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homelab/kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/mosquitto-health.yaml
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fix(secret-rotator): never fail the HA run after the store; stage the image rollout
Folds the good parts of #1412 into this PR and addresses both review-bot
reviews (#1412 review 1789, #1414 review 1791):

- Everything after the OpenBao store is best-effort. Decode, reconnect,
  listing and revokes run in reap_superseded(); reap_summary() turns any
  error into "reap skipped" plus a warning, so rotate_ha_token returns Ok.
  A failed run would start a second pod (backoffLimit: 1) that keeps the
  token just stored and its successor and reaps the token consumers still
  hold until ESO syncs, i.e. the #1081 outage. Two unit tests cover it.
- Warn when the replaced token is not named "<client_name> [<6 hex>]":
  no later run reaps it, so it needs a manual revoke (from #1412).
- Staged image rollout (from #1412): only the three HA CronJobs carry the
  flux-system:secret-rotator marker; the other 17 rotators stay on
  2026-07-30 until a manual HA run validates the new binary, then a
  follow-up adds the marker to them. rotation/kustomization.yaml records
  the exception.
- Merged current main (a6f37e2b, 1691a0ac): the Reloader annotations for
  zone-configurator and speech-to-phrase are already there via #1409.
2026-10-21 07:59:52 +00:00

125 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML

---
# Class-A automated rotation of the mosquitto `health` broker credential — a
# self-generated random secret.
#
# FIRST of the eight mosquitto broker users to be enrolled. The credentials were
# previously minted once by bootstrap Jobs and then never changed at all: no
# schedule, no compromise response, and they existed only in the Secret object,
# outside the OpenBao snapshot. See kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/
# PROPOSAL-mosquitto-credential-rotation.md (PR #453 — not yet merged; this
# file lands with it) for the full plan and phasing.
#
# `health` deliberately goes first: it is the broker's OWN liveness/readiness
# probe credential, consumed by exec probes inside the mosquitto container via
# the same Secret that seeds the passwd file. Nothing outside the pod holds it,
# so a rotation needs no coordination with any client — the smallest possible
# blast radius for proving rotator -> OpenBao -> ESO -> Reloader end to end.
#
# Runs the secret-rotator binary (random mode): generate 32 random bytes,
# standard-base64 encode, and merge-patch into OpenBao. assert_fields_exist runs
# FIRST, so a misconfigured path fails safe (no rotation) rather than adding a
# stray field — which also means this ROTATES an existing value and never
# bootstraps one. Seeding is a one-time out-of-band step, documented in
# policies/rotator-mosquitto-health.hcl.
#
# Base64 output is safe for this credential specifically: the probes pass it as
# `-P "$HEALTH_PASSWORD"` to mosquitto_pub/sub inside the container, so the `+`,
# `/` and `=` characters are never parsed by a URL or a config file. That is NOT
# automatically true of the other seven users (sml2mqtt and open3e templates on
# the edge host, Shelly device firmware, the HA config entry), so the charset
# must be re-checked per user before enrolling each one — the old bootstrap Jobs
# generated alphanumeric-only passwords with `tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9'`.
#
# openbao-ns pattern: the Job runs in the openbao namespace, reaching the
# OpenBao API intra-namespace — no NetworkPolicy needed. It writes OpenBao only;
# ESO syncs mosquitto-health-credentials (ns home-assistant) and Reloader
# restarts the broker so the passwd file is rebuilt from the new value.
#
# Rotation is not instant: it completes only after the ExternalSecret's
# refreshInterval elapses and the broker rolls. During that roll two broker pods
# with different passwd files sit behind the LB (maxUnavailable: 0/maxSurge: 1),
# so a probe against the outgoing pod can fail auth briefly. Self-healing.
#
# ON-DEMAND: kubectl -n openbao create job --from=cronjob/mosquitto-health-secret-rotate mosquitto-health-secret-rotate-now
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
namespace: openbao
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
---
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: CronJob
metadata:
name: mosquitto-health-secret-rotate
namespace: openbao
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
spec:
# Quarterly, offset one month from paperless (which runs Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct) so
# unrelated rotations do not land in the same window and complicate diagnosis.
schedule: "0 4 1 2,5,8,11 *"
timeZone: Europe/Berlin
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 2
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 5
startingDeadlineSeconds: 3600
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 2
activeDeadlineSeconds: 300
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 259200 # 3 d
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mosquitto
app.kubernetes.io/component: secret-rotator
spec:
serviceAccountName: mosquitto-health-secret-rotator
restartPolicy: Never
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65534
runAsGroup: 65534
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: rotate
# Dated tag, per the convention documented in kustomization.yaml —
# every rotator here now uses the same one. Verified for this tag:
# it pulls, `random` is among its modes, and it carries the
# RANDOM_BYTES>=16 floor documented below (RANDOM_BYTES=8 exits
# "refusing to generate a weak secret").
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/secret-rotator:2026-07-30
args: ["random"]
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
env:
- name: BAO_ADDR
value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
- name: BAO_ROLE
value: rotator-mosquitto-health
- name: BAO_PATH
value: homelab/apps/home-assistant/mosquitto-health-credentials
# Matches the key the ExternalSecret projects and the key the
# Secret already carries, so mosquitto-deployment.yaml's
# secretKeyRef is unchanged.
- name: BAO_FIELDS
value: "password"
# 32 bytes -> 44 base64 chars. The binary refuses anything below
# 16 bytes outright.
- name: RANDOM_BYTES
value: "32"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 25m
memory: 16Mi
limits:
memory: 48Mi