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claude-botandClaude Opus 5 dd311f4b01 chore(rook-ceph): return mon_data_avail_warn to the Ceph default
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The override existed because the mons share the node's /var with containerd,
and on the VMs that was ~60 GB — 30% free measured image and snapshot churn
rather than anything about Ceph, so k8s-2 tripped MON_DISK_LOW whenever the
image cache filled and GC could not reclaim it (#434).

Bare metal removed the premise. /var is now ~931 GB per node at 7-8% used, so
30% free is a real reserve again and the ~106 MB mon database is irrelevant
against it. Reaching 70% would be a genuine signal about the node rather than
noise about the image cache. The comment still described the 60 GB VM /var and
ended with "BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this", which is now done.

Set to 30 rather than deleted, deliberately. `ceph config` keeps a value that
only disappears from this file: `ceph config dump` currently shows
`mon advanced mon_data_avail_warn 20`, and removing the line would leave it
there indefinitely. That is the trap the bluestore settings below already
document, and the one that crash-looped an OSD during the network provider
change when public_network survived being deleted here.

mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
monitoring-rules still watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
node filling rather than the mon growing.

kubectl diff against the live cluster shows the value and the generation bump,
nothing else. Verify after it applies with
`ceph config get mon mon_data_avail_warn` — 30 there is the proof the database
entry was overwritten and not merely edited in git.

Supersedes the remaining half of #503, which was closed as overtaken by the
bare-metal migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 08:37:46 +02:00
k.renner 36e683aee1 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] TargetDown (default) (#635)' (#644) from alert-fix/issue-635 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#644
2026-08-27 06:35:54 +00:00
k.renner c34b423d38 Merge pull request 'chore(rook-ceph): give the SAN pool the whole /29 now the nodes are off it' (#654) from ceph-san-pool-widen into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#654
2026-08-27 06:35:12 +00:00
k.renner 5fd0691ed2 Merge pull request 'fix(talos): stop the VLAN parents autoconfiguring on the fallback network' (#653) from no-ipv6-on-vlan-parents into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#653
2026-08-27 06:34:51 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 f0f0b0af9d chore(rook-ceph): give the SAN pool the whole /29 now the nodes are off it
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The pool was .4-.6 because the nodes held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph needed
host networking to reach VLAN 49 — three addresses for three OSDs, with no
spare, during the one phase where things were actually moving.

The nodes have since given those addresses up: the link is only a macvlan
parent now and does not need one of its own. The reservation has nothing left
to avoid, so the pool takes .1 through .6.

Six for three is the headroom the migration could not afford. It leaves room
for a leaked allocation to sit until the whereabouts reconciler collects it —
the case where a node is lost hard enough that the CNI DEL never runs — and
room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.

Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it somewhere roomier on the
segment stays deliberate. There is no router here, so an address outside the
/29 is unreachable from anything using one inside it, which is what would
break a future rolling change where migrated and un-migrated OSDs still have
to talk to each other. That was nearly the shape of this attachment and it
would have taken every pool down at the first OSD.

Inert for the running cluster: a NetworkAttachmentDefinition is read when a
pod is created, so the three existing OSDs keep .4, .5 and .6 until they next
restart for some other reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 08:03:46 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 4c6c23377d fix(talos): stop the VLAN parents autoconfiguring on the fallback network
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The cluster had no IPv6 egress. Pods could not reach the IPv6 internet at all
while IPv4 from the same pod worked normally.

enp2s0f0np0 is nothing but the trunk parent for mgmt0 and ens19, and enp87s0
is unused. Both sit on the untagged fallback network, where by design nothing
is supposed to run — and both were autoconfiguring from its router
advertisements: an fd00::/64 ULA each, plus an IPv6 default route each.

That left four IPv6 default routes per node at identical priority 1024 —
mgmt0, enp2s0f0np0, enp87s0 and lo — of which only mgmt0 has a globally
routable source address. With nothing to break the tie, outbound IPv6 mostly
left through an interface whose only usable source was a ULA.

This is the same argument the file already makes for ens19, where host
addresses on a link that exists only as a macvlan parent are called "never
needed and actively harmful". It was simply never extended to the physical
ports.

