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5155581fba |
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste key
|
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```
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**Manual unseal is required after every pod restart** (node drain, upgrade,
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crash): `kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal`.
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crash), **per replica** — the server runs three raft peers (see
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`infrastructure/openbao/helmrelease.yaml`), and a sealed one is neither a
|
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voter nor a standby, so it stays out of the cluster until unsealed:
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`kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-<N> -- bao operator unseal`, same key for
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all three. Three peers mean one sealed replica is survivable; two are not.
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Accepted for now; auto-unseal needs a second trust root (transit/KMS) and is
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explicitly out of scope. Symptom of sealed: ESO stores go NotReady, synced
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Secrets keep their last value (they are real k8s Secrets — pods keep running).
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@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ Secrets, and every secret-consuming app stays Pending. This step is **manual**
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(the unseal key lives in `pass`, off-cluster by design).
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```sh
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# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pod to exist (sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
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kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
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# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pods to exist (all three sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
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kubectl -n openbao get pods
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# 2. Restore the most recent raft snapshot. Source it from the snapshot PVC
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# (infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml) or, in a total-loss rebuild,
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@@ -158,8 +158,12 @@ kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
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kubectl -n openbao cp <snapshot>.snap openbao-0:/tmp/restore.snap
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kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/restore.snap
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# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1).
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# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1) — EVERY replica, same key.
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# A sealed server is neither a raft voter nor a standby, so unsealing only
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# openbao-0 leaves the three-peer cluster one node short of quorum.
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kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste homelab/openbao/unseal-key
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kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-1 -- bao operator unseal # same key
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kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-2 -- bao operator unseal # same key
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```
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Verify the store recovers before moving on:
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@@ -170,7 +174,9 @@ kubectl -n <ns> get externalsecret # want: SecretSynced
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```
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> **Manual unseal is required after every OpenBao pod restart**, not just
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> during rebuilds. Details + rationale: `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
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> during rebuilds, and for *each* replica that restarts — a rolling node
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> drain seals all three in turn. Details + rationale:
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> `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
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## Step 5 — apps: let the rest reconcile
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ resources:
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- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
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- prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
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- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
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- prometheusrule-openbao.yaml
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- prometheusrule-velero.yaml
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- prometheusrule-woodpecker-rotation.yaml
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# CNPG backup health. Seven Postgres clusters ship to Hetzner and nothing
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
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kind: PrometheusRule
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metadata:
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name: openbao
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namespace: monitoring
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labels:
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# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
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# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
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release: kube-prometheus-stack
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spec:
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groups:
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- name: openbao.rules
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rules:
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# WHY THIS WATCHES POD READINESS RATHER THAN A SEAL METRIC
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#
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# OpenBao is not scraped: there is no ServiceMonitor for it, and its
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# metrics endpoint needs either a token or an explicit
|
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# `unauthenticated_metrics_access` telemetry setting, neither of which
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# is configured. Confirmed against Prometheus — no bao_* or vault_*
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# series exist. External Secrets exports nothing usable either, so the
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# ClusterSecretStore going NotReady is invisible as a metric.
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#
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# kube-state-metrics readiness carries the signal anyway, and does so
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# for a structural reason rather than by luck: a sealed OpenBao fails
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# its readiness probe, because a sealed server can neither serve
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# requests nor act as a raft standby. Sealed is therefore always
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# not-Ready. The converse does not hold — a crash or a stuck
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# scheduling would also fire this — but both want a human too, so the
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# imprecision costs nothing.
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- alert: OpenBaoReplicaNotReady
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# A replica that is sealed never recovers on its own, so the
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# duration is only there to ignore ordinary rescheduling: a healthy
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# pod moving between nodes is Ready again in well under a minute.
