates it when the bridge reports
+# "not connected"; there is no copy in ansible-vault.
+edge_mqtt_bridge_account: edge-1
+# HTTPS port of edge-mqtt-cred (esp32 device API, mTLS). Only a client
+# certificate from the MQTT CA with this CN is accepted.
+edge_mqtt_cred_port: 8443
+edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn: mqtt-account-controller

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/files/edge-mqtt-cred.py

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# Managed by ansible (roles/mqtt-bridge). Receives the cluster bridge password
+# from mqtt-account-controller (REN-1307) so no plaintext copy lives in
+# ansible-vault and no play run is needed to rotate it.
+#
+# Speaks the controller's esp32 device API over HTTPS:
+#   GET /api/status   -> {"mqtt": {"connected": bool}}
+#   PUT /api/settings <- {"mqtt": {"user": "...", "pass": "..."}}
+# A client certificate from the MQTT CA with CN mqtt-account-controller is
+# required; nothing else may call it. The server key is generated on this
+# host and never leaves it (the controller pins it on first contact).
+#
+# PUT writes the bridge file (template + credentials), removes the legacy
+# vault-password bridges and restarts the local mosquitto. The password is
+# kept only in that 0640 root:mosquitto file.
+import grp
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import ssl
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+CONF = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
+WRITE = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def connected():
+    try:
+        out = subprocess.run(
+            ["mosquitto_sub", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", str(CONF["local_port"]),
+             "-t", CONF["state_topic"], "-C", "1", "-W", "3"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdout
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        return False
+    return out.strip() == "1"
+
+
+def write_bridge(user, password):
+    with open(CONF["template"]) as f:
+        body = f.read()
+    body += f"remote_username {user}\nremote_password {password}\n"
+    d = os.path.dirname(CONF["bridge_file"])
+    fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=d, prefix=".edge-mqtt-cred.")
+    with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
+        f.write(body)
+    os.chown(tmp, 0, grp.getgrnam("mosquitto").gr_gid)
+    os.chmod(tmp, 0o640)
+    os.replace(tmp, CONF["bridge_file"])
+    for legacy in CONF["legacy_files"]:
+        if os.path.exists(legacy):
+            os.remove(legacy)
+    subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "mosquitto"], check=True, timeout=60)
+
+
+def valid(s):
+    # Controller passwords are random URL-safe tokens; anything with
+    # whitespace or a control character would break the config line.
+    return isinstance(s, str) and 0 < len(s) <= 256 and s.isprintable() and not any(c.isspace() for c in s)
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def authorized(self):
+        cert = self.connection.getpeercert() or {}
+        cns = [v for rdn in cert.get("subject", ()) for k, v in rdn if k == "commonName"]
+        if cns != [CONF["allowed_cn"]]:
+            self.send_error(403)
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    def reply(self, code, obj=None):
+        data = b"" if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode()
+        self.send_response(code)
+        if data:
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        if not self.authorized():
+            return
+        if self.path != "/api/status":
+            return self.send_error(404)
+        self.reply(200, {"mqtt": {"connected": connected()}})
+
+    def do_PUT(self):
+        if not self.authorized():
+            return
+        if self.path != "/api/settings":
+            return self.send_error(404)
+        try:
+            n = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+            if not 0 < n <= 4096:
+                raise ValueError("body size")
+            m = json.loads(self.rfile.read(n))["mqtt"]
+            user, password = m["user"], m["pass"]
+        except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
+            return self.send_error(400)
+        if user != CONF["user"] or not valid(password):
+            return self.send_error(400)
+        with WRITE:
+            write_bridge(user, password)
+        self.log_message("bridge credentials for %s replaced, mosquitto restarted", user)
+        self.reply(204)
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
+        sys.stderr.write("%s %s\n" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args))
+
+
+class Server(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    address_family = socket.AF_INET6
+
+    def server_bind(self):
+        self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
+        super().server_bind()
+
+    def get_request(self):
+        # The TLS handshake runs in the request thread, with a timeout, so a
+        # stalled peer cannot block the accept loop.
+        sock, addr = self.socket.accept()
+        sock.settimeout(10)
+        return self.ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=True, do_handshake_on_connect=False), addr
+
+
+def main():
+    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+    ctx.load_cert_chain(CONF["cert"], CONF["key"])
+    ctx.load_verify_locations(CONF["ca"])
+    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+    srv = Server(("::", CONF["port"]), Handler)
+    srv.ctx = ctx
+    srv.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/files/mqtt-ca.crt

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIUN8ne4k4Wif9O83GDyKiBP0Ma7EIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
+GTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUmVubmVyIE1RVFQgQ0EwHhcNMjYxMDA2MTUzMDE1WhcNMzYx
+MDAzMTUzMDE1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5SZW5uZXIgTVFUVCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49
+AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOZhZF2JDoyvVg2oIXSbJAuAWDcoG22RxPA4oMKRMA/b
+XzIY566D2k6cVnWqbil9s/q4O2mj+Epo7plBw8NwuOOjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
+AwICpDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcqSDDiLZzhrvqq9f16Y08
+CO7QfzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiBFkxd9pXnqIcjReEcOTvCBZ3HxKu2jNQGL
+/le7gunTGgIgZapWAcu4awa+wmZcR/z2luOjD2GhIT15um14Z+sstJk=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/handlers/main.yml

@@ -5,3 +5,9 @@
   ansible.builtin.service:
     name: mosquitto
     state: restarted
+
+- name: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: edge-mqtt-cred
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/tasks/main.yml

@@ -11,13 +11,39 @@
     name: mosquitto
     state: present
 
-- name: Deploy local mosquitto bridge config
+- name: Create the bridge directory
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
+    state: directory
+    owner: root
+    group: mosquitto
+    mode: "0750"
+
+- name: Check for the controller-managed bridge file
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf"
+  register: edge_mqtt_bridge_managed
+
+# Until mqtt-account-controller has pushed the first password, keep the
+# vault-password bridges so the cluster never loses edge-1's data. Once the
+# managed file exists, never render them again (edge-mqtt-cred removed them).
+- name: Deploy legacy vault-password bridges
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2
+    dest: /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf
+    owner: root
+    group: mosquitto
+    mode: "0640"   # carries the legacy cluster bridge credentials
+  when: not edge_mqtt_bridge_managed.stat.exists
+  notify: Restart mosquitto
+
+- name: Deploy local mosquitto config
   ansible.builtin.template:
     src: edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2
     dest: /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
     owner: root
     group: mosquitto
-    mode: "0640"   # carries the cluster bridge credentials
+    mode: "0640"
   notify: Restart mosquitto
 
 - name: Enable local mosquitto bridge
@@ -25,3 +51,59 @@
     name: mosquitto
     enabled: true
     state: started
+
+# --- edge-mqtt-cred (REN-1307): receives the bridge password from
+# mqtt-account-controller. edge-1 holds only the public MQTT CA and its own
+# server key, generated here and never copied off the host.
+- name: Create edge-mqtt-cred config directory
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred
+    state: directory
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "0700"
+
+- name: Generate edge-mqtt-cred server key and certificate
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    cmd: >-
+      openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1
+      -nodes -days 36500 -subj "/CN={{ inventory_hostname }}"
+      -keyout /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key -out /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt
+    creates: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred files
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: "{{ item.src }}"
+    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.py, dest: /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred, mode: "0755"}
+    # Public CA of the cluster's MQTT client certificates
+    # (kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/mqtt-ca.yaml), valid until 2036-10-03.
+    - {src: mqtt-ca.crt, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt, mode: "0644"}
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Deploy edge-mqtt-cred config and bridge template
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: "{{ item.src }}"
+    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json, mode: "0600"}
+    # Read only on the controller's next push: a change here reaches the
+    # running bridge when the password is next set.
+    - {src: edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2, dest: /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in, mode: "0600"}
+    - {src: edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/edge-mqtt-cred.service, mode: "0644"}
+  notify: Restart edge-mqtt-cred
+
+- name: Enable edge-mqtt-cred
+  ansible.builtin.systemd:
+    name: edge-mqtt-cred
+    enabled: true
+    state: started
+    daemon_reload: true

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/templates/edge-1-bridge.conf.in.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). edge-mqtt-cred appends
+# remote_username/remote_password to this and writes the result to
+# /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf. One bridge for
+# open3e, as the register account `{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}`
+# (ACL readwrite open3e/#). sml2mqtt is retired (SML reader, 2026-09-19).
+connection {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}
+address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
+bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
+bridge_insecure false
+remote_clientid edge1-bridge
+cleansession false
+try_private true
+restart_timeout 5 30
+queue_qos0_messages true
+# The bridge state goes to the LOCAL broker only (retained 1/0); edge-mqtt-cred
+# reads it to answer the controller's "connected?".
+notifications true
+notifications_local_only true
+notification_topic $SYS/broker/connection/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}/state
+topic open3e/# out 0
+topic open3e/cmnd in 0

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/templates/edge-mqtt-bridge-legacy.conf.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge. Legacy vault-password bridges, rendered only
+# while /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/{{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf does not
+# exist; edge-mqtt-cred deletes this file on the controller's first push
+# (REN-1307). Remove with the vault keys once edge-1 is on the register account.
+# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
+# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
+# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
+connection edge1-open3e
+address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
+bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
+bridge_insecure false
+remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
+remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
+remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
+cleansession false
+try_private true
+notifications false
+restart_timeout 5 30
+queue_qos0_messages true
+topic open3e/# out 0
+topic open3e/cmnd in 0

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/templates/edge-mqtt-bridge.conf.j2

@@ -22,36 +22,9 @@ log_type notice
 listener 1883 127.0.0.1
 allow_anonymous true
 
-# --- Bridge 1: open3e datapoints + command topic, as the cluster `open3e`
-# user (its ACL is `readwrite open3e/#`, which covers publishing datapoints
-# and subscribing to open3e/cmnd). e3oncan also publishes under open3e/#.
-connection edge1-open3e
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_user }}
-remote_password {{ edge_open3e_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-open3e
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic open3e/# out 0
-topic open3e/cmnd in 0
-
-# --- Bridge 2: power-meter topics, as the cluster `sml2mqtt` user (ACL
-# `write sml2mqtt/#`). Publish-only, so no `in` topics.
-connection edge1-sml2mqtt
-address {{ edge_mqtt_cluster_host }}:{{ edge_mqtt_cluster_tls_port }}
-bridge_cafile {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_cafile }}
-bridge_insecure false
-remote_username sml2mqtt
-remote_password {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
-remote_clientid edge1-bridge-sml2mqtt
-cleansession false
-try_private true
-notifications false
-restart_timeout 5 30
-queue_qos0_messages true
-topic sml2mqtt/# out 0
+# --- Bridges to the cluster broker (REN-1307). bridge.d holds either
+# {{ edge_mqtt_bridge_account }}.conf, written by edge-mqtt-cred with the password
+# mqtt-account-controller pushed, or, until that first push, legacy.conf with
+# the two vault-password bridges. edge-mqtt-cred deletes legacy.conf when it
+# writes the new file.
+include_dir /etc/mosquitto/bridge.d