How it surfaced: NetbirdRelayMemberDown and NetbirdPublicEdgeMemberDown had
been firing for 30 hours, reading as though the proxies were down. They were
not — every failing target is an IPv6 literal and the blackbox exporter is a
pod, so the probes were failing on cluster egress. The proxies answered IPv6
in 13 ms from a workstation on another VLAN throughout.

Applied to k8s-1 first and verified before rolling to the other two, because
the existing precedent disables v6 on a VLAN *child* while this targets VLAN
*parents*, and mgmt0 carries the address Ceph and Cilium use:

  mgmt0 kept 2003:d6:9718:3b02:… and fd40::…    unchanged
  fd00:: addresses                              2 -> 0
  IPv6 default routes                           4 -> 2 (mgmt0, lo)
  failing blackbox probes                       5 -> 0
  Ceph                                          217 PGs active+clean, no OSD restart

All three nodes are already patched live; this puts it in git so the next
apply-config does not undo it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 07:51:51 +02:00
k.renner f7f04281c0 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] AlertmanagerClusterFailedToSendAlerts (monitoring) (#649)' (#650) from alert-fix/issue-649 into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#650
2026-08-27 04:54:09 +00:00
k.renner c4a6d72cd6 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] KubeStatefulSetReplicasMismatch (openbao) (#645)' (#648) from alert-fix/issue-645 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#648
2026-08-27 04:53:56 +00:00
k.renner 8c019e50d2 Merge pull request 'feat(monitoring): alert on OpenBao replicas being unavailable' (#647) from openbao-alerting into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#647
2026-08-27 04:53:34 +00:00
security-bot c9e9830092 chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-27 01:17:36 +00:00
issue-fix-bot 781b849adb fix: [alert] KubeStatefulSetReplicasMismatch (openbao) (#645)
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2026-08-26 22:45:57 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 af81045277 feat(monitoring): alert on OpenBao replicas being unavailable
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There was no OpenBao alerting of any kind — no rule, no ServiceMonitor. That
is why today's seal went unnoticed for two hours: the k8s-1 Talos upgrade
sealed the single replica, the ClusterSecretStore went InvalidProviderConfig,
and nothing said so.

Three replicas make this more important rather than less. Before, a seal was a
visible outage that announced itself. Now the service survives one, so a
sealed replica is a quiet loss of redundancy that nothing surfaces until the
next drain takes quorum with it.

Watches pod readiness rather than a seal metric, because there is no seal
metric to watch. OpenBao is not scraped: no ServiceMonitor exists, and its
metrics endpoint needs a token or an explicit unauthenticated_metrics_access
telemetry setting, neither configured. Verified against the running
Prometheus — no bao_* or vault_* series at all. External Secrets exports
nothing usable either, so the ClusterSecretStore going NotReady is invisible.

Readiness carries the signal for a structural reason, not by luck: a sealed
server fails its readiness probe because it can neither serve requests nor act
as a raft standby. Sealed is therefore always not-Ready. The converse does not
hold — a crash or stuck scheduling fires the same alert — but those want a
human too.

Three rules:

  OpenBaoReplicaNotReady   < 3 ready for 10m, warning. The duration only
                           ignores ordinary rescheduling; a sealed replica
                           never recovers on its own.
  OpenBaoQuorumLost        < 2 ready for 5m, critical. Raft quorum of three
                           is two, so below that the store is down.
  OpenBaoMetricsMissing    absent() for 15m, warning. Both rules above are
                           threshold comparisons, so if the series disappears
                           they stop evaluating and the silence is
                           indistinguishable from health.

