Article vectors (titleDe | titleEn | scope, embedded locally, cosine in
memory) feed the assign candidates alongside the note-neighbour articles
and form the groups of a new consolidate step after assign: one bounded
call per group of up to 8 nearby articles, at most 60 per run, returning
merges (fold mechanics, redirects incl. public ones) and parent links
(no cycles anywhere in the plan). Groups are remembered by fingerprint
in _state.json.
PlannedArticle gains a parent; split children get the overview. The write
prompt marks main and sub-articles among its link targets (children
capped at 20); the article page shows the main article and the visible
sub-articles from the plan. Parent changes do not make articles stale.
The assign prompt also sends room notes to the room article; the write
prompt writes room articles from the room's angle.
The plan file gets version 3: the v2 plan reads as no plan, its state is
dropped, and the next run bootstraps. Prompts.Version 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ArticleQueries serves anonymous readers only the redirects listed in
publicRedirects, so a retired slug whose article was not public (or a chain
through one) answers the usual 404, identical to a missing slug. Signed-in
readers follow every redirect. Body links of the anonymous view resolve
through the same filtered set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A text-model HttpRequestException skips its assign batch (not remembered),
split or fold article; only embedding/index failures end planning.
- Neighbour timeouts (TaskCanceledException, run not cancelled) count as
service down.
- Thin articles with a nearby article and no keep at their inputs are not
written until their fold decision; split children of the run are not
folded.
- NearestAsync widens its query up to 8x the batch size, then fills from
the open notes in slug order.
- Deleted articles' slugs (and redirects to them) stay reserved in
_plan.json "retired"; a note left without articles is unassigned, not
skipped.
- Fold records whether the folded article was public in both languages
("publicRedirects"); repointed redirects keep their flag.
- Assigned counts only notes assigned to an article.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The service no longer schedules work itself. POST /api/v1/encyclopedia/run
syncs and runs the encyclopedia; it answers 502 when the run fails or the
text model stopped it, so a CronJob shows a failed run as a failed Job.
The sync loop keeps its startup sync and the webhook trigger; the 30-min
interval is a CronJob calling POST /api/v1/sync.
Removed: EncyclopediaBackgroundService, Encyclopedia RunAt/TimeZone,
Wiki:Sync IntervalSeconds/RetrySeconds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A scanner hit in the slug or titles, or the German leak check flagging them, makes the article private in both languages. The plan prompt forbids concrete identifiers in titles and slugs and keeps existing titles; prompt version 5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#14 put the read API behind a session or an API key. External agents
reach the wiki through wiki-index.renner.uno with BasicAuth only, and
since #14 they got 401: a regression.
The service now checks `Authorization: Basic` itself against the same
htpasswd lines Traefik's wiki-api-basic-auth middleware uses
(Auth:Basic:UsersPath: a file, or a mounted Secret directory where every
visible key is read, as Traefik reads every key of an Opaque Secret).
This is a credential check in the service, not trust in a proxy: the
header proves nothing unless the password matches the hash.
- Hash formats Traefik accepts: bcrypt ($2a$/$2b$/$2y$, BCrypt.Net-Next
4.2.1), Apache MD5 ($apr1$, implemented here and checked against the
Traefik docs example and `openssl passwd -apr1`), SHA1 ({SHA}). Any
other format authenticates nobody.
- The identity is a machine named after the BasicAuth user.
- Policy "read" accepts it; "write" stays API-key only, and the UI stays
OIDC only.
- A verified (user, password, hash) triple is cached in memory, so bcrypt
costs once per process.
- With no UsersPath configured the scheme authenticates nobody, so this
image is safe before the deployment mounts the Secret.
Tests: all three hash formats read the API; a wrong password, an unknown
user, an empty password and a user found only in a hidden Secret entry
are 401; BasicAuth cannot write and does not open the UI.
Auth:Oidc:PublicOrigin was a hand copy of the Ingress host. Traefik routes on
the Host header and Authentik matches redirect URIs strictly, so the URI is
https://<request host>/signin-oidc; https because TLS ends at Traefik and
browsers only reach the wiki over https.
The ProxyHeader scheme took the username from X-Authentik-Username for any
peer inside Auth:ReverseProxy:TrustedProxies. The deployment set that to
the whole pod CIDR (a hand copy of the Talos podSubnets), so every pod the
network policies let reach :8080 (Hermes, Gitea, Traefik, all of ai and
monitoring) could claim any human's name on the Facts page and on saved
answers. Authentik's proxy provider sends no signed identity header, so the
header cannot be verified at all.
Humans now sign in with OpenID Connect against Authentik: a public client
with PKCE, the username is preferred_username from the ID token, whose
signature is checked against the provider's JWKS. Nothing about the
network path or the request headers names a user any more.
- Auth:Oidc:Authority, ClientId and PublicOrigin are required; the host
refuses to start without them. PublicOrigin builds the redirect URI,
because TLS ends at Traefik and the request scheme is http.
- UI pages, static assets and the Blazor hub need a session (fallback
policy); an anonymous browser is redirected to the provider.
- The read API (/api/v1 reads, /ask, /questions, /rank, /status) needs a
session or an API key (policy "read") and answers 401, never a redirect.
Before, it was anonymous and relied on the gate, BasicAuth or network
policy in front.
- Writes still need an API key (policy "write").
- /health, /ready and the HMAC-signed /webhook stay anonymous.
- ProxyHeaderAuthenticationHandler and Auth:ReverseProxy are removed.
Tests: an in-process OpenID provider issues RS256 ID tokens. They cover
the PKCE challenge and redirect URI, the full code flow ending in a
session named after the token's user, rejection of a token signed by a
foreign key, the Authentik header signing in nobody, and 401s for
credential-less API calls.
A statement may carry images (a type label, for instance). The drafter
sees them as image blocks and transcribes what is printed; the deposit
stores each picture beside the note as raw/<stem>-<n>.<ext>, lists it in
the frontmatter and embeds it in the body. INoteStore gains a binary
create and a browse URL, so the raw page can link to the pictures. The
page takes pictures from a file picker (camera on phones) or from paste,
resized in the browser to 1600px.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IFactDrafter port: a statement in, title/content/tags out. Anthropic
implements it over the transport the answer model already uses (extracted
into MessagesTransport). RecordStatementUseCase drafts, sets the person as
source, keeps the statement verbatim in the body and deposits through the
existing use case. The Facts page is the text box and the receipt; the API
shape for machines is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same DepositFactUseCase as POST /api/v1/facts, attributed as a human
identity from the Authentik proxy header. Cascading authentication state
carries the principal into the Blazor circuit; without a signed-in user
the form is replaced by a notice. Lists the raw sources awaiting the
nightly distill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