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/templates/edge-mqtt-cred.json.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{{ {
+  "port": edge_mqtt_cred_port,
+  "allowed_cn": edge_mqtt_cred_allowed_cn,
+  "user": edge_mqtt_bridge_account,
+  "cert": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.crt",
+  "key": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/tls.key",
+  "ca": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/mqtt-ca.crt",
+  "template": "/etc/edge-mqtt-cred/bridge.conf.in",
+  "bridge_file": "/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ ".conf",
+  "legacy_files": ["/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d/legacy.conf"],
+  "local_port": edge_mqtt_port,
+  "state_topic": "$SYS/broker/connection/" ~ edge_mqtt_bridge_account ~ "/state",
+} | to_nice_json }}

ansible/roles/mqtt-bridge/templates/edge-mqtt-cred.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Managed by roles/mqtt-bridge (REN-1307). See /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred.
+[Unit]
+Description=Receives the MQTT bridge credential from mqtt-account-controller
+After=network-online.target mosquitto.service
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/sbin/edge-mqtt-cred /etc/edge-mqtt-cred/config.json
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+# Root only to write the bridge file and restart mosquitto.
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/etc/mosquitto/bridge.d
+ProtectHome=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

ansible/roles/power-meter-sml/defaults/main.yml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
----
-# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
-
-# Service root. Kept per-role so the role is usable on its own.
-edge_base_dir: /opt/edge-host
-
-# Own compose project directory. Unchanged from the path used under the
-# previous shared project.
-sml_base_dir: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/sml2mqtt"
-
-# The compose file that used to hold both this service and zwave-js. Removed
-# once, so the fixed container_name is released for the new projects.
-edge_legacy_compose: "{{ edge_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-
-# Stable by-id symlink -- see the zwave-gateway role.
-edge_stromzaehler_device: /dev/serial/by-id/usb-FTDI_FT230X_Basic_UART_DK0E1GP5-if00-port0
-
-# Hand-pinned on purpose: critical meter bridge, deliberately excluded from
-# image automation.
-edge_sml2mqtt_image: spacemanspiff2007/sml2mqtt:3.6.0
-
-# Secret from inventory/group_vars/edge_host/vault.yml:
-#   edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password

ansible/roles/power-meter-sml/handlers/main.yml

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
----
-- name: Restart sml2mqtt
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d --force-recreate
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: true

ansible/roles/power-meter-sml/tasks/main.yml

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
----
-# Power-meter reader: sml2mqtt against the FTDI serial meter head.
-#
-# Its own compose project. It shared a compose file with the Z-Wave gateway,
-# which meant a change to either recreated both -- two unrelated services bound
-# to different USB devices. Data paths are unchanged.
-
-- name: Create sml2mqtt directory
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-    state: directory
-    mode: "0755"
-
-# sml2mqtt reads only a config file and has no env override for the password,
-# so the rendered config carries it -- 0600, root-owned, same trust boundary as
-# the k8s init-container approach it replaced.
-- name: Deploy sml2mqtt config
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: sml2mqtt-config.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/config.yml"
-    mode: "0600"
-  notify: Restart sml2mqtt
-
-- name: Deploy sml2mqtt compose project
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: docker-compose.yml.j2
-    dest: "{{ sml_base_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: Restart sml2mqtt
-
-- name: Pull sml2mqtt image
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose pull
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  changed_when: false
-
-# Tolerates a missing USB device, as for the Z-Wave gateway.
-- name: Start sml2mqtt
-  ansible.builtin.command:
-    cmd: docker compose up -d
-    chdir: "{{ sml_base_dir }}"
-  register: sml_compose_up
-  failed_when: >-
-    sml_compose_up.rc != 0
-    and 'error gathering device information' not in sml_compose_up.stderr
-  changed_when: >-
-    'Started' in sml_compose_up.stderr or 'Created' in sml_compose_up.stderr
-    or 'Started' in sml_compose_up.stdout or 'Creating' in sml_compose_up.stdout
-
-- name: Warn if sml2mqtt is waiting for its USB device
-  ansible.builtin.debug:
-    msg: >-
-      sml2mqtt could not start -- the FTDI meter head is not present:
-      {{ sml_compose_up.stderr_lines | select('search', 'device') | list }}
-  when: sml_compose_up.rc != 0

ansible/roles/power-meter-sml/templates/docker-compose.yml.j2

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml).
-#
-# Its own compose project -- see the role tasks for why it no longer shares a
-# file with the Z-Wave gateway.
-#
-# Outbound-only (serial in, MQTT out). Host networking sidesteps the docker
-# NAT66 gap: the broker LB is IPv6-first and bridge-network v6 SYNs leave
-# unmasqueraded and die. The host stack reaches it fine (open3e proves it
-# continuously).
-services:
-  sml2mqtt:
-    image: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_image }}
-    container_name: sml2mqtt
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    network_mode: host
-    # Serial exclusivity: this is the ONLY reader of the meter port --
-    # HA's edl21 integration stays disabled.
-    devices:
-      - "{{ edge_stromzaehler_device }}:/dev/stromzaehler"
-    volumes:
-      - ./config.yml:/sml2mqtt/config.yml:ro

ansible/roles/power-meter-sml/templates/sml2mqtt-config.yml.j2

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by ansible (roles/power-meter-sml). Ported 1:1 from the k8s ConfigMap
-# sml2mqtt-config; only host and password delivery differ (broker is now
-# reached via its LoadBalancer hostname, password rendered by ansible
-# instead of an init container).
-logging:
-  level: INFO
-  file: stdout        # 'stdout' -> docker logs (NOT '' — that opens the dir)
-
-mqtt:
-  connection:
-    identifier: sml2mqtt-meter
-    host: {{ edge_mqtt_host }}
-    port: {{ edge_mqtt_port }}
-    user: sml2mqtt
-    password: {{ edge_sml2mqtt_mqtt_password }}
-  topic prefix: sml2mqtt
-  defaults:
-    qos: 0
-    retain: false
-  last will:
-    topic: status
-
-general:
-  Wh in kWh: false      # keep raw Wh to match edl21 history — HA long-term
-                        # stats continue with zero unit discontinuity
-  republish after: 120  # re-emit unchanged values every 120 s
-
-inputs:
-  - type: serial
-    url: /dev/stromzaehler   # FTDI FT230X, mapped by docker compose
-    timeout: 3
-    # 9600 8N1 are sml2mqtt defaults for SML/EDL21 — no override needed.

ci/images/agent-runtime-ops/Containerfile

@@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ COPY --from=helm /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
 # Time zones (REN-1196): the base has no /usr/share/zoneinfo, so
 # TZ=Europe/Berlin silently prints UTC and Python ZoneInfo() raises. The
 # default zone stays UTC; agents set TZ where they need local time.
+# jq (REN-1345): the agents' duty lists and the Paperclip skill use it.
 USER root
 RUN apt-get update \
-    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata \
+    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tzdata jq \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 USER 1000:1000
 
@@ -57,6 +58,6 @@ USER 1000:1000
 # Base user (1000:1000), entrypoint (tini) and cmd (agent shim) are inherited.
 RUN TZ=Europe/Berlin date +%Z | grep -Eq '^CES?T$' \
     && python3 -c "from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo; ZoneInfo('Europe/Berlin')" \
-    && kubectl version --client && flux version --client && kustomize version && helm version \
+    && kubectl version --client && flux version --client && kustomize version && helm version && jq --version \
     && env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
-       sh -ec 'for t in kubectl flux kustomize helm claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'
+       sh -ec 'for t in kubectl flux kustomize helm jq claude-agent-acp; do command -v "$t"; done'

ci/images/paperclip/README.md

@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@ Job (and, on destroy, the pod) reads 404, polling for up to 20 s, below the
 server's 30 s plugin RPC timeout. If that check times out or fails, the hook
 returns no receipt, as before. No upstream PR yet.
 
+Agents in k8s pods cannot read their own secrets (REN-1345): the sandbox
+callback bridge answers `403 Route not allowed` for `/api/agents/me/secrets`,
+although upstream's own Paperclip skill documents those routes for runs.
+`ren-1345-bridge-agent-secrets.patch` adds the five `/api/agents/me` secret
+routes (list, read one value, list/create/withdraw proposals) to the bridge
+allowlist. The server still resolves the agent from the run JWT and checks
+the binding; company-wide secret routes stay denied. No upstream PR yet.
+
 ## Files
 
 - `upstream.env` — pinned commit and the version string stamped into the

ci/images/paperclip/ren-1345-bridge-agent-secrets.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.test.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.test.ts
+index 4419bee..d57de8d 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.test.ts
++++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.test.ts
+@@ -1452,6 +1452,11 @@ describe("sandbox callback bridge", () => {
+       { method: "POST", path: "/api/routines/r-1/triggers" },
+       { method: "PATCH", path: "/api/routine-triggers/t-1" },
+       { method: "DELETE", path: "/api/routine-triggers/t-1" },
++      { method: "GET", path: "/api/agents/me/secrets" },
++      { method: "POST", path: "/api/agents/me/secrets/github_token/value" },
++      { method: "GET", path: "/api/agents/me/secret-proposals" },
++      { method: "POST", path: "/api/agents/me/secret-proposals" },
++      { method: "DELETE", path: "/api/agents/me/secret-proposals/prop-1" },
+     ];
+     for (const request of allowed) {
+       expect(authorizeSandboxCallbackBridgeRequestWithRoutes(request)).toBeNull();
+@@ -1491,6 +1496,11 @@ describe("sandbox callback bridge", () => {
+       { method: "POST", path: "/api/companies/co-1/logo" },
+       { method: "GET", path: "/api/companies/co-1/secrets" },
+       { method: "PATCH", path: "/api/secrets/secret-1" },
++      { method: "GET", path: "/api/agents/agent-1/secrets" },
++      { method: "POST", path: "/api/agents/me/secrets/a/b/value" },
++      { method: "GET", path: "/api/agents/me/secrets/github_token/value" },
++      { method: "GET", path: "/api/companies/co-1/secret-proposals" },
++      { method: "POST", path: "/api/companies/co-1/secret-proposals/prop-1/approve" },
+     ];
+     for (const request of denied) {
+       expect(authorizeSandboxCallbackBridgeRequestWithRoutes(request)).toBe(
+diff --git a/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.ts b/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.ts
+index 40776a3..e825197 100644
+--- a/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.ts
++++ b/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-callback-bridge.ts
+@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ export const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_CALLBACK_BRIDGE_ROUTE_ALLOWLIST: readonly SandboxCa
+   { method: "POST", path: /^\/api\/agents\/[^/]+\/skills\/sync$/ },
+   { method: "PATCH", path: /^\/api\/agents\/[^/]+\/instructions-path$/ },
+ 
++  // Run-scoped secrets of the calling agent (`/agents/me` only). The server
++  // resolves the agent from the run JWT and checks bindings; values are
++  // registered for run-log redaction. Company-wide secret routes stay denied.
++  { method: "GET", path: /^\/api\/agents\/me\/secrets$/ },
++  { method: "POST", path: /^\/api\/agents\/me\/secrets\/[^/]+\/value$/ },
++  { method: "GET", path: /^\/api\/agents\/me\/secret-proposals$/ },
++  { method: "POST", path: /^\/api\/agents\/me\/secret-proposals$/ },
++  { method: "DELETE", path: /^\/api\/agents\/me\/secret-proposals\/[^/]+$/ },
++
+   // Read-only schema discovery for validated control-plane requests.
+   { method: "GET", path: /^\/api\/openapi\.json$/ },
+ 

kubernetes/apps/authentik/blueprints-configmap.yaml

@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ data:
             # return entries instead of short-circuiting. Built from
             # the samba-bridge repo at
             # gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge .
-            container_image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge-ldap-outpost:2026.5.3-f02b945
+            container_image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge-ldap-outpost:2026.8.3-872f754
             object_naming_template: "ak-outpost-%(name)s"
             kubernetes_namespace: authentik
             kubernetes_replicas: 1
@@ -2189,6 +2189,66 @@ data:
           negate: false
           failure_result: false
 