Verified against the running Prometheus rather than assumed: the selector
matches (the same query with `< 4` returns the series at 3), and the alerting
thresholds correctly return nothing at 3/3 ready. Testing only that it returns
nothing would not have caught a typo in the selector.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 23:00:10 +02:00
issue-fix-bot 5155581fba fix: [alert] TargetDown (default) (#635)
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2026-08-26 20:45:37 +00:00
10 changed files with 210 additions and 40 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste key
```
**Manual unseal is required after every pod restart** (node drain, upgrade,
crash): `kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal`.
crash), **per replica** — the server runs three raft peers (see
`infrastructure/openbao/helmrelease.yaml`), and a sealed one is neither a
voter nor a standby, so it stays out of the cluster until unsealed:
`kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-<N> -- bao operator unseal`, same key for
all three. Three peers mean one sealed replica is survivable; two are not.
Accepted for now; auto-unseal needs a second trust root (transit/KMS) and is
explicitly out of scope. Symptom of sealed: ESO stores go NotReady, synced
Secrets keep their last value (they are real k8s Secrets — pods keep running).
+10 -4
View File
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ Secrets, and every secret-consuming app stays Pending. This step is **manual**
(the unseal key lives in `pass`, off-cluster by design).
```sh
# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pod to exist (sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pods to exist (all three sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
kubectl -n openbao get pods
# 2. Restore the most recent raft snapshot. Source it from the snapshot PVC
# (infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml) or, in a total-loss rebuild,
@@ -158,8 +158,12 @@ kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
kubectl -n openbao cp <snapshot>.snap openbao-0:/tmp/restore.snap
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/restore.snap
# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1).
# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1) — EVERY replica, same key.
# A sealed server is neither a raft voter nor a standby, so unsealing only
# openbao-0 leaves the three-peer cluster one node short of quorum.
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste homelab/openbao/unseal-key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-1 -- bao operator unseal # same key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-2 -- bao operator unseal # same key
```
Verify the store recovers before moving on:
@@ -170,7 +174,9 @@ kubectl -n <ns> get externalsecret # want: SecretSynced
```
> **Manual unseal is required after every OpenBao pod restart**, not just
> during rebuilds. Details + rationale: `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
> during rebuilds, and for *each* replica that restarts — a rolling node
> drain seals all three in turn. Details + rationale:
> `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
## Step 5 — apps: let the rest reconcile
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
- prometheusrule-openbao.yaml
- prometheusrule-velero.yaml
- prometheusrule-woodpecker-rotation.yaml
# CNPG backup health. Seven Postgres clusters ship to Hetzner and nothing
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: openbao
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: openbao.rules
rules:
# WHY THIS WATCHES POD READINESS RATHER THAN A SEAL METRIC
#
# OpenBao is not scraped: there is no ServiceMonitor for it, and its
# metrics endpoint needs either a token or an explicit
# `unauthenticated_metrics_access` telemetry setting, neither of which
# is configured. Confirmed against Prometheus — no bao_* or vault_*
# series exist. External Secrets exports nothing usable either, so the
# ClusterSecretStore going NotReady is invisible as a metric.
#
# kube-state-metrics readiness carries the signal anyway, and does so
# for a structural reason rather than by luck: a sealed OpenBao fails
# its readiness probe, because a sealed server can neither serve
# requests nor act as a raft standby. Sealed is therefore always
# not-Ready. The converse does not hold — a crash or a stuck
# scheduling would also fire this — but both want a human too, so the
# imprecision costs nothing.
- alert: OpenBaoReplicaNotReady
# A replica that is sealed never recovers on its own, so the
# duration is only there to ignore ordinary rescheduling: a healthy
# pod moving between nodes is Ready again in well under a minute.
expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 3
for: 10m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "OpenBao has {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
description: >-
An OpenBao replica has been unavailable for 10 minutes. The usual
cause is a sealed replica after a node drain — every restart
seals it, and it stays out of the raft cluster until unsealed by
hand. The service is still up on the remaining replicas, so
nothing is broken yet, but redundancy is reduced and a second
drain would cost quorum. Check `kubectl -n openbao get pods` and
`bao status` in the not-ready pod; unseal with the key from
`pass` (homelab/openbao/unseal-key).
- alert: OpenBaoQuorumLost