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expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 3
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for: 10m
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labels:
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severity: warning
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annotations:
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summary: "OpenBao has {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
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description: >-
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An OpenBao replica has been unavailable for 10 minutes. The usual
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cause is a sealed replica after a node drain — every restart
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seals it, and it stays out of the raft cluster until unsealed by
|
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hand. The service is still up on the remaining replicas, so
|
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nothing is broken yet, but redundancy is reduced and a second
|
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drain would cost quorum. Check `kubectl -n openbao get pods` and
|
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`bao status` in the not-ready pod; unseal with the key from
|
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`pass` (homelab/openbao/unseal-key).
|
||||
|
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- alert: OpenBaoQuorumLost
|
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# Raft quorum of a three-node cluster is two. At one ready replica
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# the cluster cannot elect a leader and the secret store is down:
|
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# the ClusterSecretStore goes InvalidProviderConfig and no
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# ExternalSecret can refresh.
|
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#
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# Shorter window than the warning above because this is an outage,
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# not a degradation — but not zero, so a rolling restart that
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# briefly dips does not page.
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expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 2
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for: 5m
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||||
labels:
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||||
severity: critical
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
summary: "OpenBao below raft quorum — {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
Fewer than two OpenBao replicas are ready, so raft cannot hold
|
||||
quorum and the secret store is unavailable. ExternalSecrets stop
|
||||
refreshing; existing Secrets keep their last values, so failures
|
||||
surface only when something rotates or a new secret is needed.
|
||||
Unseal the sealed replicas (key in `pass`,
|
||||
homelab/openbao/unseal-key) — each one individually, since a
|
||||
sealed server cannot be a standby.
|
||||
|
||||
- alert: OpenBaoMetricsMissing
|
||||
# Guards the two alerts above. Both are threshold comparisons, so if
|
||||
# kube-state-metrics stops exporting this series — the StatefulSet
|
||||
# deleted, the namespace gone, kube-state-metrics itself broken —
|
||||
# they silently stop evaluating and the silence looks identical to
|
||||
# health. This makes that state say something.
|
||||
expr: absent(kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"})
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for: 15m
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labels:
|
||||
severity: warning
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
summary: "No readiness metric for the OpenBao StatefulSet"
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
kube-state-metrics has not reported
|
||||
kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready for the openbao
|
||||
StatefulSet in 15 minutes. Either the StatefulSet is gone or
|
||||
kube-state-metrics is not scraping — and while this is absent,
|
||||
OpenBaoReplicaNotReady and OpenBaoQuorumLost cannot fire at all.
|
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@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ spec:
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||||
# stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
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||||
# policy) — no extra dependency.
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||||
- name: reconcile-publish-ip
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||||
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
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||||
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
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||||
command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
|
||||
volumeMounts:
|
||||
- name: data
|
||||
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ spec:
|
||||
readOnly: true
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: music-assistant
|
||||
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
|
||||
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
|
||||
env:
|
||||
- name: LOG_LEVEL
|
||||
value: info
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -47,26 +47,27 @@ spec:
|
||||
# (paperless + audiobookshelf + immich + ... all clone at once).
|
||||
cephConfig:
|
||||
mon:
|
||||
# Ceph's 30% default assumes the mon has a filesystem to itself, where
|
||||
# 30% free is a meaningful reserve. Here the mons live on
|
||||
# dataDirHostPath /var/lib/rook — the node's /var, shared with ~29 GB
|
||||
# of containerd image and snapshot storage — and the mon DB itself is
|
||||
# ~106 MB. So the default measures container churn, not Ceph: k8s-2
|
||||
# trips MON_DISK_LOW whenever the image cache fills, and image GC does
|
||||
# not clear it (most of /var/lib/containerd is overlayfs snapshots held
|
||||
# by running containers, which GC cannot reclaim — see #434).
|
||||
# 20% of a 60 GB /var still leaves ~12 GB against a 106 MB database.
|
||||
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
|
||||
# monitoring-rules watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
|
||||
# node filling rather than the mon growing.
|
||||
# The Ceph default, stated rather than left out. Removing the line would
|
||||
# not restore it: `ceph config` keeps a value that only disappears from
|
||||
# this file, so the old 20 would sit in the mon config database
|
||||
# indefinitely — the same trap the bluestore settings below describe,
|
||||
# and the one that crash-looped an OSD during the network provider
|
||||
# change when public_network survived being deleted here.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this. Give the mons their own volume and
|
||||
# the default 30% becomes meaningful again, at which point this override
|
||||
# should be dropped rather than carried over. It cannot be done on the
|
||||
# current cluster — every StorageClass is Ceph-backed, so a mon PVC
|
||||
# would be circular, and Rook only applies mon.volumeClaimTemplate to
|
||||
# newly created mons, never migrating existing ones.
|
||||
mon_data_avail_warn: "20"
|
||||
# It was 20 because the mons share the node's /var with containerd, and
|
||||
# on the VMs that was ~60 GB: 30% free measured image and snapshot churn
|
||||
# rather than anything about Ceph, so k8s-2 tripped MON_DISK_LOW whenever
|
||||
# the image cache filled and GC could not reclaim it (#434).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Bare metal removed the premise. /var is now ~931 GB per node at 7-8%
|
||||
# used, so 30% free is a real reserve again and the ~106 MB mon database
|
||||
# is irrelevant against it. Reaching 70% would be a genuine signal about
|
||||
# the node rather than noise about the image cache.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
|
||||
# monitoring-rules still watches /var directly for the real risk, which
|
||||
# is the node filling rather than the mon growing.
|
||||
mon_data_avail_warn: "30"
|
||||
# Stop compacting the whole RocksDB prefix on every paxos trim.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Upstream default is true — "Compact a certain prefix (including paxos)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,20 +29,22 @@
|
||||
# needed — unlike the v30iot attachments, there is no DHCP-supplied default
|
||||
# route to confine, because there is no DHCP and no default route.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The pool stays inside 10.99.0.0/29, on-link with the node addresses, and
|
||||
# this is load-bearing during the migration rather than a detail. OSDs move
|
||||
# one at a time, so the cluster runs mixed for a while: an OSD already on
|
||||
# this attachment has to reach an OSD still using the node's host address.
|
||||
# There is no router on this segment, so anything outside the /29 would be
|
||||
# unreachable from the un-migrated side and the two would mark each other
|
||||
# down — during precisely the window that is supposed to be safe.
|
||||
# The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6. It was .4-.6 while the
|
||||
# migration ran, because the nodes still held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph
|
||||
# needed host networking to reach this link — three addresses for three
|
||||
# OSDs, no spare. The nodes have since given those up (the link is only a
|
||||
# macvlan parent now and needs no address of its own), so the reservation
|
||||
# has nothing left to avoid.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# range_start/range_end reserve .4-.6 and leave .1-.3 to the nodes. That is
|
||||
# exactly one address per OSD with nothing spare, which is sufficient
|
||||
# because osdMaxUpdatesInParallel bounds the migration to one OSD at a
|
||||
# time: allocations grow 1, 2, 3 and never overlap. Once the switch is
|
||||
# confirmed and the node addresses come out of the Talos configs, the pool
|
||||
# can take the whole /29 and the spare returns.
|
||||
# Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it elsewhere on the
|
||||
# segment is not cosmetic. There is no router here, so an address outside
|
||||
# the /29 would be unreachable from anything still using one inside it —
|
||||
# which is exactly what would break a future rolling change, where migrated
|
||||
# and un-migrated OSDs have to keep talking to each other.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Six addresses for three OSDs is the headroom the migration could not
|
||||
# afford: room for a leaked allocation to sit until the reconciler collects
|
||||
# it, and room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# IPAM
|
||||
#
|
||||
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ spec:
|
||||
"ipam": {
|
||||
"type": "whereabouts",
|
||||
"range": "10.99.0.0/29",
|
||||
"range_start": "10.99.0.4",
|
||||
"range_start": "10.99.0.1",
|
||||
"range_end": "10.99.0.6"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,29 @@ machine:
|
||||
# un-translated SYN-ACK -> client kernel RST, verified live 2026-07-23).
|
||||
# This disables v6 entirely on that link, including link-local.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
# Same argument, applied to the physical ports rather than a VLAN child.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# enp2s0f0np0 is nothing but the trunk parent for mgmt0 and ens19, and
|
||||
# enp87s0 is unused. Both sit on the untagged fallback network, where by
|
||||
# design nothing is supposed to run — and both were autoconfiguring
|
||||
# themselves from its router advertisements: an fd00::/64 ULA each, plus
|
||||
# an IPv6 default route each.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The result was four IPv6 default routes per node at identical priority
|
||||
# 1024 — mgmt0, enp2s0f0np0, enp87s0 and lo — of which only mgmt0 has a
|
||||
# globally routable source address. With nothing to break the tie,
|
||||
# outbound IPv6 mostly left through an interface whose only usable source
|
||||
# was a ULA, so the cluster had no IPv6 egress at all while IPv4 worked
|
||||
# normally. It surfaced as two NetBird probes reporting the proxies down
|
||||
# for 30 hours; the proxies were fine and answered IPv6 in 13 ms from
|
||||
# outside.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Verified on k8s-1 before rolling to the others: disabling v6 on a VLAN
|
||||
# parent leaves the VLAN child alone. mgmt0 kept its global address and
|
||||
# its fd40:: address, Ceph did not notice, and every failing probe
|
||||
# recovered on the next scrape.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
install:
|
||||
# Three NVMe drives are ordinary block devices to Talos here: the Kingston
|
||||
# OM8PGP41024Q-A0 system disk, the Samsung PM983 that Rook claims as the
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +117,30 @@ vlanID: 40
|
||||
parent: enp2s0f0np0
|
||||
up: true
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Management addressing is DHCP and the lease is NOT reserved anywhere in this
|
||||
# repo — the k8s-{1,2,3}.srv.renner.uno reservations live on the UDM out of band
|
||||
# and opentofu/unifi.tf declares no live resources. The addresses do move under
|
||||
# a running node: k8s-3 went 10.2.40.168 -> .138 mid-flight on 2026-08-26
|
||||
# without its Node object ever re-registering (issue #635).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# kube-apiserver does not follow when that happens. Talos starts it with
|
||||
# `--advertise-address=$(POD_IP)` and no `--endpoint-reconciler-type` override,
|
||||
# so the advertised address is fixed at pod start and the default lease
|
||||
# reconciler goes on renewing the masterlease under the OLD address. Nothing
|
||||
# expires it while the process lives, so `default/kubernetes` keeps handing out
|
||||
# a dead endpoint and the node's live address is never registered at all — 19h
|
||||
# of TargetDown on job="apiserver", a monitoring blind spot on one of three
|
||||
# apiservers, and it cleared only when the static pod restarted.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# So after any node re-IPs, check that
|
||||
# `kubectl get endpoints kubernetes -n default` agrees with
|
||||
# `kubectl get nodes -o wide`, and restart the offending node
|
||||
# (`talosctl -n <node> reboot`) if it does not.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Pinning mgmt0 with a static AddressConfig alongside this document would remove
|
||||
# the trigger, but it needs an address outside the UDM's DHCP pool — which is
|
||||
# not declared in this repo — and §6 of RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md applies:
|
||||
# prove it with `talosctl apply-config --mode=try` before making it permanent.
|
||||
apiVersion: v1alpha1
|
||||
kind: DHCPv4Config
|
||||
name: mgmt0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,15 @@ machine:
|
||||
# macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments; host addresses on that L2
|
||||
# make node replies bypass the UDM and break every UDM-DNATed flow.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
|
||||
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
|
||||
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
|
||||
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
|
||||
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
|
||||
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
|
||||
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
install:
|
||||
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
|
||||
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ machine:
|
||||
sysctls:
|
||||
# v30iot NIC carries no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
|
||||
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
|
||||
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
|
||||
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
|
||||
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
|
||||
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
|
||||
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
|
||||
install:
|
||||
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
|
||||
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user