+      # OpenProject: confidential client, secret from OpenBao via !Env.
+      # Git owns the provider, its application and the member list.
+      - id: openproject-users-group
+        model: authentik_core.group
+        identifiers:
+          name: OpenProject Users
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          is_superuser: false
+          users:
+            - !Find [authentik_core.user, [username, k.renner]]
+
+      - id: openproject-provider
+        model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
+        identifiers:
+          name: Provider for OpenProject
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          authentication_flow: !KeyOf passkey-passwordless-flow
+          authorization_flow: !KeyOf passkey-stepup-flow
+          invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
+          client_type: confidential
+          client_id: openproject
+          client_secret: !Env OPENPROJECT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
+          grant_types:
+            - authorization_code
+            - refresh_token
+          signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, authentik Self-signed Certificate]]
+          property_mappings:
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile]]
+            - !Find [authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping, [managed, goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-email]]
+          redirect_uris:
+            - url: https://openproject.renner.uno/auth/authentik/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+            - url: https://openproject.renner.uno/auth/oidc-authentik/callback
+              matching_mode: strict
+
+      - model: authentik_core.application
+        identifiers:
+          slug: openproject
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          name: OpenProject
+          slug: openproject
+          provider: !KeyOf openproject-provider
+          meta_launch_url: https://openproject.renner.uno
+          meta_description: "Project board (OpenProject)"
+
+      - model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+        identifiers:
+          target: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, openproject]]
+          group: !KeyOf openproject-users-group
+          order: 0
+        state: present
+        attrs:
+          enabled: true
+          negate: false
+          failure_result: false
+
       # Superseded by the single passkey-webauthn-validation stage above.
       # Their flowstagebindings are FK-CASCADEd away with them; the
       # identification stage's webauthn_stage FK is SET_NULL and is

kubernetes/apps/authentik/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ spec:
       # Pinned to match the samba-bridge fork's app image (server.Dockerfile
       # AUTHENTIK_VERSION). Bump in lockstep with the bridge rebuild — a
       # floating range drifts the chart ahead of the pinned app image.
-      version: "2026.5.3"
+      version: "2026.8.3"
       sourceRef:
         kind: HelmRepository
         name: authentik
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ spec:
         # 2. Pinning means the deployed binary is traceable to a
         #    specific repo commit. Bump the tag whenever a new build
         #    is published from gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/authentik-samba-bridge .
-        tag: "2026.5.3-f02b945"
+        tag: "2026.8.3-872f754"
       envFrom:
         # SAMBA_BRIDGE_DOMAIN_SID / _ENABLED_GROUP / _UID_OFFSET
         # consumed by the bridge module at Django app startup. Missing
@@ -100,6 +100,21 @@ spec:
             secretKeyRef:
               name: ldap-outpost-tls
               key: tls.key
+        # Client secret of the OpenProject OIDC provider, read via `!Env`
+        # in the blueprint; OpenProject gets the same value from OpenBao
+        # apps/openproject.
+        - name: OPENPROJECT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: openproject-oidc
+              key: client-secret
+        # 2026.8 honours X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host/-For only from these
+        # networks. Traefik reaches authentik-server (IPv4 single-stack
+        # Service) from a pod IP; same ranges Traefik itself trusts for
+        # forwarded headers. Without them, HTTPS is seen as HTTP and SSO
+        # breaks. Comma-separated, no spaces (authentik list parsing).
+        - name: AUTHENTIK_LISTEN__TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS
+          value: "10.244.0.0/16,fd10:244::/48,127.0.0.0/8,::1/128"
 
     authentik:
       log_level: info

kubernetes/apps/authentik/kustomization.yaml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ resources:
   - externalsecret.yaml
   - samba-bridge-externalsecret.yaml
   - blueprints-configmap.yaml
+  - openproject-oidc-externalsecret.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml
   - paperless-gate-ingress.yaml
   - paperless-gate-egress.yaml

kubernetes/apps/authentik/openproject-oidc-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-oidc
+  namespace: authentik
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: openproject-oidc
+  data:
+    - secretKey: client-secret
+      remoteRef:
+        key: apps/openproject
+        property: oidc-client-secret

kubernetes/apps/gitea/kustomization.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,16 @@ resources:
   - statefulset.yaml
   # The live size of the data volume; see the file (REN-583).
   - pvc.yaml
+  # Before the version upgrade (REN-1367); remove after it.
+  - volumesnapshot-pre-upgrade.yaml
   - service.yaml
   - ingressroute-ssh.yaml
   - ingress.yaml
   - networkpolicy.yaml
+  # Nightly prune of old CI image builds (REN-1203).
+  - package-retention.yaml
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: gitea-package-retention
+    namespace: gitea
+    files:
+      - package-retention.py

kubernetes/apps/gitea/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -49,3 +49,26 @@ spec:
         - ports:
             - port: "3000"
               protocol: TCP
+---
+# Package retention CronJob (package-retention.yaml, REN-1203). It lists pods
+# to find the running image tags. The namespace baseline does not open the API
+# server: `kube-apiserver` is its own entity in Cilium (see
+# network-policies/paperclip-renner-ns.yaml); port is the post-DNAT 6443. Its
+# Gitea calls go to the in-cluster Service, which the baseline already allows
+# inside the namespace.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention-kube-apiserver
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+  egress:
+    - toEntities:
+        - kube-apiserver
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "6443"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/apps/gitea/package-retention.py

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+"""Prune old CI image builds from Gitea's container registry (REN-1203).
+
+See package-retention.yaml for what is pruned, what is kept, and why.
+Standard library only.
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import ssl
+import sys
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from datetime import datetime
+
+GITEA = os.environ["GITEA_URL"].rstrip("/")
+TOKEN = os.environ["GITEA_TOKEN"]
+REGISTRY_HOST = os.environ["REGISTRY_HOST"]
+OWNERS = os.environ["OWNERS"].split(",")
+KEEP = int(os.environ["KEEP_IMAGES"])
+GROUP_SECONDS = int(os.environ["GROUP_SECONDS"])
+MAX_DELETES = int(os.environ["MAX_DELETES"])
+EXCLUDE = re.compile(os.environ["EXCLUDE_PACKAGES"])
+DRY_RUN = os.environ.get("DRY_RUN", "false") == "true"
+
+# A package is a CI build package if at least one of its tags looks like this.
+BUILD_TAG = re.compile(r"^(build\.[0-9]+|main-[0-9a-f]{7,40})$")
+ALWAYS_KEEP = {"main", "latest"}
+
+SA = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"
+
+
+def log(msg):
+    print(msg, flush=True)
+
+
+def gitea(method, path):
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        GITEA + path, method=method, headers={"Authorization": "token " + TOKEN}
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
+        body = resp.read()
+        return json.loads(body) if body else None
+
+
+def ts(s):
+    # Gitea returns RFC 3339, e.g. 2026-10-07T18:07:32Z or +02:00.
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(s.replace("Z", "+00:00")).timestamp()
+
+
+def running_images():
+    """Tags in use by any pod, per package. Packages referenced by digest only
+    cannot be matched to a tag, so they are returned in `unsafe` and skipped."""
+    ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=SA + "/ca.crt")
+    with open(SA + "/token") as f:
+        sa_token = f.read().strip()
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        "https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/pods",
+        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + sa_token},
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60, context=ctx) as resp:
+        pods = json.load(resp)["items"]
+    in_use, unsafe = {}, set()
+    prefix = REGISTRY_HOST + "/"
+    for pod in pods:
+        spec = pod["spec"]
+        for c in (
+            spec.get("containers", [])
+            + spec.get("initContainers", [])
+            + spec.get("ephemeralContainers", [])
+        ):
+            image = c["image"]
+            if not image.startswith(prefix):
+                continue
+            ref = image[len(prefix):].split("@", 1)[0]
+            repo, _, tag = ref.rpartition(":")
+            if not repo or "/" in tag:
+                unsafe.add(ref)
+                continue
+            in_use.setdefault(repo, set()).add(tag)
+    return in_use, unsafe
+
+
+def list_packages(owner):
+    out, page = [], 1
+    while True:
+        batch = gitea(
+            "GET", f"/api/v1/packages/{owner}?type=container&limit=50&page={page}"
+        )
+        if not batch:
+            return out
+        out.extend(batch)
+        page += 1
+
+
+def plan(versions, protected):
+    """Group tags into images (one push writes all tags of an image within a
+    few seconds) and return the tags of the images to delete."""
+    tags = sorted(
+        (v for v in versions if not v["version"].startswith("sha256:")),
+        key=lambda v: ts(v["created_at"]),
+        reverse=True,
+    )
+    images, last = [], None
+    for v in tags:
+        t = ts(v["created_at"])
+        if last is None or last - t > GROUP_SECONDS:
+            images.append([])
+        images[-1].append(v["version"])
+        last = t
+    delete = []
+    for i, image in enumerate(images):
+        if i < KEEP or set(image) & (ALWAYS_KEEP | protected):
+            continue
+        delete.extend(image)
+    return images, delete
+
+
+def main():
+    in_use, unsafe = running_images()
+    log(f"running tags from {REGISTRY_HOST}: {sum(len(t) for t in in_use.values())}")
+    work = []
+    for owner in OWNERS:
+        by_name = {}
+        for v in list_packages(owner):
+            by_name.setdefault(v["name"], []).append(v)
+        for name, versions in sorted(by_name.items()):
+            full = f"{owner}/{name}"
+            if EXCLUDE.search(full):
+                log(f"skip {full}: excluded")
+                continue
+            if not any(BUILD_TAG.match(v["version"]) for v in versions):
+                continue
+            if full in unsafe:
+                log(f"skip {full}: a pod pins it by digest only")
+                continue
+            protected = in_use.get(full, set())
+            images, delete = plan(versions, protected)
+            log(f"{full}: {len(images)} images, {len(delete)} tags to delete, running {sorted(protected)}")
+            work += [(owner, name, tag) for tag in delete]
+    if len(work) > MAX_DELETES:
+        log(f"abort: {len(work)} deletes exceed MAX_DELETES={MAX_DELETES}; nothing deleted")
+        return 1
+    failed = 0
+    for owner, name, tag in work:
+        if DRY_RUN:
+            log(f"dry-run: would delete {owner}/{name}:{tag}")
+            continue
+        path = "/api/v1/packages/{}/container/{}/{}".format(
+            owner, urllib.parse.quote(name, safe=""), urllib.parse.quote(tag, safe="")
+        )
+        try:
+            gitea("DELETE", path)
+            log(f"deleted {owner}/{name}:{tag}")
+        except Exception as e:  # keep going; report at the end
+            failed += 1
+            log(f"FAILED {owner}/{name}:{tag}: {e}")
+    log(f"done: {len(work) - failed} deleted, {failed} failed, dry_run={DRY_RUN}")
+    return 1 if failed else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

kubernetes/apps/gitea/package-retention.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# Nightly retention for CI image builds in Gitea's container registry (REN-1203).
+#
+# Why: nothing pruned old builds, so the data volume filled up (REN-580, at
+# 40Gi) and was down to 24% free again four days after the grow to 60Gi
+# (REN-1203, about 2.2 GB/day). Gitea 1.21 has no API for per-owner cleanup
+# rules, and the owners are human accounts, so the rules cannot live in Gitea.
+# This job applies the rule Hermes ran by hand in REN-1204.
+#
+# What it prunes, per package of the owners in OWNERS:
+#   - only CI build packages: at least one tag is `build.<n>` or `main-<sha>`.
+#     Date-tagged utility images (alpine-jq, cni-plugins, ...) are not touched.
+#   - one image carries several tags (build.N, short and long sha, sometimes
+#     main/latest). Tags pushed within GROUP_SECONDS are one image, and the job
+#     deletes all tags of an image, because a sha tag left behind keeps the
+#     blobs alive.
+#   - keeps the KEEP_IMAGES newest images, any image tagged main or latest, and
+#     any image whose tag a pod in the cluster runs now. A package that a pod
+#     pins by digest only is skipped as a whole.
+#   - never touches gitea_admin/* (CI base images) or EXCLUDE_PACKAGES. The
+#     agent-runtime images are excluded because Paperclip pins their tag in its
+#     own config, not in a pod that exists between runs.
+#   - aborts without deleting if the plan exceeds MAX_DELETES.
+# Freed blobs are removed by Gitea's own `cleanup_packages` cron (daily).
+#
+# Token: `gitea-hermes-bot-package-retention-token` on hermes-bot (site admin),
+# scope `write:package` only (REN-1204). Admin and repo routes return 403 with
+# it. Hermes owns the account and the token.
+#
+# Kubernetes access: list pods, cluster-wide, to find the running tags. Nothing
+# else.
+#
+# Dry run: set DRY_RUN to "true"; the job then only logs the plan.
+# Stop it: `spec.suspend: true` in git. Revert: delete this file, the
+# configMapGenerator entry and the policy in networkpolicy.yaml. Deleted images
+# cannot be restored; CI rebuilds one from its commit.
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: gitea-package-retention
+  data:
+    - secretKey: GITEA_TOKEN
+      remoteRef:
+        key: infrastructure/gitea/hermes-bot
+        property: gitea-hermes-bot-package-retention-token
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: ["pods"]
+    verbs: ["list"]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: gitea-package-retention
+    namespace: gitea
+---
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-package-retention
+  namespace: gitea
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+spec:
+  # Quiet hour for CI pushes. Gitea's own daily cleanup_packages cron frees
+  # the blobs afterwards.
+  schedule: "30 22 * * *"
+  timeZone: Etc/UTC
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
+  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      backoffLimit: 0
+      activeDeadlineSeconds: 1800
+      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 604800
+      template:
+        metadata:
+          labels:
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea-package-retention
+        spec:
+          restartPolicy: Never
+          enableServiceLinks: false
+          serviceAccountName: gitea-package-retention
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            seccompProfile:
+              type: RuntimeDefault
+          containers:
+            - name: retention
+              image: docker.io/library/python:3.13-alpine@sha256:2d9aefe2fef018a7eb2c13064c89c71929800fd2e5dccdbf52ea5da5bb8d929a
+              command: ["python3", "/app/package-retention.py"]
+              env:
+                # In-cluster Service; the public name hairpins off the ingress
+                # LB from a pod (see networkpolicy.yaml).
+                - name: GITEA_URL
+                  value: http://gitea.gitea.svc:3000
+                - name: REGISTRY_HOST
+                  value: gitea.renner.uno
+                - name: OWNERS
+                  value: k.renner,konairius
+                - name: KEEP_IMAGES
+                  value: "5"
+                # Tags of one push land within seconds; the smallest gap
+                # between two images was 379 s (REN-1204).
+                - name: GROUP_SECONDS
+                  value: "60"
+                - name: MAX_DELETES
+                  value: "300"
+                - name: EXCLUDE_PACKAGES
+                  value: "^konairius/agent-runtime"
+                - name: DRY_RUN
+                  value: "false"
+                - name: PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
+                  value: "1"
+              envFrom:
+                - secretRef:
+                    name: gitea-package-retention
+              resources:
+                requests:
+                  cpu: 10m
+                  memory: 32Mi
+                limits:
+                  memory: 128Mi
+              securityContext:
+                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+                capabilities:
+                  drop: ["ALL"]
+              volumeMounts:
+                - name: script
+                  mountPath: /app
+                  readOnly: true
+          volumes:
+            - name: script
+              configMap:
+                name: gitea-package-retention

kubernetes/apps/gitea/statefulset.yaml

@@ -34,10 +34,12 @@ spec:
           # RUN_USER check -> fatal). The migrated /var/lib/gitea/data drops in as-is,
           # but the LXC's /etc/gitea/app.ini is RELOCATED to custom/conf/app.ini
           # (GITEA_APP_INI below) and its RUN_USER must read `git`, not `gitea` —
-          # both handled as explicit steps in MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md. Pinned
-          # to match the LXC for a clean SQLite lift; no imagepolicy marker (an
-          # auto-bump across versions on live SQLite data must never be applied).
-          image: gitea/gitea:1.21.4-rootless@sha256:600f1f1e1d090c763866db16882b5eac5c6a80b7664ee53bec0806c656c0033f
+          # both handled as explicit steps in MIGRATION-gitea-woodpecker.md. No
+          # imagepolicy marker: a minor bump migrates the live SQLite database and
+          # needs a snapshot first (volumesnapshot-pre-upgrade.yaml). 1.21.4 ->
+          # 1.27.3 in REN-1367 (OpenProject needs the 1.22+ webhook fields); the
+          # next step, 28.x, changes the outgoing-request (webhook) host lists.
+          image: gitea/gitea:1.27.3-rootless@sha256:1c17ecaead42eb3b5391553d8708103a4beb0e86edf5b9ebc1eb269c318845f2
           env:
             - name: GITEA_WORK_DIR
               value: /var/lib/gitea
@@ -118,6 +120,15 @@ spec:
               containerPort: 3000
             - name: ssh
               containerPort: 2222
+          # The first start on a new minor version runs the database migrations
+          # before the HTTP server listens. Give that up to 15 minutes; without
+          # it the liveness probe kills Gitea in the middle of a migration.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /api/healthz
+              port: http
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 90
           readinessProbe:
             httpGet:
               path: /api/healthz

kubernetes/apps/gitea/volumesnapshot-pre-upgrade.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+# Point-in-time copy of the Gitea data PVC (SQLite DB, repositories, LFS,
+# packages, app.ini), taken before the 1.21.4 -> 1.27.3 upgrade (REN-1367).
+# Merge this first and see the SnapshotReady event in namespace gitea before
+# the image bump: 1.22+ migrates the database, and a migrated database cannot
+# run on 1.21 again. The way back is a restore from this snapshot.
+#
+# Crash-consistent (taken from the live RBD volume), like the velero CSI
+# snapshots; SQLite recovers from its journal on open. The velero
+# `gitea-daily` schedule holds a second, off-cluster copy.
+#
+# Restore (only if the upgrade fails):
+#   1. Revert the image bump PR and set `replicas: 0` on the StatefulSet in git.
+#   2. In git, replace pvc.yaml with a claim `data-gitea-0` that has
+#      `dataSource: {kind: VolumeSnapshot, apiGroup: snapshot.storage.k8s.io,
+#      name: gitea-data-pre-upgrade}` and no volumeName; the old claim must be
+#      deleted first (prune is disabled on it, so this is a cluster-write step).
+#   3. Set `replicas: 1` again; gitea-0 starts 1.21.4 on the restored data.
+#
+# Delete this file once the upgrade has run cleanly; the snapshot goes with it
+# (prune).
+apiVersion: snapshot.storage.k8s.io/v1
+kind: VolumeSnapshot
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-data-pre-upgrade
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  volumeSnapshotClassName: ceph-block-snapclass
+  source:
+    persistentVolumeClaimName: data-gitea-0

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/deployment.yaml

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ spec:
               memory: 32Mi
       containers:
         - name: home-assistant
-          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
+          image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
           env:
             - name: TZ
               value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -187,6 +187,55 @@ spec:
               memory: 32Mi
             limits:
               memory: 64Mi
+        # MQTT client certificate for Home Assistant (REN-953). HA keeps
+        # client certificates only as PEMs uploaded into its MQTT config
+        # entry, so a cert-manager renewal (~60 days) could never reach it
+        # without a reconfigure flow and an admin token. Instead HA's config
+        # entry points at 127.0.0.1:11883 (plain, loopback only) and this
+        # sidecar forwards to the broker's mTLS listener :8884 with the
+        # certificate of the register account `home-assistant`. The broker
+        # takes the username from the certificate CN; whatever user/password
+        # HA sends is ignored. --timed-reload picks up a renewed certificate
+        # for new connections without a restart; an open connection stays up
+        # (checked locally with ghostunnel v1.11.3 and mosquitto 2.0.22).
+        #
+        # Probes: liveness only, on the HTTPS status port (process alive). No
+        # readiness probe on purpose: a broker outage must not take HA out of
+        # its Service endpoints.
+        - name: mqtt-tls
+          image: ghostunnel/ghostunnel:v1.11.3@sha256:2599b8a04bae16d70a4209495618dea61b46a00a9a05fcf74da282688ad3517f
+          args:
+            - client
+            - --listen=127.0.0.1:11883
+            - --target=mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884
+            - --cert=/mqtt-tls/tls.crt
+            - --key=/mqtt-tls/tls.key
+            - --cacert=/mqtt-tls/ca.crt
+            - --timed-reload=10m
+            - --status=0.0.0.0:16060
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 65534
+            runAsGroup: 65534
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+          livenessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: 16060
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 4
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /mqtt-tls
+              readOnly: true
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
         # Browser-based VS Code editing /config in-place. Sidecar (not
         # separate Deployment) because the config PVC is RWO ceph-block.
         # Exposed LAN-only on vscode.home.renner.uno; --auth=none means
@@ -297,6 +346,14 @@ spec:
         - name: proxy-config
           configMap:
             name: ha-proxy-config
+        # Client certificate of the register account home-assistant, issued
+        # by mqtt-account-controller. Not subPath, so renewals land in place.
+        # 0444 because the sidecar runs as 65534; only this pod mounts it.
+        # Not in the Reloader annotation: a renewal must not restart HA.
+        - name: mqtt-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+            defaultMode: 0444
         # Writable emptyDir for the nginx entrypoint's envsubst output
         # (/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf rendered from the .template).
         - name: proxy-conf-d

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/kustomization.yaml

@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@ resources:
   # probes use the cert account mosquitto-probe, REN-953); removed with its
   # rotator in the REN-802 cleanup step.
   - mosquitto-health-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
-  # open3e-int broker credential: open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal
-  # CAN; OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated.
-  - mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml
   - mosquitto-config.yaml
   - mosquitto-certificate.yaml
   - mosquitto-service.yaml

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml

@@ -177,77 +177,6 @@ spec:
             limits:
               memory: 64Mi
 ---
-# Second broker user: `shellies`. Separate Secret (not a second key on
-# mosquitto-credentials) so each credential's lifecycle is independent —
-# rotating one never touches the other, and existing clusters whose
-# mosquitto-credentials was already generated for `homeassistant` only
-# don't end up with a half-populated Secret.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials-bootstrap
-  namespace: home-assistant
-  annotations:
-    # Job pod templates are immutable; force-recreate so image bumps
-    # apply on Flux re-reconcile. Safe: the Job is idempotent (see above).
-    kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/force: enabled
-spec:
-  backoffLimit: 4
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto-bootstrap
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: mosquitto-bootstrap
-      restartPolicy: OnFailure
-      containers:
-        - name: bootstrap
-          image: alpine:3.24@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6
-          command:
-            - sh
-            - -c
-            - |
-              set -eu
-              apk add --no-cache curl jq >/dev/null
-
-              NS=home-assistant
-              NAME=mosquitto-shellies-credentials
-              TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
-              CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
-              API=https://kubernetes.default.svc
-
-              if curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets/$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                echo "$NAME already exists; nothing to do."
-                exit 0
-              fi
-
-              PW=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' </dev/urandom | head -c 32)
-              PW_B64=$(printf '%s' "$PW" | base64 | tr -d '\n')
-
-              body=$(jq -nc \
-                --arg name "$NAME" \
-                --arg ns "$NS" \
-                --arg pw "$PW_B64" \
-                '{apiVersion: "v1",
-                  kind: "Secret",
-                  metadata: {name: $name, namespace: $ns},
-                  type: "Opaque",
-                  data: {password: $pw}}')
-
-              curl -fsSL --cacert "$CA" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-                   -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
-                   --data "$body" \
-                   "$API/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/secrets" >/dev/null
-
-              echo "generated $NAME"
-          resources:
-            requests:
-              cpu: 10m
-              memory: 32Mi
-            limits:
-              memory: 64Mi
----
 # Fourth broker user: `sml2mqtt` — the power-meter bridge. Publish-only
 # under `sml2mqtt/#` (ACL in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so
 # its lifecycle is independent of the others. The sml2mqtt pod reads this
@@ -392,7 +321,7 @@ spec:
 ---
 # Broker user `zigbee2mqtt` — the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (ZHA replacement). Scoped
 # to its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree plus `write homeassistant/#` (so it can
-# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs, exactly like the `shellies` user) and
+# publish HA MQTT-discovery configs) and
 # `read homeassistant/status` (HA's birth/will topic; on `online` Z2M
 # republishes cached device states, NOT discovery configs — ACL and the full
 # reasoning in mosquitto-deployment.yaml). Own credential so its lifecycle is

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-deployment.yaml

@@ -5,14 +5,6 @@ metadata:
   namespace: home-assistant
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-  annotations:
-    # REQUIRED for credential rotation to take effect. The startup shim rebuilds
-    # the password file only on pod start, so without this a rotated Secret sits
-    # inert while the old password stays valid indefinitely.
-    #
-    # Listed per-Secret rather than with the blanket auto annotation, so that
-    # enrolling another broker user is a visible edit to this line.
-    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
 spec:
   replicas: 1
   strategy:
@@ -74,23 +66,14 @@ spec:
               set -eu
               rm -f /mosquitto/auth/passwd
               mosquitto_passwd -c -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd homeassistant "$HA_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd shellies "$SHELLY_PASSWORD"
               mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd admin "$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
               mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd sml2mqtt "$SML2MQTT_PASSWORD"
               mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e "$OPEN3E_PASSWORD"
-              mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd open3e-int "$OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD"
               mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd evcc "$EVCC_PASSWORD"
               mosquitto_passwd -b /mosquitto/auth/passwd zigbee2mqtt "$ZIGBEE2MQTT_PASSWORD"
-              # ACL: HA keeps full access (subscribes to everything); the
-              # shellies user is `readwrite shellies/#` (devices publish state
-              # and subscribe to their command topics) + `write homeassistant/#`
-              # so Shelly Gen2 firmwares can publish HA MQTT-discovery configs.
-              # It is WRITE-only on homeassistant/# on purpose: a publish-only
-              # client never needs to read the whole discovery/state tree, and
-              # denying read removes device-inventory recon for a compromised
-              # Shelly. (Full per-device write scoping isn't expressible with
-              # the flat discovery topic layout; that would need a dynamic-auth
-              # plugin — out of scope.)
+              # ACL: HA keeps full access (subscribes to everything). Shellies
+              # are not legacy users any more: each has its own Dynamic Security
+              # account from mqtt-accounts.yaml (REN-802, REN-1017).
               # `admin` is a workstation/debugging credential — full
               # readwrite, kept on its own credential so its password can
               # be rotated independently of the HA session.
@@ -111,10 +94,6 @@ spec:
               user homeassistant
               topic readwrite #
 
-              user shellies
-              topic readwrite shellies/#
-              topic write homeassistant/#
-
               user admin
               topic readwrite #
 
@@ -124,12 +103,6 @@ spec:
               user open3e
               topic readwrite open3e/#
 
-              # open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal CAN: own subtree
-              # under open3e/ so edge-1's listener on open3e/cmnd never sees
-              # its commands.
-              user open3e-int
-              topic readwrite open3e/int/#
-
               user evcc
               topic read open3e/#
               topic readwrite evcc/#
@@ -137,9 +110,8 @@ spec:
 
               # `zigbee2mqtt` is the Zigbee2MQTT bridge (the ZHA replacement).
               # Owns its own `zigbee2mqtt/#` subtree; may WRITE `homeassistant/#`
-              # to publish HA MQTT-discovery configs (write-only there, like the
-              # shellies user, to deny discovery-tree recon from a compromised
-              # bridge); and READs `homeassistant/status`, HA's birth/will topic.
+              # to publish HA MQTT-discovery configs (write-only there, to deny
+              # discovery-tree recon from a compromised bridge); and READs `homeassistant/status`, HA's birth/will topic.
               #
               # That read grant does NOT buy a discovery re-publish: on
               # `online`, Z2M 2.12.1 republishes bridge/state and cached device
@@ -176,11 +148,6 @@ spec:
                 secretKeyRef:
                   name: mosquitto-credentials
                   key: homeassistant-password
-            - name: SHELLY_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-shellies-credentials
-                  key: password
             - name: ADMIN_PASSWORD
               valueFrom:
                 secretKeyRef:
@@ -196,13 +163,6 @@ spec:
                 secretKeyRef:
                   name: mosquitto-open3e-credentials
                   key: password
-            # open3e-int: OpenBao-backed + Class-A rotated (see
-            # mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml).
-            - name: OPEN3E_INT_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-                  key: password
             - name: EVCC_PASSWORD
               valueFrom:
                 secretKeyRef:

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Projects the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker credential (open3e-esp32 gateway
-# on the Vitocal internal CAN) from OpenBao into the Secret the broker
-# consumes. Rotator: kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml.
-#
-# creationPolicy is implicitly Owner: deleting this ExternalSecret deletes the
-# live Secret. Set creationPolicy: Orphan first to detach without destroying.
-apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
-kind: ExternalSecret
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-  namespace: home-assistant
-spec:
-  refreshInterval: 10m
-  secretStoreRef:
-    kind: ClusterSecretStore
-    name: openbao
-  target:
-    name: mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-  dataFrom:
-    - extract:
-        key: apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-account-controller.yaml

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ subjects:
 #     that creates, because the name is in the request path).
 #   mqtt-<name>-tls: delete on revocation, one entry per cert account
 #     delivered to this namespace. Add the name with the register entry.
+#   mqtt-ha-cert-sync: sha256 of the client certificate last accepted by
+#     Home Assistant's MQTT config entry (HA cert sync, REN-953/REN-1284).
 apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Role
 metadata:
@@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ metadata:
 rules:
   - apiGroups: [""]
     resources: ["secrets"]
-    resourceNames: ["mqtt-account-hashes", "mqtt-dynsec-seed"]
+    resourceNames: ["mqtt-account-hashes", "mqtt-dynsec-seed", "mqtt-ha-cert-sync"]
     verbs: ["get", "create", "patch"]
   - apiGroups: [""]
     resources: ["secrets"]
@@ -252,7 +254,7 @@ spec:
         - name: controller
           # Woodpecker builds main-<sha> on every merge to main; no sortable
           # tag, so bumps are manual (same as ical-proxy).
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/mqtt-account-controller:main-a5b299d@sha256:ab1309f53170500b7d67f65b09bb247e1a476250667150597fc3ca62a5f4ba60
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/mqtt-account-controller:main-cb96b1a@sha256:9d9b9e83a9c0f9f567e57edacab11cf4c58e8c0e49e38e8d7b51421cd1242911
           env:
             - name: BROKER_URL
               value: ssl://mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884
@@ -263,6 +265,22 @@ spec:
               value: http://shelly-manager-api.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local
             - name: SHELLY_MANAGER_API_KEY_FILE
               value: /etc/shelly-manager/api-key
+            # HA cert sync (REN-953, REN-1284): keeps Home Assistant's MQTT
+            # config entry on mosquitto:8884 with the CA and client
+            # certificate of the register account `home-assistant`. After
+            # each loop the controller compares tls.crt (mounted below) with
+            # the last certificate HA accepted (Secret mqtt-ha-cert-sync) and,
+            # only inside 02:00-05:00 Europe/Berlin, runs HA's reconfigure
+            # flow. HA tests the connection before it saves. Defaults:
+            # broker mosquitto.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8884, cert dir
+            # /etc/mqtt-home-assistant-tls. Off while HA_MQTT_ENTRY_ID is unset.
+            - name: HA_MQTT_ENTRY_ID
+              value: 01KRFXD4046FEBWQ0EX0GNE418
+            # HA itself (:8123), not the :8124 XFF proxy; same namespace.
+            - name: HA_URL
+              value: http://home-assistant-bgp.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:8123
+            - name: HA_TOKEN_FILE
+              value: /etc/ha-token/token
             # Not :8080: several :8080 ingress grants in the home-assistant
             # default-deny apply to every pod in the namespace.
             - name: LISTEN
@@ -293,6 +311,12 @@ spec:
             - name: shelly-manager-key
               mountPath: /etc/shelly-manager
               readOnly: true
+            - name: ha-mqtt-tls
+              mountPath: /etc/mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: ha-token
+              mountPath: /etc/ha-token
+              readOnly: true
           resources:
             requests:
               cpu: 5m
@@ -315,3 +339,35 @@ spec:
             items:
               - key: api-key
                 path: api-key
+        # Client certificate HA gets (cert-manager renews it in place; not a
+        # subPath mount, so the next loop sees the new file).
+        - name: ha-mqtt-tls
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-home-assistant-tls
+        # HA long-lived token of the service user `MQTT Cert Sync`
+        # (system-admin; config flows need admin). REN-1268.
+        - name: ha-token
+          secret:
+            secretName: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+---
+# HA admin token for the HA cert sync (see the Deployment env). Minted by
+# Hermes on a dedicated HA service user, not the owner's account (REN-1268).
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+  namespace: home-assistant
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: mqtt-account-controller
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: mqtt-account-controller-ha-token
+  data:
+    - secretKey: token
+      remoteRef:
+        key: apps/home-assistant/mqtt-cert-sync-token
+        property: token

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/mqtt-accounts.yaml

@@ -59,11 +59,25 @@
   auth: cert
   deliver: {namespace: paperclip}
   acl: ["read open3e/#", "read zigbee2mqtt/#", "read homeassistant/#"]
+# edge-1's local mosquitto bridge (REN-1307): one bridge for open3e/e3oncan
+# and sml2mqtt, replacing the legacy password users `open3e` and `sml2mqtt`
+# (different name, so it cannot shadow their logins). The controller pushes
+# the password to edge-mqtt-cred on edge-1 (ansible role mqtt-bridge) over
+# HTTPS with its own client certificate, and pins edge-1's self-generated
+# server certificate on first contact (key edge-1.pin in mqtt-account-hashes;
+# delete it after a reinstall of edge-1).
+- name: edge-1
+  auth: password
+  deliver: {esp32: "https://edge-1.iot.renner.uno:8443"}
+  # No sml2mqtt/#: the SML meter reader is retired for good (owner,
+  # 2026-09-19; grid data comes from the E380 on the CAN bus).
+  acl: ["readwrite open3e/#"]
 # Shellies (REN-1017): one password account per device, pushed by the
 # controller through shelly-manager's per-device API. Name shelly-<id> =
-# shelly-manager device id. Same ACL as the legacy user `shellies`, which
-# keeps working until every device has moved. Gen2+ devices reboot once
-# when their password is pushed.
+# shelly-manager device id. ACL as the former shared user `shellies`
+# (removed in REN-1017 step 4). Gen2+ devices reboot once when their password
+# is pushed. A new Shelly needs its entry here first: shelly-manager's MQTT
+# template user no longer exists on the broker.
 - name: shelly-5               # Plus i4, the API test device of REN-929
   auth: password
   deliver: {shelly-manager: 5}

kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/shelly-manager-deployment.yaml

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: shelly-manager
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/shelly-manager:build.1791389286 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/shelly-manager:build.1791426752 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           ports:
             - name: http

kubernetes/apps/immich/machine-learning.yaml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: immich-machine-learning
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3.3.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-machine-learning"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 3003

kubernetes/apps/immich/server.yaml

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ spec:
               mountPath: /ca
       containers:
         - name: immich-server
-          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.2.4 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
+          image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3.3.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:immich-server"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 3001

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/cnpg-podmonitors.yaml

@@ -123,3 +123,23 @@ spec:
       interval: 30s
   podTargetLabels:
     - role
+---
+# op-pg (OpenProject, REN-1363). Added with the cluster, like ha-pg, so the
+# CNPG backup/WAL rules see it from the first moment.
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: PodMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: cnpg-op-pg
+  namespace: openproject
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudnative-pg
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      cnpg.io/cluster: op-pg
+  podMetricsEndpoints:
+    - port: metrics
+      interval: 30s
+  podTargetLabels:
+    - role

kubernetes/apps/monitoring-rules/probes-blackbox.yaml

@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ spec:
         # health, not reachability — the root path returns 404 by design, since
         # the service only answers on calendar paths.
         - https://ical-proxy.renner.uno/health
+        # OpenProject (REN-1363). Ungated (the app has its own login), so the
+        # public name reaches the app: /health_checks/default answers 200 only
+        # when the web process and op-pg are up. App health and the public
+        # edge path in one target.
+        - https://openproject.renner.uno/health_checks/default
         # APP-HEALTH probes for the gated monitoring UIs, from the correct
         # in-cluster vantage (monitoring-vantage-point-rule): the gate is
         # only on the ingress, so the ClusterIP /-/healthy endpoints are

kubernetes/apps/monitoring/helmrelease-alloy-syslog.yaml

@@ -174,18 +174,18 @@ spec:
             forward_to = [loki.process.udm_cef.receiver]
           }
 
-          // CEF parser for UDM SIEM payload. One regex with named groups
-          // for header (vendor|product|product_version|sig_id|name|sev) and
-          // extension (UNIFIhost / UNIFIdeviceName / -Model / -Ip / -Mac /
-          // -Version / msg). Only deviceName may contain spaces — use a
-          // non-greedy match anchored to the literal next-key boundary.
-          // Keep the full raw line as the log content so unparsed senders
-          // (or future CEF format drift) still land queryably.
+          // CEF parser for UDM SIEM payload. The listener also receives the
+          // UDM's plain syslog (log_all_contents), which does not match and
+          // passes through unlabelled. CEF extension keys differ per event
+          // type, so the regex anchors only on the header
+          // (vendor|product|product_version|sig_id|name|sev), UNIFIcategory,
+          // UNIFIhost and the trailing msg. The full raw line stays the log
+          // content.
           loki.process "udm_cef" {
             forward_to = [loki.write.default.receiver]
 
             stage.regex {
-              expression = "CEF:\\d+\\|(?P<vendor>[^|]*)\\|(?P<product>[^|]*)\\|(?P<product_version>[^|]*)\\|(?P<signature_id>[^|]*)\\|(?P<event_name>[^|]*)\\|(?P<cef_severity>[^|]*)\\|UNIFIhost=(?P<unifi_host>\\S+) UNIFIdeviceName=(?P<device_name>.+?) UNIFIdeviceModel=(?P<device_model>\\S+) UNIFIdeviceIp=(?P<device_ip>\\S+) UNIFIdeviceMac=(?P<device_mac>\\S+) UNIFIdeviceVersion=(?P<device_version>\\S+) msg=(?P<msg>.+)$"
+              expression = "CEF:\\d+\\|(?P<vendor>[^|]*)\\|(?P<product>[^|]*)\\|(?P<product_version>[^|]*)\\|(?P<signature_id>[^|]*)\\|(?P<event_name>[^|]*)\\|(?P<cef_severity>[^|]*)\\|UNIFIcategory=(?P<category>.+?) UNIFIhost=(?P<unifi_host>.+?) \\S+=.* msg=(?P<msg>.+)$"
             }
 
             stage.labels {
@@ -194,8 +194,7 @@ spec:
                 product      = "product",
                 signature_id = "signature_id",
                 event_name   = "event_name",
-                device_model = "device_model",
-                host         = "device_name",
+                category     = "category",
               }
             }
           }

kubernetes/apps/openproject/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# openproject
+
+OpenProject Community Edition, the owner's project board (REN-1346,
+REN-1363). <https://openproject.renner.uno>, public through the NetBird
+proxy like immich and matrix; OpenProject's own login guards it.
+
+## Layout
+
+- `openproject` Deployment, one pod: init `seeder` (schema load or
+  migrations, then seed), then `web` (puma, :8080) and
+  `worker` (GoodJob). One pod because both need the RWO attachments PVC.
+- `op-pg` CNPG cluster (PostgreSQL 17, 2 instances), WAL archive and daily
+  base backup to Hetzner `s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/op-pg`, 30 days.
+- `openproject-assets` PVC (attachments), Velero `openproject-daily` at
+  10:15 local, 30 days.
+- `openproject-secrets` is generated once in-cluster by ESO:
+  `SECRET_KEY_BASE` and `OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD` (login
+  `admin`). The password only seeds the first start; a change in the UI is
+  not reverted.
+
+## Image updates
+
+The image is pinned by tag and digest (`openproject/openproject:<x.y.z>-slim`)
+and Renovate opens the bump. The `seeder` init container migrates the schema
+before the new web container starts. A major bump (17 -> 18) gets its own
+card and a check of the upstream upgrade notes.
+
+## Monitoring
+
+- Blackbox `https://openproject.renner.uno/health_checks/default`: public
+  edge, Traefik, web and database in one target (catch-all
+  `BlackboxProbeFailed`).
+- `cnpg-op-pg` PodMonitor: the CNPG backup and WAL-archive rules cover op-pg.
+- Velero schedule rules cover `openproject-daily`.
+
+## Restore
+
+Database (physical restore of the latest base backup plus WAL):
+
+1. Check a backup exists: `kubectl -n openproject get backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`
+   and the bucket path `op-pg/`.
+2. Follow `kubernetes/RECOVERY.md` (cold rebuild) with this stanza in
+   `cluster.yaml` in place of `bootstrap.initdb`:
+
+   ```yaml
+   bootstrap:
+     recovery:
+       source: op-pg-store
+       database: openproject
+       owner: openproject
+   externalClusters:
+     - name: op-pg-store
+       plugin:
+         name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
+         parameters:
+           barmanObjectName: op-pg-store
+           serverName: op-pg
+   ```
+
+   Scale the `openproject` Deployment to 0 first, so nothing writes to an
+   empty database while the cluster rebuilds. Revert to `initdb` afterwards.
+3. A non-destructive test restore into a side cluster: "CNPG restore-test"
+   in `kubernetes/RECOVERY.md`.
+
+Attachments: scale the Deployment to 0, delete the `openproject-assets` PVC,
+then `velero restore create --from-backup <openproject-daily-...>
+--include-namespaces openproject`. Restore database and attachments from the
+same day, so attachment rows and files match.
+
+`openproject-secrets`: if lost, ESO generates a new one. Sessions end; the
+admin password in the database stays what it was.

kubernetes/apps/openproject/cluster.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: Cluster
+metadata:
+  name: op-pg
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  instances: 2
+  smartShutdownTimeout: 10
+  stopDelay: 60
+  # PG 17, not the repo-standard 16: OpenProject 17 ships its all-in-one
+  # image and packages on 17 and its system requirements point there. Bare
+  # major tag like the other clusters (minor bumps flow, majors stay an
+  # explicit decision).
+  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:17
+  storage:
+    storageClass: ceph-block
+    size: 5Gi
+  plugins:
+    - name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
+      isWALArchiver: true
+      parameters:
+        barmanObjectName: op-pg-store
+  bootstrap:
+    initdb:
+      database: openproject
+      owner: openproject
+  postgresql:
+    parameters:
+      shared_buffers: "128MB"
+      max_connections: "100"
+      # Same write-reduction settings as the other clusters; see
+      # apps/trmnl/cluster.yaml for the reasoning and the RPO trade.
+      wal_compression: "zstd"
+      archive_timeout: "30min"
+      checkpoint_timeout: "15min"
+      max_wal_size: "2GB"
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      cpu: 100m
+      memory: 256Mi
+    limits:
+      memory: 512Mi

kubernetes/apps/openproject/hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: hetzner-s3-creds
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3

kubernetes/apps/openproject/ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Public, same edge path as immich and matrix: the dns.renner.uno/public
+# label makes netbird-service-sync publish the host through the NetBird proxy
+# (Cloudflare wildcard -> proxy.renner.uno -> TLS passthrough to Traefik) and
+# external-dns-unifi skip it; LAN clients follow the public answer and the UDM
+# hairpins back in. OpenProject's own login guards it.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: openproject
+  namespace: openproject
+  labels:
+    dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - openproject.renner.uno
+      secretName: openproject-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: openproject.renner.uno
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: openproject
+                port:
+                  number: 80

kubernetes/apps/openproject/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - secrets.yaml
+  - pvcs.yaml
+  - openproject.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml
+  # op-pg CNPG Postgres + offsite Barman backup (PostgreSQL 17, the version
+  # OpenProject 17 targets — see cluster.yaml).
+  - cluster.yaml
+  - objectstore.yaml
+  - scheduled-backup.yaml
+  - hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
+  - oidc-externalsecret.yaml

kubernetes/apps/openproject/objectstore.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: ObjectStore
+metadata:
+  name: op-pg-store
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  configuration:
+    # Offsite Hetzner Object Storage (fsn1), same bucket as the other CNPG
+    # clusters. No SSE: Hetzner supports only SSE-C, unusable by barman-cloud
+    # (plugin #646), so at-rest encryption is unavailable; transit is TLS.
+    destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/op-pg
+    endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
+    s3Credentials:
+      accessKeyId:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
+      secretAccessKey:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
+      # Region is required (REGION=fsn1) — without it boto3's HeadBucket
+      # (barman-cloud-check-wal-archive during bootstrap.recovery) 400s.
+      region:
+        name: hetzner-s3-creds
+        key: REGION
+    wal:
+      compression: gzip
+    data:
+      compression: gzip
+  retentionPolicy: "30d"

kubernetes/apps/openproject/oidc-externalsecret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-oidc
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: openproject-oidc
+    template:
+      data:
+        OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_IDENTIFIER: "{{ .clientId }}"
+        OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_SECRET: "{{ .clientSecret }}"
+  data:
+    - secretKey: clientId
+      remoteRef:
+        key: apps/openproject
+        property: oidc-client-id
+    - secretKey: clientSecret
+      remoteRef:
+        key: apps/openproject
+        property: oidc-client-secret

kubernetes/apps/openproject/openproject.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-config
+  namespace: openproject
+data:
+  OPENPROJECT_HOST__NAME: "openproject.renner.uno"
+  # TLS ends at Traefik; this makes OpenProject build https:// links and set
+  # secure cookies.
+  OPENPROJECT_HTTPS: "true"
+  # Log in with the generated password directly instead of being forced to
+  # change it on first login (see secrets.yaml).
+  OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RESET: "false"
+  # One user base and a small team: two puma workers instead of the
+  # per-CPU default keep the pod inside its memory limit.
+  OPENPROJECT_WEB_WORKERS: "2"
+  # Authentik OIDC provider, seeded on every pod start; client id and
+  # secret come from openproject-oidc.
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_DISPLAY__NAME: "Authentik"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ISSUER: "https://auth.renner.uno/application/o/openproject/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_HOST: "auth.renner.uno"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_PORT: "443"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_SCHEME: "https"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_AUTHORIZATION__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/authorize/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_TOKEN__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/token/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_USERINFO__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/userinfo/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_END__SESSION__ENDPOINT: "/application/o/openproject/end-session/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_JWKS__URI: "/application/o/openproject/jwks/"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_LOGIN: "preferred_username"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_FIRST__NAME: "given_name"
+  OPENPROJECT_OPENID__CONNECT_AUTHENTIK_ATTRIBUTE__MAP_LAST__NAME: "family_name"
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: openproject
+  namespace: openproject
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+  annotations:
+    # Env vars are read once at container start; roll the pod when the
+    # ConfigMap or the generated Secret changes.
+    configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: openproject-config
+    secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: openproject-secrets,openproject-oidc
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  # Web and worker share the RWO attachments PVC, and the seeder init
+  # container migrates the schema; two pods would race on both.
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+    spec:
+      enableServiceLinks: false
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        # `app` in the official image.
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      initContainers:
+        # Loads the schema on an empty database, else runs pending
+        # migrations, then seeds (idempotent; creates `admin` on first run).
+        # Runs on every pod start, so an image bump migrates before the new
+        # web container serves. Restarted by the kubelet until op-pg accepts
+        # connections.
+        - name: seeder
+          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
+          args: ["/app/docker/prod/seeder"]
+          envFrom:
+            - configMapRef:
+                name: openproject-config
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-secrets
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-oidc
+          env:
+            # CNPG generates this Secret; `uri` carries the rotated password
+            # and points at op-pg-rw.
+            - name: DATABASE_URL
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: op-pg-app
+                  key: uri
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: assets
+              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 250m
+              memory: 512Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 2Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+      containers:
+        - name: web
+          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
+          args: ["/app/docker/prod/web"]
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8080
+          envFrom:
+            - configMapRef:
+                name: openproject-config
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-secrets
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-oidc
+          env:
+            - name: DATABASE_URL
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: op-pg-app
+                  key: uri
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: assets
+              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
+          # /health_checks/default checks the database and the web process.
+          # The Host header is required: the request goes to the pod IP,
+          # which OpenProject's host check would answer with 404.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health_checks/default
+              port: http
+              httpHeaders:
+                - name: Host
+                  value: localhost
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            # ~5 min for puma to boot and preload the app.
+            failureThreshold: 30
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health_checks/default
+              port: http
+              httpHeaders:
+                - name: Host
+                  value: localhost
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /health_checks/default
+              port: http
+              httpHeaders:
+                - name: Host
+                  value: localhost
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 250m
+              memory: 1Gi
+            limits:
+              memory: 2Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+        # Background jobs (GoodJob): mails, notifications, exports, and the
+        # cron-like jobs. Needs the attachments volume for exports/imports.
+        - name: worker
+          image: openproject/openproject:17.9.1-slim@sha256:2beeecac788d4f423c46a95ffbd04e6479491938b9924b610e9f47d81a38303c
+          args: ["/app/docker/prod/worker"]
+          envFrom:
+            - configMapRef:
+                name: openproject-config
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-secrets
+            - secretRef:
+                name: openproject-oidc
+          env:
+            - name: DATABASE_URL
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: op-pg-app
+                  key: uri
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: assets
+              mountPath: /var/openproject/assets
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 100m
+              memory: 512Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 1536Mi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+      volumes:
+        - name: assets
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: openproject-assets
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: openproject
+  namespace: openproject
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 80
+      targetPort: http

kubernetes/apps/openproject/pvcs.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Attachments (OPENPROJECT_ATTACHMENTS__STORAGE__PATH defaults to
+# $APP_DATA_PATH/files = /var/openproject/assets/files). Web and worker share
+# one pod, so RWO is enough and the Deployment uses `Recreate`. Backed up by
+# the Velero schedule openproject-daily (selected by these labels).
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-assets
+  namespace: openproject
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+    app.kubernetes.io/component: assets
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: ceph-block
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 10Gi

kubernetes/apps/openproject/scheduled-backup.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: ScheduledBackup
+metadata:
+  name: op-pg-daily
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  # 03:00 local, same slot as the other CNPG clusters. `immediate` takes the
+  # first base backup as soon as the cluster is up. The attachments PVC is
+  # covered by the Velero schedule openproject-daily.
+  schedule: "0 0 3 * * *"
+  immediate: true
+  backupOwnerReference: self
+  cluster:
+    name: op-pg
+  method: plugin
+  pluginConfiguration:
+    name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io

kubernetes/apps/openproject/secrets.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Generated once in-cluster by ESO; nothing here is seeded by hand.
+#
+#   SECRET_KEY_BASE                       Rails session/cookie key.
+#   OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD  Password of the `admin` account the
+#                                         seeder creates on the first start.
+#                                         Only read at seed time: changing the
+#                                         password in the UI later is not
+#                                         reverted, and this value goes stale.
+#
+# Deleting the Secret regenerates both; that logs everyone out and does NOT
+# change an existing admin password.
+apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Password
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-secrets
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  length: 64
+  digits: 16
+  symbols: 0
+  allowRepeat: true
+  noUpper: false
+  secretKeys:
+    - SECRET_KEY_BASE
+    - OPENPROJECT_SEED_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD
+---
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-secrets
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  # Generate once; Periodic would rotate the key every refresh.
+  refreshPolicy: CreatedOnce
+  target:
+    name: openproject-secrets
+  dataFrom:
+    - sourceRef:
+        generatorRef:
+          apiVersion: generators.external-secrets.io/v1alpha1
+          kind: Password
+          name: openproject-secrets

kubernetes/apps/paperclip/agent-kubectl-rbac.yaml

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
 # `paperclip-prometheus-read`. Atlas, Iris, Hestia and Argus get exactly what
 # they hold today through that shared account: built-in `view` cluster-wide
 # (no Secrets, no write verb) plus the `monitoring/paperclip-prometheus-read`
-# Role (see prometheus-read-rbac.yaml). Hermes gets only `get` on the five
-# token Secrets below, to issue and rotate the kubeconfigs.
+# Role (see prometheus-read-rbac.yaml). Hermes gets `get` on the five token
+# Secrets below, to issue and rotate the kubeconfigs, plus that Prometheus
+# Role (REN-1345).
 #
 # Token Secrets carry no data in git; kube-controller-manager fills
 # `data.token`. Flux applies server-side and does not own `data`, so it does
@@ -159,7 +160,9 @@ roleRef:
   # Existing Role in prometheus-read-rbac.yaml, unchanged.
   name: paperclip-prometheus-read
 # Subjects live in `paperclip`, the binding in `monitoring`: `namespace:` is
-# load-bearing.
+# load-bearing. agent-hermes is bound here too (REN-1345): its duty list reads
+# Prometheus, and this Role is `get` on three named read-only proxies only.
+# It does not get `view`.
 subjects:
   - kind: ServiceAccount
     name: agent-atlas
@@ -173,6 +176,9 @@ subjects:
   - kind: ServiceAccount
     name: agent-argus
     namespace: paperclip
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: agent-hermes
+    namespace: paperclip
 ---
 apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Role

kubernetes/apps/paperclip/paperclip.yaml

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: paperclip
-          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:build.1791297080@sha256:0764e882521410d8ce8ed1359f8a1aa64eaa7746aa909653ef70050c239ca195 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
+          image: gitea.renner.uno/konairius/paperclip:build.1791487850@sha256:ff81da300e6c35581f34fad61a55da771b0e991d2fb2dcb624a0361263f01a37 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:paperclip"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 3100

kubernetes/apps/trmnl/terminus.yaml

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ spec:
         # is a device-bricking class of risk. Bumps are a reviewed, manual
         # act — see kubernetes/infrastructure/image-automation/README.md.
         - name: terminus
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.76.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.77.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
           ports:
             - name: http
               containerPort: 2345
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ spec:
             capabilities:
               drop: ["ALL"]
         - name: sidekiq
-          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.76.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
+          image: ghcr.io/usetrmnl/terminus:0.77.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:terminus"}
           command: ["bundle", "exec", "sidekiq", "-r", "./config/sidekiq.rb"]
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:

kubernetes/apps/woodpecker/agent.yaml

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ spec:
           # Image automation, range 3.x (see image-automation/woodpecker.yaml).
           # MUST stay version-matched with woodpecker-server (gRPC parity) — both
           # track the same range/filter so they bump together on each release.
-          image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.18.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
+          image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3.19.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-agent"}
           env:
             - name: WOODPECKER_SERVER
               value: woodpecker.woodpecker.svc.cluster.local:9000 # in-cluster gRPC, replaces LXC :9000

kubernetes/apps/woodpecker/server.yaml

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ spec:
           # minor + patch auto-update within 3.x; only the 4.0 major is held for
           # a reviewed bump. Safe now the DB is postgres (the old sqlite-surprise
           # -bump hazard is gone). Stays in lockstep with the agent.
-          image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.18.1 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
+          image: woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3.19.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:woodpecker-server"}
           env:
             - name: WOODPECKER_HOST
               value: https://ci.renner.uno

kubernetes/clusters/homelab/openproject.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: openproject
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  # OpenProject Community (REN-1363): web + worker, the op-pg CNPG Cluster +
+  # ObjectStore + ScheduledBackup and the attachments PVC. Own KS so a
+  # failure here never holds up the shared apps KS.
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 1m
+  timeout: 30m
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./kubernetes/apps/openproject
+  prune: true
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: infrastructure
+    - name: infrastructure-crds
+    - name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
+    - name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
+  healthCheckExprs:
+    - apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+      kind: Cluster
+      failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
+      current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"

kubernetes/infrastructure/namespaces/namespaces.yaml

@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: matrix
 ---
+# OpenProject Community, the owner's project board (REN-1363).
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: openproject
+---
 # Terminus (TRMNL BYOS server) driving the entrance-way e-ink panel.
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/kustomization.yaml

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ resources:
   - gitea-ns.yaml
   - netbird-service-sync-ns.yaml
   - trmnl-ns.yaml
+  - openproject-ns.yaml
   - matrix-ns.yaml
   - wordpress-ns.yaml
   - ai-ns.yaml

kubernetes/infrastructure/network-policies/openproject-ns.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny-ingress
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  endpointSelector: {}
+  ingress:
+    # Intra-namespace — openproject → op-pg.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": openproject
+    # openproject.renner.uno via Traefik.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+    # Prometheus scrape.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
+    # Velero backups via PVC mount.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": velero
+    # CNPG operator (in `database` ns) reconciles op-pg — needs to reach
+    # the postgres pods for health, failover, role checks.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
+    - fromEntities:
+        - host
+        - remote-node
+    # ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
+    # home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale. INGRESS ONLY.
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchExpressions:
+            - key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
+              operator: Exists
+      icmps:
+        - fields:
+            - { type: 0,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 8,   family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 11,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 12,  family: IPv4 }
+            - { type: 1,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 2,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 3,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 4,   family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
+            - { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
+
+---
+# Egress for the OpenProject pod only, so the op-pg CNPG pods keep
+# unrestricted egress for the barman-cloud WAL archive to Hetzner (same trade
+# as trmnl-ns.yaml).
+#
+# Outside the namespace OpenProject reaches only Authentik (OIDC), via
+# Traefik. No SMTP, no file-storage integration; adding one needs a rule
+# here, or it fails closed.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-egress
+  namespace: openproject
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+  egress:
+    # Intra-namespace — op-pg-rw.
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": openproject
+    # auth.renner.uno resolves to the Traefik VIP; Cilium DNATs before
+    # egress policy, so the rule matches Traefik's container port (as in
+    # matrix-ns.yaml mas-authentik-egress).
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ingress
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "8443"
+              protocol: TCP
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
+            k8s-app: kube-dns
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: UDP
+            - port: "53"
+              protocol: TCP

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int.hcl

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# OpenBao policy: rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int
-#
-# Least-privilege policy for the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker-credential
-# rotation CronJob (kubernetes auth role `rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int`).
-# Per-secret isolation, same template as rotator-mosquitto-health.
-#
-# NOT applied by Flux. Apply ONCE with an admin token:
-#
-#   bao policy write rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int \
-#     kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/policies/rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int.hcl
-#
-#   bao write auth/kubernetes/role/rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int \
-#     bound_service_account_names=mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotator \
-#     bound_service_account_namespaces=openbao \
-#     policies=rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int ttl=15m
-#
-# Do NOT set token_no_default_policy=true (kv-v2 patch preflight needs default).
-#
-# BOOTSTRAP: `random` mode rotates an existing field and never creates one.
-# Seed the path once with a `password` field before the first rotation:
-#
-#   bao kv put -mount=homelab apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials \
-#     password=<generated>
-#
-# The consumer is the open3e-esp32 gateway on the heat pump's internal CAN
-# (NVS key mq_pass); a rotation takes effect on the device only after its
-# MQTT settings are updated (web UI or NVS image).
-path "homelab/data/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials" {
-  capabilities = ["read", "patch"]
-}

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/kustomization.yaml

@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ resources:
   - review-bot.yaml
   - claude-oauth.yaml
   - mosquitto-health.yaml
-  - mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml
 # NOT ROTATED, deliberately — recorded here because the whole point of this
 # directory is that unrotated credentials should be a visible choice:
 #

kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-open3e-int.yaml

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
----
-# Class-A rotation of the mosquitto `open3e-int` broker credential: the
-# open3e-esp32 gateway on the Vitocal internal CAN (ECU 0x6e0). Same
-# rotator -> OpenBao -> ESO -> Reloader chain as mosquitto-health.yaml.
-#
-# The consumer is an embedded device: after a rotation its MQTT password must
-# be updated on the device (web UI Einstellungen, or an NVS image over USB).
-#
-# ON-DEMAND: kubectl -n openbao create job --from=cronjob/mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotate mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotate-now
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ServiceAccount
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotator
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
----
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: CronJob
-metadata:
-  name: mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotate
-  namespace: openbao
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-    app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
-spec:
-  # Quarterly, own month offset (paperless: 1,4,7,10; health: 2,5,8,11).
-  schedule: "0 4 1 3,6,9,12 *"
-  # Suspended (REN-802): the ESP32 only gets its password by hand, so a
-  # rotation would take the gateway offline. MQTT credentials move to the
-  # git-defined account register; this rotator is removed in that cleanup.
-  suspend: true
-  timeZone: Europe/Berlin
-  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
-  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
-  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 5
-  startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
-  jobTemplate:
-    spec:
-      backoffLimit: 2
-      activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
-      ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
-      template:
-        metadata:
-          labels:
-            app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
-            app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
-        spec:
-          serviceAccountName: mosquitto-open3e-int-secret-rotator
-          restartPolicy: Never
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            runAsUser: 65534
-            runAsGroup: 65534
-            seccompProfile:
-              type: RuntimeDefault
-          containers:
-            - name: rotate
-              image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
-              args: ["random"]
-              securityContext:
-                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-                readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
-                capabilities:
-                  drop: ["ALL"]
-              env:
-                - name: BAO_ADDR
-                  value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
-                - name: BAO_ROLE
-                  value: rotator-mosquitto-open3e-int
-                - name: BAO_PATH
-                  value: homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-open3e-int-credentials
-                - name: BAO_FIELDS
-                  value: "password"
-                - name: RANDOM_BYTES
-                  value: "32"
-              resources:
-                requests:
-                  cpu: 25m
-                  memory: 16Mi
-                limits:
-                  memory: 48Mi

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/openbao-clustersecretstore.yaml

@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@ spec:
         - crowdsec
         - evcc
         - flux-system # flux-system-git-auth: syncs the rotated flux gitea PAT into Flux's git secret
+        - gitea # gitea-package-retention token (apps/gitea/package-retention.yaml, REN-1203)
         - home-assistant
         - immich
         - influxdb
         - ingress
         - matrix # synapse-secrets, mx-pg barman creds (apps/matrix)
         - monitoring
+        - openproject # op-pg barman creds (apps/openproject)
         - paperclip
         - paperless
         - renovate # renovate-bot token (apps/renovate/externalsecret.yaml)

kubernetes/infrastructure/post-crds/velero-schedules.yaml

@@ -368,3 +368,30 @@ spec:
     labelSelector:
       matchLabels:
         app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse
+---
+apiVersion: velero.io/v1
+kind: Schedule
+metadata:
+  name: openproject-daily
+  namespace: velero
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: homelab-backup
+spec:
+  # Daily at 10:15 local (next free stagger slot after matrix-daily at
+  # 09:45). openproject-assets only: the attachments. Selected by the label
+  # this repo sets, like wordpress-daily; the op-pg database is covered by
+  # Barman.
+  schedule: "15 10 * * *"
+  useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
+  template:
+    includedNamespaces:
+      - openproject
+    includedResources:
+      - persistentvolumeclaims
+    storageLocation: default
+    ttl: 720h0m0s
+    snapshotMoveData: true
+    labelSelector:
+      matchLabels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: openproject
+        app.kubernetes.io/component: assets