# Raft quorum of a three-node cluster is two. At one ready replica
# the cluster cannot elect a leader and the secret store is down:
# the ClusterSecretStore goes InvalidProviderConfig and no
# ExternalSecret can refresh.
#
# Shorter window than the warning above because this is an outage,
# not a degradation — but not zero, so a rolling restart that
# briefly dips does not page.
expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 2
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "OpenBao below raft quorum — {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
description: >-
Fewer than two OpenBao replicas are ready, so raft cannot hold
quorum and the secret store is unavailable. ExternalSecrets stop
refreshing; existing Secrets keep their last values, so failures
surface only when something rotates or a new secret is needed.
Unseal the sealed replicas (key in `pass`,
homelab/openbao/unseal-key) — each one individually, since a
sealed server cannot be a standby.
- alert: OpenBaoMetricsMissing
# Guards the two alerts above. Both are threshold comparisons, so if
# kube-state-metrics stops exporting this series — the StatefulSet
# deleted, the namespace gone, kube-state-metrics itself broken —
# they silently stop evaluating and the silence looks identical to
# health. This makes that state say something.
expr: absent(kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"})
for: 15m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "No readiness metric for the OpenBao StatefulSet"
description: >-
kube-state-metrics has not reported
kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready for the openbao
StatefulSet in 15 minutes. Either the StatefulSet is gone or
kube-state-metrics is not scraping — and while this is absent,
OpenBaoReplicaNotReady and OpenBaoQuorumLost cannot fire at all.
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ spec:
# stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
# policy) — no extra dependency.
- name: reconcile-publish-ip
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ spec:
readOnly: true
containers:
- name: music-assistant
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
env:
- name: LOG_LEVEL
value: info
@@ -47,26 +47,27 @@ spec:
# (paperless + audiobookshelf + immich + ... all clone at once).
cephConfig:
mon:
# Ceph's 30% default assumes the mon has a filesystem to itself, where
# 30% free is a meaningful reserve. Here the mons live on
# dataDirHostPath /var/lib/rook — the node's /var, shared with ~29 GB
# of containerd image and snapshot storage — and the mon DB itself is
# ~106 MB. So the default measures container churn, not Ceph: k8s-2
# trips MON_DISK_LOW whenever the image cache fills, and image GC does
# not clear it (most of /var/lib/containerd is overlayfs snapshots held
# by running containers, which GC cannot reclaim — see #434).
# 20% of a 60 GB /var still leaves ~12 GB against a 106 MB database.
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
# monitoring-rules watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
# node filling rather than the mon growing.
# The Ceph default, stated rather than left out. Removing the line would
# not restore it: `ceph config` keeps a value that only disappears from
# this file, so the old 20 would sit in the mon config database
# indefinitely — the same trap the bluestore settings below describe,
# and the one that crash-looped an OSD during the network provider
# change when public_network survived being deleted here.
#
# BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this. Give the mons their own volume and
# the default 30% becomes meaningful again, at which point this override
# should be dropped rather than carried over. It cannot be done on the
# current cluster — every StorageClass is Ceph-backed, so a mon PVC
# would be circular, and Rook only applies mon.volumeClaimTemplate to
# newly created mons, never migrating existing ones.
mon_data_avail_warn: "20"
# It was 20 because the mons share the node's /var with containerd, and
# on the VMs that was ~60 GB: 30% free measured image and snapshot churn
# rather than anything about Ceph, so k8s-2 tripped MON_DISK_LOW whenever
# the image cache filled and GC could not reclaim it (#434).
#
# Bare metal removed the premise. /var is now ~931 GB per node at 7-8%
# used, so 30% free is a real reserve again and the ~106 MB mon database
# is irrelevant against it. Reaching 70% would be a genuine signal about
# the node rather than noise about the image cache.
#
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
# monitoring-rules still watches /var directly for the real risk, which
# is the node filling rather than the mon growing.
mon_data_avail_warn: "30"
# Stop compacting the whole RocksDB prefix on every paxos trim.
#
# Upstream default is true — "Compact a certain prefix (including paxos)
@@ -29,20 +29,22 @@
# needed — unlike the v30iot attachments, there is no DHCP-supplied default
# route to confine, because there is no DHCP and no default route.
#
# The pool stays inside 10.99.0.0/29, on-link with the node addresses, and
# this is load-bearing during the migration rather than a detail. OSDs move
# one at a time, so the cluster runs mixed for a while: an OSD already on
# this attachment has to reach an OSD still using the node's host address.
# There is no router on this segment, so anything outside the /29 would be
# unreachable from the un-migrated side and the two would mark each other
# down — during precisely the window that is supposed to be safe.
# The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6. It was .4-.6 while the
# migration ran, because the nodes still held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph
# needed host networking to reach this link — three addresses for three
# OSDs, no spare. The nodes have since given those up (the link is only a
# macvlan parent now and needs no address of its own), so the reservation
# has nothing left to avoid.
#
# range_start/range_end reserve .4-.6 and leave .1-.3 to the nodes. That is
# exactly one address per OSD with nothing spare, which is sufficient
# because osdMaxUpdatesInParallel bounds the migration to one OSD at a
# time: allocations grow 1, 2, 3 and never overlap. Once the switch is
# confirmed and the node addresses come out of the Talos configs, the pool
# can take the whole /29 and the spare returns.
# Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it elsewhere on the
# segment is not cosmetic. There is no router here, so an address outside
# the /29 would be unreachable from anything still using one inside it —
# which is exactly what would break a future rolling change, where migrated
# and un-migrated OSDs have to keep talking to each other.
#
# Six addresses for three OSDs is the headroom the migration could not
# afford: room for a leaked allocation to sit until the reconciler collects
# it, and room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.
#
# IPAM
#
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ spec:
"ipam": {
"type": "whereabouts",
"range": "10.99.0.0/29",
"range_start": "10.99.0.4",
"range_start": "10.99.0.1",
"range_end": "10.99.0.6"
}
}
+47
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,29 @@ machine:
# un-translated SYN-ACK -> client kernel RST, verified live 2026-07-23).
# This disables v6 entirely on that link, including link-local.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument, applied to the physical ports rather than a VLAN child.
#
# enp2s0f0np0 is nothing but the trunk parent for mgmt0 and ens19, and
# enp87s0 is unused. Both sit on the untagged fallback network, where by
# design nothing is supposed to run — and both were autoconfiguring
# themselves from its router advertisements: an fd00::/64 ULA each, plus
# an IPv6 default route each.
#
# The result was four IPv6 default routes per node at identical priority
# 1024 — mgmt0, enp2s0f0np0, enp87s0 and lo — of which only mgmt0 has a
# globally routable source address. With nothing to break the tie,
# outbound IPv6 mostly left through an interface whose only usable source
# was a ULA, so the cluster had no IPv6 egress at all while IPv4 worked
# normally. It surfaced as two NetBird probes reporting the proxies down
# for 30 hours; the proxies were fine and answered IPv6 in 13 ms from
# outside.
#
# Verified on k8s-1 before rolling to the others: disabling v6 on a VLAN
# parent leaves the VLAN child alone. mgmt0 kept its global address and
# its fd40:: address, Ceph did not notice, and every failing probe
# recovered on the next scrape.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are ordinary block devices to Talos here: the Kingston
# OM8PGP41024Q-A0 system disk, the Samsung PM983 that Rook claims as the
@@ -94,6 +117,30 @@ vlanID: 40
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Management addressing is DHCP and the lease is NOT reserved anywhere in this
# repo — the k8s-{1,2,3}.srv.renner.uno reservations live on the UDM out of band
# and opentofu/unifi.tf declares no live resources. The addresses do move under
# a running node: k8s-3 went 10.2.40.168 -> .138 mid-flight on 2026-08-26
# without its Node object ever re-registering (issue #635).
#
# kube-apiserver does not follow when that happens. Talos starts it with
# `--advertise-address=$(POD_IP)` and no `--endpoint-reconciler-type` override,
# so the advertised address is fixed at pod start and the default lease
# reconciler goes on renewing the masterlease under the OLD address. Nothing
# expires it while the process lives, so `default/kubernetes` keeps handing out
# a dead endpoint and the node's live address is never registered at all — 19h
# of TargetDown on job="apiserver", a monitoring blind spot on one of three
# apiservers, and it cleared only when the static pod restarted.
#
# So after any node re-IPs, check that
# `kubectl get endpoints kubernetes -n default` agrees with
# `kubectl get nodes -o wide`, and restart the offending node
# (`talosctl -n <node> reboot`) if it does not.
#
# Pinning mgmt0 with a static AddressConfig alongside this document would remove
# the trigger, but it needs an address outside the UDM's DHCP pool — which is
# not declared in this repo — and §6 of RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md applies:
# prove it with `talosctl apply-config --mode=try` before making it permanent.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: DHCPv4Config
name: mgmt0
+9
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,15 @@ machine:
# macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments; host addresses on that L2
# make node replies bypass the UDM and break every UDM-DNATed flow.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
+9
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ machine:
sysctls:
# v30iot NIC carries no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever